Chemical Weapons Disposal

The Army had destroyed about 17.7 percent of the chemical weapons stockpile as of January 2000 and could destroy about 90 percent of the stockpile by the 2007 deadline set by the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, the Army may not meet the deadline for the remaining 10 percent of the stockpile because the incineration method of destruction has been unacceptable to two of the states where the chemical stockpile is located. Also, the proposed method of destruction has not been proven safe and effective and accepted by state and local communities. The Army has experienced significant problems in recent years in effectively managing the use of funds set aside for the chemical demilitarization program. Effective management of the program has been hindered by its complex management structure and poor coordination among program offices and with state and local officials. Also, coordination and communication among officials responsible for aspects of the program have fallen short, causing confusion about what steps would be taken at certain sites.

GAO noted that: (1) the Army had destroyed approximately 17.7 percent of the chemical weapons stockpile as of January 31, 2000, and could destroy about 90 percent of the stockpile by the convention's 2007 deadline, given its recent progress and projected plans; (2) however, the Army may not meet the deadline for the remaining 10 percent of the stockpile because the incineration method of destruction has not been acceptable to two of the states where the chemical stockpile is located; (3) additionally, some of the nonstockpile materiel may not be destroyed before the deadline because the proposed method of destruction has not been proven safe and effective and accepted by state and local communities; (4) the Army's $14.9 billion estimate for program costs will likely increase due to: (a) the additional time required to develop and select disposal methods for the remaining 10 percent of the stockpile and for some of the nonstockpile chemical materiel; and (b) possible delays in demolition of a former chemical weapons production facility; (5) the Army has experienced significant problems in recent years in effectively managing the use of funds appropriated for the Chemical Demilitarization Program; (6) the Army reported that as of September 30, 1999, $498 million of the $3.1 billion appropriated for the program in fiscal years 1993 through 1998 was unliquidated; (7) in an assessment of interagency orders that account for $495.1 million of the unliquidated obligations, GAO found that $63.1 million had been liquidated but was not recorded in accounting records or included in financial reports prepared by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service; (8) of the remaining $432 million, most was for work completed but not yet billed by the contractor or verified by the Defense Contract Audit Agency or for work in progress but not yet completed; (9) effective management of the Chemical Demilitarization Program has been hindered by its complex management structure and ineffective coordination among program offices and with state and local officials; (10) coordination and communication among officials responsible for elements of the program have been inadequate, thus causing confusion about what actions would be taken at certain sites; (11) DOD and Army officials have not agreed on whether or when management roles, responsibilities, and accountability should be consolidated for destruction of the chemical stockpiles in Kentucky and Colorado; and (12) consequently, state and local officials have expressed concern that no single office is accountable for achieving the desired results of the Chemical Demilitarization Program.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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