Homeland Security
The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Gao ID: GAO-08-683 June 11, 2008In 2003, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) transferred from the General Services Administration (GSA) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). FPS provides physical security and law enforcement services to about 9,000 GSA facilities. To accomplish its mission of protecting GSA facilities, FPS currently has an annual budget of about $1 billion, 1,100 employees, and 15,000 contract guards located throughout the country. Recently, FPS has faced several challenges protecting GSA facilities and federal employees. This report provides information and analysis on (1) FPS's operational challenges and actions it has taken to address them, (2) funding challenges FPS faces and actions it has taken to address them, and (3) how FPS measures the effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA facilities. To address these objectives, we conducted site visits at 7 of FPS's 11 regions and interviewed FPS, GSA, tenant agencies, and local law enforcement officials.
FPS faces several operational challenges that hamper its ability to accomplish its mission, and the actions it has taken may not fully resolve these challenges. FPS's staff decreased by about 20 percent between fiscal years 2004 and 2007. FPS has managed the decreases in its staffing resources in a manner that has diminished security at GSA facilities and increased the risk of crime or terrorist attacks at many GSA facilities. For example, with the exception of a few locations, FPS no longer provides proactive patrols at GSA facilities to detect and prevent criminal incidents and terrorism-related activities. FPS also continues to face problems with managing its contract guard program and ensuring that security countermeasures, such as security cameras and magnetometers, are operational. For example, according to FPS, it has investigated significant crimes at multiple high-risk facilities, but the security cameras installed in those buildings were not working properly, preventing FPS investigators from identifying the suspects. To address some of its operational challenges, FPS is moving to an inspector-based workforce, which seeks to eliminate the police officer position and rely primarily on FPS inspectors for both law enforcement and physical security activities. FPS believes that this change will ensure that its staff has the right mix of technical skills and training needed to accomplish its mission. FPS is also hiring an additional 150 inspectors and developing a new system for completing building security assessments. However, these actions may not fully resolve FPS's operational challenges because, for example, inspectors might not be able to fulfill both law enforcement and physical security roles simultaneously. FPS also faces funding challenges, and the actions it has taken to address them have had some adverse implications. To fund its operations, FPS charges each tenant agency fees for its security services. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, FPS's projected expenses exceeded its collections and DHS had to transfer funds to make up the difference. FPS also instituted cost-saving measures such as restricting hiring and travel and limiting training and overtime. According to FPS, these measures have affected staff morale, safety and increased attrition. FPS has been authorized to increase the basic security fee four times since it transferred to DHS, currently charging tenant agencies 62 cents per square foot for basic security services. Because of these actions, FPS's collections in fiscal year 2007 were sufficient to cover costs, and FPS projects that collections will also cover costs in fiscal year 2008. However, FPS's primary means of funding its operations--the basic security fee--does not account for the risk faced by specific buildings, the level of service provided, or the cost of providing services, raising questions about equity. Several stakeholders also expressed concern about whether FPS has an accurate understanding of its costs to provide security at federal facilities. FPS has developed output measures, but lacks outcome measures to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal facilities. Its output measures include determining whether security countermeasures have been deployed and are fully operational. However, FPS has not developed outcome measures to evaluate its efforts to protect federal facilities that could provide FPS with broader information on program results. FPS also lacks a reliable data management system for accurately tracking performance measures.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-683, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
June 2008:
Homeland Security:
The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Hamper Its
Ability to Protect Federal Facilities:
GAO-08-683:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-683, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2003, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) transferred from the
General Services Administration (GSA) to the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). FPS provides physical security and law enforcement
services to about 9,000 GSA facilities. To accomplish its mission of
protecting GSA facilities, FPS currently has an annual budget of about
$1 billion, 1,100 employees, and 15,000 contract guards located
throughout the country. Recently, FPS has faced several challenges
protecting GSA facilities and federal employees.
This report provides information and analysis on (1) FPS‘s operational
challenges and actions it has taken to address them, (2) funding
challenges FPS faces and actions it has taken to address them, and (3)
how FPS measures the effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA
facilities. To address these objectives, we conducted site visits at 7
of FPS‘s 11 regions and interviewed FPS, GSA, tenant agencies, and
local law enforcement officials.
What GAO Found:
FPS faces several operational challenges that hamper its ability to
accomplish its mission, and the actions it has taken may not fully
resolve these challenges. FPS‘s staff decreased by about 20 percent
between fiscal years 2004 and 2007. FPS has managed the decreases in
its staffing resources in a manner that has diminished security at GSA
facilities and increased the risk of crime or terrorist attacks at many
GSA facilities. For example, with the exception of a few locations, FPS
no longer provides proactive patrols at GSA facilities to detect and
prevent criminal incidents and terrorism-related activities. FPS also
continues to face problems with managing its contract guard program and
ensuring that security countermeasures, such as security cameras and
magnetometers, are operational. For example, according to FPS, it has
investigated significant crimes at multiple high-risk facilities, but
the security cameras installed in those buildings were not working
properly, preventing FPS investigators from identifying the suspects.
To address some of its operational challenges, FPS is moving to an
inspector-based workforce, which seeks to eliminate the police officer
position and rely primarily on FPS inspectors for both law enforcement
and physical security activities. FPS believes that this change will
ensure that its staff has the right mix of technical skills and
training needed to accomplish its mission. FPS is also hiring an
additional 150 inspectors and developing a new system for completing
building security assessments. However, these actions may not fully
resolve FPS‘s operational challenges because, for example, inspectors
might not be able to fulfill both law enforcement and physical security
roles simultaneously.
FPS also faces funding challenges, and the actions it has taken to
address them have had some adverse implications. To fund its
operations, FPS charges each tenant agency fees for its security
services. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, FPS‘s projected expenses
exceeded its collections and DHS had to transfer funds to make up the
difference. FPS also instituted cost-saving measures such as
restricting hiring and travel and limiting training and overtime.
According to FPS, these measures have affected staff morale, safety and
increased attrition. FPS has been authorized to increase the basic
security fee four times since it transferred to DHS, currently charging
tenant agencies 62 cents per square foot for basic security services.
Because of these actions, FPS‘s collections in fiscal year 2007 were
sufficient to cover costs, and FPS projects that collections will also
cover costs in fiscal year 2008. However, FPS‘s primary means of
funding its operations”the basic security fee”does not account for the
risk faced by specific buildings, the level of service provided, or the
cost of providing services, raising questions about equity. Several
stakeholders also expressed concern about whether FPS has an accurate
understanding of its costs to provide security at federal facilities.
FPS has developed output measures, but lacks outcome measures to assess
the effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal facilities. Its
output measures include determining whether security countermeasures
have been deployed and are fully operational. However, FPS has not
developed outcome measures to evaluate its efforts to protect federal
facilities that could provide FPS with broader information on program
results. FPS also lacks a reliable data management system for
accurately tracking performance measures. Without such a system, it is
difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of its
efforts, allocate its limited resources, or make informed risk
management decisions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends, among other things, that the Secretary of DHS direct
the Director of FPS to develop and implement a strategic approach to
better manage its staffing resources, evaluate current and alternative
funding mechanisms, and develop appropriate measures to assess
performance. DHS concurred with our recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-683]. For more
information, contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or
goldsteinm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
FPS's Ability to Accomplish Its Mission Is Hampered by Operational
Challenges and Its Actions May Not Fully Resolve These Challenges:
FPS Has Taken Some Actions to Resolve Operational Challenges, but Its
Actions May Not Fully Resolve These Challenges:
FPS Faces Funding Challenges, and Its Actions to Address Them Have Had
Adverse Implications:
FPS Faces Limitations in Assessing Its Performance:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Composition of FPS Workforce, Fiscal Year 2007:
Figure 2: Security Levels of FPS's Portfolio of 9,000 GSA Facilities:
Figure 3: FPS's Projected Collections in Fiscal Year 2008 Total $230
Million:
Figure 4: FPS's Workforce, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007:
Figure 5: Composition of FPS's Workforce by Position, Fiscal Years 2004
through 2007:
Figure 6: FPS's Attrition Rates, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007:
Figure 7: Amount of Fees Collected by FPS, Fiscal Years 2006 through
2009:
Abbreviations:
ACA: Assimilative Crimes Act:
BSA: building security assessment:
BSC: building security committee:
COTR: contracting officer technical representative:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FPS: Federal Protective Service:
FSRM: Federal Security Risk Manager:
GSA: General Services Administration:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
PART: Performance Assessment Rating Tool:
RAMP: Risk Assessment Management Program:
SWA: Security Work Authorization:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 11, 2008:
Congressional Requesters:
In 2003, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) transferred from the
General Services Administration (GSA) to the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). It is responsible for providing physical security and
law enforcement services to about 9,000 GSA facilities.[Footnote 1]
Within DHS, FPS is part of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) component, the largest investigative arm of DHS. FPS is fully
funded by the security fees it collects from the agencies it protects
and does not receive a separate appropriation. To accomplish its
mission of protecting GSA facilities, FPS currently has an annual
budget of about $1 billion, about 1,100 employees, and 15,000 contract
guards located throughout the country. While there has not been a large-
scale attack on a domestic federal facility since the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, and the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, ongoing terror threats and
crime require that FPS effectively manage its resources to protect the
over 1 million employees as well as members of the public that work in
and visit GSA facilities each year.
Recently, FPS has faced several challenges. Chief among them is
ensuring that it has sufficient staffing and funding resources to
accomplish its mission of protecting GSA facilities. It has also faced
challenges in assessing the physical security of the facilities it
protects and overseeing its contract guard program. To help address
these challenges, in 2007, FPS adopted a new approach to protect GSA
facilities. Under this approach, FPS plans to essentially eliminate its
police officer position and mainly use inspectors and special agents to
perform multiple law enforcement and physical security duties
concurrently and will place more emphasis on physical security
activities, such as completing building security assessments (BSA), and
less emphasis on law enforcement activities, such as proactive patrol.
In addition, while FPS plans to maintain a level of 15,000 contract
guards, the majority of the guards are stationed at fixed posts, which
they are not permitted to leave, and do not have arrest authority.
These challenges have raised questions about FPS's ability to
accomplish its facility protection mission.
You requested that we review FPS's efforts to protect GSA facilities
since it transferred to DHS. This report provides information and
analysis on (1) FPS's operational challenges and actions it has taken
to address them, (2) funding challenges FPS faces and actions it has
taken to address them, and (3) how FPS measures the effectiveness of
its efforts to protect GSA facilities.
To determine operational challenges FPS may face in protecting GSA
facilities and actions it has taken to address them, we conducted site
visits at 7 of FPS's 11 regions, which have responsibility for
protecting about 5,169, or about 58 percent, of the approximately 9,000
buildings in FPS's portfolio. To select the regions, we considered the
number of federal buildings in each region, geographic dispersion
across the United States, the number of FPS employees in each region,
and input from FPS and GSA officials. At these locations, we
interviewed a total of 167 FPS police officers, inspectors, special
agents, management, and support staff; 53 GSA regional management and
security officials; representatives from 22 building security
committees (BSC); and 8 local law enforcement agencies about FPS's
efforts to protect federal employees, facilities, and the public. We
also interviewed officials at FPS and GSA headquarters. We reviewed and
analyzed laws related to jurisdictional issues at GSA facilities and
FPS authority, and various FPS planning documents. We also analyzed FPS
staffing data from fiscal years 2004 through 2007 to identify trends in
staffing and attrition. To determine funding challenges FPS may face,
we interviewed budget officials from the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), ICE Office of the Chief Financial Officer, FPS, and GSA.
We analyzed appropriation acts, the President's budget for FPS, and
budget justifications for fiscal years 2004 through 2009. To determine
how FPS measures the effectiveness of its efforts, we analyzed FPS's
fiscal year 2008 through 2011 strategic plan and other reports, and
interviewed officials from FPS's Risk Management Division. Because of
the sensitivity of some of the information in this report, we cannot
provide information about the specific locations of crimes or other
incidents discussed. We conducted this performance audit from April
2007 to June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
See appendix I for further details about our methodology.
Results in Brief:
FPS continues to face several operational challenges that have hampered
its ability to accomplish its mission to protect GSA facilities and the
actions it has taken may not fully resolve these challenges. Since the
transfer, while FPS has maintained 15,000 contract guards, its staff
has decreased by about 20 percent, from almost 1,400 employees at the
end of fiscal year 2004 to about 1,100 employees at the end of fiscal
year 2007. This decrease in staff has contributed to diminished
security and increased the risk of crime or terrorist attacks in many
GSA facilities. For example, FPS has decreased or eliminated law
enforcement services such as proactive patrol in many FPS locations.
Reports issued by multiple government entities acknowledge the
importance of proactive patrol in detecting and preventing criminal
incidents and terrorism-related activities before they happen.
Moreover, FPS has not resolved long-standing challenges, such as
improving the oversight of its contract guard program. For example, one
FPS regional official reported that some guard posts had not been
inspected in 18 months, while another reported that some posts had not
been inspected in over 1 year. In addition, FPS faces difficulties in
ensuring the quality and timeliness of BSAs, which are a core component
of FPS's mission. At one location, one regional supervisor stated that
while reviewing a BSA for an address he personally visited, he realized
that the inspector completing the BSA had not actually visited the site
because the inspector referred to a large building when the actual site
was a vacant plot of land owned by GSA. FPS has also experienced
problems ensuring that security countermeasures, such as security
cameras and magnetometers, are operational. For example, according to
FPS, it has investigated significant crimes at multiple high-risk
facilities, but the security cameras installed in those buildings were
not working properly, preventing FPS investigators from identifying the
suspects. To address some of its operational challenges, FPS is
changing to an inspector-based workforce, seeking to eliminate the
police officer position and rely primarily on FPS inspectors for both
law enforcement and physical security activities. FPS believes that
this change will ensure that its staff has the right mix of technical
skills and training needed to accomplish its mission. FPS is also
hiring an additional 150 inspectors and developing a new system for
BSAs. However, these actions may not fully resolve the operational
challenges FPS faces. For example, FPS's ability to provide law
enforcement services under its inspector-based workforce approach may
be diminished because FPS will rely on its inspectors to provide these
services and physical security services simultaneously. Also, while the
additional 150 FPS inspectors will increase FPS's staff to 1,200, this
staffing level is still below the 1,279 employees FPS had at the end of
fiscal year 2006, when, according to FPS officials, tenant agencies
were experiencing a decrease in security services.
FPS faces several funding challenges, and the actions it has taken to
address them have had adverse implications. FPS's collections have not
been sufficient to cover operational costs in recent years and FPS's
primary means of funding its operations--the basic security fee--does
not account for the risk faced by particular buildings, and depending
on that risk, the level of service provided to tenant agencies or the
cost of providing those services. To fund its operations, FPS charges
each tenant agency fees for its security services. Since FPS
transferred to DHS, its projected expenses exceeded its revenues by $70
million in fiscal year 2005 and $57 million in fiscal year 2006. DHS
and FPS have addressed these projected shortfalls in a variety of ways.
For example, DHS transferred emergency supplemental funding, and FPS
instituted a number of cost-saving measures to address its budgetary
challenges, such as restricting hiring and travel, limiting training
and overtime, and suspending employee performance awards. According to
FPS officials, these measures have had a negative effect on staff
morale, are partially responsible for FPS's high attrition rates, and
could reduce the performance and safety of FPS personnel. FPS also
increased the basic security fee charged to tenant agencies from 35
cents per square foot in fiscal year 2005 to 62 cents per square foot
in fiscal year 2008. Because of these actions, fiscal year 2007 was the
first year FPS's collections were sufficient to cover its costs. FPS
also projects that collections will cover its costs in fiscal year
2008. However, FPS's basic security fee does not fully account for the
risk faced by a particular building. For example, level I facilities
may face less risk because they are typically small storefront-type
operations with a low level of public contact. However, these
facilities are charged the same basic security fee of 62 cents per
square foot as a level IV facility that has a high volume of public
contact, may contain high-risk law enforcement and intelligence
agencies and highly sensitive government records. In addition, FPS's
basic security fee raises questions about equity because it does not
account for the level of service provided or the cost of those
services. For example, a recent FPS workload study estimated that the
agency spends about six times more hours providing services to higher-
risk buildings than lower-risk buildings. A 2007 Booz Allen Hamilton
report said FPS's cost of providing services does not align with the
fees it charges customers, potentially resulting in some customers
being overcharged. We have reported that basing government fees on the
cost of providing a service promotes equity, especially when the cost
of providing the service differs significantly among different users,
as is the case with FPS. Finally, several stakeholders question whether
FPS has an accurate understanding of the costs of providing security at
GSA facilities.
FPS is limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of its
efforts to protect GSA facilities. To determine how well it is
accomplishing its mission to protect GSA facilities, FPS has identified
some output measures that are a part of OMB's Performance Assessment
Rating Tool. These measures include determining whether security
countermeasures have been deployed and are fully operational, the
amount of time it takes to respond to an incident, and the percentage
of BSAs completed on time. Some of these measures are also included in
FPS's federal facilities security index, which is used to assess its
performance. However, FPS has not developed outcome measures to
evaluate the net effect of its efforts to protect GSA facilities. While
output measures are helpful, outcome measures are also important
because they can provide FPS with broader information on program
results, such as the extent to which its decision to move to an
inspector-based workforce will enhance security at GSA facilities or
help identify the security gaps that remain at GSA facilities and
determine what action may be needed to address them. In addition, FPS
does not have a reliable data management system that will allow it to
accurately track these measures or other important measures such as the
number of crimes and other incidents occurring at GSA facilities.
Without such a system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve
the effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal employees and
facilities, allocate its limited resources, or make informed risk
management decisions. According to FPS officials, the agency is in the
process of developing a system that will allow it to better assess its
efforts and expects to have the system fully implemented in 2011.
To improve FPS's ability to address its operational and funding
challenges and to ensure that it has useful performance measures and
reliable information to assess the effectiveness of efforts to protect
GSA facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security
direct the Director of FPS to take the following six actions:
* develop and implement a strategic approach to mange its staffing
resources that, among other things, determines the optimum number of
employees needed to accomplish its facility protection mission and
allocate these resources based on risk management principles and the
agency's goals and performance measures;
* clarify roles and responsibilities of local law enforcement agencies
in regard to responding to incidents at GSA facilities;
* improve FPS's use of the fee-based system by developing a method to
accurately account for the cost of providing security services to
tenant agencies and ensuring that its pricing structure takes into
consideration the varying levels of risk and service provided at GSA
facilities;
* evaluate whether FPS's current use of a fee-based system or an
alternative funding mechanism is the most appropriate manner to fund
its operations;
* develop and implement specific guidelines and standards for measuring
its performance, including outcome measures to assess its performance
and improve the accountability of FPS; and:
* improve how FPS categorizes, collects, and analyzes data to help it
better manage and understand the results of its efforts to protect GSA
facilities.
We provided a draft of our report to DHS for review and comment. DHS
concurred with our findings and recommendations.
Background:
As the primary federal agency that is responsible for protecting and
securing GSA facilities and federal employees across the country, FPS
has the authority to enforce federal laws and regulations aimed at
protecting federally owned and leased properties and the persons on
such property and, among other things, to conduct investigations
related to offenses against the property and persons on the property.
To protect the over 1 million federal employees and about 9,000 GSA
facilities from the risk of terrorist and criminal attacks, in fiscal
year 2007, FPS had about 1,100 employees, of which 541, or almost 50
percent, were inspectors, as shown in figure 1.[Footnote 2] FPS also
has about 15,000 contract guards.
Figure 1: Composition of FPS Workforce, Fiscal Year 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Composition of FPS Workforce, Fiscal Year 2007:
Inspectors: 50%;
Police officers: 19%;
Agents: 9%;
All others: 22%.
Source: GAO analysis of FPS data.
Note: "Inspectors" includes an unknown number of physical security
specialists, who do not have law enforcement authority. "All others"
include administrative and support staff.
[End of figure]
FPS inspectors[Footnote 3] are primarily responsible for:
* responding to incidents and demonstrations,
* overseeing contract guards,
* completing BSAs for numerous buildings,[Footnote 4]
* serving as contracting officer technical representatives (COTR) for
guard contracts,
* collecting and reviewing time cards for guards, and:
* participating in tenant agencies' BSC meetings.
FPS police officers are primarily responsible for:
* patrolling GSA facilities,
* responding to criminal incidents,
* assisting in the monitoring of contract guards, and:
* responding to demonstrations at GSA facilities and conducting basic
criminal investigations.
FPS physical security specialists, who do not have law enforcement
authority, are responsible for:
* completing BSAs,
* participating in tenant agencies' BSC meetings, and:
* assisting in the monitoring of contract guard services.
Special agents are the lead entity within FPS for:
* gathering intelligence for criminal and antiterrorist activities,
and:
* planning and conducting investigations relating to alleged or
suspected violations of criminal laws against GSA facilities and their
occupants.
According to FPS, its 15,000 contract guards are used primarily to
monitor facilities through fixed post assignments and access control.
According to FPS policy documents, contract guards may detain
individuals who are being seriously disruptive, violent, or suspected
of committing a crime at a GSA facility, but do not have arrest
authority.
FPS provides law enforcement and physical security services to its
customers. Law enforcement services provided by FPS include proactive
patrol and responding to incidents in or around GSA facilities.
[Footnote 5] Physical security services provided by FPS include the
completion of BSAs, oversight of contract guards, participation in BSC
meetings, and the recommendation of security countermeasures. The level
of physical protection services FPS provides at each of the
approximately 9,000 facilities varies depending on the facility's
security level. To determine a facility's security level, FPS uses the
Department of Justice's (DOJ) Vulnerability Assessment Guidelines,
which are summarized below.
* A level I facility has 10 or fewer federal employees, 2,500 or fewer
square feet of office space, and a low volume of public contact or
contact with only a small segment of the population. A typical level I
facility is a small storefront-type operation, such as a military
recruiting office.
* A level II facility has between 11 and 150 federal employees; more
than 2,500 to 80,000 square feet; a moderate volume of public contact;
and federal activities that are routine in nature, similar to
commercial activities.
* A level III facility has between 151 and 450 federal employees, more
than 80,000 to 150,000 square feet and a moderate to high volume of
public contact.
* A level IV facility has over 450 federal employees; more than 150,000
square feet; a high volume of public contact; and tenant agencies that
may include high-risk law enforcement and intelligence agencies,
courts, judicial offices, and highly sensitive government records.
* A Level V facility is similar to a Level IV facility in terms of the
number of employees and square footage, but contains mission functions
critical to national security. FPS does not have responsibility for
protecting any level V buildings.
On the basis of the DOJ Vulnerability Assessment Guidelines, FPS
categorized the approximately 9,000 GSA facilities in its portfolio
into five security levels, as shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Security Levels of FPS's Portfolio of 9,000 GSA Facilities:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Security Levels of FPS's Portfolio of 9,000 GSA Facilities:
Level I: 26%;
Level II: 52%;
Level III: 8%;
Level IV: 10%;
Others: 4%.
Source: GAO analysis of FPS data.
Note: "Other" includes 364 level 0 buildings (4 percent of its
portfolio), 11 level V facilities (0.12 percent of its portfolio), and
two buildings with an unknown security level.
[End of figure]
FPS also follows DOJ guidance for completing BSAs.[Footnote 6] DOJ
guidance states that BSAs are required to be completed every 2 to 4
years, depending on the security level of the building. For example, a
BSA for a level IV building is completed every 2 years and every 4
years for a level I building. As part of each assessment, the inspector
is required to conduct an on-site physical security analysis using
FPS's Federal Security Risk Manager (FSRM) methodology and interview
the Chairman and each member of the BSC, GSA realty specialists,
designated officials of tenant agencies, site security supervisors, and
building managers. After completing their assessments, inspectors make
recommendations to the BSC for building security countermeasures. The
BSC is responsible for approving the recommended countermeasures. In
some cases, FPS has delegated the protection of facilities to tenant
agencies, which may have their own law enforcement authority or may
contract separately for guard services.
FPS is a reimbursable organization and is fully funded by collecting
security fees from tenant agencies. To fund its operations, FPS charges
each tenant agency a basic security fee per square foot of space
occupied in a GSA facility. In 2008, the basic security fee is 62 cents
per square foot and covers services such as patrol, monitoring of
building perimeter alarms, and dispatching of law enforcement response
through its control centers, criminal investigations, and BSAs. FPS
also collects an administrative fee it charges tenant agencies for
building specific security services such as access control to
facilities' entrances and exits; employee and visitor checks; and the
purchase, installation, and maintenance of security equipment,
including cameras, alarms, magnetometers, and X-ray machines. In
addition to these security services, FPS provides agencies with
additional services upon request, which are funded through reimbursable
Security Work Authorizations (SWA), for which FPS charges an
administrative fee. For example, agencies may request additional
magnetometers or more advanced perimeter surveillance capabilities.
While FPS's fiscal year 2008 annual budget totals $1 billion, for the
purposes of this report we are focusing on the fees FPS estimates it
will collect for the security services it provides to tenant
agencies.[Footnote 7] For example, in fiscal year 2008, FPS estimates
collections will total about $230 million, of which $187 million will
be from its basic security services, $23 million from building specific
services, and $20 million from SWAs, as shown in figure 3.
Figure 3: FPS's Projected Collections in Fiscal Year 2008 Total $230
Million:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
FPS's Projected Collections in Fiscal Year 2008 Total $230 Million:
Basic security fees: 81% ($187 million);
Building specific fees: 10% ($23 million);
Security work authorization fees: 9% ($20 million).
Source: GAO analysis of FPS data.
[End of figure]
FPS's Ability to Accomplish Its Mission Is Hampered by Operational
Challenges and Its Actions May Not Fully Resolve These Challenges:
FPS currently faces several operational challenges, such as a decrease
in staff, that make it difficult to accomplish its facility protection
mission. This decrease in staff has affected FPS's ability to provide
mission-critical services such as proactive patrol, contract guard
oversight, and quality BSAs in a timely manner. FPS is taking steps to
address these challenges. For example, FPS is moving to an inspector-
based workforce, hiring 150 additional inspectors, and developing a new
system to improve the quality and timeliness of BSAs. However, these
actions may not fully resolve FPS's operational challenges.
FPS's Staff Has Steadily Declined Since Transferring to DHS:
Providing law enforcement and physical security services to GSA
facilities is inherently labor intensive and requires effective
management of available staffing resources. However, since transferring
from GSA to DHS, FPS's staff has declined and the agency has managed
its staffing resources in a manner that has diminished security at GSA
facilities and increased the risk of crime or terrorist attacks at many
GSA facilities. Specifically, FPS's staff has decreased by about 20
percent, from almost 1,400 employees at the end of fiscal year 2004 to
about 1,100 employees at the end of fiscal year 2007, as shown in
figure 4, while the number of buildings FPS has responsibility for has
increased from approximately 8,800 to about 9,000. Over 60 percent of
the decrease in staffing occurred in fiscal year 2007, when FPS's staff
decreased by about 170 employees because FPS offered voluntary early
retirement, detailed assignments to other ICE and DHS components, and
did not replace positions that were lost to attrition. In fiscal year
2008, FPS initially planned to reduce its staff further. However, a
provision in the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act requires FPS to
increase its staff to 1,200 by July 31, 2008.[Footnote 8] According to
FPS's Director, the agency expects to meet this requirement. In
addition, according to the Director of FPS, in fiscal year 2010 it
plans to increase its staff to 1,450.
Figure 4: FPS's Workforce, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a line graph depicting the following data:
FPS's Workforce, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007:
Fiscal year: 2004;
Number of staff: 1384.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Number of staff: 1345.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Number of staff: 1279.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Number of staff: 1109.
Source: Federal Protective Service.
[End of figure]
Between fiscal years 2004 and 2007, the number of employees in each
position also decreased, with the largest decrease occurring in the
police officer position. For example, the number of police officers
decreased from 359 in fiscal year 2004 to 215 in fiscal year 2007, and
the number of inspectors decreased from 600 in fiscal year 2004 to 541
at the end of fiscal year 2007, as shown in figure 5.
Figure 5: Composition of FPS's Workforce by Position, Fiscal Years 2004
through 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data:
Composition of FPS's Workforce by Position, Fiscal Years 2004 through
2007:
Fiscal year: 2004;
Police Officers: 359;
Inspectors: 600;
Agents: 134;
All others: 291.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Police Officers: 328;
Inspectors: 612;
Agents: 139;
All others: 266.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Police Officers: 301;
Inspectors: 585;
Agents: 131;
All others: 262.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Police Officers: 215;
Inspectors: 541;
Agents: 104;
All others: 249.
Source: Federal Protective Service.
Note: "Inspectors" includes an unknown number of physical security
specialists, who do not have law enforcement authority. "All others"
include administrative and support staff.
[End of figure]
Critical Law Enforcement Services Have Been Reduced or Eliminated:
At many facilities FPS has eliminated proactive patrol of GSA
facilities to prevent or detect criminal violations. The FPS Policy
Handbook states that patrol should be used to prevent crime and
terrorist actions and delegates responsibility for determining the
frequency and location of patrols to FPS's Regional Directors. The
elimination of proactive patrol has a negative effect on security at
GSA facilities because law enforcement personnel cannot effectively
monitor individuals surveilling federal buildings, inspect suspicious
vehicles (including potential vehicles for bombing federal buildings),
and detect and deter criminal activity in and around federal buildings.
While the number of contract guards employed in GSA facilities will not
be decreased, most are stationed at fixed posts, which they are not
permitted to leave, and do not have arrest authority. According to a
FPS policy document, contract guards are authorized to detain
individuals. However, according to some regional officials, some
contract guards do not exercise their detention authority because of
liability concerns.
According to some FPS officials at regions we visited, not providing
proactive patrol has limited its law enforcement personnel to a
reactive force. In addition, FPS officials at several regions we
visited said that proactive patrol has, in the past, allowed its police
officers and inspectors to identify and apprehend individuals that were
surveilling GSA facilities. In contrast, when FPS is not able to patrol
federal buildings, there is increased potential for illegal entry and
other criminal activity at federal buildings. For example, in one city
we visited, a deceased individual had been found in a vacant GSA
facility that was not regularly patrolled by FPS. FPS officials stated
that the deceased individual had been inside the building for
approximately 3 months.
Reports issued by multiple government entities acknowledge the
importance of proactive patrol in detecting and deterring terrorist
surveillance teams, which frequently use information such as the
placement of armed guards and proximity to law enforcement agency
stations when choosing targets and planning attacks. These
sophisticated surveillance and research techniques can be derailed by
active law enforcement patrols in and around federal facilities.
According to several inspectors and police officers in one FPS region,
proactive patrol is important in their region because, in the span of 1
year, there were 72 homicides within three blocks of a major federal
office building and because most of the crime in their area takes place
after hours, when there are no FPS personnel on duty. Tenant
representatives in some regions we visited have noticed a decline in
FPS's law enforcement presence in recent years and believe this has
negatively affected security. For example, one tenant stated that FPS
used to provide proactive patrols in the area at night and on weekends
but stopped in early 2006. Most tenant representatives we interviewed
believe that FPS's law enforcement function is highly valued and would
like to see more police officers patrolling their facilities.
In addition to eliminating proactive patrol, many FPS regions have
reduced their hours of operation for providing law enforcement services
in multiple locations, which has resulted in a lack of coverage when
most federal employees are either entering or leaving federal buildings
or on weekends when some facilities remain open to the public.
Moreover, FPS police officers and inspectors in two cities explained
that this lack of coverage has left some federal day care facilities
vulnerable to loitering by homeless individuals and drug users. Some
FPS police officers and inspectors also said that reducing hours has
increased response time in some locations by as much as a few hours to
a couple of days, depending on the location of the incident. For
example, one consequence of reduced hours is that some police officers
often have to travel from locations in another state in order to
respond to incidents in both major metropolitan and rural locations.
The decrease in FPS's duty hours has jeopardized police officer and
inspector safety, as well as building security. Some FPS police
officers and inspectors said that they are frequently in dangerous
situations without any FPS backup because many FPS regions have reduced
their hours of operation and overtime. In one region, FPS officials
said that a public demonstration in a large metropolitan area required
that all eight police officers and inspectors scheduled to work during
the shift be deployed to the demonstration for crowd control. During
the demonstration, however, two inspectors had to leave the
demonstration to arrest a suspect at another facility; two more also
left to respond to a building alarm. Four FPS personnel remained to
cover the demonstration, a fact that contributed to an unsafe
environment for FPS staff.
Additionally, FPS has a decreased capacity to handle situations in
which a large FPS presence is needed while maintaining day-to-day
operations. For example, during a high-profile criminal trial,
approximately 75 percent of one region's workforce was detailed to
coordinate with local law enforcement agencies and other federal law
enforcement agencies to provide perimeter security for a courthouse,
leaving few FPS police officers and inspectors to respond to criminal
incidents and other tenant needs in the rest of the region. This
problem was also reported by inspectors in several other regions in the
context of providing law enforcement at public demonstrations and
criminal trials, which can occur frequently at some GSA facilities.
According to FPS, in September 2007, it drafted a policy that created
Crisis Response Teams, which will handle situations in which a large
FPS presence is needed.
Adequate Oversight of Contract Guard Program Remains a Challenge:
Contract guard inspections are important for several reasons, including
ensuring compliance with contract requirements, guards have up-to-date
certifications for required training including firearms or cardio
pulmonary resuscitation, and guards are completing assigned duties. FPS
policy states that guard posts should be inspected frequently, and some
FPS officials have stated that guard posts should be inspected once per
month. However, some posts are inspected less than once per year, in
part because contract guards are often posted in buildings hours or
days away from the nearest FPS inspector. For example, one area
supervisor reported guard posts that had not been inspected in 18
months, while another reported posts that had not been inspected in
over 1 year. In another region, FPS inspectors and police officers
reported that managers told them to complete "2820" guard inspections
over the telephone, instead of in person.[Footnote 9] In addition, when
inspectors do perform guard inspections, they do not visit the post
during each shift; consequently some guard shifts may never be
inspected by an FPS official. As a result, some guards may be
supervised exclusively by a representative of the contract guard
company. Moreover, in one area we visited with a large FPS presence
officials reported difficulty in getting to every post within the
required 1-month period. We obtained a copy of a contract guard
inspection schedule in one metropolitan city that showed 20 of 68 post
inspections were completed for the month.
Some tenant agencies have also noticed a decline in the level of guard
oversight in recent years and believe this has led to poor performance
on the part of some contract guards. For example, in one city, tenant
representatives in a major federal building stated that many of the
tenants complain about the quality of contract guard services because
they do not have enough guidance from FPS inspectors, and as a result,
there have been several security breaches, such as stolen property.
According to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and GSA officials in
one of the regions we visited, contract guards failed to report the
theft of an FBI surveillance trailer worth over $500,000, even though
security cameras captured the trailer being stolen while guards were on
duty. The FBI did not realize it was missing until 3 days later. Only
after the FBI started making inquiries did the guards report the theft
to FPS and the FBI. During another incident, FPS officials reported
contract guards--who were armed--taking no action as a shirtless
suspect wearing handcuffs on one wrist ran through the lobby of a major
federal building while being chased by an FPS inspector. In addition,
one official reported that during an off-hours alarm call to a federal
building, the official arrived to find the front guard post empty,
while the guard's loaded firearm was left unattended in the unlocked
post. We also personally witnessed an incident in which an individual
attempted to enter a level IV facility with illegal weapons. According
to FPS policies, contract guards are required to confiscate illegal
weapons, detain and question the individual, and notify FPS. In this
instance, the weapons were not confiscated, the individual was not
detained or questioned, FPS was not notified, and the individual was
allowed to leave with the weapons.
Difficulties in Ensuring Quality and Timeliness of Building Security
Assessments:
Building security assessments, which are completed by both inspectors
and physical security specialists, are the core component of FPS's
physical security mission. However, ensuring the quality and timeliness
of them is an area in which FPS continues to face challenges. Many
inspectors in the seven regions we visited stated that they are not
provided sufficient time to complete BSAs. For example, while FPS
officials have stated that BSAs for level IV facilities should be
completed in 2 to 4 weeks, several inspectors reported having only 1 or
2 days to complete assessments for their buildings because of pressure
from supervisors to complete BSAs as quickly as possible. For example,
1 region is attempting to complete more than 100 BSAs by June 30, 2008,
3 months earlier than required, because staff will be needed to assist
with a large political event in the region. In addition, one inspector
in this region reported having one day to complete site work for six
BSAs in a predominately rural state in the region. Some regional
supervisors have also found problems with the accuracy of BSAs. One
regional supervisor reported that an inspector was repeatedly counseled
and required to redo BSAs when supervisors found he was copying and
pasting from previous BSAs. Similarly, one regional supervisor stated
that in the course of reviewing a BSA for an address he had personally
visited, he realized that the inspector completing the BSA had not
actually visited the site because the inspector referred to a large
building when the actual site was a vacant plot of land owned by GSA.
According to FPS, the Director of FPS issued a memorandum in December
2007 emphasizing the importance of conducting BSAs in an ethical
manner.
A 2006 report prepared by ICE's Office of Professional Responsibility
on performance in one FPS region found that nearly all of the completed
BSAs were missing interviews with required stakeholders and that
Interagency Security Committee security design criteria were not used
in the assessment of a preconstruction project as required.
Additionally, several tenant agencies stated that they are using or
plan to find contractors to complete additional BSAs because of
concerns with the quality and timeliness of the assessments completed
by FPS. Furthermore, we have previously reported that several DHS
components are completing their own BSAs over and above the assessment
completed by FPS because FPS's assessments are not always timely or
lack quality. Similarly, many facilities have received waivers from FPS
to enable the agencies to complete their own BSAs, and the lack of FPS
personnel with top secret clearances has led to an increase in the
number of agencies granted waivers for BSAs.
Some GSA and FPS officials have stated that inspectors lack the
training and physical security expertise to prepare BSAs according to
the standards. Currently, inspectors receive instructions on how to
complete BSAs as part of a 4-week course at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center's Physical Security Training Program. However, many
inspectors and supervisors in the regions we visited stated that this
training is insufficient and that refresher training is necessary in
order to keep inspectors informed about emerging technology, but this
refresher training has not been provided in recent years. Regional GSA
officials also stated that they believe the physical security training
provided to inspectors is inadequate and that it has affected the
quality of BSAs they receive. FPS officials have stated the Physical
Security Training Program curriculum is currently being revised and the
agency recently conducted a 1-week physical security refresher course
in one region and plans to conduct this training in three others.
FPS's ability to ensure the quality and timeliness of BSAs is also
complicated by challenges with the current risk assessment tool. We
have previously reported that there are three primary concerns with the
FSRM system, the tool FPS currently uses to conduct BSAs. First, it
does not allow FPS to compare risks from building to building so that
security improvements to buildings can be prioritized. Second, current
risk assessments need to be categorized more precisely. According to
FPS, too many BSAs are categorized as high or low, which does not allow
for a refined prioritization of security improvements. Third, FSRM does
not allow for tracking the implementation status of security
recommendations based on assessments.[Footnote 10]
Some Security Countermeasures Have Not Been Maintained:
According to FPS, GSA, and tenant agency officials in the regions we
visited, some of the security countermeasures, such as security
cameras, magnetometers, and X-ray machines at some facilities, as well
as some FPS radios and BSA equipment, have been broken for months or
years and are poorly maintained. At one level IV facility, FPS and GSA
officials stated that 11 of 150 security cameras were fully functional
and able to record images. Similarly, at another level IV facility, a
large camera project designed to expand and enhance an existing camera
system was put on hold because FPS did not have the funds to complete
the project. FPS officials stated that broken cameras and other
security equipment can negate the deterrent effect of these
countermeasures as well as eliminate their usefulness as an
investigative tool. For example, according to FPS, it has investigated
significant crimes at multiple level IV facilities, but the security
cameras installed in those buildings were not working properly,
preventing FPS investigators from identifying the suspects.
Complicating this issue, FPS officials, GSA officials, and tenant
representatives stated that additional countermeasures are difficult to
implement because they require approval from BSCs, which are composed
of representatives from each tenant agency who generally are not
security professionals. In some of the buildings that we visited,
security countermeasures were not implemented because BSC members
cannot agree on what countermeasures to implement or are unable to
obtain funding from their agencies. For example, a FPS official in a
major metropolitan city stated that over the last 4 years inspectors
have recommended 24-hour contract guard coverage at one high-risk
building located in a high crime area multiple times, however, the BSC
is not able to obtain approval from all its members. In addition,
several FPS inspectors stated that their regional managers have
instructed them not to recommend security countermeasures in BSAs if
FPS would be responsible for funding the measures because there is not
sufficient money in regional budgets to purchase and maintain the
security equipment.
FPS Has Taken Some Actions to Resolve Operational Challenges, but Its
Actions May Not Fully Resolve These Challenges:
FPS is taking steps to address the operational challenges it faces. For
example, FPS is implementing a plan to move to an inspector-based
workforce, hiring 150 additional inspectors, and plans to develop and
implement a new system to improve the quality and timeliness of BSAs.
However, these actions may not fully resolve its operational challenges
because, for example, some inspectors may not be able to perform both
law enforcement and physical security duties simultaneously.
FPS Is Implementing an Inspector-Based Workforce Approach:
In 2007, FPS decided to adopt an inspector-based workforce approach to
protect GSA facilities. According to FPS, this approach will provide it
with the capabilities and flexibility to perform law enforcement and
physical security services. Under the inspector-based workforce
approach, the composition of FPS's workforce will change from a
combination of inspectors and police officers to mainly inspectors; FPS
will place more emphasis on physical security, such as BSAs, and less
emphasis on the law enforcement part of its mission; contract guards
will continue to be the front-line defense for protection at GSA
facilities; and there will be a continued reliance on local law
enforcement. According to FPS, this approach will allow it to focus on
enforcing the Interagency Security Committee's security standards,
complete BSAs in a timely manner, manage the contract guard program,
and test security standards. While FPS's current workforce includes
police officers, inspectors, criminal investigators/special agents, and
support staff; police officers will be phased out under FPS's new
approach. Inspectors will be required to complete law enforcement
activities such as patrolling and responding to incidents at GSA
facilities in addition to their physical security activities. Special
agents will continue to be responsible for conducting investigations.
According to FPS, an inspector-based workforce will help it to achieve
its strategic goals such as ensuring that its staff has the right mix
of technical skills and training needed to accomplish its mission and
building effective relationships with its stakeholders.
The inspector-based workforce approach presents some additional
challenges for FPS and may exacerbate some of its long-standing
challenges. For example, the approach does not emphasize law
enforcement responsibilities, such as proactive patrol. In addition,
having inspectors perform both law enforcement and physical security
duties simultaneously may prevent some inspectors from responding to
criminal incidents in a timely manner and patrolling federal buildings.
For example, some officials stated that if inspectors are in a meeting
with tenants, it will take them more time to get in their vehicle and
drive to respond to an incident than it would for a police officer who
is already in a car or on the street patrolling and that given the
difficulty with scheduling meetings with BSCs, inspectors may decide
not to respond to a nonviolent or non-emergency situation at another
facility. However, according to FPS headquarters officials, if
MegaCenter protocols are followed, this situation will not occur
because another inspector would be called to respond to the incident.
In April 2007, a DHS official and several FPS inspectors testified
before Congress that FPS's inspector-based workforce will require
increased reliance on state and local law enforcement agencies for
assistance with crime and other incidents at GSA facilities and that
FPS would seek to enter into memorandums of agreement with local law
enforcement agencies. However, according to FPS's Director, the agency
recently decided not to pursue memorandums of agreement with local law
enforcement agencies, in part because of reluctance on the part of
local law enforcement officials to sign such memorandums and because 96
percent of the properties in FPS's inventory are listed as concurrent
jurisdiction facilities where both federal and state governments have
jurisdiction over the property. Under the Assimilative Crimes Act
(ACA), state law may be assimilated to fill gaps in federal criminal
law where the federal government has concurrent jurisdiction with the
state.[Footnote 11] For properties with concurrent jurisdiction, both
FPS and state and local law enforcement officers and agents are
authorized to enforce state laws. FPS police officers, inspectors, and
agents are also authorized by law to enforce federal laws and
regulations for the protection of persons and property regarding
property owned or occupied by the federal government, but state and
local law enforcement officials would have no authority to enforce
federal laws and regulations.[Footnote 12]
As an alternative to memorandums of agreement, according to FPS's
Director, the agency will rely on the informal relationships that exist
between local law enforcement agencies and FPS. However, whether this
type of relationship will provide FPS with the type of assistance it
will need under the inspector-based workforce is unknown.
Representatives of seven of the eight local law enforcement agencies we
visited were unaware of decreases in FPS's workforce or its transition
to an all-inspector workforce. Officials from five of the eight local
law enforcement agencies we interviewed stated that their agencies did
not have the capacity to take on the additional job of responding to
incidents at federal buildings and stated that their departments were
already strained for resources. Many of the FPS officials in the seven
regions we visited also expressed concern about the potential lack of
capacity on the part of local law enforcement. One regional FPS
official, for example, reported that there have been incidents in which
local law enforcement authorities refused to respond to certain types
of calls, especially in one of the major cities in the region.
The Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized by law to utilize the
facilities and services of federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies with the consent of the agencies when the Secretary determines
it to be economical and in the public interest.[Footnote 13] However,
one local law enforcement official stated that even if the federal
government were to reimburse the local law enforcement agency for
services, the police department would not be able to hire and train
enough staff to handle the extra responsibilities. Three local law
enforcement agencies stated that they did not know enough about FPS's
activities in the area to judge their department's ability to take over
additional responsibility for FPS at GSA facilities. In addition, many
FPS and local law enforcement officials in the regions we visited
stated that jurisdictional authority would pose a significant barrier
to gaining the assistance of local law enforcement agencies. Local law
enforcement representatives also expressed concerns about being
prohibited from entering GSA facilities with service weapons,
especially courthouses.[Footnote 14] Similarly, local law enforcement
officials in a major U.S. city stated that they cannot make an arrest
or initiate a complaint on federal property, so they have to wait until
a FPS officer or inspector arrives. FPS officials and local law
enforcement agencies have cited confusion over the law as one reason
for jurisdictional difficulties.
FPS also provides facility protection to approximately 400 properties
where the federal government maintains exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Under exclusive federal jurisdiction, the federal government has all of
the legislative authority within the land area in question and the
state has no residual police powers. The ACA also applies to properties
with exclusive federal jurisdiction, but unlike properties with
concurrent jurisdiction, state and local law enforcement officials are
not authorized to enforce state and local laws. Furthermore, like those
properties with concurrent federal jurisdiction, state and local law
enforcement officials would have no authority to enforce federal laws
and regulations. Even if the Secretary of Homeland Security utilized
the facilities and services of state and local law enforcement
agencies, according to ICE's legal counsel, state and local law
enforcement officials would only be able to assist FPS in functions
such as crowd and traffic control, monitoring law enforcement
communications and dispatch, and training.
FPS Plans to Hire Additional Inspectors:
In the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress included a
provision requiring FPS to employ no fewer than 1,200 employees, 900 of
which must be law enforcement personnel. To comply with this
legislation, FPS is in the process of recruiting an additional 150
inspectors to reach the mandated staffing levels. These inspectors will
be assigned to 8 of FPS's 11 regions. According to the Director of FPS,
the addition of 150 inspectors to its current workforce will allow FPS
to resume providing proactive patrol and 24-hour presence based on risk
and threat levels at some facilities. However, these additional 150
inspectors will not have an impact on the 3 regions that will not
receive them. In addition, while this increase will help FPS to achieve
its mission, this staffing level is still below the 1,279 employees
that FPS had at the end of fiscal year 2006, when, according to FPS
officials, tenant agencies experienced a decrease in service. In
addition, in 2006, FPS completed a workforce study that recommended an
overall staffing level of more than 2,700, including about 1,800
uniformed law enforcement positions (inspectors and police officers).
According to this study, with 1,800 law enforcement positions FPS
could, among other things, provide 24-hour patrol in 23 metropolitan
areas, perform weekly guard post inspections, allow time for training,
and participate on BSCs.
FPS Is Developing a New System for Completing BSAs:
FPS's Risk Management Division is in the process of developing a new
tool referred to as the Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP) to
replace its current system (FSRM) for completing BSAs.[Footnote 15]
According to FPS, a pilot version of RAMP is expected to be rolled out
in fiscal year 2009. RAMP will be accessible to inspectors via a secure
wireless connection anywhere in the United States and will guide them
through the process of completing a BSA to ensure that standardized
information is collected on all GSA facilities. According to FPS, once
implemented, RAMP will provide inspectors with accurate information
that will enable them to make more informed and defensible
recommendations for security countermeasures. FPS also anticipates that
RAMP will allow inspectors to obtain information from one source,
generate reports automatically, enable the agency to track selected
countermeasures throughout their life cycle, address some issues with
the subjectivity of BSAs, and reduce the amount of time spent on
administrative work by inspectors and managers.
FPS Faces Funding Challenges, and Its Actions to Address Them Have Had
Adverse Implications:
FPS's collections have not been sufficient to cover its projected
operational costs in recent years, and FPS has faced projected
shortfalls twice in the last 4 years. While FPS has taken actions to
address these gaps, its actions have had adverse implications,
including low morale among staff, increased attrition, and the loss of
institutional knowledge as well as difficulties in recruiting new
staff. Also, FPS's primary means of funding its operations--the basic
security fee--does not account for the risk faced by particular
buildings and, depending on that risk, the level of service provided to
tenant agencies or the cost of providing those services.
FPS's Collections Have Not Been Sufficient to Cover Operational Costs:
FPS funds its operations through the collection of security fees
charged to tenant agencies for security services. However, these fees
have not been sufficient to cover its operational costs in recent
years. FPS has addressed this gap in a variety of ways. When FPS was
located at GSA it received additional funding from the Federal
Buildings Fund to cover the gap between collections and costs.[Footnote
16] For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Federal Buildings Fund
provided for the approximately $140 million difference between FPS's
collections and costs. Also, the first year after the transfer to DHS,
fiscal year 2004, FPS needed $81 million from the Federal Buildings
Fund to cover the difference between collections and the cost of
operations. While fiscal year 2004 was the last year funding from the
Federal Buildings Fund was available to support FPS, the agency
continued to experience budgetary challenges because of the gap between
operational costs and fee collections, and also because of increases in
its support costs after the transfer to DHS.[Footnote 17]
In fiscal year 2005, FPS was authorized to increase the basic security
fee from 30 cents per square foot to 35 cents per square foot,
providing approximately $15 million in additional collections.[Footnote
18] However, FPS's collections were projected to be $70 million short
of its operational costs that year. To make up for the projected
shortfall and to avoid a potential Anti-deficiency Act violation, FPS
instituted a number of cost-saving measures that included restricted
hiring and travel, limited training and overtime, and no employee
performance awards. Similarly, in fiscal year 2006, FPS faced another
projected shortfall of $57 million. To address this projected
shortfall, FPS maintained existing cost savings measures and DHS had to
transfer $29 million in emergency supplemental funding to FPS. DHS's
Acting Undersecretary for Management stated that this funding was
necessary to avoid a shortfall in fiscal year 2006, and to ensure that
security at GSA facilities would not be jeopardized.
In fiscal year 2007, FPS continued its cost-saving measures, which
resulted in approximately $27 million in savings, and increased the
basic security fee from 35 cents per square foot to 39 cents per square
foot. Because of these actions, fiscal year 2007 was the first year
that FPS did not face a projected shortfall. However, according to a
FPS memo to the DHS Chief Financial Officer, FPS had recommended
increasing the basic security fee to 49 cents per square foot in fiscal
year 2007. The memo also stated that the increase was needed to avoid a
dramatic reduction in the level of security provided at GSA facilities.
A basic security fee of 49 cents per square foot in fiscal year 2007
would have provided approximately $30 million in additional
collections, which might have negated the need to implement cost-saving
measures for that year. In addition, Booz Allen Hamilton reported that
the basic security fees for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 were too low to
recover FPS's costs of providing security and stated that they should
have been about 25 cents more per square foot, or about 60 cents per
square foot.[Footnote 19] In fiscal year 2008, the basic security fee
increased to 62 cents per square foot, and FPS is projecting that the
fee will be sufficient to cover its operational costs and that it will
not have to implement any cost-saving measures, although a FPS official
noted that the loss of staff in recent years has helped decrease its
operational costs. In fiscal year 2009, FPS's basic security fees will
increase to 66 cents per square foot, which represents the fourth time
FPS has increased the basic security fee since transferring to DHS.
FPS's Actions to Address Budgetary Challenges Have Had Adverse
Implications:
According to FPS, its cost-saving measures have also had adverse
implications, including low morale among staff, increased attrition and
the loss of institutional knowledge, as well as difficulties in
recruiting new staff. In addition, several FPS police officers and
inspectors said that overwhelming workloads, uncertainty surrounding
their job security, and a lack of equipment have diminished morale
within the agency. These working conditions could affect the
performance and safety of FPS personnel. FPS officials said the agency
has lost many of its most experienced law enforcement staff in recent
years, and several police officers and inspectors said they were
actively looking for new jobs outside FPS. For example, FPS reports
that 73 inspectors, police officers, and physical security specialists
left the agency in fiscal year 2006, representing about 65 percent of
the total attrition in the agency for that year. Attrition rates have
steadily increased from fiscal years 2004 to 2007, as shown in figure
6. The attrition rate for the inspector position has increased, despite
FPS's plan to move to an inspector-based workforce. FPS officials said
its cost-saving measures have helped the agency address projected
revenue shortfalls and have been eliminated in fiscal year 2008. In
addition, according to FPS, these measures will not be necessary in
fiscal year 2009 because the basic security fee was increased and
staffing has decreased.
Figure 6: FPS's Attrition Rates, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data:
FPS's Attrition Rates, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007:
Fiscal year: 2004;
Total Attrition rate: 0.65%;
Officer Attrition rate: 0.56%;
Inspector Attrition rate: 0.83%.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Total Attrition rate: 7.14%;
Officer Attrition rate: 5.49%;
Inspector Attrition rate: 5.72%.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Total Attrition rate: 8.76%;
Officer Attrition rate: 10.96%;
Inspector Attrition rate: 6.84%.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Total Attrition rate: 14.16%;
Officer Attrition rate: 16.28%;
Inspector Attrition rate: 11.28%.
Source: GAO analysis of FPS data.
Note: "Inspectors" includes an unknown number of physical security
specialists, who do not have law enforcement authority. "Total
attrition" includes inspectors, police officers, physical security
specialists, special agents, and administrative and support staff.
[End of figure]
FPS's Basic Security Fee Does Not Account for Risk and Raises Questions
about Equity:
FPS's primary means of funding its operations is the fee it charges
tenant agencies for basic security services, as shown in figure 7.
Figure 7: Amount of Fees Collected by FPS, Fiscal Years 2006 through
2009:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Amount of Fees Collected by FPS, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2009:
Year: 2006;
Basic security fees: $112 million;
Building specific fees: $42 million;
Security work authorization fees: $53 million;
Total fees: $207 million.
Year: 2007;
Basic security fees: $128 million;
Building specific fees: $44 million;
Security work authorization fees: $50 million;
Total fees: $222 million.
Year: 2008;
Basic security fees: $187 million;
Building specific fees: $23 million;
Security work authorization fees: $20 million;
Total fees: $230 million.
Year: 2009;
Basic security fees: $190 million;
Building specific fees: $24 million;
Security work authorization fees: $20 million;
Total fees: $234 million.
Source: FPS.
Note: Figures do not include pass through funding. Fiscal years 2008
and 2009 are projections.
[End of figure]
However, this fee does not fully account for the risk faced by
particular buildings or the level of basic security services provided,
and does not reflect the actual cost of providing services. Some of the
basic security services covered by this fee include law enforcement
activities at GSA facilities, preliminary investigations, the capture
and detention of suspects, and BSAs, among other services. In fiscal
year 2008, FPS charged 62 cents per square foot for basic security and
has been authorized to increase the rate to 66 cents per square foot in
fiscal year 2009. FPS charges federal agencies the same basic security
fee regardless of the perceived threat to that particular building or
agency. Although FPS categorizes buildings according to security levels
based on its assessment of the building's risk and size, it does not
affect the security fee charged by FPS. For example, level I facilities
typically face less risk because they are generally small storefront-
type operations with a low level of public contact, such as a small
post office or Social Security Administration office. However, these
facilities are charged the same basic security fee of 62 cents per
square foot as a level IV facility that has a high volume of public
contact and may contain high-risk law enforcement and intelligence
agencies and highly sensitive government records.
In addition, FPS's basic security rate has raised questions about
equity because federal agencies are required to pay the fee regardless
of the level of service it provides or the cost of providing the
service. For instance, in some of the regions we visited, FPS officials
described situations where staff are stationed hundreds of miles from
buildings under its responsibility, with many of these buildings rarely
receiving services from FPS staff and relying mostly on local law
enforcement agencies for law enforcement services. However, FPS charges
these tenant agencies the same basic security fees as buildings in
major metropolitan areas where numerous FPS police officers and
inspectors are stationed and are available to provide security
services. Consequently, FPS's cost of providing services is not
reflected in its basic security charges. For instance, a June 2006 FPS
workload study estimating the amount of time spent on various security
services showed differences in the amount of resources dedicated to
buildings at various security levels. The study said that FPS staff
spend approximately six times more hours providing security services to
higher-risk buildings (levels III and IV buildings) compared to lower-
risk buildings (levels I and II buildings). In addition, a 2007 Booz
Allen Hamilton report of FPS's operational costs found that FPS does
not link the actual cost of providing basic security services with the
security fees it charges tenant agencies. The report recommends
incorporating a security fee that takes into account the complexity or
the level of effort of the service being performed for the higher-level
security facilities. The report states that FPS's failure to consider
the costs of protecting buildings at varying risk levels could result
in some tenants being overcharged. We also have reported that basing
government fees on the cost of providing a service promotes equity,
especially when the cost of providing the service differs significantly
among different users, as is the case with FPS.[Footnote 20]
Changes in FPS's security fees have also had adverse implications for
agencies, specifically the frequent late notifications about rate
increases. In the last 3 years, FPS has increased its rates but has not
notified agencies of these increases until late in the federal budget
cycle. According to an official from ICE's Office of the Chief
Financial Officer, FPS is required to announce its basic security fee
at the same time GSA announces its rent charges, which are typically
set by June 1 of the preceding year. However, since transferring to
DHS, FPS has not complied with this schedule. For example, FPS
announced that its administrative security fees for fiscal year 2007
would increase from 8 percent to 15 percent several months after tenant
agencies received their annual appropriation for 2007. In March of
fiscal year 2008, FPS announced that the basic security fee for fiscal
year 2008 would increase from 57 cents per square foot to 62 cents per
square foot and that the increase would be retroactive. Consequently,
most tenant agencies have to fund these unexpected increases outside of
the federal budget cycle. GSA officials said this would have a
significant impact on many federal agencies, causing them to divert
funds from operational budgets to account for this unexpected increase
in cost.
Several Stakeholders Have Expressed Concern about FPS's Ability to
Determine Its Costs of Providing Security Services:
Several stakeholders have raised questions about whether FPS has an
accurate understanding of the cost of providing security at GSA
facilities. An official from ICE's Office of the Chief Financial
Officer said FPS has experienced difficulty in estimating its costs
because of inaccurate cost data. In addition, OMB officials said they
have asked FPS to develop a better cost-accounting system in past
years. The 2007 Booz Allen Hamilton report found that FPS does not have
a methodology to assign costs to its different security activities and
that it should begin capturing the cost of providing various security
services to better plan, manage, and budget its resources. We have also
previously cited problems with ICE's and FPS's financial system,
including problems associated with tracking expenditures.[Footnote 21]
We also have previously reported on the importance of having accurate
cost information for budgetary purposes and to set fees and prices for
services. We have found that without accurate cost information, it is
difficult for agencies to determine if fees need to be increased or
decreased, accurately measure performance, and improve efficiency.
Also, federal accounting standards and the Chief Financial Officers Act
of 1990 require agencies to maintain accurate cost data and set
standards for federal agencies that include requirements for
determining and reporting on the full costs of government services.
FPS Faces Limitations in Assessing Its Performance:
To determine how well it is accomplishing its mission to protect GSA
facilities, FPS has identified some output measures that are a part of
OMB's Performance Assessment Rating Tool. These measures include
determining whether security countermeasures have been deployed and are
fully operational, the amount of time it takes to respond to an
incident, and the percentage of BSAs completed on time. Some of these
measures are also included in FPS's federal facilities security index,
which is used to assess its performance. However, FPS has not developed
outcome measures to evaluate the net effect of its efforts to protect
GSA facilities. While output measures are helpful, outcome measures are
also important because they can provide FPS with broader information on
program results, such as the extent to which its decision to move to an
inspector-based workforce will enhance security at GSA facilities or
help identify the security gaps that remain at GSA facilities and
determine what action may be needed to address them. The Government
Performance and Results Act requires federal agencies to, among other
things, measure agency performance in achieving outcome-oriented goals.
Measuring performance allows organizations to track the progress they
are making toward their goals and gives managers critical information
on which to base decisions for improving their progress. In addition,
we and other federal agencies have maintained that adequate and
reliable performance measures are a necessary component of effective
management. We have also found that performance measures should provide
agency managers with timely, action-oriented information in a format
conducive to helping them make decisions that improve program
performance, including decisions to adjust policies and priorities.
However, FPS does not appear to be using these key management practices
to manage its security program.
FPS is also limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of its
efforts to protect GSA facilities, in part because it does not have a
data management system that will allow it to provide complete and
accurate information on its security program. Without a reliable data
management system, it is difficult for FPS and others to determine the
effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA facilities or for FPS to
accurately track and monitor incident response time, effectiveness of
security countermeasures, and whether BSAs are completed on time.
Currently, FPS primarily uses Web Records Management System (WebRMS)
and Security Tracking System (STS) to track and monitor output
measures. These output measures include FPS's efficiency in response to
calls for law enforcement assistance; determining whether appropriate
security countermeasures have been recommended, deployed, and are fully
operational; and to what extent BSAs are completed on time.[Footnote
22] However, FPS acknowledged that there are weaknesses with these
systems that make it difficult to accurately track and monitor these
output measures. For example, according to FPS, STS, which is used to
track security countermeasures, does not allow for tracking the
implementation status of recommended countermeasures, such as security
cameras, bollards, or X-ray machines. Without this ability, FPS has
difficulty determining whether it has mitigated the risk of GSA
facilities to crime or a terrorist attack.
In addition, according to many FPS officials at the seven regions we
visited, the data maintained in WebRMS may not be a reliable and
accurate indicator of crimes and other incidents for several reasons.
First, because FPS does not write an incident report for every
incident, not all incidents are entered in WebRMS. Second, according to
FPS, there are many incidents phoned into the MegaCenter that would not
show up in WebRMS because FPS police officers or inspectors did not
complete the report. Third, the types and definitions of prohibited
items vary not only region by region, but also building by building.
For example, a can of pepper spray may be prohibited in one building,
but allowed in another building in the same region. Standard guidelines
and definitions would minimize the amount of subjectivity that police
officers and inspectors may apply when deciding how and what types of
information to enter in WebRMS. Finally, according to FPS, having fewer
police officers has decreased the total number of crime and incident
reports entered in WebRMS because there is less time spent on law
enforcement activities. The officials in one FPS region we visited
stated that 2 years ago there were 25,000 reports filed through WebRMS.
However, this year they are projecting about 10,000 reports because
there are fewer FPS police officers to respond to an incident and write
a report if necessary.
FPS officials also stated that inspectors and police officers often
have to enter the same information into multiple data systems, leading
to a greater risk for human error, such as transposing numbers,
affecting the accuracy of the data. Our past work has shown that when
data management systems are not integrated and compatible, excessive
use of resources and inconsistent analysis of program results can
occur.
FPS has recognized the need to improve its current data management
systems. As mentioned earlier, FPS is developing RAMP and expects it to
be fully operational in 2011. According to FPS, the development and
implementation of RAMP will provide it with an integrated system and a
set of standard guidelines to use when collecting information, such as
the types and definition of incidents and incident response times. FPS
is also planning to procure a computer-assisted dispatch system for use
at its MegaCenters, which will help to improve its ability to
accurately track, analyze, and report crime and other incidents.
Conclusions:
Providing law enforcement and physical security support services to GSA
facilities requires effective management of available staffing and
funding resources. Since FPS transferred to DHS, its understanding of
its staffing needs has changed frequently, and it is unclear whether
the agency has an accurate estimate of the number of employees needed
to achieve its mission. While FPS has taken some actions to address the
operational and funding challenges it faces, many of these actions may
not fully resolve these challenges. For example, FPS currently is in
the process of changing to an all-inspector workforce and adding 150
inspectors to its workforce. The additional inspectors could have a
positive impact on the eight regions where they will be assigned.
However, it may not enhance FPS's ability to provide law enforcement
services such as proactive patrol and 24-hour response to GSA
facilities. In addition, it is unclear whether FPS's inspector-based
workforce and the additional 150 inspectors will improve its oversight
of contract guards or the quality and timeliness of BSAs. FPS could
also benefit from better aligning its staffing resources with the
agency's goals and performance. This alignment could enable FPS to
identify gaps in security protection at GSA facilities and assign
employees to the highest-risk areas. It is also important that FPS
ensure that its decision to move to an inspector-based workforce does
not hamper its ability to protect GSA facilities. For example, FPS
believes that it can rely on the informal relationships that exist
between it and local law enforcement agencies for assistance with
responding to incidents at GSA facilities. However, local law
enforcement agencies and FPS regional officials believe that there are
jurisdictional issues that need to be clarified.
Moreover, FPS's primary means of funding its operations--the basic
security fee--does not account for the level of risk faced by buildings
and, depending on that risk, the level of service provided or the cost
of providing security at GSA facilities. This issue raises questions
about whether some federal agencies are being overcharged by FPS. FPS
also does not have a detailed understanding of its operational costs,
including accurate information about the cost of providing its security
services at GSA facilities with different risk levels. Without this
type of information, FPS has difficulty justifying the rate of the
basic security fee to its customers. We have found that by having
accurate cost information, an organization can demonstrate its cost-
effectiveness and productivity to stakeholders, link levels of
performance with budget expenditures, provide baseline and trend data
for stakeholders to compare performance, and provide a basis for
focusing an organization's efforts and resources to improve its
performance. In addition, FPS has generally funded its operations by
using a fee-based system. However, historically and recently FPS's
collections have not been sufficient to cover its projected operational
costs and the steps it has taken to address the projected shortfalls
have reduced staff morale and diminished security at GSA facilities.
Thus, we believe it is important that FPS assess whether the fee-based
system or an alternative funding mechanism is most appropriate for
funding the agency.
Given the operational and funding challenges FPS faces, it is important
that the agency develop and implement business and performance
management practices that will ensure that it is providing services
efficiently, effectively, and in accordance with risk-based management.
Having specific guidance and standards for measuring its efforts to
protect GSA facilities from the risk of terrorist attacks, crime, or
related incidents will also be beneficial to FPS. We have found that
numerous federal and private sector organizations use security-related
performance measures to help improve security, make decisions about
risk management and resource allocation, and evaluate program
effectiveness. Performance measurements can also be used to prioritize
security needs and justify investment decisions so that an agency can
maximize limited resources. While the output measures FPS uses are
helpful, outcome measures are also important because they can provide
FPS with broader information on program results, such as the extent to
which its decision to move to an inspector-based workforce will enhance
security at GSA facilities or help identify the security gaps that
remain at GSA facilities and what action may be needed to address them.
Finally, a reliable data management system will allow FPS to provide
complete and accurate information on its security program. In past
reports, we have discussed the importance of maintaining timely and
accurate data to help monitor and improve the effectiveness of
government programs. We have found that in order to make informed
decisions and ensure accountability, agencies need data management
systems that can generate timely, accurate, and useful information.
Without a reliable data management system, it is difficult for FPS and
other stakeholders to determine the effectiveness of its efforts to
protect GSA facilities or for FPS to accurately track and monitor
incident response time, effectiveness of security countermeasures, and
whether BSAs are completed on time.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve its ability to address its operational and funding
challenges and to ensure that it has useful performance measures and
reliable information to assess the effectiveness of efforts to protect
GSA facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security
direct the Director of FPS to take the following six actions:
* develop and implement a strategic approach to manage its staffing
resources that, among other things, determines the optimum number of
employees needed to accomplish its facility protection mission and
allocate these resources based on risk management principles and the
agency's goals and performance measures;
* clarify roles and responsibilities of local law enforcement agencies
in regard to responding to incidents at GSA facilities;
* improve FPS's use of the fee-based system by developing a method to
accurately account for the cost of providing security services to
tenant agencies and ensuring that its fee structure takes into
consideration the varying levels of risk and service provided at GSA
facilities;
* evaluate whether FPS's current use of a fee-based system or an
alternative funding mechanism is the most appropriate manner to fund
the agency;
* develop and implement specific guidelines and standards for measuring
its performance, including outcome measures to assess its performance
and improve the accountability of FPS; and:
* improve how FPS categorizes, collects, and analyzes data to help it
better manage and understand the results of its efforts to protect GSA
facilities.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment.
DHS concurred with the report's findings and recommendations. DHS's
comments can be found in appendix II.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretary of Homeland Security, DHS's Assistant Secretary for
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and appropriate congressional
committees. We also will make copies available to others on request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Mark L. Goldstein:
Director, Physical Infrastructure:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar:
Chairman:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton:
Chairwoman:
Subcommittee on Public Buildings, Economic Development, and Emergency
Management:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine any operational challenges the Federal Protective Service
(FPS) faces in protecting General Services Administration (GSA)
facilities and actions it has taken to address those challenges, we
interviewed about 170 FPS police officers, inspectors, special agents,
support personnel, and administrators at headquarters and at 7 of FPS's
11 regions. These 7 regions represent about 59 percent of FPS's
facility protection portfolio. We also interviewed about 53 GSA
headquarters and regional management and security officials, 101 tenant
agency officials from 22 building security committees, and 8 local law
enforcement agencies about FPS's efforts to protect federal employees,
facilities, and the public. These 7 regions were selected using both
quantitative and qualitative criteria in order to maximize diversity
among the site visits. In selecting regions to visit, we considered the
number of buildings in each region, geographic dispersion across the
United States, the number of FPS personnel in each region, and input
from FPS and GSA officials. We analyzed FPS staffing data from fiscal
years 2004 through 2007 to identify trends in staffing. To validate
staffing data received from FPS, we compared the data to staffing
numbers from the Office of Personnel Management and found them to be
accurate. We also analyzed laws relating to jurisdictional issues at
GSA facilities and FPS's authority. We analyzed a FPS workforce study,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Professional
Responsibility performance reports, and the FPS policy handbook.
To determine any budgetary and funding challenges FPS faces and actions
it has taken to address them, we interviewed budget officials from the
Office of Management and Budget, ICE's Office of the Chief Financial
Officer, FPS, and GSA. We analyzed appropriation acts, and FPS's budget
and budget justifications for fiscal years 2004 through 2009. In
addition, we analyzed FPS's 2006 workforce study and a 2007 Booz Allen
Hamilton activity-based costing study.
To determine how FPS measures the effectiveness of its efforts, we
analyzed FPS's strategic plan for fiscal years 2008 through 2011 and
strategic planning and performance reports and interviewed officials
from FPS's Risk Management Division. We also analyzed crime and
incident data from FPS's Web Records Management System and interviewed
FPS officials about the reliability of the data. Because of
inconsistency in reporting among regions and problems with ensuring
that all incidents are included in the data, we determined that this
data do not reliably capture all crime and incidents in federal
buildings.
Because of the sensitivity of some of the information in this report,
we cannot provide information about the specific locations of crime or
other incidents discussed. We conducted this performance audit from
April 2007 to June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Department of Homeland Security:
June 3, 2008:
Mr. Mark Goldstein:
Director, Physical Infrastructure:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Goldstein:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report GAO-08-683
"The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Hamper
Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities."
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement's Federal Protective Service (FPS) concurs with the
audit findings of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) regarding
the challenges faced by FPS. FPS has already undertaken considerable
steps to implement the audit's findings.
FPS recently completed its new Strategic Plan. The plan will help
ensure that FPS can comply with the staffing requirements mandated in
the FY 2008 appropriations language. FPS is also adopting a Risk
Assessment and Management Program (RAMP). RAMP will be a secure, web-
enabled tool to conduct risk assessments at FPS-protected sites,
recommend appropriate countermeasures, and monitor the effectiveness of
those measures.
FPS has also worked to strengthen its communications with its numerous
stakeholders. FPS has conducted a number of focus group meetings with
stakeholders to discuss and resolve issues at working levels and to
identify systemic problems that can be corrected at higher levels. In
addition, FPS has formed a partnership with its private and public
sector tenants through an Executive Advisory Council (EAC) to help
coordinate security strategies and activities and to improve
communication between FPS and building occupants.
Below, we address the specific GAO recommendations:
GAO Recommendation 1: Develop and implement a strategic approach to
manage [FPS] staffing resources that, among other things, determines
the optimum number of employees needed to accomplish its facility
protection mission and allocate these resources based on risk
management principles and the agency's goals and performance measures.
ICE Response: Concur. ICE and FPS are using the results of several
workload studies and analyses to establish a more strategic and risk-
based approach to staffing that identities the resources and funding
needed to accomplish FPS's mission. This approach will provide an
opportunity to integrate the strategic goals and objectives defined in
the ICE FPS Strategic Plan into specific organizational and individual
performance measures and address mission accomplishment based upon
levels of risk.
GAO Recommendation 2: Clarify roles and responsibilities of local law
enforcement agencies in regards to responding to incidents at GSA
facilities.
ICE Response: Concur. ICE will examine responsibilities for local law
enforcement response to incidents at GSA facilities, in particular, the
differences in response based upon the type of facility (e.g., leased
or federally owned). For example, previous analysis has shown that for
leased facilities. which comprise 81 percent of our inventory, the
state/local taxes paid by the property owner that support local law
enforcement response, are included in the lease agreement. Therefore.
on its face, it appears that local police and fire/rescue response
might be obligatory. ICE will research this further.
GAO Recommendation 3: Improve FPS's use of the fee base system by
developing a method to accurately account for the cost of providing
security services to tenant agencies and ensuring that its fee
structure takes into consideration the varying levels of risk and
service provided at GSA facilities.
ICE Response: Concur. ICE agrees that the legacy GSA fee methodology
should be updated to more accurately reflect and assign the cost of
delivering law enforcement and security services to all facilities FPS
is responsible for protecting. In theory, the FPS basic security fee
was designed to enable FPS to provide the most basic of services to all
customer facilities, regardless of risk level assigned to the facility.
Once the building security assessment is completed, a risk level for
that facility is then established. Based on the risk level. appropriate
countermeasures are designed and installed and the facility is assessed
a building-specific charge to recover the costs of acquiring,
installing, and maintaining the countermeasures.
The additional costs associated with providing higher levels of
security, both additional law enforcement attention and the increased
administrative/contracting, support. are intended to be recovered in
the building specific fee. However, authorized fees and FTE levels have
not been sufficient to ensure that basic security services are
available and provided at all facilities that the FPS is tasked to
protect. Available resources must be prioritized based upon risk.
vulnerability and consequence. Hence, the ICE FPS has focused its
resources on the protection of those facilities assigned the highest
risk level. In the absence of sufficient resources to ensure that the
same comparable level of basic security services can be provided to all
facilities and locations. FPS will undertake a study that examines
alternative fee methodologies that assign costs reflective of services
required to meet the security needs at various risk levels based on
strategic mission, risk management principles, agency goals, and
performance goals.
GAO Recommendation 4: Evaluate whether FPS's current use of a fee-based
system or an alternative funding mechanism is the most appropriate
manner to fund the agency.
ICE Response: Concur. The ICE FPS fee-based system of funding was
developed by GSA within the context of providing protection for federal
real property assets and the tenant agencies housed within GSA
facilities. Like commercial real estate management, GSA developed an
average cost per square foot to recover the basic cost of protecting
the inventory and assessed all tenant agencies a prorated share of
these estimated basic security costs based upon the number of square
feet each tenant occupies, regardless of risk. In addition to the basic
security costs, facilities determined to be high risk and requiring
additional security countermeasures were assessed a building specific
fee. This fee included costs of the enhanced security measures as well
as an administrative fee for the additional cost of acquiring,
installing, overseeing and managing the additional security activities.
While this system of fees might fit within the real estate mission of
GSA, it is a paradigm that no longer promotes or assures the
accomplishment of FPS's mission. The transfer of FPS to the Department
of Homeland Security significantly altered the focus of the FPS
mission. Protecting the homeland, securing critical infrastructure,
risk, vulnerability, and consequence are the new FPS mission foci and
these security drivers are difficult to translate into the "pennies per
square foot" legacy GSA real estate-driven cost recovery model.
ICE FPS will continue its research, development, and recommendation of
funding options that support the security and protection mission of the
FPS within DHS. Alternative fee methodologies, along with options that
include combinations of different fees with other funding sources, will
be considered. The most-effective options will be proposed for
consideration in the next available budget cycle.
GAO Recommendation 5: Develop and implement specific guidelines and
standards for measuring performance including outcome measures to
assess its performance and improve the accountability of FPS.
ICE Response: Concur. Using the ICE FPS Strategic Plan as the
foundation, FPS has begun updating its current performance measures to
focus on operational outputs while supporting strategic level outcome
reporting. FPS is also acquiring new systems to enhance its operational
capabilities for gathering data and developing action plans to assess
collective and individual performance. The Risk Assessment and
Management Program (RAMP) and a Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system
will provide a suite of tools designed to ease the collection,
analysis, and reporting of performance measure information. This will
also contribute to more effective management and increase the
effectiveness of services provided to stakeholders.
GAD Recommendation 6: "Improve how FPS categorizes, collects, and
analyzes data to help better manage and understand its efforts to
protect GSA facilities."
ICE Response: Concur. ICE FPS is developing systems for collecting and
analyzing elements of its security and protection operations to
adequately determine the costs of providing appropriate and adequate
risk mitigation at GSA facilities. This involves identifying and
defining information that is needed, establishing automated processes
for gathering data, and analyzing the output to determine risk levels
and to acquire and install countermeasures (including contract guard
services) to mitigate threats to property and people.
The Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP) and a Computer Aided
Dispatch (CAD) system will provide ready access to the variety of
information that will permit FPS to maintain appropriate situational
awareness, as well as the capability to access, analyze, report, and
utilize information to accomplish the FPS vision of "Secure Facilities,
Safe Occupants" at costs that are appropriate and equitable.
We thank you again for the opportunity to review this important report
and provide comments.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Penelope G. McCormack:
Acting Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Mark L. Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Tammy Conquest, Assistant
Director; Daniel Cain; Collin Fallon; Brandon Haller, Aaron Johnson;
Katie Hamer; Carol Henn; Daniel Hoy; and Susan Michal-Smith made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For the purposes of this report, the 9,000 facilities referred to
are under the control or custody of GSA.
[2] The number of inspectors includes an unknown number of physical
security specialists, who do not have law enforcement authority. FPS
was unable to provide us with the exact number of physical security
specialists it employs.
[3] FPS inspectors are also referred to as Law Enforcement Security
Officers and have responsibilities for completing physical security and
law enforcement activities.
[4] FPS officials have stated that there is no official policy on the
number of buildings assigned to each inspector. The number of buildings
is entirely dependent on geographic dispersion and risk level.
[5] Patrol refers to movement within an area for the purpose of
observation or surveillance to prevent or detect criminal violations,
maintain security, and be available to provide service and assistance
to the public.
[6] On March 10, 2008, the Interagency Security Committee, an
organization composed of representatives from non-military government
agencies that provides leadership in physical security programs,
published new standards for determining the security level of federal
facilities, which will supersede the standards developed in the 1995
DOJ vulnerability assessment. It is unclear how the new standards will
affect the BSA process.
[7] According to FPS, its budget also includes $638 million in funding
provided by customer agencies for building-specific and SWA security
services, called pass through funding. Pass through funding is not
directly appropriated to FPS, but FPS collects it from customer
agencies and uses the funds to manage the procurement and installation
of security countermeasures or other security services provided through
the building-specific or SWA programs. The remaining $139 million in
FPS's fiscal year 2008 budget is a contingency amount that FPS is
authorized to collect to respond to a major disaster if needed. The
authority to spend this money expires at the end of the fiscal year.
[8] Pub. L. No 110-161, 121 Stat 1844, 2051 (2007).
[9] "2820" inspections are named for the forms on which guard
inspections are completed.
[10] GAO, Federal Real Property: DHS Has Made Progress, but Additional
Actions Are Needed to Address Real Property Management and Security
Challenges, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-658]
(Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2007).
[11] 18 U.S.C. § 13.
[12] 40 U.S.C. § 1315.
[13] [3] 40 U.S.C. § 1315(d)(3).
[14] 18 U.S.C. § 930(a)
[15] RAMP will replace several FPS systems, including its Security
Tracking System and the Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking
System, and may be integrated with other systems associated with the
BSA program.
[16] Established by Congress in 1972 and administered by GSA, the
Federal Buildings Fund is a revolving fund in the U.S. Treasury into
which federal agency rent and certain other moneys are deposited.
Moneys deposited into the fund are available, subject to congressional
appropriation, for GSA's real property management and related
activities. See 40 U.S.C § 592.
[17] Since the transfer, FPS support costs (e.g., information
technology, administrative services, and human capital services) paid
to ICE has increased from approximately $16 million in fiscal year 2004
to $27 million in fiscal year 2007.
[18] According to FPS, an increase of 1 cent in the basic security fee
increases collections by $3 million.
[19] FPS and ICE hired Booz Allen Hamilton to conduct an activity-based
cost study. The report assumes building-specific and tenant-specific
administrative fees would be lower than those charged in fiscal years
2006 and 2007, suggesting rates of 13.57 percent and 1.70 percent,
respectively, as opposed to the approved rates of 15 percent and 8
percent.
[20] GAO, Federal User Fees: A Design Guide, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-386SP] (Washington, D.C.: May
29, 2008).
[21] GAO, Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in
Transforming Immigration Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-05-81] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2004).
[22] An output measure is the tabulation, calculation, or recording of
activity or effort and can be expressed in a quantitative or
qualitative manner.
[End of section]
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