Homeland Security
The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal Facilities Gao ID: GAO-08-897T June 19, 2008The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for providing physical security and law enforcement services to about 9,000 General Services Administration (GSA) facilities. To accomplish its mission of protecting GSA facilities, FPS currently has an annual budget of about $1 billion, about 1,100 employees, and 15,000 contract guards located throughout the country. GAO was asked to provide information and analysis on challenges FPS faces including ensuring that it has sufficient staffing and funding resources to protect GSA facilities and the over one million federal employees as well as members of the public that work in and visit them each year. GAO discusses (1) FPS's operational challenges and actions it has taken to address them, (2) funding challenges, and (3) how FPS measures the effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA facilities. This testimony is based on our recently issued report (GAO-08-683) to this Subcommittee.
FPS faces several operational challenges that hamper its ability to accomplish its mission and the actions it has taken may not fully resolve these challenges. FPS's staff has decreased by about 20 percent from fiscal years 2004 through 2007. FPS has also decreased or eliminated law enforcement services such as proactive patrol in many FPS locations. Moreover, FPS has not resolved longstanding challenges, such as improving the oversight of its contract guard program, maintaining security countermeasures, and ensuring the quality and timeliness of building security assessments (BSA). For example, one regional supervisor stated that while reviewing a BSA for an address he personally visited he realized that the inspector completing the BSA had falsified the information because the inspector referred to a large building when the actual site was a vacant plot of land owned by GSA. To address some of these operational challenges, FPS is currently changing to an inspector based workforce, which seeks to eliminate the police officer position and rely primarily on FPS inspectors for both law enforcement and physical security activities. FPS is also hiring an additional 150 inspectors. However, these actions may not fully resolve the challenges FPS faces, in part because the approach does not emphasize law enforcement responsibilities. Until recently, the security fees FPS charged to agencies have not been sufficient to cover its costs and the actions it has taken to address the shortfalls have had adverse implications. For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) transferred emergency supplemental funding to FPS. FPS restricted hiring and limited training and overtime. According to FPS officials, these measures have had a negative effect on staff morale and are partially responsible for FPS's high attrition rates. FPS was authorized to increase the basic security fee four times since it transferred to DHS in 2003, currently charging tenant agencies 62 cents per square foot for basic security services. Because of these actions, FPS's collections in fiscal year 2007 were sufficient to cover costs, and FPS projects that collections will also cover costs in fiscal year 2008. However, FPS's primary means of funding its operations--the basic security fee--does not account for the risk faced by buildings, the level of service provided, or the cost of providing services, raising questions about equity. Stakeholders expressed concern about whether FPS has an accurate understanding of its security costs. FPS has developed output measures, but lacks outcome measures to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal facilities. Its output measures include determining whether security countermeasures have been deployed and are fully operational. However, FPS does not have measures to evaluate its efforts to protect federal facilities that could provide FPS with broader information on program outcomes and results. FPS also lacks a reliable data management system for accurately tracking performance measures. Without such a system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of its efforts, allocate its limited resources, or make informed risk management decisions.
GAO-08-897T, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal Facilities
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Thursday, June 19, 2008:
Homeland Security:
The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Raise
Concerns About Protection of Federal Facilities:
Statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director Physical Infrastructure
Issues:
GAO-08-897T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-897T, a testimony to the Chair and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for providing
physical security and law enforcement services to about 9,000 General
Services Administration (GSA) facilities. To accomplish its mission of
protecting GSA facilities, FPS currently has an annual budget of about
$1 billion, about 1,100 employees, and 15,000 contract guards located
throughout the country.
GAO was asked to provide information and analysis on challenges FPS
faces including ensuring that it has sufficient staffing and funding
resources to protect GSA facilities and the over one million federal
employees as well as members of the public that work in and visit them
each year. GAO discusses (1) FPS‘s operational challenges and actions
it has taken to address them, (2) funding challenges, and (3) how FPS
measures the effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA facilities.
This testimony is based on our recently issued report (GAO-08-683) to
this Subcommittee.
What GAO Found:
FPS faces several operational challenges that hamper its ability to
accomplish its mission and the actions it has taken may not fully
resolve these challenges. FPS‘s staff has decreased by about 20 percent
from fiscal years 2004 through 2007. FPS has also decreased or
eliminated law enforcement services such as proactive patrol in many
FPS locations. Moreover, FPS has not resolved longstanding challenges,
such as improving the oversight of its contract guard program,
maintaining security countermeasures, and ensuring the quality and
timeliness of building security assessments (BSA). For example, one
regional supervisor stated that while reviewing a BSA for an address he
personally visited he realized that the inspector completing the BSA
had falsified the information because the inspector referred to a large
building when the actual site was a vacant plot of land owned by GSA.
To address some of these operational challenges, FPS is currently
changing to an inspector based workforce, which seeks to eliminate the
police officer position and rely primarily on FPS inspectors for both
law enforcement and physical security activities. FPS is also hiring an
additional 150 inspectors. However, these actions may not fully resolve
the challenges FPS faces, in part because the approach does not
emphasize law enforcement responsibilities.
Until recently, the security fees FPS charged to agencies have not been
sufficient to cover its costs and the actions it has taken to address
the shortfalls have had adverse implications. For example, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) transferred emergency
supplemental funding to FPS. FPS restricted hiring and limited training
and overtime. According to FPS officials, these measures have had a
negative effect on staff morale and are partially responsible for FPS‘s
high attrition rates. FPS was authorized to increase the basic security
fee four times since it transferred to DHS in 2003, currently charging
tenant agencies 62 cents per square foot for basic security services.
Because of these actions, FPS‘s collections in fiscal year 2007 were
sufficient to cover costs, and FPS projects that collections will also
cover costs in fiscal year 2008. However, FPS‘s primary means of
funding its operations”the basic security fee”does not account for the
risk faced by buildings, the level of service provided, or the cost of
providing services, raising questions about equity. Stakeholders
expressed concern about whether FPS has an accurate understanding of
its security costs.
FPS has developed output measures, but lacks outcome measures to assess
the effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal facilities. Its
output measures include determining whether security countermeasures
have been deployed and are fully operational. However, FPS does not
have measures to evaluate its efforts to protect federal facilities
that could provide FPS with broader information on program outcomes and
results. FPS also lacks a reliable data management system for
accurately tracking performance measures. Without such a system, it is
difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of its
efforts, allocate its limited resources, or make informed risk
management decisions.
What GAO Recommends:
In our recently issued report, GAO recommended, among other things,
that the Secretary of DHS direct the Director of FPS to develop and
implement a strategic approach to better manage its staffing resources,
evaluate current and alternative funding mechanisms, and develop
appropriate performance measures. DHS agreed with the recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-897T]. For more information,
contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
June 19, 2008:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here to discuss the efforts of the Federal
Protective Service (FPS) in protecting federal employees, the public,
and General Services Administration (GSA) facilities. As you know, in
2003, FPS transferred from GSA to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and is responsible for providing physical security and law
enforcement services to about 9,000 GSA facilities.[Footnote 1] Within
DHS, FPS is part of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
component, the largest investigative arm of DHS. FPS is funded by the
security fees it collects from the agencies it protects and does not
receive a separate appropriation. To accomplish its mission of
protecting GSA facilities, FPS currently has an annual budget of about
$1 billion, about 1,100 employees, and 15,000 contract guards located
throughout the country. While there has not been a large-scale attack
on a domestic federal facility since the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 and the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building
in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, ongoing terror threats and crime require
that FPS effectively manage its resources to protect the over one
million employees as well as members of the public that work in and
visit GSA facilities each year.
Recently, FPS has faced several challenges. Chief among them is
ensuring that it has sufficient staffing and funding resources to
accomplish its mission of protecting GSA facilities. It has also faced
challenges in assessing the physical security of the facilities it
protects and overseeing its contract guard program. To help address
these challenges, in 2007, FPS adopted a new approach to protect GSA
facilities. Under this approach, FPS plans to essentially eliminate its
police officer position and mainly use inspectors and special agents to
perform multiple law enforcement and physical security duties
concurrently and will place more emphasis on physical security
activities, such as completing building security assessments (BSA), and
less emphasis on law enforcement activities, such as proactive patrol.
In addition, while FPS plans to maintain a level of 15,000 contract
guards, the majority of the guards are stationed at fixed posts, from
which they are not permitted to leave, and do not have arrest
authorities. These challenges have raised questions about FPS's ability
to accomplish its facility protection mission.
This testimony provides information and analysis on (1) FPS's
operational challenges and actions it has taken to address them, (2)
funding challenges FPS faces and actions it has taken to address them,
and (3) how FPS measures the effectiveness of its efforts to protect
GSA facilities. The testimony is based on our recently published
report: GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Faces
Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal
Facilities.[Footnote 2]
Due to the sensitivity of some of the information in this report we
cannot provide information about the specific locations of crime or
other incidents discussed. We conducted this performance audit from
April 2007 to June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
FPS continues to face several operational challenges that have hampered
its ability to accomplish its mission to protect GSA facilities and the
actions it has taken may not fully resolve these challenges. Since the
transfer, while FPS has maintained 15,000 contract guards, its staff
has decreased by about 20 percent from almost 1,400 employees at the
end of fiscal year 2004 to about 1,100 employees at the end of fiscal
year 2007. This decrease in staff has contributed to diminished
security and increased the risk of crime or terrorist attacks at many
GSA facilities. For example, FPS has decreased or eliminated law
enforcement services such as proactive patrol in each of its 11
regions. In addition, FPS officials at several regions we visited said
that proactive patrol has, in the past, allowed its officers and
inspectors to identify and apprehend individuals that were surveilling
GSA facilities. In contrast, when FPS is not able to patrol federal
buildings, there is increased potential for illegal entry and other
criminal activity at federal buildings. Moreover, FPS has not resolved
longstanding challenges, such as improving the oversight of its
contract guard program.[Footnote 3] In addition, FPS faces difficulties
in ensuring the quality and timeliness of BSAs, which are a core
component of FPS's physical security mission. For example, one regional
supervisor stated that while reviewing a BSA for an address he
personally visited he realized that the inspector completing the BSA
had falsified the information because the inspector referred to a large
building when the actual site was a vacant plot of land owned by GSA.
FPS has also experienced problems ensuring that security
countermeasures, such as security cameras and magnetometers, are
operational. To address some of these operational challenges, FPS is
currently changing to an inspector based workforce, which seeks to
eliminate the police officer position and rely primarily on FPS
inspectors for both law enforcement and physical security activities.
FPS believes that this change will ensure that its staff has the right
mix of technical skills and training needed to accomplish its mission.
FPS is also hiring an additional 150 inspectors and developing a new
system for BSAs. However, these actions may not fully resolve the
operational challenges FPS faces, in part because the approach does not
emphasize law enforcement responsibilities.
Until recently, the security fees FPS charged to tenant agencies have
not been sufficient to cover its costs and the actions it has taken to
address the shortfalls have had adverse implications. Since
transferring to DHS, DHS and FPS have addressed these projected
shortfalls in a variety of ways. For example, DHS transferred emergency
supplemental funding to FPS and FPS restricted hiring and travel,
limited training and overtime, and suspended employee performance
awards. According to FPS officials, these measures have had a negative
effect on staff morale and are partially responsible for FPS's overall
attrition rate increasing from about 2 percent in fiscal year 2004 to
about 14 percent in fiscal year 2007. FPS also increased the basic
security fee charged to tenant agencies from 35 cents per square foot
in fiscal year 2005 to 62 cents per square foot in fiscal year 2008.
Because of these actions, fiscal year 2007 was the first year FPS
collections were sufficient to cover its costs. FPS also projects that
collections will cover its costs in fiscal year 2008. However, FPS's
primary means of funding its operations is the basic security fee,
which is the same for federal agencies regardless of the perceived
threat to a particular building or agency. Therefore, the fee does not
account for the risk faced by particular buildings and, depending on
that risk, it does not account for the level of service provided to
tenant agencies or the cost of providing those services. For example,
level I facilities may face less risk because they are typically small
storefront-type operations with a low level of public contact. However,
these facilities are charged the same basic security fee of 62 cents
per square foot as a level IV facility that has a high volume of public
contact, may contain high-risk law enforcement and intelligence
agencies and highly sensitive government records. In addition, a 2007
Booz Allen Hamilton report of FPS's operational costs found that FPS
does not link the actual cost of providing basic security services with
the security fees it charges tenant agencies. The report recommends
incorporating a security fee that takes into account the complexity or
the level of effort of the service being performed for the higher level
security facilities.
FPS is limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of its
efforts to protect GSA facilities. To determine how well it is
accomplishing its mission to protect GSA facilities, FPS has identified
some output measures such as determining whether security
countermeasures, such as bollards and cameras, have been deployed and
are fully operational; the amount of time it takes to respond to an
incident; and the percentage of BSAs completed on time. Output measures
assess activities, not the results of those activities. However, FPS
has not developed outcome measures to evaluate the results and the net
effect of its efforts to protect GSA facilities. Outcome measures are
important because they can provide FPS with broader information on
program results, such as the extent to which its decision to move to an
inspector-based workforce will enhance security at GSA facilities. In
addition, FPS does not have a reliable data management system that
would allow it to accurately track these measures or other important
measures such as the number of crimes and other incidents occurring at
GSA facilities. Without such a system, it is difficult for FPS to
evaluate and improve the effectiveness of its efforts to protect
federal employees and facilities, allocate its limited resources, or
make informed risk management decisions. According to FPS officials,
the agency is in the process of developing a system that will allow it
to improve its data collection and analysis of its performance. In our
report that we issued last week to this Subcommittee and other
congressional committees, we recommended, among other things, that the
Secretary of DHS direct the Director of FPS to develop and implement a
strategic approach to better manage its staffing resources, evaluate
current and alternative funding mechanisms, and develop appropriate
measures to assess performance. DHS agreed with these recommendations.
Background:
As the primary federal agency that is responsible for protecting and
securing GSA facilities and federal employees across the country, FPS
has the authority to enforce federal laws and regulations aimed at
protecting federally owned and leased properties and the persons on
such property, and, among other things, to conduct investigations
related to offenses against the property and persons on the property.
To protect the over one million federal employees and about 9,000 GSA
facilities from the risk of terrorist and criminal attacks, in fiscal
year 2007, FPS had about 1,100 employees, of which 541, or almost 50
percent, were inspectors. FPS inspectors are primarily responsible for
responding to incidents and demonstrations, overseeing contract guards,
completing BSAs for numerous buildings, and participating in tenant
agencies' BSC meetings. [Footnote 4] About 215, or 19 percent, of FPS's
employees are police officers who are primarily responsible for
patrolling GSA facilities, responding to criminal incidents, assisting
in the monitoring of contract guards, responding to demonstrations at
GSA facilities, and conducting basic criminal investigations. About
104, or 9 percent, of FPS's 1,100 employees are special agents who are
the lead entity within FPS for gathering intelligence for criminal and
anti-terrorist activities, and planning and conducting investigations
relating to alleged or suspected violations of criminal laws against
GSA facilities and their occupants.
FPS also has about 15,000 contract guards that are used primarily to
monitor facilities through fixed post assignments and access control.
According to FPS policy documents, contract guards may detain
individuals who are being seriously disruptive, violent, or suspected
of committing a crime at a GSA facility, but do not have arrest
authority.
The level of law enforcement and physical protection services FPS
provides at each of the approximately 9,000 GSA facilities varies
depending on the facility's security level. To determine a facility's
security level, FPS uses the Department of Justice's (DOJ)
Vulnerability Assessment Guidelines which are summarized below.
* A level I facility has 10 or fewer federal employees, 2,500 or fewer
square feet of office space and a low volume of public contact or
contact with only a small segment of the population. A typical level I
facility is a small storefront-type operation, such as a military
recruiting office.
* A level II facility has between 11 and 150 federal employees, more
than 2,500 to 80,000 square feet; a moderate volume of public contact;
and federal activities that are routine in nature, similar to
commercial activities.
* A level III facility has between 151 and 450 federal employees, more
than 80,000 to 150,000 square feet and a moderate to high volume of
public contact.
* A level IV facility has over 450 federal employees, more than 150,000
square feet; a high volume of public contact; and tenant agencies that
may include high-risk law enforcement and intelligence agencies,
courts, judicial offices, and highly sensitive government records.
* A Level V facility is similar to a Level IV facility in terms of the
number of employees and square footage, but contains mission functions
critical to national security. FPS does not have responsibility for
protecting any level V buildings.
FPS is a reimbursable organization and is funded by collecting security
fees from tenant agencies, referred to as a fee-based system. To fund
its operations, FPS charges each tenant agency a basic security fee per
square foot of space occupied in a GSA facility. In 2008, the basic
security fee is 62 cents per square foot and covers services such as
patrol, monitoring of building perimeter alarms and dispatching of law
enforcement response through its control centers, criminal
investigations, and BSAs. FPS also collects an administrative fee it
charges tenant agencies for building specific security services such as
access control to facilities' entrances and exits, employee and visitor
checks; and the purchase, installation, and maintenance of security
equipment including cameras, alarms, magnetometers, and x-ray machines.
In addition to these security services, FPS provides agencies with
additional services upon request, which are funded through reimbursable
Security Work Authorizations (SWA), for which FPS charges an
administrative fee. For example, agencies may request additional
magnetometers or more advanced perimeter surveillance capabilities.
FPS's Ability to Accomplish Its Mission Is Hampered by Operational
Challenges and the Steps It Has Taken May Not Fully Resolve Them:
FPS faces several operational challenges, including decreasing staff
levels, which has led to reductions in the law enforcement services
that FPS provides. FPS also faces challenges in overseeing its contract
guards, completing its BSAs in a timely manner, and maintaining
security countermeasures. While FPS has taken steps to address these
challenges, it has not fully resolved them.
FPS's Staff Has Steadily Declined Since It Transferred to DHS:
Providing law enforcement and physical security services to GSA
facilities is inherently labor intensive and requires effective
management of available staffing resources. However, since transferring
from GSA to DHS, FPS's staff has declined and the agency has managed
its staffing resources in a manner that has reduced security at GSA
facilities and may increase the risk of crime or terrorist attacks at
many GSA facilities. Specifically, FPS's staff has decreased by about
20 percent from almost 1,400 employees at the end of fiscal year 2004,
to about 1,100 employees at the end of fiscal year 2007, as shown in
figure 1. In fiscal year 2008, FPS initially planned to reduce its
staff further. However, a provision in the 2008 Consolidated
Appropriations Act requires FPS to increase its staff to 1,200 by July
31, 2008.[Footnote 5] In fiscal year 2010, FPS plans to increase its
staff to 1,450, according to its Director.
Figure 1: FPS's Workforce, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007:
This figure is a line graph showing FPS's workforce, fiscal years 2004
through 2007. The X axis represents the fiscal year, and the Y axis
represents the number of staff.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Number of staff: 1384.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Number of staff: 1345.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Number of staff: 1279.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Number of staff: 1109.
[See PDF for image]
Source: Federal Protective Service.
[End of figure]
From fiscal year 2004 to 2007, the number of employees in each position
also decreased, with the largest decrease occurring in the police
officer position. For example, the number of police officers decreased
from 359 in fiscal year 2004 to 215 in fiscal year 2007 and the number
of inspectors decreased from 600 in fiscal year 2004 to 541 at the end
of fiscal year 2007, as shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Composition of FPS's Workforce by Position, Fiscal Years 2004
through 2007:
This figure is a combination line graph showing composition of FPS's
workforce by position, fiscal years 2004 through 2007. The X axis
represents the fiscal year, and the Y axis represents the number of
staff. The lines represent: inspectors, police officers, agents, and
all other.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Police Officers: 359;
Inspectors: 600;
Agents: 134;
All other: 291.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Police Officers: 328;
Inspectors: 612;
Agents: 139;
All other: 266.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Police Officers: 301;
Inspectors: 585;
Agents: 131;
All other: 262.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Police Officers: 215;
Inspectors: 541;
Agents: 104;
All other: 249.
[See PDF for image]
Source: The Federal Protective Service.
Note: "Inspectors" include an unknown number of physical security
specialists, who do not have law enforcement authority. The category
"All other" includes administrative and support staff.
[End of figure]
Critical Law Enforcement Services Have Been Reduced or Eliminated:
At many facilities, FPS has eliminated proactive patrol of GSA
facilities to prevent or detect criminal violations. The FPS Policy
Handbook states that patrol should be used to prevent crime and
terrorist attacks. The elimination of proactive patrol has a negative
effect on security at GSA facilities because law enforcement personnel
cannot effectively monitor individuals who might be surveilling federal
buildings, inspect suspicious vehicles (including potential vehicles
for bombing federal buildings), and detect and deter criminal activity
in and around federal buildings. While the number of contract guards
employed in GSA facilities will not decrease and according to a FPS
policy document, the guards are authorized to detain individuals, most
are stationed at fixed posts from which they are not permitted to leave
and do not have arrest authority. According to some regional officials,
some contract guards do not exercise their detention authority because
of liability concerns.
According to several inspectors and police officers in one FPS region,
proactive patrol is important in their region because, in the span of
one year, there were 72 homicides within 3 blocks of a major federal
office building and because most of the crime in their area takes place
after hours when there are no FPS personnel on duty. In addition, FPS
officials at several regions we visited said that proactive patrol has,
in the past, allowed its police officers and inspectors to identify and
apprehend individuals that were surveilling GSA facilities. In
contrast, when FPS is not able to patrol federal buildings, there is
increased potential for illegal entry and other criminal activity at
federal buildings. For example, in one city we visited, a deceased
individual had been found in a vacant GSA facility that was not
regularly patrolled by FPS. FPS officials stated that the deceased
individual had been inside the building for approximately three months.
In addition, more recently, at this same facility, two individuals who
fled into the facility after being pursued by the local police
department for an armed robbery were subsequently apprehended and
arrested by the local police department. While the local police
department contacted FPS for assistance with responding to the incident
at the federal facility, FPS inspectors were advised by senior FPS
supervisors not to assist the local police department in their search
for the suspects because GSA had not paid the security fee for the
facility.
In addition to eliminating proactive patrol, many FPS regions have
reduced their hours of operation for providing law enforcement services
in multiple locations, which has resulted in a lack of coverage when
most federal employees are either entering or leaving federal buildings
or on weekends when some facilities remain open to the public.
Moreover, FPS police officers and inspectors in two cities explained
that this lack of coverage has left some federal day care facilities
vulnerable to loitering by homeless individuals and drug users. The
decrease in FPS's duty hours has also jeopardized police officer and
inspector safety, as well as building security. Some FPS police
officers and inspectors said that they are frequently in dangerous
situations without any FPS backup because many FPS regions have reduced
their hours of operation and overtime.
Adequate Oversight of Contract Guard Program Remains a Challenge:
Contract guard inspections are important for several reasons, including
ensuring that guards comply with contract requirements; have up-to-date
certifications for required training, including firearms or
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and that they perform assigned duties.
While FPS policy does not specify how frequently guard posts should be
inspected, we found that some posts are inspected less than once per
year, in part, because contract guards are often posted in buildings
hours or days away from the nearest FPS inspector. For example, one
area supervisor reported guard posts that had not been inspected in 18
months while another reported posts that had not been inspected in over
one year. In another region, FPS inspectors and police officers
reported that managers told them to complete guard inspections over the
telephone, instead of in person. In addition, when inspectors do
perform guard inspections they do not visit the post during each shift;
consequently some guard shifts may never be inspected by an FPS
official. As a result, some guards may be supervised exclusively by a
representative of the contract guard company. Moreover, in one area we
visited with a large FPS presence, officials reported difficulty in
getting to every post within that region's required one month period.
We obtained a copy of a contract guard inspection schedule in one
metropolitan city that showed 20 of 68 post inspections were completed
for the month.
Some tenant agencies have also noticed a decline in the level of guard
oversight in recent years and believe this has led to poor performance
on the part of some contract guards. For example, according to Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and GSA officials in one of the regions
we visited, contract guards failed to report the theft of an FBI
surveillance trailer worth over $500,000, even though security cameras
captured the trailer being stolen while guards were on duty. The FBI
did not realize it was missing until three days later. Only after the
FBI started making inquiries did the guards report the theft to FPS and
the FBI. During another incident, FPS officials reported contract
guards--who were armed--taking no action as a shirtless suspect wearing
handcuffs on one arm ran through the lobby of a major federal building
while being chased by an FPS inspector. In addition, one official
reported that during an off-hours alarm call to a federal building, the
official arrived to find the front guard post empty while the guard's
loaded firearm was left unattended in the unlocked post.
We also personally witnessed an incident in which an individual
attempted to enter a level IV facility with illegal weapons. According
to FPS policies, contract guards are required to confiscate illegal
weapons, detain and question the individual, and to notify FPS. In this
instance, the weapons were not confiscated, the individual was not
detained or questioned, FPS was not notified, and the individual was
allowed to leave with the weapons. We will shortly begin a
comprehensive review of FPS's contract guard program for this
Subcommittee and other congressional committees.
Difficulties in Ensuring Quality and Timeliness of Building Security
Assessments:
Building security assessments, which are completed by both inspectors
and physical security specialists, are the core component of FPS's
physical security mission. However, ensuring the quality and timeliness
of them is an area in which FPS continues to face challenges. The
majority of inspectors in the seven regions we visited stated that they
are not provided sufficient time to complete BSAs. For example, while
FPS officials have stated that BSAs for level IV facilities should take
between two to four weeks to complete, several inspectors reported
having only one or two days to complete assessments for their
buildings. They reported that this was due to pressure from supervisors
to complete BSAs as quickly as possible. For example, one region is
attempting to complete more than 100 BSAs by June 30, 2008, three
months earlier than required, because staff will be needed to assist
with a large political event in the region. In addition, one inspector
in this region reported having one day to complete site work for six
BSAs in a rural state in the region.
Some regional supervisors have also found problems with the accuracy of
BSAs. One regional supervisor reported that an inspector was repeatedly
counseled and required to redo BSAs when supervisors found he was
copying and pasting from previous BSAs. Similarly, one regional
supervisor stated that, in the course of reviewing a BSA for an address
he had personally visited, he realized that the inspector completing
the BSA falsified information and had not actually visited the site
because the inspector referred to a large building when the actual site
was a vacant plot of land owned by GSA. In December 2007, the Director
of FPS issued a memorandum emphasizing the importance of conducting
BSAs in an ethical manner.
FPS's ability to ensure the quality and timeliness of BSAs is also
complicated by challenges with the current risk assessment tool it uses
to conduct BSAs, the Federal Security Risk Manager system. We have
previously reported that there are three primary concerns with this
system. First, it does not allow FPS to compare risks from building to
building so that security improvements to buildings can be prioritized.
Second, current risk assessments need to be categorized more precisely.
According to FPS, too many BSAs are categorized as high or low, which
does not allow for a refined prioritization of security improvements.
Third, the system does not allow for tracking the implementation status
of security recommendations based on assessments.[Footnote 6]
Some Security Countermeasures Have Not Been Maintained:
According to FPS, GSA, and tenant agency officials in the regions we
visited, some of the security countermeasures, such as security
cameras, magnetometers, and X-ray machines at some facilities, as well
as some FPS radios and BSA equipment, have been broken for months or
years and are poorly maintained. At one level IV facility, FPS and GSA
officials stated that 11 of 150 security cameras were fully functional
and able to record images. Similarly, at another level IV facility, a
large camera project designed to expand and enhance an existing camera
system was put on hold because FPS did not have the funds to complete
the project. FPS officials stated that broken cameras and other
security equipment can negate the deterrent effect of these
countermeasures as well as eliminate their usefulness as an
investigative tool. For example, according to FPS, it has investigated
significant crimes at multiple level IV facilities, but some of the
security cameras installed in those buildings were not working
properly, preventing FPS investigators from identifying the suspects.
Complicating this issue, FPS officials, GSA officials, and tenant
representatives stated that additional countermeasures are difficult to
implement because they require approval from BSCs, which are composed
of representatives from each tenant agency who generally are not
security professionals. In some of the buildings that we visited,
security countermeasures were not implemented because BSC members
cannot agree on what countermeasures to implement or are unable to
obtain funding from their agencies. For example, a FPS official in a
major metropolitan city stated that over the last 4 years inspectors
have recommended 24-hour contract guard coverage at one high-risk
building located in a high crime area multiple times, however, the BSC
is not able to obtain approval from all its members. In addition,
several FPS inspectors stated that their regional managers have
instructed them not to recommend security countermeasures in BSAs if
FPS would be responsible for funding the measures because there is not
sufficient money in regional budgets to purchase and maintain the
security equipment.
FPS Has Taken Some Actions To Resolve Operational Challenges But Its
Actions May Not Fully Resolve These Challenges:
According to FPS, it has a number of ongoing efforts that are designed
to address some of its longstanding challenges. For example, in 2007,
FPS decided to adopt an inspector-based workforce approach to protect
GSA facilities. Under this approach, the composition of FPS's workforce
will change from a combination of inspectors and police officers to
mainly inspectors. The inspectors will be required to complete law
enforcement activities such as patrolling and responding to incidents
at GSA facilities concurrently with their physical security activities.
FPS will also place more emphasis on physical security, such as BSAs,
and less emphasis on the law enforcement part of its mission; contract
guards will continue to be the front-line defense for protection at GSA
facilities; and there will be a continued reliance on local law
enforcement. According to FPS, an inspector-based workforce will help
it to achieve its strategic goals such as ensuring that its staff has
the right mix of technical skills and training needed to accomplish its
mission and building effective relationships with its stakeholders.
However, the inspector-based workforce approach presents some
additional challenges for FPS. For example, the approach does not
emphasize law enforcement responsibilities, such as proactive patrol.
Reports issued by multiple government entities acknowledge the
importance of proactive patrol in detecting and deterring terrorist
surveillance teams, which use information such as the placement of
armed guards and proximity to law enforcement agency stations when
choosing targets and planning attacks. Active law enforcement patrols
in and around federal facilities can potentially disrupt these
sophisticated surveillance and research techniques. In addition, having
inspectors perform both law enforcement and physical security duties
simultaneously may prevent some inspectors from responding to criminal
incidents in a timely manner and patrolling federal buildings.
FPS stated that entering into memorandums of agreement with local law
enforcement agencies was an integral part of the inspector-based
workforce approach because it would ensure law enforcement response
capabilities at facilities when needed. According to FPS's Director,
the agency recently decided not to pursue memorandums of agreement with
local law enforcement agencies, in part, because of reluctance on the
part of local law enforcement officials to sign such memorandums. In
addition, FPS believes that the agreements are not necessary because 96
percent of the properties in its inventory are listed as concurrent
jurisdiction facilities where both federal and state governments have
jurisdiction over the property. Nevertheless, the agreements would
clarify roles and responsibilities of local law enforcement agencies
when responding to crime or other incidents.
However, FPS also provides facility protection to approximately 400
properties where the federal government maintains exclusive federal
jurisdiction. Under exclusive federal jurisdiction, the federal
government has all of the legislative authority within the land area in
question and the state has no residual police powers. Furthermore,
state and local law enforcement officials are not authorized to enforce
state and local laws or federal laws and regulations at exclusive
federal jurisdiction facilities. According to ICE's legal counsel, if
the Secretary of Homeland Security utilized the facilities and services
of state and local law enforcement agencies, state and local law
enforcement officials would only be able to assist FPS in functions
such as crowd and traffic control, monitoring law enforcement
communications and dispatch, and training. Memorandums of agreement
between FPS and local law enforcement agencies would help address the
jurisdictional issues that prevent local law enforcement agencies from
providing assistance at facilities with exclusive federal jurisdiction.
As an alternative to memorandums of agreement, according to FPS's
Director, the agency will rely on the informal relationships that exist
between local law enforcement agencies and FPS. However, whether this
type of relationship will provide FPS with the type of assistance it
will need under the inspector-based workforce is unknown. Officials
from five of the eight local law enforcement agencies we interviewed
stated that their agency did not have the capacity to take on the
additional job of responding to incidents at federal buildings and
stated that their departments were already strained for resources. FPS
and local law enforcement officials in the regions we visited also
stated that jurisdictional authority would pose a significant barrier
to gaining the assistance of local law enforcement agencies.
Representatives of local law enforcement agencies also expressed
concerns about being prohibited from entering GSA facilities with
service weapons, especially courthouses.[Footnote 7] Similarly, local
law enforcement officials in a major city stated that they cannot make
an arrest or initiate a complaint on federal property, so they have to
wait until a FPS officer or inspector arrives.
Another effort FPS has begun is to address its operational challenges
by recruiting an additional 150 inspectors to reach the mandated
staffing levels in the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations
Act.[Footnote 8] According to the Director of FPS, the addition of 150
inspectors to its current workforce will allow FPS to resume providing
proactive patrol and 24-hour presence based on risk and threat levels
at some facilities. However, these additional 150 inspectors will be
assigned to eight of FPS's 11 regions and thus will not have an impact
on the three regions that will not receive them. In addition, while
this increase will help FPS to achieve its mission, this staffing level
is still below the 1,279 employees that FPS had at the end of fiscal
year 2006 when, according to FPS officials, tenant agencies experienced
a decrease in service.
FPS's Risk Management Division is also in the process of developing a
new tool referred to as the Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP)
to replace its current system (FSRM) for completing BSAs.[Footnote 9]
According to FPS, a pilot version of RAMP is expected to be rolled out
in fiscal year 2009. The RAMP will be accessible to inspectors via a
secure wireless connection anywhere in the United States and will guide
them through the process of completing a BSA to ensure that
standardized information is collected on all GSA facilities. According
to FPS, once implemented, RAMP will allow inspectors to obtain
information from one source, generate reports automatically, enable the
agency to track selected countermeasures throughout their lifecycle,
address some issues with the subjectivity of BSAs, and reduce the
amount of time spent on administrative work by inspectors and managers.
FPS's Actions to Address Budgetary Challenges Have Had Adverse
Implications:
FPS funds its operations through the collection of security fees
charged to tenant agencies for security services. However, until
recently these fees have not been sufficient to cover its projected
operational costs. FPS has addressed this gap in a variety of ways.
When FPS was located in GSA it received additional funding from the
Federal Buildings Fund to cover the gap between collections and
costs.[Footnote 10] Since transferring to DHS, to make up for the
projected shortfalls to ensure that security at GSA facilities would
not be jeopardized, and to avoid a potential Anti-deficiency Act
violation in fiscal year 2005, FPS instituted a number of cost saving
measures that included restricted hiring and travel, limited training
and overtime, and no employee performance awards. In addition, in
fiscal year 2006, DHS had to transfer $29 million in emergency
supplemental funding to FPS. FPS also increased the basic security fee
charged to tenant agencies from 35 cents per square foot in fiscal year
2005 to 62 cents per square foot in fiscal year 2008. Because of these
actions, fiscal year 2007 was the first year FPS's collections were
sufficient to cover its costs. FPS also projects that collections will
cover its costs in fiscal year 2008. In fiscal year 2009, FPS's basic
security fee will increase to 66 cents per square foot, which
represents the fourth time FPS has increased the basic security fee
since transferring to DHS.
However, according to FPS, its cost savings measures have had adverse
implications, including low morale among staff, increased attrition and
the loss of institutional knowledge, as well as difficulties in
recruiting new staff. In addition, several FPS police officers and
inspectors said that overwhelming workloads, uncertainty surrounding
their job security, and a lack of equipment have diminished morale
within the agency. These working conditions could potentially impact
the performance and safety of FPS personnel. FPS officials said the
agency has lost many of their most experienced law enforcement staff in
recent years and several police officers and inspectors said they were
actively looking for new jobs outside FPS. For example, FPS reports
that 73 inspectors, police officers, and physical security specialists
left the agency in fiscal year 2006, representing about 65 percent of
the total attrition in the agency for that year. Attrition rates have
steadily increased from fiscal years 2004 through 2007, as shown in
figure 3. For example, FPS's overall attrition rate increased from
about 2 percent in fiscal year 2004 to about 14 percent in fiscal year
2007. The attrition rate for the inspector position has increased,
despite FPS's plan to move to an inspector-based workforce. FPS
officials said its cost saving measures have helped the agency address
projected revenue shortfalls. The measures have been eliminated in
fiscal year 2008. In addition, according to FPS, these measures will
not be necessary in fiscal year 2009 because the basic security fee was
increased and staffing has decreased.
Figure 3: FPS's Attrition Rates, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007:
This figure is a combination line graph showing FPS's attrition rates,
fiscal years 2004 through 2007. The X axis represents fiscal year, and
the Y axis represents the attrition rate (percentage). The lines
represent the inspector attrition, police officer attrition, and total
attrition.
Fiscal year: "2004";
Total Attrition: 0.65;
Officer attrition: 0.56;
Inspector attrition: 0.83.
Fiscal year: "2005";
Total Attrition: 7.14;
Officer attrition: 5.49;
Inspector attrition: 5.72.
Fiscal year: "2006";
Total Attrition: 8.76;
Officer attrition: 10.96;
Inspector attrition: 6.84.
Fiscal year: "2007";
Total Attrition: 14.16;
Officer attrition: 16.28;
Inspector attrition: 11.28.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Note: "Inspectors" includes an unknown number of physical security
specialists, who do not have law enforcement authority. The category
"Total attrition" includes inspectors, police officers, physical
security specialists, special agents, and administrative and support
staff.
FPS's Basic Security Fee Does Not Account for Risk and Raises Questions
about Equity:
FPS's primary means of funding its operations is the fee it charges
tenant agencies for basic security services, as shown in figure 4. Some
of the basic security services covered by this fee include law
enforcement activities at GSA facilities, preliminary investigations,
the capture and detention of suspects, and BSAs, among other services.
The basic security fee does not include contract guard services.
Figure 4: Amount of Fees Collected by FPS, Fiscal Years 2006 through
2009:
This figure is a vertical combination bar graph showing amount of fees
collected by FPS, fiscal years 2006 through 2009. The X axis represents
year, and the Y axis represents dollars in millions. The bars represent
security work authorization fees, building specific fees, and basic
security fees.
Year: 2006;
Basic Security: 112;
Building Specific fees: 42;
Security Work Authorization fees: 53.
Year: 2007;
Basic Security: 128;
Building Specific fees: 44;
Security Work Authorization fees: 50.
Year: 2008;
Basic Security: 187;
Building Specific fees: 23;
Security Work Authorization fees: 20.
Year: 2009;
Basic Security: 190;
Building Specific fees: 24;
Security Work Authorization fees: 20.
[See PDF for image]
Source: FPS.
Note: This figure does not include pass through funding, which is
funding provided to FPS by customer agencies for building-specific and
SWA security services. Pass through funding is not directly
appropriated to FPS, but FPS collects it from customer agencies and
uses the funds to manage the procurement and installation of security
countermeasures or other security services provided through the
building-specific or SWA programs. Fiscal years 2008 and 2009 are
projections.
[End of figure]
However, this fee does not fully account for the risk faced by
particular buildings or the varying levels of basic security services
provided, and does not reflect the actual cost of providing services.
In fiscal year 2008, FPS charged 62 cents per square foot for basic
security and has been authorized to increase the rate to 66 cents per
square foot in fiscal year 2009. FPS charges federal agencies the same
basic security fee regardless of the perceived threat to that
particular building or agency. Although FPS categorizes buildings into
security levels based on its assessment of the building's risk and
size, this categorization does not affect the security fee charged by
FPS. For example, level I facilities typically face less risk because
they are generally small storefront-type operations with a low level of
public contact, such as a small post office or Social Security
Administration office. However, these facilities are charged the same
basic security fee of 62 cents per square foot as a level IV facility
that has a high volume of public contact and may contain high-risk law
enforcement and intelligence agencies and highly sensitive government
records.
In addition, FPS's basic security rate has raised questions about
equity because federal agencies are required to pay the fee regardless
of the level of service FPS provides or the cost of providing the
service. For instance, in some of the regions we visited, FPS officials
described situations in which staff is stationed hundreds of miles from
buildings under its responsibility. Many of these buildings rarely
receive services from FPS staff and rely mostly on local police for law
enforcement services. However, FPS charges these tenant agencies the
same basic security fees as those buildings in major metropolitan areas
in which numerous FPS police officers and inspectors are stationed and
are available to provide security services.
FPS's cost of providing services is not reflected in its basic security
charges. For instance, a June 2006 FPS workload study estimating the
amount of time spent on various security services showed differences in
the amount of resources dedicated to buildings at various security
levels. The study said that FPS staff spend approximately six times
more hours providing security services to higher-risk buildings (levels
III and IV buildings) compared to lower-risk buildings (levels I and II
buildings). In addition, a 2007 Booz Allen Hamilton report of FPS's
operational costs found that FPS does not link the actual cost of
providing basic security services with the security fees it charges
tenant agencies. The report recommends incorporating a security fee
that takes into account the complexity or the level of effort of the
service being performed for the higher level security facilities. The
report states that FPS's failure to consider the costs of protecting
buildings at varying risk levels could result in some tenants being
overcharged. We also have reported that basing government fees on the
cost of providing a service promotes equity, especially when the cost
of providing the service differs significantly among different users,
as is the case with FPS.[Footnote 11]
Several stakeholders have raised questions about whether FPS has an
accurate understanding of the cost of providing security at GSA
facilities. An ICE Chief Financial Office official said FPS has
experienced difficulty in estimating its costs because of inaccurate
cost data. In addition, OMB officials said they have asked FPS to
develop a better cost accounting system in past years. The 2007 Booz
Allen Hamilton report found that FPS does not have a methodology to
assign costs to its different security activities and that it should
begin capturing the cost of providing various security services to
better plan, manage and budget its resources. We have also previously
cited problems with ICE's and FPS's financial system, including
problems associated with tracking expenditures.[Footnote 12] We also
have previously reported on the importance of having accurate cost
information for budgetary purposes and to set fees and prices for
services. We have found that without accurate cost information it is
difficult for agencies to determine if fees need to be increased or
decreased, accurately measure performance, and improve efficiency.
FPS Faces Limitations in Assessing Its Performance:
To determine how well it is accomplishing its mission to protect GSA
facilities, FPS has identified some output measures, such as
determining whether security countermeasures have been deployed and are
fully operational, the amount of time it takes to respond to an
incident and the percentage of BSAs completed on time. Output measures
assess activities, not the results of those activities. However, FPS
has not developed outcome measures to evaluate the results and the net
effect of its efforts to protect GSA facilities. While output measures
are helpful, outcome measures are also important because they can
provide FPS with broader information on program results, such as the
extent to which its decision to move to an inspector-based workforce
will enhance security at GSA facilities or help identify the security
gaps that remain at GSA facilities and determine what action may be
needed to address them. The Government Performance and Results Act
requires federal agencies to, among other things, measure agency
performance in achieving outcome oriented goals. Measuring performance
allows organizations to track the progress they are making toward their
goals and gives managers critical information on which to base
decisions for improving their performance. In addition, we and other
federal agencies have maintained that adequate and reliable performance
measures are a necessary component of effective management. We have
also found that performance measures should provide agency managers
with timely, action-oriented information in a format conducive to
helping them make decisions that improve program performance, including
decisions to adjust policies and priorities.
FPS is also limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of its
efforts to protect GSA facilities, in part, because it does not have a
data management system that will allow it to provide complete and
accurate information on its security program. Without a reliable data
management system, it is difficult for FPS and others to determine the
effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA facilities or for FPS to
accurately track and monitor incident response time, effectiveness of
security countermeasures, and whether BSAs are completed on time.
Currently, FPS primarily uses the Web Records Management System
(WebRMS) and Security Tracking System to track and monitor output
measures. However, FPS acknowledged that there are weaknesses with
these systems which make it difficult to accurately track and monitor
its performance. In addition, according to many FPS officials at the
seven regions we visited, the data maintained in WebRMS may not be a
reliable and accurate indicator of crimes and other incidents because
FPS does not write an incident report for every incident, all incidents
are not entered into WebRMS and because the types and definitions of
items prohibited in buildings vary not only region by region, but also
building by building. For example, a can of pepper spray may be
prohibited in one building, but allowed in another building in the same
region. According to FPS, having fewer police officers has also
decreased the total number of crime and incident reports entered in
WebRMS because there is less time spent on law enforcement activities.
The officials in one FPS region we visited stated that two years ago
there were 25,000 reports filed through WebRMS, however this year they
are projecting about 10,000 reports because there are fewer FPS police
officers to respond to an incident and write a report if necessary.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, our work shows that FPS has faced and
continues to face multiple challenges in ensuring that GSA facilities,
their occupants, and visitors, are protected from crime and the risk of
terrorist attack. In the report we issued last week, we recommended
that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of FPS to
develop and implement a strategic approach to manage its staffing
resources; clarify roles and responsibilities of local law enforcement
agencies in regards to responding to incidents at GSA facilities;
improve FPS's use of the fee-based system by developing a method to
accurately account for the cost of providing security services to
tenant agencies; assess whether FPS's current use of a fee-based system
or an alternative funding mechanism is the most appropriate manner to
fund the agency; and develop and implement specific guidelines and
standards for measuring its performance including the collection and
analysis of data. DHS concurred with these recommendations and we are
encouraged that FPS is in the process of addressing them.
This concludes our testimony. We are pleased to answer any questions
you might have.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Mark
Goldstein at 202-512-2834 or by email at goldsteinm@gao.gov.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Daniel
Cain, Tammy Conquest, Colin Fallon, Katie Hamer, Daniel Hoy, and Susan
Michal-Smith.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For the purposes of this testimony, the 9,000 facilities referred
to are under the control or custody of GSA.
[2] GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces
Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal
Facilities, GAO-08-683 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008).
[3] GAO, Homeland Security: Transformation Strategy Needed to Address
Challenges Facing the Federal Protective Service, GAO-04-537
(Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2004). DHS Office of Inspector General,
Federal Protective Service Needs To Improve its Oversight of the
Contract Guard Program, OIG-07-05 (Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2006).
[4] FPS officials have stated that there is no official policy on the
number of buildings assigned to each inspector. The number of buildings
is entirely dependent on geographic dispersion and risk level.
[5] Pub. L. No 110-161, 121 Stat 1844, 2051 (2007).
[6] GAO, Federal Real Property: DHS Has Made Progress, but Additional
Actions Are Needed to Address Real Property Management and Security
Challenges, GAO-07-658 (Washington, DC.: June 2007).
[7] 18 U.S.C. § 930(a)
[8] The 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act required FPS to employ no
fewer than 1,200 employees, 900 of which must be law enforcement
personnel.
[9] RAMP will replace several FPS systems including its Security
Tracking System and the Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking
System and may be integrated with other systems associated with the BSA
program.
[10] Established by Congress in 1972 and administered by GSA, the
Federal Buildings Fund is a revolving fund in the U.S. Treasury into
which federal agency rent and certain other moneys are deposited.
Moneys deposited into the fund are available, subject to congressional
appropriation, for GSA's real property management and related
activities. See 40 U.S.C. § 592.
[11] GAO, Federal User Fees: A Design Guide, GAO-08-386SP (Washington,
D.C.: May 29, 2008). GAO, Understanding the Tax Reform Debate:
Background, Criteria & Questions, GAO-05-1009SP (Washington, D.C.:
September 1, 2005).
[12] GAO, Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in
Transforming Immigration Programs, GAO-05-81 (Washington, D.C.: October
14, 2004). GAO, Homeland Security: Departmentwide Integrated Financial
Management Systems Remain a Challenge, GAO-07-536 (Washington, D.C.:
June 21, 2007).
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