Homeland Security
Federal Protective Service's Contract Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract Guards Gao ID: GAO-10-341 April 13, 2010To accomplish its mission of protecting about 9,000 federal facilities, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) currently has a budget of about $1 billion, about 1,225 full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards. FPS obligated $659 million for guard services in fiscal year 2009. This report assesses the challenges FPS faces in managing its guard contractors, overseeing guards deployed at federal facilities, and the actions, if any, FPS has taken to address these challenges. To address these objectives, GAO conducted site visits at 6 of FPS's 11 regions; interviewed FPS officials, guards, and contractors; and analyzed FPS's contract files. GAO also conducted covert testing at 10 judgmentally selected level IV facilities in four cities. A level IV facility has over 450 employees and a high volume of public contact.
FPS faces a number of challenges in managing its guard contractors that hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. FPS requires contractors to provide guards who have met training and certification requirements, but 7 of 7 guard contractors we reviewed were not in compliance with this requirement. Specifically, we reported in July 2009 that 62 percent, or 411, of the 663 guards employed by 7 of FPS's 38 contractors and deployed to federal facilities had at least one expired certification, including those showing that the guard has not committed domestic violence, which make the guards ineligible to carry firearms. As of February 2010, according to FPS data, 435 of the 663 guards are now fully certified, 167 are not fully certified, and 61 guards are no longer working on the contract. FPS's guard contract also states that a contractor who does not comply with the contract is subject to enforcement action. FPS did not take any enforcement actions against these 7 contractors for noncompliance. In fact, FPS exercised the option to extend their contracts. FPS also did not comply with its requirement that a performance evaluation of each contractor be completed annually and that these evaluations and other performance-related data be included in the contract file. FPS also faces challenges in ensuring that many of the 15,000 guards have the required training and certification to be deployed at a federal facility. In July 2009, we reported that since 2004, FPS had not provided X-ray and magnetometer training to about 1,500 guards in one region. As of January 2010, these guards had not received this training and continued to work at federal facilities in this region. X-ray and magnetometer training is important because guards control access points at federal facilities. In addition, once guards are deployed to a federal facility, they are not always complying with assigned responsibilities (post orders). For example, we identified security vulnerabilities when GAO investigators successfully passed undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS guards with components for an improvised explosive device concealed on their persons at 10 level IV facilities in four cities in major metropolitan areas. Since July 2009, FPS has conducted 53 similar tests, and in over half of these tests some guards did not identify prohibited items, such as guns and knives. In response to GAO's July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of actions that once fully implemented could help address challenges it faces in managing its contract guard program. For example, FPS has increased the number of guard inspections at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. FPS also revised its X-ray and magnetometer training; however, guards will not all be fully trained until the end of 2010, although they are deployed at federal facilities. FPS recognized that its guard program has long-standing challenges and in 2009 contemplated a number of changes to the program, including assuming responsibility for all guard training and/or federalizing some guard positions at some federal facilities. However, FPS has not taken any actions in pursuing these ideas.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Mark L. Goldstein Team: Government Accountability Office: Physical Infrastructure Phone: No phone on recordGAO-10-341, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Contract Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract Guards
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2010:
Homeland Security:
Federal Protective Service's Contract Guard Program Requires More
Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract Guards:
GAO-10-341:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-341, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
To accomplish its mission of protecting about 9,000 federal
facilities, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) currently has a
budget of about $1 billion, about 1,225 full-time employees, and about
15,000 contract security guards. FPS obligated $659 million for guard
services in fiscal year 2009.
This report assesses the challenges FPS faces in managing its guard
contractors, overseeing guards deployed at federal facilities, and the
actions, if any, FPS has taken to address these challenges. To address
these objectives, GAO conducted site visits at 6 of FPS‘s 11 regions;
interviewed FPS officials, guards, and contractors; and analyzed FPS‘s
contract files. GAO also conducted covert testing at 10 judgmentally
selected level IV facilities in four cities. A level IV facility has
over 450 employees and a high volume of public contact.
What GAO Found:
FPS faces a number of challenges in managing its guard contractors
that hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. FPS requires
contractors to provide guards who have met training and certification
requirements, but 7 of 7 guard contractors we reviewed were not in
compliance with this requirement. Specifically, we reported in July
2009 that 62 percent, or 411, of the 663 guards employed by 7 of FPS‘s
38 contractors and deployed to federal facilities had at least one
expired certification, including those showing that the guard has not
committed domestic violence, which make the guards ineligible to carry
firearms. As of February 2010, according to FPS data, 435 of the 663
guards are now fully certified, 167 are not fully certified, and 61
guards are no longer working on the contract. FPS‘s guard contract
also states that a contractor who does not comply with the contract is
subject to enforcement action. FPS did not take any enforcement
actions against these 7 contractors for noncompliance. In fact, FPS
exercised the option to extend their contracts. FPS also did not
comply with its requirement that a performance evaluation of each
contractor be completed annually and that these evaluations and other
performance-related data be included in the contract file.
FPS also faces challenges in ensuring that many of the 15,000 guards
have the required training and certification to be deployed at a
federal facility. In July 2009, we reported that since 2004, FPS had
not provided X-ray and magnetometer training to about 1,500 guards in
one region. As of January 2010, these guards had not received this
training and continued to work at federal facilities in this region. X-
ray and magnetometer training is important because guards control
access points at federal facilities. In addition, once guards are
deployed to a federal facility, they are not always complying with
assigned responsibilities (post orders). For example, we identified
security vulnerabilities when GAO investigators successfully passed
undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS guards with
components for an improvised explosive device concealed on their
persons at 10 level IV facilities in four cities in major metropolitan
areas. Since July 2009, FPS has conducted 53 similar tests, and in
over half of these tests some guards did not identify prohibited
items, such as guns and knives.
In response to GAO‘s July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of
actions that once fully implemented could help address challenges it
faces in managing its contract guard program. For example, FPS has
increased the number of guard inspections at federal facilities in
some metropolitan areas. FPS also revised its X-ray and magnetometer
training; however, guards will not all be fully trained until the end
of 2010, although they are deployed at federal facilities. FPS
recognized that its guard program has long-standing challenges and in
2009 contemplated a number of changes to the program, including
assuming responsibility for all guard training and/or federalizing
some guard positions at some federal facilities. However, FPS has not
taken any actions in pursuing these ideas.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends, among other things, that the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) direct the Director of FPS to
(1) identify other approaches that would be cost-beneficial for
protecting federal buildings, and (2) increase contract guard program
oversight and step up enforcement when noncompliance occurs. DHS
concurred with seven of GAO‘s eight recommendations. DHS did not fully
concur with GAO‘s recommendation to issue a standardized record-
keeping format to ensure that contract files have required
documentation.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-341] or key
components. For more information, contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-
2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Scope and Methodology:
Background:
FPS Faces Challenges Managing Its Guard Contractors That Hamper Its
Ability to Protect Federal Facilities:
FPS Faces Challenges with Overseeing Guards That Raise Concern about
Protection of Federal Facilities:
Recent Actions Taken by FPS May Help Improve Oversight of the Contract
Guard Program:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Guard Training and Certifications Required by FPS Contracts:
Figure:
Figure 1: Number of FPS Guards and Federal Facilities with Guards, by
Region:
Abbreviations:
CCG: Consolidated Contracting Group:
CERTS: Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking System:
COTR: Contracting Officer Technical Representative:
CPARS: Contractor Performance Assessment System:
CPR: cardiopulmonary resuscitation:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DVD: digital video disc:
FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulation:
FPS: Federal Protective Service:
GSA: General Services Administration:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
IED: improvised explosive device:
NPPD: National Protection and Programs Directorate:
RAMP: Risk Assessment Management Program:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 13, 2010:
Congressional Requesters:
Over 1 million government employees work in federal facilities, and
members of the public visit such facilities each year. Protecting
these facilities from a potential terrorist attack or acts of violence
remains a daunting challenge. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is
the primary agency with responsibility for providing law enforcement
and related security services for the nearly 9,000 facilities that are
under the control and custody of the General Services Administration
(GSA). To accomplish its mission of protecting federal facilities, FPS
currently has a budget of about $1 billion,[Footnote 1] about 1,225
full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards
(guards) deployed at about 2,360 federal facilities across the
country.[Footnote 2] In fiscal year 2009, FPS obligated $659 million
for guard services, which represents the single largest item in its
budget.
FPS's contract guard program is the most visible component of its
operations as well as the first public contact for individuals
entering a federal facility. FPS relies heavily on its guards and
considers them to be the agency's "eyes and ears" while performing
their duties. Guards are primarily responsible for controlling access
to federal facilities by (1) checking the identification of government
employees who work there as well as members of the public who visit,
and (2) operating security equipment, such as X-ray machines and
magnetometers to screen for prohibited materials, such as firearms,
knives, explosives, or items intended to be used to fabricate an
explosive or incendiary device.[Footnote 3] Guards do not have arrest
authority but can detain individuals who are being disruptive or pose
a danger to public safety.
You requested that we evaluate FPS's oversight of its contract guard
program. We provided you with testimony on our preliminary findings in
July 2009 in which we specified a number of our concerns with FPS's
management of its contract guard program.[Footnote 4] This report
provides additional information and analysis on the challenges FPS
faces in managing its guard contractors and guards, and it describes
what actions, if any, FPS has taken to address these challenges.
During our review, FPS transferred from the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to the
National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) on October 28,
2009.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the challenges FPS faces in managing its guard
contractors and guards, we conducted site visits at 6 of FPS's 11
regions. To select these 6 regions, we considered the number of FPS
guards, contractors, and federal facilities, and the geographic
dispersion of the regions across the United States. At each region, we
observed FPS's guard inspection process and interviewed FPS's regional
manager, contract guard program managers, inspectors who are
responsible for conducting guard inspections; guards, and contractors.
We also interviewed officials at GSA headquarters and regional
security officials in all 11 FPS regions, to identify any concerns GSA
has with FPS's contract guard program.[Footnote 5] We also met with
representatives of the National Association of Security Companies to
learn about the contract security guard industry. In addition, we
reviewed and analyzed FPS's contract requirements and training and
certifications requirements, and reviewed the Security Guard
Information Manual. We also randomly selected 663 out of approximately
15,000 guard training records that were maintained in FPS's Contract
Guard Employment Requirements Tracking System (CERTS) and validated
them against the contractual requirements that were in effect at the
time of our review. To assess the reliability of the CERTS data, we
interviewed agency officials about data quality, reviewed relevant
documentation, and performed our own electronic testing of the data.
Because CERTS was not fully reliable for our purpose of determining
the extent to which there were guards with expired certifications or
training records, we corroborated our findings using FPS regional
spreadsheets and information provided by the contractors, or the
actual guard files.
To determine what actions, if any, FPS has taken against contractors
for not complying with the terms of the contract, we reviewed the
contract files for 7 of FPS's 38 guard contractors. We selected these
7 contractors because our previous work showed that they had contract
compliance issues. In addition to reviewing FPS's contract files, we
interviewed contracting officials in these locations to learn about
what information should be included in the contract files. We also
requested all contract evaluations for January 2006 through June 2009.
We estimate that the number of guard contracts requiring a performance
evaluation during this period would have totaled approximately 375.
[Footnote 6] We analyzed a random sample of 99 FPS contractor
evaluations to determine how FPS evaluated the performance of its
contractors on an annual basis. We conducted covert testing at 10
judgmentally selected level IV facilities. The facilities were
selected from FPS's most current listing of federal facilities by
security level. The criteria for choosing these facilities include
public access, location in a major metropolitan area, and level IV
facility security level. The results of our audit work are not
generalizable. However, almost 54 percent of FPS's 15,000 guards and
52 percent of the 2,360 facilities that have guards are located in the
6 regions where we conducted our audit work. Because of the
sensitivity of some of the information in our report, we cannot
provide information about the specific locations of the incidents
discussed.
To determine what actions, if any, FPS has taken to address challenges
with managing its contract guard program, we reviewed new contract
guard program guidance issued since our July 2009 testimony. We
conducted follow-up site visits at 3 of the original 6 FPS regions
that we visited and interviewed FPS officials, contractors, and guards
who are responsible for implementing FPS's new contract guard program
guidance. We also observed guard inspections and covert testing done
by FPS in August and November 2009.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to February 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, FPS has relied on a substantial contract guard force to
help accomplish its mission of protecting federal facilities. The
level of security FPS provides at each of the 9,000 federal facilities
varies depending on the building's security level.[Footnote 7] While
the contractor has the primary responsibility for training and
ensuring that the guards have met certification requirements, FPS is
ultimately responsible for oversight of the guards and relies on about
752 inspectors located in its 11 regions to inspect guard posts and
verify that training, certifications, and time cards are accurate. It
is also responsible for providing X-ray and magnetometer training to
the guards. Figure 1 shows the location of FPS's 11 regions and the
number of guards and federal facilities with guards in each of these
regions, as of July 2009.
Figure 1: Number of FPS Guards and Federal Facilities with Guards, by
Region:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of the U.S.]
(1) New England Region:
Guards: 4443;
Federal facilities with guards: 101.
(2) Northeast & Caribbean Region:
Guards: 1,050;
Federal facilities with guards: 185.
(3) Mid-Atlantic Region:
Guards: 1,356;
Federal facilities with guards: 259.
(4) Southeast Region:
Guards: 1,801;
Federal facilities with guards: 385.
(5) Great Lakes Region:
Guards: 1,396;
Federal facilities with guards: 301.
(6) The Heartland Region:
Guards: 571;
Federal facilities with guards: 135.
(7) Greater Southwest Region:
Guards: 1,476;
Federal facilities with guards: 294.
(8) Rocky Mountain Region:
Guards: 359;
Federal facilities with guards: 132.
(9) Pacific Rim Region:
Guards: 1,022;
Federal facilities with guards: 292.
(10) Northwest/Arctic Region:
Guards: 369;
Federal facilities with guards: 111.
(11) National Capital Region:
Guards: 2,998;
Federal facilities with guards: 165.
Sources: GAO analysis of FPS data and Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Some of the key responsibilities of FPS's guards include controlling
access, enforcing property rules and regulations, detecting and
reporting criminal acts, and responding to emergency situations
involving the safety and security of the facility. Guards may only
detain, not arrest, an individual, and their authority typically does
not extend beyond the facility. Before guards are assigned to a post
or an area of responsibility at a federal facility, FPS requires that
they all undergo background suitability checks and complete
approximately 128 hours of training provided by the contractor or FPS,
including 8 hours of X-ray and magnetometer training. Guards must also
pass an FPS-administered written examination and possess the necessary
certificates, licenses, and permits as required by the contract. FPS
also requires its guards to complete 40 hours of refresher training
every 2 to 3 years, depending on the terms of the contract. Some
states also require that guards obtain additional training and
certifications. In addition, in response to our July 2009 report, in
August 2009, FPS revised its X-ray and magnetometer training
requirements and began requiring its guards to watch a 15-minute
digital video disc (DVD) on bomb component detection that addresses
types of bombs, bomb components, abnormal behavioral such as
apprehension or nervousness, and actions to take if a bomb threat is
detected. FPS also requires the contractor to ensure that all guards
view this DVD when they receive refresher training, which occurs every
2-3 years after the basic training.
As of October 2009, FPS had 125 guard contracts with 38 different
contractors.[Footnote 8] The majority of FPS guard service contracts
are for routine security services at federal facilities and are for a
12-month base period. They also have four 12-month options. FPS's
contractors are responsible for providing and maintaining all guard
services as described in the contract statement of work, including:
* management,
* supervision,
* training,
* equipment,
* supplies, and:
* licensing.
FPS has three Consolidated Contracting Groups (CCG) located in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Grand Prairie, Texas; and Federal Way,
Washington, that provide contracting support for guard services and
other FPS mission-related acquisitions. Within the CCGs, 43 warranted
contracting officers are dedicated to FPS contracts. After awarding a
contract, the contracting officers are responsible for enforcing the
terms and conditions of the guard contracts, including authorizing and
negotiating any changes to the contract. Each year the contracting
officer is required to perform an annual review of the contract and
take enforcement action if the services have not been provided, in
accordance with the terms of the contract.[Footnote 9] The contracting
officer also issues modifications and ensures proper payments are made
in accordance with the contract.
In addition to the 43 warranted contracting officers, approximately 60
Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTR) work with the
contracting officers to complete annual contractor performance
evaluations and determine if a contract option should be exercised.
COTRs are responsible for daily contract oversight, assessing a
contractor's performance, and ensuring that the contractor is meeting
all training, certification, and suitability requirements. Many of the
COTRs are current or former inspectors and may have other job duties
in addition to their COTR responsibilities, depending on their
regional resource alignment.
FPS's inspectors are also involved in the oversight of contract
guards. The inspectors help the COTRs oversee guards and contractors.
For example, the COTR relies on inspectors to perform guard
inspections and report any problems with respect to the performance of
guards on post to the COTR. Finally, FPS has a contract guard program
manager in each of its 11 regions who is responsible for coordinating
with the contracting officers and the COTRs to ensure that performance
monitoring and reporting are being used to ensure continuous high-
quality contractor performance in their regions.
FPS Faces Challenges Managing Its Guard Contractors That Hamper Its
Ability to Protect Federal Facilities:
Some FPS Guard Contractors Did Not Always Comply with the Terms of
Contracts:
FPS continues to face challenges with overseeing its guard contractors
that hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. FPS generally
requires its contractors to provide guards who have completed the
training and certification requirements shown in table 1. The most
notable area where FPS contract requirements vary is regarding X-ray
and magnetometer training. For example, for 3 of the 7 contractors we
reviewed, FPS's contracts do not require X-ray and magnetometer
training if the guards were not assigned to an access control point.
In contrast, guards employed by the other 4 contractors we reviewed
were required to receive X-ray and magnetometer training regardless of
their duty station.
Table 1: Guard Training and Certifications Required by FPS Contracts:
Training: Contractor provided:
* 64 hours of basic training;
* 32 hours of live firearms training;
* 8 hours of classroom firearms training;
* 8 hours of basic baton training;
Training: FPS provided:
* 8 hours of government training;
* 8 hours of X-ray and magnetometer training;
* 40 hours of refresher training (including X-ray and magnetometer)
every 2 to 3 years;
Certifications:
* DHS background investigation;
* Medical examination certificate;
* Domestic violence declaration;
* Passing score on written examination;
* Firearms qualification certificate;
* Expandable/straight baton training certificate;
* Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training certificate;
* Basic training certificate;
* Firearms training certificate;
* Government-provided training certificate;
* Magnetometer/X-ray training certificate;
* First aid training certificate.
Source: FPS.
[End of table]
On the basis of our review of FPS's contractual requirements and guard
training and certification records maintained by FPS and/or the
contractor, we reported in July 2009 that 62 percent, or 411, of the
663 guards employed by 7 of FPS's 38 guard contractors and
subsequently deployed to a federal facility had at least one expired
certification. Examples of expired certifications included firearms
qualification, background investigation, domestic violence
declaration, CPR, or first aid training certification. More
specifically, we also found that over 75 percent of the 354 guards at
one level IV facility had expired certifications or the contractor had
no record of the training. According to the contractor information for
another contract, almost 40 percent of the 191 guards at another level
IV facility had domestic violence declarations that had expired.
Guards are not permitted to carry firearms unless they have such
declarations.
Since our July 2009 report, we have requested information from FPS to
determine whether the status of these guards' certifications had
changed. FPS's data showed that of the 663 guards, 435 are now fully
certified and trained, 167 are not fully certified and trained, and 61
guards are no longer working on the contract.
We also testified in July 2009 that some guard contractors were not
providing building-specific training, such as on actions to take
during a building evacuation or a building emergency. This lack of
training may have contributed to several incidents in which guards
neglected their assigned responsibilities. For example,
* At a level IV facility, the guards did not follow evacuation
procedures and left two access points unattended, thereby leaving the
facility vulnerable.
* At a different level IV facility, a guard allowed employees to enter
the building while an incident involving suspicious packages was being
investigated.
* At a level III facility, a guard allowed employees to access an area
that was required to be evacuated because of a suspicious package.
In addition to receiving insufficient building-specific training,
guards generally said that they did not receive scenario-based
training and thus were not sure what they should do in certain
situations. During our site visits at 6 FPS regions, we interviewed
over 50 guards and presented them with an incident that occurred at a
federal facility in 2008. Specifically, we asked the guards whether
they would assist an FPS inspector chasing an individual escaping from
a federal facility in handcuffs.[Footnote 10] According to FPS
policies and in accordance with contract requirements, contract guards
are responsible for detecting, delaying, detaining, or apprehending
persons attempting to gain unauthorized access to government property
or otherwise violating laws, rules, and regulations. The guards'
responses varied, however. Some guards stated that they would assist
the FPS inspector and apprehend the individual, while others stated
that they would likely do nothing and stay at their posts because they
feared being fired for leaving their posts. Some guards also told us
that they would not intervene because of the threat of a liability
lawsuit for use of force and did not want to risk losing their jobs.
Moreover, guards employed by some contractors were not always
complying with post orders once they were deployed to federal
facilities. FPS's post orders describe a number of things that guards
are prohibited from doing while on post. For example, guards are
prohibited from sleeping, using government property such as computers,
and test-firing a weapon unless at a range course. However, as we
testified in July 2009, when FPS routinely inspects guard posts, it
has found incidents at level IV facilities where guards were not
complying with post orders, including the following:
* A guard was caught using government computers while he was supposed
to be standing post, to further his private for-profit adult Web site.
* A guard attached a motion sensor to a pole at the entrance to a
federal facility garage to alert him whenever a person was approaching
his post. Another law enforcement agency discovered the device and
reported it to FPS.
* A guard, during regular business hours, accidentally fired his
firearm in a restroom while practicing drawing his weapon.
* A guard failed to recognize or did not properly X-ray a box
containing semiautomatic handguns at the loading dock at one federal
facility we visited. FPS became aware of the situation only because
the handguns were delivered to FPS.
In each of these incidents, the guards were fired or disciplined.
However, FPS continues to find instances where guards are not
complying with post orders. For example, 2 days after the July 2009
hearing, another guard fired his firearm in a restroom in a level IV
facility while practicing drawing his weapon.
FPS Has Not Taken Actions against Some Contractors for Not Meeting the
Terms of the Contract:
FPS has not taken actions against some guard contractors that did not
comply with the terms of the contracts. According to FPS guard
contracts, a contractor has not complied with the terms of the
contract if the contractor has a guard working without valid
certifications or background suitability investigations, falsifies a
guard's training records, does not have a guard at a post, or has an
unarmed guard working an armed post. If FPS determines that a
contractor does not comply with these contract requirements, it can--
among other things--assess a financial deduction for nonperformed
work; elect not to exercise a contract option; or terminate the
contract for default or cause. Deductions are one type of action FPS
may use to address contractor nonperformance issues.
We reviewed the official contract files for the 7 contractors who, as
we testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts with
expired certification and training records to determine what action,
if any, FPS had taken against these contractors for contract
noncompliance. According to the documentation in the contract files,
FPS did not take any enforcement action against them for not complying
with the terms of the contract, a finding consistent with DHS's
Inspector General's 2009 report.[Footnote 11] In fact, FPS exercised
the option to extend the contracts of these 7 contractors. FPS
contracting officials told us that the contracting officer who is
responsible for enforcing the terms of the contract considers the
appropriate course of action among the available contractual remedies
on a case-by-case basis. For example, the decision of whether to
assess financial deductions is a subjective assessment in which the
contracting officer and the COTR take into account the value of the
nonperformance and the seriousness of the deficiency, according to FPS
contracting officials. According to FPS's Acquisitions Division
Director, financial deductions are rarely taken for contract
noncompliance and when they are the amount is generally insignificant.
FPS Did Not Always Comply with Its Procedures for Completing Annual
Performance Evaluations:
FPS requires that a performance evaluation be completed annually and
at the conclusion of the contract for those contracts exceeding
$100,000. Contractor performance evaluations are one of the most
important tools available for ensuring that the contractor meets the
terms of the contract. According to contracting officials, monetary
deductions do little to change contractor behavior, but contractors
recognize the importance of evaluations and that FPS uses them to help
determine whether to extend the contract. FPS policy also requires
contracting officials to consider past performance as one of several
technical evaluation factors in awarding new contracts. In addition,
given that other federal agencies rely on many of the same contractors
to provide security services, the need to complete accurate
evaluations of a contractor's past performance is critical.
FPS's contracting officers and COTRs did not always evaluate
contractors' performance as required, and some evaluations were
incomplete and not consistent with contractors' performance. We
reviewed a random sample of 99 contract performance evaluations from
calendar year 2006 through June 2009. These evaluations were for 38
contractors. Eighty-two of the 99 contract performance evaluations
showed that FPS assessed the quality of services provided by the
majority of its guard contractors as "satisfactory," "very good," or
"exceptional." For the remaining 17 evaluations, 11 showed that the
contractor's performance was "marginal," 1 as "unsatisfactory," and
assessments for 5 contractors were not complete. According to
applicable guidance, a contractor must meet contractual requirements
to obtain a satisfactory evaluation and a contractor should receive an
unsatisfactory evaluation if its performance does not meet most
contract requirements and recovery in a timely manner is not likely.
[Footnote 12] Nevertheless, we found instances where some contractors
received a satisfactory or better rating although they had not met
some of the terms of the contract. For example, contractors receiving
satisfactory or better ratings included the 7 contractors that had
guards with expired certification and training records working at
federal facilities. In addition, some performance evaluations that we
reviewed did not include a justification for the rating and there was
no other supporting documentation in the official contract file to
explain the rating. Moreover, there was no information in the contract
file that indicated that the COTR had communicated any performance
problems to the contracting officer.
FPS Did Not Always Comply with Procedures for Maintaining Contract
Files:
FPS's contracting officials told us that the contract files should
contain annual performance evaluations. In addition, if a contractor
has not met the terms of the contract, the contract file should also
contain guard inspection reports and correspondence between the
contracting officer and contractor, and any other written reports that
can be used to evaluate the contractor's performance in meeting the
terms of the contract. In addition, DHS's Office of Procurement
Operations has also established procedures for preparing and
organizing contract files and has provided contracting officials with
a standard checklist to identify the documentation required in each
stage of the contract award life cycle. According to this checklist,
the contract file should contain information about performance
monitoring, quality assurance records, and evaluations of contractor
performance for contracts over $100,000. The Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) also prescribes requirements for establishing,
maintaining, and disposing of contract files. It requires the head of
each office that performs contracting, contract administration, or
payment functions to establish files containing records of all
contractual actions.
FPS's CCGs did not follow these procedures for the contract files we
reviewed. Specifically, our review of the official contract files for
the 7 contractors who had guards with expired training and
certification records working at federal facilities showed that the
files were poorly documented, did not contain all of the required
performance-related information, and varied among the CCGs. For
example, contract files for 5 of the 7 contractors we reviewed did not
have guard inspection reports, justifications for extending the
contract, or annual performance evaluations. Without the performance-
related information, FPS has difficulty deciding whether to exercise a
contract option. Moreover, because federal agencies rely on many of
the same contractors to provide security services, the need to
consistently document contractor performance is important in
determining future contracts.
FPS Faces Challenges with Overseeing Guards That Raise Concern about
Protection of Federal Facilities:
FPS Is Not Providing All Guards with X-ray and Magnetometer Training
in Some Regions:
While FPS has given its guard contractors the responsibility to
conduct most of the training of guards, FPS is responsible for
conducting the 8 hours of X-ray and magnetometer training that all
guards are required to have. However, as we reported in July 2009, FPS
was not providing some of its guards with all of the required training
in the six regions we visited. For example, in one region, FPS has not
provided the required X-ray or magnetometer training to its almost
1,500 guards since 2004. X-ray and magnetometer training is important
because the majority of the guards are primarily responsible for using
this equipment to monitor and control access points at federal
facilities. Controlling access to a facility helps ensure that only
authorized personnel, vehicles, and materials are allowed to enter,
move within, and leave the facility.
In the absence of the X-ray and magnetometer training, one contractor
in the region said that it is relying on veteran guards who have
experience operating these machines to provide some on-the-job
training to new guards. FPS officials subsequently told us that the
contract for this region requires that only guards who are assigned to
work on posts that contain screening equipment are required to have 8
hours of X-ray and magnetometer training. However, in response to our
July 2009 testimony, FPS now requires all guards to receive 16 hours
of X-ray and magnetometer training. As of January 2010, these guards
had not received the 16 hours of training but continued to work at
federal facilities in this region. FPS plans to provide X-ray and
magnetometer training to all guards by the end of 2010.
Lapses and weaknesses in FPS's X-ray and magnetometer training have
contributed to several incidents at federal facilities in which the
guards neglected to carry out their responsibilities. For example, at
a level IV federal facility in a major metropolitan area, an infant in
a carrier was sent through the X-ray machine. Specifically, according
to an FPS official in that region, a woman with her infant in a
carrier attempted to enter the facility, which has child care
services. While retrieving her identification, the woman placed the
carrier on the X-ray machine.[Footnote 13] Because the guard was not
paying attention and the machine's safety features had been disabled,
causing the belt to operate continuously, the infant in the carrier
was sent through the X-ray machine. FPS investigated the incident and
dismissed the guard. However, the guard subsequently sued FPS for not
providing the required X-ray training. The guard won the suit because
FPS could not produce any documentation to show that the guard had
received the training, according to an FPS official.
FPS Lacks Assurance That Its Guards Have Required Certifications:
As we reported in July 2009, FPS's primary system--CERTS--for
monitoring and verifying whether guards have the training and
certifications required to stand post at federal facilities is not
fully reliable. Moreover, five of the six regions we visited did not
have current information on guard training and certifications. Guard
contractors are responsible for maintaining the status of each element
of the guards' certifications, such as firearms qualification,
domestic violence certification, and first aid training. These
certifications are subsequently entered into and tracked in CERTS by
FPS personnel in the regional program offices. According to FPS
officials in these five regions, updating CERTS is time-consuming and
they do not have the resources needed to keep up with the thousands of
paper files. Consequently, these five regions were not generally
relying on CERTS and instead were relying on the contractor to self-
report training and certification information about its guards.
Not having a fully reliable system to better track whether training
has occurred may have contributed to a situation in which a contractor
allegedly falsified training records. As we reported last summer, in
2007, FPS was not aware that a contractor who was responsible for
providing guard service at several level IV facilities in a major
metropolitan area had allegedly falsified training records until it
was notified by an employee of the company. According to FPS's
affidavit, the contractor allegedly repeatedly self-certified to FPS
that its guards had satisfied CPR and first aid training requirements,
as well as the contractually required biannual recertification
training, although the contractor knew that the guards had not
completed the required training and were not qualified to stand post
at federal facilities. According to FPS's affidavit, in exchange for a
$100 bribe, contractor officials provided a security guard with
certificates of completion for CPR and first aid. The case is
currently being litigated in U.S. District Court.
FPS Has Limited Assurance That Guards Are Complying with Post Orders
once They Are Deployed to Federal Facilities:
FPS has limited assurance that its 15,000 guards are complying with
post orders. As we testified in July 2009, we identified substantial
security vulnerabilities related to FPS's guard program. Each time
they tried, our investigators successfully passed undetected through
security checkpoints monitored by FPS guards with the components for
an improvised explosive device (IED) concealed on their persons at 10
level IV facilities in four cities in major metropolitan areas. We
planned additional tests but suspended them after achieving 100
percent test results, which highlighted the vulnerabilities federal
facilities face. The specific components for this device, items used
to conceal the device components, and the methods of concealment that
we used during our covert testing are classified, and thus are not
discussed in this report. Of the 10 level IV facilities we penetrated,
8 were government owned and 2 were leased facilities. The facilities
included field offices of a U.S. Senator and a U.S. Representative as
well as agencies of the Departments of Homeland Security,
Transportation, Health and Human Services, Justice, and State, and
others. The 2 leased facilities did not have any guards at the access
control point at the time of our testing. In August 2009, FPS told us
that the 2 leased facilities did not have guards because the
facilities were recently reclassified from a level IV to level II
based on the new Interagency Security Committee security standards.
Using publicly available information, our investigators identified a
type of device that a terrorist could use to cause damage to a federal
facility and threaten the safety of federal workers and the general
public. The device was an IED made up of two parts--a liquid explosive
and a low-yield detonator--and included a variety of materials not
typically brought into a federal facility by employees or the public.
Although the detonator itself could function as an IED, investigators
determined that it could also be used to set off a liquid explosive
and cause significantly more damage. To ensure safety during this
testing, we took precautions so that the IED would not explode. For
example, we lowered the concentration level of the material.[Footnote
14]
To gain entry into each of the 10 level IV facilities, our
investigators showed photo identification (state driver's licenses)
and walked through the magnetometer machines without incident. The
investigators also placed their briefcases with the IED material on
the conveyor belts of the X-ray machines, but the guards detected
nothing. Furthermore, our investigators did not receive any secondary
searches from the guards that might have revealed the IED material
that we brought into the facilities. At security checkpoints at 3 of
the 10 facilities, our investigators noticed that the guard was not
looking at the X-ray screen as some of the IED components passed
through the machine. A guard questioned an item in the briefcase at 1
of the 10 facilities, but the materials were subsequently allowed
through the X-ray machine. At each facility, once past the guard
screening checkpoint, our investigators proceeded to a restroom and
assembled the IED. At some of the facilities, the restrooms were
locked. Our investigators gained access by asking employees to let
them in. With the IED completely assembled in a briefcase, our
investigators walked freely around several floors of the facilities
and into various executive and legislative branch offices.
In addition, recent FPS penetration testing--similar to the covert
testing we conducted in May 2009--showed that guards continued to
experience problems with complying with post orders. Since July 2009,
FPS has conducted 53 penetration tests in the six regions we visited.
The guards identified the prohibited items (guns, knives, and fake
bombs) in 18 tests but did not identify the items in 35 tests.
More specifically, in August 2009, we accompanied FPS on 2 of these
penetration tests at a level IV facility. During 1 test, FPS agents
placed a bag containing a fake gun and knife on the X-ray machine
belt. The guard failed to identify the gun and knife on the X-ray
screen, and the undercover FPS official was able to retrieve his bag
and proceed to the check-in desk without incident. During a second
test, a knife was hidden on an FPS officer. During the test, the
magnetometer detected the knife, as did the hand wand, but the guard
failed to locate the knife and the FPS officer was able to gain access
to the facility. According to the FPS officer, the guards who failed
the test had not been provided the required X-ray and magnetometer
training. Upon further investigation, only 2 of the 11 guards at the
facility had the required X-ray and magnetometer training. In response
to the results of this test, FPS debriefed the contractor and moved
one of the guard posts to improve access control.
In November 2009, we accompanied FPS on another test of security
countermeasures at a different level IV facility. As in the previous
test, a FPS agent placed a bag containing a fake bomb on the X-ray
machine belt. The guard operating the X-ray machine did not identify
the fake bomb and the inspector was allowed to enter the facility with
it. In a second test, a FPS inspector placed a bag containing a fake
gun on the X-ray belt. The guard identified the gun and the FPS
inspector was detained. However, the FPS inspector was told to stand
in a corner and was not handcuffed or searched as required. In
addition, while all the guards were focusing on the individual with
the fake gun, a second FPS inspector walked through the security
checkpoint with two knives without being screened. In response to the
results of this test, FPS suspended 2 guards and provided additional
training to 2 guards.
Recent Actions Taken by FPS May Help Improve Oversight of the Contract
Guard Program:
FPS Is Increasing Guard Inspections at Facilities in Some Metropolitan
Areas, while the Number of Inspections at Other Facilities May Not
Increase:
In response to our July 2009 testimony, FPS has increased the number
of guard inspections at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas.
[Footnote 15] FPS currently requires two guard inspections to be
completed a week at level IV facilities. Prior to this new
requirement, FPS did not have a national requirement for guard
inspections, and each region we visited had requirements that ranged
from no inspection requirements to each inspector having to conduct
five inspections per month.
Overall, FPS's data show that the number of guard inspections has
increased nearly 40 percent, from 4,639 inspections in July 2009 to
6,501 in October 2009. However, about 54 percent of these inspections
occurred either at level IV facilities or in metropolitan areas and
not in rural areas, where we found that guard inspections are rarely
done. In our 2008 report, we found incidents in which guards deployed
to federal facilities in rural areas had not been inspected in over 1
year or where the inspections were done over the telephone, instead of
in person. In addition, while FPS's Director authorized overtime to
complete the additional inspections, previous funding challenges that
resulted in FPS limiting overtime raise questions about whether it
will be able to continue to authorize overtime to fund these increased
inspections. Moreover, concerns remain about the quality of guard
inspections. According to officials in one region, guard program
officials recently provided training for inspectors on how to conduct
and document guard inspections. However, despite this training,
program officials said that the quality of the guard inspections and
reports remains inconsistent. The guard inspection reports are one of
the key factors FPS uses to assess a contractor's performance.
FPS Is Modifying X-ray and Magnetometer Training Requirements for
Inspectors and Guards, but Has Not Addressed Other Training Issues:
FPS is in the process of providing additional X-ray and magnetometer
training, in response to our July testimony, but guards will not be
fully trained until the end of 2010. FPS plans to train its
inspectors--who will subsequently be responsible for training the
guards--first. Under the new program, FPS will require inspectors to
receive 30 hours of X-ray and magnetometer training and guards to
receive 16 hours of training. Prior to this new requirement, FPS
required guards to receive 8 hours of training on X-ray and
magnetometer machines. In July 2009, FPS also required each guard to
watch a government-provided DVD on bomb component detection by August
20, 2009. According to FPS, as of January 2010, approximately 78
percent, or 11,711, of the 15,000 guards had been certified as having
watched the DVD.
While the changes FPS has made to its X-ray and magnetometer training
will help to address some of the problems we found, there are some
weaknesses in the guard training. For example, one contractor told us
that one of the weaknesses associated with FPS's guard training
program is that it focuses primarily on prevention and detection but
does not adequately address challenge and response.[Footnote 16] This
contractor has developed specific scenario training and provides its
guards on other contracts with an additional 12 hours of training on
scenario-based examples, such as how to control a suicide bomber or
active shooter situation, evacuation, and shelter in place. The
contractor, who has multiple contracts with government agencies, does
not provide this scenario-based training to its guards on FPS
contracts because FPS does not require it. We also found that some
guards were still not provided building-specific training, such as
what actions to take during a building evacuation or a building
emergency. According to guards we spoke to in one region, guards
receive very little training on building emergency procedures during
basic training or the refresher training. These guards also said that
the only time they receive building emergency training is once they
are on post. Consequently, some guards do not know how to operate
basic building equipment, such as the locks or the building
ventilation system, which is important in a building evacuation or
building emergency.
FPS Is Developing a New System to Monitor Guard Training and
Certifications, but More Work Remains:
In 2007, FPS began developing a new system to replace several legacy
GSA systems including CERTS, Security Tracking System, and other
systems associated with the facility security assessment program. The
new system, referred to as the Risk Assessment Management Program
(RAMP), is designed to be a central database for capturing and
managing facility security, including the risks posed to federal
facilities and the countermeasures that are in place to mitigate risk.
It is also expected to enable FPS to manage guard certifications and
to conduct and track guard inspections electronically as opposed to
manually. RAMP will also allow FPS to produce regular reports on the
status of guards and guard contracts and to address issues with guards
and contractors as they arise. According to FPS officials, the first
phase of RAMP training started in some regions in October 2009.
However, as of December 2009, about half of the 752 inspectors had not
received RAMP training. FPS also has experienced technical
difficulties with RAMP, for example, server issues, and the system is
not always available for use. Consequently, the 386 inspectors that
were trained are not able to use RAMP and are doing guard inspections
manually, a fact that increases the risk of inaccurate data.
We are encouraged that FPS is attempting to replace some of its legacy
GSA systems with a more reliable and accurate system. However, FPS has
not fully addressed some issues associated with implementing RAMP. For
example, we are concerned about the accuracy and reliability of the
information that will be entered into RAMP. According to FPS, the
agency plans to transfer data from several of its legacy systems,
including CERTS, into RAMP. In July 2009, we testified on accuracy and
reliability issues associated with CERTS. Since that time, FPS has
taken steps to review and update all guard training and certification
records. For example, FPS is conducting an internal audit of its CERTS
database. As of February 2010, the results of that audit showed that
FPS was able to verify the status for about 8,600 of its 15,000
guards. FPS is experiencing difficulty verifying the status of the
remaining 6,400 guards, in part because it does not have a system to
obtain reliable information on a real-time basis.
Despite FPS's recent efforts, challenges remain. While RAMP is a step
in the right direction, it is not fully operational. Equally
important, RAMP will not put FPS in an effective position to provide
the oversight and decision making that are necessary to ensure that
its 15,000 guards deployed at federal facilities in metropolitan and
rural areas, private contractors, and 1,225 full-time employees in
headquarters and 11 regions are performing as required and achieving
FPS's facility protection mission. We have previously reported that
for an agency to effectively manage and control its operations, it
must have relevant and reliable information relating to its mission on
a real-time basis.[Footnote 17] FPS does not have this capability. FPS
relies on its 11 regions to manage its contract guard program,
including the collection and analysis of performance information.
However, each of the 11 regions differs in how it manages, collects,
and reports contract guard information. Without the ability to access
contract guard information on a real-time basis, FPS cannot ensure
appropriate oversight and accountability, or that the agency's
facility protection mission is accomplished.
In addition, since 2002, we and DHS's Inspector General have reported
that oversight of the contract guard program is a challenge for FPS.
[Footnote 18] For example, in 2008, we reported on the poor quality of
contract guards and the lack of guard inspections. However, FPS has
only recently begun addressing some of these challenges and has not
undertaken a comprehensive review of the agency's use of contract
guards to protect federal facilities since the bombing of Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in 1995. We also identified a number of
changes that have had a cascading impact on FPS's management of the
contract guard program. Chief among them is FPS's decision to move to
an inspector-based workforce. Under this approach, FPS eliminated its
police officer position and is primarily using about 752 inspectors
and special agents to oversee its 15,000 contract guards, provide law
enforcement services, conduct building security assessments, and
perform other duties as assigned. Many inspectors in the regions we
visited stated that they are not provided sufficient time to complete
guard inspections because FPS's priority is physical security
activities, such as completing facility security assessments. The
combined effect of recent changes and long-standing challenges has
contributed to the poor oversight of the contract guard program, and
we believe it indicates a need for a reassessment of the current
approach to protect federal facilities and greater oversight.
FPS also has not completed a workforce analysis to determine if its
current staff of about 752 inspectors will be able to effectively
complete the additional inspections as required and provide the X-ray
and magnetometer training to 15,000 guards in addition to their
current physical security and law enforcement responsibilities. Our
previous work has raised questions about the wide range of
responsibilities inspectors have and the quality of facility security
assessments and guard oversight. According to the Director of FPS,
while having more resources would help address the weaknesses in the
guard program, the additional resources would have to be trained and
thus could not be deployed immediately. Finally, according to the
Director of FPS, the agency recognized that its guard program has long-
standing challenges, and in response to recent concerns about the
guard program identified by GAO and others, FPS contemplated assuming
responsibility for all guard training and/or federalizing some guard
positions at some federal facilities. However, FPS decided not to
pursue federalizing guard positions because of the cost. While
federalizing guard positions may not be cost-beneficial, we believe
that given the long-standing challenges FPS faces with managing its
guard program, it should continue to conduct research to determine if
other options for protecting federal facilities may be more cost-
beneficial.
Conclusions:
FPS continues to face challenges in ensuring that its $659 million
guard program is effective in protecting federal facilities. While FPS
has recently taken some actions, such as requiring more guard training
and inspections, to address these long-standing challenges, guards
employed by private contractors continue to neglect or inadequately
perform their assigned responsibilities. We believe that FPS continues
to struggle with managing its contract guard program in part because,
although it has used guards to supplement the agency's workforce since
the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, it has not
undertaken a comprehensive review of its use of guards to protect
federal facilities to determine whether other options and approaches
would be more cost-beneficial. FPS also has not acted diligently in
ensuring that its guard contractors meet the terms of the contract and
taking enforcement action when noncompliance occurs. In addition, we
believe that FPS's overall approach to protecting federal facilities,
coupled with many unresolved operational issues, has hampered its
oversight of the contract guard program. The combined effect of these
long-standing challenges suggests that FPS needs to do more to protect
the over 1 million government employees and members of the public who
visit federal facilities each year. Thus, we believe that among other
things, FPS needs to reassess how it protects federal facilities and
take a stronger role in overseeing contractor performance.
We also believe that completing the required contract performance
evaluations for its contractors and maintaining contract files will
put FPS in a better position to determine whether it should continue
to exercise contract options with some contractors. FPS's decision to
increase guard inspections at federal facilities in metropolitan areas
is a step in the right direction. However, it does not address issues
with guard inspections at federal facilities outside metropolitan
areas, which are equally vulnerable. Thus, without routine inspections
of guards at these facilities, FPS has no assurance that guards are
complying with their post orders. In addition, ensuring that its
guards are adequately trained to respond to building-specific
situations, for example, how to handle an evacuation or shelter in
place situation at a federal facility, is equally important. The lack
of building-specific and scenario-based training may have contributed
to several incidents in which guards neglected their assigned
responsibilities.
Moreover, maintaining accurate and reliable data on whether the 15,000
guards deployed at federal facilities have met the training and
certification requirements is important for a number of reasons.
First, without accurate and reliable data, FPS cannot consistently
ensure compliance with contract requirements and lacks information
critical for effective oversight of its guard program. Second, given
that other federal agencies rely on many of the same contractors to
provide security services, the need to complete accurate evaluations
of a contractor's past performance is critical to future contract
awards. Finally, until FPS develops and implements a management tool,
in addition to RAMP, that provides it with reliable contract guard
data on a real-time basis, the agency will not be in an effective
position to provide the oversight and decision making that are
necessary to ensure that its 15,000 guards deployed at federal
facilities in metropolitan and rural areas, private contractors, and
1,225 full-time employees in headquarters and 11 regions are
performing as required and achieving FPS's facility protection mission.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Given the long-standing and unresolved issues related to FPS's
contract guard program and challenges in protecting federal
facilities, employees, and the public who use these facilities, we
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under
Secretary of NPPD and the Director of FPS to take the following eight
actions:
* identify other approaches and options that would be most beneficial
and financially feasible for protecting federal facilities;
* rigorously and consistently monitor guard contractors' and guards'
performance and step up enforcement against contractors that are not
complying with the terms of the contract;
* complete all contract performance evaluations in accordance with FPS
and FAR requirements;
* issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure that contract
files have required documentation;
* develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards at federal
facilities outside metropolitan areas;
* provide building-specific and scenario-based training and guidance
to its contract guards;
* develop and implement a management tool for ensuring that reliable,
comprehensive data on the contract guard program are available on a
real-time basis; and:
* verify the accuracy of all guard certification and training data
before entering them into RAMP, and periodically test the accuracy and
reliability of RAMP data to ensure that FPS management has the
information needed to effectively oversee its guard program.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS
concurred with seven of the eight recommendations in this report.
Regarding the report's recommendation--issue a standardized record-
keeping format to ensure that contract files have required
documentation--DHS concurred that contract files must have required
documentation and did not concur that a new record-keeping format
should be issued. DHS commented that written procedures already exist
and are required for use by all DHS's Office of Procurement Operations
staff and the components it serves, including NPPD. We believe that
the policies referenced by DHS are a step in the right direction in
ensuring that contract files have required documentation; however,
although these policies exist, we found a lack of standardization and
consistency in the contract files we reviewed among the three
Consolidated Contract Groups. In response to this recommendation, DHS
also commented it will conduct an internal audit of the contract files
to determine the extent and quality of contract administration. We
agree with this next step.
In addition, while DHS agreed with our other recommendations, we are
concerned that some of the steps it described may not address our
recommendation--to develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards at
federal facilities outside metropolitan areas. In response to this
recommendation, FPS commented that to provide routine oversight of
guards in remote regions it will use an employee of a tenant agency
(referred to as an Agency Technical Representative) who has authority
to act as a representative of a COTR for day-to-day monitoring of
contract guards. However, during the course of this review, several
FPS regional officials told us that the Agency Technical
Representatives were not fully trained and did not have an
understanding of the guards' roles and responsibilities. These
officials also said that the program may not be appropriate for all
federal facilities. We believe that if FPS plans to use Agency Tenant
Representatives to oversee guards, it is important that the agency
ensures that the representatives are knowledgeable of the guards'
responsibilities and are trained on how and when to conduct guard
inspections as well as how to evacuate facilities during an emergency.
Furthermore, while we support FPS's overall plans to better manage its
contract guard program, we believe it is also important for FPS to
have performance metrics to evaluate whether its planned actions are
fully implemented and are effective in addressing the challenges it
faces managing its contract guard program. DHS's comments are
presented in appendix I. Finally, DHS provided technical
clarifications, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov]. If you have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.
Signed by:
Mark L. Goldstein:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Joseph L. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar:
Chairman,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton:
Chairwoman:
Subcommittee on Public Buildings, Economic Development, and Emergency
Management:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Office of the Under Secretary:
National Protection and Programs Directorate:
Washington, DC 20528:
March 26, 2010:
Mr. Mark L. Goldstein:
Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Subject: GA0-10-341, Federal Protective Service's Contract Guard
Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract
Guards:
Dear Mr. Goldstein:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to review and comment on the U.S. Government Accountability Office's
(GAO's) draft report referenced above. GAO provided several
conclusions and made eight recommendations with regard to the current
level of FPS contract guard compliance with training and
qualifications requirements. The Department concurs with seven of the
recommendations and non-concurs with one as referenced below.
GAO Recommendation 1: Conduct research to identify other approaches
and options that would be most beneficial and financially feasible for
protecting federal buildings.
Response: Concur. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) was created to
designate a centralized provider of integrated security and law
enforcement services to the federal community. Throughout its
existence, FPS has remained flexible in implementing the variety of
means used to accomplish its protective mission and has continually
examined past actions, best practices, and available resources and
technology to determine the best available means to protect federal
facilities.
Largely due to resource constraints, FPS' approaches and options to
protecting federal facilities have focused efforts on providing more
robust and analytical risk assessments, enhancing the training and
oversight of protective security officers, and entering into various
contracts to facilitate streamlining the implementation of
countermeasures on a nationwide basis. FPS recently increased its
interaction with the research and development community, through the
DHS Science and Technology Directorate, to better define requirements
for the next generation of security technology. FPS is simultaneously
testing new developments in countermeasures to assess their maximum
effectiveness as part of the integrated set of countermeasures. These
initiatives are driven by the need to provide a comprehensive approach
to facility protection that capitalizes on FPS' law enforcement
knowledge and expertise in physical security within the framework of
available resources to support mission requirements.
GAO Recommendation 2: Rigorously and consistently monitor guard
contractors and guards' performance and step up enforcement against
contractors and/or guards that are not complying with the terms of the
contract.
Response: Concur. FPS continues to rigorously and consistently monitor
guard contractors, and through the development and implementation of
new policies and initiatives, FPS will strengthen its assurances that
contract Protective Security Officer (PSO) providers are complying
with the terms and conditions of their contracts. These policies and
initiatives establish organizational responsibilities for post, site,
and administrative inspections.
As an example of the measures being taken to increase its oversight of
contract compliance, FPS is increasing its minimum requirements for
post inspection and administrative audits of individual PSO files from
10 percent annually to 10 percent monthly. Results of post inspections
and administrative audits are entered into the Risk Assessment and
Management Program (RAMP), allowing FPS to effectively monitor overall
contractor performance by location, contract, and contract company.
A number of other initiatives and programs have been implemented to
improve contract guard oversight. Beyond certifying that guard
personnel are qualified on paper to perform their assigned duties, FPS
has developed and implemented a Covert Testing Program to further
enhance and complement the ongoing efforts of FPS' operational
oversight of the contract guard program. Policies have been revised to
increase the number, frequency and scope of guard post,
administrative, and site inspections. In addition to increasing the
frequency of scheduled inspections. FPS increased the number of
unannounced inspections by more than 100 percent during the past nine
months. Finally, in addition to the increased monitoring of on-site
performance of the contract security force, FPS has significantly
increased its review of contract deliverables such as contractor
quality control plans, supervision plans, and certification
documentation, an action which better allows FPS to identify and take
enforcement actions against contractors who are not meeting the terms
of their contracts.
GAO Recommendation 3: Complete all contract performance evaluations in
accordance with FPS and FAR requirements.
Response: Concur. DHS is prepared to implement this recommendation
through strict adherence to applicable internal policy/procedure (DHS
Office of Procurement Operations (OPO) Procurement Operating Procedure
(POP) 40381, "Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting and
Procedure") and capitalization of the knowledge and skills acquired by
staff through the contractor performance assessment training. While
staff training in this area is an ongoing DHS initiative, National
Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) Contracting Officer
Technical Representatives (COTRs) and OPO Contracting Officers have
received (I) a web-based training session presenting an overview of
the reporting requirements and the Contractor Performance Assessment
Reporting System (CPARS) and (2) a classroom session with specific
role-based instruction and live demonstration in CPARS, This training
was provided during fourth quarter FY09 and first quarter FY10. DHS
OPO Contracting Officers and NPPD/FPS COTRs have also been provided
with copies of POP 403R1, CPARS Guidebooks tailored to their
respective roles, and other tools to aid them in providing quality
narratives within a contractor performance assessment.
Furthermore, NPPD/FPS will ensure visibility of contractor performance
assessments at the leadership level and will hold employees
accountable for failure to promptly and properly complete contractor
performance assessments. To this end, NPPD has implemented reporting
requirements and will incorporate completion of contractor performance
assessments into the performance goals of those employees responsible
for this function.
GAO Recommendation 4: Issue a standardized recordkeeping format to
ensure that contract files have required documentation.
Response: Non-concur. While both NPPD and DHS OPO concur that contract
files must have required documentation, we do not concur that a new
recordkeeping format should be issued. Written procedures already
exist and are required for use by all DHS OPO staff and the components
it services, including NPPD. These policies are set forth in the DHS
OPO POP 301R1. "Contract File Checklists," and OPO POP 404R1,
"Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) Roles,
Responsibilities and Requirements."
* POP 301R1 includes a standard contract file checklists which include
pre-solicitation, solicitation, pre-award, award, post-award, contract
administration, contract modification, deliver/task order, and close-
out documentation requirements.
* POP 301R1 requires that Contracting Officers and Contract
Specialists include documents in files consistent with the checklists
and further requires that supervisors monitor the consistency of
documentation with standard checklists.
* POP 404R1 requires COTRs to maintain a working file to document
their actions and sets forth the minimum required contents of the
COTR's working file.
Standardized checklists are tools that aid the Contracting Officer in
ensuring that all required documentation is in place and the extent of
documentation required under those checklists is dictated by the
nature, complexity, commercial availability, estimated value of the
requirement, and the applicability of laws and regulations to that
particular action. OPO also has an electronic took kit for more
standardized contract administration available to Contracting Officers
and Specialists.
In response to this recommendation, .DHS OPO will conduct an internal
audit of contract files to determine the extent and quality of
contract administration. It is projected that this audit will occur in
the first quarter of FY11. Prior to that time, OPO staff and NPPD
COTRs will again be provided all applicable policies for proper file
documentation and alerted to the upcoming audit. Upon review of
internal audit findings, OPO will develop and/or provide training as
needed.
GAO Recommendation 5: Develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards
at federal facilities outside metropolitan areas.
Response: Concur. To address this issue and to ensure routine
monitoring of PSOs, FPS established aggressive schedules for
conducting post inspections. For Level IV facilities, the inspection
frequency is a minimum of two posts (any shift) weekly, without regard
to the geographic location of the facility. Inspection results are
immediately entered into RAMP, documenting the number of inspections
by location and PSO. Additionally, to compensate for inadequate
resources and to provide routine oversight of guards in remote
regions, FPS developed and implemented the Agency Technical
Representative Program. The Agency Technical Representative is an
employee of a tenant agency who has the authority to act as a
representative of a COTR for day-to-day monitoring of contract PSO
performance.
GAO Recommendation 6: Provide building specific and scenario based
training and guidance to its contract guards.
Response: Concur. FPS already uses a variety of tactics to provide
building-specific and scenario-based information to contract guards
but is also enhancing methods of delivery and measurement of
retention. Following are several examples of current practices:
* Basic Training and Written Examination ” Basic training that is
required for all contract guards includes instruction on a variety of
scenarios that are common to contract guard functions. Grounded in the
FPS Security Guard Information Manual (SLIM) content, after completing
the course, contract guards must pass a written examination to
demonstrate their mastery of the material.
* Post Desk Books ” As defined by FPS Policy FPS-08-003, post desk
books are the complete operational reference book provided for each
contract security guard post. The consistent structure and content
required provides information that is building-specific and scenario-
based. They include information ranging from the facility occupants
and points of contact to procedures on how to respond to HAZMAT
incidents. All contract guards are contractually required to be
familiar with the content of these Desk Books prior to standing post.
* Occupant Emergency Plan Guide ” In 2007, FPS developed and published
a comprehensive guide for the development of Occupant Emergency Plans
(OEPs) by all Federal Departments and Agencies. The guide and its
supplements contain templates for OEPs, which contain emergency-
specific scenarios for prevention, protection, response, and recovery.
This guide and its scenarios are used to develop the OEP containing
specific procedures for the facility emergency response team and
occupants and the procedures in the post orders that are specific to
the actions required of the contract guards.
FPS measures the knowledge of the contract guards through written
examination, routine post inspections, and Operation Shield, a program
in which unannounced inspections measure the effectiveness of the
contract guards. To further enhance current capabilities to identify
specific knowledge gaps, the inspection process will provide post-
specific questions for the on-duty contract guards. Where knowledge
gaps are identified, the enhanced specificity in the inspections will
allow for more efficient and effective remediation for individual
contract guards. It will also allow FPS to identify trends across
companies or the country that could indicate changes are needed in
content or instructional methodology.
threats and needs arise. Recent examples include specific training on
active shooter scenarios along with an intelligence bulletin
associated with the shooting at the Las Vegas Courthouse, and training
on techniques and procedures to detect weapons at screening posts.
GAO Recommendation 7: Develop and implement a management tool for
ensuring that reliable comprehensive data on the contract guard
program is available on a real time basis.
Response: Concur. FPS has incorporated a comprehensive guard
management module into RAMP to provide reliable real time data on the
contract PSO program. This module includes capabilities to record
contract information centrally, maintain and update PSO information
(including certifications), conduct post inspections, and align posts
to facilities. These capabilities allow FPS to measure contractor
performance continuously and take corrective actions as necessary.
GAO Recommendation 8: Verify the accuracy of all guard certification
and training data before entering into RAMP, and periodically test the
accuracy and reliability of RAMP data to ensure that FPS management
has the information needed to effectively oversee its guard program.
Response: Concur. FPS applies several tactics to oversee and validate
information pertaining to contractor certifications before and after
entry into RAMP. Activities conducted before data entry range from
monitoring of contractor-provided training and weapons qualifications
to proctoring and scoring of the FPS written examination, FPS is also
responsible for the entry of information associated with contractor
suitability determinations. After data is entered through the
electronic reporting of certifications by contractors, FPS conducts
audits and inspections to test the accuracy and reliability of RAMP
data to ensure that RAMP provides an up-to-date database from which to
measure compliance with contract requirements.
The FPS Risk Management Division is currently revising FPS directive
09-001, which details the site inspection and audit procedures of
contractors. This policy will increase the requirement for audits from
10 percent of the files annually to 10 percent of the files monthly
and provide prescriptive instructions on method, which will result in
a more than 100 percent increase in frequency of record validation. In
addition, FPS policy requires that FPS monitor contractor-provided
training and weapons qualifications to ensure accuracy of content,
delivery, and records.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this draft report, and we
look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Rand Beers:
Under Secretary:
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Mark L. Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact name above, Tammy Conquest, Assistant
Director; Jonathan Carver; John Cooney; Collin Fallon; Brandon Haller;
Daniel Hoy; Susan Michal-Smith; and Josh Ormond made key contributions
to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Funding for FPS is provided through revenues and collections
charged to building tenants of properties protected by FPS. The
revenues and collections are credited to FPS's appropriation and are
available until expended for the protection of federally owned and
leased buildings and for FPS operations.
[2] While FPS does not use guards at the remaining 6,700 facilities
under its protection, it uses other security countermeasures such as
cameras and perimeter lighting to help protect these facilities.
[3] Title 41 CFR Sections 102-74.435 and 102-74-440 identify and list
items that are prohibited by law from being introduced into a federal
facility except for law enforcement purposes and other limited
circumstances. Those items are explosives, firearms, or other
dangerous weapons. In addition, Facility Security Committees, which
are composed of representatives of tenant agencies at federal
facilities, have broad latitude in determining items in addition to
those specifically prohibited by statute that can be prohibited in
their facilities.
[4] GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal
Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered
by Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T] (Washington, D.C.: July 8,
2009).
[5] In 2003, FPS transferred from GSA to DHS. FPS is responsible for
providing physical security and law enforcement services to about
9,000 federal facilities, which are under the control or custody of
GSA.
[6] As of October 2009, FPS had 125 guard contracts with 38 different
contractors. We requested that FPS provide us with contract
performance evaluations from January 2006 through June 2009. On the
basis of FPS's requirement that a contract evaluation be completed
annually, we estimated that we should have received 375 contract
evaluations for the 125 contracts over that 3-year time period.
[7] According to the Department of Justice's 1995 Vulnerability
Assessment Guidelines, there are five security levels. A level I
facility is typically a small storefront-type operation such as a
military recruiting office with 10 or fewer employees and a low volume
of public contact. A level II facility has from 11 to 150 employees; a
level III facility has from 151 to 450 employees and a moderate to
high volume of public contact; a level IV facility has over 450
employees, a high volume of public contact, and includes high-risk law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. FPS does not have
responsibility for a level V facility such as the White House or the
Central Intelligence Agency.
[8] FPS acquires guard services using an indefinite delivery
indefinite quantity contract or a blanket purchase agreement. An
indefinite delivery indefinite quantity contract provides for an
indefinite quantity of supplies or services during a fixed period of
time, whereas a blanket purchase agreement is a simplified acquisition
method that government agencies use to procure anticipated repetitive
services or supplies from qualified sources of supply.
[9] The Federal Acquisition Regulation also requires that agencies
evaluate a contractor's performance for each contract that exceeds the
simplified acquisition threshold at the time the work is completed and
for agencies to provide interim evaluation for contracts, including
options that exceed 1 year. FAR Subpart 42.15.
[10] GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces
Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal
Facilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683]
(Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008).
[11] The Inspector General found that FPS does not always take
deductions against a contractor for services that are not provided in
accordance with contract requirements. Department of Homeland
Security, Office of Inspector General, Federal Protective Service
Contract Guard Procurement and Oversight Process, OIG-09-51
(Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2009).
[12] As part of DHS, FPS is required to use the Department of Defense
Contractor Performance Assessment System (CPARS) to officially
document its performance evaluations. CPARS requires the use of an
adjectival rating scale by evaluators that includes ratings of
"exceptional," "very good," "satisfactory," "marginal," and
"unsatisfactory."
[13] X-ray machines are hazardous because of the potential radiation
exposure. In contrast, magnetometers do not emit radiation and are
used to detect metal.
[14] Tests that we performed at a national laboratory in July 2007 and
in February 2006 clearly demonstrated that a terrorist using these
devices could cause severe damage to a federal facility and threaten
the safety of federal workers and the general public. Our
investigators obtained the components for these devices at local
stores and over the Internet for less than $150.
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T].
[16] Challenge and response refers to being more proactive instead of
reactive to an incident.
[17] GAO, Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1008G] (Washington, D.C.: August
2001).
[18] GAO, Building Security: Security Responsibilities for Federal
Owned and Leased Facilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-8] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31,
2002); Homeland Security: Transformation Strategy Needed to Address
Challenges Facing the Federal Protective Service, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-537] (Washington, D.C.: July 14,
2004); and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683]. See
also Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General,
Federal Protective Service Needs to Improve its Oversight of the
Contract Guard Program, OIG-07-05 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2006),
and OIG-09-51.
[End of section]
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