Homeland Security
Federal Protective Service's Use of Contract Guards Requires Reassessment and More Oversight Gao ID: GAO-10-614T April 14, 2010To accomplish its mission of protecting about 9,000 federal facilities, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) currently has a budget of about $1 billion, about 1,225 full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards. FPS obligated $659 million for guard services in fiscal year 2009. This testimony is based on our report issued on April 13, 2010, and discusses challenges FPS continues to face in (1) managing its guard contractors and (2) overseeing guards deployed at federal facilities, and (3) the actions FPS has taken to address these challenges. To address these objectives, GAO conducted site visits at 6 of FPS's 11 regions; interviewed FPS officials, guards, and contractors, and analyzed FPS's contract files. GAO also reviewed new contract guard program guidance issued since our July 2009 report and observed guard inspections and penetration testing done by FPS.
FPS faces a number of challenges in managing its guard contractors that hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. FPS requires contractors to provide guards who have met training and certification requirements. FPS's guard contract also states that a contractor who does not comply with the contract is subject to enforcement action. GAO reviewed the official contract files for the seven contractors who, as GAO testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts with expired certification and training requirements to determine what action, if any, FPS had taken against these contractors for contract noncompliance. These contractors had been awarded several multiyear contracts totaling $406 million to provide guards at federal facilities in 13 states and Washington, D.C. FPS did not take any enforcement actions against these seven contractors for noncompliance. In fact, FPS exercised the option to extend their contracts. FPS also did not comply with its requirement that a performance evaluation of each contractor be completed annually and that these evaluations and other performance-related data be included in the contract file. FPS plans to provide additional training and hold staff responsible for completing these evaluations more accountable. FPS also faces challenges in ensuring that many of the 15,000 guards have the required training and certification to be deployed at a federal facility. In July 2009, GAO reported that since 2004, FPS had not provided X-ray and magnetometer training to about 1,500 guards in 1 region. As of January 2010, these guards had not received this training and continued to work at federal facilities in this region. X-ray and magnetometer training is important because guards control access points at federal facilities. FPS currently does not have a fully reliable system for monitoring and verifying whether its 15,000 guards have the certifications and training to stand post at federal facilities. FPS developed a new Risk Assessment and Program Management system to help monitor and track guard certifications and training. However, FPS is experiencing difficulties with this system and has suspended its use. In addition, once guards are deployed to a federal facility, they are not always complying with assigned responsibilities (post orders). Since July 2009, FPS has conducted 53 penetration tests in the 6 regions we visited, and in over half of these tests some guards did not identify prohibited items, such as guns and knives. In response to GAO's July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of actions that, once fully implemented, could help address challenges it faces in managing its contract guard program. For example, FPS has increased the number of guard inspections at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. FPS also revised its X-ray and magnetometer training; however, all guards will not be fully trained until the end of 2010, although they are deployed at federal facilities. Despite FPS's recent actions, it continues to face challenges in ensuring that its $659 million guard program is effective in protecting federal facilities. Thus, among other things, FPS needs to reassess how it protects federal facilities and rigorously enforce the terms of the contracts.
GAO-10-614T, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Use of Contract Guards Requires Reassessment and More Oversight
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, April 14, 2010:
Homeland Security:
Federal Protective Service's Use of Contract Guards Requires
Reassessment and More Oversight:
Statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-10-614T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-614T, a testimony before the Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
To accomplish its mission of protecting about 9,000 federal
facilities, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) currently has a
budget of about $1 billion, about 1,225 full-time employees, and about
15,000 contract security guards. FPS obligated $659 million for guard
services in fiscal year 2009.
This testimony is based on our report issued on April 13, 2010, and
discusses challenges FPS continues to face in (1) managing its guard
contractors and (2) overseeing guards deployed at federal facilities,
and (3) the actions FPS has taken to address these challenges. To
address these objectives, GAO conducted site visits at 6 of FPS‘s 11
regions; interviewed FPS officials, guards, and contractors, and
analyzed FPS‘s contract files. GAO also reviewed new contract guard
program guidance issued since our July 2009 report and observed guard
inspections and penetration testing done by FPS.
What GAO Found:
FPS faces a number of challenges in managing its guard contractors
that hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. FPS requires
contractors to provide guards who have met training and certification
requirements. FPS‘s guard contract also states that a contractor who
does not comply with the contract is subject to enforcement action.
GAO reviewed the official contract files for the seven contractors
who, as GAO testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts
with expired certification and training requirements to determine what
action, if any, FPS had taken against these contractors for contract
noncompliance. These contractors had been awarded several multiyear
contracts totaling $406 million to provide guards at federal
facilities in 13 states and Washington, D.C. FPS did not take any
enforcement actions against these seven contractors for noncompliance.
In fact, FPS exercised the option to extend their contracts. FPS also
did not comply with its requirement that a performance evaluation of
each contractor be completed annually and that these evaluations and
other performance-related data be included in the contract file. FPS
plans to provide additional training and hold staff responsible for
completing these evaluations more accountable.
FPS also faces challenges in ensuring that many of the 15,000 guards
have the required training and certification to be deployed at a
federal facility. In July 2009, GAO reported that since 2004, FPS had
not provided X-ray and magnetometer training to about 1,500 guards in
1 region. As of January 2010, these guards had not received this
training and continued to work at federal facilities in this region. X-
ray and magnetometer training is important because guards control
access points at federal facilities. FPS currently does not have a
fully reliable system for monitoring and verifying whether its 15,000
guards have the certifications and training to stand post at federal
facilities. FPS developed a new Risk Assessment and Program Management
system to help monitor and track guard certifications and training.
However, FPS is experiencing difficulties with this system and has
suspended its use. In addition, once guards are deployed to a federal
facility, they are not always complying with assigned responsibilities
(post orders). Since July 2009, FPS has conducted 53 penetration tests
in the 6 regions we visited, and in over half of these tests some
guards did not identify prohibited items, such as guns and knives.
In response to GAO‘s July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of
actions that, once fully implemented, could help address challenges it
faces in managing its contract guard program. For example, FPS has
increased the number of guard inspections at federal facilities in
some metropolitan areas. FPS also revised its X-ray and magnetometer
training; however, all guards will not be fully trained until the end
of 2010, although they are deployed at federal facilities. Despite FPS‘
s recent actions, it continues to face challenges in ensuring that its
$659 million guard program is effective in protecting federal
facilities. Thus, among other things, FPS needs to reassess how it
protects federal facilities and rigorously enforce the terms of the
contracts.
What GAO Recommends:
In GAO‘s report related to this testimony, GAO recommended, among
other things, that FPS identify other approaches that would be cost-
beneficial to protecting federal facilities. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) concurred with seven of GAO‘s eight
recommendations. DHS did not fully concur with GAO‘s recommendation to
issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure that contract
files have required documentation.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-614T] or key
components. For more information, contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-
2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We are pleased to be here to discuss the results of our report on the
Federal Protective Service's (FPS) contract guard program, issued
April 13, 2010.[Footnote 1] As you are aware, FPS--within the National
Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)--is responsible for protecting the buildings,
grounds, and property that are under the control and custody of the
General Services Administration (GSA), as well as the persons on the
property; authorized to enforce federal laws and regulations aimed at
protecting GSA buildings and persons on the property; and authorized
to investigate offenses against these buildings and persons.[Footnote
2] To accomplish its mission of protecting federal facilities, FPS
currently has a budget of about $1 billion,[Footnote 3] about 1,225
full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards
(guards) deployed at about 2,360 federal facilities across the country.
[Footnote 4] In fiscal year 2009, FPS obligated $659 million for guard
services, which represents the single largest item in its budget.
FPS's contract guard program is the most visible component of its
operations as well as the first public contact for individuals
entering a federal facility. FPS relies heavily on its guards and
considers them to be the agency's "eyes and ears" while performing
their duties. Guards are primarily responsible for controlling access
to federal facilities by (1) checking the identification of government
employees as well as members of the public who work in and visit
federal facilities, and (2) operating security equipment, such as X-
ray machines and magnetometers to screen for prohibited materials,
such as firearms, knives, explosives, or items intended to be used to
fabricate an explosive or incendiary device.[Footnote 5] Guards do not
have arrest authority but can detain individuals who are being
disruptive or pose a danger to public safety.
This testimony, based on our report, discusses challenges FPS
continues to face in (1) managing its guard contractors, (2)
overseeing guards deployed at federal facilities, and (3) actions FPS
has taken to address these challenges. Our methodology included site
visits to 6 of FPS's 11 regions. To select these 6 regions, we
considered the number of FPS guards, contractors, and federal
facilities, and the geographic dispersion of the regions across the
United States. At each region, we observed FPS's guard inspection
process and interviewed FPS's regional manager, contract guard program
managers, inspectors who are responsible for conducting guard
inspections; guards, and contractors. We also randomly selected 663
out of approximately 15,000 guard training records that were
maintained in FPS's Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking
System (CERTS) and/or by the guard contractor and validated them
against the contractual requirements that were in effect at the time
of our review. We also reviewed the contract files for 7 of FPS's 38
guard contractors. We selected these 7 contractors because our
previous work showed that they had contract compliance issues. In
addition, we analyzed a random sample of 99 FPS contractor evaluations
to determine how FPS evaluated the performance of its contractors on
an annual basis.
We also reviewed new contract guard program guidance issued since our
July 2009 testimony and observed guard inspections and covert testing
done by FPS in August and November 2009.[Footnote 6] Because of the
sensitivity of some of the information in our report, we cannot
provide information about the specific locations of the incidents
discussed. We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to
February 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
FPS Faces Challenges Managing Its Guard Contractors That Hamper Its
Ability to Protect Federal Facilities:
Some FPS Guard Contractors Did Not Always Comply with the Terms of
Contracts and FPS Has Not Taken Actions against Them:
FPS has not taken actions against some guard contractors that did not
comply with the terms of the contracts. According to FPS guard
contracts, a contractor has not complied with the terms of the
contract if the contractor has a guard working without valid
certifications or background suitability investigations, falsifies a
guard's training records, does not have a guard at a post, or has an
unarmed guard working at a post at which the guard should be armed. If
FPS determines that a contractor does not comply with these contract
requirements, it can--among other things--assess a financial deduction
for nonperformed work, elect not to exercise a contract option, or
terminate the contract for default or cause.
We reviewed the official contract files for the 7 contractors who, as
we testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts with
expired certification and training requirements to determine what
action, if any, FPS had taken against these contractors for contract
noncompliance. The 7 contractors we reviewed had been awarded several
multiyear contracts totaling $406 million to provide guards at federal
facilities in 13 states and Washington, D.C.
According to the documentation in the contract files, FPS did not take
any enforcement action against the 7 contractors for not complying
with the terms of the contract, a finding consistent with DHS's
Inspector General's 2009 report.[Footnote 7] In fact, FPS exercised
the option to extend the contracts of these 7 contractors. FPS
contracting officials told us that the contracting officer who is
responsible for enforcing the terms of the contract considers the
appropriate course of action among the available contractual remedies
on a case-by-case basis. For example, the decision of whether to
assess financial deductions is a subjective assessment in which the
contracting officer and the contracting officer technical
representative (COTR) take into account the value of the
nonperformance and the seriousness of the deficiency, according to FPS
contracting officials.
FPS Did Not Always Comply with Its Procedures for Completing Annual
Performance Evaluations of Its Guard Contractors:
FPS requires an annual performance evaluation of each contractor and
at the conclusion of contracts exceeding $100,000, and requires that
these evaluations and other performance-related documentation be
included in the contract file. Contractor performance evaluations are
one of the most important tools available for ensuring compliance with
contract terms. Moreover, given that other federal agencies rely on
many of the same contractors to provide security services, completing
accurate evaluations of a contractor's past performance is critical.
However, we found that FPS's contracting officers and COTRs did not
always evaluate contractors' performance as required, and some
evaluations were incomplete and not consistent with contractors'
performance.
We reviewed a random sample of 99 contract performance evaluations
from calendar year 2006 through June 2009. These evaluations were for
38 contractors. Eighty-two of the 99 contract performance evaluations
showed that FPS assessed the quality of services provided by the
majority of its guard contractors as satisfactory, very good, or
exceptional. For the remaining 17 evaluations, 11 showed that the
contractor's performance was marginal, 1 as unsatisfactory, and
assessments for 5 contractors were not complete. According to
applicable guidance, a contractor must meet contractual requirements
to obtain a satisfactory evaluation and a contractor should receive an
unsatisfactory evaluation if its performance does not meet most
contract requirements and recovery in a timely manner is not likely.
[Footnote 8]
Nevertheless, we found instances where some contractors received a
satisfactory or better rating although they had not met some of the
terms of the contract. For example, contractors receiving satisfactory
or better ratings included the 7 contractors discussed above that had
guards with expired certification and training records working at
federal facilities. In addition, some performance evaluations that we
reviewed did not include a justification for the rating and there was
no other supporting documentation in the official contract file to
explain the rating. Moreover, there was no information in the contract
file that indicated that the COTR had communicated any performance
problems to the contracting officer.
FPS Continues to Face Challenges with Overseeing Guards That Raise
Concern about Protection of Federal Facilities:
FPS Is Not Providing All Guards with X-ray and Magnetometer Training
in Some Regions:
As of February 2010, FPS had yet to provide some of its guards with
all of the required X-ray or magnetometer training. For example, we
reported in July 2009 that in one region, FPS has not provided the
required X-ray or magnetometer training to 1,500 guards since 2004.
FPS officials subsequently told us that the contract for this region
requires that only guards who are assigned to work on posts that
contain screening equipment are required to have 8 hours of X-ray and
magnetometer training. However, in response to our July 2009
testimony, FPS now requires all guards to receive 16 hours of X-ray
and magnetometer training. As of February 2010, these 1,500 guards had
not received the 16 hours of training but continued to work at federal
facilities in this region. FPS plans to provide X-ray and magnetometer
training to all guards by December 2010. X-ray and magnetometer
training is important because the majority of the guards are primarily
responsible for using this equipment to monitor and control access
points at federal facilities. Controlling access to a facility helps
ensure that only authorized personnel, vehicles, and materials are
allowed to enter, move within, and leave the facility.
FPS Lacks Assurance That Its Guards Have Required Certifications and
Training:
FPS currently does not have a fully reliable system for monitoring and
verifying whether its 15,000 guards have the certifications and
training to stand post at federal facilities. FPS is developing a new
system--Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP)--to help it
monitor and verify the status of guard certifications and training.
However, in our July 2009 report, we raised concerns about the
accuracy and reliability of the information that will be entered into
RAMP. Since that time, FPS has taken steps to review and update all
guard training and certification records. For example, FPS is
conducting an internal audit of its CERTS database. However, as of
February 2010, the results of that audit showed that FPS was able to
verify that about 8,600 of its 15,000 guards met the training and
certification requirements. FPS is experiencing difficulty verifying
the status of the remaining 6,400 guards. FPS has also received about
1,500 complaints from inspectors regarding a number of problems with
RAMP. For example, some inspectors said it was difficult and sometimes
impossible to find guard information in RAMP and to download guard
inspection reports. Thus they were completing the inspections
manually. Other inspectors have said it takes almost 2 hours to log on
to RAMP. Consequently, on March 18, 2010, FPS suspended the use of
RAMP until it resolves these issues. FPS is currently working on
resolving issues with RAMP.
FPS Continues to Have Limited Assurance That Guards Are Complying with
Post Orders once They Are Deployed to Federal Facilities:
Once guards are deployed to a federal facility, guards are not always
complying with assigned responsibilities (post orders). As we
testified in July 2009, we identified substantial security
vulnerabilities related to FPS's guard program.[Footnote 9] FPS also
continues to find instances where guards are not complying with post
orders. For example, 2 days after our July 2009 hearing, a guard fired
his firearm in a restroom in a level IV facility while practicing
drawing his weapon. In addition, FPS's own penetration testing--
similar to the covert testing we conducted in May 2009--showed that
guards continued to experience problems with complying with post
orders. Since July 2009, FPS conducted 53 similar penetration tests at
federal facilities in the 6 regions we visited, and in over 66 percent
of these tests, guards allowed prohibited items into federal
facilities. We accompanied FPS on two penetration tests in August and
November 2009, and guards at these level IV facilities failed to
identify a fake bomb, gun, and knife during X-ray and magnetometer
screening at access control points. During the first test we observed
in August 2009, FPS agents placed a bag containing a fake gun and
knife on the X-ray machine belt. The guard failed to identify the gun
and knife on the X-ray screen, and the undercover FPS official was
able to retrieve his bag and proceed to the check-in desk without
incident. During a second test, a knife was hidden on an FPS officer.
During the test, the magnetometer detected the knife, as did the hand
wand, but the guard failed to locate the knife and the FPS officer was
able to gain access to the facility. According to the FPS officer, the
guards who failed the test had not been provided the required X-ray
and magnetometer training. Upon further investigation, only 2 of the
11 guards at the facility had the required X-ray and magnetometer
training. In response to the results of this test, FPS debriefed the
contractor and moved one of the guard posts to improve access control.
In November 2009, we accompanied FPS on another test of security
countermeasures at a different level IV facility. As in the previous
test, an FPS agent placed a bag containing a fake bomb on the X-ray
machine belt. The guard operating the X-ray machine did not identify
the fake bomb and the inspector was allowed to enter the facility with
it. In a second test, an FPS inspector placed a bag containing a fake
gun on the X-ray belt. The guard identified the gun and the FPS
inspector was detained. However, the FPS inspector was told to stand
in a corner and was not handcuffed or searched as required. In
addition, while all the guards were focusing on the individual with
the fake gun, a second FPS inspector walked through the security
checkpoint with two knives without being screened. In response to the
results of this test, FPS suspended 2 guards and provided additional
training to 2 guards.
Recent Actions Taken by FPS May Help Improve Oversight of the Contract
Guard Program:
In response to our July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of
actions that, once fully implemented, could help address the
challenges the agency faces in managing its contract guard program.
For example, FPS:
* Increased guard inspections at facilities in some metropolitan
areas. FPS has increased the number of guard inspections to two a week
at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas.[Footnote 10] Prior
to this new requirement, FPS did not have a national requirement for
guard inspections, and each region we visited had requirements that
ranged from no inspection requirements to each inspector having to
conduct five inspections per month.
* Increased X-ray and magnetometer training requirements for
inspectors and guards. FPS has increased its X-ray and magnetometer
training for inspectors and guards from 8 hours to 16 hours. In July
2009, FPS also required each guard to watch a government-provided
digital video disc (DVD) on bomb component detection by August 20,
2009. According to FPS, as of January 2010, approximately 78 percent,
or 11,711 of the 15,000 guards had been certified as having watched
the DVD.
* Implementing a new system to monitor guard training and
certifications. As mentioned earlier, FPS is also implementing RAMP.
According to FPS, RAMP will provide it with the capability to monitor
and track guard training and certifications and enhance its ability to
conduct and track guard inspections. RAMP is also designed to be a
central database for capturing and managing facility security
information, including the risks posed to federal facilities and the
countermeasures that are in place to mitigate risk. It is also
expected to enable FPS to manage guard certifications and to conduct
and track guard inspections electronically as opposed to manually.
However, as mentioned earlier, as of March 18, 2010, FPS suspended the
use of RAMP until it can resolve existing issues.
Despite FPS's recent actions, it continues to face challenges in
ensuring that its $659 million guard program is effective in
protecting federal facilities. While the changes FPS has made to its X-
ray and magnetometer training will help to address some of the
problems we found, there are some weaknesses in the guard training.
For example, many of the 15,000 guards will not be fully trained until
the end of 2010. In addition, one contractor told us that one of the
weaknesses associated with FPS's guard training program is that it
focuses primarily on prevention and detection but does not adequately
address challenge and response.[Footnote 11] This contractor has
developed specific scenario training and provides its guards on other
contracts with an additional 12 hours of training on scenario-based
examples, such as how to control a suicide bomber or active shooter
situation, evacuation, and shelter in place. The contractor, who has
multiple contracts with government agencies, does not provide this
scenario-based training to its guards on FPS contracts because FPS
does not require it. We also found that some guards were still not
provided building-specific training, such as what actions to take
during a building evacuation or a building emergency. According to
guards we spoke to in one region, guards receive very little training
on building emergency procedures during basic training or the
refresher training. These guards also said that the only time they
receive building emergency training is once they are on post.
Consequently, some guards do not know how to operate basic building
equipment, such as the locks or the building ventilation system, which
is important in a building evacuation or building emergency.
FPS's decision to increase guard inspections at federal facilities in
metropolitan areas is a step in the right direction. However, it does
not address issues with guard inspections at federal facilities
outside metropolitan areas, which are equally vulnerable. Thus,
without routine inspections of guards at these facilities, FPS has no
assurance that guards are complying with their post orders.
We believe that FPS continues to struggle with managing its contract
guard program in part because, although it has used guards to
supplement the agency's workforce since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred
P. Murrah Federal Building, it has not undertaken a comprehensive
review of its use of guards to protect federal facilities to determine
whether other options and approaches would be more cost-beneficial.
FPS also has not acted diligently in ensuring that its guard
contractors meet the terms of the contract and taking enforcement
action when noncompliance occurs. We also believe that completing the
required contract performance evaluations for its contractors and
maintaining contract files will put FPS in a better position to
determine whether it should continue to exercise contract options with
some contractors. Moreover, maintaining accurate and reliable data on
whether the 15,000 guards deployed at federal facilities have met the
training and certification requirements is important for a number of
reasons. First, without accurate and reliable data, FPS cannot
consistently ensure compliance with contract requirements and lacks
information critical for effective oversight of its guard program.
Second, given that other federal agencies rely on many of the same
contractors to provide security services, completing accurate
evaluations of a contractor's past performance is critical to future
contract awards.
Thus, in our report we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the Under Secretary of NPPD and the Director of FPS to
take the following eight actions:
* identify other approaches and options that would be most beneficial
and financially feasible for protecting federal buildings;
* rigorously and consistently monitor guard contractors' and guards'
performance and step up enforcement against contractors that are not
complying with the terms of the contract;
* complete all contract performance evaluations in accordance with FPS
and Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements;
* issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure that contract
files have required documentation;
* develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards at federal
facilities outside metropolitan areas;
* provide building-specific and scenario-based training and guidance
to its contract guards;
* develop and implement a management tool for ensuring that reliable,
comprehensive data on the contract guard program are available on a
real-time basis; and:
* verify the accuracy of all guard certification and training data
before entering them into RAMP, and periodically test the accuracy and
reliability of RAMP data to ensure that FPS management has the
information needed to effectively oversee its guard program.
DHS concurred with seven of our eight recommendations. Regarding our
recommendation to issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure
that contract files have required documentation, DHS concurred that
contract files must have required documentation but did not concur
that a new record-keeping format should be issued. DHS commented that
written procedures already exist and are required for use by all DHS's
Office of Procurement Operations staff and the components it serves,
including NPPD. We believe that the policies referenced by DHS are a
step in the right direction in ensuring that contract files have
required documentation; however, although these policies exist, we
found a lack of standardization and consistency in the contract files
we reviewed among the three Consolidated Contract Groups.
Overall, we are also concerned about some of the steps FPS plans to
take to address our recommendations. For example, FPS commented that
to provide routine oversight of guards in remote regions it will use
an employee of a tenant agency (referred to as an Agency Technical
Representative) who has authority to act as a representative of a COTR
for day-to-day monitoring of contract guards. However, several FPS
regional officials told us that the Agency Technical Representatives
were not fully trained and did not have an understanding of the
guards' roles and responsibilities. These officials also said that the
program may not be appropriate for all federal facilities. We believe
that if FPS plans to use Agency Tenant Representatives to oversee
guards, it is important that the agency ensure that the
representatives are knowledgeable of the guard's responsibilities and
are trained on how and when to conduct guard inspections as well as
how to evacuate facilities during an emergency. Furthermore, while we
support FPS's overall plans to better manage its contract guard
program, we believe it is also important for FPS to have appropriate
performance metrics to evaluate whether its planned actions are fully
implemented and are effective in addressing the challenges it faces
managing its contract guard program.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony. We are pleased to answer
any questions you might have.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Mark L.
Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or by e-mail at goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making
key contributions to this testimony include Tammy Conquest, Assistant
Director; Tida Barakat; and Jonathan Carver.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Contract
Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of
Contract Guards, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-341]
(Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2010).
[2] 40 U.S.C. § 1315.
[3] Funding for FPS is provided through revenues and collections
charged to building tenants of properties protected by FPS. The
revenues and collections are credited to FPS's appropriation and are
available until expended for the protection of federally owned and
leased buildings and for FPS operations.
[4] While FPS does not use guards at the remaining 6,700 facilities
under its protection, it uses other security countermeasures such as
cameras and perimeter lighting to help protect these facilities.
[5] Title 41 CFR Sections 102-74.435 and 102-74-440 identify and list
items that are prohibited by law from being introduced into a federal
facility except for law enforcement purposes and other limited
circumstances. Those items are explosives, firearms, or other
dangerous weapons. In addition, Facility Security Committees, which
are composed of representatives of tenant agencies at federal
facilities, have broad latitude in determining items in addition to
those specifically prohibited by statute that can be prohibited in
their facilities.
[6] GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal
Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities is Hampered
by Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T] (Washington, D.C.: July 8,
2009).
[7] The Inspector General found that FPS does not always take
deductions against a contractor for services that are not provided in
accordance with contract requirements. Department of Homeland
Security, Office of Inspector General, Federal Protective Service
Contract Guard Procurement and Oversight Process, OIG-09-51
(Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2009).
[8] As part of DHS, FPS is required to use the Department of Defense
Contractor Performance Assessment System (CPARS) to officially
document its performance evaluations. CPARS requires the use of an
adjectival rating scale by evaluators that includes ratings of
exceptional, very good, satisfactory, marginal, and unsatisfactory.
[9] As we testified in July 2009, each time they tried, our
investigators successfully passed undetected through security
checkpoints monitored by FPS guards with the components for an
improvised explosive device (IED) concealed on their persons at 10
level IV facilities in four cities in major metropolitan areas. We
planned additional tests but suspended them after achieving 100
percent test results, which highlighted the vulnerabilities federal
facilities face. A level IV facility has over 450 employees and a high
volume of public contact.
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T].
[11] Challenge and response refers to being proactive instead of
reactive to an incident.
[End of section]
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