Space Shuttle

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has not established contingency plans to replace an orbiter in the event of a catastrophic accident or to repair an orbiter seriously damaged in an accident because national policy is not to produce any additional orbiters. The agency also is terminating its structural spaces program. Orbiter project officials argue that should the need arise for an additional orbiter or structural component, that capability to produce it could be obtained from the commercial sector. However, production would take longer than if spare structural components and critical manufacturing were readily available. Ending that program will result in the loss of some critical manufacturing skills that would be needed to produce another orbiter, such as the skills needed to make payload bay door skins. However, NASA believes that this situation poses significant risks to the shuttle because those skills could be reacquired if another orbiter is needed. The plants at Downey and Palmdale in southern California will be required to support the shuttle at least until modification for flights to the Russian space station and the international space station are completed. The National Facilities Study Team recommended that NASA consolidate production at the two plants after it completes major modifications to the orbiters. GAO agrees that a decision will be needed on the use of these plants when the modification program is completed since excess capacity will exist.

GAO found that: (1) NASA has not established contingency plans to replace an orbiter in the event of a catastrophic accident or to repair an orbiter seriously damaged in an accident; (2) NASA is terminating its structural spares program and parts that are 85 percent or more complete will be finished and placed in storage; (3) although NASA can obtain the capability to produce replacement components, production would take longer than if spare components and manufacturing skills were readily available; (4) although terminating the structural spares program will eliminate critical manufacturing skills, NASA does not believe it will significantly increase the risk to the shuttle program because those skills could be reacquired if another orbiter is needed; and (5) NASA needs to decide on the use of two production facilities after its modification program is completed, since excess capacity will exist.