Space Shuttle

The 1986 explosion aboard the space shuttle Challenger underscored the risks inherent in human space flight. The Presidential Commission investigating the accident found that it had been caused by poor rocket motor design, but the Commission also cited as a contributing factor shortcomings in NASA's processes for identifying, assessing, and managing risk. This report reviews the steps that NASA has taken to improve the free flow of information in launch decisions and the progress NASA has made in adopting quantitative methods for assessing risk.

GAO found that: (1) NASA has successfully created numerous formal and informal communication channels and an open organizational culture that encourages people to discuss safety concerns and to elevate unaddressed concerns to higher management levels; (2) while most personnel agreed that the current culture encourages discussions of safety concerns, there was not universal agreement about the kinds of risk information needed for final launch decisions; (3) some personnel expressed concerns about the effects of pending cost reductions and program changes on shuttle safety; (4) NASA primarily relies on qualitative methods to assess and prioritize significant shuttle risk; (5) costs, lack of expertise, and lack of data have hindered NASA progress in increasing its use of quantitative methods to assess shuttle safety risks; and (6) NASA databases do not always provide timely, accessible, accurate, and complete information to facilitate quantitative assessment or decisionmaking.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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