Space Station

Uncertainty about future Russian involvement in the international space station underscores the need for NASA to continuously develop and implement contingency plans. Russia had agreed to provide a host of critical equipment for the station, but funding problems have already delayed the delivery of the service module--the first major Russian-funded component--and have raised concerns about Russia's ability to support the station during assembly and thereafter. NASA is implementing a multifaceted plan to address the risk of further delay of the service module and the possibility that the Russians will be unable to provide the progress vehicles needed to reboost the station. The agency now estimates it will cost $1.2 billion to protect against Russian nonperformance. Despite this contingency plan, NASA lacks an approved overall plan to deal with issues like late delivery and loss of critical hardware. NASA is satisfied that Russian quality assurance and manufacturing standards are acceptable. However, the service module's inability to meet debris protection requirements is a potential safety issue. Pressures on the program budget continue to mount. NASA assumes that assembly will be completed by 2004--a schedule that the agency concedes will not be easy to meet. Schedule delays could further increase total program costs. The prime contractor's estimate of overruns at completion has been raised several times and now stands at $986 million. At the same time, the program's nonprime components--science facilities and ground and vehicle operations--have risen from $8.5 billion in 1994 to more than $12.4 billion today.

GAO noted that: (1) uncertainty regarding future Russian involvement will require NASA to continuously plan and implement contingency initiatives; (2) as an International Space Station partner, Russia agreed to provide certain equipment; (3) however, Russia's funding problems have delayed delivery of the Service Module (SM) and raised concerns about Russia's ability to support the station during assembly and once it is completed; (4) NASA is implementing a multifaceted contingency plan to mitigate the risk of further delay of the SM and the possibility that Progress vehicles for reboosting the station cannot be provided by the Russians; (5) the plan includes the development of the U.S.-built interim control module and modifications to the Russian-built and U.S.-financed functional cargo block; (6) NASA is developing its own permanent reboosting capability; (7) NASA's plan includes payments to the Russian Space Agency to complete near-term work on the SM and the Progress and Soyuz space vehicles; (8) while the ultimate cost of NASA's plan is uncertain, the agency estimates that the cost to protect against Russian nonperformance will be about $1.2 billion; (9) although NASA has a contingency plan to mitigate Russian nonperformance, it does not have an approved overall contingency plan to address certain issues; (10) NASA acknowledges that the lack of an overall contingency plan is a program risk item; (11) NASA is satisfied that Russian quality assurance and manufacturing standards are acceptable; (12) however, the SM's inability to meet station requirements for debris protection is a potential safety issue; (13) the SM will require improvements after it is launched to meet the station's debris protection requirement; (14) based on the module's launch date, it will be about 3 1/2 years after launch before improvements can be completed; (15) pressures on the program's budget continue to mount; (16) NASA's cost estimates assume assembly completion in 2004; (17) the agency acknowledges the difficulty in maintaining that schedule; (18) if the schedule is not met, total program costs for the U.S. segment of the station will increase further; (19) the prime contractor's estimate of overrun at completion has been increased several times and stands at $986 million; (20) in 1994, the nonprime component of the program's development budget was $8.5 billion; today, it is over $12.4 billion; and (21) NASA has begun to subject the nonprime area to increased scrutiny, and modifications are being made to a centralized database of potential risk areas to include the identification of the cost of such risks.