Space Shuttle

Several internal NASA studies have shown that downsizing has harmed the shuttle program's workforce. Many key areas lack enough qualified workers, and the remaining workforce shows signs of overwork and fatigue. Forfeited leave, absences from training courses, and stress-related employee assistance visits are all on the rise. More than twice as many workers are more than 60 years old than are under 30 years old, jeopardizing the program's ability to hand off leadership to the next generation. This situation also poses significant shuttle program flight-safety risks, according to NASA. To revitalize its workforce, NASA has ended its downsizing plans and has begun to hire new staff. It has started an overall workforce review to examine personnel needs, barriers, and reforms to address long-term requirements. During the next five years, NASA plans to develop and institute various safety and supportability upgrades. The program's success, however, depends on NASA's ability to overcome programmatic and technical challenges, such as a demanding schedule and undefined design and workforce requirements. Continued management emphasis will be critical to the success of NASA's human capital planning.

GAO noted that: (1) several internal NASA studies have shown that the shuttle program's workforce has been affected negatively by downsizing, much of which occurred after 1995; (2) since 1995, the shuttle workforce has decreased by more than one-third to about 1,800 full-time equivalent employees; (3) the shuttle program has identified many key areas that are not sufficiently staffed by qualified workers, and the remaining workforce shows signs of overwork and fatigue; (4) NASA has recognized the need to revitalize its workforce; (5) NASA and the Office of Management and Budget have begun an overall workforce review to examine personnel needs, barriers to achieving proper staffing levels and skill mixes, and potential reforms to help address the agency's long-term requirements; (6) in addition, the Government Performance and Results Act requires a performance plan that describes how an agency's goals and objectives are to be achieved; (7) these plans are to include a description of the: (a) operational processes, skills, and technology; and (b) human, capital, information, and other resources required to meet goals and objectives; (8) in reviewing NASA's fiscal year (FY) 2000 annual performance plan, GAO found that the plan does not adequately describe how the agency's strategies and human capital resources will help it achieve performance goals; (9) NASA's FY 2001 plan, however, addresses at least some human capital issues in that it includes an objective to improve workforce health monitoring; (10) in addition, in June 2000, the President directed the heads of all executive agencies to integrate human resource management into planning, budgeting, and mission evaluation processes; (11) concerning safety issues, over the next 5 years, NASA plans to develop and begin equipping the shuttle fleet with a variety of safety and supportability, upgrades, at an estimated cost of about $2.2 billion; (12) however, to implement the program successfully, NASA will have to overcome a number of programmatic and technical challenges, such as a demanding schedule and undefined design and workforce requirements; (13) while the President's June 2000 directive provides further emphasis on the need to integrate human capital requirements with the strategic planning process, continued management emphasis will be critical to the success of NASA's human capital planning; and (14) in addition, NASA will need to take steps to ensure it has the right people to manage the shuttle program.