Major Management Challenges and Program Risks
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Gao ID: GAO-03-114 January 1, 2003In its 2001 performance and accountability report on NASA, GAO identified important management, oversight, and workforce issues facing the agency. The information GAO presents in this report is intended to help sustain congressional attention and an agency focus on continuing to make progress in addressing these challenges--and others that have arisen since 2001--and ultimately overcoming them. This report is part of a special series of reports on governmentwide and agency-specific issues.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) continues to face challenges that threaten its ability to effectively run its largest programs. NASA is taking steps to address these challenges. But because they are rooted in NASA's culture and long-standing ways of doing business, NASA will need to make a major transformation. Strengthening strategic human capital management: NASA is facing shortages in its workforce, which could likely worsen as the workforce continues to age and the pipeline of talent shrinks. This dilemma is more pronounced among areas crucial to NASA's ability to perform its mission, such as engineering, science, and information technology. NASA is addressing this challenge through strategic planning, a new workforce planning and analysis system, and requesting additional personnel flexibilities, among other initiatives. Controlling International Space Station costs: Development costs for this premier project have soared to the point where NASA has had to cutback the program substantially, including reducing construction, the number of crew members, and scientific research. This has raised concern among NASA's international partners, who have a large stake in the scientific research to be performed on the station. NASA is instituting management and cost-estimating reforms. But it must still reach agreement with its partners on its planned cutbacks. Reducing space launch costs: NASA recognizes the need to reduce the costs of space launches and replace its aging space shuttle. The administration recently submitted an amendment to NASA's fiscal year 2003 budget request, which (1) extends the life of the space shuttle and enhances its reliability, (2) funds the development of a new vehicle for ferrying crew to and from the space station, and (3) alters the time frame for a shuttle replacement. Accomplishing these and other goals related to space launches will be difficult and risky in light of the technology advances NASA would like to pursue and the high degree of communication and coordination required among industry and government partners. Improving contract management: NASA spends most of its funds on acquisitions. Yet, for many years, it has been unable to oversee contracts effectively, principally because it lacked accurate and reliable information on contract spending and it placed little emphasis on end results, product performance, and cost control. NASA has addressed many acquisition-related weaknesses and is beginning to tackle one of its most formidable barriers to sound contract management--the lack of a modern, integrated financial management system. Considerable work remains to be done since NASA is only in the early stages of designing and implementing this new system, and NASA reported that it is already facing challenges in terms of cost, interoperability, and security.
GAO-03-114, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Performance and Accountability Series:
January 2003:
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
GAO-03-114:
A Glance at the Agency Covered in This Report:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration‘s mission encompasses
* human exploration and development of space,
* the advancement and communication of scientific knowledge, and
* research and development of aeronautics and space technologies.
Its activities span a broad range of complex and technical endeavors”
from investigating the composition, evaluation, and resources of Mars;
its international partners to complete and operate the International
Space Station;to working with to providing satellite and aircraft
observations of Earth for scientific and weather forecasting purposes;
to developing new technologies designed to improve air safety.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
This Series:
This report is part of a special GAO series, first issued in 1999 and
updated in 2001, entitled the Performance and Accountability Series:
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks. The 2003 Performance
and Accountability Series contains separate reports covering each
cabinet department, most major independent agencies, and the U.S.
Postal Service. The series also includes a governmentwide perspective
on transforming the way the government does business in order to meet
21st century challenges and address long-term fiscal needs.The
companion 2003 High-Risk Series: An Update identifies areas at high
risk due to either their greater vulnerabilities to waste, fraud,
abuse, and mismanagement or major challenges associated with their
economy, efficiency, oreffectiveness. A list of all of the reports in
this series is included at the end of this report.
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-114, a report to Congress included as part of
GAO‘s Performance and Accountability Series.
Why GAO did This Report:
In its 2001 performance and accountability report on NASA, GAO
identified important management, oversight, and workforce issues
facing the agency. The information GAO presents in this report is
intended to help sustain congressional attention and an agency focus
on continuing to make progress in addressing these challenges”and
others that have arisen since 2001”and ultimately overcoming them.
This report is part of a special series of reports on governmentwide
and agency-specific issues.
What GAO Found:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) continues
to face challenges that threaten its ability to effectively run its
largest programs. NASA is taking steps to address these challenges.
But because they are rooted in NASA‘s culture and long-standing ways
of doing business, NASA will need to make a major transformation.
* Strengthening strategic human capital management. NASA is facing
shortages in its workforce, which could likely worsen as the workforce
continues to age and the pipeline of talent shrinks. This dilemma is
more pronounced among areas crucial to NASA‘s ability to perform its
mission, such as engineering, science, and information technology.
NASA is addressing this challenge through strategic planning, a new
workforce planning and analysis system, and requesting additional
personnel flexibilities, among other initiatives.
* Controlling International Space Station costs. Development costs
for this premier project have soared to the point where NASA has
had to cutback the program substantially, including reducing
construction, the number of crew members, and scientific research.
This has raised concern among NASA‘s international partners, who have a
large stake in the scientific research to be performed on the station.
NASA is instituting management and cost-estimating reforms. But it
must still reach agreement with its partners on its planned cutbacks.
* Reducing space launch costs. NASA recognizes the need to reduce the
costs of space launches and replace its aging space shuttle. The
administration recently submitted an amendment to NASA‘s fiscal year
2003 budget request, which (1) extends the life of the space shuttle
and enhances its reliability, (2) funds the development of a new
vehicle for ferrying crew to and from the space station, and (3) alters
the time frame for a shuttle replacement. Accomplishing these and
other goals related to space launches will be difficult and risky in
light of the technology advances NASA would like to pursue and the high
degree of communication and coordination required among industry and
government partners.
* Improving contract management. NASA spends most of its funds on
acquisitions. Yet, for many years, it has been unable to oversee
contracts effectively, principally because it lacked accurate and
reliable information on contract spending and it placed little emphasis
on end results, product performance, and cost control. NASA has
addressed many acquisition- related weaknesses and is beginning to
tackle one of its most formidable barriers to sound contract
management”the lack of a modern, integrated financial management
system.
Considerable work remains to be done since NASA is only in the early
stages of designing and implementing this new system, and NASA reported
that it is already facing challenges in terms of cost,
interoperability,
and security.
What Remains to be Done:
To make its improvement initiatives fully successful, GAO believes that
NASA will need to
* move to a results-oriented culture and provide the sustained
attention needed to make sure human capital reforms stay on track;
* overcome barriers facing implementation of its financial management
system and transform its financial management organization so that it
better supports NASA‘s core mission; and
* successfully follow through on planned oversight improvements
so that costs and scheduling risks can be mitigated.
Contents:
Transmittal Letter:
Major Performance and Accountability Challenges:
GAO Contacts:
Related GAO Products:
Performance and Accountability and High-Risk Series:
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copyrighted materials separately from GAO‘s product.
January 2003:
The President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives:
This report addresses the major management challenges and program risks
facing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as it
seeks to advance human exploration and development of space, advance
and communicate scientific knowledge, and research and develop
aeronautics and space technologies. The report discusses the actions
that NASA has taken and that are under way to address the challenges
GAO identified in its Performance and Accountability Series 2 years
ago, and major events that have occurred that significantly influence
the environment in which the agency carries out its mission. Also, GAO
summarizes the challenges that remain, new ones that have emerged, and
further actions that GAO believes are needed.
This analysis should help the new Congress and the administration carry
out their responsibilities and improve government for the benefit of
the American people. For additional information about this report,
please contact Allen Li, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management,
at (202) 512-4841 or at lia@gao.gov.
Signed by David M Walker:
David M. Walker
Comptroller General
of the United States:
[End of section]
Major Performance and Accountability Challenges:
NASA is at a critical juncture. Since its inception, NASA has advanced
space exploration and scientific knowledge and accomplished unparalled
feats of engineering. But NASA now faces challenges, particularly in
terms of maintaining a skilled workforce, controlling costs, and
providing effective oversight for important projects. Recognizing the
need for change, NASA‘s Administrator has recently articulated a new
vision for NASA--one that is science-driven, not destination-driven. To
put NASA on a better footing to fulfill this vision, the agency is
taking on a major transformation aimed at eliminating stovepipes,
becoming more integrated and results-oriented, and reducing risks while
working more economically, efficiently, and effectively.
We have identified four performance and accountability challenges
facing NASA. These include:
* strengthening strategic human capital management,
* controlling International Space Station costs,
* reducing space launch costs, and:
* improving contract management.
Collectively, these challenges seriously affect NASA‘s ability to
effectively run its largest programs. With an aging workforce, for
example, NASA is facing the loss of science and engineering expertise
across its mission areas. Moreover, cost overruns have prevented NASA
from achieving its original goals with the International Space Station
and taken away resources from other programs. Weak contract management
and financial controls pose additional risks across the agency.
Therefore, we have placed this area on our high-risk list.
Since our last Performance and Accountability Series report,[Footnote
1] issued in January 2001, NASA has been taking actions to address each
of its challenges. For example, NASA has hired new staff, who helped
address imbalances in some critical skill areas in the shuttle program,
and it has also developed a strategic human capital plan to enhance its
entire workforce. In an effort to control space station costs, NASA
made substantial cutbacks in the space station program and is
instituting management and cost-estimating reforms. NASA also took
significant steps to improve contract management, including reducing
its use of unnegotiated contract changes and beginning to implement a
new integrated financial management system. However, we are continuing
to categorize contract management as high risk since key actions remain
to provide the oversight needed for the more than $12 billion NASA
spends annually on its contracts.
Moreover, in our last report, we had identified NASA‘s faster-
better-cheaper approach to space exploration as a major management
challenge. However, since NASA decided to end this approach as a
preference for managing its programs and projects, we removed this
designation. We added reducing space launch costs as a challenge, given
the wide range of complex and difficult tasks that need to be addressed
for NASA‘s plans for future space travel to succeed.
While NASA is taking positive steps toward addressing management
problems, its ultimate challenge will be in tackling the root problems
impeding its major programs. This will require instituting a
results-oriented culture that fosters knowledge sharing and empowers
its workforce to accomplish programmatic goals; making sure that the
agency adheres to rigorous and effective management controls to prevent
cost overruns and scheduling problems; transforming the financial
management organization so that it better supports NASA‘s core mission;
and sustaining commitment to change.
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
[End of figure] - graphic text:
Strengthening Strategic Human Capital Management:
Like many agencies, NASA is facing substantial challenges in attracting
and retaining a highly skilled workforce. Left unchecked, for example,
reductions in the space shuttle workforce could have jeopardized NASA‘s
ability to safely support the shuttle‘s planned flight rate. NASA is
taking comprehensive steps to address this problem across all mission
areas, but implementing a strategic approach to marshaling, managing,
and maintaining human capital represents a significant challenge.
Leading public organizations here in the United States and abroad have
found that strategic human capital management must be the centerpiece
of any serious change management initiative and efforts to transform
the cultures of government agencies. People are an agency‘s most
important organizational asset. They define its culture, drive its
performance, and embody its knowledge base. Because serious human
capital shortfalls are eroding the ability of many agencies to
effectively perform their missions, we designated strategic human
capital management as a governmentwide high-risk area in January 2001
and continue to designate it as high risk today. Plainly, the problem
is not federal employees. Rather, the problem is the lack of a
consistent strategic approach to marshaling, managing, and maintaining
the human capital needed to maximize our government performance and
ensure its accountability.
We reported in January 2001 that NASA‘s shuttle workforce had declined
significantly in recent years to the point of reducing NASA‘s ability
to safely support the shuttle program. Many key areas were not
sufficiently staffed by qualified workers, and the remaining workforce
showed signs of overwork and fatigue. To the agency‘s credit, NASA has
recognized the need to revitalize the shuttle‘s workforce, discontinued
its downsizing plans for the shuttle program in December 1999, and
initiated efforts to hire new staff. In September 2001, we testified
that NASA was hiring approximately 200 full-time equivalent staff and
that it had focused more attention on human capital in its annual
performance plan by outlining an overall strategy to attract and retain
a skilled workforce. But even with these gains, there were still
considerable challenges. For example, NASA‘s new staff would require
considerable training, and the agency still needed to deal with
critical losses due to retirements in coming years.
Data obtained from NASA since September 2001 show that these challenges
have not been mitigated, and work climate indicators continue to
reflect high levels of job stress. In addition, while new hires helped
address staffing needs in some critical skill areas in the shuttle
program, staffing shortages in many key areas still remain a problem.
These areas include subsystems engineering, flight software
engineering, electrical engineering, environmental control, and
shuttle resources management. NASA‘s hiring posture for fiscal year
2003 will target areas where skill imbalances still exist in the
shuttle program.
Figure 1: Shuttle Undergoing Inspection at the Kennedy Space Center:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As we testified in July 2002, NASA believes that similar workforce
problems affect the entire agency and that, as a result, its ability to
perform future missions and manage its programs may be at risk. The
average age of its workforce is over 45, and the agency is finding it
particularly difficult to hire people with engineering, science, and
information technology skills--fields critical to NASA missions. At
this time, within the science and engineering workforce, the over-60
population outnumbers the under-30 population nearly 3 to 1. Currently,
15 percent of NASA‘s science and engineering employees are eligible to
retire; within 5 years, about 25 percent will be retirement eligible.
At the same time, the pipeline of people with science and engineering
skills is shrinking, and competition for workers with those skills is
intense. According to NASA‘s Inspector General, the agency also faces
the loss of significant procurement expertise through the year
2007.[Footnote 2] Coupled with these concerns, NASA has limited
capability for personnel tracking and planning, particularly on an
agencywide or programwide basis. Further, NASA acknowledges that it
needs to complete and submit to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) a transformation workforce restructuring plan, which it notes
that, in conjunction with its strategic human capital plan, will be
critical to ensuring that no skill gaps or deficiencies exist in
mission critical occupations.[Footnote 3]
NASA is taking steps to address its workforce predicament. For example,
it is developing an agencywide integrated workforce planning and
analysis system as part of its new financial management system. The new
system is expected to track the distribution of NASA‘s workforce across
programs, capture critical competencies and skills, determine
management and leadership depth, and facilitate gap analyses. NASA
already completed a pilot of an interim competency management system at
one of its centers. The interim system will facilitate a gap analysis
of human capital in terms of skills and competencies. NASA plans to
implement the interim system agencywide in 2003, and integrate it with
the new comprehensive workforce planning and analysis system in 2005.
The new system should foster better management of the existing
workforce and enable better strategic decisions about future
workforce needs.
NASA also developed a strategic human capital plan, which identifies
human capital goals, problems, improvement initiatives, and intended
outcomes and incorporates strategies and metrics to support the
goals.[Footnote 4] The plan has been reviewed and approved by OMB and
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). According to NASA, the plan
is based on OMB‘s scorecard of human capital standards and OPM‘s
scorecard of supporting human capital dimensions, as well as our own
model, which we published in March 2002.[Footnote 5] Our model is
designed to help agency officials effectively lead and manage their
people and integrate human capital considerations into their daily
decision making and the program results they seek to achieve. In doing
so, the model highlights the importance of a sustained commitment by
agency leaders to maximize the value of their agency‘s human capital
and to manage related risks. Consistent with OPM‘s and OMB‘s views, our
model of strategic human capital management embodies an approach that
is fact-based, focused on achieving strategic results, and incorporates
merit principles and other national goals.
Additionally, NASA has renewed attention to hiring applicants just out
of college and intends to pursue this even more aggressively in coming
years. It is undertaking a number of initiatives and activities aimed
at acquiring and retaining critically needed skills, such as using the
new Federal Career Intern Program to hire recent science and
engineering graduates, supplementing the workforce with nonpermanent
civil servants where it makes sense, and implementing a program to
repay student loans to attract and retain employees in
critical positions.
NASA has also incorporated a strategic objective and two performance
goals and supporting indicators to address human capital in its fiscal
year 2003 performance plan. The plan includes a goal to align
management of the agency‘s human resources to best achieve its
strategic goals and objectives along with a second goal to attract and
retain a workforce that represents America‘s diversity at all levels
and to maximize individual performance through training and development
experiences. Recognizing its human capital management challenge, NASA
has included strategies in the plan that will focus on restructuring
and revitalizing its workforce.
Further, the 107th Congress considered a series of legislative
proposals developed by NASA to provide it with further flexibilities
and authorities for attracting and retaining a skilled workforce. These
included streamlining hiring procedures; making noncompetitive
conversions of term employees to permanent positions; offering larger
recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses; expanding use of early
retirement; and providing authority for permanent and enhanced buyouts.
In testifying before Congress on the legislative proposals in July
2002, the NASA Administrator indicated that the provisions, taken
together as an integrated package, form a strong nucleus in support of
NASA‘s strategic human capital plan and The President‘s Management
Agenda and will enable NASA to avert a serious human capital crisis.
During those same hearings, we testified that several of the NASA
issues mirror aspects of other legislative proposals such as the
Federal Human Capital Act of 2001 (S. 1603, 107th Cong.,
2001),[Footnote 6] and noted that while we had not performed a detailed
analysis of the support behind NASA‘s legislative proposals, several
points as outlined as follows were worthy of consideration:
* First, the addition of flexibilities and authorities alone will not
solve workforce problems. Agencies need to undertake a wide array of
initiatives to attract, retain, and motivate a top quality workforce.
These include such actions as revitalizing recruiting and college
relations efforts; conducting employee feedback surveys to set
priorities and assess progress; conducting employee preference surveys
so employees can be given the opportunity to work in areas that
interest and energize them consistent with overall institutional needs;
inventorying the skills and knowledge of existing employees; initiating
professional development programs for newly hired staff to help them
transition and progress; implementing modern, effective, and credible
performance appraisal and management systems; redesigning training
programs to directly link them to core competencies; and implementing
employee-friendly benefits, such as day care centers, business casual
dress, flextime, and public transportation subsidies.
* Second, agencies need to make the most of current flexibilities and
authorities already available. These flexibilities are identified by
OPM in its guide, Human Resource Flexibilities and Authorities in the
Federal Government. They include such things as the ability to use
commercial recruiting firms to recruit for vacancies; customize merit
promotion plans and performance systems; increase basic pay to attract
and retain staff with unusually high or unique qualifications; and
grant substantial cash incentive awards. Agencies should develop a
sound business case for using these flexibilities by focusing on how a
given flexibility will address human capital challenges and ultimately
improve agency results. In tandem with exercising these flexibilities,
agencies must learn to effectively balance their pay and incentive
programs to encourage both individual and team contributions to achieve
results. In our December 2002 report, we identified 6 key practices for
the effective use of human capital flexibilities. These practices are
(1) planning strategically and making targeted investments,
(2) ensuring stakeholder input in developing policies and procedures,
(3) educating managers and employees on the availability and use of
flexibilities, (4) streamlining administrative processes, (5) building
transparency and accountability into the system, and (6) changing the
organizational culture.[Footnote 7]
* Third, agencies need effective succession planning. NASA‘s workforce
profile, particularly for science and engineering workers, points to
the need for this. Faced with the same problems at GAO, we reinstated
our Executive Candidate Development Program, under which candidates are
selected through a rigorous competitive process and are prepared for
assignments at the SES level. While the potential loss of expertise
through retirements will be substantial, this turnover also affords
NASA‘s Administrator the opportunity to change culture, skill mix,
deployment locations, and other agency attributes. NASA will, however,
need to leverage technology and enhance its training efforts to help
make this transition and facilitate needed knowledge
sharing initiatives.
* Fourth, agencies must ensure that strategic human capital plans are
results-oriented and data-driven. This includes developing appropriate
information on the number and location of employees and their key
competencies and skills as well as data on the profile of the
workforce, and performance goals and measures for human capital
approaches. Further, this data must be used effectively to develop
strategies that continually ensure they have the right mix of employees
to meet future needs. A key to success in this area also will be NASA‘s
ability to implement its new financial management system, since it will
encompass the new workforce planning and analysis system.
We will continue to monitor NASA‘s progress in resolving its human
capital problems, including how well its human capital initiatives and
reforms and any new and existing flexibilities and authorities are
helping to strategically manage and reshape its workforce.
Controlling International Space Station Costs:
The International Space Station is characterized as one of the most
challenging engineering feats ever attempted. It also represents an
important effort to foster international cooperation in scientific
research and space exploration. But development costs for the
International Space Station have soared to the point where NASA has had
to make substantial cutbacks in the program. Specifically, the cost to
complete assembly has mushroomed by about $5 billion to the current
estimate of about $30 billion, and while assembly of the station was
originally expected to be completed in 2002, NASA now expects it to be
done in 2006. This has negatively impacted NASA‘s credibility with
Congress and raised concern among international partners and the
scientific community about the viability of the space station. NASA is
taking action to keep costs in check, but its success in this area
still faces considerable challenges.
NASA has had difficulty predicting and controlling costs and scheduling
for the space station since its inception in 1984. In September 1997,
we reported that the cost and schedule performance of the space
station‘s prime contract, which showed signs of deterioration in 1996,
had continued to worsen steadily and that the program‘s financial
reserves for contingencies had deteriorated, principally because of
program uncertainties and cost overruns. In our January 2001
Performance and Accountability Series report, we reported that the
prime contract for the space station was initially expected to cost
over $5.2 billion, and the assembly of the station was expected to be
completed in June 2002. But by October 2000, the prime contractor‘s
cost had grown to about $9 billion, of which $986 million was for cost
overruns, and the station was not expected to be complete until
April 2006. NASA‘s Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported the same
cost overrun in a February 2000 audit report, and based on
recommendations in that report, NASA agreed to take several actions,
including discussing the prime contractor‘s cost performance at
regularly scheduled meetings and preparing monthly reports to senior
management on the overrun status.
Figure 2: The International Space Station:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Our July 2002 report on the International Space Station shows that
the reasons for continued cost growth include an inadequate definition
of requirements, changes in program content, and schedule delays and
inadequate program oversight. NASA has controls in place that should
have alerted management to the growing cost problem and the need for
mitigation, but these were largely ignored because of NASA‘s focus
on fiscal year budget management rather than on total program
cost management.
The estimated cost growth is having a profound effect on the utility of
the space station--with substantial cutbacks in construction, the
number of crew members, and scientific research. As a part of the space
station restructuring, further work and funding for the habitation
module and crew return vehicle have been deferred, thus requiring the
on-orbit crew to be reduced from seven to three members. This will
limit the crew-member hours that can be devoted to research.
Additionally, NASA has cut back from 27 to 20 the number of facilities
available for research. This will eliminate some experiments, such as
those relating to biotechnology. NASA‘s international partners and the
scientific community are not satisfied with these and other reductions
in capabilities and have raised concerns about the viability of the
space station science program.
NASA is instituting a number of management and cost-estimating reforms.
But there are significant challenges to their successful
implementation. First, NASA is now preparing a life cycle cost estimate
for the program based on a three-person crew. However, between now and
submission of the fiscal year 2004 budget, NASA and OMB must agree on
the estimate. Furthermore, NASA‘s financial management system used to
collect required space station cost data has proven inadequate. Second,
NASA must decide how research can be maximized with only a three-person
crew. Third, NASA has not yet reached an agreement with its
international partners on an acceptable on-orbit configuration and
sharing of research facilities and costs. Thus, the capacity and
capabilities of the space station, the scope of research that can be
accomplished, and the partners‘ share of operating costs are unknown at
this time. In addition to the reforms, NASA has requested additional
funding for the space station program in its revised fiscal year 2003
budget request.
Reducing Space Launch Costs:
Until last November, NASA was pursuing a $4.8 billion, 5-year program-
-known as the Space Launch Initiative (SLI)--to build a new generation
of space vehicles to replace its aging space shuttle. This was part of
NASA‘s broader plan for the future of space travel--known as NASA‘s
Integrated Space Transportation Plan--which involved operating the
space shuttle through 2020 and developing successive generations of
transportation vehicles that would begin to be deployed around 2011.
The primary goals for SLI were to reduce the risk of crew loss as well
as substantially lower the cost of space transportation so that more
funds could be made available for scientific research, technology
development, and exploration activities. Currently, NASA spends nearly
one third of its budget on space transportation.
Figure 3: NASA Illustration of Its Second Generation Transportation
Vehicle:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
We reported in September 2002 that SLI was a considerably complex and
challenging endeavor for NASA--from both a technical and business
standpoint. For example, it would require NASA to develop and advance
new technologies for the new vehicle, including (1) new airframe
technologies that will include robust, low-cost, low-maintenance
structure, tanks, and thermal protection systems, using advanced
ceramic and metallic composite materials, and (2) new propulsion
technologies, including main propulsion systems, orbital maneuvering
systems, main engines, and propellant management. The program would
also require NASA to carefully coordinate and communicate among
industry and government partners since agreements need to be reached on
what the basic capabilities of the new vehicle will be, what designs or
architectures should be pursued, how development costs will be shared,
and what individual partner responsibilities will be. Lastly, the SLI
project would require careful oversight, especially in view of past
difficulties NASA has had in developing the technologies for reusable
launch vehicles to replace the space shuttle. These efforts did not
achieve their goals primarily because NASA did not develop realistic
cost estimates, timely acquisition and risk management plans, or
adequate and realistic performance goals.
Most important, however, we reported that NASA was incurring a high
level of risk in pursuing its plans to select potential designs for the
new vehicle without first making other decisions that would have a
large impact on the SLI program. These included decisions on what DOD‘s
role would be in the program; what the final configuration of the
International Space Station would be; and what overall direction NASA‘s
Space Transportation Plan would take. At the time, there were
indications that NASA and DOD differed on priorities and requirements
for the program. Also, NASA had yet to come to agreement with its
international partners on space station issues that could dramatically
impact SLI requirements, such as how many crew members would operate
the station. Moreover, NASA was still in the process of reassessing its
overall space transportation plans.
NASA agreed with our findings and took steps needed to refocus its
space launch efforts. On October 21, 2002, NASA postponed its Systems
Requirements Review (SRR) for SLI so that it could focus on defining
DOD‘s role, determine the future requirements of the International
Space Station, and firm up the agency‘s future space
transportation needs.
In November 2002, the administration submitted to the Congress an
amendment to NASA‘s fiscal year 2003 budget request to implement a
new Integrated Space Transportation Plan. The new plan makes
investments to extend the space shuttle‘s operational life for
continued safe operations and refocuses the SLI program on developing
an orbital space plane--which provides a crew transfer capability to
and from the space station--and next generation launch technology.
We will continue to monitor NASA‘s progress in reducing launch costs
and position ourselves to advise the Congress accordingly. As it
proceeds forward with its revised plans, it will still be important for
NASA to implement management controls that can effectively predict what
the total costs of the program will be and minimize risks. These
include cost estimates, controls designed to provide early warnings of
cost and schedule overruns, and risk mitigation plans. With such
controls in place, NASA would be positioned to provide its managers and
the Congress with the information needed to ensure that the program is
on track and able to meet expectations.
Correcting Weaknesses in Contract Management:
Much of NASA‘s success depends on the work of its contractors--on which
it spends the greatest part of its funds--$12.7 billion or 90 percent.
But for many years, NASA has not been able to effectively oversee
contracts, principally because it lacked accurate and reliable
information on contract spending and it has placed little emphasis on
end results, product performance, and cost control. NASA has addressed
many acquisition-related weaknesses, but key tasks remain, including
completing the design and implementation of a new integrated financial
management system.
Since 1990, we have identified NASA‘s contract management function as
an area at high risk due to its ineffective systems and processes for
overseeing contractor activities. Our reports and testimonies since
then have demonstrated just how debilitating these weaknesses in
contract management and oversight can be to important space programs.
Our July 2002 report on the International Space Station, for example,
found that NASA did not effectively control costs or technical and
scheduling risks, provide adequate oversight review, or effectively
coordinate efforts with its partners. In other examples, we found that
NASA lacked effective systems and processes for overseeing contractor
activities and did not emphasize controlling costs.
In addition, NASA‘s ability to collect, maintain, and report the full
cost of its projects and programs is weakened by diverse and often
incompatible center-level accounting systems and uneven and nonstandard
cost-reporting capabilities. The agency‘s financial management
environment is comprised of decentralized, nonintegrated systems with
policies, procedures, and practices that are unique to its field
centers. For the most part, data formats are not standardized,
automated systems are not interfaced, and on-line financial information
is not readily available to program managers. Thus, it is difficult to
ensure that contracts are being efficiently and effectively implemented
and that budgets are executed as planned.
NASA‘s lack of a fully integrated financial management system also
hurts NASA‘s ability to provide data required for external reporting
purposes. For example, in March 2002, we testified that NASA was unable
to provide us with detailed support for amounts that it reported to
Congress as obligated against space station and related shuttle program
cost limits as required by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Authorization Act of 2000.[Footnote 8] Furthermore,
NASA‘s independent auditor, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, disclaimed an
opinion on the agency‘s fiscal year 2001 financial statements and
identified significant internal control weaknesses related to
accounting for space station material and equipment and to computer
security. This action is in contrast with the unqualified or ’clean“
audit opinions of its previous auditor for fiscal years 1996
through 2000. Also in contrast with NASA‘s previous auditor‘s opinion,
Pricewaterhouse Coopers concluded that NASA‘s financial management
systems do not substantially comply with the requirements of the
Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996[Footnote 9]
(FFMIA). FFMIA builds on previous financial management reform
legislation by emphasizing the need for agencies to have systems that
can generate timely, accurate, and useful information with which to
make informed decisions and to ensure accountability on an
ongoing basis.
In recent years, NASA made progress in addressing its contract
management challenges. In July 1998, for example, we reported that
NASA was developing systems to provide oversight and information needed
to improve contract management and that it had made progress evaluating
its field centers‘ procurement activities on the basis of international
quality standards and its own procurement surveys. In January 1999, we
reported that NASA was implementing its new system for measuring
procurement-related activities and had made progress in evaluating
procurement functions in its field centers.
NASA has also made progress reducing its use of undefinitized contract
actions[Footnote 10]--that is, unnegotiated (i.e., uncosted) contract
changes. Both NASA‘s Office of the Inspector General and we have
reported our concerns about NASA‘s frequent use of undefinitized
contract changes. In 2000, we reported concerns about NASA‘s use of
such actions, since this practice could result in contract cost
overruns and cost growth in the International Space Station program.
NASA‘s Office of the Inspector General is currently conducting a review
of NASA‘s management of undefinitized contract actions. Data provided
by NASA show significant reductions in the use of these actions. NASA
officials attribute recent declines to increased management controls
and emphasis by NASA centers on limiting undefinitized
contract actions.
Moreover, NASA recognizes the urgency of successfully implementing
a fully integrated financial management system. NASA is working on
implementing such a system and expects a new system to be fully
operational in fiscal year 2008. NASA has estimated the life cycle
costs of this system to be $861 million.[Footnote 11] This is NASA‘s
third attempt toward implementing a fully integrated financial
management system. NASA abandoned the first two efforts after 12 years
and after spending $180 million. According to NASA, the agency‘s
current approach focuses on learning from other organizations‘
successes in implementing similar projects, as opposed to revisiting
its own failures. NASA has also abandoned its prior approach of
attempting to acquire and implement the entire system all at once.
Instead, the project is being broken down into manageable pieces. That
is, it is being split into modules that NASA states it will implement
individually, based on the availability of proven commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) software products. NASA initially segmented implementation
of the integrated financial management project into 14 modules, but has
since reorganized the program into 8 modules. One of the first modules
NASA plans to implement is the core financial module, which is expected
to be fully operational in June 2003. According to NASA officials, the
core financial module will provide NASA‘s program managers with timely,
consistent, and reliable information for management decisions as well
as the ability to tie all agency costs to major activities, including
civil service personnel costs.
While NASA has made some progress, much work remains to strengthen
contract oversight. First, NASA has encountered some difficulty in
implementing its new financial management system. As we testified in
July 2002, a recent NASA review found that the total cost estimate for
deployment of the core financial module at all NASA centers had grown
considerably beyond the cost initially contemplated. The review also
acknowledged that interoperability and security vulnerabilities exist
within the current information infrastructure, although specific
details were not provided. Furthermore, NASA reported that the agency‘s
technical project resources are stretched to the point where the impact
of any individual schedule mishap could have a systemwide effect. To
address these continuing problems, the Administrator appointed an
executive to provide leadership and accountability in the direction and
operation of the new system. He also recently decided that the near-
term focus of the program should be to ensure a successful and rapid
deployment of the core financial module--the backbone of the system--
and that the schedule of the remaining modules should undergo further
risks assessments before moving forward. The keys to success as NASA
moves forward in acquiring and implementing its new financial
management system are to employ proven best practices, including
(1) aligning its selection of commercial components of the system with
a NASA-wide blueprint, commonly called an enterprise architecture;
(2) analyzing and understanding the dependencies among these commercial
components before acquiring and implementing them; (3) following an
event-driven system acquisition strategy; (4) employing effective
acquisition management processes, such as those governing requirements
management, risk management, and test management; (5) ensuring that
data existing in legacy systems are corrected before being loaded into
the new system, so that data errors will not be perpetuated in the new
system; and (6) proactively positioning NASA for the business process
changes embedded in the new system by, for example, providing adequate
formal and on-the-job training.
Second, NASA still needs to ensure that it has the right data to
oversee its programs and contractors--specifically data to allow
comparisons of actual costs to estimates, provide an early warning of
cost overruns or other related difficulties, and monitor contract
performance and make program requirement trade-off decisions. As we
reported in August 2001 and again in March 2002, despite its past and
current efforts, NASA does not track the actual costs of completed
space station components, even though it often estimates costs at the
component level for planning and budgeting purposes. Several factors
contribute to this situation, including ineffective policies and
procedures for updating cost estimates at each major design phase. NASA
is also not yet able to uniformly ensure that contractors provide cost
data at a level that will give managers the information they need to
assess the validity of previous cost estimates, fully monitor the work
being performed, and appropriately identify cost drivers. NASA has
begun taking actions to improve the type and detail of cost data
available for some large programs, but these efforts are not
yet complete.
Because more work is needed to demonstrate substantial progress in
resolving the root causes of NASA‘s contract management weaknesses, we
are retaining contract management as a major management challenge and a
high-risk area. We are continuing to monitor NASA‘s progress in
addressing contract management weaknesses. In response to a May
24, 2002, bicameral, bipartisan request from the Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee and the House Science Committee,
we are currently assessing the extent to which NASA‘s management of the
financial management system acquisition is in accordance with
effective system acquisition practices and is designed to support
NASA‘s decision-making needs and external reporting requirements.
Addressing the Challenges Requires Broader Steps:
NASA‘s management challenges reflect a deeper need for broad cultural
change within the agency. Particularly important is the need to shift
its overall orientation from processes to results; stovepipes to
matrixes; hierarchical to flatter and more horizontal structures;
management control to employee empowerment; and reactive behavior to
proactive approaches. Making such a shift will require redefining and
communicating priorities and values, and a performance management
system that will reinforce agency priorities. It will also require a
fundamental reassessment of the organizational layers, levels, units,
and locations and possibly realignment to support the agency‘s
strategic plan and desired transformation.
NASA is hardly alone in this respect. Federal agencies generally need
to reexamine their policies, programs, and operations in light of a
number of trends, including the changing nature of the economy; rapidly
evolving science and technology; dramatic shifts in the age and
composition of the population; diverse, diffuse, and asymmetrical
security threats; and long range fiscal challenges. Leading public and
private organizations here in the United States and abroad have found
that to successfully transform themselves, they must often change their
culture. Leading organizations also understand that their people,
processes, technologies, and environments are the key enablers that
drive cultural change.
NASA‘s Administrator recognizes the scope of the transformation
needed at NASA. In fact, in early 2002, he stressed that NASA must
avoid getting distracted with challenges that call for simply
incremental or marginal improvements and dedicate itself to overcoming
its limits by finding entirely new ways to achieve its objectives.
Moreover, to become a science-driven organization,[Footnote 12] the
Administrator called for a new commitment to fiscal responsibility and
wise use of assets. The Administrator also underscored the need to
eliminate stovepipes within the agency to build an integrated strategy
that links human space flight and robotic space flight in a stepping
stone approach to exploration and discovery. To make its
transformation, NASA is primarily using the five major initiatives from
The President‘s Management Agenda (strategic management of human
capital, competitive sourcing, improved financial performance,
expanded electronic government, and budget and performance integration)
as a guide to enact management reforms within the agency.
The success of NASA‘s transformation will hinge on its ability to solve
financial and contract management problems since these problems
threaten the success of virtually every major program. While NASA‘s
efforts to design and implement a new financial management system and
other actions taken certainly move NASA forward in this area, other
issues remain. Specifically, NASA is not yet able to uniformly ensure
that contractors provide cost data at a level that will identify cost
drivers, give managers the information they need to make trade-off
decisions, and link back to cost estimates. Also, NASA has not yet
shifted management attention away from yearly budgets to total costs or
the need to adhere to controls that focus on reducing cost, scheduling,
and performance risks. Overall, our reviews as well as NASA‘s show that
finance is not viewed as intrinsic to NASA‘s program management
decision process, nor does it focus on what ’could“ and ’should“ take
place from an analytical cost-planning standpoint.
To address these issues, NASA must transform its financial management
operations so that it better supports NASA‘s core mission.
Specifically, as discussed in our study of leading private sector and
state organizations,[Footnote 13] NASA must go beyond obtaining an
unqualified audit opinion toward (1) routinely generating reliable cost
and performance information and analysis, (2) undertaking other value-
added activities that support strategic decision-making and mission
performance, and (3) strengthening NASA‘s financial team to better
support the agency‘s mission and goals. NASA must also view the
implementation of its new financial management system as an opportunity
to fundamentally change the way it does business. As we found in the
same study, to reap the full benefit of a modern, integrated financial
management system, these organizations reengineered their core business
processes. In fact, productivity gains typically result from more
efficient processes, not from simply automating old ones.
Lastly, to successfully implement its human capital plan, financial
management, and other reforms, NASA will need sustained commitment from
senior leaders. Changing an organization like NASA with its deep-seated
culture and tradition is a massive undertaking that will take
considerable effort and time to implement. Given the high stakes
involved, it is critical that NASA‘s leadership provide the necessary
direction, oversight, and sustained attention to ensure that reforms
stay on track. In this regard, NASA‘s Administrator comes to the
position with a strong management background and expertise in financial
management. He has already made a personal commitment to change the
workforce and the way NASA does business. Moreover, NASA has appointed
a chief operating officer in order to provide sustained management
attention to strategic planning, organizational alignment, human
capital strategy, performance management, and other elements necessary
for transformation success. The challenge ahead for NASA will be to
achieve the same level of commitment from managers at NASA centers so
that NASA can effectively use existing and new authorities to manage
its people strategically and quickly implement the tools needed to
strengthen management and oversight.
[End of section]
GAO Contacts:
Subjects covered in this report: Strengthening strategic human capital
management; ; Controlling International Space Station costs; ; Reducing
space launch costs; ; Correcting weaknesses in contract management;
Contact persons: Allen Li, Director; Acquisition and Sourcing
Management; (202) 512-4841; lia@gao.gov; ; Gregory D. Kutz, Director;
Financial Management and Assurance; (202) 512-9505; kutzg@gao.gov.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Performance and Accountability Series:
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide
Perspective. GAO-01-241. Washington, D.C.: January 2001.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. GAO-01-258. Washington, D.C.: January 2001.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-01-263. Washington, D.C.:
January 2001.
Human Capital:
Human Capital: Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies
in Managing Their Workforces. GAO-03-2. Washington, D.C.:
December 6, 2002.
NASA Management Challenges: Human Capital and Other Critical Areas Need
to be Addressed. GAO-02-945T. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2002.
Managing For Results: Using Strategic Human Capital Management to Drive
Transformational Change. GAO-02-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002.
Managing for Results: Building on the Momentum for Strategic Human
Capital Reform. GAO-02-528T. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2002.
A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-02-373SP.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2002.
Space Shuttle Safety: Update on NASA‘s Progress in Revitalizing
the Shuttle Workforce and Making Safety Upgrades. GAO-01-1122T.
Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2001.
Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders. GAO/OCG-
00-14G. Washington, D.C.: September 2000.
Space Shuttle: Human Capital and Safety Upgrade Challenges Require
Continued Attention. GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186. Washington, D.C.:
August 15, 2000.
Space Shuttle: Human Capital Challenges Require Management Attention.
GAO/T-NSIAD-00-133. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2000.
Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders. GAO/GGD-
99-179. Washington, D.C.: September 1999.
International Space Station:
Space Station: Actions Under Way to Manage Cost, but Significant
Challenges Remain. GAO-02-735. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002.
NASA: Compliance With Cost Limits Cannot Be Verified. GAO-02-504R.
Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2002.
NASA: Leadership and Systems Needed to Effect Financial Management
Improvements. GAO-02-551T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2002.
NASA: International Space Station and Shuttle Support Cost Limits. GAO-
01-100R. Washington D.C.: August 31, 2001.
Space Station: Inadequate Planning and Design Led to Propulsion Module
Project Failure. GAO-01-633. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2001.
Space Station: Prime Contract Changes. GAO/NSIAD-00-103R.
Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2000.
Space Station: Russian-Built Zarya and Service Module Compliance
With Safety Requirements. GAO/NSIAD-00-96R. Washington, D.C.:
April 28, 2000.
Space Station: Russian Compliance with Safety Requirements. GAO/
T-NSIAD-00-128. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2000.
Space Station: Russian Commitment and Cost Control Problems. GAO/NSIAD-
99-175. Washington, D.C.: August 17, 1999.
Space Station: Cost to Operate After Assembly Is Uncertain. GAO/
NSIAD-99-177. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 1999.
Space Station: Status of Russian Involvement and Cost Control Efforts.
GAO/T-NSIAD-99-117. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 1999.
Space Station: U.S. Life-Cycle Funding Requirements. GAO/
T-NSIAD-98-212. Washington, D.C: June 24, 1998.
International Space Station: U.S. Life-Cycle Funding Requirements. GAO/
NSIAD-98-147. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 1998.
Space Station: Cost Control Problems. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-54.
Washington, D.C.: November 5, 1997.
Space Station: Deteriorating Cost and Schedule Performance Under
the Prime Contract. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-262. Washington, D.C.:
September 18, 1997.
Space Station: Cost Control Problems Are Worsening. GAO/NSIAD-97-213.
Washington, D.C.: September 16, 1997.
NASA: Major Management Challenges. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-178.
Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1997.
Space Station: Cost Control Problems Continue to Worsen. GAO/
T-NSIAD-97-177. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 1997.
Space Station: Cost Control Difficulties Continue. GAO/T-NSIAD-96-210.
Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1996.
Space Station: Cost Control Difficulties Continue. GAO/NSIAD-96-135.
Washington, D.C.: July 17, 1996.
Launch Costs:
Space Transportation: Challenges Facing NASA‘s Space Launch Initiative.
GAO-02-1020. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2002.
Space Transportation: Critical Areas NASA Needs to Address in Managing
Its Reusable Launch Vehicle Program. GAO-01-826T. Washington, D.C.:
June 20, 2001.
Space Transportation: Progress of the X-33 Reusable Launch Vehicle
Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-243. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 1999.
Space Transportation: Status of the X-33 Reusable Launch Vehicle
Program. GAO/NSIAD-99-176. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 1999.
Contract Management:
Space Station: Actions Under Way to Manage Cost, but Significant
Challenges Remain. GAO-02-735. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002.
NASA: Compliance With Cost Limits Cannot Be Verified. GAO-02-504R.
Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2002.
NASA: Leadership and Systems Needed to Effect Financial Management
Improvements. GAO-02-551T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2002.
NASA: International Space Station and Shuttle Support Cost Limits.
GAO-01-1000R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.
Space Station: Inadequate Planning and Design Led to Propulsion Module
Project Failure. GAO-01-633. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2001.
Space Station: Prime Contract Changes. GAO/NSIAD-00-103R.
Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2000.
Executive Guide: Creating Value Through World-class Financial
Management. GAO/AIMD-00-134. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2000.
NASA Procurement: Status of Efforts to Improve Oversight. GAO/NSIAD-98-
198R. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 1998.
NASA: Major Management Challenges. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-178.
Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1997.
High-Risk Program: Information on Selected High-Risk Areas. GAO/HR-97-
30. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 1997.
NASA Procurement: Contract Management Oversight. GAO/NSIAD-97-114R.
Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1997.
NASA: Procurement Assessments. GAO/NSIAD-97-80R. Washington, D.C.:
February 4, 1997.
NASA: Contract Management. GAO/NSIAD-96-95R. Washington, D.C.:
February 16, 1996.
[End of section]
Performance and Accountability and High-Risk Series:
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide
Perspective. GAO-03-95.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Agriculture. GAO-03-96.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Commerce.
GAO-03-97.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense.
GAO-03-98.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Education.
GAO-03-99.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Energy.
GAO-03-100.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Health and
Human Services. GAO-03-101.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland
Security. GAO-03-102.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Housing
and Urban Development. GAO-03-103.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Interior. GAO-03-104.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice.
GAO-03-105.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Labor.
GAO-03-106.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of State.
GAO-03-107.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Transportation. GAO-03-108.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Treasury. GAO-03-109.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans
Affairs. GAO-03-110.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Agency for
International Development. GAO-03-111.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Environmental Protection
Agency. GAO-03-112.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Federal Emergency
Management Agency. GAO-03-113.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. GAO-03-114.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Office of Personnel
Management. GAO-03-115.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Small Business
Administration. GAO-03-116.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security
Administration. GAO-03-117.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Postal Service.
GAO-03-118.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119.
High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-03-120.
High-Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal
Government and the Nation‘s Critical Infrastructures. GAO-03-121.
High-Risk Series: Federal Real Property. GAO-03-122.
.................
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
GAO-01-258 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2001).
[2] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Audit Report:
Procurement Workforce Planning, IG-01-041 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 2001).
[3] As stated in President‘s Management Agenda Action Plans For The
National Aeronautics And Space Administration, (Washington, D.C.: May
9, 2002). This document is an agreement between NASA and OMB on NASA‘s
plans for addressing the governmentwide initiatives in The President‘s
Management Agenda.
[4] NASA has also developed a companion strategic human capital
implementation plan that contains detailed action plans for the
improvement initiatives.
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital
Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).
[6] We testified on this proposed legislation in March 2002.
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: Effective Use of
Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies in Managing Their Workforces,
GAO-03-2 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2002).
[8] Section 202 of P.L. 106-391.
[9] Section 801 of P.L. 104-208.
[10] An undefinitized contract action means a unilateral or bilateral
contract modification or delivery/task order in which the final price
or estimated cost and fee have not been negotiated and mutually agreed
to by NASA and the contractor. 48 CFR 1843.7001.
[11] Life cycle costs include implementation efforts through fiscal
year 2008 and major upgrades, plus operation and support costs for each
module for the first 2 years after the module goes live.
[12] Specifically, the Administrator would like the science of
exploration and discovery to determine where NASA should go next and
also to use technology to enable advances and to facilitate greater
achievements.
[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Creating Value
Through World-Class Financial Management, GAO/AIMD-00-134 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 1, 2000). Our executive guide was based on practices used by
nine leading organizations--Boeing, Chase Manhattan Bank, General
Electric, Pfizer, Hewlett-Packard, Owens Corning, and the states of
Massachusetts, Texas, and Virginia.
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