NASA
Shuttle Fleet's Safe Return to Flight Is Key to Space Station Progress Gao ID: GAO-04-201T October 29, 2003Since its inception, the International Space Station has experienced numerous problems that have resulted in significant cost growth and assembly schedule slippages. Following the Columbia accident and the subsequent grounding of the shuttle fleet in February 2003, concerns about the future of the space station escalated, as the fleet has been key to the station's assembly and operations. In August 2003, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board drew a causal link between aggressive space station goals--supported by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) current culture--and the accident. Specifically, the Board reported that, in addition to technical failures, Columbia's safety was compromised in part by internal pressures to meet an ambitious launch schedule to achieve certain space station milestones. This testimony discusses the implications of the shuttle fleet's grounding on the space station's schedule and cost, and on the program's partner funding and agreements--findings we reported on in September 2003. The testimony also proposes a framework for providing NASA and the Congress with a means to bring about and assess needed cultural changes across the agency.
Since the grounding of the shuttle fleet last February, the space station has been in a survival mode. Due to the limited payload capacity of the Russian launch vehicles--which the program must now rely on to transport crew and supplies to and from the station--on-orbit assembly is at a standstill and on-board research has been limited. Moreover, certain safety concerns on board the station cannot be corrected until the shuttle fleet returns to flight. For example, NASA has had to delay plans to fly additional shielding to protect the on-orbit Russian Service Module from space debris--a risk that increases each year the shielding is not installed. To date, NASA has not fully estimated the increased costs and future budget impact incurred due to the grounding of the space shuttle fleet. However, it projects that additional costs of maintaining the space station while the shuttle fleet is grounded will reach almost $100 million for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. It has also identified a number of factors that will affect costs--including the need to extend contracts to complete development and assembly of the station. Delays in completing the assembly of the station--which will be at least 2 years--are likely to incur significant additional program costs. At the same time, partner funding is uncertain, which may result in NASA paying a larger share of certain program costs. Although the full impact of the shuttle fleet's grounding on the space station is still unknown, it is clear that the station's future is dependent on the shuttle fleet's return to flight. NASA must carefully weigh this future against the risks inherent in its current culture. As we reported early this year, NASA's organization and culture has repeatedly undermined the agency's ability to achieve its mission. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board similarly found that NASA's history and culture have been detrimental to the shuttle fleet's safety and that needed improvements at NASA go beyond technical enhancements and procedural modifications. The cultural change required for NASA to consider the numerous technical and administrative recommendations made by the Board could be the agency's greatest challenge to date. In an effort to help NASA as it undergoes this change--and the Congress as it assesses NASA's future corrective actions--we have provided a framework for establishing appropriate operating principles and values and program direction, securing and maintaining a sufficient and skilled workforce, establishing proper performance targets, and ensuring adequate monitoring.
GAO-04-201T, NASA: Shuttle Fleet's Safe Return to Flight Is Key to Space Station Progress
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-04-201T
entitled 'NASA: Shuttle Fleet's Safe Return to Flight Is Key to Space
Station Progress' which was released on October 29, 2003.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m., EST:
Wednesday, October 29, 2003:
NASA:
Shuttle Fleet's Safe Return to Flight Is Key to Space Station Progress:
Statement of Allen Li, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-04-201T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-201T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Science, Technology, and Space, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since its inception, the International Space Station has experienced
numerous problems that have resulted in significant cost growth and
assembly schedule slippages. Following the Columbia accident and the
subsequent grounding of the shuttle fleet in February 2003, concerns
about the future of the space station escalated, as the fleet has been
key to the station‘s assembly and operations.
In August 2003, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board drew a
causal link between aggressive space station goals”supported by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration‘s (NASA) current culture”
and the accident. Specifically, the Board reported that, in addition
to technical failures, Columbia‘s safety was compromised in part by
internal pressures to meet an ambitious launch schedule to achieve
certain space station milestones.
This testimony discusses the implications of the shuttle fleet‘s
grounding on the space station‘s schedule and cost, and on the
program‘s partner funding and agreements”findings we reported on in
September 2003. The testimony also proposes a framework for providing
NASA and the Congress with a means to bring about and assess needed
cultural changes across the agency.
What GAO Found:
Since the grounding of the shuttle fleet last February, the space
station has been in a survival mode. Due to the limited payload
capacity of the Russian launch vehicles”which the program must now
rely on to transport crew and supplies to and from the station”on-
orbit assembly is at a standstill and on-board research has been
limited. Moreover, certain safety concerns on board the station cannot
be corrected until the shuttle fleet returns to flight. For example,
NASA has had to delay plans to fly additional shielding to protect the
on-orbit Russian Service Module from space debris”a risk that
increases each year the shielding is not installed.
To date, NASA has not fully estimated the increased costs and future
budget impact incurred due to the grounding of the space shuttle
fleet. However, it projects that additional costs of maintaining the
space station while the shuttle fleet is grounded will reach almost
$100 million for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. It has also identified a
number of factors that will affect costs”including the need to extend
contracts to complete development and assembly of the station. Delays
in completing the assembly of the station”which will be at least 2
years”are likely to incur significant additional program costs. At the
same time, partner funding is uncertain, which may result in NASA
paying a larger share of certain program costs.
Although the full impact of the shuttle fleet‘s grounding on the space
station is still unknown, it is clear that the station‘s future is
dependent on the shuttle fleet‘s return to flight. NASA must carefully
weigh this future against the risks inherent in its current culture.
As we reported early this year, NASA‘s organization and culture has
repeatedly undermined the agency‘s ability to achieve its mission. The
Columbia Accident Investigation Board similarly found that NASA‘s
history and culture have been detrimental to the shuttle fleet‘s
safety and that needed improvements at NASA go beyond technical
enhancements and procedural modifications. The cultural change
required for NASA to consider the numerous technical and
administrative recommendations made by the Board could be the agency‘s
greatest challenge to date.
In an effort to help NASA as it undergoes this change”and the Congress
as it assesses NASA‘s future corrective actions”we have provided a
framework for establishing appropriate operating principles and values
and program direction, securing and maintaining a sufficient and
skilled workforce, establishing proper performance targets, and
ensuring adequate monitoring.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-201T.
To view the full product, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Allen Li at (202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss the challenges facing the
International Space Station in the wake of the Columbia accident. The
grounding of the shuttle fleet this past February escalated concerns
about the future of the space station--which, since its inception, has
experienced numerous problems that have resulted in significant cost
growth and assembly schedule slippages. The shuttle fleet has been key
to the station's assembly and operations, and without it, the program
must rely on Russian launch vehicles to transport crew and supplies to
and from the station. As requested, my testimony today will discuss the
implications of the shuttle fleet's grounding on the space station's
schedule and cost and on the program's partner funding and agreements-
-findings we reported on to the full Committee in September
2003.[Footnote 1]
You asked how the Congress can assess the cultural changes that the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is considering as
the agency proceeds with its efforts to safely return the shuttle fleet
to flight. As you know, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
reported in August 2003 that in addition to technical failures,
Columbia's safety was compromised in part by the shuttle program's
fluctuating priorities and arbitrary schedule pressures to achieve
certain space station milestones.[Footnote 2] The Board characterized
NASA's emphasis on maintaining the launch schedule to support
construction of the station as a "line in the sand" and found evidence
that structural inspection requirements for the shuttle were reduced
and other requirements were deferred in order to meet an ambitious
schedule. NASA's recent revision to its return to flight plan
recognizes that to ensure safety in all its programs, a cultural change
is needed across the agency. Today, I am proposing a framework intended
to provide NASA and the Congress with a means to assess cultural change
in the context of NASA's overall mission.
In summary, the grounding of the shuttle fleet last February has
basically put the space station in a survival mode. Due to the limited
payload capacity of the Russian launch vehicles, on-orbit assembly is
at a standstill and on-board research has been limited. Moreover,
certain safety concerns on board the station cannot be corrected until
the shuttle fleet returns to flight. NASA estimates that additional
costs of maintaining the space station while the shuttle fleet is
grounded will reach almost $100 million for fiscal years 2003 and 2004.
However, significant additional program costs are likely to be incurred
because completing assembly of the station will be delayed by at least
2 years. At the same time, partner funding is uncertain--which may
result in NASA paying a larger share of certain program costs--and
partner agreement on the final station configuration has been delayed
by approximately one year.
While the space station's future is clearly dependent on the shuttle
fleet's return to flight, NASA must carefully weigh this future against
the risks inherent in its current culture. As we reported in January
2003, NASA's management challenges and risks reflect a deeper need for
broad cultural change to eliminate organizational stovepipes and
hierarchy, which have repeatedly undermined the agency's ability to
achieve its mission.[Footnote 3] The Columbia Accident Investigation
Board similarly found in its August 2003 report that NASA's history and
culture resulted in organizational practices that have been detrimental
to the shuttle fleet's safety. The cultural sea change required for
NASA to consider the numerous technical and administrative
recommendations made by the Board could be the agency's greatest
challenge to date. In an effort to help NASA as it undergoes a cultural
change--and the Congress as it assesses NASA's future corrective
actions--we have provided a framework for establishing appropriate
operating principles and values and program direction, securing and
maintaining a sufficient and skilled workforce, establishing proper
performance targets, and ensuring adequate monitoring.
Background:
In 1998, NASA and its international partners--Canada, Europe, Japan,
and Russia--began on-orbit assembly of the International Space Station,
envisioned as a permanently orbiting laboratory for conducting
materials and life sciences research and earth observations under
nearly weightless conditions. The International Space Station program
has three key goals: (1) maintain a permanent human presence in space,
(2) conduct world-class research in space, and (3) enhance
international cooperation and U.S. leadership through international
development and operations of the space station. Each of the partners
is to provide hardware and crew, and each is expected to share
operating costs and use of the station.[Footnote 4]
Since October 2000, the space station has been permanently occupied by
two or three crewmembers, who maintain and operate the station and
conduct hands-on scientific research. The space station is composed of
numerous modules, including solar arrays for generating electricity,
remote manipulator systems, and research facilities. The station is
being designed as a laboratory in space for conducting experiments in
near-zero gravity. Life sciences research on how humans adapt to long
durations in space, biomedical research, and materials-processing
research on new materials or processes are under way or planned. In
addition, the station will be used for various earth science and
observation activities. Figure 1 shows the International Space Station
on orbit.
Figure 1: International Space Station On Orbit:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Since fiscal year 1985, the Congress has appropriated a total of about
$32 billion for the program. When the station's current design was
approved in 1993, NASA estimated that its cost would be $17.4
billion.[Footnote 5] By 1998, that estimate had increased to $26.4
billion. In January 2001, NASA announced that an additional $4 billion
in funding over a 5-year period would be required to complete the
station's assembly and sustain its operations. By May 2001, that
estimated cost growth increased to $4.8 billion. In an effort to
control space station costs, the administration announced in its
February 2001 Budget Blueprint that it would cancel or defer some
hardware and limit construction of the space station at a stage the
administration calls "core complete.":
In November 2001, the International Space Station Management and Cost
Evaluation Task Force--appointed by the NASA Administrator--made a
number of recommendations to get costs under control. NASA implemented
most of the recommendations, and the task force reported in December
2002 that significant progress had been made in nearly all aspects of
the program, including establishing a new management structure and
strategy, program planning and performance monitoring processes, and
metrics. NASA was postured to see results of this progress and to
verify the sufficiency of its fiscal year 2003 budget to provide for
the core complete version of the station when the Columbia accident
occurred.
Grounding of the Shuttle Fleet Will Result in Additional Schedule
Delays and Cost:
With the shuttle fleet grounded, NASA is heavily dependent on its
international partners--especially Russia--for operations and
logistics support for the space station. However, due to the limited
payload capacity of the Russian space vehicles, on-orbit assembly has
been halted. The program's priority has shifted from station
construction and research to maintenance and safety, but these areas
have also presented significant challenges and could further delay
assembly of the core complete configuration. While NASA maintains that
its fiscal year 2004 budget will remain unchanged, the schedule delays
that have resulted from the grounding of the shuttle fleet will come at
a cost.
Program's Priority Has Shifted From Station Construction and Research
to Maintenance and Safety:
The space shuttle fleet has been the primary means to launch key
hardware to the station because of its larger payload capacity. With
the shuttle fleet grounded, current space station operations are solely
dependent on the Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles. Because the
payload capacity of the Soyuz and Progress vehicles are significantly
less than that of the U.S. shuttle fleet,[Footnote 6] operations are
generally limited to rotating crew and transporting food, potable
water,[Footnote 7] and other items to the station. The Russian vehicles
are also used for logistics support.
On-orbit assembly of the station has effectively ceased. Prior to the
Columbia accident, NASA had planned to assemble the core complete
configuration of the station by February 2004. NASA officials estimate
that assembly delays will be at least a "month for month" slip from the
previous schedule, depending on the frequency of flights when the
shuttles resume operations. Assuming a return to flight around fall
2004, the core complete configuration would not be assembled before
early 2006.
While the space station crew's primary responsibility is to perform
routine maintenance, the two crewmembers on board will conduct some
research, according to an interim space station research plan developed
by NASA. However, due to the grounding of the shuttle fleet and the
station's reliance on the Russian vehicles, this research will be
curtailed. For example:
* Outfitting of U.S. research facilities halted: Currently, 7 of the 20
planned research facilities are on orbit. With the fleet grounded,
three major research facilities--which, according to NASA, complete the
outfitting of the U.S. laboratory--could not be launched in March of
this year, as planned.[Footnote 8] At this time, it remains unknown
when the full configuration of the 20 research facilities will be on
board the station.
* Existing hardware failures: Because new and additional hardware
cannot be transported, NASA has to rely more heavily on existing on-
orbit science facilities--facilities that have already experienced some
failures. For example, the refrigerator-freezers on board the station,
which serve as the main cold storage units, have failed several times,
according to NASA officials. A larger cold temperature facility was one
of three facilities that had been planned for launch in March 2003.
* Limited science material: Currently, there are very limited
allocations for science materials to be transported to or from the
space station by the Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles.[Footnote 9]
According to NASA officials, they plan to send about 93 kilograms (just
over 200 pounds) of science material to the station on the next
Progress vehicle scheduled for launch in January 2004. However,
returning samples from investigations will be delayed until the shuttle
fleet returns to flight because of the Soyuz's limited storage
capacity.
NASA also cannot resolve known safety concerns on board the station
while the shuttle fleet is grounded. For example, NASA has had to delay
plans to fly additional shielding to protect the on-orbit Russian
Service Module from space debris--a risk that increases each year the
shielding is not installed. NASA is studying alternatives for launching
and installing the debris protection panels earlier than currently
planned. In addition, a failed on-orbit gyro--one of four that
maintains the station's orbital stability and control--remains on board
because the shuttle flight that was to carry a replacement gyro to the
station and return the failed unit for detailed analysis was planned
for March of this year--1 month after the grounding of the shuttle
fleet.
Cost Implications Have Yet to Be Determined, but Increases Are Likely:
To date, NASA has not fully estimated the potential increased costs and
future budget impact incurred due to the grounding of the space shuttle
fleet. However, it has identified a number of factors that will likely
result in increased costs--including the need to extend contracts to
complete development and assembly of the station.
NASA has requested $1.71 billion for fiscal year 2004 for the space
station. The request is based, in part, on near completion of the
hardware development for the U.S. core configuration and the transition
to on-orbit operations. Soon after the Columbia accident, NASA stated
that it would maintain budget requests at current levels until the
shuttle returns to flight. NASA estimates the impact to the station
program from the Columbia accident to be $22 million in fiscal year
2003 and up to $72 million in fiscal year 2004. NASA maintains that an
assessment of total impact cannot be accomplished prior to the fiscal
year 2006 budget submission in February 2005.
However, the considerable uncertainty about when the shuttle will
return to flight, what the payload capability will be, and how many
flights can be achieved each year greatly impact the total cost to the
station program. NASA anticipates that by keeping a crew on board the
station while the shuttle fleet is grounded and the continued
development of space station hardware will incur additional costs. For
example, NASA officials told us there are approximately 80,000 pounds
of hardware at Kennedy Space Station ready for integration to the space
station and another 106,000 pounds there being processed.
Uncertainty of the Shuttle's Return-to-Flight Date Delays Partner
Agreements:
While long-term plans are not well defined at this time, alternative
funding may be needed to sustain the station--let alone achieve the
station's intended goals. International agreements governing the space
station partnership specify that the space agencies of the United
States, Canada, Europe, and Japan are responsible for funding the
operations and maintenance of the elements that each contributes, the
research activities each conducts, and a share of common operating
costs. Under current planning, NASA will fund the entire cost of common
supplies and ground operations, then be reimbursed by the other
partners for their shares. Depending on contributions made by the
partners while the shuttle fleet is grounded, the share that each
partner contributes to the common operations costs may have to be
adjusted and could result in NASA's paying a larger share of those
costs. For example, the European Automated Transfer Vehicle is
scheduled to begin flying in September 2004. If that vehicle takes on a
larger role in supporting the station than currently planned, the
European share of common operations costs could be reduced with the
other partners paying more.
At the same time, NASA and its partners must develop a plan for
assembling the partners' modules and reaching agreement on the final
station configuration. Prior to the Columbia accident, options for the
final on-orbit configuration were being studied, and a decision was
planned for December 2003. NASA officials told us the process has been
delayed, and NASA and its partners agreed on a program action plan in
October 2003 that will ultimately lead to an agreement on the final on-
orbit configuration in December 2004.
Proposed Framework for Guiding and Assessing Cultural Change:
Clearly, the space station's future is dependent on the shuttle fleet's
safe return to flight. In the past, we have reported on challenges
facing NASA's shuttle program--especially in maintaining an adequate
shuttle workforce.[Footnote 10] In January 2003, we reported that NASA
needed to shift its overall orientation from processes to results,
organizational stovepipes to matrixes, management hierarchy and control
to flatter structures and employee empowerment, and reactive behavior
to proactive approaches. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's
report and recommendations similarly indicate that needed improvements
to the shuttle program go beyond technical enhancements and procedural
modifications. Specifically, the Board found that despite several
schedule slippages and rapidly diminishing schedule margins, NASA
remained committed to 10 shuttle launches in less than 16 months to
achieve the space station's core complete status by February 2004--a
target date set in mid 2001. According to the Board, this schedule-
driven environment influenced managers' decisions about the potential
risks to the shuttle if a piece of foam struck the orbiter--an event
that had occurred during an October 2002 shuttle flight and one that
was ultimately identified as the technical cause behind Columbia's
breakup. The Board concluded that cultural issues--including lapses in
leadership and communication, a dogged "can do" attitude, and reliance
on past successes--were critical factors that contributed to the
accident.
In its September 8, 2003, response to the Board's findings,[Footnote
11] NASA stated that it would pursue an in-depth assessment to identify
and define areas where the agency's culture can be improved and take
aggressive action." NASA indicated that it would take actions to
achieve several goals:
* Create a culture that values effective communication and remove
barriers to the expression of dissenting views.
* Increase its focus on the human element of change management and
organizational development.
* Ensure that existing procedures are complete, accurate, fully
understood, and followed.
* Create a robust system that institutionalizes checks and balances to
ensure the maintenance of the agency's technical and safety standards.
Most recently, on October 15, 2003, NASA indicated that the agency is
also assessing if cultural change is needed agency-wide. However, the
agency offered no further details beyond its previous commitments.
As NASA works to change its culture, and as the Congress assesses the
adequacy of NASA's corrective actions, applying a framework could prove
beneficial. Such a framework should recognize NASA's operating
principles and values, describe the direction of NASA's programs, focus
attention on securing and maintaining skills for its employees, provide
safety targets, show key results, and acknowledge the importance of
internal and external review. The following framework--similar in
concept to GAO's framework for ensuring the quality of its work--is
anchored in four main areas: leadership, human capital, program
performance, and monitoring and review.
Figure 2: Framework for Quality:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
* Leadership: The leadership anchor encompasses the agency's core
values, including safety as NASA's highest priority; and the
expectations that top management sets, such as stressing the importance
of character, integrity, and support of safety assurance measures. This
anchor also stresses the need to encourage staff to raise safety
concerns, regardless of the staff member's formal organizational
relationships or job responsibilities. Strategic planning and
stakeholder consultation have importance only if championed by NASA's
leadership. The leadership anchor helps address the question "What do
we do?":
* Human Capital: Securing and assigning skilled staff, understanding
short-and long-term skill deficiencies, establishing and maintaining
skills, as well as assessing individual employee performance are major
components of a comprehensive human capital anchor. NASA's efforts at
developing a strategic human capital plan and legislative proposals
related to human capital would be included in this anchor. The human
capital anchor helps address the question "Who will do it?":
* Program Performance: While the primary focus of program performance
is often related to mission-related activities, such as flight
processing and major modifications, effective program performance also
measures results achieved, oversight of contractors, infrastructure
maintenance, and sound financial management to provide decision makers
with accurate information with which to make resource tradeoffs and
long-term investments. The program performance anchor helps address the
question "How do we translate what we do into processes and procedures-
-that is, how do we operationalize our work?":
* Monitoring and Review: The oversight and enforcement of safety is a
shared responsibility between program officials, Associate
Administrators, the NASA Administrator, and independent groups such as
non-advocate reviews and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. The
monitoring and review anchor helps address the question "How is this
reinforced?":
We believe this framework can serve to identify the priorities agency
leadership must communicate, the human capital activities needed to
ensure that expected employee performance is achieved, the safety
processes and procedures that need to be operationalized as part of
program performance, and the scope of enforcement responsibilities. As
such, use of this framework can help the Congress monitor the
corrective actions NASA will undertake to strengthen the agency's
culture.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to
answer any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have.
Contact and Acknowledgments For future information, please contact
Allen Li at (202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony include Jerry Herley, James Beard, Rick
Cederholm, and Karen Sloan.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Station: Impact of the
Grounding of the Shuttle Fleet, GAO-03-1107 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.12,
2003).
[2] Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume 1 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 2003).
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
GAO-03-114 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003).
[4] In 1996, NASA and the Russian Aviation and Space Agency signed a
"balance protocol" listing the services that each side would provide to
the other during assembly and operations.
[5] All amounts are stated in current-year dollars.
[6] At about 36,000 pounds, the shuttle's payload capacity is roughly 7
times that of Russia's Progress vehicle and almost 35 times the payload
capacity of its Soyuz vehicle.
[7] Potable water is a constraint to sustaining station operations. For
example, crewmembers currently have a limit of two liters of water per
day per crewmember.
[8] The research facilities that were packed in a logistics module
awaiting launch had to be removed from the flight module and serviced.
[9] Currently, science material is flown on a space and weight
available basis. For example, if food or other life support items were
not depleted between flights, science material might be transported.
[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Shuttle: Human Capital and
Safety Upgrade Challenges Require Continued Attention, GAO/NSIAD/
GGD-00-186 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 2000).
[11] See NASA, NASA's Implementation Plan for Space Station Return to
Flight and Beyond (Oct., 2003).
