Space Station
Impact of the Grounding of the Shuttle Fleet Gao ID: GAO-03-1107 September 12, 2003In 1998, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and its international partners--Canada, Europe, Japan, and Russia--began on-orbit assembly of the International Space Station, envisioned as a permanently orbiting laboratory for conducting scientific research under nearly weightless conditions. Since its inception, the program has experienced numerous problems, resulting in significant cost growth and assembly schedule slippages. Following the loss of Columbia in February 2003, NASA grounded the U.S. shuttle fleet, putting the immediate future of the space station in doubt, as the fleet, with its payload capacity, has been key to the station's development. If recent discoveries about the cause of the Columbia's disintegration require that the remaining shuttles be redesigned or modified, delays in the fleet's return to flight could be lengthy. In light of these uncertainties, concerns about the space station's cost and progress have grown. This report highlights the current status of the program in terms of on-orbit assembly and research; the cost implications for the program with the grounding of the shuttle fleet; and identifying significant program management challenges, especially as they relate to reaching agreements with the international partners.
Although the effects of the Columbia accident on the space station are still being explored, it is clear that the station will cost more, take longer to complete, and have further delay in the achievement of key research objectives. Due to the limited payload capacity of Russia's Soyuz and Progress vehicles--which the program must now rely on to rotate crew and provide logistics support--the station is currently in a survival mode. Onorbit assembly is at a standstill, and the on-board crew has been reduced from three to two members. NASA officials maintain that delays in on-orbit assembly will be at least a "month for month" slip from the previous schedule. However, these delays have presented a number of operational challenges. For example, several key components that were ready for launch when the Columbia accident occurred have been idle at Kennedy Space Center and now require additional maintenance or recertification before they can be launched. Moreover, certain safety concerns on-board the station cannot be addressed until the shuttle fleet's return to flight. The grounding of the shuttle fleet has also further impeded the advancement of the program's science investigations. Specifically, the limited availability of research facilities and new science materials has constrained on-board research. NASA has yet to estimate the potential costs and future budget impacts that will result from the grounding of the shuttle fleet. Throughout the life of the program, however, maintaining goals and objectives for the space station has been a challenge for NASA. NASA has analyzed anticipated costs that the program will incur to keep a limited crew on board the station until the U.S. shuttles resume flight, and officials have stated that there would not be significant changes to the execution of the current budget and that the fiscal year 2004 budget request would remain at current levels. NASA plans to continue to develop hardware and deliver station elements to Kennedy Space Center to be prepared for launch as previously scheduled. However, a number of factors will likely result in increased costs, including costs to maintain and store station components and costs for extending contracts. Important decisions regarding funding and partner agreements still need to be made. For example, agreements that cover the partners' responsibility for shared common operations costs may need to be adjusted, an adjustment that could result in NASA's paying a larger share of these costs. In addition, logistics flights using Russian vehicles may need to be accelerated to ensure continued operations on-board the station. Russia has stated that additional flights are possible, but it could need additional funding from the other partners. However, the United States may be prohibited from providing certain payments due to a statutory restriction. NASA and its partners must also develop a plan for assembling the partners' modules and reaching agreement on the final station configuration. The partners were on a path to agree on final configuration by December 2003, but this process has been delayed by the Columbia accident.
GAO-03-1107, Space Station: Impact of the Grounding of the Shuttle Fleet
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, U.S. Senate:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
September 2003:
Space Station:
Impact of the Grounding of the Shuttle Fleet:
GAO-03-1107:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-1107 a report to Chairman, Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 1998, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and
its international partners”Canada, Europe, Japan, and Russia”began on-
orbit assembly of the International Space Station, envisioned as a
permanently orbiting laboratory for conducting scientific research
under nearly weightless conditions. Since its inception, the program
has experienced numerous problems, resulting in significant cost
growth and assembly schedule slippages.
Following the loss of Columbia in February 2003, NASA grounded the
U.S. shuttle fleet, putting the immediate future of the space station
in doubt, as the fleet, with its payload capacity, has been key to the
station‘s development. If recent discoveries about the cause of the
Columbia‘s disintegration require that the remaining shuttles be
redesigned or modified, delays in the fleet‘s return to flight could
be lengthy. In light of these uncertainties, concerns about the space
station‘s cost and progress have grown.
This report highlights the current status of the program in terms of
on-orbit assembly and research; the cost implications for the program
with the grounding of the shuttle fleet; and identifying significant
program management challenges, especially as they relate to reaching
agreements with the international partners.
What GAO Found:
Although the effects of the Columbia accident on the space station are
still being explored, it is clear that the station will cost more,
take longer to complete, and have further delay in the achievement of
key research objectives. Due to the limited payload capacity of
Russia‘s Soyuz and Progress vehicles”which the program must now rely
on to rotate crew and provide logistics support”the station is
currently in a survival mode. On-orbit assembly is at a standstill,
and the on-board crew has been reduced from three to two members. NASA
officials maintain that delays in on-orbit assembly will be at least a
’month for month“ slip from the previous schedule. However, these
delays have presented a number of operational challenges. For example,
several key components that were ready for launch when the Columbia
accident occurred have been idle at Kennedy Space Center and now
require additional maintenance or recertification before they can be
launched. Moreover, certain safety concerns on-board the station
cannot be addressed until the shuttle fleet‘s return to flight. The
grounding of the shuttle fleet has also further impeded the
advancement of the program‘s science investigations. Specifically, the
limited availability of research facilities and new science materials
has constrained on-board research.
NASA has yet to estimate the potential costs and future budget impacts
that will result from the grounding of the shuttle fleet. Throughout
the life of the program, however, maintaining goals and objectives for
the space station has been a challenge for NASA. NASA has analyzed
anticipated costs that the program will incur to keep a limited crew
on board the station until the U.S. shuttles resume flight, and
officials have stated that there would not be significant changes to
the execution of the current budget and that the fiscal year 2004
budget request would remain at current levels. NASA plans to continue
to develop hardware and deliver station elements to Kennedy Space
Center to be prepared for launch as previously scheduled. However, a
number of factors will likely result in increased costs, including
costs to maintain and store station components and costs for extending
contracts.
Important decisions regarding funding and partner agreements still
need to be made. For example, agreements that cover the partners‘
responsibility for shared common operations costs may need to be
adjusted, an adjustment that could result in NASA‘s paying a larger
share of these costs. In addition, logistics flights using Russian
vehicles may need to be accelerated to ensure continued operations on-
board the station. Russia has stated that additional flights are
possible, but it could need additional funding from the other
partners. However, the United States may be prohibited from providing
certain payments due to a statutory restriction. NASA and its partners
must also develop a plan for assembling the partners‘ modules and
reaching agreement on the final station configuration. The partners
were on a path to agree on final configuration by December 2003, but
this process has been delayed by the Columbia accident.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1107.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Allen Li (202) 512-
4841 or LiA@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Grounding of Shuttle Fleet Has Further Delayed On-Orbit Assembly of
Space Station and Research:
Cost Implications Have Yet to Be Determined, but Increases Are Likely:
Uncertainty of the Shuttle's Return-to-Flight Date Delays International
Partner Agreements:
Conclusions:
Agency Comments:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Appendix II: Prior GAO Reports and Testimonies Related to the
International Space Station Program:
Appendix III: Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Projected Funding for the Space Station Program:
Figures:
Figure 1: International Space Station On-Orbit:
Figure 2: The Logistics Module Scheduled for March 2003 Shuttle Launch
Being Unpacked at Kennedy Space Center in Florida:
Figure 3: Solar Array Wings:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 12, 2003:
The Honorable John McCain
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In 1998, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and
its international partners--Canada, Europe, Japan, and Russia--began
on-orbit assembly of the International Space Station, envisioned as a
permanently orbiting laboratory for conducting materials and life-
sciences research as well as earth observations under nearly weightless
conditions. Since its inception, the space station program has
experienced numerous problems that have resulted in significant cost
growth and assembly schedule slippages. In February 2003, the immediate
future of the space station was placed in doubt when NASA grounded the
shuttle fleet following the loss of the shuttle Columbia. The U.S.
shuttle fleet had been key to the station's development because of its
greater payload capacity for transporting essential hardware.
Delays in the fleet's return to flight could be lengthy if recent
discoveries about the cause of the Columbia accident require
substantial redesign or modifications to the remaining shuttles or if
organizational changes are recommended by the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board.[Footnote 1] With the grounding of the U.S. shuttle
fleet and the uncertainty about its return to flight, concerns about
the space station's cost and progress have grown. In view of these
concerns, you asked that we (1) describe the current status of the
program in terms of on-orbit assembly and research; (2) determine the
cost implications for the program with the grounding of the shuttle
fleet; and (3) identify significant program management challenges,
especially as they relate to reaching agreements with the international
partners.
Results in Brief:
Although the effects of the Columbia accident on the space station are
still being explored, it is clear that the station will cost more, take
longer to complete, and further delay the accomplishment of key
research objectives. Until the shuttle fleet is cleared to fly again,
the space station is basically in a survival mode. Owing to the limited
payload capacity of the Russian launch vehicles--which the program must
now rely on to rotate crew and provide logistics support--on-orbit
assembly is at a standstill, and the on-board crew has been reduced
from three to two members. Delays in on-orbit assembly have also
presented a number of operational challenges. For example, several key
components that were ready for on-orbit assembly when the Columbia
accident occurred have been idle at Kennedy Space Center and now
require additional maintenance or recertification before they can be
launched. Moreover, certain safety concerns on-board the station cannot
be addressed until the shuttle fleet returns to flight. The grounding
of the shuttle fleet has also further impeded the advancement of the
program's science investigations. Specifically, the research being
conducted on the station has been constrained by the limited
availability of research facilities and new science materials.
NASA has yet to estimate the potential costs and future budget impacts
incurred because of the grounding of the space shuttle fleet. Yet
throughout the life of the program, NASA has been challenged to
maintain goals and objectives for the space station. NASA has conducted
an analysis to anticipate costs the program will incur to keep a
limited crew on-board the station until the shuttle resumes flight.
Officials have stated that there would not be significant changes to
the execution of the current budget and that the fiscal year 2004
budget request would remain at current levels. However, a number of
factors will likely result in increased costs, including costs for
unplanned maintenance and storage of station components at Kennedy
Space Center that were ready for launch; test and recertification of
some components; and costs for extending contracts for the retention of
critical skills longer than planned to complete development and
assembly of the station.
The Columbia accident has delayed important decisions affecting
international partner funding and agreements. Agreements that cover the
partners' responsibility for shared common operations costs may have to
be adjusted, and could result in NASA's assuming a larger share of
these costs. In addition, alternative funding may be needed to sustain
the station. To ensure operations continue on-board the station,
flights using the Russian Progress logistics vehicle will need to be
accelerated and additional flights may be required. Depending on the
duration of the shuttle fleet's grounding, Russia has stated it can
provide additional Progress flights, if necessary, and the Russian
Aviation and Space Agency is negotiating with its government in an
attempt to secure the necessary funding to build those vehicles. If the
Russian government does not fund the needed vehicles, other
international partners may have to fund them. However, current law may
prohibit the United States from providing certain payments due to a
statutory restriction. NASA and its partners must also develop a plan
for assembling the partners' modules and reaching agreement on the
final station configuration. The partners were on a path to agree on a
final on-orbit configuration of the station by December 2003, but this
process has been delayed by the Columbia accident.
NASA commented on a draft of this report and agrees with its content
and conclusions. NASA's response is included as appendix I.
Background:
The International Space Station program has three key goals: (1)
maintain a permanent human presence in space, (2) conduct world-class
research in space, and (3) enhance international cooperation and U.S.
leadership through international development and operations of the
space station. Each of the partners is to provide hardware and crew,
and each is expected to share operating costs and use of the
station.[Footnote 2]
On-orbit assembly of the space station began in November 1998 and,
since October 2000, two to three crew members, who maintain and operate
the station and conduct hands-on scientific research, have permanently
occupied the space station. The space station is composed of numerous
modules, including solar arrays for generating electricity, remote
manipulator systems, and research facilities. The station is being
designed as a laboratory in space for conducting experiments in near-
zero gravity. Life sciences research on how humans adapt to long
durations in space, biomedical research, and materials-processing
research on new materials or processes are under way or planned. In
addition, the station will be used for various earth observation
activities. Figure 1 shows the International Space Station on-orbit.
Figure 1: International Space Station On-Orbit:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Since its inception, the station program has been plagued with cost and
schedule overruns. When the space station's current design was approved
in 1993, NASA estimated that its cost would be $17.4 billion.[Footnote
3] By 1998, that estimate had increased to $26.4 billion. In January
2001, NASA announced that an additional $4 billion in funding over a 5-
year period would be required to complete the station's assembly and
sustain its operations. By May 2001, that estimated cost growth
increased to $4.8 billion. Since fiscal year 1985, the Congress has
appropriated about $32 billion for the program. In an effort to control
space station costs, the administration announced in its February 2001
Budget Blueprint, that it would cancel or defer some hardware and limit
construction of the space station at a stage the administration calls
"core complete." The administration said that enhancements to the
station might be possible if NASA demonstrates improved cost-estimating
and program management, but the administration is only committed to the
completion of the core complete configuration.
In July 2001, the NASA Administrator appointed an independent
International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force
to assess the financial management of the station program and make
recommendations to get costs under control. The task force published
its report in November 2001 and recommended that the program (1) extend
crew rotations from 4 to 6 months and reduce the number of shuttle
flights to 4 per year; (2) consolidate the number of contracts and
reduce government staff in station operations and sustaining
engineering; (3) establish an Associate Administrator for space station
at NASA Headquarters, with total responsibility for engineering and
research; and (4) prioritize research to maximize limited
resources.[Footnote 4] NASA implemented most of the recommendations,
and the task force reported in December 2002 that significant progress
had been made in nearly all aspects of the program, including
establishing a new management structure and strategy, program planning
and performance monitoring processes, and metrics. NASA was postured to
see results of this progress and to verify the sufficiency of its
fiscal year 2003 budget to provide for the core complete version of the
station when the Columbia accident occurred.
In response to the task force's recommendations, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) imposed a 2-year "probation" period on NASA
to provide time to reestablish the space station program's credibility.
Activities that are to take place during this period include
establishing a technical baseline and a life-cycle cost estimate for
the remainder of the program, prioritizing the core complete science
program, and reaching agreement with the international partners on the
station's final configuration and capabilities. OMB, with input from
NASA, is developing criteria that are to be used for measuring progress
toward achieving a credible program. NASA provided its input to OMB in
June 2003, but as of August 2003, OMB and NASA had not reached
agreement on the success criteria.
Grounding of Shuttle Fleet Has Further Delayed On-Orbit Assembly of
Space Station and Research:
The grounding of the U.S. shuttle fleet has presented a number of
operational challenges for the space station program. With the fleet
grounded, NASA is heavily dependent on its international partners--
especially Russia--for operations and logistics support for the space
station. However, due to the limited payload capacity of the Russian
space vehicles, on-orbit assembly has been halted. The program's
priority has shifted from station construction to maintenance and
safety, but these areas have also presented significant challenges and
could further delay assembly of the core complete configuration. While
some on-board research is planned, it will be curtailed by the limited
payload capacity of the Russian vehicles.
Current On-Orbit Assembly, Maintenance Operations, and Safety
Challenges:
The space shuttle fleet has been the primary means to launch key
hardware to the station because of the shuttle's greater payload
capacity. At about 36,000 pounds, the shuttle's payload capacity is
roughly 7 times that of Russia's Progress vehicle and almost 35 times
the payload capacity of its Soyuz vehicle. With the shuttle fleet
grounded, current space station operations are solely dependent on the
Soyuz and Progress vehicles.[Footnote 5] Because the Soyuz and Progress
vehicles' payloads are significantly less than that of the U.S. shuttle
fleet, operations are generally limited to transporting crew, food,
potable water,[Footnote 6] and other items, as well as providing
propellant resupply and reboosting the station to higher orbits. On-
orbit assembly of the station has effectively ceased.
Maintaining the readiness of ready-to-launch space station components
has also presented a number of operational challenges, as in the
following examples:
* A logistics module, which carries research facilities and life
support items to the station, that was scheduled and ready for launch
in March 2003 had to be opened and unpacked (see fig. 2). Several racks
were removed to provide the proper preventative maintenance of the
contents until they can be rescheduled on a future flight. In addition,
crew-specific items had to be removed in anticipation of crew changes
for the next shuttle flight. This module requires more than 2 months to
be repacked and tested prior to launch.
Figure 2: The Logistics Module Scheduled for March 2003 Shuttle Launch
Being Unpacked at Kennedy Space Center in Florida:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
* One of the solar array wings scheduled for launch in May 2003 was
approaching its 45-month prelaunch storage limit. Due to the launch
delay, the wing had to be removed from the truss section and replaced
with a new wing (see fig. 3). The removed wing was shipped to the
contractor for deployment testing, which NASA hoped would result in a
lengthening of the prelaunch storage limit to at least 60 months.
However, according to NASA officials, preliminary results were very
positive, and the storage life certification could be extended to as
much as 8 years or more.
Figure 3: Solar Array Wings:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Truss section where the canister containing a solar array wing was
removed to be tested (photograph on left), and the removed canister
(foreground) and its replacement (background) that is being readied for
assembly on the truss section (photograph on right).
* The performance of the batteries on the truss sections that were
ready for launch has also raised concerns. Prolonged storage at ambient
temperatures could shorten the overall life of the battery. According
to NASA officials, a process has been developed to charge the batteries
periodically without removing them from the trusses during storage,
then to provide a charge capability on the launch pad just prior to
launch. This process, however, will require a new device to be
developed and expending resources not previously planned for this
function.
Station program managers are resolved to meet these challenges and have
station components ready for flight when the next shuttle is ready for
launch. In addition, NASA is using this longer storage time to
determine the feasibility of adding new testing procedures. For
example, NASA is developing tests to apply power to some elements and
may also perform additional leak tests.
The grounding of the shuttle fleet has also hampered NASA's ability to
correct known safety concerns on-board the station. For example, NASA
has had to delay plans to fly additional shielding to the space station
to adequately protect the on-orbit Russian Service Module from space
debris. NASA's analysis of the problem shows the probability of orbital
space debris penetrating the module increases by 1.6 percent each year
the shielding is not installed. NASA accepted this risk by issuing a
waiver for the noncompliance with a safety requirement, but planned to
have the shielding installed within 37 months of the module's launch in
July 2000. Six of the required 23 panels have been installed on the
module, and NASA is negotiating with the Russian Aviation and Space
Agency to manufacture the 17 remaining panels. NASA officials told us
that they are studying alternatives for launching and installing the
debris protection panels earlier than originally planned. In addition,
there will be delays in analyzing the failure of an on-orbit gyro--one
of four that maintain the station's orbital stability and control.
According to NASA, a shuttle flight planned for March of this year was
to carry a replacement gyro to the station and return the failed unit
for detailed analysis. Because the shuttle flight was canceled, the
failed unit was not returned. Consequently, NASA is unable at this time
to provide a definitive analysis of the reasons for the failure of the
unit or to know if the problem applies to the remaining units.
NASA had planned to assemble the core complete configuration of the
station by February 2004. NASA officials have maintained that assembly
delays will be at least a "month for month" slip from the previous
schedule, depending on the frequency of flights when the shuttles
resume operations. At best, then, the core complete configuration would
not be assembled before sometime in fiscal year 2005.
Current Research Efforts Curtailed by Limited Payload Capability:
While the space station crew's current responsibility is primarily to
perform routine maintenance, the two-crew members will conduct some
research on-board the station. An interim space station research plan
developed by NASA details the amount and type of research that will be
conducted. Further, NASA states that although the crew has been reduced
from three to two members, more crew time will be available to carry
out research tasks because no assembly or space walks are planned.
Regardless, the limited payload capability of the Russian vehicles
directly affects the extent of research that can be conducted, as
illustrated in the following examples:
* Outfitting of U.S. research facilities halted: Lacking the shuttle
fleet's greater lift capability, the amount of research hardware
transported to and from the station has been significantly limited.
With the fleet grounded, three major research facilities--which,
according to NASA, complete the outfitting of the U.S. laboratory--
could not be launched in March of this year, as planned.[Footnote 7] As
of August 2003, 7 of the 20 planned research facilities are on orbit.
NASA had planned to add 7 more facilities by January 2008. At this
time, it is unknown when the full configuration of the 20 research
facilities will be on-board the station.
* Existing hardware failures: Because new and additional hardware
cannot be transported, NASA has to rely more heavily on existing on-
orbit science facilities--facilities that have already experienced some
failures. For example, in November 2002, the Microgravity Science
Glovebox--which provides an enclosed and sealed workspace for
conducting experiments--failed and did not become operational until
late March 2003. NASA officials state there also have been failures of
the existing refrigerator-freezers on-board the station, which serve as
the main cold storage units until a larger space station cold
temperature facility becomes available. The larger cold temperature
facility was one of three facilities that had been planned for launch
in March 2003.
* Limited science material: Currently, there are no allocations for
science materials to be transported to or from the space station by the
Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles. Based on the payload planning for
these flights, however, there will be limited opportunities to launch
small research projects. NASA officials state that the next two
Progress flights could carry up to 40 kilograms and 100 kilograms,
respectively, based on continuous payload planning. This would be much
greater than the April 2003 Soyuz flight, which was able to carry 2.5
kilograms (about 5.5 pounds) of science material to the station for
experiments in the current increment.
As a result, research experiments for the current flight increment have
been reduced. Specifically, only about two-thirds of new investigations
and about three-quarters of ongoing investigations from previous
increments will be accomplished on the current increment. Further,
returning samples from these investigations will be delayed until the
U.S. shuttle fleet returns to flight because of the Soyuz's limited
storage capacity. The investigations on the next increment are also in
jeopardy as there is no planned up mass allocation for science
material.[Footnote 8]
Delays in transporting needed hardware and materials for research to
the space station could be further constrained, depending on any safety
modifications to the shuttle fleet based on recommendations of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board. If safety modifications to the
shuttle increase the vehicle's weight, the payload carrying capability
for research could be adversely affected. For example, if NASA
determines that the shuttle's robotic arm is needed on future flights
to address safety concerns, approximately 1,000 pounds of weight would
be added, which would reduce the shuttle's payload capacity for
research equipment and other hardware.
Cost Implications Have Yet to Be Determined, but Increases Are Likely:
Since the program's inception, we have repeatedly reported on the
challenges NASA has faced in maintaining goals and objectives for the
space station program.[Footnote 9] And while NASA has conducted
reassessments and independent reviews of the program in efforts to
institute corrective actions that would ensure proper cost controls,
difficulties in controlling costs have persisted. NASA budgets and
funds the space station program at essentially a fixed annual average
level of about $1.7 billion a year based on full cost
accounting.[Footnote 10] To date, NASA officials stated they have not
completely estimated the potential increased costs and future budget
impact incurred due to the grounding of the space shuttle fleet.
However, they have identified a number of factors that will likely
result in increased costs--including the continued maintenance and
storage of ready-to-launch station components as well as the testing
and recertification of some components and the need to extend contracts
to complete development and assembly of the station. NASA officials
told us that the agency is assessing these potential cost and schedule
impacts and how to mitigate the impacts within existing resources.
In fiscal year 2003, NASA received $1.85 billion in appropriated funds
for the space station and has requested $1.71 billion for fiscal year
2004 (see table 1). The funding reduction in fiscal year 2004 was based
on near completion of the hardware development for the U.S. core
configuration and the transition to on-orbit operations. NASA estimates
that after the last year of development, the annual cost to operate the
station will average $1.5 billion over a 10-year useful life. This
estimate does not include all funding requirements, such as costs
associated with necessary upgrades to preclude on-orbit hardware
obsolescence, launch costs, and other support costs that are captured
in other portions of NASA's budget.
Table 1: Projected Funding for the Space Station Program:
Dollars in millions: Office of Space Flight: Total; Pres. Budget FY
2003: $6,107; Pres. Budget FY 2004: $6,110.
Dollars in millions: Office of Space Flight: Space Station; Pres.
Budget FY 2003: 1,851; Pres. Budget FY 2004: 1,707.
Dollars in millions: Office of Space Flight: Space Shuttle; Pres.
Budget FY 2003: 3,786; Pres. Budget FY 2004: 3,968.
Dollars in millions: Office of Space Flight: Space Flight Support;
Pres. Budget FY 2003: 471; Pres. Budget FY 2004: 434.
Source: NASA's fiscal year 2004 budget request.
[End of table]
NASA officials told us that soon after the Columbia accident, they
published ground rules and assumptions that stated there would be no
significant changes to the station's budget execution and would
maintain budget requests at current levels until the shuttle returns to
flight. At that point, NASA program officials stated they will begin to
evaluate the impact that new developments, enhancements, inventories,
and staffing needed to sustain and operate the space station will have
on future budget submissions, including requests for supplemental
appropriations, and the execution of the station funding, including
program reserves.
NASA's strategy for the station program following the Columbia accident
has been to continue developing hardware as planned, to deliver these
components to Kennedy Space Center as scheduled, and to prepare them
for launch when the shuttle fleet returns to flight. Through
contingency planning efforts, NASA has identified additional costs to
be incurred by the space station program office as a result of these
continuing developmental operations. However, these additional costs
are based on an assumption that the shuttle will return to flight
within 12 months of the Columbia accident, an assumption that is
subject to change based on more definitive information concerning the
status of the shuttle fleet's operations. NASA officials state they
have not finalized plans or risk assessments for continued assembly and
operation of the space station if the shuttle fleet is grounded for a
longer period of time.
NASA has also implemented a management decision analysis[Footnote 11]
that anticipates additional costs to be incurred in keeping a crew on-
board the station while the shuttle fleet is grounded. The analysis is
based primarily on management decisions regarding crew rotation and
payload issues that involve shifting cargo and the use of consumables,
such as potable water. Other factors, according to NASA officials, that
the station program office identified could also result in cost
increases, but it has not fully quantified these costs:
* recertification of hardware;
* disassembly and reassembly of component parts;
* unpacking and repacking equipment from the logistics module that was
ready for launch;
* storage of station components that are ready for launch;
* maintaining battery life;
* unfurling and testing solar array wings, which could be affected by
prolonged storage;
* additional travel to Russia to facilitate discussions on Soyuz and
Progress vehicles' schedules and payloads and export controls issues;
* additional resupply flights; and:
* retention of some critical skills necessary to complete development
and assembly of the station.
Uncertainty of the Shuttle's Return-to-Flight Date Delays International
Partner Agreements:
In addition to the operational challenges facing NASA, funding and
partner agreements present significant challenges.[Footnote 12] While
long-term plans are not well defined at this time, alternative funding
may be needed to sustain the station, let alone achieve the station's
intended goals. At the same time, NASA and its partners must develop a
plan for assembling the partners' modules and reaching agreement on the
final station configuration. In addition, since the final on-orbit
configuration is likely to be different from the configuration when the
Intergovernmental Agreements were signed in 1998, NASA officials state
the partners may have to adjust agreements that cover the partners'
responsibility for shared common operations costs.
Depending on the duration of the shuttle fleet's grounding, the space
station program may need to consider funding alternatives to sustain
the station. International agreements governing the space station
partnership specify that the United States, Canada, Europe, and Japan
are responsible for funding the operations and maintenance of the
elements each contributes, the research activities it conducts, and a
share of common operating costs. Under current planning, NASA will fund
the entire cost of common supplies and ground operations, then be
reimbursed by the other partners for their shares. Depending on
contributions made by the partners while the shuttle fleet is grounded,
the share that each partner contributes to the common operations costs
may have to be adjusted and could result in NASA's paying a larger
share of those costs.[Footnote 13] For example, the European Automated
Transfer Vehicle is scheduled to begin flying in September 2004. If
that vehicle takes on a larger role in supporting the station than
currently planned, the European's share of common operations costs
could be reduced with the other partners paying more.
Station requirements dictate that some Progress launches be accelerated
and, depending on how long the shuttle fleet is grounded, could require
additional flights. Russia maintains that it can provide additional
launches, and the Russian Aviation and Space Agency is negotiating with
its government in an effort to obtain the necessary funding. If those
negotiations are unsuccessful, the other partners may have to provide
the needed funding. However, the U.S. may be prohibited from making
certain payments due to a statutory restriction.[Footnote 14] NASA is
engaged in discussions with the other partners on how to sustain
operations if additional flights are required.
Further, following the release of the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board's report and recommendations, NASA and the partnership must agree
on a final configuration of the on-orbit station that will be
acceptable to all parties. Prior to the Columbia accident, options for
the final on-orbit configuration were being studied, and a decision was
planned for December 2003. NASA officials told us the process has been
delayed, and NASA now expects the partners to agree on a program action
plan in October 2003 that will lead to an agreement on the final on-
orbit configuration.
During a July 2003 meeting, international partner space agency leaders
from the U.S., Europe, Canada, Japan, and Russia expressed support of
the space station program. The leaders recognized the Russian Aviation
and Space Agency for its support of station operations, logistics, crew
transportation, and crew rescue while the shuttle fleet is grounded.
The partners also expressed their support of NASA's return to flight
strategy, the resumption of station assembly, and the opportunity to
enhance the use of the station for conducting world-class research.
Conclusions:
This is one of the most challenging periods in the history of the
international space station program. NASA officials acknowledge that
the loss of the space shuttle Columbia poses cost and schedule risks
that have direct implications on completing the development and
assembly of the station and the research that is to be conducted on-
board as well as on NASA's budgets for fiscal year 2004 and beyond.
However, NASA officials told us that that it is too soon to determine
the magnitude and costs of delayed assembly and implications of any
recommendations from of Columbia Accident Investigation Board to the
space station. Until the shuttle return-to-flight date is known, it is
difficult to determine how and when potential cost and schedule
increases will impact the station program or the agency as a whole.
Agency Comments:
In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA's Deputy
Administrator said that the agency agrees with the content and
conclusions in the report. He said that the space station program is
taking the steps necessary to be ready to resume assembly immediately
upon the space shuttle's return-to-flight and to eliminate or offset
cost impacts. He also pointed out that the international partners
continue to collaborate on how to best support near-term space station
on-orbit operations until the space shuttle returns to flight. NASA
offered some technical comments on the report, which have been
incorporated as appropriate.
Scope and Methodology:
To describe the current status of the space station program in terms of
on-orbit assembly and research, we reviewed NASA's plans for completing
station assembly prior to the Columbia accident and compared those
plans to the agency's actions following the accident to continue on-
board operations while the shuttle fleet is grounded. To assess the
planned research program, we reviewed NASA's efforts to prioritize
research on-board the station as well as plans to continue research
while the shuttle fleet is grounded. We also interviewed NASA officials
regarding the agency's efforts to maintain the station and continue
research following the Columbia accident.
To determine the cost implications for the program with the grounding
of the shuttle fleet, we reviewed NASA's fiscal year 2003 budget
amendment and appropriations as well as the agency's fiscal year 2004
budget request. We also reviewed NASA's assessments of potential cost
impacts to the program and plans for mitigating those potential
impacts. In addition, we reviewed NASA's plans/interactions with its
international partners to secure support for the station while the
shuttle fleet is grounded and to reach agreement on a final station
configuration that will be acceptable to all partners. We interviewed
NASA officials with responsibility for estimating and controlling space
station costs, managing space station research, and dealing with the
international partners.
To identify program challenges facing the space station program, we
reviewed actions being taken by NASA to ensure continued safe
operations of the station, toured the Space Station Processing Facility
to view flight-ready hardware in storage, and reviewed NASA's actions
in response to the International Space Station Management and Cost
Evaluation task force report. We interviewed space station program
officials to obtain their views on the challenges facing the program.
To accomplish our work, we visited NASA headquarters, Washington, D.C.;
Johnson Space Center, Texas; and Kennedy Space Center, Florida. We also
attended two meetings of the NASA Advisory Council.
We conducted our work from November 2002 through August 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government standards.
Unless you publicly announce the contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that
time, we will send copies to the NASA Administrator; the Director,
Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will
also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
report will be available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any
questions about this report. Major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Allen Li
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
Signed by Allen Li:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Office of the Administrator Washington, DC 20546-0001:
September 2, 2003:
Mr. Allen Li
Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management
General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Li:
NASA appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report, "Space
Station: Impact of the Grounding of the Shuttle Fleet." Specific
comments are provided in the enclosure. Overall, we agree with the
content and conclusions contained in the report.
NASA and its International Partners (IP) have aggressively pursued all
possible avenues to reduce the risks associated with the completion of
the International Space Station's (ISS) assembly and to mitigate the
impacts of the Space Shuttle standdown on ISS operations. The:
ISS program is taking all steps necessary to be ready to resume
assembly immediately upon the Space Shuttle Return To Flight (RTF) and
to eliminate or offset cost impacts. The fact that meaningful science
continues onorbit, and that we can safely rotate and support the ISS
crews until the Shuttle returns to flight, attests to the strength of
the program's international partnership and commitment to continue
onorbit research. The program has been able to take advantage of every
opportunity to manifest research, supplies, and experiments on the
Russian-provided Soyuz and Progress vehicles. Investigations in
bioastrouautics and physical sciences continue and, as logistics
permit, additional studies are planned for the next expedition. NASA
has engaged its IPs in collaborative efforts to share hardware in order
to optimize the overall research output on the ISS.
NASA and its IPs continue to build, integrate, and prepare flight
hardware for launch according to the program's original schedules, and
we look forward to the day when the ISS reaches its full research
potential. In May 2003, NASA's European-built Node 2 arrived for
processing at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at the same time that Japan
delivered its laboratory module for ground testing and launch
preparation. The European Space Agency is also continuing to press
ahead with its plans to provide additional resupply capability with the
launch of its Automated Transfer Vehicle in late 2004, and the planned
delivery of its laboratory module to KSC in mid-2004. Canada is
completing work on its final robotic element, which is currently
scheduled to be delivered to KSC in late 2004. All of the IPs continue
to collaborate on how to best support near-term ISS onorbit operations
until the Space Shuttle RTF.
We are prepared to answer any additional questions you may have as we
proceed with our RTF activities. In the event that additional
information is required to support your audits, please contact Mark
Uhran of the Office of Space Flight on (202) 358-2233.
Cordially,
Frederick D. Gregory,
Deputy Administrator:
Signed by Frederick D. Gregory:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Prior GAO Reports and Testimonies Related to the
International Space Station Program:
NASA: Major Management Challenges and Program Risks. GAO-03-114.
Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
Space Station: Actions Under Way to Manage Cost, but Significant
Challenges Remain. GAO-02-735. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002.
NASA: Compliance With Cost Limits Cannot Be Verified. GAO-02-504R.
Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2002.
NASA: Leadership and Systems Needed to Effect Financial Management
Improvements. GAO-02-551T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2002.
NASA: International Space Station and Shuttle Support Cost Limits. GAO-
01-100R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.
Space Station: Inadequate Planning and Design Led to Propulsion Module
Project Failure. GAO-01-633. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2001.
Space Station: Russian-Built Zarya and Service Module Compliance With
Safety Requirements. GAO/NSIAD-00-96R. Washington, D.C.: April 28,
2000.
Space Station: Russian Compliance with Safety Requirements. GAO/TNSIAD-
00-128. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2000.
Space Station: Russian Commitment and Cost Control Problems. GAO/NSIAD-
99-175. Washington, D.C.: August 17, 1999.
Space Station: Cost to Operate After Assembly Is Uncertain. GAO/NSIAD-
99-177. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 1999.
Space Station: Status of Russian Involvement and Cost Control Efforts.
GAO/T-NSIAD-99-117. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 1999.
Space Station: U.S. Life-Cycle Funding Requirements. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-
212. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 1998.
International Space Station: U.S. Life-Cycle Funding Requirements. GAO/
NSIAD-98-147. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 1998.
Space Station: Cost Control Problems. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-54. Washington,
D.C.: November 5, 1997.
Space Station: Deteriorating Cost and Schedule Performance Under the
Prime Contract. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-262. Washington, D.C.: September 18,
1997.
Space Station: Cost Control Problems Are Worsening. GAO/NSIAD-97-
213.Washington, D.C.: September. 16, 1997.
NASA: Major Management Challenges. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-178. Washington,
D.C.: July 24, 1997.
Space Station: Cost Control Problems Continue to Worsen. GAO/T-NSIAD-
97-177. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 1997.
Space Station: Cost Control Difficulties Continue. GAO/T-NSIAD-96-
210.Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1996.
Space Station: Cost Control Difficulties Continue. GAO/NSIAD-96-135.
Washington, D.C.: July 17, 1996.
Space Station: Estimated Total U.S. Funding Requirements. GAO/NSIAD-95-
163. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 1995.
Space Station: Update on the Impact of the Expanded Russian Role. GAO/
NSIAD-94-248. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 1994.
Space Station: Impact of the Expanded Russian Role on Funding and
Research. GAO/NSIAD-94-220. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 1994.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Staff Acknowledgments:
Acknowledgments:
Individuals making key contributions to this report included Jerry
Herley, James Beard, Fred Felder, Lynn LaValle, Rick Cederholm, Josh
Margraf, and Karen Sloan.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's report was not issued
at the time our work was completed.
[2] In 1996, NASA and the Russian Aviation and Space Agency signed a
"balance protocol" listing the services that each side would provide to
the other during assembly and operations. Protocol Including Terms,
Conditions, and Assumptions, Summary Balance of Contributions and
Obligations to International Space Station and Resulting Rights of NASA
and Russian Aviation and Space Agency to International Space Station
Utilization Accommodations and Resources, and Flight Opportunities
(June 11, 1996).
[3] All amounts are stated in current-year dollars.
[4] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Report by the
International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force
to the NASA Advisory Council (Nov. 1, 2001).
[5] The Progress vehicles transport materials--such as propellant,
food, and water--and supplies to the space station. Once a Progress
vehicle arrives and is unloaded, it is repacked with trash, undocks
from the station, and burns up when it re-enters the atmosphere.
[6] Potable water is a constraint to sustaining station operations. For
example, crew members currently have a limit of two liters of water per
day per crew member.
[7] The research facilities that were packed in a logistics module
awaiting launch had to be removed from the flight module and serviced.
[8] Currently, science material is flown to the station on a space and
weight available basis. For example, if food or other life support
items were not depleted between flights, science material might be
transported.
[9] Appendix II lists prior GAO reports and testimonies related to the
space station program.
[10] Full cost accounting is an accepted accounting practice that ties
all NASA costs (including government personnel costs) to major
activities (programs and projects) and budgets, accounts, reports, and
manage programs and projects from a full cost perspective.
[11] A management decision analysis is a process for reviewing
potential risks in the station program that could impact costs. The
process includes reviews of outstanding safety waivers and the
identification of additional required testing.
[12] Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member
States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the
Government of the Russian Federation, and the Government of the United
States of America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International
Space Station, Jan. 29, 1998.
[13] The international agreements stress that the partners should seek
to minimize the exchange of funds through the performance of specific
space station operations activities or, if concerned partners agree,
through the use of barter.
[14] Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-178.
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