Space Shuttle
Further Improvements Needed in NASA's Modernization Efforts Gao ID: GAO-04-203 January 15, 2004The Columbia tragedy has accentuated the need to modernize the 20-year-old space shuttle, the only U.S. launch system that carries people to and from space. The shuttle will now be needed for another two decades. As it ages, the spacecraft's components will also age, and it may become increasingly unreliable. GAO examined the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) plans to upgrade the shuttle through 2020, how it will identify and select what upgrades are needed, how much the upgrades may cost, and what factors will influence that cost over the system's lifetime.
NASA cannot fully define shuttle upgrade requirements until it resolves questions over the shuttle's operational life and determines requirements for elements of its Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) such as the International Space Station (ISS). Prior efforts to upgrade the shuttle have been stymied because NASA could not develop a strategic investment plan or systematically define the spacecraft's requirements because of changes in its life expectancy and mission. NASA is trying to improve how it identifies, selects, and prioritizes shuttle upgrades. In March 2003, it institutionalized a Space Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) to ensure safe and effective operations, along with a management plan documenting roles and responsibilities and an annual process for selecting upgraded projects and studies. In addition, NASA will try to improve shuttle safety by implementing the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). NASA's estimate of the total cost to upgrade the shuttle--$300 million-$500 million a year, or a total of $5 billion-$8 billion through 2020--is reasonably based but could be significantly higher, as it does not include potential projects such as a crew escape system. It will be difficult for NASA to make an accurate estimate until it firmly establishes the basic requirements (such as life expectancy) for the shuttle and the process for selecting shuttle upgrades. A number of potential changes could significantly increase the cost of shuttle upgrades, including responses to the recommendations of the CAIB.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-203, Space Shuttle: Further Improvements Needed in NASA's Modernization Efforts
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
January 2004:
Space Shuttle:
Further Improvements Needed in NASA's Modernization Efforts:
GAO-04-203:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-203, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Columbia tragedy has accentuated the need to modernize the 20-year-
old space shuttle, the only U.S. launch system that carries people to
and from space. The shuttle will now be needed for another two
decades. As it ages, the spacecraft‘s components will also age, and it
may become increasingly unreliable.
GAO examined the National Aeronautics and Space Administration‘s
(NASA) plans to upgrade the shuttle through 2020, how it will identify
and select what upgrades are needed, how much the upgrades may cost,
and what factors will influence that cost over the system‘s lifetime.
What GAO Found:
NASA cannot fully define shuttle upgrade requirements until it
resolves questions over the shuttle‘s operational life and determines
requirements for elements of its Integrated Space Transportation Plan
such as the International Space Station. Prior efforts to upgrade the
shuttle have been stymied because NASA could not develop a strategic
investment plan or systematically define the spacecraft‘s requirements
because of changes in its life expectancy and mission.
NASA is trying to improve how it identifies, selects, and prioritizes
shuttle upgrades. In March 2003, it institutionalized a Space Shuttle
Service Life Extension Program to ensure safe and effective
operations, along with a management plan documenting roles and
responsibilities and an annual process for selecting upgraded projects
and studies. In addition, NASA will try to improve shuttle safety by
implementing the recommendations of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board (CAIB).
NASA‘s estimate of the total cost to upgrade the shuttle”$300 million-
$500 million a year, or a total of $5 billion-$8 billion through 2020”
is reasonably based but could be significantly higher, as it does not
include potential projects such as a crew escape system. It will be
difficult for NASA to make an accurate estimate until it firmly
establishes the basic requirements (such as life expectancy) for the
shuttle and the process for selecting shuttle upgrades. A number of
potential changes could significantly increase the cost of shuttle
upgrades, including responses to the recommendations of the CAIB.
What GAO Recommends:
NASA needs to fully define shuttle upgrade requirements so decisions
on upgrade projects can be integrated with its transportation plan.
The agency must improve how it selects upgrades by developing an
indicator that shows how upgrading will increase shuttle life or
safety as well as other analytic tools to help its staff make
judgments. It must develop a thorough estimate of the total life-cycle
cost of upgrades through 2020, to determine the funding that will be
needed for shuttle upgrades.
NASA fully concurred with most GAO recommendations, and agreed with
the intent of the recommendation to develop a cost estimate for all
shuttle upgrades through 2020.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-203.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Allen Li at (202)
512-3600 or lia@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Shuttle Requirements Process Lacks Systematic Approach:
NASA's Process for Selecting and Prioritizing Upgrades Could Be Further
Improved:
Shuttle Upgrades Could Potentially Cost Billions More Than Currently
Estimated:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Comments from the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration:
Appendix II: Recommended Upgrade Projects Resulting from the Service
Life Extension Program Summit:
Appendix III: Comparison of Crew Escape Concepts Under Consideration:
Appendix IV: Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Service Life Extension Program Projects by Category--Fiscal
Year 2004-2008:
Figures:
Figure 1: Cockpit Avionics Upgrade:
Figure 2: Roof Deterioration on the Vehicle Assembly Building at
Kennedy Space Center (the tape shows a 5-foot section for perspective):
Figure 3: Space Shuttle Crew Escape Design Concepts:
Abbreviations:
AHMS: Advanced Health Management System:
ATP: Authority to Proceed:
C/W: Caution and Warning:
CAIB: Columbia Accident Investigation Board:
CAU: Cockpit Avionics Upgrade:
CG: Center of Gravity:
ET: External Tank:
ISS: International Space Station:
ISTP: Integrated Space Transportation Plan:
MLG: Main Landing Gear:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
OMM: Orbiter Major Modification:
OSP: Orbital Space Plane:
PLB: Payload Bay:
PRA: Probabilistic Risk Assessment:
PRSD: Power Reactant Storage and Distribution (fuel cells):
ROM: Rough Order of Magnitude:
RSRM: Reusable Solid Rocket Motor:
SLEP: Service Life Extension Program:
SSME: Space Shuttle Main Engine:
STE: Special Test Equipment:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 15, 2004:
The Honorable John Breaux:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space:
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bill Nelson:
United States Senate:
The space shuttle is the only U.S. launch system capable of carrying
people to and from space. It has operated for over 20 years and is
planned for use well into the second decade of this century and
possibly beyond. As the shuttle ages, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) is faced with an increased need to
modernize the shuttle due to component obsolescence and/or to enhance
safety. The Shuttle Columbia tragedy has accentuated this need. At your
request, we reviewed the shuttle modernization efforts to determine (1)
NASA's past requirements and plans to upgrade the shuttle through 2020,
(2) how NASA will identify what upgrades are required in the future and
how those upgrades will be selected and prioritized, and (3) NASA's
estimated life-cycle cost for shuttle upgrades through 2020 and
identify the potential program uncertainties that may affect cost.
Results in Brief:
Even before the Columbia tragedy, NASA faced critical decisions on how
best to modernize the shuttle to keep it flying safely throughout its
operational life. With NASA's need to improve shuttle safety as the
shuttle fleet returns to service, NASA has not yet clearly defined
shuttle upgrade requirements, improved the process for selecting and
prioritizing upgrades, and developed an estimate of the total life-
cycle cost of upgrades through 2020.
NASA cannot fully define shuttle upgrade requirements until it resolves
its uncertainty over the shuttle's operational life and determines the
basic requirements for elements of its Integrated Space Transportation
Plan[Footnote 1] (ISTP), which includes the International Space Station
(ISS). NASA has known that it needs to establish an upgrade program to
modernize various components of the space shuttle to keep it flying
safely throughout its life. However, efforts to upgrade the shuttle
have been stymied by the agency's inability to develop a long-term
strategic investment plan to fly the shuttle safely and a systematic
approach for defining the spacecraft's requirements because its life
expectancy and mission have continued to change from an original design
of a 10-year life to the year 2020 and possibly beyond.
NASA is making an effort to improve the process that identifies,
selects, and prioritizes shuttle upgrades. In March 2003, it
institutionalized a Space Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
as the primary framework for ensuring safe and effective operations,
along with a management plan documenting roles and responsibilities and
an annual process for selecting and prioritizing upgraded projects and
studies. Prior to the SLEP, NASA had no documented systematic selection
process, and managers made decisions on upgrades using their
professional insight and judgment and a limited number of quantitative
or analytic tools rather than relying on extensive use of hard data or
rigorous analysis. In addition, NASA is planning to make upgrades and
other improvements to enhance shuttle safety as a result of
implementing the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board (CAIB).
NASA has not yet attempted to prepare a total detailed life-cycle cost
estimate for all upgrades through 2020. NASA did prepare a rough order
of magnitude estimate of the total cost to upgrade the shuttle--
$300 million-$500 million a year, or a total of $5 billion-$8 billion
through 2020--based on current project estimates. Although the estimate
appears to be reasonably based, the total cost could be significantly
higher, as the estimate does not include the costs of major potential
projects such as a crew escape system. NASA will continue to have
difficulty making an accurate and reliable estimate of the total cost
until it finalizes the basic requirements (such as life expectancy) for
the shuttle and further improves the process for identifying and
selecting shuttle upgrades. Accurate and reliable cost estimates to
upgrade the shuttle and enable it to continue operations are needed by
decision makers. In addition, a number of potential program changes
could significantly increase the estimated cost of shuttle upgrades,
including major changes in shuttle requirements such as redesigned
rocket boosters to provide additional lift capability. Other costly
potential program changes include schedule slippages caused by delays
in software and hardware integration and modifications responding to
the recommendations of the CAIB.
We are making recommendations aimed at strengthening NASA's efforts to
modernize the space shuttle by fully defining basic requirements for
the shuttle; improving its analytic tools to assess shuttle upgrades;
and, once basic requirements are defined, developing a comprehensive
estimate of the total cost for the shuttle through 2020.
In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA's Deputy
Administrator stated that the agency concurred with the first three
recommendations and concurred with the intent of the fourth
recommendation concerning development of a cost estimate for all
shuttle upgrades through 2020. NASA's detailed comments are included as
appendix I.
Background:
The space shuttle is the world's first reusable space transportation
system. It consists of a reusable orbiter with three main engines, two
partially reusable solid rocket boosters, and an expendable external
fuel tank. The space shuttle is an essential element of NASA's
transportation plan that includes a framework for maintaining shuttle
fleet capability to fly safely through 2020. The space shuttle is
NASA's largest individual program accounting for about 25 percent of
the agency's fiscal year 2004 budget request. Since it is the nation's
only launch system capable of transporting people, the shuttle's
viability is critical to the space station.
We have reported in the past that extensive delays in the development
and assembly of the ISS and difficulties defining requirements and
maturing technologies for the next generation space transportation
systems have hindered the development and funding of a long-term space
transportation program.[Footnote 2] We have also testified that NASA
faced a number of programmatic and technical challenges in making
shuttle upgrades, including revitalizing its workforce and defining
shuttle technical requirements. In another report, we reported that
NASA continued to rely on qualitative risk assessments to supplement
engineering judgments and had made only limited progress in the use of
quantitative assessment methods.[Footnote 3] Recognizing such needs,
NASA has taken steps to bring a more formal approach to identifying,
prioritizing, and funding improvements.
In February 1997, NASA established the Space Shuttle Program
Development Office at NASA's Johnson Space Center to sustain, improve,
and add capability to the space shuttle through an upgrade program. In
December 2002, a new selection and prioritization process for upgrades
was implemented through the Service Life Extension Program. The SLEP
provided a formal process to select, prioritize, and fund upgrades
needed to keep the shuttle flying safely and efficiently and allow
upgrades to be evaluated and approved on a priority basis. Shuttle
upgrades are items that contribute toward the Space Shuttle Program
goals to (1) fly safely, (2) meet the manifest, (3) improve mission
supportability, and (4) improve the system in order to meet NASA's
commitments and goals for human operations in space. According to NASA,
upgrades achieve major reductions in the operational risks inherent in
the current systems by making changes that eliminate, reduce, or
mitigate significant hazards and critical failure modes and that
increase the overall reliability of the current system with respect to
the likelihood of catastrophic failure. Examples of upgrade projects
currently funded to improve safety include Cockpit Avionics, Vehicle
Main Landing Gear Tire and Wheel, External Tank Friction Stir Weld, and
Shuttle Main Engine Advanced Health Management System.
Shuttle Requirements Process Lacks Systematic Approach:
To keep the shuttle flying safely, NASA needs to fully implement an
upgrade program to modernize various shuttle components. However,
efforts to do so have been stymied by the agency's inability to develop
a long-term strategic investment plan and a systematic approach for
defining shuttle requirements, because the spacecraft's life expectancy
and mission have continued to change. Key decisions about the ultimate
life and mission of the basic elements of the integrated transportation
plan--the ISS and the Orbital Space Plane (OSP)--were not made prior to
fully defining shuttle requirements.
Originally, the shuttle was designed for a 10-year/100-flight service-
-transporting satellites and other cargo for the Department of Defense
and others and placing in orbit and maintaining the Hubble Space
Telescope--after which its life was to end. During this time, NASA was
reluctant to make long-term investments due to the shuttle's perceived
short life expectancy. With the advent of the ISS, the agency's
transportation plan indicated that the shuttle would be used to operate
and support the ISS until 2012, when a new space launch vehicle was to
take over that mission. Recently, use of the new launch vehicle was de-
emphasized by a new ISTP, which in its place proposed development of an
OSP (to transfer the crew to the ISS) and continued use of the shuttle
(to transfer cargo). The new plan proposes upgrading the shuttle's
software and hardware to extend its operational life to 2020.
NASA recognizes the need for a systematic approach for defining
requirements to upgrade the shuttle, and it recently institutionalized
a new process to select and prioritize shuttle upgrades. However, NASA
has not yet fully defined the basic elements of the ISTP--which include
the ISS, the OSP, and the Next Generation Launch Technology.[Footnote
4] NASA has not precisely determined when the ISS will be completed;
its ultimate mission, its useful life, and even how many astronauts
will be on board, for example. Specifically, NASA has not made explicit
decisions on shuttle requirements--such as its future mission, lift
capability, and life expectancy. According to NASA officials, these
decisions will significantly affect shuttle upgrades. Similarly, the
CAIB found that the shifting date for shuttle replacement has severely
complicated decisions on how to invest in shuttle upgrades.
NASA's Process for Selecting and Prioritizing Upgrades Could Be Further
Improved:
NASA is making an effort to improve how it identifies, selects, and
prioritizes shuttle upgrades. In December 2002, NASA initiated a SLEP
as the primary framework for ensuring safe and effective operations. By
March 2003, NASA had prepared a formal management plan documenting
roles and responsibilities and defining an annual process for selecting
and prioritizing upgraded projects and studies. Prior to the SLEP, NASA
had no documented systematic selection process, and managers made
decisions on upgrades using their professional insight and judgment and
a limited number of quantitative or analytic tools rather than
extensive use of hard data or rigorous analysis. As a result, projects
that were identified, funded, and implemented flowed from an informal
"bottom-up" approach that relied largely on insight and judgment of
selected managers and limited use of quantitative tools.
Earlier Process to Identify and Prioritize Upgrades:
According to NASA officials, prior to the new SLEP process, the
identification, selection, and prioritization of shuttle upgrade
projects largely involved an informal bottom-up approach. The upgrades
were first proposed in an open and a continuous call for projects
concepts and were drawn from shuttle element project organization,
industry, or other shuttle program stakeholders. Upgrade projects would
then go to the Space Shuttle Program Manager, the Shuttle Program
Development Manager, and the directors of the affected NASA field
centers, who would provide proposed projects to the Associate
Administrator for Space Flight, who would select and prioritize the
projects. This early process was much more strongly driven by
collective management insight or "judgment" rather than by hard data or
rigorous analysis. During this process, there was little guidance from
top management as to how the decisions on shuttle upgrades integrated
with all the other elements of the ISTP.
The identification, selection, and prioritization of the Cockpit
Avionics Upgrade (CAU) is one example of a lack of a documented,
structured, and systematic selection process prior to the SLEP. The CAU
is estimated to cost $442 million and is NASA's most costly of the
currently approved upgrade projects. The CAU will update the cockpit's
dials and gauges with a modern instrument panel. By automating complex
procedures in the shuttle cockpit, the upgrade is intended to improve
the situational awareness of the crew and to better equip them to
handle potential flight problems by reducing crew workload. (See fig.
1.):
Figure 1: Cockpit Avionics Upgrade:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Managers gave the CAU project the highest priority based on their
professional insight and judgment and a limited number of quantitative
or analytic tools rather than extensive use of hard data or rigorous
analysis. The upgrade was ranked as the highest priority based on the
perceived importance of crew situational awareness. NASA did not have a
metric to show the relationship of the cost of the upgrade to an
increase in shuttle life and/or safety. The ranking was essentially a
collaborative voting process based on their professional knowledge that
crew error accounts for 50 percent of all incidents. As crew awareness
depends on a number of human factors, a quantitative metric, such as
NASA's Quantitative Risk Assessment System, could not be used since it
did not contain key human attributes needed to evaluate the percentage
of safety improvement of the upgrade project.
The SLEP Process Currently in Place:
In December 2002, NASA initiated a SLEP as the primary framework for
ensuring safe and effective operations, along with a management plan a
few months later, documenting roles and responsibilities and an annual
process for selecting and prioritizing upgraded projects and studies.
The new process, which was first used in March 2003 at the first SLEP
Summit, uses panels of experts from NASA, which are mostly chaired by
the Deputy Center Directors, who meet periodically to develop and
assess project recommendations. The SLEP is structured around eight
panels of senior managers that make greater use of quantitative tools
in areas such as safety and sustainability, including an outside panel
of industry experts and an Integration Panel. The Integration Panel
refines the prioritized recommendations of each panel into final
recommendations to a group of top-level managers known as the Space
Flight Leadership Council (the Council). As a result of the last Summit
in March 2003, the Council approved all project recommendations of the
Integration Panel with a total estimated cost of about $1.7 billion
from fiscal years 2004-08. (See app. II.) In making its
recommendations, the Council was not restricted by fiscal constraints.
The Council endorsed 60 SLEP upgrade projects for fiscal year 2004
costing $416 million. By contrast, NASA's fiscal year 2004 budget
request, submitted in February 2003, asked for $379 million. The
difference is being deliberated within NASA's internal budget process.
One product resulting from the SLEP 2003 Summit was NASA's selection
and identification of upgrade projects related to safety improvement,
sustainability, and requirements for new capabilities as defined by
"customers" such as the ISS. NASA then placed the projects into one of
the following four categories: (1) "Should Start"--projects strongly
recommended for start in fiscal year 2004 and which would create near
term risk if they did not start, (2) "Existing Commitments"--projects
previously authorized, (3) "Foundational Activities"--projects that
add insight into the current condition of assets, and (4) "Projects and
Studies"--system specific activities at various levels of maturity.
(See table 1.):
Table 1: Service Life Extension Program Projects by Category--Fiscal
Year 2004-2008:
Categories: Should Start;
Sustainability: RSRM Case Vendor;
Sustainability: PRSD Tank Vendor;
Sustainability: SSME STE Equipment.
Categories: Existing Commitments;
Sustainability: RSRM Obsolescence;
Sustainability: Infrastructure;
Safety improvement: Cockpit Avionics;
Safety improvement: AHMS Phase I;
Safety improvement: MLG Tire/Wheel;
Safety improvement: Industrial Safety;
Categories: Foundational Activities;
Sustainability: Aging Vehicle Studies;
Sustainability: RSRM Ground Test;
Sustainability: Sustainability Health Metrics;
Safety improvement: PRA Development;
Customer driven capabilities: Performance Trade Studies.
Categories: Projects and Studies;
Sustainability: Vehicle Health Monitoring;
Sustainability: STE Obsolescence;
Sustainability: Material Obsolescence;
Sustainability: Component Obsolescence;
Sustainability: Supply Chain Viability;
Sustainability: Spares Augmentation;
Sustainability: ET 3rd Generation Foam;
Safety improvement: New Start: AHMS II;
Safety improvement: Study: Hydrazine Replacement;
Safety improvement: Study: SSME Nozzle;
Safety improvement: Study: Orbiter Hardening;
Safety improvement: Study: Enhanced C/W;
Safety improvement: Study: Crew Survivability.
Source: NASA.
Legend:
AHMS: Advanced Health Management System:
C/W: Caution and Warning:
ET: External Tank:
MLG: Main Landing Gear:
PRA: Probabilistic Risk Assessment:
PRSD: Power Reactant Storage and Distribution (fuel cells):
RSRM: Reusable Solid Rocket Motor:
SSME: Space Shuttle Main Engine:
STE: Special Test Equipment:
[End of table]
NASA also considers development of the infrastructure to sustain
shuttle operations through 2020 equally as important as upgrades to
keep the shuttle flying safely. One example of a sustainability project
for fiscal year 2004 is the replacement of the roof of the 39-year-old
Vehicle Assembly Building at Kennedy Space Center, which is in poor
condition, as shown by the bubbles that have developed in its surface.
(See fig. 2.) The roof replacement is estimated to cost $16 million and
is part of NASA's total spending on infrastructure of $54 million in
fiscal year 2004.
Figure 2: Roof Deterioration on the Vehicle Assembly Building at
Kennedy Space Center (the tape shows a 5-foot section for perspective):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Further Improvements in the SLEP Possible:
NASA needs to improve its analytic tools to help it improve the basis
for identifying and selecting shuttle upgrades. NASA uses Probabilistic
Risk Assessment (PRA) methodologies, specifically the Quantitative Risk
Assessment System, to improve safety by assessing the relative risk
reduction of potential upgrade projects to overall shuttle risk.
However, program managers are aware that the PRA is incomplete and does
not contain certain key attributes that would make it more accurate,
reliable, and useful. Early next year, they plan to begin using a
revised PRA more oriented toward the shuttle. In addition, the Manager
of the Shuttle Program Development Office believes it is important to
develop a new Sustainability Health Metric System in order to mitigate
the risk that an asset required to fly may not be available. The metric
would score a proposed sustainability project after an evaluation of a
set of common sustainability factors for all elements of shuttle flight
and ground systems and subsystems. Similarly, the CAIB could not find
adequate application of a metric that took an integrated systematic
view of the entire space shuttle system. NASA is considering
development of a sustainability metric, and the Manager of the Shuttle
Program Development Office believes that if approved, it could be ready
for use during the SLEP Summit in February 2004. NASA expects that the
nomination of projects at that meeting will come from a more
comprehensive evaluation through extensive use of hard data and
rigorous analysis.
Although creation of the SLEP may improve the identification and
selection process, further improvements are possible. According to SLEP
program officials responsible for identifying, selecting, and
prioritizing shuttle upgrades, they need clear guidance from top
management as to how those decisions integrate with the other elements
of the ISTP, such as the ISS and the OSP. In addition, SLEP program
officials said the identification and selection of upgrades for the
shuttle program lack a clear measurable metric showing the relationship
of an upgrade investment to an increase in shuttle operational life.
They believe such a metric would be useful to decision makers in
identifying, selecting, and prioritizing shuttle upgrades. Finally,
according to NASA Headquarters officials, recommendations of the CAIB
are under study and will likely change the selection and prioritization
of shuttle upgrades for both the near term and the long term.
Shuttle Upgrades Could Potentially Cost Billions More Than Currently
Estimated:
Until NASA finalizes the basic requirements for the shuttle and further
improves its process for identifying and selecting upgrades, it will be
difficult to accurately and reliably estimate the total cost of
upgrades through 2020. NASA's current estimate for the cost of
upgrading the shuttle is itself highly uncertain. Accurate and reliable
cost estimates to upgrade the shuttle to continue operations are needed
by decision makers. We found that the agency has not yet attempted to
prepare a detailed life-cycle cost[Footnote 5] estimate for all
upgrades through 2020. NASA did prepare a rough order of magnitude
estimate based on an analysis of current project estimates through
2020. The total cost of shuttle upgrades, however, could potentially be
significantly greater as the estimate did not include potential
projects such as a crew escape system. In addition, a number of
potential changes could significantly increase the estimated cost, such
as changes in program requirements, schedule slippages caused by delays
in software and hardware integration, and implementation of
recommendations of the CAIB.
Current Estimate Is Rough Order of Magnitude:
A NASA official stated that it is difficult to develop accurate and
reliable long-term estimates of shuttle upgrades through 2020,
particularly in light of uncertainty of the shuttle's basic
requirements such as its life expectancy. However, developing life-
cycle cost estimates for agency programs is not a new issue in the
federal government. The Office of Management and Budget maintains
guidelines for preparing a cost-effectiveness analysis, including life-
cycle cost estimates applicable to all federal agencies within the
executive branch.[Footnote 6] Cost estimates should include all costs
consistent with agency policy guidance. NASA performs a cost and
systems analysis to produce feasible concepts and explore a wide range
of implementation options to meet its program objectives. To do this,
NASA must develop the life cycle of the program to include the direct,
indirect, recurring, nonrecurring, and other related costs for the
design, development, production, operation, maintenance, support, and
retirement of the program.[Footnote 7] Comprehensive life-cycle cost
estimates include both the project cost estimate and the operations
cost through the end of shuttle operations.[Footnote 8]
NASA has not prepared a detailed total life-cycle cost estimate for
upgrades through 2020 due to the uncertainty of the shuttle's basic
requirements, as well as the difficulty of preparing estimates of out-
year funding to 2020. However, in June 2003, the agency estimated the
shuttle upgrade cost through that year by using a rough order of
magnitude estimate of $300 million-$500 million a year, or a total of
$5 billion-$8 billion. The $300 million-$500 million per year estimate
projected for out-year funding was modeled using a simulation
tool[Footnote 9] and developed by an independent consulting firm.
According to a NASA official, they will rerun this estimate by the next
SLEP Summit in February 2004, using as a basis whatever the recommended
upgrade projects are at the time.
We performed an analysis of the rough order of magnitude estimate
completed by NASA for all upgrades through 2020. Based on the data, we
found that the $300 million-$500 million range of estimated costs per
year, and the methodology used to estimate the costs, appears to be
reasonable. According to a NASA official, NASA's cost estimates are
focused on the annual budget process, rather than long term through
2020, because any individual project takes a while to mature and near-
year estimates, such as those from the current year and through 2008,
would be more accurate than those from 2009 and beyond, which are more
likely to change. NASA's estimate is based on known projects for fiscal
years 2004 and 2005 whose costs taper off in later years and the
assessment of an additional 20 projects through 2020, where cost
estimates and implementation plans are not certain.
Although the rough order of magnitude estimate, as well as the
methodology used to derive it, appears to be reasonable, the total cost
could be billions more since potential upgrade projects such as a crew
escape system are not included. Initially, Boeing released a list of
safety and supportability options that included crew/cockpit escape
concepts for the shuttle. Figure 3 illustrates the primary types of
crew escape presently under consideration. The approximate costs
involved for the eight present concepts range between $1 billion and
$3.9 billion, depending on the one selected.[Footnote 10] There are
three other ejection concepts under development, none of which have
received a full assessment. These other concepts will be assessed in a
more in-depth manner, as well as previous metrics and costs, at the
next SLEP Summit in February 2004. (Appendix III contains information
on all 11 concepts.):
Figure 3: Space Shuttle Crew Escape Design Concepts:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Potential Program Changes Could Increase Total Upgrade Cost:
A number of potential program changes could significantly increase the
estimated cost of shuttle upgrades through 2020. For example, rough
order of magnitude estimates do not account for possible slippages in
the shuttle schedule. According to a NASA official, if NASA and/or
Congress deem a crew escape option a major priority, more highly
developed costs and schedules would be created. Also, slippage due to
delays in hardware or software integration can affect projects where
the final vehicle modifications are planned for the major maintenance
periods.
NASA has not yet made explicit decisions about the end state of the
International Space Station.[Footnote 11] For example, if the useful
life of the ISS were extended and/or an OSP were put into service to
support the station as an alternative to the shuttle, the life-cycle
costs of the shuttle may be affected. Until all requirements about the
ISS have been fully defined, it will be difficult to determine a
detailed cost of shuttle upgrades through 2020.
Other potential program changes that would increase costs include a
requirements change, such as additional lift capability that would
require a new rocket booster. Any redesign option, if selected, would
add billions to the total upgrade cost. For example, redesign and
development of new liquid-fueled rocket boosters is estimated at a
rough order of magnitude cost of $5 billion. Redesign and development
of a five-segment solid booster would be a cheaper but less flexible
option, at an estimated rough order of magnitude of $2 billion.
Another major driver of increased costs would be implementing the
recommendations of the CAIB. Its numerous recommendations, such as
major changes to the shuttle's thermal protection system, could
potentially increase costs. NASA officials have said the agency intends
to implement all the recommendations the CAIB issued in its report, but
precise costs have yet to be determined.
Conclusions:
NASA is at a critical juncture in the life of the space shuttle. NASA
had planned to upgrade the shuttle in the future. Now, after the
Columbia tragedy, NASA has an increased emphasis to fly the shuttle
safely through 2020. NASA officials acknowledge that the loss of the
Columbia will be a key influence on the selection and prioritization of
shuttle upgrades as NASA officials assess both the short-and long-term
implications of the CAIB recommendations. Although creation of the
Space Shuttle Service Life Extension Program institutionalizes the
process for identifying, selecting, and prioritizing upgrades,
additional changes are needed to further strengthen that process such
as increased use of analytic tools and metrics to complement
professional judgment. NASA management has also not yet made explicit
decisions about the basic requirements for key elements in its
Integrated Space Transportation Plan--the ISS, the OSP, and the space
shuttle. The agency's lack of a long-term plan, caused by frequent
changes in the life of the shuttle, has made it hard to fully define,
select, and prioritize shuttle upgrade requirements, which form a basis
for identifying needed upgrades. Such a long-term plan needs to be
developed now in conjunction with activities to return the shuttle to
fly safely. In addition, accurate and reliable life-cycle cost
estimates are important for determining resources needed for the
selection and priority of upgrades and to determine annual budget
requests. Even though an estimate of the total life-cycle cost has not
been made, it is evident that the cost of upgrades through 2020 could
be billions more than NASA's current rough order of magnitude estimate
if potential projects, such as a crew escape system and new projects
resulting from the CAIB recommendations, are included. Unless
improvements are made in NASA's shuttle modernization efforts, NASA
will not be able to ensure upgrades are being made to address the most
necessary needs or to articulate the extent of safety that has been
enhanced, and determine the total cost of the program.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To strengthen the agency's efforts to modernize the space shuttle, we
recommend that the NASA Administrator take the following four actions:
* Fully define the requirements for all elements of the ISTP so that
those responsible for identifying, selecting, and prioritizing shuttle
upgrades will have the guidance and a sound basis to ensure their
decisions on upgrade projects are completely integrated with all other
elements of the transportation plan. In particular, the Administrator
should determine, in conjunction with its international partners, the
ultimate life and mission of the ISS in order to provide a sound basis
for fully defining shuttle requirements.
* Develop and consistently apply a clear measurable metric to show the
relationship of upgrade investments to an increase in shuttle
operational life and/or safety for the entire space shuttle system.
NASA's Quantitative Risk Assessment System could be a basis for such a
metric since it is intended to measure the safety improvement of a
single upgrade project.
* Continue to pursue development of analytic tools and metrics to help
assure that SLEP program officials have accurate, reliable, and timely
quantifiable information to complement their professional judgment.
* Develop a total cost estimate for all upgrades through 2020 by
updating the current rough order of magnitude estimate to include new
projects resulting from the CAIB recommendations, estimates of project
life-cycle costs, and estimates of major potential projects, such as a
crew escape system, so that the resources needed to fund shuttle
upgrades can be ascertained.
Agency Comments:
In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA's Deputy
Administrator stated that the agency concurred with the first three
recommendations. Furthermore, NASA concurred with the intent of the
fourth recommendation concerning development of a cost estimate for all
shuttle upgrades through 2020. However, the Deputy Administrator
commented that there were major uncertainties that severely limit the
agency's ability to foresee budget requirements beyond 3 to 5 years,
such as unanticipated technical problems and the required time to
accurately assess upgrade projects. Consequently, NASA believes that it
is better to size the long-term (5 to 15 years) anticipated budget run-
out based on broad estimates rather than on specific lists of projects.
We recognize that there can be many uncertainties in developing long-
term budget estimates. However, NASA's proposal of an anticipated
budget run-out based on broad estimates is not a substitute for
identifying the financial implications of identified needs.
Specifically, in order for NASA to develop a credible Integrated Space
Transportation Plan, the agency needs a more accurate and reliable
long-term total cost estimate. As we stated in our recommendation,
establishing such an estimate could be facilitated by (1) using life-
cycle cost estimating techniques on its list of potential projects that
NASA used to develop its cost estimate through 2020, (2) updating its
list of potential upgrade projects to include recommended projects of
the CAIB, and (3) including major potential upgrade projects currently
under consideration, such as a crew escape system. The comprehensive
nature of this cost estimate will enable (1) NASA to formulate a more
definitive picture of how it will ensure that the shuttle fleet flies
safely in the future and (2) decision makers to understand associated
costs. Therefore, our recommendation remains unchanged.
Scope and Methodology:
To assess NASA's requirements and plans to upgrade the shuttle for
continuous service through 2020, we obtained and reviewed internal
documents and independent studies and discussed the requirements and
plans with responsible NASA officials.
To assess how NASA determined what upgrades were needed and how they
were identified, selected, and prioritized, we obtained and analyzed
schedules and documents from program officials and obtained an
understanding of the process for identifying, selecting, and
prioritizing shuttle upgrades. We also reviewed documents regarding
analytic tools used to select and prioritize shuttle upgrades.
To assess the estimated life-cycle cost of shuttle upgrades, we
reviewed and discussed NASA's guidance regarding preparation of life-
cycle cost estimates with program officials. To assess the rough order
of magnitude estimate for out-year funding completed by NASA for all
upgrades through 2020, we obtained data and analyzed the estimate using
a Monte Carlo simulation tool called @Risk--an Excel-based spreadsheet.
Monte Carlo simulation helps to assess the risks and uncertainties
associated with Microsoft Excel spreadsheet models by randomly
generating values for uncertain variables over and over to simulate a
model. We assessed this technique to determine the level of confidence
around the estimates and verified our assessment with responsible
program officials.
To accomplish our work, we interviewed officials and analyzed documents
at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Johnson Space Center, Houston,
Texas; and Kennedy Space Center, Florida.
We also reviewed reports and interviewed representatives of NASA's
Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D.C., and NASA's
Independent Program Assessment Office, Langley Research Center,
Hampton, Virginia.
We conducted our work from April to October 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we
plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from the date of this
letter. We will then send copies to others who are interested and make
copies available to others who request them. In addition, the report
will be available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staffs have any
questions about this report. Major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Allen Li:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
Signed by Allen Li:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Office of the Administrator
Washington, DC 20546-0001:
December 19, 2003:
Mr. Allen Li
Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Li:
Thank you for the completed comprehensive evaluation of the Space
Shuttle Upgrades/Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). I am pleased to
express my gratitude for the professionalism your team exhibited while
conducting this essential audit. NASA appreciates the insight of the
General Accounting Office. We welcome your findings. Below, please find
our comments to the recommendations provided in your report.
Recommendation 1:
"Fully define the requirements for all elements of the Integrated Space
Transportation Plan (ISTP)...":
We concur with your recommendation. The investments we make in the
Space Shuttle Program can change significantly depending on the
suppositions that are made on the strategic direction of human space
flight. As was noted in the report, investments in the Space Shuttle
Program cannot be completely addressed until these requirements are
fully defined. The Agency's ISTP defines these high-level requirements.
The strategic direction for the long-term Space Shuttle Program
investments will be realized as the ISTP is refined, including plans
for the lifetime of the International Space Station. As such, the Space
Shuttle Program staff is working closely with the NASA Space Architect
to update investment activities, as updates to the ISTP are finalized.
Recommendation 2:
"Develop and consistently apply a clear measurable metric...":
We concur with your recommendation. We fully realize the critical
importance of accurately selecting the needed investments to safely
maintain and operate the Space Shuttle system into the future. In fact,
as you mentioned in your report, this effort is already underway and is
being addressed within the Space Shuttle SLEP Summit process. We are
pleased that your lead auditor attended the Inaugural Summit held in
March of this year. We are anticipating his attendance at future Summit
events. As the Summit process evolves, the consistency and
measurability of those investments selected to upgrade the Space
Shuttle fleet will be further refined.
Recommendation 3:
"Continue to pursue the development of analytic tools and metrics...":
We concur with your recommendation. The organization of the Space
Shuttle SLEP is designed to build upon previous investment management
initiatives and to advance the effectiveness of allocating resources to
ensure that our mission to safely fly the Space Shuttle fleet into the
future is realized. The SLEP process has given impetus to the
improvement of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment tool and the
development of a new all encompassing metric that will address Space
Shuttle sustainability and infrastructure concerns. We will continue to
seek out additional investment metric tools to accurately capture
reliable and timely quantifiable information.
Recommendation 4:
"Develop a total cost estimate for all upgrades through 2020 by
updating the current rough order of magnitude estimate...":
We concur with the intent of your recommendation. As we discussed in
the exit briefing, there are major uncertainties that severely limit
our ability to foresee definitive budget requirements beyond 3-5 years,
such as:
a) emergence of unanticipated technical problems and,
b) the time required to accurately assess upgrades, projects for cost,
schedule, and technical merit (up to 2 years for major upgrades).
Therefore, we believe it is better to size the long term (5-15 year)
anticipated budget runout based on broad estimates than on specific
lists of projects and to size the near-term (3-5 year) budget on a
finalized list of approved projects.
Again, thank you for the critical insight the report provided. We
assure you that we are well on our way toward implementing your
recommendations.
Cordially,
Signed by:
Frederick D. Gregory:
Deputy Administrator:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Recommended Upgrade Projects Resulting from the Service
Life Extension Program Summit:
Real Year Dollars in Millions--Not in Full Cost:
Subcategory: Should Start in FY04[A] (Sustainability Related):
RSRM-Case Hardware Availability;
FY 04: 5;
FY 05: 5;
FY 06: 5;
FY 07: 5;
FY 08: 5;
Total: 25.
Subcategory: Should Start in FY04[A] (Sustainability Related):
Orbiter- Certify PRSD Tank Supplier and Procure Spares;
FY 04: 4;
FY 05: 8;
FY 06: 8;
FY 07: 4;
FY 08: 8;
Total: 31.
Subcategory: Should Start in FY04[A] (Sustainability Related):
SSME- Sustaining Test Equipment Tasks;
FY 04: 6;
FY 05: 3;
FY 06: 1;
FY 07: 0;
FY 08: 0;
Total: 10.
Subcategory: Existing Commitments[B] (Safety Related)[C]:
Vehicle CAU;
FY 04: 91;
FY 05: 77;
FY 06: 14;
FY 07: 0;
FY 08: 0;
Total: 182.
Subcategory: Existing Commitments[B] (Safety Related)[C]:
Vehicle Main Landing Gear Tire and Wheel;
FY 04: 3;
FY 05: 0;
FY 06: 0;
FY 07: 0;
FY 08: 0;
Total: 3.
Subcategory: Existing Commitments[B] (Safety Related)[C]:
SSME AHMS (Phase 1);
FY 04: 4;
FY 05: 3;
FY 06: 2;
FY 07: 1;
FY 08: 0;
Total: 10.
Subcategory: Existing Commitments[B] (Safety Related)[C]:
Industrial Engineering for Safety;
FY 04: 15;
FY 05: 15;
FY 06: 15;
FY 07: 15;
FY 08: 15;
Total: 75.
Subcategory: Existing Commitments[B] (Safety Related)[C]:
Others[D] (Sustainability Related)[E];
FY 04: 51;
FY 05: 43;
FY 06: 27;
FY 07: 21;
FY 08: 10;
Total: 152.
Subcategory: Existing Commitments[B] (Safety Related)[C]:
RSRM Obsolescence;
FY 04: 18;
FY 05: 19;
FY 06: 20;
FY 07: 20;
FY 08: 21;
Total: 98.
Subcategory: Existing Commitments[B] (Safety Related)[C]:
Infrastructure;
FY 04: 92;
FY 05: 77;
FY 06: 78;
FY 07: 79;
FY 08: 80;
Total: 406.
Subcategory: Foundational Activities[F] (Sustainability Related):
Aging Vehicle Studies[G];
FY 04: 10;
FY 05: 14;
FY 06: 0;
FY 07: 0;
FY 08: 0;
Total: 24.
Subcategory: Foundational Activities[F] (Sustainability Related):
RSRM Ground Test Program;
FY 04: 4;
FY 05: 10;
FY 06: 20;
FY 07: 9;
FY 08: 21;
Total: 64.
Subcategory: Foundational Activities[F] (Sustainability Related):
Improved Tools/Metrics[H];
FY 04: 7;
FY 05: 5;
FY 06: 3;
FY 07: 3;
FY 08: 3;
Total: 21.
Subcategory: (Customer Driven Capabilities Related)[I]:
Performance Trade Studies (Lift, Power, Stay Time);
FY 04: 2;
FY 05: 2;
FY 06: 0;
FY 07: 0;
FY 08: 0;
Total: 4.
Subcategory: Projects and Studies (Sustainability Related)[J]:
New Start: Vehicle Health Monitoring Study;
FY 04: 4;
FY 05: 4;
FY 06: 0;
FY 07: 0;
FY 08: 0;
Total: 8.
Subcategory: Projects and Studies (Sustainability Related)[J]:
New Start: ET 3[RD] Generation Foam Study;
FY 04: 3;
FY 05: 7;
FY 06: 8;
FY 07: 0;
FY 08: 0;
Total: 18.
Subcategory: Projects and Studies (Sustainability Related)[J]:
STE Obsolescence (14)[K];
FY 04: 16;
FY 05: 18;
FY 06: 11;
FY 07: 7;
FY 08: 7;
Total: 59.
Subcategory: Projects and Studies (Sustainability Related)[J]:
Material Obsolescence (3);
FY 04: 2;
FY 05: 0;
FY 06: 0;
FY 07: 0;
FY 08: 0;
Total: 2.
Subcategory: Projects and Studies (Sustainability Related)[J]:
Component Obsolescence (14);
FY 04: 6;
FY 05: 23;
FY 06: 27;
FY 07: 16;
FY 08: 13;
Total: 85.
Subcategory: Projects and Studies (Sustainability Related)[J]:
Supply Chain Viability (8);
FY 04: 4;
FY 05: 0;
FY 06: 1;
FY 07: 1;
FY 08: 0;
Total: 5.
Subcategory: Projects and Studies (Sustainability Related)[J]:
Spares Augmentation for SLE (5);
FY 04: 5;
FY 05: 10;
FY 06: 26;
FY 07: 23;
FY 08: 18;
Total: 82.
Subcategory: (Safety Related Improvements):
New Start: SSME AHMS (Phase 2b);
FY 04: 35;
FY 05: 45;
FY 06: 45;
FY 07: 23;
FY 08: 12;
Total: 160.
Subcategory: (Safety Related Improvements):
Study: Hydrazine Replacement;
FY 04: 3;
FY 05: 3;
FY 06: 1;
FY 07: 0;
FY 08: 0;
Total: 7.
Subcategory: (Safety Related Improvements):
Study: Orbiter Hardening;
FY 04: 2;
FY 05: 2;
FY 06: 0;
FY 07: 0;
FY 08: 0;
Total: 4.
Subcategory: (Safety Related Improvements):
Study: SSME Channel Wall Nozzle;
FY 04: 4;
FY 05: 12;
FY 06: 16;
FY 07: 0;
FY 08: 0;
Total: 32.
Subcategory: (Safety Related Improvements):
Study: Crew Survivability Trades;
FY 04: 1;
FY 05: 0;
FY 06: 0;
FY 07: 0;
FY 08: 0;
Total: 1.
Reserves;
FY 04: 20;
FY 05: 20;
FY 06: 20;
FY 07: 20;
FY 08: 20;
Total: 100.
Total[L];
FY 04: 416;
FY 05: 426;
FY 06: 347;
FY 07: 246;
FY 08: 233;
Total: 1,668.
Source: NASA.
Note: Final funding profile is dependent on the outcome of the FY 2005
President's Budget Submission.
[A] "Should Start" - High scoring sustainability projects that are
strongly recommended by NASA for starts in FY04 and which would create
near-term risk for the program if they did not start.
[B] "Existing Commitments"-Projects previously authorized.
[C] "Safety Improvement"-Projects and studies designed to improve loss
of vehicle/loss of crew probabilities.
[D] "Others"-A major item in this category is the program installation
costs for the Cockpit Avionics Upgrade, which is tracked separately, as
well as the costs of other smaller projects.
[E] "Sustainability"-Assuring the assets required to fly are in place.
[F] "Foundational Activities"-Tasks that add to NASA's general insight
into the current condition of their assets. Non-system specific.
[G] Aging Vehicle Studies include: Mid-Life Certification Assessment &
Issue Mitigation, Fleet Leader Program, Corrosion Control, STE Survey/
Evaluation, Non-Destructive Evaluation Upgrades.
[H] Probabilistic Risk Assessment (safety related), Sustainability
Health Metrics (sustainability related), Analytical Hierarchy Tool
System (sustainability related).
[I] "Customer Driven Capabilities"--Requirements for new capabilities
as defined by current or potential customers. Customers in this context
are the entities that require the space shuttle for access to space.
Currently, that is mainly the space station, the research community,
and the space telescope community.
[J] "Projects and Studies"--System-specific activities at various
levels of maturity within the system.
[K] This number represents the number of projects in each subcategory.
[L] Totals do not add due to rounding.
Legend:
AHMS: Advanced Health Management System:
CAU: Cockpit Avionics Upgrade:
ET: External Tank:
PRSD: Power Reactant Storage and Distribution (fuel cells):
RSRM: Reusable Solid Rocket Motor
SLE: Service Life Extension:
SSME: Space Shuttle Main Engine:
STE: Special Test Equipment:
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comparison of Crew Escape Concepts Under Consideration:
Concept[A]: 1. Extraction-50;
Crew size: 5 crew; 5 flight deck;
Mass properties: 122 lb added; No ballast required;
1st kit delivery and OMM: 4.5 y after ATP; 18 m OMM;
Ascent coverage no fireball[B]: 0 to 9k ft;
Ascent coverage fireball potential: None;
NASA PRA % risk: 31%.
Concept[A]: 2. Ejection-42A;
Crew size: 6 crew; 4 flight / 2 mid deck;
Mass properties: 1,788 lb added; 1,900 ballast;
1st kit delivery and OMM: 4.5 y after ATP; 18 m OMM;
Ascent coverage no fireball[B]: 0 to 70k ft;
Ascent coverage fireball potential: 10k to 70k ft;
NASA PRA % risk: 52%.
Concept[A]: 3. Ejection-43A;
Crew size: 7 crew; 4 flight/ 3 mid deck;
Mass properties: 3,012 lb added; 2,700 ballast;
1st kit delivery and OMM: 4.5 y after ATP; 18 m OMM;
Ascent coverage no fireball[B]: 0 to 70k ft;
Ascent coverage fireball potential: 10k to 70k ft;
NASA PRA % risk: 52%.
Concept[A]: 4. Forebody-1-2N;
Crew size: 7 crew; 4 flight / 3 mid deck;
Mass properties: 8,315 lb added; 2,700 ballast[C];
1st kit delivery and OMM: 5.5 y after ATP; 18 m OMM;
Ascent coverage no fireball[B]: 3k to 210k ft;
Ascent coverage fireball potential: 10k to 210k ft;
NASA PRA % risk: 80%.
Concept[A]: 5. Hybrid-1-H-42A;
Crew size: 6 crew; 4 flight / 2 mid deck;
Mass properties: 6,448 lb added; 2,700 ballast[D];
1st kit delivery and OMM: 5.5 y after ATP; 18 m OMM;
Ascent coverage no fireball[B]: 0 to 210k ft;
Ascent coverage fireball potential: 10k to 210k ft;
NASA PRA % risk: 87%.
Concept[A]: 6. Hybrid-1-H-50;
Crew size: 5 crew; flight deck;
Mass properties: 4,825 lb added; 2,700 ballast[D];
1st kit delivery and OMM: 5.5 y after ATP; 18 m OMM;
Ascent coverage no fireball[B]: 0 to 210k ft;
Ascent coverage fireball potential: 10k to 210k ft;
NASA PRA % risk: 87%.
Concept[A]: 7. PLB Capsule & Seats;
Crew size: 7 crew; 2 flight / 5 capsule;
Mass properties: 7,256 lb added; 2,700 ballast[D];
1st kit delivery and OMM: 5 y after ATP; 16 m OMM;
Ascent coverage no fireball[B]: Capsule 2k - 210k Seat 0 - 70k;
Ascent coverage fireball potential: Capsule 10k - 210k; Seat 10k - 70k;
NASA PRA % risk: 52%.
Concept[A]: 8. Payload Bay Compartment and Seats[E];
Crew size: 7 crew; 2 flight / 5 PLB;
Mass properties: 6,024 lb added; 2,700 ballast[D];
1st kit delivery and OMM: 4 y after ATP; 12 m OMM;
Ascent coverage no fireball[B]: No Pad[F[75K/80K FT MAX] Max;
Ascent coverage fireball potential: 10k to 70k ft;
NASA PRA % risk: 52%.
Concept[A]: 9. Ejection[G];
Crew size: 2 crew; 2 flight deck;
Mass properties: xxxx lb added; xxxx ballast;
1st kit delivery and OMM: x.x y after ATP; xx m OMM;
Ascent coverage no fireball[B]: 0 to 70k ft;
Ascent coverage fireball potential: 10k to 70k ft;
NASA PRA % risk: 52%.
Concept[A]: 10. Ejection[G];
Crew size: 3 crew; 3 flight deck;
Mass properties: xxxx lb added; xxxx ballast;
1st kit delivery and OMM: x.x y after ATP; xxx m OMM;
Ascent coverage no fireball[B]: 0 to 70k ft;
Ascent coverage fireball potential: 10k to 70k ft;
NASA PRA % risk: 52%.
Concept[A]: 11. Ejection[G];
Crew size: 4 crew; 4 flight deck;
Mass properties: xxxx lb added; xxxx ballast;
1st kit delivery and OMM: x.x y after ATP; xx m OMM;
Ascent coverage no fireball[B]: 0 to 70k ft;
Ascent coverage fireball potential: 10k to 70k ft;
NASA PRA % risk: 52%.
Source: NASA.
[A] Under the "Concept" column: The first number usually represents the
number of crew on the flight deck and the second number usually
represents the amount of crew on the mid-deck. The letter following
these numbers represents the option. For example, for #2, "42A"
represents 4 on Flight Deck, 2 on Mid-deck, option "A". However, for
#4, "1-2N" strictly represents the option and for #5 & #6, "1-H" stands
for "Hybrid" option.
[B] The "fireball" is the environment following a shuttle explosion
during ascent. The fireball size, temperature, and pressure are a
function of the amount of ascent propellant remaining and the altitude
of the vehicle. The more the propellant and the lower the altitude,
the larger the fireball and the more difficulty for the crew to
survive. The options do not adjust for a fireball ascent.
[C] Center of Gravity cannot be corrected with max ballast of 2,700
lb.
[D,E] PRA AND ASCENT COVERAGE BASED ON 42A EJECTION SEAT ASSESSMENT.
[F] "NO PAD" means that it does not have pad-abort capability (crew
could not use option to escape while Shuttle is on pad).
[G] Assessment due by February 2004 for Service Life Extension Program
Summit.
Legend:
ATP: Authority to Proceed:
CG: Center of Gravity:
OMM: Orbiter Major Modification
PLB: Payload Bay PRA: Probabilistic Risk Assessment
ROM: Rough Order of Magnitude:
SLEP: Service Life Extension Program:
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Staff Acknowledgments:
Acknowledgments:
Individuals making key contributions to this report included Jerry
Herley, Thomas Hopp, T. J. Thomson, and Karen Richey.
FOOTNOTES
[1] NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan provides a road map for
continued shuttle operations and for key investment decisions.
[2] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Transportation: Status of
the X-33 Reusable Launch Vehicle Program, GAO/NSIAD-99-176 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 11, 1999), Space Transportation: Challenges Facing NASA's
Space Launch Initiative, GAO-02-1020 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17,
2002), and Space Station: Impact of the Grounding of the Shuttle Fleet,
GAO-03-1107 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2003).
[3] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Shuttle Safety: Update on
NASA's Progress in Revitalizing the Shuttle Workforce and Making Safety
Upgrades, GAO-01-1122T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2001) and Space
Shuttle: Need to Sustain Launch Risk Assessment Process Improvements,
GAO/NSIAD-96-73 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 1996).
[4] Next Generation Launch Technology will develop key technologies,
such as propulsion and structures, for a future launch vehicle.
[5] Life-cycle cost is the sum total of direct, indirect, recurring,
and nonrecurring costs of a system over its entire life through
disposal. A detailed life-cycle cost estimate would include a full
range of all potential upgrades, as well as their full range of
potential costs.
[6] Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-94.
[7] NASA Procedures and Guidelines (NPG) 7120.5 B.
[8] Space Shuttle Program Upgrades Management Plan (NSTS 37400, volume
I, revision A).
[9] Performed through the use of a "Monte Carlo" spreadsheet
simulation, which randomly generates values for uncertain variables
over and over to simulate a model. Without the aid of simulation, a
spreadsheet model will only reveal a single outcome, generally the most
likely or average scenario, but after hundreds or thousands of trials,
one can view the statistics of the results and the certainty of any
outcome.
[10] The estimated cost for each of the eight present concepts is
proprietary information.
[11] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Station: Actions Under
Way to Manage Cost, but Significant Challenges Remain, GAO-02-735
(Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002).
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