Space Shuttle
Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to Sustain Its Workforce Through Retirement Gao ID: GAO-05-230 March 9, 2005The President's vision for space exploration (Vision) directs the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to retire the space shuttle following completion of the International Space Station, planned for the end of the decade. The retirement process will last several years and impact thousands of critically skilled NASA civil service and contractor employees that support the program. Key to implementing the Vision is NASA's ability to sustain this workforce to support safe space shuttle operations through retirement. Because of the potential workforce issues that could affect the safety and effectiveness of operations through the space shuttle's retirement, GAO was asked to identify (1) the progress of efforts to develop a strategy for sustaining the space shuttle workforce through retirement and (2) factors that may have impeded these efforts.
The Space Shuttle Program has made limited progress toward developing a detailed long-term strategy for sustaining its workforce through the space shuttle's retirement. The program has taken preliminary steps, including identifying the lessons learned from the retirement of programs comparable to the space shuttle, such as the Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program, to assist in its workforce planning efforts. Other efforts have been initiated or are planned, such as enlisting the help of human capital experts and revising the acquisition strategy for updating the space shuttle's propulsion system prime contracts; however, actions taken thus far have been limited. NASA's prime contractor for space shuttle operations has also taken some preliminary steps to begin to prepare for the impact of the space shuttle's retirement on its workforce, such as working with a consulting firm to conduct a comprehensive study of its workforce. However, its ability to progress with these efforts is reliant on NASA making decisions that impact contractor requirements through the remainder of the program. Making progress toward developing a detailed strategy, however, will be important given the potential impact that workforce problems would have on NASA-wide goals. For example, a delay to the space shuttle's schedule due to workforce problems would delay the agency's ability to proceed with space exploration activities. NASA and its prime contractor for space shuttle operations have already indicated that they could face challenges sustaining their critically skilled workforces if a career path beyond the space shuttle's retirement is not apparent. In addition, governmentwide fiscal realities call into question whether funding will be available to support the use of incentives, such as retention bonuses, that could help NASA sustain its space shuttle workforce. Several factors hamper the Space Shuttle Program's ability to develop a detailed long-term strategy to sustain the critically skilled workforce necessary to support safe space shuttle operations through retirement. For example, because of the program's near-term focus on returning the space shuttle to flight, other efforts, such as assessing hardware and facility needs that will ultimately aid the program in determining workforce requirements, are being delayed. In addition, program officials indicated that they are faced with uncertainties regarding the implementation of future aspects of the Vision and lack the requirements needed on which to base their workforce planning efforts. Despite these factors, our prior work on strategic workforce planning has shown that there are steps, such as scenario planning, that successful organizations take to better position themselves to address future workforce needs.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-230, Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to Sustain Its Workforce Through Retirement
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2005:
Space Shuttle:
Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to Sustain Its Workforce through
Retirement:
GAO-05-230:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-230, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The President's vision for space exploration (Vision) directs the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to retire the
space shuttle following completion of the International Space Station,
planned for the end of the decade. The retirement process will last
several years and impact thousands of critically skilled NASA civil
service and contractor employees that support the program. Key to
implementing the Vision is NASA's ability to sustain this workforce to
support safe space shuttle operations through retirement.
Because of the potential workforce issues that could affect the safety
and effectiveness of operations through the space shuttle's retirement,
GAO was asked to identify (1) the progress of efforts to develop a
strategy for sustaining the space shuttle workforce through retirement
and (2) factors that may have impeded these efforts.
What GAO Found:
The Space Shuttle Program has made limited progress toward developing a
detailed long-term strategy for sustaining its workforce through the
space shuttle's retirement. The program has taken preliminary steps,
including identifying the lessons learned from the retirement of
programs comparable to the space shuttle, such as the Air Force Titan
IV Rocket Program, to assist in its workforce planning efforts. Other
efforts have been initiated or are planned, such as enlisting the help
of human capital experts and revising the acquisition strategy for
updating the space shuttle's propulsion system prime contracts;
however, actions taken thus far have been limited. NASA's prime
contractor for space shuttle operations has also taken some preliminary
steps to begin to prepare for the impact of the space shuttle's
retirement on its workforce, such as working with a consulting firm to
conduct a comprehensive study of its workforce. However, its ability to
progress with these efforts is reliant on NASA making decisions that
impact contractor requirements through the remainder of the program.
Making progress toward developing a detailed strategy, however, will be
important given the potential impact that workforce problems would have
on NASA-wide goals. For example, a delay to the space shuttle's
schedule due to workforce problems would delay the agency's ability to
proceed with space exploration activities. NASA and its prime
contractor for space shuttle operations have already indicated that
they could face challenges sustaining their critically skilled
workforces if a career path beyond the space shuttle's retirement is
not apparent. In addition, governmentwide fiscal realities call into
question whether funding will be available to support the use of
incentives, such as retention bonuses, that could help NASA sustain its
space shuttle workforce.
Several factors hamper the Space Shuttle Program's ability to develop a
detailed long-term strategy to sustain the critically skilled workforce
necessary to support safe space shuttle operations through retirement.
For example, because of the program's near-term focus on returning the
space shuttle to flight, other efforts, such as assessing hardware and
facility needs that will ultimately aid the program in determining
workforce requirements, are being delayed. In addition, program
officials indicated that they are faced with uncertainties regarding
the implementation of future aspects of the Vision and lack the
requirements needed on which to base their workforce planning efforts.
Despite these factors, our prior work on strategic workforce planning
has shown that there are steps, such as scenario planning, that
successful organizations take to better position themselves to address
future workforce needs.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that NASA take steps aimed at better positioning
the agency to sustain a critically skilled space shuttle workforce
through retirement. In particular, we are recommending that the Space
Shuttle Program begin identifying its future workforce needs based upon
various future scenarios the program could face. In commenting on a
draft of this report, NASA concurred with our recommendation.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-230.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 512-
4841 or lia@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Progress toward Developing a Strategy to Sustain the Space Shuttle
Workforce Is Limited:
Several Factors Have Impeded Efforts to Develop a Long-Term Strategy to
Sustain a Critically Skilled Space Shuttle Workforce:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Summary of NASA Reports on Lessons Learned Applicable to
the Space Shuttle Program:
Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Summary of NASA Reports on Lessons Learned Applicable to the
Space Shuttle Program:
Figures:
Figure 1: Estimated Timeline for the Process of Retiring NASA's Space
Shuttle:
Figure 2: NASA Space Operations Centers:
Abbreviations:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act:
ISS: International Space Station:
JSC: Johnson Space Center:
KSC: Kennedy Space Center:
MSFC: Marshall Space Flight Center:
NAPA: National Academy of Public Administration:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
SFOC: Space Flight Operations Contract:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 9, 2005:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Co-Chairman:
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John McCain:
United States Senate:
On January 14, 2004, the President articulated a new vision for space
exploration (Vision) for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). Part of the Vision includes the goal of retiring
the space shuttle following completion of the International Space
Station (ISS), planned for the end of the decade.[Footnote 1] The space
shuttle, NASA's largest individual program,[Footnote 2] is an essential
element of NASA's ability to implement this Vision, because it is the
only launch system presently capable of transporting the remaining
components necessary to complete assembly of the ISS. NASA currently
projects that it will need to conduct an estimated 28 flights over the
next 5 to 6 years to complete assembly of and provide support to the
ISS. However, because of the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia
and its crew in February 2003, NASA will do so with an overriding focus
on ensuring safety of operations.[Footnote 3]
The safety of the space shuttle is largely contingent on NASA's ability
to sustain the critically skilled workforce necessary to support space
shuttle operations through retirement. Moving forward, this will be a
concern, as the process of retiring the space shuttle will last several
years and impact thousands of critically skilled NASA civil service and
contractor employees that support the program. This workforce has been
the focus of many reviews[Footnote 4] in the past, which have
highlighted significant issues concerning the depth of critical skills
available to the program and other cultural, organizational, and safety
issues that impact the program's ability to safely support space
shuttle operations. These reviews recommended, among other things, that
NASA assess the quantity and quality of its space shuttle workforce in
terms of experience and special skills; transform its culture; and take
steps to strengthen its safety organization.
As agreed with your offices, we reviewed the status of NASA's efforts
to position itself to sustain the critically skilled space shuttle
workforce necessary to support space shuttle operations through
retirement. Specifically, we identified (1) the progress of NASA's
efforts to develop a strategy for sustaining a critically skilled space
shuttle workforce through retirement and (2) factors that may have
impeded these efforts.
To perform our work, we interviewed various NASA officials, including
Space Shuttle Program, Human Resources, and Safety officials. We
obtained and analyzed NASA documents related to human capital
management, such as human capital plans, policies and procedures for
workforce planning, and information on NASA's workforce analysis tools.
Further, we obtained and reviewed Space Shuttle Program documents
related to the program's retirement, such as its lessons learned
reports. In addition, we interviewed officials from NASA's prime
contractor for space shuttle operations, United Space Alliance, and
obtained and reviewed contractor documents related to its workforce and
support of space shuttle operations. We also gathered information from
human capital experts and reviewed GAO human capital reports and
guidance regarding strategic workforce planning. Complete details of
our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. We performed our
work from April 2004 to March 2005 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The Space Shuttle Program has made limited progress toward developing a
detailed long-term strategy for sustaining its workforce through the
space shuttle's retirement. The program has taken preliminary steps,
including identifying the lessons learned from the retirement of
programs comparable to the space shuttle, such as the Air Force Titan
IV Rocket Program, to assist in its workforce planning efforts. Other
efforts have been initiated or are planned, such as enlisting the help
of human capital experts and revising the acquisition strategy for
updating the space shuttle's propulsion system prime contracts;
however, actions taken thus far have been limited. United Space
Alliance has taken some preliminary steps begin to prepare for the
impact of the space shuttle's retirement on its workforce, such as
working with a consulting firm to conduct a comprehensive study of its
workforce. However, its ability to progress with these efforts is
reliant on NASA making decisions that impact contractor requirements
through the remainder of the program. Making progress toward developing
a detailed strategy, however, will be important given the potential
impact that workforce problems would have on NASA-wide goals. For
example, a delay to the space shuttle's schedule due to workforce
problems would delay NASA's ability to proceed with space exploration
activities. NASA and United Space Alliance have already indicated that
they could face difficulty in sustaining their critically skilled
workforces if a career path beyond the space shuttle's retirement is
not apparent to employees. In addition, governmentwide fiscal realities
call into question whether funding will be available to support the use
of incentives, such as retention bonuses, that could help NASA sustain
its space shuttle workforce.
Several factors hamper the Space Shuttle Program's ability to develop a
detailed long-term strategy to sustain the critically skilled workforce
necessary to support safe space shuttle operations through retirement.
For example, because of the program's near-term focus on returning the
space shuttle to flight, other efforts, such as assessing hardware and
facility needs that will ultimately aid the program in determining
workforce requirements, are being delayed. In addition, program
officials indicated that they are faced with uncertainties regarding
the implementation of future aspects of the Vision and lack the
requirements needed on which to base their workforce planning efforts.
Despite these factors, our prior work on strategic workforce planning
has shown that there are steps, such as scenario planning, that
successful organizations take to better position themselves to address
future workforce needs.
In this report, we are recommending that NASA take steps aimed at
better positioning the Space Shuttle Program to sustain a critically
skilled workforce through retirement. In particular, we are
recommending that the Space Shuttle Program begin identifying its
future workforce needs based upon various future scenarios the program
could face. In written and oral comments on a draft of this report,
NASA concurred with our findings, conclusions, and recommendation.
Background:
Prior to retiring the program, NASA will need to first return the space
shuttle to flight[Footnote 5] and execute the remaining missions needed
to complete assembly of and provide support for the ISS. At the same
time, NASA will need to begin the process of closing out or
transitioning to other NASA programs the space shuttle's assets, such
as its workforce, hardware, and facilities, which are no longer needed
to support the program. The process of closing out or transitioning the
program's assets will extend well beyond the space shuttle's final
flight (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Estimated Timeline for the Process of Retiring NASA's Space
Shuttle:
[See PDF for image]
[A] The planning window for the first flight is May 12 through June 3,
2005. The planning window for the second flight is July 10 through
August 2, 2005.
[End of figure]
Retiring the space shuttle and, in the larger context, implementing the
Vision, will require that the Space Shuttle Program rely on its most
important asset--its workforce. The space shuttle workforce consists of
approximately 2,000 civil service[Footnote 6] and 15,600 prime
contractor[Footnote 7] personnel, including a large number of engineers
and scientists. In addition to these personnel, there are a large
number of critical, lower level subcontractors and suppliers throughout
the United States who support the program. The program's workforce is
responsible for conducting such things as space shuttle payload
processing, mission planning and control, ground operations, and for
managing the space shuttle's propulsions systems. While each of the
NASA centers support the Space Shuttle Program to some degree, the vast
majority of this workforce is located at three of NASA's Space
Operations Centers--Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center (KSC),
and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: NASA Space Operations Centers:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The space shuttle workforce and NASA's human capital management has
been the subject of many GAO[Footnote 8] and other reviews[Footnote 9]
in the past. These reviews showed that the space shuttle workforce had
suffered from agency downsizing in the mid 1990s and that NASA faced
challenges recruiting and training new employees, sufficiently staffing
its workforce with qualified workers, and dealing with an aging
workforce and signs of overwork and fatigue in its remaining workforce.
In the past, NASA officials said that these challenges posed
significant flight safety risks for the program. While the Space
Shuttle Program had taken some steps to address these issues,
sustaining critical skills in many key areas such as subsystems
engineering remained a problem. In addition, in 2003 the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board noted that years of workforce reductions
and outsourcing negatively impacted NASA's experience and systems
knowledge base. Further, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
noted that safety and mission assurance personnel were eliminated and
careers in safety lost organizational prestige. Additional studies
highlighted recent trends affecting the science and engineering labor
pool from which employers like NASA draw from. For example, the
National Science Board reported in 2004 that worldwide competition for
individuals with science and engineering skills was increasing, while
the potential pool of individuals with these skills was
decreasing.[Footnote 10] NASA's former Administrator has testified that
this situation poses a significant challenge to the agency's ability to
maintain a world-class workforce, because it relies on a highly
educated and broad science and engineering workforce to accomplish its
mission.
Over the past few years, GAO and others in the federal government have
underscored the importance of human capital management and strategic
workforce planning. For example, we designated strategic human capital
management as a governmentwide, high-risk area in 2001, 2003, and 2005,
and continue to highlight it as a major management challenge
specifically for NASA.[Footnote 11] Strategic Management of Human
Capital was also placed at the top of the President's Management
Agenda,[Footnote 12] and the Office of Management and Budget and Office
of Personnel Management have made efforts to improve governmentwide
human capital management and strategic workforce planning.[Footnote 13]
Recognizing the need for guidance related to strategic human capital
management, GAO has issued various reports that outline a strategic
human capital approach and provided tools, such as a Model of Strategic
Human Capital Management and Human Capital Self Assessment Checklist
for Agency Leaders,[Footnote 14] that agencies can use to aid in
addressing this challenge.
In response to an increased focus governmentwide on strategic human
capital management, NASA has taken several steps to improve its human
capital management. These include steps such as devising an agencywide
strategic human capital plan, developing workforce analysis tools to
assist in identifying critical skills needs, and requesting and
receiving additional human capital flexibilities to help the agency
compete successfully with the private sector in attracting and
retaining employees and to reshape and redeploy its workforce to
support its mission.[Footnote 15]
GAO's prior work on strategic human capital management has shown that
workforce planning is needed to ensure that the right people with the
right skills are in the right place at the right time. Workforce
planning addresses two critical needs: (1) aligning an organization's
human capital program with its current and emerging mission and
programmatic goals and (2) developing long-term strategies for
acquiring, developing, and retaining staff to achieve programmatic
goals. Although approaches to such planning may vary according to an
organization's specific needs and mission, our work suggests that,
irrespective of the context in which workforce planning is done, such a
process should address five key elements. These include (1) involving
top management, employees, and other stakeholders in developing,
communicating, and implementing the strategic workforce plan; (2)
determining the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to
achieve the future programmatic results; (3) developing strategies
tailored to address critical skills and competency gaps that need
attention; (4) building the capability needed to address
administrative, educational, and other requirements important to
supporting workforce strategies; and (5) monitoring and evaluating the
agency's progress toward its human capital goals and the contribution
that human capital results have made toward achieving programmatic
goals.
Progress toward Developing a Strategy to Sustain the Space Shuttle
Workforce Is Limited:
The Space Shuttle Program has made limited progress toward developing a
detailed long-term strategy for sustaining its workforce through the
space shuttle's retirement. While NASA recognizes the importance of
having in place a strategy for sustaining a critically skilled
workforce to support the space shuttle's operations, it has only taken
preliminary steps, such as identifying lessons learned from the
retirement of programs comparable to the space shuttle, to do so. Other
efforts have been initiated or are planned, such as enlisting the help
of human capital experts and revising the acquisition strategy to
update the space shuttle's propulsion system prime contracts; however,
actions taken thus far have been limited. NASA's prime contractor for
space shuttle operations has also taken some preliminary steps, but its
ability to progress with these efforts is reliant on NASA making
decisions that impact contractor requirements through the remainder of
the program. Making progress toward developing a detailed strategy,
however, will be important given the potential impact that workforce
problems would have on NASA-wide goals.
The Space Shuttle Program Has Taken Preliminary Steps toward Developing
a Strategy for Sustaining a Critically Skilled Workforce:
To begin its planning efforts for the space shuttle's retirement, the
program identified the lessons learned from the retirement of programs
comparable to the space shuttle, such as the Air Force Titan IV Rocket
Program, the Navy Base Realignment and Closure activity, and the NASA
Industrial Facility closure. Among other things, the lessons learned
reports highlight the practices used by other programs when making
personnel decisions, such as the importance of developing transition
strategies and early retention planning to the success of the space
shuttle's retirement. (See app. II for a summary of NASA's reports to
date on the lessons learned that are applicable to the retirement of
the space shuttle.) Program officials said that this preliminary effort
is the first step in an approach they expect to take to plan for
retiring the space shuttle. According to these officials, they plan to
use the information collected from this preliminary effort to guide in
the development of a management plan for retiring the space shuttle.
This management plan is expected to include such things as the overall
plan, processes, schedule, and roles and responsibilities related to
retiring the space shuttle. To inform this management plan, the program
expects sometime around mid-2005 to assess its hardware and facility
needs through retirement to determine whether to maintain, closeout, or
transition assets to other NASA programs--such as space exploration
activities.[Footnote 16] Once these hardware and facility assessments
have been completed, the program plans to conduct an assessment of its
workforce needs. Officials said that they must understand the program's
hardware and facility needs before they can conduct an assessment of
its workforce needs through retirement.
While Other Efforts Have Been Initiated or Are Planned, Limited Actions
Have Been Taken:
In addition to the Space Shuttle Program's preliminary work to prepare
for sustaining its workforce through retirement, the program has
contracted with the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to
assist it in planning for the space shuttle's retirement and
transitioning to future programs. Specifically, NAPA is to (1)
benchmark the best practices of public and private sector organizations
that have dealt with workforce issues resulting from the retirement,
transition, or elimination of programs comparable to the space shuttle,
such as in number of employees affected; (2) assess and review the
workforce aspects of the program's retirement strategy throughout the
course of its development to ensure that it is addressing the problem
adequately; and (3) to the extent possible, assist the program in
devising innovative strategies for mitigating the impact of the space
shuttle's retirement on the workforce. According to NAPA officials, it
has conducted preliminary benchmarking efforts and is awaiting further
direction from NASA for its next steps with regard to this task.
Although the additional tasks NAPA is to undertake have been
identified, it has yet to undertake efforts associated with these
tasks. Because NAPA will be reviewing NASA's management plan for
retiring the space shuttle as it is developed, the majority of its
efforts will not be undertaken until NASA begins to plan more earnestly
for sustaining its critically skilled workforce through the program's
retirement, which, according to NASA, will likely occur after the space
shuttle's return to flight.
In addition, because the Space Shuttle Program is heavily reliant on
its contractor workforce to support the space shuttle's operations,
NASA officials said that they could include provisions in future Space
Shuttle Program contracts that require contractors to take steps to
prepare for sustaining their workforces through the space shuttle's
retirement. However, the program has yet to do so. For example, in
September 2004 the Space Shuttle Program exercised the final 2-year
option of its Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC).[Footnote 17] At
this point, NASA did not require that United Space Alliance take any
steps to prepare for sustaining its workforce, such as by submitting a
critical skills retention plan. A senior NASA official recognized the
need for United Space Alliance to devise such a plan, and said that
this type of requirement would likely be included as part of the new
contract NASA intends to award to United Space Alliance in 2006, once
workforce requirements for the remainder of the program have been
determined.
Separate from the SFOC, the Space Shuttle Propulsion Office at MSFC has
begun devising an acquisition strategy for updating its propulsion
system prime contracts to take into account the Vision's goal of
retiring the space shuttle following completion of the ISS. Although at
the time of our review this acquisition strategy was not yet complete,
officials said that the updated contracts will likely include a
requirement for the contractor to submit a critical skills retention
plan. This plan would outline the strategies the contractor plans to
implement to sustain the critical skills necessary to support the
program through retirement. In addition, officials said that they could
take advantage of the award fee[Footnote 18] provisions available in
the space shuttle's propulsion prime contracts to incentivize
contractors to put in place strategies for sustaining a critically
skilled workforce through retirement and monitor their success in doing
so.
NASA's Prime Contractor for Space Shuttle Operations Has Taken
Preliminary Steps to Prepare for the Space Shuttle's Retirement:
United Space Alliance has taken preliminary steps to begin to prepare
for the space shuttle's retirement and its impact on the company's
workforce. For example, the company has begun to define its critical
skills needs to continue to support the Space Shuttle Program; has
devised a communication plan; contracted with a human capital
consulting firm to conduct a comprehensive study of its workforce; and
continues to monitor indicators of employee morale and workforce
stability. While these efforts are underway, contractor officials said
that further efforts to prepare for the space shuttle's retirement and
its impact on their workforce are on hold until NASA first makes
decisions that impact the space shuttle's remaining flight schedule and
thus the time frames for retiring the program and transitioning its
assets. Once these decisions have been made and United Space Alliance's
contract requirements have been defined, these officials said that they
would then be able to proceed with their workforce planning efforts for
the space shuttle's retirement, a process that will likely take 6
months to complete.
The Potential Impact of Workforce Problems and Other Challenges the
Space Shuttle Program Faces Highlight the Need for Workforce Planning:
Making progress toward developing a detailed strategy for sustaining a
critically skilled space shuttle workforce through the program's
retirement will be important given the potential impact that workforce
problems could have on NASA-wide goals. According to NASA officials, if
the Space Shuttle Program faces difficulties in sustaining the
necessary workforce, NASA-wide goals, such as implementing the Vision
and proceeding with space exploration activities, could be impacted.
For example, workforce problems could lead to a delay in flight
certification for the space shuttle, which could potentially result in
a delay to the program's overall flight schedule, thus compromising the
goal of completing assembly of the ISS by 2010. In addition, officials
said that space exploration activities could slip as much as 1 year for
each year that the space shuttle's operations are extended because
NASA's ability to progress with these activities is reliant on funding
and assets that are expected to be transferred from the Space Shuttle
Program to other NASA programs.
One workforce issue that has already been identified that could impact
the program's ability to support space shuttle operations through
retirement is an inadequate safety workforce. For example, Safety and
Mission Assurance Directorate officials at KSC indicated that they
already face difficulties in maintaining a sufficient number of safety
personnel to support the Space Shuttle Program. An analysis done by the
Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at KSC shows that it lacks an
adequate number of employees to fully perform all of its required
functions for the Space Shuttle Program, which increased due to
additional safety requirements put in place following the Space Shuttle
Columbia accident. Due to this analysis, some additional workforce was
added to provide support in this area. Although the Safety and Mission
Assurance Directorate now believes that it can meet its inspection
schedule, officials said that should the Directorate be unable to
complete all of its required inspections, they would deny the space
shuttle's certification for flight readiness. This would delay the
program's flight schedule.
NASA officials told us they expect to face various challenges in
sustaining the critically skilled workforce necessary to support the
space shuttle's operations through its retirement, including retaining
the current workforce, many of whom may want to participate in or will
be needed to support future phases of implementing the Vision, and
providing a transition path to other programs for the workforce that is
needed to support the Space Shuttle Program through retirement.
Additional challenges that could affect the program's ability to
support space shuttle operations include:
* Impact on the prime contractor for space shuttle operations. United
Space Alliance may not be able to offer a long-term career path to its
employees beyond the space shuttle's final flight. This problem results
from the company having been established specifically to perform ground
and flight operations for the Space Shuttle Program. As such, its
future following the space shuttle's retirement remains uncertain.
Given this uncertainty, contractor officials stated that they will
likely face difficulty recruiting and retaining employees to continue
supporting the space shuttle as it nears retirement because of the
perceived lack of long-term job security. In addition, they said that
the lack of job security may be reflected in poor morale, inattention
to details, errors, accidents, absences, and attrition. In addressing
problems that may result from this challenge, United Space Alliance has
the ability to outplace some employees who work with the Space Shuttle
Program to its parent companies. However, contractor officials said
that other steps it may have to take to address workforce issues, such
as paying retention bonuses, are likely to require funding above normal
levels.
* Governmentwide budgetary constraints. Throughout the process of
retiring the space shuttle, NASA, like other federal agencies, will
have to contend with urgent challenges facing the federal budget that
will put pressure on discretionary spending--such as investments in
space programs--and require it to do more with fewer resources. As a
result, the Space Shuttle Program's ability to make use of tools that
require additional funding--such as certain aspects of NASA's new
workforce flexibilities like recruitment or retention bonuses--may be
limited. Further, GAO has reported that NASA has had difficulties in
accurately estimating the costs of its programs.[Footnote 19] Given
this, the agency may not be able to provide a sound and accurate
business case to support the use of such tools. Workforce planning
efforts that identify gaps in critical skills based upon expected
future needs and support the use of strategies to address these gaps
could provide the information needed to support a sound business case.
Several Factors Have Impeded Efforts to Develop a Long-Term Strategy to
Sustain a Critically Skilled Space Shuttle Workforce:
While the Space Shuttle Program is still in the early stages of
planning for the program's retirement, its development of a detailed
long-term strategy to sustain its future workforce is being hampered by
several factors. These include (1) the program's primary near-term
focus on returning the space shuttle to flight and (2) uncertainties
with respect to implementing the Vision. Space Shuttle Program
officials assert that these factors limit the steps they are able to
take at this time to plan for the program's future workforce needs.
However, our prior work on strategic workforce planning has shown that
there are steps that successful organizations take to better position
themselves to address future workforce needs, even when faced with
uncertainties.
Near-Term Focus on Returning the Space Shuttle to Flight Has Left
Future Workforce Needs Unaddressed:
Since the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the program has focused on
its near-term goal of returning the space shuttle to flight. While this
focus is understandable given the importance of the space shuttle's
role in completing assembly of the ISS, it has led to the program
delaying efforts to determine future workforce needs. For example, in
developing the management plan for retiring the space shuttle, program
officials said that the majority of the assessments the program is to
complete to support decisions regarding whether to maintain, closeout,
or transition the program's assets will not be undertaken until after
the space shuttle has returned to flight. According to these officials,
one reason for this delay is that personnel needed to conduct the
assessments are currently focused on supporting return to flight
activities. Because the workforce assessment will not be conducted
until after the program determines its hardware and facility
requirements, its future workforce needs will likely remain
unidentified until well after the space shuttle has returned to flight.
Uncertainties with Respect to Implementing the Vision Limit the Space
Shuttle Program's Ability to Identify Future Workforce Needs:
While the Vision has provided the Space Shuttle Program with the goal
of retiring the space shuttle by 2010 upon completion of the ISS, the
program lacks well-defined objectives or goals on which to base its
workforce planning efforts. For example, NASA has not yet determined
the final configuration of the ISS or the type of vehicle that will
replace the space shuttle and be used for space exploration. These
decisions are important because they affect the time frames for
retiring the space shuttle. Once made, these decisions will also
provide important information that officials have said will be used to
guide Space Shuttle Program retirement planning efforts, including
efforts to determine whether to maintain, closeout, or transition the
program's facilities, hardware, and workforce as they are no longer
needed to support the program. Lacking this information, officials have
said that their ability to progress with detailed long-term workforce
planning is limited.
Despite Uncertainties, the Space Shuttle Program Could Follow a
Strategic Human Capital Management Approach to Plan for Sustaining Its
Critically Skilled Workforce:
Studies by several organizations, including GAO, have shown that
successful organizations in both the public and private sectors follow
a strategic human capital management approach, even when faced with an
uncertain future environment. For example, following a strategic human
capital management approach can help an organization to (1) prepare its
workforce to meet present and future mission requirements, (2) plan for
future human capital needs in an uncertain environment, and (3) address
future human capital issues that could jeopardize the accomplishment of
goals.[Footnote 20] As part of this approach, strategic workforce
planning begins with establishing a strategic direction and setting
goals to guide planning efforts for the organization early on in the
planning process.[Footnote 21] When this is not possible due to an
uncertain future environment, scenario planning is one approach that
can be used as part of a strategic workforce planning process.
Scenario planning is used to describe different future environments
that an organization may face and can provide a basis for developing
and planning strategies to meet the challenges posed by those scenarios
rather than planning to meet the needs of a single view of the future.
For example, following the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001,
and during the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the
U.S. Coast Guard undertook scenario planning to guide its short-term
operational and human capital planning efforts due to uncertainties.
For the Space Shuttle Program, scenario planning could guide workforce
planning efforts because it can be undertaken despite uncertainties the
program faces and without having definitive requirements for program
hardware and facility needs through retirement. Scenario planning could
also provide the space shuttle program with flexibility in its
workforce planning efforts because it does not rely on information
provided by hardware and facility assessments and could be undertaken
by NASA personnel not currently focused on returning the space shuttle
to flight. The information provided by scenario planning could then be
used by program officials to support workforce assessments once
decisions about the programs hardware and facility needs have been
made.
Conclusions:
This is one of the most challenging periods in the history of the Space
Shuttle Program. Not only must NASA demonstrate that the space shuttle
can safely fly again, it must begin the process of retiring its largest
program while preparing for the uncertain future of space exploration.
The necessity to plan for sustaining a critically skilled space shuttle
workforce at this time is critical given the impact that expected
workforce problems would have on the program and other larger NASA
goals. While the Space Shuttle Program acknowledges that sustaining its
critically skilled workforce through the program's retirement is
important, the absence of a detailed long-term strategy for doing so
makes it unclear how the program will actually accomplish this. By
delaying steps to address future workforce needs until other decisions
have been made, the program is not taking advantage of valuable time
that it could use to better position itself to implement workforce
strategies to address expected future challenges and sustain a
critically skilled workforce through retirement. Approaches to
workforce planning that take in to account uncertainties and provide
the program with flexibility in determining future workforce
requirements would be particularly relevant to the Space Shuttle
Program given the issues that must be resolved before the program can
proceed with more detailed workforce planning efforts.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To better position the agency to sustain a critically skilled space
shuttle workforce through retirement, we recommend that the Acting
Administrator direct the Associate Administrator for the Office of
Space Operations to implement an approach, as part of its preliminary
planning efforts, for identifying the program's future workforce needs
that takes into account various future scenarios the program could
face. The program should then use this information to develop
strategies for meeting the needs of its potential future scenarios. The
information collected and strategies devised during scenario planning
will then be readily available to be incorporated into the program's
detailed workforce planning efforts once any uncertainties have been
resolved.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written and oral comments on a draft of this report, NASA indicated
that it concurred with our findings, conclusions, and recommendation.
NASA reiterated that its primary near-term focus is on safely returning
the space shuttle to flight, but stated that the agency is laying the
foundation needed to move forward with a comprehensive approach for
transitioning the Space Shuttle Program through its Integrated Space
Operations Summit process. NASA plans to use this process to provide
the agency with an independent view of the respective issues
surrounding the mission execution and transition of the Space Shuttle
Program and its assets. According to NASA, the information provided by
this process will allow the agency to review the risks and
opportunities related to a number of alternate scenarios that the Space
Shuttle Program might support within the Vision.
We are encouraged that NASA is laying the foundation needed for
transitioning the Space Shuttle Program. NASA has the opportunity to
use the Integrated Space Operations Summit process, specifically the
alternate future scenarios for the Space Shuttle Program that it will
provide, to proceed with identifying the program's future workforce
needs based upon such scenarios. As our recommendation stated, this
information could then be readily available to support the program's
detailed workforce planning efforts once any uncertainties have been
resolved. NASA's comments are reprinted in appendix III.
NASA also provided technical comments, which we addressed throughout
the report as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you announce its contents earlier,
we will not distribute this report further until 30 days from its date.
At that time, we will send copies to NASA's Acting Administrator and
interested congressional committees. We will make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. Key contributors to this
report are acknowledged in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Allen Li, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To identify the progress that the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and United Space Alliance have made toward
developing a strategy for sustaining their critically skilled
workforces through the space shuttle's retirement, we:
* Obtained and analyzed NASA documents and briefing slides related to
human capital management, including NASA's Strategic Human Capital Plan
and Implementation Plan, NASA center Strategic Human Capital
Implementation Plans, NASA's Workforce Plan for Use of the NASA
Flexibility Act of 2004 Authorities, policies and procedures for
workforce planning, and information on NASA's integrated human capital
management tools--such as its Competency Management System, Workforce
Integrated Management System, and workforce analysis tools.
* Obtained and reviewed NASA documents and briefing slides related to
the space shuttle's operations and retirement, including reports
identifying the "lessons learned" from the Air Force Titan IV Rocket
Program, Navy Base Realignment and Closure activity, NASA Industrial
Facility closure, and the Boeing A/V-8B and F/A-18 production line
transition, and plans and projected schedules for future space shuttle
flights and manifests.
* Interviewed United Space Alliance officials regarding their support
of space shuttle operations and involvement with space shuttle
retirement planning efforts. We also obtained and analyzed documents
related to United Space Alliance's workforce, including demographic
data, workforce strategies, and critical skills identification.
* Reviewed previous GAO reports on NASA, the Space Shuttle Program, and
on human capital and workforce planning best practices. We also
reviewed human capital reports and guidance from the Office of
Personnel Management and the Office of Management and Budget, and
interviewed officials from the National Academy of Public
Administration regarding human capital management. In addition, we
reviewed a report issued by the National Science Board on issues facing
the U.S. science and engineering workforce.
* Interviewed NASA and United Space Alliance officials and received
written and oral responses to questions regarding the space shuttle
workforce, its demographics, space shuttle operations, and space
shuttle retirement planning efforts; NASA operations and management;
NASA and United Space Alliance human capital and workforce planning
practices; the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004; NASA Safety and Mission
Assurance activities; and space shuttle contracts, including the Space
Flight Operations Contract.
To identify any factors that may have impeded efforts to develop a
strategy for sustaining a critically skilled workforce through
retirement, we:
* Interviewed NASA and United Space Alliance officials to obtain an
understanding of the challenges they face in planning for the space
shuttle's retirement and in addressing workforce issues that may arise
as a result of the decision to retire the space shuttle.
* Obtained and analyzed NASA and United Space Alliance responses to
questions that asked for information regarding their goals and
strategies for retiring the space shuttle, the processes they expect to
follow to achieve these goals, and the tools and strategies they might
use to address workforce issues through the space shuttle's retirement.
To accomplish our work, we visited and interviewed officials
responsible for space shuttle operations at NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C; and at three NASA centers designated as Space
Operations Centers, including Johnson Space Center (JSC), Texas;
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida; and Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC), Alabama. These centers were chosen because they maintain
primary responsibility for conducting space shuttle operations and are
the centers at which the vast majority of the space shuttle workforce
is located. The offices we met with at each of these centers included
Safety and Mission Assurance and Human Resources. Additional
information was attained from the Space Shuttle Program Office at JSC;
the Space Shuttle Processing Directorate and Space Shuttle Strategic
Planning Office at KSC; the Space Shuttle Propulsion Office, Customer
and Employees Relations Directorate, and Space Transportation
Directorate at MSFC; and the Offices of Space Operations, Exploration
Systems, and Procurement at NASA Headquarters.
We conducted our review from April 2004 to March 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Summary of NASA Reports on Lessons Learned Applicable to
the Space Shuttle Program:
To prepare for the space shuttle's retirement, NASA identified the
lessons learned from the closeout or retirement of programs comparable
to the space shuttle, including the Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program,
the Navy Base Realignment and Closure activity, and the NASA Industrial
Facility closure.[Footnote 22] NASA's reports capture lessons learned
that might be applicable to the Space Shuttle Program's retirement
planning. NASA's highlights from these studies are shown in table 1.
Table 1: Summary of NASA Reports on Lessons Learned Applicable to the
Space Shuttle Program:
Report: Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program Closeout;
NASA's highlights:
* Successful program mission execution is the goal. This is a large
consideration, as mission success is the top priority, focusing on
safety and quality. Implicit in this is the successful retention of
personnel, as well as retention through closeout to follow-on programs;
* A fundamental change in mindset must occur to ensure successful
mission execution. Because the supply line of spares will terminate,
the Space Shuttle Program must establish the mindset that identifies
and preserves all materials necessary for mission execution;
* Management information should not be based on rumors. The ground
rules for the retirement effort should be established early with buy-in
from the stakeholders and be carried through the entire program. These
rules can change over the program, but should only be from official
direction, such as from congressional directive;
* Environmental assessment and remediation will be a large
consideration for resources. Informed and active planning will require
knowledge and ongoing effort with regulations, local laws, and Federal
Acquisition Regulations;
* Communication with stakeholders, Space Shuttle Program managers, and
particularly all Space Shuttle Program personnel must be consistent and
clear from the start of planning through program retirement;
* Most importantly, begin the planning process early.
Report: Navy Base Realignment and Closure Activity: Closure of Naval
Station Roosevelt Roads;
NASA's highlights:
* Develop an overarching, long-term strategic plan involving
integration of the Space Shuttle Program retirement and follow-on
programs to optimize NASA resources by minimizing costs and ensuring
that planned milestones do not slip;
* Consider special legislation to earmark funds from property sales to
return to NASA;
* Know the environmental conditions and liabilities of all closeout
sites. Perform environmental baseline surveys early so that the results
can be used in strategic planning;
* Environmental assessment and remediation require time and will be a
considerable portion of the closeout budget;
* Develop and implement a strong communication plan that is proactive
and open with all audiences-- internal, congressional, and external.
Report: NASA Industrial Facility Closure in Downey, California;
NASA's highlights:
* Major decision drivers will be the congressional direction for
closing and transitioning the Space Shuttle Program, the disposition of
tooling, transitioning or retaining critical capabilities, and possibly
personnel issues;
* The Space Shuttle Program needs to perform a strategic assessment of
the total program's assets, skills, and capabilities. Identify phase-
out candidates and streamline operations to gain efficiencies;
* The challenges in the closeout effort include environmental
remediation, historical preservation, personnel retention, and property
disposition;
* Significant costs were for personnel relocation, moving equipment,
and environmental remediation;
* A significant challenge will be to determine the extent to which
NASA's activities contributed to the current environmental condition of
each site and the extent to which NASA is responsible for remediation
of the site;
* The closeout team should include representatives of external
organizations such as historical, environmental, and political (local,
state, and federal) organizations, the General Services Administration,
the Defense Contract Audit Agency, etc., and internal contractors;
* Communicate internally and externally with honesty and clarity.
Prevent rumors with an effective communication process. A public
relations firm may provide expertise in strategic communication to
garner goodwill with the surrounding community.
Source: NASA.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Office of the Administrator:
Washington, DC 20546-0001:
February 25, 2005:
Mr. Allen Li:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Li:
NASA acknowledges the hard work and professionalism that the GAO has
rut forth in their audit of the workforce issues surrounding the
transition of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) in support of the Vision
for Space Exploration. We are in accord with your findings and
conclusions. Our primary near-term focus is safely returning the Space
Shuttle to flight to complete the assembly of the International Space
Station (ISS). However, we are also carefully and methodically laying
the foundation that will be needed to address a comprehensive
transition approach. This effort will accelerate as near-term Vision
objectives are achieved and decisions made as to whether Space Shuttle
assets will be used to provide lift capability in support of Vision
objectives following completion of ISS assembly,
To transition a program of the size and complexity of the SSP will not
be easy As was stated in the report, we are studying the lessons of
those who have preceded us. In addition to the transition-focused
activities within the SSP, we are gathering information from our well-
established Integrated Space Operations Summit (ISOS) process. This
year's ISOS has been modified and enhanced to include an SSP Mission
Execution panel and an SSP Transition panel. Each panel is chartered to
provide an independent strategic view of the respective issues
surrounding the SSP. This effort includes review of the risks and
opportunities related to a number of alternate scenarios that the SSP
might support within the Vision for Space Exploration.
We look forward to our continued work with the GAO as we proceed with
implementing the Vision for Space Exploration.
Cordially,
Signed by:
Fredrick D. Gregory:
Acting Administrator:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Allen Li (202) 512-4841:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Wesley A. Johnson, Robert
Lilly, James Morrison, Shelby S. Oakley, and T.J. Thomson made key
contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Vision includes a return to the moon that is intended to
ultimately enable future exploration of Mars and other destinations. To
accomplish this, NASA plans to (1) complete its work on the ISS by
2010, fulfilling its commitment to 15 international partner countries;
(2) begin developing a new manned exploration vehicle to replace the
space shuttle; and (3) return to the moon as early as 2015 and no later
than 2020 in preparation for future, more ambitious missions.
[2] The Space Shuttle Program accounted for 27 percent of NASA's fiscal
year 2005 budget request.
[3] Following the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board made recommendations to NASA aimed at
significantly reducing the chances of further accidents in the space
shuttle's remaining flights. Since that time, the Space Shuttle Program
has worked to implement these recommendations and has made other
efforts aimed at improving the space shuttle's safety. Columbia
Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume I (Washington, D.C.: August
2003).
[4] GAO, Space Shuttle: Human Capital Challenges Require Management
Attention, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-133 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2000) and
GAO, Space Shuttle: Human Capital and Safety Upgrade Challenges Require
Continued Attention, GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186 (Washington, D.C.: Aug 15,
2000); Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume I
(Washington, D.C.: August 2003); Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel,
Annual Report for 2001 (Washington, D.C.: March 2002); and Behavioral
Sciences Technology, Inc., Assessment and Plan for Organizational
Culture Change at NASA (Ojai, Calif.: March 15, 2004).
[5] To return the space shuttle to flight, NASA will conduct two
flights. The planning window for the first flight is May 12 through
June 3, 2005, and the planning window for the second flight is July 10
through August 2, 2005. The purpose of these flights is to test and
evaluate new procedures for flight safety implemented as a result of
the Space Shuttle Columbia accident.
[6] Number is based on a full-time equivalent calculation. Full-time
equivalent is a measure of staff hours equal to those of an employee
who works 40 hours per week in 1 year; therefore, the actual number of
employees who work part-time or full-time on the Space Shuttle Program
is greater than 2,000. The number was calculated by averaging the
number of civil service employees over fiscal year 2004.
[7] The number was calculated by averaging the number of contractor
employees over fiscal year 2004. This number includes data from NASA's
prime contractor for space shuttle operations, United Space Alliance,
and other NASA contractors. United Space Alliance, established in 1996
as a joint venture between Lockheed Martin and Boeing to consolidate
NASA's various Space Shuttle Program contracts under a single entity,
and its approximately 10,400 employees are responsible for conducting
the space shuttle's ground and flight operations under the Space Flight
Operations Contract. The remaining contractor personnel are associated
with other space shuttle components, such as its propulsion systems.
[8] GAO/T-NSIAD-00-133 and GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186.
[9] Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume I (Washington,
D.C.: August 2003); Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report for
2001 (Washington, D.C.: March 2002); and Behavioral Sciences
Technology, Inc., Assessment and Plan for Organizational Culture Change
at NASA (Ojai, Calif.: March 15, 2004).
[10] National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2004.
Volume 1, NSB 04-1 (Arlington, Va.: National Science Foundation, 2004).
[11] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2001); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119
(Washington, D.C.: January 2003); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-
05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005); GAO, Performance
Accountability Series--Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A
Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-01-241 (Washington, D.C.: January
2001); GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A
Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-03-95 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003);
GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, GAO-01-258 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2001); and GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, GAO-03-114 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2003). See also www.gao.gov/pas/2005.
[12] The President's Management Agenda was launched in fiscal year 2002
as a strategy for improving the management and performance of the
federal government. It focuses on five governmentwide initiatives,
including strategic human capital management, where deficiencies were
most apparent and where the government could begin to deliver concrete,
measurable results. Executive branch agencies continue to be evaluated
quarterly based upon their progress in implementing actions to address
the five initiatives.
[13] Based on an Office of Management and Budget standard of strategic
management of human capital and developed in conjunction with GAO, the
Office of Personnel Management issued its Human Capital Assessment and
Accountability Framework in October 2002, which lists six "Human
Capital Standards for Success," including one on workforce planning.
[14] GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002) and GAO, Human Capital: A Self-
Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders, GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 1, 2000).
[15] Enacted in February 2004, the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 (P.L.
108-201) amends title 5, United States Code, by inserting a new chapter
98 in that title, which provides new authorities to NASA. On March 26,
2004, NASA submitted a written workforce plan for using its new
authorities to Congress.
[16] Prior to conducting these assessments, NASA will hold an
Integrated Space Operations Summit to evaluate space shuttle and ISS
assets and devise a set of strategic implementation plans to meet the
agency's future needs.
[17] NASA has extended the SFOC through September 2006 and has begun
proceedings with United Space Alliance to award the follow-on contract
to be effective on October 1, 2006, through the end of the program.
NASA chose to exercise the 2-year extension under the current SFOC to
allow the Space Shuttle Program to remain focused on returning the
space shuttle to flight. Further, this option was exercised to provide
better clarity into the content for the follow-on contract necessary to
safely complete ISS assembly and support and retire the space shuttle.
[18] Award-fee provisions may be used in fixed-price contracts when the
government wishes to motivate a contractor and other incentives cannot
be used because contractor performance cannot be measured objectively.
Federal Acquisition Regulation ¶16.404 (a).
[19] See GAO, NASA: Lack of Disciplined Cost-Estimating Processes
Hinders Effective Program Management, GAO-04-642 (Washington, D.C.: May
28, 2004).
[20] GAO-02-373SP and GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective
Strategic Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11,
2003).
[21] A strategic direction is a clear set of organizational intents--
including a clearly defined mission, set of core values, goals and
objectives, and strategies to achieve these. Setting a strategic
direction and program goals is part of the general performance
management principles that Congress expects federal agencies to follow
under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), Pub.
L. No. 103-62. GPRA calls for agencies to address human capital in the
context of performance management and requires annual performance plans
for each program activity in the agency's budget, which describes how
agencies will use resources to accomplish their strategic direction and
program goals.
[22] NASA also identified the lessons learned from the closeout of the
Boeing A/V-8B and F/A-18 production line transition. This report,
however, was not completed in time for our reporting purposes.
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