NASA
More Knowledge Needed to Determine Best Alternatives to Provide Space Station Logistics Support Gao ID: GAO-05-488 May 18, 2005The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space shuttle fleet has been key to International Space Station operations. Since the grounding of the fleet in February 2003, Russia has provided logistics support. However, due to the limited payload capacity of the Russian space vehicles, on-orbit assembly of the space station stopped. In May 2004 and in February 2005, NASA testified before the Congress that it had assessed using alternative launch vehicles to the space shuttle for space station operations. NASA concluded that using alternatives would be challenging and result in long program delays and would ultimately cost more than returning the space shuttle safely to flight. Yet uncertainties remain about when the space shuttle will return to flight, and questions have been raised about NASA's assessment of alternatives. GAO was asked to determine whether NASA's assessment was sufficient to conclude that the space shuttle is the best option for assembling and providing logistics support to the space station.
NASA's 2004 assessment identified significant challenges associated with using alternative launch vehicles for space station assembly and operation. According to previous studies and our discussions with industry representatives, these challenges would likely preclude using alternative vehicles for assembly missions. However, NASA's assessment was insufficient to conclude that the shuttle was the best option for logistics support missions prior to the proposed retirement of the space shuttle in 2010. NASA relied primarily on headquarters expertise to conduct the informal assessment, and while we recognize that the extensive experience of its senior managers is an important element in evaluating alternatives, NASA officials did not document the proceedings and decisions reached in its assessment. As a result, the existence of this assessment of alternatives cannot be verified, nor can the conclusions be validated. NASA is currently evaluating responses from a September 2004 request for information from various commercial space transportation industries that could provide launch services to support space station operations, following retirement of the shuttle in 2010, until the station's planned retirement in 2016. NASA officials indicated that a commercial launch capability to support space station operations is possible prior to the proposed shuttle retirement in 2010, but stated that this capability would not eliminate any of the scheduled space shuttle flights. NASA is also re-examining its requirements for the type of scientific research to be conducted on the space station as well as the manifest requirements of the space shuttle. Combining the information gathered from commercial industry and a better definition of space station and shuttle requirements, NASA officials agree there is an opportunity to perform a more comprehensive assessment of alternatives, especially for logistics missions late this decade.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-488, NASA: More Knowledge Needed to Determine Best Alternatives to Provide Space Station Logistics Support
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2005.
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2005:
NASA:
More Knowledge Needed to Determine Best Alternatives to Provide Space
Station Logistics Support:
GAO-05-488:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-488, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space
shuttle fleet has been key to International Space Station operations.
Since the grounding of the fleet in February 2003, Russia has provided
logistics support. However, due to the limited payload capacity of the
Russian space vehicles, on-orbit assembly of the space station stopped.
In May 2004 and in February 2005, NASA testified before the Congress
that it had assessed using alternative launch vehicles to the space
shuttle for space station operations. NASA concluded that using
alternatives would be challenging and result in long program delays and
would ultimately cost more than returning the space shuttle safely to
flight.
Yet uncertainties remain about when the space shuttle will return to
flight, and questions have been raised about NASA's assessment of
alternatives. GAO was asked to determine whether NASA's assessment was
sufficient to conclude that the space shuttle is the best option for
assembling and providing logistics support to the space station.
What GAO Found:
NASA's 2004 assessment identified significant challenges associated
with using alternative launch vehicles for space station assembly and
operation. According to previous studies and our discussions with
industry representatives, these challenges would likely preclude using
alternative vehicles for assembly missions. However, NASA's assessment
was insufficient to conclude that the shuttle was the best option for
logistics support missions prior to the proposed retirement of the
space shuttle in 2010. NASA relied primarily on headquarters expertise
to conduct the informal assessment, and while we recognize that the
extensive experience of its senior managers is an important element in
evaluating alternatives, NASA officials did not document the
proceedings and decisions reached in its assessment. As a result, the
existence of this assessment of alternatives cannot be verified, nor
can the conclusions be validated.
NASA is currently evaluating responses from a September 2004 request
for information from various commercial space transportation industries
that could provide launch services to support space station operations,
following retirement of the shuttle in 2010, until the station's
planned retirement in 2016. NASA officials indicated that a commercial
launch capability to support space station operations is possible prior
to the proposed shuttle retirement in 2010, but stated that this
capability would not eliminate any of the scheduled space shuttle
flights. NASA is also re-examining its requirements for the type of
scientific research to be conducted on the space station as well as the
manifest requirements of the space shuttle. Combining the information
gathered from commercial industry and a better definition of space
station and shuttle requirements, NASA officials agree there is an
opportunity to perform a more comprehensive assessment of alternatives,
especially for logistics missions late this decade.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that NASA take action to ensure that its current
assessments of alternatives for providing logistics support are
comprehensive and fully documented and that the assessments are
completed before investments are made in commercial space
transportation.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-488.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 512-
4841 or lia@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
NASA's 2004 Assessment Was Based on Insufficient Knowledge for
Concluding Space Shuttle Was Best Launch Option, but Opportunities Now
Exist for More Detailed Study:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Appendix III: Challenges of Using Alternative Vehicles:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Space Shuttle Endeavour Docked to the International Space
Station:
Figure 2: International Space Station Operations Support until 2016:
Abbreviations:
AAS: Alternate Access to Station:
ATV: Automated Transfer Vehicle:
HTV: H-II Transfer Vehicle:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 18, 2005:
The Honorable Ken Calvert:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science: House of
Representatives:
The Honorable Sam Brownback:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher:
House of Representatives:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space
shuttle has been the primary vehicle for delivering components for
assembly and providing logistics support to the International Space
Station. NASA grounded the space shuttle fleet following the Space
Shuttle Columbia accident in February 2003, leaving the space station
dependent on Russia to provide crew rotation, crew rescue, and
logistics support. However, due to the limited payload capacity of
Russian space vehicles, on-orbit assembly of the space station has
halted. NASA plans to return the space shuttle to flight by mid 2005
and resume space station assembly and logistics missions.
In May 2004 and again in February 2005, NASA testified before the
Congress that it had assessed using alternative launch vehicles for
completing space station assembly and providing logistics support.
According to NASA officials, their assessment showed that using
alternative launch vehicles would introduce unacceptable operational
risks, technical challenges, long program delays, and would ultimately
cost more than returning the space shuttle to flight. Therefore, NASA
concluded that the space shuttle's unique capabilities provided the
best available option for these missions. Despite these testimonies,
concerns have been raised about NASA's conclusions, both within
Congress and the industry. Due to the uncertainty regarding when the
space shuttle would return to safe flight and concerns that additional
flights would be needed to support assembly and logistics operations,
you asked us to determine whether NASA's assessment of alternatives was
sufficient to conclude that the space shuttle is the best option for
completing assembly and providing logistics support to the space
station.
To conduct our work, we obtained and analyzed agency documentation and
interviewed NASA officials responsible for managing the launch
services, space shuttle, and space station programs within NASA
headquarters as well as program managers at NASA centers involved in
space shuttle and space station operations. We also interviewed
commercial space transportation contractors and reviewed pertinent
documentation related to expendable launch vehicles. In addition, we
reviewed NASA's request for information for commercial space
transportation services, which it issued in September 2004, and its
plans for assessing the responses to this request and follow-on
activities. We conducted our work from August 2004 through April 2005
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
For a complete description of our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
Results in Brief:
In early 2004, NASA performed an informal assessment of alternative
launch vehicles that was incomplete and did not provide a clearly
documented rationale to conclude that the space shuttle was the best
option to support space station operations. NASA identified significant
challenges associated with using an alternative to the space shuttle
for space station assembly, which could preclude these missions from
consideration. However, the assessment conducted by NASA did not
include an analysis of the schedule impacts or costs associated with
using alternative launch vehicles for logistics missions later this
decade. While we recognize that the extensive experience of its senior
managers is an important element in evaluating alternatives, NASA
relied primarily on headquarters expertise to conduct the informal
assessment. NASA officials did not document the proceedings and
decisions reached in its assessment. As a result, the existence of this
assessment of alternatives cannot be verified, nor can the conclusions
be validated.
NASA is currently evaluating responses from commercial industry on
capabilities of alternate launch services for providing cargo launch
services to and the ability to return items from the space station.
Additionally, NASA is re-examining its requirements for the space
station and space shuttle. With this information from commercial
industry and more definitive space station requirements, NASA officials
agreed that there is an opportunity to perform a detailed analysis of
alternatives to determine if any planned space shuttle missions to
perform logistics, prior to the shuttle's retirement, could instead
make use of commercial launch services.
This report makes recommendations aimed at better positioning the
agency to determine the best available options for providing logistics
support to the space station and ensuring that NASA's current analyses
of alternative launch vehicles are comprehensive and fully documented.
In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our
recommendations.
Background:
NASA and its international partners--Canada, Europe, Japan, and Russia-
-are building the space station to serve as an orbiting research
facility. The space shuttle is the primary vehicle supporting the
assembly and resupply of the station. Figure 1 shows the Space Shuttle
Endeavour docked to the International Space Station. Following the
Columbia accident in February 2003, the NASA Administrator grounded the
space shuttle fleet pending an investigation into the cause of the
accident. The administrator appointed the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board to determine the cause of the accident and to make
recommendations for improving the safety of the space shuttle before it
could return to flight. The board issued its report in August 2003 with
29 recommendations for improvement--15 of which must be implemented
before the space shuttle can return to flight. NASA plans to return the
shuttle to flight in July 2005.
Figure 1: Space Shuttle Endeavour Docked to the International Space
Station:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
While the shuttle has been grounded, space station crew transfers and
logistics resupply have depended on Russian Soyuz and Progress
vehicles.[Footnote 1] Europe and Japan are also developing logistics
cargo vehicles to support space station operations later this decade.
These Russian, European, and Japanese vehicles are launched on
expendable rockets. The European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV),
scheduled to be available for missions to the space station in 2006, is
being designed to rendezvous and dock with the space station's Russian
Service Module. The Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV) is scheduled
to be available in 2008 and will fly within the proximity of the space
station to be caught by the station's robotic arm before being berthed
to the space station. The ATV and HTV also carry less cargo than the
shuttle.
Because the Russian Soyuz and Progress are the only vehicles currently
available and carry significantly less payload than the space shuttle,
operations are generally limited to transporting crew, food, potable
water, as well as propellant resupply for reboosting the space station
to higher orbits. Launches of space station assembly elements and large
orbital replacement items for maintenance have effectively ceased.
From 2000 to early 2004, NASA performed two studies that focused on the
potential use of commercial launch vehicles to provide logistics
services to the space station. In a 90-day study conducted in 2000,
NASA determined that no commercial logistics service for the space
station was possible at that time, as no launch vehicles possessed the
critical capabilities necessary to provide logistics services,
including automated rendezvous capabilities. As a result of this study,
NASA decided to solicit and fund a more detailed review of concepts
designed to provide logistics services to the space station. The
Alternate Access to Station (AAS) study contracts were awarded in July
2002, with 1-year contracts given to four contractors. In summer 2003,
these contractors presented architectures that relied on existing
domestic or international expendable launch vehicles. In the fall of
2003, the contracts were extended, and the contractors were asked to
address larger cargo delivery capabilities and "downmass" (e.g.
returning research materials to earth) requirements were added for the
return of cargo. This study ended in January 2004 with the contractors
briefing on their study results, at which time NASA concluded that
developing a domestic capability to meet most of the space station
cargo service needs was possible within 3 to 5 years.
In January 2004, the President announced a new Vision for Exploration
that called for retiring the shuttle in 2010, requiring NASA to find an
alternative to support space station operations through 2016 by the end
of the decade. The President called for a shift in NASA's long-term
focus, envisioning that NASA will retire the space shuttle after nearly
30 years of service as soon as assembly of the International Space
Station is completed, planned for the end of the decade, and will
develop a new crew exploration vehicle as well as launch human missions
to the moon between 2015 and 2020. In essence, NASA's implementation
plan holds aeronautics, science, and other activities at near constant
levels and transitions funding currently dedicated to the space station
and space shuttle programs to the new exploration strategy as the space
station and space shuttle programs phase out. The vision also changed
the space station's on-board research focus. Originally, the space
station was to be used for conducting experiments in near-zero gravity
to include life sciences research on how humans adapt to long durations
in space, biomedical research, and materials-processing research. Under
the new vision, the research will be focused on determining the effects
of long duration space travel on humans and developing countermeasures
for those effects, with the goal that the space station research
necessary to support human explorers on other worlds would be complete
by 2016. Figure 2 shows NASA's proposed plan for operational support of
the space station until 2016.
Figure 2: International Space Station Operations Support until 2016:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
NASA's 2004 Assessment Was Based on Insufficient Knowledge for
Concluding Space Shuttle Was Best Launch Option, but Opportunities Now
Exist for More Detailed Study:
According to program officials, NASA's 2004 informal assessment
concluded that alternative launch vehicles would present operational
risks, technical challenges, and long program delays and would cost
more than returning the space shuttle to flight, making the space
shuttle the best option for both assembly and logistics missions
through the end of the decade. According to previous studies and our
discussions with commercial industry representatives, the time involved
for developing an alternate capability would probably preclude assembly
missions from consideration. However, NASA did not have sufficient
knowledge to support its conclusion regarding logistic support
missions. Specifically, NASA did not perform a comparative cost
analysis that considered the schedule impacts or associated costs of
planned space shuttle operations. Furthermore, NASA officials did not
document these informal proceedings and decisions reached; therefore,
the thoroughness of any assessment of alternatives cannot be verified,
nor can their conclusions be validated.
NASA is currently evaluating responses from commercial industry on
different ways to provide logistics services to and from the space
station. NASA's re-examination of its requirements for the space
station and space shuttle, coupled with the cost information of
alternatives obtained from commercial industry responses, provide NASA
with a basis for performing a detailed analysis of alternatives to
determine if any planned space shuttle logistics missions could be
performed by or complemented with commercial launch vehicles later this
decade.
Technical Challenges Difficult to Overcome for Assembly Missions, but
Cost Comparison of Later Logistics Missions Insufficient:
As a result of the informal assessment, NASA outlined a number of
technical challenges to using an alternate vehicle for space station
support, especially for assembly missions where the space shuttle's
crew and remote manipulator arm perform key functions. Appendix III
provides a discussion of these challenges. NASA officials stated they
used the AAS study, which concentrated solely on logistics support
missions, as the foundation for its 2004 informal assessment. In a
summary of that study, NASA reported that the AAS contractors projected
the cost to develop an alternate launch capability would be
approximately $1 billion, take 3 to 5 years to develop, and require $2
to $3 billion per year for operations. We held discussions with
commercial industry representatives who concurred with this time frame
to develop an alternate capability to support space station operation.
Since a majority of the space station assembly missions are scheduled
within the next 3 years, these types of missions could preclude the use
of an alternative vehicle.
However, NASA did not have sufficient knowledge to conclude that the
shuttle was the best option for logistics missions prior to its
retirement of the shuttle in 2010. NASA officials stated that the
technical challenges for developing an alternative vehicle could be
overcome, but probably not before the 28 missions scheduled through
2010, of which 8 are for logistics, including 5 of the last 7 missions.
However, we found no evidence of analyses performed by NASA to compare
the cost and schedule impact of using alternate launch systems with the
scheduled space shuttle program costs, to include the cost of returning
the space shuttle to flight. We recently reported that the majority of
NASA's budget estimates for returning the space shuttle to flight had
not been fully developed.[Footnote 2] In fact, NASA officials stated
that they did not compare estimated costs for developing alternative
launch vehicles against budget estimates for the 28 space shuttle
flights currently planned to support the space station, which total
more than $22 billion between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2010. In
addition, NASA has also requested $1.8 billion for crew and cargo
services over the same time frame to purchase commercial services using
existing and emerging capabilities, both domestic and foreign. In its
fiscal year 2006 budget request, NASA indicated that such commercial
services are expected to be available not later than 2009 and that
these services are a key element in the future of the space station
program.
Informal Assessment Was Not Documented:
In addition to lacking sufficient knowledge with regard to the use of
alternatives for logistics missions, NASA did not document the
proceedings and decisions reached in its 2004 assessment. Specifically,
the agency did not record the processes it followed and therefore did
not capture the basis of the decisions reached. When asked about the
details of the assessment, NASA officials indicated that the informal
assessment was based primarily on the expertise within the headquarters
and they did not formally document the decision paths. While we
recognize that the extensive experience of its senior managers is an
important element in evaluating alternatives, the existence of any
formal assessment of alternatives covering the entire range of missions
for space station support cannot be verified, and the agency's position
on the space shuttle being the best option cannot be validated.
NASA's Current Request for Information from Commercial Industry and
Requirements Review Presents an Opportunity to Perform a More Detailed
Analysis:
NASA received 26 responses from a September 2004 request for
information that asked for, among other things, input from the
commercial space industry regarding capabilities and market interest
for missions for providing cargo launch services to, and the ability to
return items from, the space station. This request for information had
similar characteristics as the AAS study, which also had as its
objective to explore the development of alternative cargo "upmass" and
"downmass" support for the space station. The responses are being
evaluated, and NASA plans to seek more detailed information from the
commercial launch industry for additional study or development work in
June 2005. According to NASA officials, the responses from industry
with regard to space station logistics support have been very
promising. The officials indicated that it might be possible to have a
developed and certified capability to provide commercial cargo launch
service to the space station prior to space shuttle retirement late
this decade, rather than only after its retirement. However, we were
told these services would not eliminate any of the scheduled space
shuttle flights, but only augment the capabilities of the space shuttle.
While these responses are being evaluated and knowledge is being
gathered, NASA is also reviewing the space station research
requirements and re-examining the planned manifest for the 28 space
shuttle flights in an attempt to better align their missions to the
Vision for Space Exploration. According to NASA's fiscal year 2006
budget submission, the agency is examining configurations of the space
station that meet the needs of the new vision and the international
partners with as few space shuttle flights as necessary.
Combining the information gathered from commercial industry and a
better definition of space station requirements, NASA officials agreed
there is an opportunity to perform a more comprehensive assessment of
alternatives, especially for the logistics missions late this decade.
According to a recent revision of NASA's internal guidance, the most
important aspect of formulating a program technical approach is
conducting a thorough analysis of alternatives.[Footnote 3] NASA
guidance defines an analysis of alternatives as a formal method that
compares alternatives by estimating their ability to satisfy mission
requirements through an effectiveness analysis and by estimating their
life cycle costs through cost analysis. The results of these two
analysis are used together to produce a cost-effectiveness comparison
that allows decision-makers to assess cost and effectiveness
simultaneously. An analysis of alternatives broadly examines multiple
elements of program alternatives (including technical performance,
risk, life cycle cost, and programmatic aspects), and is typically an
important part of the formulation studies.
Conclusions:
NASA views a thorough analysis of alternatives as an important aspect
in the formulation of a program technical approach. While we recognize
that the extensive experience of its senior managers is an important
element in evaluating alternatives, NASA did not have the full breadth
of knowledge necessary to perform a comprehensive assessment of
alternative launch vehicles to enable it to conclude the space shuttle
was the best option to support space station operations. However,
NASA's recent request for information from industry offers the agency
an opportunity to enhance its knowledge of alternatives to the space
shuttle for providing logistics support for the space station and to
explore the use of alternatives to the existing space shuttle manifest
currently under review. Although alternate vehicles would not be
available for missions to the space station until later this decade and
difficult to use for assembly missions, several of the space shuttle's
final flights are planned logistics support missions that might be
conducted using alternative launch vehicles. By completing a
comprehensive analysis, NASA could also identify the feasibility and
risks associated with an alternative means of providing logistics
support to the space station in case delays occur requiring extension
of the planned 2010 date. Furthermore, a comprehensive and thoroughly
documented analysis of launch requirements and launch alternatives can
provide NASA with comparative cost information and afford the agency
the opportunity to use its resources more effectively and efficiently.
This is particularly important now since the space station and space
shuttle programs will be competing for limited resources.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To better position the agency to determine the best available option
for providing logistics support to the space station, we recommend the
NASA Administrator take the following three steps:
* Direct current efforts to explore other space launch options to
utilize a comprehensive and fully documented assessment of alternatives
that matches mission requirements, and associated manifest, with the
launch vehicles expected to be available;
* As part of this assessment, (a) determine the development and
operation costs associated with these potential alternatives and (b)
perform a detailed analysis of these alternatives to determine the best
option for delivering the logistics cargo required for space station
operations prior to and after space shuttle retirement; and:
* Ensure this assessment is completed before any NASA investments are
made for commercial space transportation services to the space station.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our
recommendations and stated that the agency seeks to fully explore space
launch options for assuring access to the space station in conjunction
with its retirement planning for the space shuttle. NASA plans to
document its acquisition strategy through a NASA Headquarters
Acquisition Strategy Meeting prior to release of a request for proposal
for commercial space station cargo services later this summer. In
addition, NASA said it will evaluate the cost and capabilities of the
proposed transportation system to meet space station and agency needs,
as well as the needs of its partners. NASA also said that its
acquisition strategy will be consistent with space station
requirements, international partner agreements, and available funding.
We are encouraged that NASA has taken steps to pursue a deliberate
alternative cargo transportation system assessment. However, NASA
should not limit documentation of this effort to the acquisition
strategy meeting, but should also document the decision paths leading
up to that event and throughout the evaluation of the transportation
systems proposed by contractors responding to NASA's request for
proposals. This approach should identify the decision makers involved
and provide a fully documented rationale of the acquisition processes
as NASA analyzes all alternatives to determine the best options for
delivering the logistics cargo for space station operations. NASA's
comments are reprinted in appendix II.
As agreed, unless you publicly announce the contents earlier, we plan
no further distribution of this report until 15 days from its issue
date. At that time, we will send copies to the NASA Administrator; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
parties. We will also make copies available to others on request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any
questions about this report. Major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Allen Li:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine whether NASA conducted a detailed assessment of
alternatives to the space shuttle for completing assembly and providing
logistics support to the International Space Station, we:
* Obtained and analyzed pertinent NASA documents and briefing slides
related to the International Space Station, space shuttles, and other
launch alternatives, such as Expendable Launch Vehicles, including:
European Space Agency Segment Specifications for the Automated Transfer
Vehicle; Specification for the Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicle;
International Space Station Payload Integration and Assembly Sequence
specifications; Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle configurations; space
station and space shuttle status, history, and cost briefings; Return
to Flight Status Briefings; and, Alternate Access to Station briefings.
* Reviewed previous GAO reports on NASA, the Space Shuttle Program,
International Space Station Program, and best practices in many areas
and multiple agencies. We also reviewed reports from the Congressional
Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, Office of Management and
Budget, and the Planetary Society, and Russian Space Program.
* Interviewed officials responsible for managing the programs within
the Space Operations Mission Directorate at NASA headquarters, as well
as program managers at Johnson Space Center, Texas. We also interviewed
NASA officials at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, who are responsible
for processing space station payloads and integrating those payloads
with the launch vehicles. We interviewed contractors at Boeing Launch
Services and Lockheed Martin Space Systems and reviewed pertinent
documentation related to expendable launch vehicles for space station
assembly and logistics support. We also reviewed NASA's request for
information related to commercial industry interest in providing that
capability and NASA's plans for assessing responses to the request for
information and follow on activities. For this, we interviewed NASA
officials within the Space Operations Mission Directorate and at
Johnson Space Center, Texas. We also interviewed Air Force officials
from the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program. We also received,
reviewed, and analyzed follow-up written and oral comments from several
individuals at these locations and NASA's Science Directorate.
To accomplish our work, we visited and interviewed officials at NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C; Johnson Space Center, Texas; and Kennedy
Space Center, Florida. These centers were chosen because they maintain
primary responsibility for conducting space shuttle and space station
operations on a day-to-day basis. The offices we met with at
headquarters and each of these centers included space station program
officials, space shuttle program officials, NASA Launch Services
Office, the International Space Station Payload Processing Directorate
at Kennedy Space Center, and Space Shuttle Program Integration Office
at Kennedy Space Center. We also visited the Boeing Launch Services,
Inc., in Huntington Beach, California, and Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station, Florida; Boeing Commercial Space Systems in Research Park,
Huntsville, Alabama; and Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company in
Littleton, Colorado, and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida.
We conducted our work from August 2004 through April 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Office of the
Administrator:
Washington, DC 20546-0001:
May 9, 2005:
Mr. Allen Li:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team: United States
Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Li:
Thank you for the completed comprehensive evaluation of alternatives to
provide Space Station logistics support. I am pleased to express my
gratitude for the professionalism your team exhibited while conducting
this essential audit. NASA appreciates the opportunity to comment on
the Draft Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled,
"NASA: More Knowledge Needed to Determine Best Alternatives to Provide
Space Station Logistics Support" (GAO-05-488). Below, please find our
comments to the recommendations provided in your report.
Recommendation 1: "Direct current efforts to explore other space launch
options to utilize a comprehensive and fully documented assessment of
alternatives that matches mission requirements, and associated
manifest, with the launch vehicles expected to be available;"
We concur with your recommendation. NASA has pursued deliberate
alternative cargo transportation system assessment activities through
refinements in the International Space Station (ISS) logistical and
utilization requirements, release and evaluation of responses to a
Commercial Transportation Services Request for Information and an
Industry Day held April 25, 2005, to further refine acquisition
alternatives and ongoing discussions with international partners. NASA
seeks to fully explore space launch options for assuring access to the
ISS in conjunction with retirement planning for the Space Shuttle. The
acquisition strategy pursued will be documented through a NASA
Headquarters Acquisition Strategy Meeting (ASM) prior to release of a
subsequent commercial ISS cargo transportation services Request for
Proposal (RFP) expected later this summer.
Recommendation 2: "As part of this assessment, (a) determine the
development and operation costs associated with these potential
alternatives and (b) perform a detailed analysis of these alternatives
to determine the best option for delivering the logistics cargo
required for space station operations prior to and after space shuttle
retirement,"
We concur with your recommendation. As part of the evaluation of the
ISS cargo transportation system RFP later this year, NASA will evaluate
the cost and capabilities of the proposed transportation system to meet
ISS and Agency needs.
NASA expects to develop an acquisition strategy that meets our ISS
Partners' commitments with necessary flexibility to accommodate
changing requirements throughout the life of the ISS program.
Recommendation 3: "Ensure this assessment is completed before any NASA
investments are made for commercial space transportation services to
the space station."
We concur with your recommendation. NASA's acquisition strategy for ISS
Cargo Services will follow the Agency ASM process regarding release of
an RFP through contract award and will be approved by Agency
management. The approach will be consistent with ISS requirements,
international partnership agreements, and available funding.
Again, thank you for the critical insight the report provided. We
assure you that we are well on our way toward implementing your
recommendations.
Cordially,
Signed by:
Frederick D. Gregory:
Deputy Administrator:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Challenges of Using Alternative Vehicles:
According to NASA officials involved in the 2004 assessment,
accommodating a transition to other launch vehicles would create
significant challenges that drive risk, schedule, and costs. NASA
officials stated the space station elements were designed and built to
take advantage of the more benign launch environment in the space
shuttle's cargo bay, to be removed and repositioned by the space
shuttle's robotic arm, and then connected together by the space shuttle
crew during space walk activities. The following outlines the major
challenges NASA identified:
* There would be a need to develop a new process to assemble the space
station using only the space station crew and without the benefit of
the space shuttle remote manipulator arm.
* Using another launch vehicle would require the redesign and retesting
of space station elements already built due to the change in launch
environment. NASA officials stated the space shuttle launch
environment, with respect to vibration and g-force exerted on the
payload, cannot be duplicated on an expendable launch vehicle.
* A new, unique transfer vehicle would need to be developed in order to
rendezvous and dock assembly elements with the space station. For
logistics cargo support, two transfer vehicles are currently being
developed for logistics mission to support space station operations,
the European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and the Japanese H-II
Transfer Vehicle (HTV). These vehicles, much like the Russian Progress
vehicle, have a limited cargo capability when compared to the space
shuttle. The ATV, scheduled to be available for missions to the space
station in 2006, is being designed to rendezvous and dock to the space
station via the Russian Service Module. The HTV is scheduled to be
available in 2008 and will fly within the proximity of the space
station to be caught by the space station's robotic arm before being
berthed to the space station.
* A carrier to go inside the new transfer vehicle to replicate the
space shuttle attach points would need to be developed.
* According to these officials, in order to meet volume requirements,
the payload fairings would have to be modified from the current 5-meter
to a 6-meter version to accommodate the larger diameter payloads to the
space station during assembly missions.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Allen Li (202) 512-4841:
Acknowledgments:
Staff making key contributions to this report were Jim Morrison, James
Beard, Rick Cederholm, Karen Sloan, and T.J Thomson.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Soyuz vehicles are used primarily to ferry crew to and from the
station. Progress vehicles are used to resupply and reboost the station.
[2] GAO, Space Shuttle: Cost for Hubble Servicing Mission and
Implementation of Safety Recommendations Not Yet Definitive, GAO-05-34
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2004).
[3] NPR 7120.5C: NASA Program and Project Management Processes and
Requirements, March 22, 2005.
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