NASA's Deep Space Network
Current Management Structure Is Not Conducive to Effectively Matching Resources with Future Requirements Gao ID: GAO-06-445 April 27, 2006The President's Vision for Space Exploration calls for human and robotic missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. In response, over the next two decades, NASA may spend $100 billion on new technologies and facilities that will require reliable ground communications to achieve those missions. Presently, that communications capability is provided by NASA's Deep Space Network--a system of antennas located at three sites around the world. However, the Network faces challenges that may hinder its provision of current and future mission support. This report discusses (1) the significant operational challenges faced by the Deep Space Network and (2) the extent to which NASA is integrating the Network into its future communications plans.
While NASA's Deep Space Network can meet most requirements of its current workload, it may not be able to meet near-term and future demand. The system--suffering from an aging, fragile infrastructure with some crucial components over 40 years old--has lost science data during routine operations and critical events. In addition, new customers find they must compete for this limited capacity, not just with each other, but also with legacy missions extended past their lifetimes, such as NASA's Voyager, that nonetheless return valuable science. Program officials doubt they can provide adequate coverage to an increasing set of new mission customers, especially if they increase dramatically under the President's Vision. The Deep Space Network's future utility is also in question because NASA does not currently match funding for space communications capabilities with agency wide space communications requirements. While NASA created an agency level entity to review the technical requirements for integrating assets like the network into an agency wide space communications architecture for the future, that entity does not address program level requirements nor influence investment decisions. Control over such requirements and funding remains with the mission directorates and programs themselves. This disconnect allows programs to invest in capabilities that may undercut agency wide goals for space communications. After this review was initiated, NASA began to study how to better manage this gap between agency-level requirements and program-level funding, but no recommendations for action have yet been proposed.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-445, NASA's Deep Space Network: Current Management Structure Is Not Conducive to Effectively Matching Resources with Future Requirements
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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Space and
Aeronautics, Committee on Science, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2006:
NASA's Deep Space Network:
Current Management Structure Is Not Conducive to Effectively Matching
Resources with Future Requirements:
GAO-06-445:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-445, a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The President‘s Vision for Space Exploration calls for human and
robotic missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. In response, over the
next two decades, NASA may spend $100 billion on new technologies and
facilities that will require reliable ground communications to achieve
those missions. Presently, that communications capability is provided
by NASA‘s Deep Space Network”a system of antennas located at three
sites around the world. However, the Network faces challenges that may
hinder its provision of current and future mission support.
This report discusses (1) the significant operational challenges faced
by the Deep Space Network and (2) the extent to which NASA is
integrating the Network into its future communications plans.
What GAO Found:
While NASA‘s Deep Space Network can meet most requirements of its
current workload, it may not be able to meet near-term and future
demand. The system”suffering from an aging, fragile infrastructure with
some crucial components over 40 years old”has lost science data during
routine operations and critical events. In addition, new customers find
they must compete for this limited capacity, not just with each other,
but also with legacy missions extended past their lifetimes, such as
NASA‘s Voyager, that nonetheless return valuable science. Program
officials doubt they can provide adequate coverage to an increasing set
of new mission customers, especially if they increase dramatically
under the President‘s Vision.
The Deep Space Network‘s future utility is also in question because
NASA does not currently match funding for space communications
capabilities with agency wide space communications requirements. While
NASA created an agency level entity to review the technical
requirements for integrating assets like the network into an agency
wide space communications architecture for the future, that entity does
not address program level requirements nor influence investment
decisions. Control over such requirements and funding remains with the
mission directorates and programs themselves. This disconnect allows
programs to invest in capabilities that may undercut agency wide goals
for space communications. After this review was initiated, NASA began
to study how to better manage this gap between agency-level
requirements and program-level funding, but no recommendations for
action have yet been proposed.
Figure: Panoramic of Goldstone, Calif., facility antennas:
[See PDF for Image]
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making several recommendations to NASA that will assist the
agency in better aligning resources for the Deep Space Network with
overall agency requirements for future space exploration. NASA
concurred with GAO‘s recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-445].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 512-
4841 or lia@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DSN Challenges Could Hamper Its Ability to Meet Future Mission
Requirements:
Existing Management Structure Does Not Allow NASA to Match Space
Communications Resources With Requirements:
Conclusion:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Agency Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:
Figures:
Figure 1: Location of Primary Deep Space Network Communications Sites:
Figure 2: External corrosion on 70-meter antenna:
Figure 3: Road Damage to Asphalt Roadway at Goldstone Facility:
Figure 4: Water Intrusion to Internal Antenna Structure at Goldstone
Facility:
Figure 5: Voyager I Mission Spacecraft:
Figure 6: Mars Exploration Rover:
Abbreviations:
DSN: Deep Space Network:
JPL: Jet Propulsion Laboratory:
SCAWG: Space Communications Architecture Working Group:
SCCIB: Space Communication Coordination and Integration Board:
SMD: Science Mission Directorate:
TOR: Terms of Reference:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 27, 2006:
The Honorable Mark Udall:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science:
House of Representatives:
In January 2004, the President outlined a Vision for Space Exploration
that calls for human and robotic missions to the Moon, Mars, and
beyond. Over the next two decades, NASA plans to spend over $100
billion to develop a number of new capabilities, supporting
technologies, and facilities that are critical to enabling these
missions. These missions will have at least one thing in common: they
will require a reliable network to handle all communication functions
for both manned and unmanned spacecraft. Most of that functional
capability for deep space communications currently resides in NASA's
Deep Space Network (DSN).
DSN was established in 1959 to support NASA's exploration of the solar
system. According to agency officials, DSN is designed to communicate
with spacecraft at distances greater than 1.2 million miles from Earth-
-the distance defined as deep space. It is currently the only system of
its nature with the capability to serve vast numbers of deep space
missions. Since its inception, the network has returned extensive
science data and has proven to be a linchpin for successful space
exploration missions. Its services are used by NASA, other domestic
organizations, and foreign space agencies. However, over time, DSN
officials have had to deal with maintaining an aged infrastructure and
managing coverage time for an increasing mission set with limited
capacity. In addition, although NASA has not made any definitive
decisions in this regard, new deep space communications requirements
are envisioned to support projected missions to the moon.
In maintaining a reliable deep space communication system for the near
term, while also preparing for the future, NASA will need to
effectively manage its communication needs and the allocation of
resources to meet them. As recently as 2003, the National Research
Council reported that DSN was suffering from insufficient
communications capabilities and occasional failures. In light of these
issues, you asked us to: (1) identify the challenges NASA's DSN program
faces in meeting its current and planned space communications workload
and (2) determine the extent NASA is integrating DSN into its space
communications plans for the future.
To conduct our work, we reviewed documents and data related to the
operations and capabilities of DSN as well as NASA-wide strategic
planning documents about the Vision for Space Exploration. We
interviewed program officials as well as contractor personnel about
challenges they face in managing and operating DSN. Further, we
collected and analyzed information related to space communications
architecture management at NASA and held discussions with NASA space
communications officials about future space communications architecture
requirements, what assets the architecture will include, and how its
development is being managed. We also held discussions with NASA's
Space Communications Organization Study Group, which was established
during the course of our review to develop options for how to manage
space communications at NASA. We met with officials at NASA
Headquarters and NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), as well as ITT
Industries contractors at their offices in Monrovia, Calif., and at the
DSN facility in Goldstone, Calif. Complete details of our scope and
methodology can be found in appendix I. We performed our review from
May 2005 to April 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
NASA's Deep Space Network (DSN) is able to meet most of the
requirements of its current workload, but serious questions exist as to
whether it will be able to keep up with both near-term and future
demands. In the near term, DSN faces a deteriorating infrastructure and
a limited capacity to serve additional missions. System infrastructure,
which has been marked by extensive deferred maintenance, is aging and
is likely to become increasingly fragile and subject to breakdown at a
time when demand is anticipated to increase. The potential exists for
the loss of scientific data that would be difficult, if not impossible,
to replace. In addition, new users will find that, aside from competing
for network capacity with each other, they must also compete with
legacy programs that have been extended far beyond their intended
lifetimes, but still return science data and thus take up considerable
network time. For example, the Voyager mission launched in 1977 still
requires DSN support and is envisioned to rely on DSN for the
foreseeable future. Capacity limits constrain the amount of science
data that can be returned from deep space by new missions that are
added to DSN's set of users.
DSN's future utility is also in question because NASA currently has no
mechanism in place to match funding for space communications
capabilities with agency-wide space communications requirements. The
agency's Space Communication Coordination and Integration Board is
responsible for reviewing the technical requirements of space
communications programs to determine whether they fit into an agency
wide architecture. However, according to agency officials, the Board is
only advisory in nature and does not review all program requirements,
such as infrastructure needs. As a result, such program requirements
are often not raised at the agency level. Furthermore, funding for
space communications capabilities is controlled by the individual
communications programs and their associated mission directorates, who
may not necessarily consider agency wide goals when making investments.
This disconnect between establishment of requirements and control of
resources creates the potential for programs to make investments in
capabilities that may undercut agency wide goals for space
communications. For example, agency officials noted both the Deep Space
Network and the Ground Network programs recently were on a path to
develop separate array technologies to support overlapping requirements
for the same lunar missions. These efforts would have undercut the
agency's goals of a seamless, integrated architecture for space
communications and would have represented unnecessary duplication of
effort and added costs. After our review was initiated, NASA created a
task group to study how to better manage this gap between agency-level
requirements and program-level funding, but it has not yet made any
recommendations for action to address the situation.
We are making recommendations to NASA that the DSN program identify its
current and future requirements in more comprehensive terms and how
those requirements might be supported as well as items that NASA's task
group on space communications should consider to better align program
requirements with agency space communications goals. In written
comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our
recommendations.
Background:
NASA established DSN over 40 years ago with the intention of
coordinating all deep space communications through a single ground
system to improve efficiency and minimize duplication. Today, DSN
consists of communications antennas at three major sites around the
world--Goldstone, Calif; Madrid, Spain; and Canberra,
Australia.[Footnote 1] These sites are specifically positioned to offer
complete coverage to deep space mission craft regardless of their
positions around the Earth. DSN officials informed us that while
contractor personnel operate all three sites, NASA owns the physical
assets and is responsible for funding all operations at the sites. Each
site has a 70-meter antenna, which can provide communications with the
most distant spacecraft, and several smaller antennas that can
facilitate communications with closer spacecraft or can be arrayed to
communicate with more distant missions. NASA's Jet Propulsion
Laboratory is responsible for management of DSN and also serves as the
distribution point for data collected from deep space.
Figure 1: Location of Primary Deep Space Network Communications Sites:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DSN supports an average of 35 to 40 deep space missions each year.
According to program officials, as a mission is being developed, a
representative from the DSN program works with the mission team to
establish the amount of coverage the mission will need from DSN assets
during its lifetime. This coverage includes the amount of time per day
for routine communications and also critical coverage of major mission
events. In most cases, missions must negotiate with the DSN program
because they desire more coverage than DSN can provide. Once the amount
of coverage time is established and major mission events are scheduled,
DSN commits to that coverage in a Service Agreement with the mission.
Within the agreement, DSN commits to providing coverage for 95 percent
of the time agreed to with its mission customers, while the remaining 5
percent allows for unexpected disruptions during that coverage. This 95
percent commitment almost guarantees that all critical mission events
will be covered without disruption. Once this is put into place,
missions are generally free to trade time amongst themselves if
priorities change or a particular mission gets kicked off the network
due to an unexpected anomaly in the system. The missions that DSN
supports are not charged for their usage of the system, unless they
require a unique technology that DSN must add to its system in order to
provide coverage. This is a relatively rare phenomenon, however. DSN is
primarily funded through its managing entity, the Science Mission
Directorate, and receives resources consistent with its performance the
previous year and its previous year's budget.
DSN works in conjunction with NASA's other space communications assets
to provide coverage to missions at all distances from the Earth. The
Ground Network provides communications capabilities to spacecraft in
low-Earth orbit. Additionally, the Space Network, including the
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System, is an Earth-based satellite
relay system that also facilitates missions in low-Earth orbit. In
order for a spacecraft to receive support from all of these
communications assets, NASA must ensure they are coordinated and can
provide the capabilities for which they are intended.
Throughout its history, NASA has had different management structures
trying to achieve this coordination. According to NASA officials, from
the Apollo missions in the 1960s through 1995, space communications was
managed through an agency wide communications entity with budgetary
authority to provide appropriate investments in system capabilities. In
1995, this management and budget authority was devolved to a central
contract managed out of the Johnson Space Center in an effort to cut
costs and streamline maintenance to the assets. The savings from this
realignment were never realized for the agency and the communications
assets were severely underfunded as a result of how they were managed
under this arrangement. Subsequently, management and budget authority
for these assets were brought back to NASA headquarters in 2001 and
aligned with the mission directorate responsible for the customers each
asset served. NASA then created the Space Communication Coordination
and Integration Board to oversee the technical integration of these
assets into a seamless space communications architecture. This is how
space communications assets, including the DSN program, are managed
currently at NASA.
The NASA Authorization Act of 2005 contains a requirement that the NASA
Administrator submit a plan for updating NASA's space communications
architecture for low-Earth orbital operations and deep space
exploration so that it is capable of meeting NASA's needs over the next
20 years.[Footnote 2] This plan is due to be submitted to the House
Committee on Science and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation no later than February 17, 2007. In addition, the
Conference Report accompanying the Science, State, Justice, Commerce
and Related Agencies Appropriations Law, 2006[Footnote 3] requires that
NASA include a 10-year funding profile for DSN in its fiscal year 2007
budget request.[Footnote 4]
DSN Challenges Could Hamper Its Ability to Meet Future Mission
Requirements:
DSN is currently able to meet most requirements of its existing
workload. However, according to program officials, DSN's current
operational ability is no predictor of future success, and they have
significant concerns about the ability of the system to continue to
meet customer requirements into the future. These concerns are based on
the system's aging infrastructure and projected additional workload on
top of servicing existing missions.
Sustainability of DSN's Infrastructure Is Unknown:
DSN suffers from an aged, fragile infrastructure. Significant parts of
that infrastructure--including many antennas--were first built in the
1950s and 1960s and are showing their age. DSN program officials stated
that the Goldstone complex is down, on average, 16 hours per week for
maintenance and repairs due to problems associated with its age. While
Goldstone contains some of the oldest equipment in the system and the
poor condition of much of its equipment characterizes the underlying
fragility of the network, operational disruptions occur across the
entire network. For instance, the 70-meter dishes are widely regarded
by program officials and mission customers as increasingly fragile,
which calls into question expectation of their continued reliability.
In fact, mission customers shared similar concerns that DSN's
infrastructure is not in the appropriate condition that it should be to
support their missions. With increasing use of these assets, they fear
service will only deteriorate and more disruptions will occur during
service to their missions. Program officials and mission customers
provided some examples, as follows, of disruptions that have occurred
during service as a result of infrastructure deterioration:
* During a critical event for the Deep Impact Mission on July 4, 2005,
corrosion of the sub reflector on the 70-meter dish at DSN's Madrid
site caused an unexpected disruption in service. In response, program
managers had to shift coverage to alternative antennas. While they were
able to provide adequate coverage of the event for the Deep Impact
Mission, the shift to back-up antennas forced other users off at that
time, which meant they lost coverage.
* In October 2005, a significant power disruption caused by corrosion
to a major power line resulted in multiple antennas at the Goldstone
complex going offline, resulting in several hours of downtime and a
subsequent loss of scientific data.[Footnote 5]
* In November 2005, failure of a prime network server resulted in
several hours of unexpected downtime, which in turn caused considerable
loss of data to four research projects. During this anomaly, the
Stardust, Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, Mars Odyssey and Mars Global
Surveyor missions lost a total of 241 minutes of coverage to their
missions.
Program officials also expressed concern about the possibility of
massive antenna failure due to metal fatigue. Ultimately, such a
failure would result from a partial or total collapse of an antenna
structure. Although no DSN antenna has yet collapsed from fatigue, an
antenna in West Virginia similar in design and age to those already
used by the DSN program collapsed unexpectedly in 1988. DSN program
managers are in the process of finding an engineering firm to conduct a
survey of the program's antenna assets to assess their structural
reliability. Beyond that action, program officials rely mostly on their
experience and visual observations to assess the condition of these
assets.
Figure 2: External corrosion on 70-meter antenna:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Deferred maintenance also poses a significant challenge to the
sustainability of DSN assets. Since 2002, the program has consistently
deferred approximately $30 million in maintenance projects each year.
These projects are commonly associated with infrastructure that is not
directly related to system performance and have been given lower
priority when more pressing needs limit the system's ability to provide
coverage for its customers. For example, several roadway, water and
electrical projects at the Goldstone facility have consistently been
deferred due to the need to address system maintenance needs considered
to have become more pressing. Although the program does seek to
prioritize its most pressing projects and direct resources to them once
its budget is allotted, operating aging facilities and systems
inevitably results in the need for new repairs rising unexpectedly,
which forces program managers to constantly have to juggle priorities
to address them.
Figure 3: Road Damage to Asphalt Roadway at Goldstone Facility:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Water Intrusion to Internal Antenna Structure at Goldstone
Facility:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Limited Capacity to Provide Coverage Is Exacerbated By An Increasing
Mission Set:
DSN also faces increasing competition between new and old users for
coverage time on the system. There is a growing demand for a level of
service that DSN is not likely to be able to provide to its customers.
DSN promises 95 percent availability to its mission customers for
routine mission coverage. According to program officials, the remaining
5 percent is reserved for unexpected failures and downtimes during
mission coverage. They said DSN can maintain its 95 percent commitment
to its mission customers within its current mission set. However, as
that mission set increases, officials become less confident in their
ability to continue to achieve that level of service.
New missions are continuing to increase as they have in the past--by
some 350 percent over the last 20 years. By the year 2020, DSN is
projected to be required to support twice the number of missions it
does currently. DSN officials thus find themselves faced with the need
to balance this new demand with an equally compelling demand from
existing "legacy" missions that have remained operational beyond their
original lifetimes but are still returning science data and need to be
maintained. Such legacy missions include the following:
* The Voyager missions--two similar spacecraft launched in 1977 to
conduct close-up studies of Jupiter and Saturn, Saturn's rings, and the
larger moons of the two planets--are still supported by DSN today even
though their primary missions were completed in 1989. Each mission
receives approximately 12 hours of coverage each day using one of the
network's 70-meter dishes.
Figure 5: Voyager I Mission Spacecraft:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
* The Mars Rover missions, although scheduled to end their prime
missions in mid-2004, have gone well beyond their forecasted lifetimes.
Program officials pointed out that even though they did not have a role
in the decision to extend the missions, the program continues to
allocate funds to support their operations through present day.
Figure 6: Mars Exploration Rover:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
It is up to the DSN program to determine how best to provide service to
its many mission customers, but this task is becoming increasingly
complex. The effort to balance conflicting program priorities is a
continuing struggle for DSN program managers. So far, DSN has been able
to avoid stressing the capacity of the system because a select number
of missions it was scheduled to support were either canceled or failed
before requiring significant support. However, according to program
officials, if the number of missions the system is scheduled to support
begins to increase, the amount of service the system can provide will
be limited. Further, officials expect that any commitments to provide
support for manned missions under the coming Vision for Space
Exploration, in addition to what it currently must support, will
prevent them from being able to provide necessary coverage to new
mission customers or maintain the service guarantee of 95 percent
availability to any customer.
In addition, the DSN program is planning to begin decommissioning its
26 meter antennas in 2006 due to costs of maintenance associated with
their age. Officials told us that they believe the program's remaining
34-and 70-meter antennas will be unable to sustain the anticipated
workload in the very near future, and one projection is that the system
will reach capacity in 2013. If this occurs, the opportunity to
continue adding new mission customers will be limited and the potential
for lost deep space science is significant.
Existing Management Structure Does Not Allow NASA to Match Space
Communications Resources With Requirements:
DSN's future utility is also in question because NASA currently does
not have a mechanism in place to match funding for space communications
assets with program requirements, such as infrastructure and technology
development needs, from an agency wide perspective. At the end of 2003,
NASA created the Space Communication Coordination and Integration Board
with the intent of reviewing requirements for integration of space
communications assets into a seamless architecture, but according to
agency officials, the Board does not review individual program
requirements or have any authority over the allocation of resources to
the space communications programs. Instead, funding for space
communications capabilities is controlled by the individual
communications programs and their associated mission directorates, who
may not consider agency wide goals when making investments. This
disconnect between requirements and resources has caused program level
requirements to be given low priority by the agency, which in turn has
forced programs to make tradeoffs to maintain functionality and has
offered the potential for programs to make investments that may
undercut agency wide goals for space communications. In light of this
problem, NASA has recently established a task group to identify ways to
better address how to match agency requirements with program resources.
Agency Space Communications Oversight Board Establishes Limited
Requirements:
At the end of 2003, NASA created the Space Communication Coordination
and Integration Board to establish technical requirements for the
integration of NASA's space communications assets into a seamless
communications architecture for the future. According to NASA
officials, the Board is technical in nature and not intended to manage
space communications, but rather focus on integrating the architecture.
Further, officials said that no other agency-level entity reviews
requirements for individual communications programs or establishes
broader mission requirements for space communications. As a result,
they informed us that program requirements, such as infrastructure and
technology development needs, have consistently been given low priority
by the agency. They said that the DSN program is forced to make
tradeoffs to maintain functionality, but it is not able to fully
address its requirements and has concerns about its ability to continue
supporting the operations for which it is entrusted.
Currently, identification of appropriate investment resources (in line
with decisions made about the architecture) is performed by the mission
directorate with responsibility over the program and the program's
customers. There is no overarching entity for space communications
management at NASA to consider the specific investment needs of the
programs and direct funding accordingly. And while all programs are
supposed to consider the broader needs of the agency and other programs
in their investment decisions, officials informed us that there is no
formal oversight mechanism to ensure that investment decisions made at
the program level are in line with those broader requirements.
As a result of this mismatch between agency level requirements and
investment decisions for the programs that support those requirements,
NASA has limited ability to prevent competing programs from making
investments that, while supporting individual program requirements,
undercut broader agency goals. For example, several agency officials
noted both the Deep Space Network and the Ground Network programs
recently were on a path to develop separate array technologies to
support overlapping requirements for the same lunar missions, which
would have undercut agency efforts to create a seamless, integrated
architecture for space communications and would have represented
unnecessary duplication of effort and added costs. But officials said
these pilot efforts were terminated after much of the planning for them
had taken place. However, the termination was a result of budget
constraints and lack of clearly defined requirements, as opposed to a
decision by an authority with an agency wide investment perspective. In
addition, another potential DSN customer--the Solar Dynamic
Observatory--recognized that DSN could not provide it with the service
it needed, so it invested in its own communications antennas to provide
the coverage it needed. Such duplication undermines the original intent
of DSN to be an efficient, single network for NASA's deep space
communications on Earth.
NASA Efforts Address Mis-Match Between Requirements, Resources:
During the course of our review, NASA established a task group to
address how best to manage the agency's space communications programs
so program resources are invested in a way that supports agency wide
goals. The task group has yet to make any recommendations to address
these issues.
Currently, the task group must consider two primary competing
viewpoints within the agency. One viewpoint holds that the current
structure of space communications, in which mission directorates and
programs control resources, is ideal because it allows communications
support to be controlled by the same entity that establishes and funds
the programs that use the system. For example, DSN is funded by the
Science Mission Directorate, which also supports the vast majority of
missions that the DSN serves. Some agency officials believe that this
approach provides better customer service, since resource trade-offs
can be made by those closest to both the customers and the service
provider. However, under this current structure, maintenance
requirements for DSN have consistently been deemed a low priority.
Alternatively, others in the agency point to the success of a more
centralized space communications structure, as was in place before
1995. Under this structure, resource decisions can be made in light of
an overall agency perspective on which communications program can best
fulfill agency wide communications goals. However, one official
suggested that under this structure, maintenance requirements for DSN
could become an even lower priority as the requirements of other
programs are considered. In the former case, a program like DSN must
compete for funding against individual missions. In the latter case, a
program like DSN will compete for funding against other space
communications assets.
Conclusion:
By establishing DSN as the primary communications system for supporting
deep space missions, NASA will be reliant on the system for mission
successes--both now and in the distant future. By virtue of this
reliance, NASA has a responsibility to ensure that the system is
operationally sound and meets user needs. The system faces challenges
that call into question how well it will continue to be able to
adequately support deep space missions. The potential for more
significant system failure and major disruption to the deep space
exploration program, both manned and unmanned, looms large if nothing
is done to address the condition of DSN. As NASA continues to depend on
the program for meeting its deep space communications requirements, the
program and the agency will have to determine what those requirements
are and how they can best meet those requirements with a viable system
for the future. Establishing these requirements in terms more
comprehensive than just being able to provide coverage for 95 percent
of committed time will provide for a better understanding of what is
needed by the program. Furthermore, quantification and characterization
of such requirements in more comprehensive terms will be critical to
the development of a plan as required under the 2005 NASA Authorization
Act.
As NASA prepares to take on extensive exploration initiatives under the
President's Vision for Space Exploration, the agency needs to position
itself to make investment decisions from an agency-wide perspective.
Currently, because NASA does not consider program level requirements
when planning agency wide commitments for space communications, many of
these program requirements, such as infrastructure needs, are not being
addressed, which means they will worsen and inhibit the agency's
ability to support future space exploration initiatives. Also, since
space communications programs have the ability to direct resources to
investments, investments made may not support agency wide requirements
conducive to a broader and possibly more efficient space communications
capability for the agency. As NASA begins to commit more resources to
deep space exploration in the future, the agency must ensure that it
properly addresses the communications needs of all of its missions and
makes investments from that viewpoint. NASA has the opportunity to
address this issue through a newly created task group charged with
analyzing how this can best be achieved.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To better position the Deep Space Network to meet existing workload
challenges and prepare the network for future deep space communications
responsibilities, we recommend that the NASA Administrator direct DSN
to (1) identify total program requirements for deep space
communications capabilities for the near and long term, in terms better
defined than the single coverage commitment of 95 percent, (2)
determine the extent to which the program's current capabilities can
support those identified requirements and (3) develop a plan to address
any gap between those capabilities and requirements and identify the
estimated costs of any enhancements needed.
As NASA's task group on space communications considers how program
requirements can be better integrated into overall agency goals for
space communications capabilities, we recommend that the NASA
Administrator direct the group to consider the following in carrying
out its task: (1) identify what priority program-level requirements
have in agency-level decisions affecting space communications, (2)
determine how program-level requirements for space communications
programs can be identified and communicated to agency-level decision
makers, and (3) establish how the agency can identify program-level
investments needed to address program requirements that support agency
wide goals for space communications and how to coordinate those
investments to avoid duplication and additional costs. While
considering these recommendations and the task at hand, the group
should also consider the importance of having shared knowledge and
communication about these issues openly with all entities involved.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
NASA concurred with our recommendations. In commenting on the draft of
our report, NASA pointed out that it already had a plan in place that
addresses our first set of recommendations, namely the need for the
agency to identify all DSN requirements for the near and long-term, how
it will meet those requirements, and identify costs associated with
meeting those requirements. While we recognize that NASA has a DSN
Roadmap, the agency still lacks a detailed strategy for addressing DSN
needs for the future that includes all program requirements, i.e.
deferred maintenance, in addition to the already projected mission
needs. Furthermore, the DSN Roadmap does not include estimation of
costs and does not address the impact of unmet needs on its ability to
meet mission requirements.
NASA also commented that the DSN has not been responsible for the loss
of missions. Our report does not state that missions were lost because
of the DSN. However, NASA officials provided GAO evidence that mission
science had been lost as a result of disruptions in the operation of
DSN, and that point is characterized in the report.
As agreed with your offices, unless you announce its contents earlier,
we will not distribute this report further until 30 days from its date.
At that time, we will send copies to the NASA Administrator and
interested congressional committees. We will make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
acknowledged in appendix III.
Signed by:
Allen Li, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To identify the challenges facing NASA's Deep Space Network program in
meeting its current and planned space communications workload, we
performed the following:
* We obtained and analyzed NASA documents and briefing slides related
to the operation and capabilities of the Deep Space Network, including
budget submissions and funding breakouts, workforce projections,
missions lists, fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 Program Operating
Plans, the DSN Strategic Roadmap, mission agreements, the memorandums
of agreement with the host countries of the foreign DSN sites, a 2004
NASA-wide facilities condition assessment, deferred maintenance
information and work breakdown system data, risk assessments for
various aspects of the network, return on investment analyses for
various technology upgrades and system performance and reliability
data, including records of downtimes.
* We reviewed the NASA Vision for Exploration roadmaps and the National
Research Council reports on those roadmaps, the Vision for Exploration
Architecture report, and NASA Strategic Plan for 2005 and Beyond for
information about the role of DSN in the Vision. We also reviewed
previous GAO reports on infrastructure investment, technology
development and deferred maintenance.
* We interviewed NASA mission officials to receive their feedback on
the performance of DSN, including performance shortfalls, in meeting
their needs and collected information related to those specific
missions. We also discussed the nature of challenges experienced by the
program through interviews with NASA and Jet Propulsion Laboratory
officials and DSN contractor personnel and received written and oral
responses from all.
To determine the extent NASA is integrating DSN into its space
communications plans for the future, we performed the following:
* We collected and analyzed information related to space communications
architecture management at NASA, including the NASA 4.0 Communication
and Navigation Capability Roadmap, space communication architecture
plans, descriptions of the various space communications assets intended
to play a role in the future architecture, Memorandum of Agreement for
the Management of NASA's Space Communications Networks, and a
description of the history of space communications management at NASA.
* We held discussions with NASA space communications officials about
future space communications architecture requirements, what assets the
architecture will include, and how its development is being managed by
the Space Communication Coordination and Integration Board (SCCIB) and
Space Communications Architecture Working Group (SCAWG). We reviewed
the charter of the SCAWG. We also discussed the budget development and
execution process for DSN at the Science Mission Directorate (SMD)
level, and how that impacts integration of the DSN into the overall
agency space communications architecture.
* We met with NASA's Space Communications Organization Study Group,
which was established during the course of our review, to discuss its
task of identifying options for the management of space communications
for the future of NASA space exploration. We also reviewed the Terms of
Reference (TOR) for this group to better understand its goals and time
frames.
To accomplish our work, we visited and interviewed officials
responsible for DSN operations at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C;
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, Calif; and ITT Industries
contractor officials at their offices in Monrovia, Calif., and at the
DSN site complex in Goldstone, Calif. At NASA Headquarters, we met with
officials from the Science Mission Directorate, including lead
representatives from the Deep Space Network program, the Exploration
Missions Directorate and the Space Operations Mission Directorate,
including the Space Communications Architecture Working Group. We also
met with DSN mission officials from the Mars Rovers, Deep Impact,
Cassini-Huygens, and Stardust programs.
We conducted our review from May 2005 to April 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Agency Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Office of the Administrator:
Washington, DC 20546-0001:
April 10, 2006:
Mr. Allen Li:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Li:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the draft report
entitled "NASA's Deep Space Network: Current Management Structure is
Not Conducive to Effectively Matching Resources with Future
Requirements (GAO-06-445)." In general,
it identifies many of the issues and tradeoffs NASA faces daily in
managing the Deep Space Network. Clearly, it is a challenge to balance
the need to make the program responsive to specific users with the need
to manage DSN as an Agency-wide asset. We appreciate GAO's
acknowledgment of that balancing act. In the same vein, we agree with
many of GAO's recommendations regarding the importance of conducting
long-term planning for the future of the Deep Space Network, in
particular the need to identify long-term requirements, assess current
and projected capabilities against those requirements, and develop
mechanisms for bridging any gaps. Those recommendations and our
responses are discussed in greater detail below.
The GAO recommended "...that the NASA Administrator direct DSN to (1)
identify total program requirements for deep space communication
capabilities for the near and long term, in terms better defined than
the single coverage commitment of 95 percent, (2) determine the extent
to which the program's current capabilities can support those
identified requirements, and (3) develop a plan to address any gap
between those capabilities and requirements and identify the estimated
costs of any enhancements needed."
NASA concurs with the recommendations and is, in many ways, already
implementing them. As NASA moves forward with the program, the Agency
developed a "Roadmap" to help guide the future of the Deep Space
Network. The Roadmap proceeded in stages that mirror GAO's
recommendations. First, it proposed a series of upgrades based on
projected mission demands through 2030. Second, NASA circulated that
upgrade plan within the user community and reviewed their input in
order to ensure that the proposed upgrades aligned with future user
needs. During the process, NASA also sought to identify and resolve
likely gaps between future demands and future capabilities. Finally,
the Roadmap was presented to the Agency-wide Space Communications
Architecture Working Group (SCAWG), which in turn developed a future
architecture. NASA is currently in the process of refining that
architecture and estimating the costs of implementing it. We believe
that GAO's recommendations on positioning the DSN to prepare for future
communications responsibilities are very helpful and that the refined
architecture and cost estimates will consider those recommendations.
The GAO raises important points about the difficulty of making
tradeoffs between missions and the relative age of the Deep Space
Network infrastructure. It notes instances in which these tradeoffs
resulted in less-than-ideal outcomes. While we may take issue with some
of the specific anecdotes GAO identified, the overall report will be
helpful in educating the American people about the challenges of
exploring space. NASA strives for the ideal outcome for all parties
concerned, but the fact is that DSN does not have infinite capability,
and it will be impossible to meet all of the potential demands of all
of the potential users all of the time. With that in mind, I am
concerned that the GAO report may create the wrong impression: that the
DSN network as a whole is not currently meeting mission demands. In
fact, NASA has never lost a mission due to issues associated with the
DSN network. More importantly, no mission has been unable to meet its
mission requirements due to a lack of capability in the DSN.
Nevertheless, NASA shares GAO's concerns about the future capacity and
capabilities of the system. As I mentioned earlier, the road-mapping
exercise that NASA initiated before GAO began its study will help us
plan the system's long-term evolution. As GAO noted, however, not all
of the issues associated with the DSN revolve around resources,
capabilities, and requirements. So, NASA initiated a study to review
the management structure for all NASA space communications. As noted in
the GAO report, DSN has not always been managed under its current
structure. An alternative may, in fact, be preferable given the
evolution of the Agency. Our ongoing study, being conducted by the
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), will help answer that
question in the broader context of the Agency's plan for space
exploration. The PA&E study will take into account GAO's
recommendations to: (1) identify program level requirements and their
priority in Agency-level decision-making, (2) determine how program
level requirements can be identified and communicated to Agency-level
decision-makers, and (3) establish a process by which the Agency can
identify the program-level investments needed to address program-level
requirements that serve Agency-wide goals for space communications
while avoiding duplication and excess cost. We will certainly keep your
GAO team informed as to the result of our ongoing study.
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on the GAO report. I
hope you will keep my comments, and those of NASA personnel, in mind as
you complete and publish the study.
Cordially,
Signed by:
Shana Dale:
Deputy Administrator:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:
GAO Contact:
Allen Li (202) 512-4841:
Staff Acknowledgements:
In addition to the individual named above, Brendan Culley, James
Morrison, Sylvia Schatz, Robert Swierczek, Trevor Thomson, Hai Tran and
Thomas Twambly made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The relationships between the United States and Spain and Australia
are outlined in international agreements. According to DSN officials,
in exchange for use of land by NASA's assets in these foreign
countries, the Spanish and Australian space agencies have full access
to all deep space science collected by NASA spacecraft.
[2] See sec. 102(c)(1), Public Law 109-155.
[3] See H.R. Conference Report 109-272 accompanying Public Law 109-108.
[4] This profile was not included in NASA's fiscal year 2007 budget
request.
[5] Although we requested the amount of science data lost due to this
disruption, the program could not provide it.
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