NASA
Agency Has Taken Steps Toward Making Sound Investment Decisions for Ares I but Still Faces Challenging Knowledge Gaps
Gao ID: GAO-08-51 October 31, 2007
One of the first steps in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) efforts to implement the President's plan to return humans to the moon and prepare for eventual human space flight to Mars is the development of the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle. In 2005, NASA outlined a framework for implementing the President's plan and has awarded contracts for Ares I and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle it is designed to send into space. It plans to conduct the first human space flight in 2015. However, the agency is seeking to speed development efforts in order to reduce the gap in our nation's ability to provide human access to space caused by the Space Shuttle's retirement in 2010. GAO was asked to assess NASA's progress in developing the knowledge needed to make sound investment decisions for the Ares I project. GAO's work included analyzing Ares I plans, contracts, schedules, and risk assessments.
NASA has been taking steps to build a business case--demonstrating the project is achievable within the constraints of time and money and other resources NASA has available--for Ares I. This has included relying on established technology and adopting an acquisition strategy that emphasizes attaining knowledge on cost, schedule, and technical and development feasibility before commitments are made to long-terms investments. The project also acknowledges that many risks are present and is undertaking an array of activities to track and mitigate those risks. However, NASA has not yet developed the knowledge needed to make sound investment decisions for the Ares I project. Principally, there are gaps in knowledge about requirements, costs, schedule, technology, design, and production feasibility. Our work shows that successful program execution is dependent on having these elements in place at the time long-term investment commitments are made. While NASA still has 10 months under its own schedule to close gaps in knowledge about requirements, technologies, costs, and time and other elements needed to develop the Ares I system, the gaps we identified are fairly significant and challenging given the complexity and interdependencies in the program. For example, continued instability in the design of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle is hampering the Ares I project's efforts to establish firm requirements, the aggressive J-2X upper stage engine development schedule is not synchronized with the rest of the project, and it is unclear if NASA has allocated sufficient funding to the project.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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GAO-08-51, NASA: Agency Has Taken Steps Toward Making Sound Investment Decisions for Ares I but Still Faces Challenging Knowledge Gaps
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Science and Technology, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2007:
NASA:
Agency Has Taken Steps Toward Making Sound Investment Decisions for
Ares I but Still Faces Challenging Knowledge Gaps:
GAO-08-51:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-51, a report to the Chairman, Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
One of the first steps in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration‘s (NASA) efforts to implement the President‘s plan to return humans to the moon and prepare for eventual human space flight to Mars is the development of the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle. In 2005, NASA outlined a framework for implementing the President‘s plan and has awarded contracts for Ares I and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle it is designed to send into space. It plans to conduct the first human space flight in 2015. However, the agency is seeking to speed development efforts in order to reduce the gap in our nation‘s ability to provide human access to space caused by the Space Shuttle‘s retirement in 2010. GAO was asked to assess NASA‘s progress in developing the knowledge needed to make sound investment decisions for the Ares I project. GAO‘s work included analyzing Ares I plans, contracts, schedules, and risk assessments.
What GAO Found:
NASA has been taking steps to build a business case”demonstrating the project is achievable within the constraints of time and money and other resources NASA has available”for Ares I. This has included relying on established technology and adopting an acquisition strategy that emphasizes attaining knowledge on cost, schedule, and technical and development feasibility before commitments are made to long-terms investments. The project also acknowledges that many risks are present and is undertaking an array of activities to track and mitigate those risks. However, NASA has not yet developed the knowledge needed to make sound investment decisions for the Ares I project. Principally, there are gaps in knowledge about requirements, costs, schedule, technology, design, and production feasibility. Our work shows that successful program execution is dependent on having these elements in place at the time long-term investment commitments are made. While NASA still has 10 months under its own schedule to close gaps in knowledge about requirements, technologies, costs, and time and other elements needed to develop the Ares I system, the gaps we identified are fairly significant and challenging given the complexity and interdependencies in the program. For example, continued instability in the design of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle is hampering the Ares I project‘s efforts to establish firm requirements, the aggressive J-2X upper stage engine development schedule is not synchronized with the rest of the project, and it is unclear if NASA has allocated sufficient funding to the project.
Figure: Artist‘s rendition of Ares I:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends NASA establish a sound business case for Ares I before proceeding beyond preliminary design review (now set for July 2008), and if necessary, delay the preliminary design review until the project‘s readiness to move forward is demonstrated.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on [hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-51. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
NASA Has Taken Steps Toward Making Sound Investment Decisions for Ares
I but Still Faces Knowledge Gaps:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Constellation Program Schedule, by Fiscal Year:
Figure 2: Space Shuttle, Ares I, and Ares V Comparison:
Figure 3: Comparison of NASA's Life Cycle with a Knowledge-Based
Acquisition Life Cycle:
Figure 4: Ares I Risks as Tracked by IRMA:
Figure 5: Illustration of Ares I Common Bulkhead and Frustrum:
Figure 6: Ares I Project Schedule Timelines, by Fiscal Year:
Abbreviations:
DDT&E: design, development, test, and evaluation:
ESAS: Exploration Systems Architecture Study:
IRMA: Integrated Risk Management Application:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 31, 2007:
The Honorable Bart Gordon:
Chairman:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to spend
nearly $230 billion over the next 2 decades to implement the
President's Vision for Space Exploration (Vision), which calls for a
return of humans to the moon and eventual human spaceflight to Mars.
NASA is implementing the Vision under the Constellation program. [Footnote 1] Among the first major efforts of this program are
the development of new space flight systems--including the Ares I Crew
Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle--to tackle the
mission. NASA has awarded contracts related to each effort and plans to
conduct the first human spaceflight launch in 2015. However, the agency
is seeking to speed development efforts in order to reduce the gap in
our nation's ability to provide human access to space caused by the
Space Shuttle retirement in 2010.
In September 2005, NASA outlined an initial framework for implementing
the Vision in its Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). NASA
indicated it would maximize the use of heritage hardware and established technology in order to reduce cost and minimize risk. It
proposed using the same engines and reusable solid rocket boosters that
now launch the Space Shuttle as the basis for the Ares I Crew Launch
Vehicle. Since then, however, NASA has undertaken a number of
additional reviews to further refine the project requirements which
resulted in changes to the Ares I design.
You asked us to assess NASA's progress in developing the knowledge
needed to make sound investment decisions for the Ares I project. To
address this objective, we obtained and reviewed Ares I plans,
contracts, schedules, risk assessments, budget documentation, and
technology maturity assessments. We conducted further qualitative and
quantitative analyses of these documents and compared them to criteria
established in NASA directives governing development projects and in
GAO's best practices body of work. Our work was conducted between March
2007 and September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
NASA has been taking steps to build a business case for Ares I,
including relying on established technology and adopting an acquisition
strategy that emphasizes attaining knowledge on cost, schedule, and
technical and development feasibility before commitments are made to
long-term investments. The program also acknowledges that many risks
are present and is undertaking an array of activities to track and
mitigate those risks. However, NASA has not yet developed the knowledge
needed to make sound investment decisions for the Ares I project.
Principally, there are gaps in knowledge about requirements, costs,
schedule, technology, design, and production feasibility. Our work
shows that successful program execution is dependent on having these
elements in place at the time long-term investment commitments are
made. While NASA still has 10 months under its own schedule to close
gaps in knowledge about requirements, technologies, costs, and time and
other elements needed to develop the Ares I system, the gaps we
identified are significant and challenging given the complexity and
interdependencies in the program. More specifically, the challenges
NASA faces are the following:
* Requirements knowledge gaps: Ares I requirements are not yet stable,
namely because requirements are not yet stable for the Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle--which Ares I will be launching. NASA recognizes
the need to synchronize Ares I and Orion requirements as the top risk
facing the Ares I project. According to NASA, at least 14 of the 57
risks in the Ares project--as tracked by the Constellation program's
integrated risk management system--are explicitly tied to requirements
instability. When requirements are in flux and development efforts are
contingent upon the flow-down of stable requirements, it can create a
ripple effect of unknowns and be extremely difficult to establish firm
cost and schedule baselines. In fact, NASA was not able to definitize,
that is, reach agreement on the terms and conditions of its development
contracts for the first stage and upper stage engine until very
recently because requirements were in flux.
* Technology and hardware development knowledge gaps: Three major
elements of the Ares I system--first stage, upper stage, and the upper
stage engine--pose significant development challenges. Although the
first stage draws heavily from existing Space Shuttle systems,
incorporating a fifth segment is likely to affect the flight
characteristics of the existing reusable solid rocket booster. These
flight characteristics would need to be demonstrated and understood
prior to the production effort. Also, the upper stage is including a
shared or "common" bulkhead between its two fuel tanks. Experience from
the Apollo program indicates that common bulkheads are complex,
difficult to manufacture, and should be avoided. Further, the J-2X
upper stage engine represents a new engine development effort that is
likely to encounter problems during development. NASA estimates that J-
2X will require 29 rework cycles to address problems.
* Aggressive schedule: The J-2X upper stage engine, the critical path
for the Ares I development, is on an aggressive development schedule
wherein the J-2X engine design cycle is ahead of the Ares I vehicle
design cycle. Delays in the J-2X schedule for design, development,
test, and evaluation would have a ripple effect throughout the entire
Ares I project. In addition, the critical design review for the first
stage is currently scheduled after the Ares I project-level critical
design review. This places the project at risk of prematurely beginning
full-scale test and integration activities.
* Projected funding shortfalls: NASA's funding strategy for the
Constellation program relies on accumulating funds in fiscal years 2006
and 2007 for work planned in fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010. NASA
estimates its total budget will be insufficient to fund all
Constellation activities during these years. These funding shortfalls
could result in planned work not being completed to support schedules
and milestones.
NASA acknowledges these risks and has mitigation plans in place for
most of them. For example, NASA is mitigating J-2X schedule risk by
acquiring additional test resources in order to relieve pressure on the
test schedule. We are making recommendations to the NASA Administrator
to direct the Ares I project to develop a sound business case before
beginning product development.
Background:
Ares I and Orion are currently targeted for operation no later than
2015 (see fig. 1). However, NASA is seeking to accelerate this schedule
to minimize the gap in the nation's ability to launch humans into
space.[Footnote 2] Following the initial phase, Constellation will
develop crew and cargo capabilities for missions to the lunar surface,
no later than 2020. As currently planned, this system will include the
Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle, Earth Departure Stage, Lunar Surface
Access Module, and associated support capabilities. Further development
will provide crew, cargo, and infrastructure to support human
exploration of Mars and beyond.
Figure 1: Constellation Program Schedule, by Fiscal Year:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a timeline , depicting the following data:
Ares I crew launch vehicle:
System requirements review: December, 2007;
Preliminary design review: July, 2008;
Critical design review: March, 2010;
Initial operating capability for both projects: March, 2015.
Orion crew exploration vehicle:
System requirements review: March, 2007;
Preliminary design review: August, 2008;
Critical design review: September 2009;
Initial operating capability for both projects: March, 2015.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
[End of figure]
In September 2005, NASA authorized the Ares I project to proceed with
the development of a new human-rated crew launch vehicle with a
24.5-metric ton lift capability and a total budget of $14.4 billion for
design, development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E), and
production.[Footnote 3] In April 2006, NASA awarded a $1.8 billion
contract for DDT&E of the first stage to Alliant Techsystems followed
by a $1.2 billion contract for DDT&E of the J-2X upper stage engine to
Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne in June 2006. NASA is developing the upper
stage and the upper stage instrument unit, which contains the control
systems and avionics for the Ares I, in-house.
Recent Changes to Ares I Architecture:
As initially conceived in the ESAS--NASA's effort to identify the best
architecture and strategy to implement the President's 2004 Vision for
Space Exploration--the Ares I design was predicated on using existing
Shuttle components including the four-segment reusable solid rocket
booster as the first stage and the Space Shuttle main engine as the
upper stage engine. According to agency officials, after standing up
the Ares I project office, NASA began to examine the ESAS architecture
from a more programmatic perspective. At this point NASA began to
consider alternatives that would streamline the development path for
the Ares family of launch vehicles and save development and operations
costs in the long run.
Implementing the ESAS architecture for the Ares launch vehicle family
would have entailed five new efforts to develop and/or modify
propulsion hardware including:
* modifying and certifying the Space Shuttle's four-segment reusable
solid rocket booster for the Ares I first stage;
* modifying and certifying, a five-segment reusable solid rocket
booster for the Ares V, based on the Space Shuttle's four-segment
reusable solid rocket booster;
* modifying and certifying an expendable Space Shuttle main engine for
the Ares I upper stage;
* modifying and certifying a different expendable Space Shuttle main
engine for the Ares V; and;
* developing and certifying, based on the Apollo era J-2 engine, an
engine for the Ares V.
This approach would have also required NASA to manage multiple booster
configurations and multiple Space Shuttle main engine versions during
the lunar mission time frame.
After completing additional systems engineering and analysis of life-
cycle costs, in January 2006 NASA made changes to the Ares I design to
reduce the total number of development efforts required to enable the
Ares launch vehicle family.[Footnote 4] The Ares I design (see fig. 2)
now includes the five-segment reusable solid rocket booster for its
first stage and the J-2X--an engine based on the J-2 and J-2S engines
used on the 1960s era Saturn V--as the upper stage engine. The current
design increases commonality between the Ares I and Ares V, and
eliminates the need to develop, modify, and certify both a four-segment
reusable solid rocket booster and an expendable Space Shuttle main
engine for the Ares I. NASA also expects the J-2X to be less expensive
and easier to manufacture than the Space Shuttle main engine. According
to NASA, by developing the J-2X and resolving risks associated with
incorporating a fifth segment into the reusable solid rocket booster
earlier, the new Ares I design now represents a significant and direct
down payment on the Ares V. Furthermore, NASA believes this approach
can enable an earlier Ares V availability date, since the risks
associated with incorporating the fifth segment into the reusable solid
rocket booster will have been resolved.
Figure 2: Space Shuttle, Ares I, and Ares V Comparison:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the overall height, in feet, of the Space Shuttle, Ares I, and Ares V.
Space Shuttle (four-segment reusable solid rocket booster):
Overall vehicle height in feet: approximately 180.
Ares I (five-segment reusable solid rocket booster and J-2X:
Overall vehicle height in feet: approximately 330.
Ares V (five-segment reusable solid rocket booster and J-2X:
Overall vehicle height in feet: approximately 360.
Source: NASA and GAO presentation.
[End of figure]
NASA estimates that incorporating the J-2X and five-segment reusable
solid rocket booster in the Ares I design will result in long-term cost
savings. According to NASA officials, the savings can be realized by
minimizing the number of development efforts--eliminating the cost of
modifying and certifying the Space Shuttle main engine and four-segment
reusable solid rocket booster for use on the Ares I--and increasing
commonality between the Ares I and the Ares V. While achieving these
savings involves increasing the Constellation budget by $730 million
through 2010, NASA estimates that these changes will result in net long
term savings of $1.2 billion. Our past work on total ownership costs
indicates that making design trades early in development is a best
practice among leading commercial developers that can reduce long-term
operating and support costs.[Footnote 5]
NASA Has Taken Steps Toward Making Sound Investment Decisions for Ares
I but Still Faces Knowledge Gaps:
NASA has taken steps toward making sound investment decisions for Ares
I. For instance, it is relying on established technology to support the
program, and it is adopting an acquisition strategy that emphasizes
attaining knowledge on cost, schedule, and technical and development
feasibility before commitments are made to long-terms investments. NASA
also recognizes that the program is still facing many technical,
programmatic, and funding risks and has undertaken measures to track
and mitigate those risks. However, NASA still must develop the
knowledge needed to make sound investment decisions for the Ares I
project. Principally, there are gaps in knowledge about requirements,
costs, schedule, technology, design, and production feasibility.
Knowledge about Requirements and Resources Is Critical to Making Sound
Investment Decisions:
GAO's work on best practices over the past decade has shown that
success in large-scale, expensive development efforts like Ares I
depends on establishing an executable business case before committing
resources to a new product development effort. The business case in its
simplest form is demonstrated evidence that (1) the customer's needs
are valid and can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the
chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing resources-
-that is, proven technologies, design knowledge, existing funding, and
adequate time to deliver the product when it is needed. A program
should not go forward into product development unless a sound business
case can be made. For a program to deliver a successful product within
available resources, managers should demonstrate high levels of
knowledge before significant commitments are made. In essence,
knowledge supplants risk over time.
Having adequate knowledge about requirements and resources is
particularly important for a project like Ares I. Human spaceflight
development programs are complex and difficult by nature, and the Ares
I project faces daunting challenges in terms of design, testing, and
manufacturing regardless of the systems and technologies underpinning
the system's design. There are also considerable external pressures
being placed on the program. For example, the program is being asked to
deliver capability by 2015 in order to minimize the gap between the
Space Shuttle's retirement and deployment of new transportation
vehicles. In addition, there are funding constraints due to the need to
fund other programs in NASA's portfolio. Moreover, over the past
decade, there have been a number of instances where NASA pursued costly
efforts to build a second generation of reusable human spaceflight
vehicles without attaining critical knowledge about requirements and
resources and, in turn, experienced significant problems--including
cost and schedule delays. These include the National Aero-Space Plane,
the X-33 and X-34, and the Space Launch Initiative, which were
eventually canceled. While these endeavors have helped to advance
scientific and technical knowledge, none of these projects accomplished
NASA's objective of fielding a new reusable space vehicle. We estimate
that these unsuccessful development efforts have cost approximately
$4.8 billion since the 1980s.
NASA Is Attempting to Follow a Knowledge-Based Approach to Building a
Business Case for the Ares I Project:
The current Ares I acquisition strategy does include some knowledge-
based concepts. The Ares I first stage design draws heavily from
existing Space Shuttle systems. Our work has shown that design
solutions based on modifying and/or improving existing technologies and
systems are less risky than design solutions based on new technologies
and new inventions. Furthermore, NASA's decision to include the J-2X
engine and five-segment booster in the Ares I design in order to reduce
long-term operations and support cost is in line with the practices of
leading commercial developers that give long-term savings priority over
short-term gains.
The Ares I project was also proactive in ensuring that the ongoing
project was in compliance with NASA's new directives, which include
elements of a knowledge-based approach. NASA's new acquisition
directives require a series of key reviews and decision points between
each life-cycle phase of the Ares I project that serve as gates through
which the project must pass before moving forward.[Footnote 6] The
directives also recommend, but do not require, specific entrance and
success criteria for each technical review. We found that the Ares I
project had implemented the use of key decision points and adopted the
recommended entrance and exit criteria for the December 2006 Systems
Requirements Review and the upcoming October 2007 Systems Definition
Review. According to NASA officials, the Constellation program made a
conscious decision to require all of its projects to use the criteria
recommended in the new directives for all reviews. We also found that
the Ares I project has established specific knowledge-based goals--such
as demonstrating maturity of key technologies by the preliminary design
review and requiring a threshold 90 percent of engineering drawings be
complete by the critical design review.
Figure 3 illustrates how NASA's current acquisition directives for
spaceflight programs and projects have incorporated some knowledge-
based concepts into NASA's approach to acquisitions. For example, NASA
Procedural Requirements 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and Project
Management Requirements, requires decision reviews between each major
phase of the acquisition life cycle. Further, NASA Procedural
Requirements 7123.1A, NASA Systems Engineering Processes and
Requirements, recommends general entrance and success criteria for the
decision reviews. While the directives include multiple decision points
at which progress in development can be measured, they also allow the
centers and individual projects to establish the specific criteria used
to define success for these reviews. NASA Procedural Requirements
7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements,
also requires that at the end of the formulation phase, projects
demonstrate some elements of a sound business case, to include firm
requirements, mature technologies, a preliminary design, and realistic
cost and schedule estimates before proceeding into
implementation.[Footnote 7]
Figure 3: Comparison of NASA's Life Cycle with a Knowledge-Based
Acquisition Life Cycle:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a comparison of NASA's Life Cycle with a Knowledge-Based
Acquisition Life Cycle.
NASA‘s life cycle for flight systems and ground support projects:
Formulation:
* Pre-phase A: Concept studies (Key Decision Point A at end of phase);
* Phase A: Concept development (System definition review during the phase; Preliminanry non-advocate review at end of phase; Key Decision Point B at end of phase).
* Phase B: Preliminary design and technology completion (Preliminary design review during phase; Non-advocate review at end of phase; Key Decision Point C at end of phase).
Implementation:
* Phase C: Final Design and fabrication (Critical design review during the phase; Key Decision Point D at end of phase).
* Phase D: System assembly, integration and test, launch (Key Decision Point D at end of phase).
* Phase E: Operations and sustainment (Key Decision Point D at end of phase).
* Phase F: Closeout.
Knowledge-based approach:
* Concept and technology development (Knowledge point 1 (KP1) at end of phase: Technologies, time, funding, and other resources match customer needs); This is the program start point, and coincides with Key Decision Point C of the NASA life cycle.
* Product development: Integration; Demonstration. (Knowledge point 2 (KP2) between integration and demonstration: Design performs as expected. This coincides with Key Decision Point D of the NASA life cycle); Knowledge point 3 (KP2) at end of cycle: Production meets cost, schedule, and quality targets. This coincides with the middle of Phase D of the NASA life cycle).
* Production.
Management decision reviews include:
* Preliminary non-advocate review;
* Non-advocate review;
* Key decision points.
Technical reviews include:
* System definition review;
* Preliminary design review;
* Critical design review.
Source: NASA data and GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
NASA Is also Taking Measures to Mitigate Risks:
In accordance with a knowledge-based approach, NASA's acquisition
directives also require all space flight programs and projects,
including the Ares I project, to maintain a continuous risk management
system.[Footnote 8] NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5D, NASA Space
Flight Program and Project Management Requirements, defines risk
management as an organized, systematic decision-making process that
efficiently identifies, analyzes, and plans for the handling of risks,
and tracks, controls, communicates, and documents risk in order to
increase the likelihood of achieving project goals.
NASA is currently using the Web-based Integrated Risk Management
Application (IRMA) as a tool for implementing continuous risk
management within the Ares I project. IRMA identifies and documents
risks, categorizes risks--as high, medium, and low based on both the
likelihood of an undesirable event as well as the consequences of that
event to the project--and tracks performance against mitigation plans.
In the case of the Ares I project, as illustrated by figure 4, IRMA is
tracking 57 Ares I risks including 31 high-risk areas.[Footnote 9]
Figure 4: Ares I Risks as Tracked by IRMA:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Level of Risk: High;
Number of risks: 31;
Level of risk: Medium;
Number of risks: 23;
Level of risk: Low;
Number of risks: 2.
Source: NASA data and GAO analysis.
Note: Risks in this figure total only 56 because 1 of the risks has not been categorized as high, medium, or low.
[End of figure]
Critical Knowledge Needed for Investment Decision Making for Ares I Has
Not Yet Been Attained:
NASA has not yet established firm requirements or developed mature
technologies, a preliminary design, or realistic cost estimates, or
determined the ultimate time and money needed to complete the program
and so is not in a position to make informed investment decisions. Our
work and NASA's own directives have shown that a successful knowledge-
based acquisition strategy is dependent on having these elements in
place at the time long-term investment commitments are made. For NASA,
this milestone is currently scheduled for July 2008. While NASA still
has 10 months to close gaps in knowledge, it will be challenged to do
so.
Gaps in Knowledge about Ares I Requirements:
In following a knowledge-based approach to development, successful
organizations extensively research and define requirements before
program start to ensure that they are achievable, given available
resources. In successful programs, negotiations and trade-offs occur
before product development is started to ensure that a match exists
between customer expectations and developer resources. By contrast,
previous NASA programs have continued to define requirements after
product development was started--which in turn created unknowns about
costs and schedule as well as the need for rework late in development
to address changes in performance parameters.
For the Ares I program, 14 of the project's self-identified risk
factors are tied to unstable requirements--many of which are
interrelated between Ares I and Orion projects. Because the Orion
vehicle is the payload that the Ares I must deliver to orbit, changes
in the Orion design, especially those that affect weight, directly
affect Ares lift requirements. Both the Orion and Ares I vehicles have
a history of weight and mass growth, and NASA is still defining the
mass, loads, and weight requirements for both vehicles. For example, a
design analysis cycle completed in May 2007 revealed an unexpected
increase in ascent loads (the physical strain on the spacecraft during
launch) that could result in increases to the weight of the Orion
vehicle and both stages of the Ares I. While our work shows that the
preliminary design phase is an appropriate place to conduct systems
engineering to support requirement trade-off decisions, when
requirements are in flux and development efforts are contingent upon
the flow-down of stable requirements, it can create a ripple effect of
unknowns and make it extremely difficult to establish firm cost
estimates and schedule baselines. NASA recognizes that the need to
synchronize Ares I and Orion requirements is the top risk facing the
Ares I project and that continued instability in the Orion design is
increasing risk to the Ares I project. The Ares I and Orion projects
are working on this issue but don't expect to finalize new mass, loads,
and weight allocations until after the October 2007 Systems Definition
Review. Until these top-level requirements are finalized, lower-level
requirements will also remain in flux.
Requirements instability is also increasing risk for the individual
elements of the Ares I. The J-2X engine design cycle is ahead of the
Ares I vehicle design cycle. Consequently, there is a possibility that
new and/or late developing requirements for the Ares I could lead to
costly changes being required for the engine design. In addition, until
the Ares I requirements are finalized, NASA will not know whether the
existing hardware--such as the first stage reusable solid rocket
boosters--will need modifications to satisfy requirements.
Furthermore, NASA has not yet matured guidance, navigation, and control
requirements for the upper stage subsystems. According to an agency
official, these requirements cannot be finalized until mass, loads and
weight requirements are finalized. Since these requirements are not
expected to be provided until just 2 ½ months prior to the upper stage
preliminary design review process start, there is a possibility that
the system requirements review design concepts will be highly affected
once requirements are received.
Requirements instability also contributed to NASA's inability to
definitize design, development, and test and evaluation contracts for
both the first stage and upper stage engine until August and July 2007
respectively--more than a year after the contracts were awarded. The
NASA Federal Acquisitions Regulation Supplement establishes a goal of
definitizing undefinitized contracts[Footnote 10] within 6 months of
issuance.[Footnote 11] NASA awarded sole-source, cost-reimbursable
contracts for all of design, development, and test and evaluation of
the first stage and upper stage engine in April 2006 and June 2006
respectively. Our past work indicates that while it is appropriate for
developmental contracts for government specific items to be cost-
reimbursable in nature, it is a poor practice to allow these types of
contracts to remain undefinitized for extended periods. In fact, both
GAO and NASA inspector general reports have identified risks in NASA
programs in the past, including the International Space Station and the
Space Shuttle due to heavy reliance on undefinitized contract actions.
According to agency officials, these contracts remained undefinitized
over 1 year because of the difficulty associated with establishing
requirements for the complex Ares I development effort. According to
agency officials, however, NASA mitigated the risk of the contracts
remaining undefinitized by capping the value of the undefinitized work
and by closely monitoring the contractor's progress.
Gaps in Knowledge about Resources:
In following a knowledge-based approach, successful organizations also
ensure that resources--primarily funding, time, and other resources--
can be matched to requirements before program start. For example, they
ensure that technologies can work as intended, funding will be
available, costs are accurately estimated, and that the project
schedule provides the time required to complete critical technology
development, design, and production activities. Although NASA is
relying on the use of existing systems and low-risk technology, there
are still gaps in knowledge about resources--including money, time, and
availability of technologies and hardware.
Ares I First Stage:
NASA is incorporating a fifth segment into the existing four-segment
Space Shuttle reusable solid rocket booster by adding a third center
segment--the two center segments of the four-segment reusable solid
rocket booster are identical. NASA is also adding a frustum--an
inverted cone-shaped connecter--to mate the reusable solid rocket
booster to the larger-diameter upper stage (see fig. 5). Adding the
fifth segment and the frustum has increased the length and flexibility
of the reusable solid rocket booster. It is currently unclear how the
modification will affect the flight characteristics of the reusable
solid rocket booster. Failure to completely understand the flight
characteristic of the modified booster could create a risk of hardware
failure and loss of vehicle control. In addition, there is also a
possibility that the reusable solid rocket booster heritage hardware
may not meet qualification requirements given the new ascent and re-
entry loads and vibration and acoustic environments associated with the
Ares I. This could result in cost and schedule impacts due to redesign
and requalification efforts. NASA is currently working to define this
risk. Furthermore, the added weight of the fifth segment to the
boosters is forcing the contractor to push the state of the art in
developing a parachute recovery system.
In January 2007, an independent review of the first stage development
questioned the cost-effectiveness of continuing with a reusable booster
design. According to NASA and contractor officials, the primary benefit
of recovering the reusable solid rocket boosters is not financial in
nature but is the knowledge gained through analysis of the recovered
flight hardware. However, NASA may need to consider expendable first
stage options given the weight issues associated with both the Ares I
and Orion vehicles. If NASA opts to pursue an expendable solution for
the first stage, the overall Ares I design and requirements could
change dramatically.
Figure 5: Illustration of Ares I Common Bulkhead and Frustrum:
[See PDF for image]
This illustration depicts the Ares I Common Bulkhead and Frustrum, with the following componenets labeled:
* First stage:
- Center segments;
- Frustrum.
* Upper Stage:
- Nozzle;
- Upper stage J-2X engine;
- Common bulkhead;
- Instrunment unit.
* Orion.
Source: NASA.
[End of figure]
Ares I Upper Stage:
NASA's development effort for the Ares I upper stage has resulted in
the redesign of its propellant tanks from two completely separate tanks
to two tanks with one shared, or common, bulkhead. While the prior two-
tank configuration was a simpler design with a lower manufacturing
cost, it did not meet mass requirements. The current common bulkhead
design involves a complex and problematic manufacturing process that
plagued earlier development efforts on the Apollo program. In fact,
IRMA indicates that one of the lessons learned from the Apollo program
was to not use common bulkheads because they are complex and difficult
to manufacture. In addition, there is a possibility that upper stage
subsystems will not meet the Constellation program's requirements for
human rating unless the Constellation program grants waivers to failure
tolerance requirements. NASA's human rating directive generally
requires that human spaceflight hardware be "two-failure tolerant,"
that is, the system should be designed to tolerate two component
failures or inadvertent actions without resulting in permanent
disability or loss of life.[Footnote 12] According to Ares I project
officials, NASA's directive allows the use of ascent abort in response
to a second failure during launch; however, Constellation program
requirements do not allow abort and require Ares I to reach orbit even
if there are two failures.
In August 2007, NASA awarded a cost-plus-award-fee contract for
production of the upper stage. The basic contract calls for
developmental hardware and test articles, the production of at least
six operational flight units, and engineering support to the NASA in-
house upper stage design team. The contract also included indefinite
delivery/indefinite quantity tasks for additional support and quantity
options for additional operational flight units. According to NASA
officials, they needed to select the production contractor early to
obtain the engineering support to ensure that the NASA design team
develops a producible and cost-effective design and to enable the
production contractor to maximize its ability to meet the production
schedule.
J-2X Upper Stage Engine:
Although the J-2X is based on the J-2 and J-2S engines used on the
Saturn V, and leverages knowledge from the X-33 and RS-68, the extent
of planned changes is such that both the ESAS and Ares I standing
review boards reported that the effort essentially represents a new
engine development. The scope of required changes is so broad, the
contractor estimates that it will need nearly 5 million hours to
complete design, development, test, and evaluation activities for the
J-2X upper stage engine. In comparison, adding a fifth segment to the
reusable solid rocket boosters requires less than one-third the amount
of hours. According to Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne representatives,
these design changes will result in the replacement and/or modification
of virtually every part derived from the J-2 or J-2S designs. NASA and
Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne recognize that some level of development
anomaly and/or test failures are inherent in all new engine development
programs, and the project has predicted that the J-2X development will
require 29 rework cycles. In addition, the J-2X element faces extensive
redesign in order to incorporate modern controls, achieve the increased
performance requirements, and meet human rating standards. Pratt and
Whitney Rocketdyne plans to replace the obsolete electromechanical
controls used in the J-2 design with software-driven digital controls
based on the controls used on the Delta IV's RS-68 engine. Pratt and
Whitney Rocketdyne is also redesigning turbo-pumps from the X-33
program that feed fuel and oxidizer into a newly configured main
combustion chamber, to increase engine thrust to 294,000 pounds--the J-
2S had 265,000 pounds of thrust. The element also faces significant
schedule risks in developing and manufacturing a carbon composite
nozzle extension in order to satisfy these thrust requirements.
According to contractor officials, the extension is more than 2 feet--
i.e., about one-third--wider in diameter than existing nozzles.
Unknowns in Overall Project Schedule:
As noted earlier, the Ares project cannot reliably estimate time needed
to complete technology development, design, and production until
requirements are fully understood. In addition, NASA is working under a
self-imposed deadline to deliver the new launch vehicles no later than
2015 in order to minimize the gap between the Space Shuttle's
retirement in 2010 and new transportation vehicles. NASA has
compensated for this schedule pressure by adding funds for testing and
other critical activities. But it is not certain that added resources
will enable NASA to deliver when expected.
More specifically, the J-2X development effort is accorded less than 7
years from development start to first flight. In comparison, the Space
Shuttle main engine, the only other human-rated liquid-fuel engine NASA
has successfully flown since the Apollo program, development required 9
years. Due to the tight schedule and long-lead nature of engine
development, the J-2X project was required to start out earlier in its
development than the other elements on the vehicle. This has caused the
engine development to be out of sync with the first stage and upper
stage in the flow-down and decomposition of requirements. Although the
only true mitigation to the technical and schedule risks for the
element is a slowdown of the engine development to allow the
requirements to catch up, this is unacceptable to the project because
of the need to minimize the gap between the Space Shuttle's retirement
in 2010 and the planned availability of the Ares I no later than 2015.
NASA acknowledges that the engine development is proceeding with an
accepted risk that future requirements changes may affect the engine
design and that the engine may not complete development as scheduled in
December 2012. If the engine does not complete development as
scheduled, subsequent flight testing might be delayed. The J-2X
development effort represents a critical path for the Ares I project.
Subsequently, delays in the J-2X schedule for design, development,
test, and evaluation would have a ripple effect throughout the entire
Ares I project.
NASA has taken steps to mitigate J-2X risks by increasing the amount of
component-level testing, procuring additional development hardware,
and working to make a third test stand available to the contractor
earlier than originally planned. The project has secured funding to
build a new $180 million altitude test facility needed to test the
engine in a relevant environment. However the project is still seeking
early access to a third test stand to perform J-2X engine testing in
early 2010. According to the contractor, the project is currently
working with the Space Shuttle program to free up a third test stand,
but the Space Shuttle program needs the stand to be available for Space
Shuttle testing until 2010. According to NASA, earlier access to a
third stand could provide mitigation of the nozzle extension
development effort, relieve test rate anxieties, and enable test
schedule confidence. Without the ability to perform this testing, the
J-2X critical path test schedule could be affected.
In addition, as shown in figure 6, the first stage critical design
review is out of sync with the Ares I project-level critical design
review. NASA has scheduled two critical design reviews for the first
stage. The first critical design review is scheduled for November 2009,
5 months before the Ares I project critical design review. At this
point, however, the project will not have fully tested the first stage
development motors. The second critical design review, in December
2010, occurs after static testing of additional developmental motors is
conducted. According to the NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5D, NASA
Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements, at the
critical design review the Ares I project should demonstrate that the
maturity of the project's design is appropriate to support proceeding
into full-scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and test. It should
also demonstrate that the technical effort is on track to complete the
flight and ground system development and mission operations in order to
meet overall performance requirements within the identified cost and
schedule constraints. By conducting the Ares I critical design review
before the first stage critical design review, the project could
prematurely begin full-scale test and integration activities a full 9
months before the first stage design has demonstrated maturity.
Figure 6: Ares I Project Schedule Timelines, by Fiscal Year:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the Ares I Project Schedule Timelines, by Fiscal Year, depicting the following data:
Name: Ares I Project:
FY06: [Empty];
FY07: December, System Requirements Review;
FY08: July, Preliminary Design Review;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: March, Critical Design Review;
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
FY14: [Empty];
FY15: March, Initial Operational Capability.
Name: Upper Stage J-2X Engine;
FY06: [Empty];
FY07: November, System Requirements Review; August, Preliminary Design Review;
FY08: August, Critical Design Review;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
FY14: [Empty];
FY15: [Empty].
Name: Upper Stage;
FY06: [Empty];
FY07: April, System Requirements Review;
FY08: May, Preliminary Design Review;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: November, Critical Design Review;
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
FY14: [Empty];
FY15: [Empty].
Name: Final Stage;
FY06: [Empty];
FY07: December, System Requirements Review;
FY08: April, Preliminary Design Review;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: December, Critical Design Review;
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
FY14: [Empty];
FY15: [Empty].
Source: NASA and GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
Constellation Funding Uncertain:
NASA's approach to funding is risky, and the current approved budget
profile is insufficient to meet Constellation's estimated needs. The
Constellation program's integrated risk management system indicates
there is a high risk that funding shortfalls could occur in fiscal
years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being completed
to support schedules and milestones. As we reported in 2006, NASA's
basic approach for funding all of the Constellation program, including
Ares I, depends on a "go as you can afford to pay" concept, wherein
lower-priority efforts will be deferred, descoped, or discontinued to
allow NASA to stay within its available budget profile.[Footnote 13]
This approach relies on the accumulation of a large rolling budget
reserve in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 to fund Constellation activities
in fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010, when NASA estimates its total
budget authority will be insufficient to fund all necessary
Constellation activities.
Risk Mitigation Activities Are Behind Schedule:
Many of the risks NASA is tracking in IRMA correlate with the elements
of a sound business case. For example, IRMA is tracking risks related
to stabilizing requirements, finalizing a preliminary design,
establishing realistic project schedules, and acquiring adequate
funding. NASA has risk mitigation plans in place for most of these
risks, and in most instances NASA is completing mitigation tasks on
schedule. As of September 17, 2007, the project is behind schedule in
completing mitigation tasks on four risks. While some of these tasks
are just a few weeks late, there is one instance where the project has
not completed mitigation tasks that were scheduled for completion in
January and April 2007. In this instance, the Ares I project office is
late completing mitigation tasks aimed at maturing Ares I requirements
for the first stage. If mitigation does not proceed as planned on Ares
I risks, NASA may be unable to establish a sound business case at the
July 2008 preliminary design review.
Conclusions:
NASA has been in a discovery and exploration phase for its Ares I
project for nearly 2 years, and it expects to remain in this phase
until July 2008. During this period, it is critical for programs to
work toward closing knowledge gaps about requirements, technologies,
funding, time, and other resources so that they can be positioned to
succeed when decisions are made to commit to making significant, long-
term investments. This is especially important for NASA given the cost
of the program and past experiences with efforts to move beyond the
current space transportation architecture.
NASA is taking positive steps toward this end, particularly by adopting
some knowledge-based acquisition concepts, relying on established
technologies and hardware, and proactively identifying and mitigating
risk. Nevertheless, there are still considerable unknowns--
principally, in terms of what requirements the program will be seeking
to achieve, how much it will cost to do so, how long it will take, and
whether certain development and production challenges inherent in the
design and architecture can even be overcome. At a minimum, critical
unknowns need to be addressed in the near future so that decision
makers have a sound basis for moving forward. If they are not, NASA
should delay making a long-term commitment to the program and reexamine
external constraints, including time and money.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the NASA Administrator direct the Ares I project
manager to develop a sound business case--supported by firm
requirements, mature technologies, a preliminary design, a realistic
cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time--before proceeding
beyond preliminary design review (currently planned for July 2008) and,
if necessary, delay the preliminary design review until a sound
business case demonstrating the project's readiness to move forward
into product development is in hand.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. II), NASA
concurred with our recommendation. NASA acknowledged that the Ares I
project faces knowledge gaps concerning requirements, technologies,
funding, time and other resources and that the agency must close these
gaps to be positioned for success when the project enters the
implementation phase. NASA stated that the Ares I project manager will
be required to demonstrate that the project meets all system
requirements with acceptable risk and within the cost and schedule
constraints, and that it has established a sound business case before
the project is allowed to proceed into the implementation phase. NASA
also stated that the NASA Agency Program Management Council and NASA
Associate Administrator will review the Ares I project at the
preliminary design review and determine the projects' readiness to
proceed into the implementation phase and begin detailed design.
Separately, NASA provided technical comments, which have been addressed
in the report, as appropriate.
We will send copies of the report to NASA's Administrator and
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Cristina Chaplain, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess NASA's progress in developing the knowledge needed to make
sound investment decisions for the Ares I project, we reviewed and
analyzed NASA's acquisition strategy for the Ares I project including
program and project plans, contracts, schedules, risk assessments,
technology maturity assessments, budget documentation, and the results
of independent assessments of the program. We interviewed and received
briefings from officials within the Ares I project office at Marshall
Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, regarding the project's
risk areas, the status of requirements and the project's process in
definitizing contracts and developing life-cycle cost estimates. We
also interviewed contractor officials on location at Pratt and Whitney
Rocketdyne in Canoga Park, California, and Alliant Techsystems in
Brigham City, Utah, regarding the J-2X engine and first stage heritage
hardware and design changes. We analyzed risk documented through the
Constellation Program's Integrated Risk Management Application and
followed up with project officials for clarification and updates to
these risks. In addition, we interviewed Constellation program
officials from Johnson Space Center regarding program risks,
requirements, and the impact of budget reductions. We also spoke with
NASA Headquarters officials from the Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate's Resources Management Office in Washington, D.C., to gain
insight into the basis for fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010
budget requests as well as the funding strategy employed by the
Constellation Program. Furthermore, we reviewed NASA, Marshall Space
Flight Center, and Johnson Space Center program and project management
directives and systems engineering directives. Our review and analysis
of these documents focused on requirements and goals set for
spaceflight systems. We compared examples of the centers'
implementation of the directives and specific criteria included in
these directives with our best practices work on system acquisition.
Our work was conducted between March 2007 and September 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Office of the Administrator:
Washington, DC 20546-0001:
October 19, 2007:
Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Chaplain:
NASA appreciates the opportunity to comment on your draft Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO-08-51, entitled "NASA: Agency Has Taken Steps Toward Making Sound Investment Decisions for Ares I but Still Faces Challenging Knowledge Gaps" which pertains to the Ares project within the Constellation Systems program.
In the draft report, GAO recommends that NASA develop the knowledge needed to make sound investment decisions for the acquisition of Ares I.
Recommendation: We recommend that the NASA Administrator direct the Ares I project manager to develop a sound business case”supported by firm requirements, mature technologies, a preliminary design, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time”before proceeding beyond preliminary design review (currently planned for July 2008) and, if necessary, delay the preliminary design review until a sound business case demonstrating the project's readiness to move forward into product development is in hand.
Response: NASA concurs with this recommendation. The Agency is working toward closing knowledge gaps about requirements, technologies, funding, time, and other resources so that it can be positioned to succeed when decisions are made to commit to significant, long-term investments in the Ares I project. Substantial work defining the Ares I requirements, cost, and schedule estimates has been completed, and this work will continue to mature through the formulation phase of the project. The Ares I project manager will be required to demonstrate that the project meets all system requirements with acceptable risk and within the cost and schedule constraints, and that it has established a sound business case to proceed with the detailed design. The NASA
Agency Program Management Council and NASA Associate Administrator will review the Ares I project at this key juncture and determine readiness for the project to proceed into the implementation phase and detailed design.
Thank you for the opportunity to review this draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Shana Dale:
Deputy Administrator:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Cristina Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Jim Morrison, Assistant
Director; Meredith M. Allen; Greg Campbell; Sylvia Schatz; and John S.
Warren made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Within NASA, a program is defined as a strategic direction that the
agency has identified as needed to implement agency goals and
objectives. A project is a specific investment within a program having
defined requirements, a life-cycle cost, a beginning, and an end that
yields new or revised products that directly address NASA's strategic
needs. Ares I is a project within the Constellation program.
[2] The Constellation program is maintaining a 2015 date for first
human spaceflight launch at a 65 percent confidence level based on
current funding. The program is also working internally toward
achieving a first human spaceflight by 2013 at a confidence level of
less than 40 percent based on current funding.
[3] Human rated space systems incorporate those design features,
operational procedures, and requirements necessary to accommodate human
passengers and crew.
[4] As a result of this analysis, NASA also modified the Ares V design
to replace the Space Shuttle main engine with an improved version of
the RS-68 engine used on the Air Force's Delta IV heavy launch vehicle.
NASA estimates that using the RS-68 will save approximately $4.25
billion in life-cycle costs through 2020.
[5] GAO, Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce
Weapon Systems' Total Ownership Costs, GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 11, 2003).
[6] NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and
Project Management Requirements, March 6, 2007. NASA Procedural
Requirements 7123.1A, NASA Systems Engineering Processes and
Requirements, March 26, 2007.
[7] The purpose of the formulation phase is to establish a cost-
effective program that is demonstrably capable of meeting agency
objectives.
[8] NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and
Project Management Requirements, March 6, 2007. NASA Procedural
Requirements 8000.4, Risk Management Procedural Requirements, February
1, 2007.
[9] This is the total number of open risks as of September 17, 2007. It
does not include risks that have been closed or risks that NASA
considers sensitive.
[10] NFS 1843.7001 defines an undefinitized contract action as a
unilateral or bilateral modification or delivery/task order in which
the final price or estimated cost and fee have not been negotiated and
mutually agreed to by NASA and the contractor.
[11] NASA FAR Supplement 1843.7005(a).
[12] NASA Procedural Requirements 8705.2A, Human-Rating Requirements
for Space Systems, February 7, 2005.
[13] GAO, NASA: Long-Term Commitment to and Investment in Space
Exploration Program Requires More Knowledge, GAO-06-817R (Washington,
D.C.: July 17, 2006).
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