Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Restructuring Is Under Way, but Challenges and Risks Remain Gao ID: GAO-07-910T June 7, 2007The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is a tri-agency acquisition--managed by the Departments of Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration--which experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program thereby decreasing its complexity, increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the first two satellites by 3 to 5 years. GAO was asked to summarize a report being released today that (1) assesses progress in restructuring the acquisition, (2) evaluates progress in establishing an effective management structure, and (3) identifies the status and key risks on the program's major segments.
The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the acquisition by establishing and implementing interim program plans guiding contractors' work activities in 2006 and 2007; however, important tasks remain to be done. Executive approvals of key acquisition documents are about 9 months late--due in part to the complexity of navigating three agencies' approval processes. Delays in finalizing these documents could hinder plans to complete contract negotiations by July 2007 and could keep the program from moving forward in fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline. The program office has also made progress in establishing an effective management structure by adopting a new organizational framework with increased oversight from program executives and by instituting more frequent and rigorous program reviews; however, plans to reassign the recently appointed Program Executive Officer will likely increase the program's risks. Additionally, the program lacks a process and plan for identifying and filling staffing shortages, which has led to delays in key activities such as cost estimating and contract revisions. As of June 2007, key positions remain to be filled. Development and testing of major NPOESS segments--including key sensors and ground systems--are under way, but significant risks remain. For example, while work continues on key sensors, two of them--the visible/infrared imager radiometer suite and the cross-track infrared sounder--experienced significant problems and are considered high risk. Continued sensor problems could cause further cost increases and schedule delays. Additionally, while progress has been made in reducing delays in the data processing system, work remains in refining the algorithms needed to translate sensor observations into usable weather products. Given the tight time frames for completing this work, it will be important for program officials and executives to continue to provide close oversight of milestones and risks.
GAO-07-910T, Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is Under Way, but Challenges and Risks Remain
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, House Committee on
Science and Technology:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 1 p.m. EDT Thursday, June 7, 2007:
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
Restructuring Is Under Way, but Challenges and Risks Remain:
Statement of David A. Powner, Director:
Information Technology Management Issues:
GAO-07-910T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-910T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Energy and Environment, House Committee on Science and Technology
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS) is a tri-agency acquisition”managed by the Departments of
Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration”which experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and
technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to
restructure the program thereby decreasing its complexity, increasing
its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the first two
satellites by 3 to 5 years.
GAO was asked to summarize a report being released today that (1)
assesses progress in restructuring the acquisition, (2) evaluates
progress in establishing an effective management structure, and (3)
identifies the status and key risks on the program‘s major segments.
What GAO Found:
The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the
acquisition by establishing and implementing interim program plans
guiding contractors‘ work activities in 2006 and 2007; however,
important tasks remain to be done. Executive approvals of key
acquisition documents are about 9 months late”due in part to the
complexity of navigating three agencies‘ approval processes. Delays in
finalizing these documents could hinder plans to complete contract
negotiations by July 2007 and could keep the program from moving
forward in fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline.
The program office has also made progress in establishing an effective
management structure by adopting a new organizational framework with
increased oversight from program executives and by instituting more
frequent and rigorous program reviews; however, plans to reassign the
recently appointed Program Executive Officer will likely increase the
program‘s risks. Additionally, the program lacks a process and plan for
identifying and filling staffing shortages, which has led to delays in
key activities such as cost estimating and contract revisions. As of
June 2007, key positions remain to be filled.
Development and testing of major NPOESS segments”including key sensors
and ground systems”are under way, but significant risks remain. For
example, while work continues on key sensors, two of them”the
visible/infrared imager radiometer suite and the cross-track infrared
sounder”experienced significant problems and are considered high risk
(see table). Continued sensor problems could cause further cost
increases and schedule delays. Additionally, while progress has been
made in reducing delays in the data processing system, work remains in
refining the algorithms needed to translate sensor observations into
usable weather products. Given the tight time frames for completing
this work, it will be important for program officials and executives to
continue to provide close oversight of milestones and risks.
Table: Key NPOESS Components and Corresponding Risk Levels:
NPOESS component: Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite;
Risk level: High.
NPOESS component: Cross-track infrared sounder;
Risk level: High.
NPOESS component: Ozone mapper/profiler suite;
Risk level: Moderate.
NPOESS component: Advanced technology microwave sounder;
Risk level: Low.
NPOESS component: Command, control, and communications system;
Risk level: Low.
NPOESS component: Interface data processing system;
Risk level: Moderate.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated program Office data.
[End of section]
What GAO Recommends:
In its report, GAO recommends that the appropriate executives approve
key acquisition documents, the Secretary of Defense delay reassigning
the Program Executive, and the Secretary of Commerce ensure that
program authorities identify and address staffing needs. Agency
officials agreed with all of the recommendations except delaying the
Program Executive‘s reassignment. GAO believes that proceeding with
this reassignment would increase program risks.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-910T].
To view the full product, click on the link above. For more
information, contact David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286 and
pownerd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss our work on the $12.5 billion dollar National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program. NPOESS is
expected to be a state-of-the-art, environment-monitoring satellite
system that will replace two existing polar-orbiting environmental
satellite systems. Polar-orbiting satellites provide data and imagery
that are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military
to map and monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the
environment. The NPOESS program is considered critical to the United
States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather
forecasting (including severe weather events such as hurricanes) and
global climate monitoring through the year 2026.
Three agencies share responsibility for the NPOESS program: the
Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/United States
Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA). To manage the NPOESS program, these agencies established a tri-
agency integrated program office. In recent years, the program has
experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical
difficulties, which led to a June 2006 decision to restructure it. This
decision decreased the complexity of the program by reducing the number
of satellites and sensors, increased the estimated cost of the program
to $12.5 billion, and delayed the launches of the first two satellites
by 3 and 5 years, respectively.
As requested, this statement summarizes a report being released today
that (1) assesses the NPOESS program office's progress in restructuring
the acquisition, (2) evaluates the program office's progress in
establishing an effective management structure, and (3) identifies the
status and key risks facing the program's major segments.[Footnote 1]
The report includes recommendations to NOAA, NASA, and DOD to
facilitate the restructuring of the program and to reduce program
risks. In preparing this testimony, we relied on our work supporting
the accompanying report. That report contains a detailed overview of
our scope and methodology. All the work on which this testimony is
based was performed in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the
acquisition by establishing and implementing interim program plans
guiding contractors' work activities in 2006 and 2007; however,
important tasks remain to be done. Although the program office
developed key acquisition documents (including a memorandum of
agreement on the roles and responsibilities of the three agencies, a
revised acquisition strategy, and a system engineering plan) the
responsible executives in the three agencies have not yet approved
these documents--even though they were due by September 1, 2006. Delays
in finalizing these documents could hinder plans to complete contract
negotiations by July 2007 and could keep the program from moving
forward in fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline.
The program office has also made progress in establishing an effective
management structure by adopting a new organizational framework with
increased oversight from program executives and by instituting more
frequent and rigorous program management reviews; however, planned
changes in executive management will likely increase program risk.
Additionally, the program lacks a process and plan for identifying and
filling staffing shortages, which has led to delays in key activities
such as cost estimating and contract revisions. As of June 2007, key
positions remain to be filled.
Development and testing of major program segments--including key
sensors and the ground systems--are under way, but significant risks
remain. For example, work continues on key sensors, but two sensors--
the visible/infrared imager radiometer suite and the cross-track
infrared sounder--have continued to experience significant
difficulties. Additionally, while significant progress has been made in
reducing delays in the NPOESS data processing system, much work remains
in refining the algorithms needed to translate sensor observations into
usable weather products. Continued sensor problems could cause further
cost increases or schedule delays. Given the tight time frames for
completing key sensors, integrating them with the demonstration
spacecraft (called the NPOESS Preparatory Project or NPP), and
developing, testing, and deploying the ground-based data processing
systems, it will be important for the Integrated Program Office, the
Program Executive Office, and the Executive Committee to continue to
provide close oversight of milestones and risks.
In our report, we made recommendations to the Secretaries of Commerce
and Defense and to the Administrator of NASA to ensure that the
appropriate executives finalize key acquisition documents in order to
allow the restructuring of the program to proceed. We made
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to direct the Air Force to
delay reassigning the recently appointed Program Executive Officer
until key program risks are resolved. We also made recommendations to
the Secretary of Commerce to ensure that NPOESS program authorities
develop and implement a written process for identifying and addressing
human capital needs and that they establish a plan to immediately fill
needed positions. In written comments, all three agencies agreed that
it was important to finalize key acquisition documents in a timely
manner, and DOD proposed extending the due dates for the documents to
July 2, 2007. In addition, the Department of Commerce concurred with
our recommendation to identify and address human capital needs and
immediately fill open positions in the NPOESS program office. Commerce
noted that NOAA was taking actions in both areas.
However, DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay
reassigning the Program Executive Officer, noting that the Program
Director responsible for the acquisition program would remain in place
for 4 years. While it is important that the System Program Director
remain in place to ensure continuity in executing the acquisition, this
position does not ensure continuity in the important oversight and
coordination functions provided by the current Program Executive
Officer. We remain concerned that reassigning the Program Executive at
a time when NPOESS is still facing critical cost, schedule, and
technical challenges will place the program at further risk.
Background:
Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate
operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series-- managed by
NOAA--and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP)--managed
by the Air Force. These satellites obtain environmental data that are
processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized weather
products. These satellite data are also the predominant input to
numerical weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for
forecasting weather 3 or more days in advance-- including forecasting
the path and intensity of hurricanes. The weather products and models
are used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so that
communities and emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate their
effects. Polar satellites also provide data used to monitor
environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion and drought
conditions, as well as data sets that are used by researchers for a
variety of studies such as climate monitoring.
NPOESS Overview:
With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would
reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the
two satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of
satisfying both civilian and military requirements.[Footnote 2] The
converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States'
ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather
forecasting and global climate monitoring through the year 2026. To
manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency Integrated
Program Office, located within NOAA.
Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain
activities: NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the
converged system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead on the
acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for facilitating the
development and incorporation of new technologies into the converged
system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of funding NPOESS, while NASA
funds specific technology projects and studies. The NPOESS program
office is overseen by an Executive Committee, which is made up of the
Administrators of NOAA and NASA and the Under Secretary of the Air
Force.
NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated to
cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from its
inception in 1995 through 2018. The program is to provide satellite
development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based satellite
data processing. These deliverables are grouped into four main
categories: (1) the space segment, which includes the satellites and
sensors; (2) the integrated data processing segment, which is the
system for transforming raw data into environmental data records (EDR)
and is to be located at four data processing centers; (3) the command,
control, and communications segment, which includes the equipment and
services needed to support satellite operations; and (4) the launch
segment, which includes launch vehicle services.
When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing, and development contract
was awarded in August 2002, the cost estimate was adjusted to $7
billion. Acquisition plans called for the procurement and launch of six
satellites over the life of the program, as well as the integration of
13 instruments--consisting of 10 environmental sensors and 3
subsystems. Together, the sensors were to receive and transmit data on
atmospheric, cloud cover, environmental, climatic, oceanographic, and
solar-geophysical observations. The subsystems were to support
nonenvironmental search and rescue efforts, sensor survivability, and
environmental data collection activities. The program office considered
4 of the sensors to be critical because they provide data for key
weather products; these sensors are in bold in table 1, which describes
each of the expected NPOESS instruments.
Table 1: Expected NPOESS Instruments as of August 31, 2004 (critical
sensors are in bold):
Instrument: Advanced technology microwave sounder (ATMS);
Description: Measures microwave energy released and scattered by the
atmosphere and is to be used with infrared sounding data from NPOESS's
cross-track infrared sounder to produce daily global atmospheric
temperature, humidity, and pressure profiles.
Instrument: Aerosol polarimetry sensor;
Description: Retrieves specific measurements of clouds and aerosols
(liquid droplets or solid particles suspended in the atmosphere, such
as sea spray, smog, and smoke).
Instrument: Conical-scanned microwave imager/sounder (CMIS);
Description: Collects microwave images and data needed to measure rain
rate, ocean surface wind speed and direction, amount of water in the
clouds, and soil moisture, as well as temperature and humidity at
different atmospheric levels.
Instrument: Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS);
Description: Collects measurements of the Earth's radiation to
determine the vertical distribution of temperature, moisture, and
pressure in the atmosphere.
Instrument: Data collection system;
Description: Collects environmental data from platforms around the
world and delivers them to users worldwide.
Instrument: Earth radiation budget sensor;
Description: Measures solar short-wave radiation and long-wave
radiation released by the Earth back into space on a worldwide scale to
enhance long-term climate studies.
Instrument: Ozone mapper/profiler suite (OMPS);
Description: Collects data needed to measure the amount and
distribution of ozone in the Earth's atmosphere.
Instrument: Radar altimeter;
Description: Measures variances in sea surface height/topography and
ocean surface roughness, which are used to determine sea surface
height, significant wave height, and ocean surface wind speed and to
provide critical inputs to ocean forecasting and climate prediction
models.
Instrument: Search and rescue satellite aided tracking system;
Description: Detects and locates aviators, mariners, and land-based
users in distress.
Instrument: Space environmental sensor suite; Description: Collects
data to identify, reduce, and predict the effects of space weather on
technological systems, including satellites and radio links.
Instrument: Survivability sensor;
Description: Monitors for attacks on the satellite and notifies other
instruments in case of an attack.
Instrument: Total solar irradiance sensor;
Description: Monitors and captures total and spectral solar irradiance
data.
Instrument: Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS);
Description: Collects images and radiometric data used to provide
information on the Earth's clouds, atmosphere, ocean, and land
surfaces.
Source: GAO, based on NPOESS program office data.
[End of table]
In addition, a demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS Preparatory
Project or NPP) was planned to be launched several years before the
first NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk associated with
launching new sensor technologies and to ensure continuity of climate
data with NASA's Earth Observing System satellites. NPP is to host
three of the four critical NPOESS sensors (VIIRS, CrIS, and ATMS), as
well as one other noncritical sensor (OMPS). NPP is to provide the
program office and the processing centers an early opportunity to work
with the sensors, ground control, and data processing systems.
When the NPOESS development contract was awarded, the schedule for
launching the satellites was driven by a requirement that the
satellites be available to back up the final POES and DMSP satellites
should anything go wrong during the planned launches of these
satellites. Early program milestones included (1) launching NPP by May
2006, (2) having the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the
final POES satellite launch in March 2008, and (3) having the second
NPOESS satellite available to back up the final DMSP satellite launch
in October 2009. If the NPOESS satellites were not needed to back up
the final predecessor satellites, their anticipated launch dates would
have been April 2009 and June 2011, respectively.
NPOESS Experienced Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical
Problems over Several Years:
Over the last few years, NPOESS has experienced continued cost
increases and schedule delays, requiring difficult decisions to be made
about the program's direction and capabilities. In 2003, we reported
that changes in the NPOESS funding stream led the program to develop a
new program cost and schedule baseline.[Footnote 3] After this new
baseline was completed in 2004, we reported that the program office
increased the NPOESS cost estimate from about $7 billion to $8.1
billion; delayed key milestones, including the planned launch of the
first NPOESS satellite--which was delayed by 7 months; and extended the
life of the program from 2018 to 2020.[Footnote 4] At that time, we
also noted that other factors could further affect the revised cost and
schedule estimates. Specifically, the contractor was not meeting
expected cost and schedule targets on the new baseline because of
technical issues in the development of key sensors, including the
critical VIIRS sensor. Based on its performance through May 2004, we
estimated that the contractor would most likely overrun its contract at
completion in September 2011 by $500 million--thereby increasing the
projected life cycle cost to $8.6 billion. The program office's
baseline cost estimate was subsequently adjusted to $8.4 billion.
In mid-November 2005, we reported that NPOESS continued to experience
problems in the development of a key sensor, resulting in schedule
delays and anticipated cost increases.[Footnote 5] At that time, we
projected that the program's cost estimate had grown to about $10
billion based on contractor cost and schedule data. We reported that
the program's issues were due, in part, to problems at multiple levels
of management--including subcontractor, contractor, program office, and
executive leadership. Recognizing that the budget for the program was
no longer executable, the NPOESS Executive Committee planned to make a
decision in December 2005 on the future direction of the program--what
would be delivered, at what cost, and by when. This involved deciding
among options involving increased costs, delayed schedules, and reduced
functionality. We noted that continued oversight, strong leadership,
and timely decision making were more critical than ever, and we urged
the committee to make a decision quickly so that the program could
proceed.
However, we subsequently reported that, in late November 2005, NPOESS
cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold that requires
DOD to certify the program to Congress.[Footnote 6] This placed any
decision about the future direction of the program on hold until the
certification took place in June 2006. In the meantime, the program
office implemented an interim program plan for fiscal year 2006 to
continue work on key sensors and other program elements using fiscal
year 2006 funding.
Nunn-McCurdy Process Led to a Decision to Restructure the NPOESS
Program:
The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when a major
defense acquisition program exceeds certain cost increase
thresholds.[Footnote 7] The law requires the Secretary of Defense to
notify Congress when a major defense acquisition is expected to overrun
its project baseline by 15 percent or more and to certify the program
to Congress when it is expected to overrun its baseline by 25 percent
or more.[Footnote 8] In late November 2005, NPOESS exceeded the 25
percent threshold, and DOD was required to certify the program.
Certifying a program entailed providing a determination that (1) the
program is essential to national security, (2) there are no
alternatives to the program that will provide equal or greater military
capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the program's cost
are reasonable, and (4) the management structure for the program is
adequate to manage and control costs. DOD established tri-agency teams-
-made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA experts--to work on each of the four
elements of the certification process.
In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner agencies)
certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost $12.5
billion through 2026.[Footnote 9] This decision approved a cost
increase of $4 billion over the prior approved baseline cost and
delayed the launch of NPP and the first two satellites by roughly 3 to
5 years. The new program also entailed establishing a stronger program
management structure, reducing the number of satellites to be produced
and launched from 6 to 4, and reducing the number of instruments on the
satellites from 13 to 9--consisting of 7 environmental sensors and 2
subsystems. It also entailed using NPOESS satellites in the early
morning and afternoon orbits and relying on European satellites for
midmorning orbit data.[Footnote 10] Table 2 summarizes the major
program changes made under the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision.
Table 2: Summary of Changes to the NPOESS Program:
Key area: Life cycle range;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 1995-2020;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 1995-2026.
Key area: Estimated life cycle cost;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: $8.4 billion;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: $12.5 billion.
Key area: Launch schedule;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: NPP by October 2006; First
NPOESS by November 2009; Second NPOESS by June 2011;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: NPP by January 2010; First
NPOESS by January 2013; Second NPOESS by January 2016.
Key area: Management structure;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: System Program Director
reports to a tri-agency steering committee and the tri-agency Executive
Committee; Independent program reviews noted insufficient system
engineering and cost analysis staff;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: System Program Director is
responsible for day-to-day program management and reports to the
Program Executive Officer; Program Executive Officer oversees program
and reports to the tri-agency Executive Committee.
Key area: Number of satellites;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 6 (in addition to NPP);
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 4 (in addition to NPP).
Key area: Number of orbits;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 3 (early morning, midmorning,
and afternoon);
Program after the Nunn- McCurdy decision: 2 (early morning and
afternoon; will rely on European satellites for midmorning orbit data).
Key area: Number and complement of instruments;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 13 instruments (10 sensors
and 3 subsystems);
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 9 instruments (7 sensors and 2
subsystems); 4 of the sensors are to provide fewer capabilities.
Key area: Number of EDRs;
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 55;
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 39 (6 are to be degraded
products).
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[End of table]
The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision established new milestones for
the delivery of key program elements, including launching NPP by
January 2010,[Footnote 11] launching the first NPOESS satellite (called
C1) by January 2013, and launching the second NPOESS satellite (called
C2) by January 2016. These revised milestones deviated from prior plans
to have the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the final POES
satellite should anything go wrong during that launch.
Delaying the launch of the first NPOESS satellite means that if the
final POES satellite fails on launch, satellite data users would need
to rely on the existing constellation of environmental satellites until
NPP data become available--almost 2 years later. Although NPP was not
intended to be an operational asset, NASA agreed to move NPP to a
different orbit so that its data would be available in the event of a
premature failure of the final POES satellite. However, NPP will not
provide all of the operational capability planned for the NPOESS
spacecraft. If the health of the existing constellation of satellites
diminishes--or if NPP data are not available, timely, and reliable--
then there could be a gap in environmental satellite data. Table 3
summarizes changes in key program milestones over time.
Table 3: Key Program Milestones:
Milestones: Final POES launch[A];
As of the August 2002 contract award: March 2008;
As of the February 2004 rebaselined program: March 2008;
As of the June 2006 certification decision: February 2009;
Change from 2004 rebaselined program: Not applicable.
Milestones: NPP launch;
As of the August 2002 contract award: May 2006;
As of the February 2004 rebaselined program: October 2006;
As of the June 2006 certification decision: January 2010[B];
Change from 2004 rebaselined program: 44-month delay.
Milestones: First NPOESS satellite planned for launch (C1);
As of the August 2002 contract award: April 2009;
As of the February 2004 rebaselined program: November 2009;
As of the June 2006 certification decision: January 2013;
Change from 2004 rebaselined program: 38-month delay.
Milestones: Final DMSP launch[A];
As of the August 2002 contract award: October 2009;
As of the February 2004 rebaselined program: May 2010;
As of the June 2006 certification decision: April 2012;
Change from 2004 rebaselined program: Not applicable.
Milestones: Second NPOESS satellite planned for launch (C2);
As of the August 2002 contract award: June 2011;
As of the February 2004 rebaselined program: June 2011;
As of the June 2006 certification decision: January 2016;
Change from 2004 rebaselined program: 55-month delay.
Source: GAO analysis, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[A] POES and DMSP are not part of the NPOESS program. Their launch
dates are provided to indicate the increased risk of satellite data
gaps between when these systems launch and when the NPOESS satellites
launch.
[B] Although the certification decision specified that NPP is to launch
by January 2010, NASA plans to launch it by September 2009 to reduce
the possibility of a gap in climate data continuity.
[End of table]
In order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy certification
decision decreased the number of NPOESS sensors from 13 to 9 and
reduced the functionality of 4 sensors. Specifically, of the 13
original sensors, 5 sensors remain unchanged, 3 were replaced with less
capable sensors, 1 was modified to provide less functionality, and 4
were cancelled. Table 4 shows the changes to NPOESS sensors, including
the 4 identified in bold as critical sensors.
Table 4: Changes to NPOESS Instruments (critical sensors are in bold):
Instrument: ATMS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first
and third NPOESS satellites.
Instrument: Aerosol polarimetry sensor;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Cancelled;
Change description: Sensor was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on
future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to fund it.[A].
Instrument: CMIS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Replaced;
Change description: CMIS sensor was cancelled, and the program office
is to procure a less complex Microwave imager/sounder for inclusion on
the second, third, and fourth NPOESS satellites.
Instrument: CrIS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first
and third NPOESS satellites.
Instrument: Data collection system;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS
satellites.
Instrument: Earth radiation budget sensor;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Replaced;
Change description: Sensor was cancelled, and is to be replaced on the
first NPOESS satellite (and no others) by an existing sensor with fewer
capabilities called the Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System.
Instrument: OMPS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Modified;
Change description: One part of the sensor, called OMPS (nadir), is to
be included on NPP and on the first and third NPOESS satellites; the
remaining part, called OMPS (limb), was cancelled on the NPOESS
satellites, but will be included on NPP.[A].
Instrument: Radar altimeter;
Status of instrument after the Nunn- McCurdy decision: Cancelled;
Change description: Sensor was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on
future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to fund it.
Instrument: Search and rescue satellite aided tracking system;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS
satellites.
Instrument: Space environmental sensor suite;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Replaced;
Change description: Sensor is to be replaced by a less capable, less
expensive, legacy sensor called the Space Environment Monitor on the
first and third NPOESS satellites.
Instrument: Survivability sensor;
Status of instrument after the Nunn- McCurdy decision: Cancelled;
Change description: Subsystem contract was cancelled, but could be
reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to
fund it.
Instrument: Total solar irradiance sensor;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Cancelled;
Change description: Sensor contract was cancelled, but could be
reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to
fund it.
Instrument: VIIRS;
Status of instrument after the Nunn-McCurdy decision: Unchanged;
Change description: Sensor is to be included on NPP and on all four
NPOESS satellites.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[A] Although direct program funding for these instruments was
eliminated, the instruments could be reintegrated on NPOESS satellites
should other parties choose to fund them. The Nunn-McCurdy decision
requires the program office to allow sufficient space on the spacecraft
for these instruments and to provide the funding needed to integrate
them.
[End of table]
The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of the
resulting weather and environmental products, called environmental data
records or EDRs. In selecting sensors for the restructured program, the
agencies placed the highest priority on continuing current operational
weather capabilities and a lower priority on obtaining selected
environmental and climate measuring capabilities. As a result, the
revised NPOESS system has significantly less capability for providing
global climate measures than was originally planned. Specifically, the
number of EDRs was decreased from 55 to 39, of which 6 are of a reduced
quality. The 39 EDRs that remain include cloud base height, land
surface temperature, precipitation type and rate, and sea surface
winds. The 16 EDRs that were removed include cloud particle size and
distribution, sea surface height, net solar radiation at the top of the
atmosphere, and products to depict the electric fields in the space
environment. The 6 EDRs that are of a reduced quality include ozone
profile, soil moisture, and multiple products depicting energy in the
space environment.
NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, but Key Steps
Remain to Be Completed:
Since the June 2006 decision to revise the scope, cost, and schedule of
the NPOESS program, the program office has made progress in
restructuring the satellite acquisition; however, important tasks
remain to be done. Restructuring a major acquisition program like
NPOESS is a process that involves identifying time-critical and high-
priority work and keeping this work moving forward, while reassessing
development priorities, interdependencies, deliverables, risks, and
costs. It also involves revising important acquisition documents
including the memorandum of agreement on the roles and responsibilities
of the three agencies, the acquisition strategy, the system engineering
plan, the test and evaluation master plan, the integrated master
schedule defining what needs to happen by when, and the acquisition
program baseline. Specifically, the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision
required the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator
of NASA to sign a revised memorandum of agreement by August 6, 2006. It
also required that the program office, Program Executive Officer, and
the Executive Committee revise and approve key acquisition documents
including the acquisition strategy and system engineering plan by
September 1, 2006, in order to proceed with the restructuring. Once
these are completed, the program office can proceed to negotiate with
its prime contractor on a new program baseline defining what will be
delivered, by when, and at what cost.
The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the
acquisition. Specifically, the program office has established interim
program plans guiding the contractor's work activities in 2006 and 2007
and has made progress in implementing these plans. The program office
and contractor also developed an integrated master schedule for the
remainder of the program--beyond fiscal year 2007. This integrated
master schedule details the steps leading up to launching NPP by
September 2009, launching the first NPOESS satellite in January 2013,
and launching the second NPOESS satellite in January 2016. Near-term
steps include completing and testing the VIIRS, CrIS, and OMPS sensors;
integrating these sensors with the NPP spacecraft and completing
integration testing; completing the data processing system and
integrating it with the command, control, and communications segment;
and performing advanced acceptance testing of the overall system of
systems for NPP.
However, key steps remain for the acquisition restructuring to be
completed. Although the program office made progress in revising key
acquisition documents, including the system engineering plan, the test
and evaluation master plan, and the acquisition strategy plan, it has
not yet obtained the approval of the Secretaries of Commerce and
Defense and the Administrator of NASA on the memorandum of agreement
among the three agencies, nor has it obtained the approval of the
NPOESS Executive Committee on the other key acquisition documents. As
of June 2007, these approvals are over 9 months past due. Agency
officials noted that the September 1, 2006, due date for the key
acquisition documents was not realistic given the complexity of
coordinating documents among three different agencies.
Finalizing these documents is critical to ensuring interagency
agreement and will allow the program office to move forward in
completing other activities related to restructuring the program. These
other activities include completing an integrated baseline review with
the contractor to reach agreement on the schedule and work activities,
and finalizing changes to the NPOESS development and production
contract. Program costs are also likely to be adjusted during upcoming
negotiations on contract changes--an event that the Program Director
expects to occur by July 2007. Completion of these activities will
allow the program office to lock down a new acquisition baseline cost
and schedule. Until key acquisition documents are finalized and
approved, the program faces increased risk that it will not be able to
complete important restructuring activities in time to move forward in
fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline in place. This places the
NPOESS program at risk of continued delays and future cost increases.
Progress Has Been Made in Establishing an Effective NPOESS Management
Structure, but Executive Turnover Increases Risks and Staffing Problems
Remain:
The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective
management structure, but--almost a year after this structure was
endorsed during the Nunn-McCurdy certification process--the Integrated
Program Office still faces staffing problems. Over the past few years,
we and others have raised concerns about management problems at all
levels of the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor
management, program office management, and executive-level
management.[Footnote 12] Two independent review teams also noted a
shortage of skilled program staff, including budget analysts and system
engineers. Since that time, the NPOESS program has made progress in
establishing an effective management structure--including establishing
a new organizational framework with increased oversight by program
executives, instituting more frequent subcontractor, contractor, and
program reviews, and effectively managing risks and performance.
However, DOD's plans for reassigning the Program Executive Officer in
the summer of 2007 increase the program's risks. Additionally, the
program lacks a staffing process that clearly identifies staffing
needs, gaps, and plans for filling those gaps. As a result, the program
office has experienced delays in getting core management activities
under way and lacks the staff it needs to execute day-to-day management
activities.
NPOESS Program Has Made Progress in Establishing an Effective
Management Structure and Increasing Oversight Activities, but Executive
Turnover Will Increase Program Risks:
The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective
management structure and increasing the frequency and intensity of its
oversight activities. Over the past few years, we and others have
raised concerns about management problems at all levels of management
on the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor
management, program office management, and executive-level management.
In response to recommendations made by two different independent review
teams, the program office began exploring options in late 2005 and
early 2006 for revising its management structure.
In November 2005, the Executive Committee established and filled a
Program Executive Officer position, senior to the NPOESS Program
Director, to streamline decision making and to provide oversight to the
program. This Program Executive Officer reports directly to the
Executive Committee. Subsequently, the Program Executive Officer and
the Program Director proposed a revised organizational framework that
realigned division managers within the Integrated Program Office
responsible for overseeing key elements of the acquisition and
increased staffing in key areas. In June 2006, the Nunn-McCurdy
certification decision approved this new management structure and the
Integrated Program Office implemented it. Figure 1 provides an overview
of the relationships among the Integrated Program Office, the Program
Executive Office, and the Executive Committee, as well as key divisions
within the program office.
Figure 1: Overview of New NPOESS Management Structure:
[See PDF for image]
Source: NOAA.
[End of figure]
Operating under this new management structure, the program office
implemented more rigorous and frequent subcontractor, contractor, and
program reviews, improved visibility into risk management and
mitigation activities, and institutionalized the use of earned value
management techniques to monitor contractor performance. In addition to
these program office activities, the Program Executive Officer
implemented monthly program reviews and increased the frequency of
contacts with the Executive Committee. The Program Executive Officer
briefs the Executive Committee in monthly letters, apprising committee
members of the program's status, progress, risks, and earned value, and
the Executive Committee now meets on a quarterly basis--whereas in the
recent past, we reported that the Executive Committee had met only five
times in 2 years.[Footnote 13]
Although the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an
effective management structure, this progress is currently at risk. We
recently reported that DOD space acquisitions are at increased risk due
in part to frequent turnover in leadership positions, and we suggested
that addressing this will require DOD to consider matching officials'
tenure with the development or delivery of a product.[Footnote 14] In
March 2007, NPOESS program officials stated that DOD is planning to
reassign the recently appointed Program Executive Officer in the summer
2007 as part of this executive's natural career progression. As of June
2007, the Program Executive Officer has held this position for 19
months. Given that the program is currently still being restructured,
and that there are significant challenges in being able to meet
critical deadlines to ensure satellite data continuity, such a move
adds unnecessary risk to an already risky program.
NPOESS Program Has Filled Key Vacancies but Lacks a Programwide
Staffing Process:
The NPOESS program office has filled key vacancies but lacks a staffing
process that identifies programwide staffing requirements and plans for
filling those needed positions. Sound human capital management calls
for establishing a process or plan for determining staffing
requirements, identifying any gaps in staffing, and planning to fill
critical staffing gaps. Program office staffing is especially important
for NPOESS, given the acknowledgment by multiple independent review
teams that staffing shortfalls contributed to past problems.
Specifically, these review teams noted shortages in the number of
system engineers needed to provide adequate oversight of subcontractor
and contractor engineering activities and in the number of budget and
cost analysts needed to assess contractor cost and earned value
reports. To rectify this situation, the June 2006 certification
decision directed the Program Director to take immediate actions to
fill vacant positions at the program office with the approval of the
Program Executive Officer.
Since the June 2006 decision to revise NPOESS management structure, the
program office has filled multiple critical positions, including a
budget officer, a chief system engineer, an algorithm division chief,
and a contracts director. In addition, on an ad hoc basis, individual
division managers have assessed their needs and initiated plans to hire
staff for key positions. However, the program office lacks a
programwide process for identifying and filling all needed positions.
As a result, division managers often wait months for critical positions
to be filled. For example, in February 2006, the NPOESS program
estimated that it needed to hire up to 10 new budget analysts. As of
September 2006, none of these positions had been filled. As of April
2007, program officials estimated that they still needed to fill 5
budget analyst positions, 5 systems engineering positions, and 10
technical manager positions. The majority of the vacancies--4 of the 5
budget positions, 4 of the 5 systems engineering positions, and 8 of
the 10 technical manager positions--are to be provided by NOAA. NOAA
officials noted that each of these positions is in some stage of being
filled--that is, recruitment packages are being developed or reviewed,
vacancies are being advertised, or candidates are being interviewed,
selected, and approved.
The program office attributes its staffing delays to not having the
right personnel in place to facilitate this process, and it did not
even begin to develop a staffing process until November 2006. Program
officials noted that the tri-agency nature of the program adds unusual
layers of complexity to the hiring and administrative functions because
each agency has its own hiring and performance management rules. In
November 2006, the program office brought in an administrative officer
who took the lead in pulling together the division managers' individual
assessments of needed staff and has been working with the division
managers to refine this list. This new administrative officer plans to
train division managers in how to assess their needs and to hire needed
staff, and to develop a process by which evolving needs are identified
and positions are filled. However, there is as yet no date set for
establishing this basic programwide staffing process. As a result of
the lack of a programwide staffing process, there has been an extended
delay in determining what staff is needed and in bringing those staff
on board; this has resulted in delays in performing core activities,
such as establishing the program office's cost estimate and bringing in
needed contracting expertise. Additionally, until a programwide
staffing process is in place, the program office risks not having the
staff it needs to execute day-to-day management activities.
In commenting on a draft of our report, Commerce stated that NOAA
implemented an accelerated hiring model. More recently, the NPOESS
program office reported that several critical positions were filled in
April and May 2007. However, we have not yet evaluated NOAA's
accelerated hiring model and, as of June 2007, over 10 key positions
remain to be filled.
Major Program Segments Are Under Development, but Significant Risks
Remain:
Major segments of the NPOESS program--the space segment and ground
systems segment--are under development; however, significant problems
have occurred and risks remain. The program office is aware of these
risks and is working to mitigate them, but continued problems could
affect the program's overall cost and schedule. Given the tight time
frames for completing key sensors, integrating them on the NPP
spacecraft, and developing, testing, and deploying the ground-based
data processing systems, it will be important for the NPOESS Integrated
Program Office, the Program Executive Office, and the Executive
Committee to continue to provide close oversight of milestones and
risks.
Space Segment--Progress Made, but Key Sensors Continue to Face Major
Risks:
The space segment includes the sensors and the spacecraft. Four sensors
are of critical importance--VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS--because they
are to be launched on the NPP satellite in September 2009. Initiating
work on another sensor, the Microwave imager/sounder, is also important
because this new sensor--replacing the cancelled CMIS sensor--will need
to be developed in time for the second NPOESS satellite launch. Over
the past year, the program made progress on each of the sensors and the
spacecraft. However, two sensors, VIIRS and CrIS, have experienced
major problems. The status of each of the components of the space
segment is described in table 5.
Table 5: Status of Selected Components of the Space Segment, as of
April 2007:
Space segment component: VIIRS;
Risk level: High;
Status: VIIRS development has continued in 2006 and in early 2007. In
December 2006, the contractor completed environmental tests of VIIRS's
engineering design unit (a prototype) and identified three problems.[A]
While these problems were being studied, the program office approved
the delivery of the engineering unit to the subcontractor responsible
for integration and testing on NPP. In late February 2007, program
officials determined that the contractor was able to mitigate all but
one of the problems, and they approved the flight unit to proceed to
system level integration with a goal of resolving the final problem
before a technical readiness review milestone. VIIRS flight unit is
scheduled to be delivered to NPP by July 2008.
Space segment component: CrIS;
Risk level: High;
Status: Development of CrIS was put on hold in October 2006 when the
flight unit designated to go on NPP experienced a major structural
failure during its vibration testing. As of March 2007, a failure
review board established by the contractors and the NPOESS program
office identified causes for failure and has planned an approach to
completing flight unit development and delivery for NPP. The review
board has also initiated inspections of all sensor modules and
subsystems for damage. The program office expects to restart acceptance
testing in July 2007, and the CrIS flight unit is expected to be
delivered to NPP by February 2008.
Space segment component: OMPS;
Risk level: Moderate;
Status: As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification in June 2006, one
element of the OMPS sensor, called OMPS (limb), was removed from the
program. In February 2007, program officials agreed to reintegrate OMPS
(limb) on NPP if NOAA and NASA would fund it. This funding was approved
in early April 2007. OMPS is currently on schedule for delivery to NPP
by May 2008; however, there are concerns that the OMPS flight unit
delivery will be so late in the integration testing process that there
could be an insufficient schedule margin should a problem arise.
Space segment component: ATMS;
Risk level: Low;
Status: The ATMS flight unit for NPP was developed by a NASA contractor
and delivered to the program in October 2005. NASA integrated the
flight unit on the spacecraft and is awaiting delivery of the other
sensors in order to complete integration testing.
Space segment component: Microwave imager/ sounder;
Risk level: Not yet rated;
Status: A new microwave imager/sounder sensor is being planned to
replace the cancelled CMIS sensor. It is planned to be ready for the
launch on the second NPOESS satellite. In October 2006, the program
office issued a request for information seeking industry ideas for the
design of the new sensor. The program office anticipates awarding a
contract to develop the sensor by October 2008.
Space segment component: Spacecraft;
Risk level: Low;
Status: The development of the spacecrafts for NPP and NPOESS are on
track. The NPP spacecraft was completed in June 2005. Integration
testing will be conducted once the NPP sensors are delivered; Early
issues with the NPOESS spacecraft (including issues with antennas and a
data storage unit) have been resolved; however, risks remain that could
delay the completion of the spacecraft. A key risk involves delays in
the delivery of the solar array, which may arrive too late to be
included in some key testing. Other risks associated with the
electrical power subsystem are taking longer than anticipated to
resolve.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[A] The three problems are (1) band-to-band co-registration, an issue
in which band registration shifts with different temperatures; (2)
cross-talk, which involves information from sensor cells leaking into
other cells; and (3) line-spread function issues, in which the
instrument's focus changes with changes in temperature.
[End of table]
Program officials regularly track risks associated with various NPOESS
components and work to mitigate them. Having identified both VIIRS and
CrIS as high risk, OMPS as moderate risk, and the other components as
low risk, the program office is working closely with the contractors
and subcontractors to resolve sensor problems. Program officials have
identified work-arounds that will allow them to move forward in testing
the VIIRS engineering unit and have approved the flight unit to proceed
to a technical readiness review milestone. Regarding CrIS, as of March
2007, a failure review board identified root causes of its structural
failure, identified plans for resolving them, and initiated inspections
of sensor modules and subsystems for damage. An agency official
reported that there is sufficient funding in the fiscal year 2007
program office's and contractor's management reserve funds to allow for
troubleshooting both VIIRS and CrIS problems. However, until the CrIS
failure review board fully determines the amount of rework that is
necessary to fix the problems, it is unknown if additional funds will
be needed or if the time frame for CrIS's delivery will be delayed.
According to agency officials, CrIS is not on the program schedule's
critical path, and there is sufficient schedule margin to absorb the
time it will take to conduct a thorough failure review process.
Managing the risks associated with the development of VIIRS and CrIS is
of particular importance because these components are to be
demonstrated on the NPP satellite, currently scheduled for launch in
September 2009. Any delay in the NPP launch date could affect the
overall NPOESS program, because the success of the program depends on
the lessons learned in data processing and system integration from the
NPP satellite. Additionally, continued sensor problems could lead to
higher final program costs.
Ground Segment--Progress Has Been Made, but Work Remains:
Development of the ground segment--which includes the interface data
processing system, the ground stations that are to receive satellite
data, and the ground-based command, control, and communications system-
-is under way and on track. However, important work pertaining to
developing the algorithms that translate satellite data into weather
products within the integrated data processing segment remains to be
completed. Table 6 describes each of the components of the ground
segment and identifies the status of each.
Table 6: Status of Ground Segment Components:
Ground segment component/description: Interface Data Processing System
(IDPS): A ground-based system that is to process the sensors' data so
that they are usable by the data processing centers and the broader
community of environmental data users. IDPS will be deployed at the
four weather data processing centers;
Risk level: Moderate;
Status: IDPS is being developed in a series of builds. Currently, IDPS
build 1.4 has been delivered for testing and recently passed two key
data transfer tests. Contractors are currently working to develop IDPS
build 1.5, which is expected to be the build that will be used with
NPP. However, work remains in three areas: system latency, algorithm
performance, and calibration and validation planning; Latency--IDPS
must process volumes of data within 65 minutes to meet NPP
requirements. The contractor has made progress in reducing the latency
of the system's data handling from 93 minutes to 73 minutes and is
working to reduce it by 8 minutes more by resolving data management
issues, increasing the number of processors, and increasing algorithm
efficiency; Algorithm performance--IDPS algorithms are the mathematical
functions coded into the system software that transform raw data into
data products, including sensor data records and environmental data
records. IDPS build 1.4 contains provisional algorithms, which are
being refined as the sensors complete various stages of testing.
Because some sensors are delayed, full characterization of those
sensors in order to refine the algorithms has also been delayed and may
not be completed in time for the delivery of IDPS build 1.5 in early
2009. If this occurs, agency officials plan to improve the algorithms
in build 1.5 during a planned maintenance upgrade prior to NPP launch;
Calibration/validation--Calibration/ validation is the process for
tweaking algorithms to provide more accurate observations. The
contractor has documented a detailed schedule for calibration and
validation during IDPS development and is developing a postlaunch task
list to drive prelaunch preparation efforts. However, much work and
uncertainty continue to exist in the calibration and validation area. A
program official noted that, while teams can do a lot of preparation
work, including building the infrastructure to allow sensor testing and
having a good understanding of the satellite, sensors, and available
data for calibration, many issues need to take place after launch.
Ground segment component/description: Ground stations for receiving
satellite data: 15 unmanned ground stations around the world (called
SafetyNet™) are to receive satellite data and send these to the four
data processing centers;
Risk level: Low;
Status: NOAA is working with domestic and foreign authorities to gain
approval to operate ground stations to receive satellite data.
According to agency officials, the full complement of ground stations
will not be in place in time for the C1 launch: however, the ground
stations will be phased in by the launch of C2. To date, the program
office has reached agreement with 4 of 15 ground station sites.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[End of table]
The NPOESS program office plans to continue to address risks facing
IDPS development. Specifically, the IDPS team is working to reduce data
processing delays by seeking to limit the number of data calls, improve
the efficiency of the data management system, increase the efficiency
of the algorithms, and increase the number of processors. The program
office also developed a resource center consisting of a logical
technical library, a data archive, and a set of analytical tools to
coordinate, communicate, and facilitate the work of algorithm subject
matter experts on algorithm development and calibration/validation
preparations. Managing the risks associated with the development of the
IDPS system is of particular importance because this system will be
needed to process NPP data.
Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce Program Risks:
Because of the importance of effectively managing the NPOESS program to
ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical weather and
environmental observations, in our accompanying report[Footnote 15] we
made recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and to
the Administrator of NASA to ensure that the responsible executives
within their respective organizations approve key acquisition
documents, including the memorandum of agreement among the three
agencies, the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation master
plan, and the acquisition strategy, as quickly as possible but no later
than April 30, 2007. We also recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Air Force to delay reassigning the recently appointed
Program Executive Officer until all sensors have been delivered to the
NPOESS Preparatory Program; these deliveries are currently scheduled to
occur by July 2008. We also made two additional recommendations to the
Secretary of Commerce to (1) develop and implement a written process
for identifying and addressing human capital needs and for streamlining
how the program handles the three different agencies' administrative
procedures and (2) establish a plan for immediately filling needed
positions.
In written comments, all three agencies agreed that it was important to
finalize key acquisition documents in a timely manner, and DOD proposed
extending the due dates for the documents to July 2, 2007. Because the
NPOESS program office intends to complete contract negotiations by July
4, 2007, we remain concerned that any further delays in approving the
documents could delay contract negotiations and thus increase the risk
to the program.
In addition, the Department of Commerce agreed with our recommendation
to develop and implement a written process for identifying and
addressing human capital needs and to streamline how the program
handles the three different agencies' administrative procedures. The
department also agreed with our recommendation to plan to immediately
fill open positions at the NPOESS program office. Commerce noted that
NOAA identified the skill sets needed for the program and has
implemented an accelerated hiring model and schedule to fill all NOAA
positions in the NPOESS program. Commerce also noted that NOAA has made
NPOESS hiring a high priority and has documented a strategy--including
milestones--to ensure that all NOAA positions are filled by June 2007.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay reassigning the
Program Executive Officer, noting that the NPOESS System Program
Director responsible for executing the acquisition program would remain
in place for 4 years. The Department of Commerce also noted that the
Program Executive Officer position is planned to rotate between the Air
Force and NOAA. Commerce also stated that a selection would be made
before the departure of the current Program Executive Officer to
provide an overlap period to allow for knowledge transfer and ensure
continuity. However, over the last few years, we and others (including
an independent review team and the Commerce Inspector General) have
reported that ineffective executive-level oversight helped foster the
NPOESS program's cost and schedule overruns. We remain concerned that
reassigning the Program Executive at a time when NPOESS is still facing
critical cost, schedule, and technical challenges will place the
program at further risk.
In addition, while it is important that the System Program Director
remain in place to ensure continuity in executing the acquisition, this
position does not ensure continuity in the functions of the Program
Executive Officer. The current Program Executive Officer is experienced
in providing oversight of the progress, issues, and challenges facing
NPOESS and coordinating with Executive Committee members as well as the
Defense acquisition authorities. Additionally, while the Program
Executive Officer position is planned to rotate between agencies, the
memorandum of agreement documenting this arrangement is still in draft
and should be flexible enough to allow the current Program Executive
Officer to remain until critical risks have been addressed.
Further, while Commerce plans to allow a period of overlap between the
selection of a new Program Executive Officer and the departure of the
current one, time is running out. The current Program Executive Officer
is expected to depart in early July 2007, and as of early June 2007, a
successor has not yet been named. NPOESS is an extremely complex
acquisition, involving three agencies, multiple contractors, and
advanced technologies. There is not sufficient time to transfer
knowledge and develop the sound professional working relationships that
the new Program Executive Officer will need to succeed in that role.
Thus, we remain convinced that given NPOESS current challenges,
reassigning the current Program Executive Officer at this time would
not be appropriate.
In summary, NPOESS restructuring is well under way, and the program has
made progress in establishing an effective management structure.
However, key steps remain in restructuring the acquisition, including
completing important acquisition documents such as the system
engineering plan, the acquisition program baseline, and the memorandum
of agreement documenting the three agencies' roles and
responsibilities. Until these key documents are finalized, the program
is unable to finalize plans for restructuring the program.
Additionally, the program office continues to have difficulty filling
key positions and lacks a programwide staffing process. Until the
program establishes an effective and repeatable staffing process, it
will have difficulties in identifying and filling its staffing needs in
a timely manner. Having insufficient staff in key positions impedes the
program office's ability to conduct important management and oversight
activities, including revising cost and schedule estimates, monitoring
progress, and managing technical risks. The program faces even further
challenges if DOD proceeds with plans to reassign the Program Executive
Officer this summer. Such a move would add unnecessary risk to an
already risky program.
In addition, the likelihood exists that there will be further cost
increases and schedule delays because of technical problems on key
sensors and pending contract negotiations. Major program segments--
including the space and ground segments--are making progress in their
development and testing. However, two critical sensors have experienced
problems and are considered high risk, and risks remain in developing
and implementing the ground-based data processing system. Given the
tight time frames for completing key sensors, integrating them, and
getting the ground-based data processing systems developed, tested, and
deployed, continued close oversight of milestones and risks is
essential to minimize potential cost increases and schedule delays.
Mr. Chairmen, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer
any questions that you or members of the committee may have at this
time.
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony,
please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov.
Other key contributors to this testimony include Colleen Phillips
(Assistant Director), Carol Cha, and Teresa Smith.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
Restructuring Is Under Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain,
GAO-07-498 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2007).
[2] Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2 (May 5, 1994).
[3] GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could
Affect Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users, GAO-03-987T
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003).
[4] GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on
Program Cost and Schedule Changes, GAO-04-1054 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
30, 2004).
[5] GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical
Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for
Difficult Trade-off Decisions, GAO-06-249T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16,
2005).
[6] GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost
Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold, GAO-06-
573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006).
[7] 10 U.S.C. § 2433 is commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy.
[8] 10 U.S.C. § 2433 (e)(2) has recently been amended by Pub. L. No.
109-163, § 802 (Jan. 6, 2006) and Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 213 (a) (Oct.
17, 2006).
[9] DOD estimated that the acquisition portion of the certified program
would cost $11.5 billion. The acquisition portion includes satellite
development, production, and launch, but not operations and support
costs after launch. When combined with an estimated $1 billion for
operations and support after launch, this brings the program life cycle
cost to $12.5 billion.
[10] The European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological
Satellite's MetOp program is a series of three polar-orbiting
satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp satellites are
planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years.
[11] According to program officials, although the Nunn-McCurdy
certification decision specifies that NPP is to launch by January 2010,
NASA plans to launch it by September 2009 to reduce the possibility of
a climate data continuity gap.
[12] GAO-06-249T; U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Inspector
General, Poor Management Oversight and Ineffective Incentives Leave
NPOESS Program Well Over Budget and Behind Schedule, OIG-17794-6-0001/
2006 (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). In addition, two independent teams
reviewed the NPOESS program in 2005: A NASA-led Independent Review Team
investigated problems with the VIIRS sensor and the impact on NPP, and
a DOD-led Independent Program Assessment Team assessed the broader
NPOESS program. The teams briefed the NPOESS Executive Committee on
their findings in August 2005 and November 2005, respectively.
[13] GAO-06-249T.
[14] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Acquisitions
and Keys to Achieving Them, GAO-06-626T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6,
2006).
[15] GAO-07-498.
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