NASA
Challenges in Completing and Sustaining the International Space Station Gao ID: GAO-07-1121T July 24, 2007This testimony discusses the challenges faced by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on the International Space Station (ISS) and the Space Shuttle. NASA is in the midst of one of the most challenging periods in its history. As part of its Vision for Space Exploration, NASA is simultaneously developing a range of new technologies and highly complex systems to support future exploration efforts, completing assembly of the space station, and retiring the space shuttle. This is NASA's biggest transition effort since landing humans on the moon more than 3 decades ago and then initiating the Space Shuttle Program a few years later. Taken together, these efforts create significant challenges in terms of managing investments, launch and other facilities, workforce, international partners, and suppliers. Clearly, any delays or problems in completing and sustaining the space station itself, may well have reverberating effects on NASA's ability to ramp up efforts to develop technologies needed for future exploration or to support other important missions. GAO has undertaken a body of work related to NASA's transition efforts that include NASA's industrial supplier base, its workforce challenges, development of new crew and cargo spacecraft, and NASA's assembly and sustainment activities related to the ISS. This statement focuses on the preliminary results of on-going efforts, as well as other GAO work completed to date. Specifically, it will address the following challenges: (1) executing plans to use the shuttle to complete the ISS; (2) maintenance of the shuttle workforce through retirement of the shuttle; and (3) filling the gap between the shuttle and new NASA-developed vehicles to service the ISS. NASA's ability to overcome these challenges will be critical to ensuring the availability of the International Space Station as a viable research entity into the future. While these results and findings are preliminary, many have been echoed in other studies and identified by NASA itself. Our work is being conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
NASA plans to finish assembling the ISS in 2010 and operate the station until 2016. The station is scheduled to support 6-person crew capability as early as 2009. The shuttle was to be the primary means for ISS re-supply and crew rotation. NASA's international partners were planning to augment the shuttle's capabilities with their cargo and crew spacecraft. Following the Columbia disaster in 2003, the President set a new "vision" for NASA that called for the shuttle's retirement in 2010 upon completing ISS assembly. As part of the Vision, NASA is developing new crew and cargo vehicles, currently scheduled to be available in the 2015 timeframe. One of the vehicles--the Crew Exploration Vehicle--will carry and support only crews traveling to low earth orbit and beyond and will also be capable of ferrying astronauts to and from the ISS. However, since these systems are not scheduled to become operational until 2015, NASA plans to rely on international partners and commercial providers to make up the 5-year gap in ISS logistics and crew rotation resulting from the shuttle retirement.
GAO-07-1121T, NASA: Challenges in Completing and Sustaining the International Space Station
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science
and Technology, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, July 24, 2007:
NASA:
Challenges in Completing and Sustaining the International Space
Station:
Statement of Cristina T. Chaplain, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-07-1121T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the challenges faced by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on the
International Space Station (ISS) and the Space Shuttle. NASA is in the
midst of one of the most challenging periods in its history. As part of
its Vision for Space Exploration, NASA is simultaneously developing a
range of new technologies and highly complex systems to support future
exploration efforts, completing assembly of the space station, and
retiring the space shuttle. This is NASA's biggest transition effort
since landing humans on the moon more than 3 decades ago and then
initiating the Space Shuttle Program a few years later. Taken together,
these efforts create significant challenges in terms of managing
investments, launch and other facilities, workforce, international
partners, and suppliers. Clearly, any delays or problems in completing
and sustaining the space station itself, may well have reverberating
effects on NASA's ability to ramp up efforts to develop technologies
needed for future exploration or to support other important missions.
GAO has undertaken a body of work related to NASA's transition efforts
that include NASA's industrial supplier base, its workforce challenges,
development of new crew and cargo spacecraft, and NASA's assembly and
sustainment activities related to the ISS. My statement today focuses
on the preliminary results of on-going efforts, as well as other GAO
work completed to date. Specifically, I will address the following
challenges: (1) executing plans to use the shuttle to complete the ISS;
(2) maintenance of the shuttle workforce through retirement of the
shuttle; and (3) filling the gap between the shuttle and new NASA-
developed vehicles to service the ISS. NASA's ability to overcome these
challenges will be critical to ensuring the availability of the
International Space Station as a viable research entity into the
future. While some of these results and findings are preliminary, many
have been echoed in other studies and identified by NASA itself. Our
work is being conducted in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Background:
NASA plans to finish assembling the ISS in fiscal year 2010 and operate
the station until 2016. The station is scheduled to support 6-person
crew capability as early as 2009. The shuttle was to be the primary
means for ISS re-supply and crew rotation. NASA's international
partners were planning to augment the shuttle's capabilities with their
cargo and crew spacecraft. Following the Columbia disaster in 2003, the
President set a new "vision" for NASA that called for the shuttle's
retirement in 2010 upon completing ISS assembly. As part of the Vision,
NASA is developing new crew and cargo vehicles, with the crew vehicle
currently scheduled to be available in the 2015 timeframe. One of the
vehicles--the Crew Exploration Vehicle--will carry and support only
crews traveling to low earth orbit and beyond and will also be capable
of ferrying astronauts to and from the ISS. However, since these
systems are not scheduled to become operational until 2015, NASA plans
to rely on international partners and commercial providers to make up
the 5-year gap in ISS logistics and crew rotation resulting from the
shuttle retirement.
Aggressive Launch Schedule for Space Shuttle:
As we have begun our review of ISS assembly, several issues related to
NASA's space shuttle manifest have come to our attention. First, the
shuttle planning manifest dated January 2007 projects that NASA will
launch 16 missions before retirement of the shuttle in 2010--one of
those has already been launched. Of the 15 remaining missions, one will
service the Hubble Telescope and 2 are designated as contingency
missions. Assuming the contingency flights are included, on average,
NASA will need to launch one shuttle every 2.7 months--an aggressive
schedule when compared to recent launch timeframes. In the past, with
three shuttles, NASA launched a shuttle every 3.7 months on average
after the Challenger accident in 1986. Since the Columbia accident in
2003, NASA has averaged 10.8 months between launches.[Footnote 1] For
the remainder of calendar year 2007, NASA has three launches planned,
which will total four missions for the year. Due to vehicle traffic
constraints, the minimum required time between shuttle launches to ISS
is 35 calendar days, so while the manifest is aggressive, it is
achievable.
Additionally, the current shuttle manifest leaves little room for
unexpected delays caused by weather damage or launch debris, which have
proven to impact the shuttle launch schedule significantly. For
example, in 2007, hail damage to the external fuel tank caused an
unexpected three month delay in a shuttle launch. While there are
limits to the planning NASA can do for such events, the tight schedule
constraints leave little room for significant delays as a result of
such occurrences.
As evidence of the increasing pressure NASA is experiencing with regard
to the shuttle manifest, the ISS program office is planning for certain
cargo elements to be launched on the two final shuttle flights even
though NASA, as an agency, still considers these flights contingency
missions. NASA is also being forced to consider the possibility of
canceling delivery of some portions of the ISS. Specifically, NASA
determined that if the schedule slips, the Cupola observatory and the
Node 3 connector built for hardware, oxygen and waste storage may be
slipped to contingency flights. If that occurs and those flights do not
launch, those elements may not be assembled on ISS as originally
planned.
Finally, NASA officials explained that since only the shuttle is large
enough to deliver certain large Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs) to the
ISS, they must be launched prior to retirement of the shuttle. These
ORUs are replacement segments for those segments operating on the ISS
that fail or reach the end of their life. The officials noted that NASA
originally planned to use the shuttle to launch and retrieve certain
large ORUs that are critical for ISS operations. After being brought
back to Earth, the plan was to repair and refurbish the ORUs and return
them to service on the ISS. However, with the shuttle no longer
available to transport those ORUs after 2010, NASA changed its strategy
for providing them to ISS from a refurbishment approach to a "launch
and burn" approach. They suggested that under the new strategy, NASA
would build enough ORUs to cover the ISS planned mission life and use
them up over time. Large ORUs that originally were to be launched and
returned on the shuttle would have to be pre-positioned on the ISS
before the shuttle retires.
There is still much to be worked out with NASA's change in strategy for
positioning ORUs to cover the space station's planned mission life. For
example, the program office is still assessing the implications of
restarting production lines to produce additional spares. This involves
examining whether the right equipment, materials, expertise, and data
is still available--an endeavor that the ISS program office
acknowledged would be challenging. We will continue to monitor changes
to the shuttle manifest as they occur.
Shuttle Workforce Challenges:
The space shuttle workforce currently consists of approximately 2,000
civil service and 15,000 contractor personnel. NASA must maintain a
workforce with necessary critical skills to manage the shuttle program
through its completion. In response to GAO recommendations, NASA has
undertaken several initiatives to attempt to address its potential
workforce drain.
In 2005, we reported that NASA had made limited progress toward
developing a detailed strategy for sustaining a critically skilled
shuttle workforce to support space shuttle operations. We reported that
significant delays in implementing a strategy to sustain the shuttle
workforce would likely lead to larger problems, such as funding and
failure to meet NASA program schedules. Accordingly, we concluded that
timely action to address workforce issues is critical given their
potential impact on NASA-wide goals such as closing the gap in human
spaceflight. At the time we performed our work several factors hampered
the ability of the Space Shuttle Program to develop a detailed long-
term strategy for sustaining the critically skilled workforce necessary
to support safe space shuttle operations through retirement. For
example, the program's focus was on returning the shuttle to flight,
and other efforts such as determining workforce requirements were
delayed. In our report, we recommended that NASA begin identifying the
Space Shuttle Program's future workforce needs based upon various
future scenarios. Scenario planning could better enable NASA to develop
strategies for meeting future needs. NASA concurred with our
recommendation. The agency acknowledged that shuttle workforce
management and critical skills retention will be a major challenge as
it progresses toward retirement of the space shuttle and as such has
acted to respond to our recommendation.
For example, since we made our recommendation, NASA developed an agency
wide strategic human capital plan and developed workforce analysis
tools to assist it in identifying critical skills needs. NASA also
developed a human capital plan specifically for sustaining the shuttle
workforce through the retirement and, then transitioning the workforce.
According to agency officials, currently NASA is mapping the available
skills of the Space Shuttle workforce with the skills it will need for
future work so that it can better plan and implement workforce
reassignments. NASA's senior leaders recognize the need for an
effective workforce strategy in order to sustain the shuttle workforce
through the shuttle's retirement, which coincides with the completion
of the ISS. Clear, strong executive leadership will be needed to ensure
that the risks associated with the transition of the shuttle workforce
are minimized.
Filling the Gap between the Shuttle and New NASA-Developed Vehicles to
Service the International Space Station:
NASA has several options for filling the gap between the shuttle, which
will retire in 2010 and new NASA-developed vehicles that are not
expected to come on-line until 2015. The first relies on new vehicles
developed within the U.S. commercial space sector. The second relies on
vehicles developed by international partners--both new and legacy
systems. There are considerable challenges with all options NASA is
examining.
NASA Dependence on Commercial Development:
NASA is working with the commercial space sector to develop and produce
transport vehicles that can take equipment and ultimately crew to and
from the space station during the gap between the space shuttle and the
crew launch vehicle. Rather than buy these vehicles outright, NASA
plans to help fund their development and purchase transportation
services or perhaps even the vehicles themselves when they are needed.
This program is known as Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
(COTS). Currently, NASA has seven COTS agreements--all are in the
initial phases of raising private funds for the development. NASA
funding has been provided to two companies, Rocketplane Kistler (RpK)
and Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX). NASA has signed five more
Space Act Agreements which facilitates sharing technological
information, but these agreements are unfunded by NASA.
There are two phases to the COTS program, the first phase entails
technical development and demonstration and the second phase may
include the competitive procurement of orbital transportation services
for ISS logistical support. NASA officials noted that both RpK and
SpaceX met their first milestone to demonstrate financial progress by
obtaining private funding. However, RpK missed its second milestone in
May 31, 2007 and had to renegotiate its Space Act Agreement milestone
with NASA.
The International Space Station Independent Safety Task Force
(IISTF)[Footnote 2] reported in February 2007 that the design,
development, and certification of the new COTS capability for ISS re-
supply was just beginning. IISTF stated that, "if similar to other new
program development activities, it most likely will take much longer
than expected and will cost more than anticipated." Our work has
generally found space and other complex system development efforts--
including NASA-sponsored efforts--often encounter schedule delays and
technical problems when they are seeking to obtain significant advances
in technologies, move forward amid changing requirements or with other
unknowns, and/or are managed without adequate oversight, In our
opinion, risks may be high in these partnerships, given that the
suppliers do not have long-standing relationships with NASA or other
government agencies and the development of the COTS vehicles represent
totally new endeavors for most of these companies. As such, it will be
exceedingly important for NASA to establish sound program management
and oversight controls over these endeavors, establish clear and
consistent guidance, limit requirements changes, and ensure it has
adequate visibility into the progress being made by the COTS suppliers.
Our review will examine the extent to which these measures are being
taken. As you know, GAO has identified contract management as a high
risk area for NASA. Actions designed to enhance program management and
oversight are being implemented, but it may take years to complete
them. This may make it even more difficult for NASA to successfully
manage and oversee its relationship with the COTS suppliers. If NASA
relies on these development efforts without adequate oversight, the
programs could fall short of cost and schedule estimates, result in
downgraded performance, and ultimately impact overall sustainment of
the ISS.
NASA Dependence on International Partners:
NASA has suggested that some supply activities during the gap can be
conducted by vehicles under development or currently in operation by
international partners--specifically, Europe, Japan and Russia--but
these vehicles have constraints. Our ongoing review will assess these
constraints in greater detail.
To begin with, new vehicles being developed by the European and
Japanese space agencies are very complex. Currently, the first test
flight for the European vehicle is likely to happen in January 2008.
The Japanese vehicle will not have its first operational flight until
2009. According to NASA officials, both the European and Japanese
vehicle developments experienced technical hurdles and budgetary
constraints, but both partners are committed to fulfilling their roles
as partners in the ISS program. They do have confidence that the
European vehicle will be available for ISS operations before retirement
of the shuttle, but they are not as confident about the Japanese
vehicle being ready by that time. NASA reliance on these vehicles to
augment re-supply activities after 2010 assumes that further delays in
their development will not occur. NASA's expectation is that these
vehicles will be developed in parallel with commercial developments.
The agency's preference is to use commercially developed vehicles,
rather than rely on the vehicles developed by the international
partners to cover the capability gap after retirement of the shuttle
fleet.
NASA also plans to continue working with Russia to provide crew and
cargo support to the ISS, but this has been facilitated through an
exemption to the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act.
Russian vehicles that were already operational were used to rotate crew
and supply ISS during the period after the Columbia accident and a
Russian Soyuz vehicle remains docked to the ISS continuously. The Iran,
North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act exemption expires at the end
of 2011, at which time any exchanges will be subject to the
restrictions of the Act. However, if commercial development does not
produce a usable vehicle by that date, the only vehicle that can
support crew transportation is the Russian Soyuz spacecraft. According
to NASA officials, the agency is planning to request a waiver to gain
further exemption beyond 2011 if this situation occurs.
Additionally, there are challenges related to sharing knowledge with
international partners due to restrictions by the International Traffic
in Arms Regulation (ITAR). This was highlighted by the International
Space Station Independent Safety Task Force, and NASA has been working
to address the concerns laid out in that study. Over the years, GAO has
identified weaknesses in the efficiency and effectiveness of government
programs designed to protect critical technologies while advancing U.S.
interests. While each program has its own set of challenges, we found
that these weaknesses are largely attributable to poor coordination
within complex interagency processes, inefficiencies in program
operations, and a lack of systematic evaluations for assessing program
effectiveness and identifying corrective actions. However, in reviewing
in the Joint Strike Fighter, another complex international system
development effort, we also identified actions that could be taken
early in programs to prevent delays and other problems related to ITAR.
Our review going forward will assess the degree to which challenges in
this area remain.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or the other members may have at this time.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further questions about this statement, please contact Cristina T.
Chaplain at (202) 512-4841. Individuals making key contributions to
this statement include James L. Morrison, Brendan S. Culley, Masha P.
Pastuhov-Purdie, Keo Vongvanith and Alyssa B. Weir.
FOOTNOTES
[1] These values represent the time between the launch date of the
flight that resulted in loss of the shuttle and the launch date of the
next subsequent flight.
[2] As required by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) Authorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No., 109-155 §801, the
International Space Station Independent Safety Task Force was charged
with assessing the vulnerabilities of the International Space Station.
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