NASA Supplier Base
Challenges Exist in Transitioning from the Space Shuttle Program to the Next Generation of Human Space Flight Systems
Gao ID: GAO-07-940 July 25, 2007
The Space Shuttle Program is currently supported by over 1,500 active suppliers, some of whom are the only known or certified source of a particular material, part or service. The retirement of the Shuttle and transition to planned exploration activities, as called for in the President's Vision for Space Exploration, creates the need for NASA to begin making decisions today about its supplier base needs for the future. GAO was asked to (1) describe NASA's plans and processes for managing its supplier base through the Shuttle's retirement and the transition to the Constellation's exploration activities; (2) address factors that could impact the effectiveness of those plans and processes; and (3) identify any other issues that NASA will likely encounter as the agency transitions to and implements the Constellation Program.
NASA is developing and implementing transition plans and processes to manage its supplier base through the retirement of the Shuttle and transition to the next generation of human space flight systems. Such efforts include: various transition plans; a decision-making structure that should enable the agency to make necessary supplier decisions; and a communications strategy and metrics to gauge the progress of transition activities. In addition, NASA has identified risks associated with the shuttle's retirement and has begun identifying capabilities and suppliers needed for future exploration activities. While NASA has developed plans and processes aimed at effectively managing the supplier base, several factors could impact their effectiveness. NASA may have to continue funding suppliers for work that would maintain the supplier's skills and capabilities, even when they are no longer working on Shuttle operations, until Constellation officials make a decision on whether or not they will be needed for future exploration activities due to a lack of detailed program requirements. In addition, relatively few supplier-related decisions have made it through the newly created decision-making process and NASA officials acknowledge the increasing number of decisions scheduled for upcoming years have the potential to overwhelm the transition decision-making process. Other issues have been identified that NASA will have to face in order to successfully transition from the shuttle program to its next generation human space flight systems. Challenges exist in the continued use of obsolescent materials, maintaining the overall viability of the supplier base, managing the overall workforce, disposing of property and equipment, and completing environmental cleanup. NASA has not developed cost estimates for transition and retirement activities past fiscal year 2010. Without cost estimates, NASA does not have the information needed to support the budget preparation process, assess the costs of addressing its supplier challenges, or account for how NASA will fund transition and retirement activities once the Space Shuttle Program comes to an end in 2010. Such knowledge is important because NASA and Congress will need to allocate funds among many competing priorities. In addition, it will be important for NASA to adjust its cost estimates every year as NASA gains more knowledge about its transition costs.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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GAO-07-940, NASA Supplier Base: Challenges Exist in Transitioning from the Space Shuttle Program to the Next Generation of Human Space Flight Systems
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the Space Shuttle Program to the Next Generation of Human Space Flight
Systems' which was released on July 25, 2007.
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2007:
NASA Supplier Base:
Challenges Exist in Transitioning from the Space Shuttle Program to the
Next Generation of Human Space Flight Systems:
GAO-07-940:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-940, a report to the Chairman and Ranking Member,
Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Space Shuttle Program is currently supported by over 1,500 active
suppliers, some of whom are the only known or certified source of a
particular material, part or service. The retirement of the Shuttle and
transition to planned exploration activities, as called for in the
President‘s Vision for Space Exploration, creates the need for NASA to
begin making decisions today about its supplier base needs for the
future. GAO was asked to (1) describe NASA‘s plans and processes for
managing its supplier base through the Shuttle‘s retirement and the
transition to the Constellation‘s exploration activities; (2) address
factors that could impact the effectiveness of those plans and
processes; and (3) identify any other issues that NASA will likely
encounter as the agency transitions to and implements the Constellation
Program.
What GAO Found:
NASA is developing and implementing transition plans and processes to
manage its supplier base through the retirement of the Shuttle and
transition to the next generation of human space flight systems. Such
efforts include: various transition plans; a decision-making structure
that should enable the agency to make necessary supplier decisions; and
a communications strategy and metrics to gauge the progress of
transition activities. In addition, NASA has identified risks
associated with the shuttle‘s retirement and has begun identifying
capabilities and suppliers needed for future exploration activities.
While NASA has developed plans and processes aimed at effectively
managing the supplier base, several factors could impact their
effectiveness. NASA may have to continue funding suppliers for work
that would maintain the supplier‘s skills and capabilities, even when
they are no longer working on Shuttle operations, until Constellation
officials make a decision on whether or not they will be needed for
future exploration activities due to a lack of detailed program
requirements. In addition, relatively few supplier-related decisions
have made it through the newly created decision-making process and NASA
officials acknowledge the increasing number of decisions scheduled for
upcoming years have the potential to overwhelm the transition decision-
making process.
Other issues have been identified that NASA will have to face in order
to successfully transition from the shuttle program to its next
generation human space flight systems. Challenges exist in the
continued use of obsolescent materials, maintaining the overall
viability of the supplier base, managing the overall workforce,
disposing of property and equipment, and completing environmental
cleanup.
NASA has not developed cost estimates for transition and retirement
activities past fiscal year 2010. Without cost estimates, NASA does not
have the information needed to support the budget preparation process,
assess the costs of addressing its supplier challenges, or account for
how NASA will fund transition and retirement activities once the Space
Shuttle Program comes to an end in 2010. Such knowledge is important
because NASA and Congress will need to allocate funds among many
competing priorities. In addition, it will be important for NASA to
adjust its cost estimates every year as NASA gains more knowledge about
its transition costs.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the NASA Administrator direct the Exploration
Systems Mission and Space Operations Mission directorates to jointly
develop cost estimates for transition and retirement activities beyond
fiscal year 2010 so that NASA can include the funding needs for the
required out-years in its fiscal year 2009 budget submission to ensure
that Congress and NASA can balance investments and negotiate between
competing priorities, including supplier needs. NASA concurred with
this recommendation.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-940].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Cristina T. Chaplain at
(202) 512-4841 or ChaplainC@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
NASA's New Plans and Processes Establish a Foundation for Managing
Transition, Retirement, and the Supplier Base:
Effectiveness of NASA's Transition Plans and Processes Not Known until
Constellation's Supplier Base Needs Become Clearer and More Decisions
Have Been Processed:
Obsolescence, Workforce Issues, and Transition Cost Estimates Pose
Other Challenges to NASA's Transition Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendation:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Space Shuttle Program Critical Single Source Suppliers:
Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Overview of NASA's Decision-Making Process:
Figures:
Figure 1: Overview of Space Shuttle and Constellation Programs:
Figure 2: NASA's Plans for Transition and Retirement:
Figure 3: Revision of NASA's Anticipated Key Decision Dates for Shuttle
Capabilities:
Abbreviations:
CLV: Crew Launch Vehicle:
ESMD: Exploration Systems Mission Directorate:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
SMRT: Space Shuttle Management Resource Transition:
SOMD: Space Operations Mission Directorate:
SRB: Solid Rocket Booster:
SSME: Space Shuttle Main Engine:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 25, 2007:
The Honorable Bart Gordon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ralph M. Hall:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the
midst of phasing out the Space Shuttle Program and beginning another
major undertaking, the Constellation Program, which will create the
next generation of spacecraft for human spaceflight. This is NASA's
biggest transition effort since landing humans on the moon more than 3
decades ago and then initiating the Space Shuttle Program a few years
later. Numerous people, hardware, and infrastructures will be impacted
by coming changes. Indeed, the supplier base that has been supporting
the Space Shuttle since its infancy is already in flux as NASA seeks to
determine which suppliers will no longer be needed after the last
Shuttle mission is flown, which will transfer to the Constellation
Program, and what will happen to mission-critical suppliers who have to
wait years for new exploration activities to begin. Over 230 of the
Space Shuttle Program's 1,500 or so active suppliers are considered
critical single source suppliers, that is, suppliers for items (parts/
materials) or providers of services for which there is no direct or
immediate replacement available. Due to the recent budget reductions,
NASA officials acknowledge that the agency will not be able to launch
its new exploration vehicles until 2015, later than the scheduled first
launch date in 2014. This results in a prolonged gap of over 4 years
between the end of the Shuttle Program and when the Constellation's
Orion and the Ares 1 vehicles come online.
Given the magnitude of the overall transition effort, you requested
that we (1) describe NASA's plans and processes for managing its
supplier base through the Shuttle's retirement and the transition to
the Constellation's exploration activities; (2) address factors that
could impact the effectiveness of those plans and processes; and (3)
identify any other issues that NASA will likely encounter as the agency
transitions to and implements the Constellation Program.
To conduct our work, we reviewed NASA plans and processes related to
transition and retirement. We reviewed project-specific documentation
related to transition and retirement within NASA as well as various
NASA reports and studies on similar efforts elsewhere in the federal
government. We reviewed budgetary information and guidance related to
transition and retirement costs. We conducted interviews with NASA
officials in the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD) and the
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) who are responsible for
transition and retirement efforts, including the transition managers.
In addition, we interviewed NASA and prime contractor officials within
the Space Shuttle and Constellation Program and project offices about
the transition and retirement effort and met with NASA officials from
the International Space Station Program. More details about our scope
and methodology are in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
NASA has taken steps in laying a foundation to transition from Shuttle
retirement through the Constellation Program's return to spaceflight.
NASA has laid out an overarching strategy for transition and
retirement, developed a plan to integrate acquisitions between the two
programs, and released a management plan that is specific to the final
years of the Shuttle Program. Taken together, these plans demonstrate
consideration of the challenges ahead. Outlined in these plans are
methods for communicating change to the Shuttle workforce and metrics
intended to help NASA management measure accomplishments and gauge
cost, schedule, and performance risk. NASA has established a new
organizational hierarchy and processes through which numerous decisions
about suppliers will be funneled. For example, NASA has developed a
Strategic Capabilities Assessment database that tracks Shuttle
capabilities and the property, personnel, suppliers, and contracts
related to each capability. The agency also uses a Critical Single
Source Supplier List to help Shuttle program managers track suppliers,
keep an eye on potential loss of capability, and assess the impact of
potential losses on the ability to meet launch schedule.
The effectiveness of NASA's transition plans and decision-making
processes is not yet known because few key decisions have formally been
considered to date. Uncertainties about the Constellation Program's
supplier base needs leave NASA's new plans and processes relatively
untested. NASA officials have made preliminary decisions about
suppliers that no longer will be needed after the Shuttle's retirement,
but agency officials are not ready to decide whether these suppliers'
capabilities will definitely be needed for the Constellation Program,
which is still in the early design phase. This decision-making gap
means that NASA may need to continue funding suppliers, even when they
are no longer working on Shuttle operations, until Constellation
officials make a decision. To ensure that critical single source
suppliers--such as the ones who produce actuators, nozzles, and heat
exchange coils for the Shuttle orbiter and solid rocket booster--do not
go out of business during this gap, NASA may provide gap funding until
agency officials have a clear idea of Constellation's requirements.
Another factor that will impact the effectiveness of NASA's new
decision-making processes is the sheer volume of decisions that working
groups and control boards must consider that involve each capability,
corresponding supplier, real property, personnel, and contracts. Just
this year, NASA has had to reschedule a number of key decision dates to
later years because the original schedule was deemed overly optimistic.
NASA will likely encounter a number of other issues as the agency
transitions to and implements the Constellation Program, including
continued use of obsolescent materials; supplier viability; potential
loss of needed science and engineering expertise; safe disposal of
Shuttle facilities; and the challenge of producing estimates of
transition costs. To save money, NASA plans to use certain proven
Shuttle technologies in the Constellation Program. However, in doing
so, the Constellation Program stands to inherit problems that the
Shuttle Program was unable to resolve during its lifespan. For example,
the Shuttle Program still uses chrysotile fiber (asbestos), a known
carcinogen, and methyl chloroform, an ozone-depleting substance, and
has not found any acceptable replacements for those two materials. In
addition, maintaining a viable supplier base was a challenge for the
Shuttle Program, which has, over the years, experienced many instances
of suppliers dropping off unpredictably. The Constellation Program
could face similar challenges as it will be using many of the same
suppliers for new exploration activities. And within NASA itself,
realigning employee resources and planning for a smaller workforce
poses a challenge. Another challenge is how to dispose of the
facilities that no longer are needed after the Shuttle's retirement
while complying with federal, state, and local environmental laws and
regulations. Last but not least, developing cost estimates for these
and many other funding needs is a challenge. The Shuttle Program is
scheduled to end in 2010, but many activities related to closeout will
continue past that date, perhaps through 2020. Although NASA has
identified its funding needs through fiscal year 2010 for transition
activities, the total cost of retiring the Shuttle and transitioning to
new exploration activities is still being developed. Without cost
estimates, NASA does not have the information needed to support the
budget preparation process or assess the costs of addressing its
supplier challenges; for example, in its fiscal year 2008 budget
submission to Congress identifying funding needs for fiscal years 2008
through 2012, NASA elected not to include funds for transition and
retirement activities beyond fiscal year 2010.
In order that NASA will be able to formulate its budget for transition
and retirement activities for the years beyond 2010, we are
recommending that the NASA Administrator direct the Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate and Space Operations Mission Directorate to jointly
develop cost estimates for transition and retirement activities beyond
2010, so that, in NASA's fiscal year 2009 budget submission, NASA can
include transition and retirement funding needs for the required out-
years through fiscal year 2013. We would expect the cost estimates to
be adjusted every year and have more fidelity as NASA gains more
knowledge about its transition costs, Constellation Program
requirements and supplier needs. NASA concurred with our
recommendation, but stated that NASA management will work with the
Office of Management and Budget to determine the appropriate timing for
including transition and retirement costs in the President's Budget
Proposal.
Background:
In January 2004, following the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003,
the President announced a new exploration policy entitled A Renewed
Spirit of Discovery: The President's Vision for U.S. Space Exploration.
The President's vision calls for retiring the Space Shuttle upon
completion of the International Space Station in 2010 and creating a
new family of exploratory vehicles for human spaceflight that will
allow a return to the moon and voyages to Mars and points beyond. To
implement the President's vision, NASA embarked on a major study and
made recommendations for technologies and potential approaches for
vehicle design. NASA incorporated these recommendations into the
Constellation Program along with exploration activities called for in
the President's vision. NASA's newly created Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate manages the Constellation program, which will
oversee three major projects--Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, the Ares
I Crew Launch Vehicle, and the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle. Figure 1
shows the general design of the Constellation vehicles and how they
differ from the Shuttle.
Figure 1: Overview of Space Shuttle and Constellation Programs:
[See PDF for image]
Source: NASA.
[End of figure]
The Space Operations Mission Directorate manages the Space Shuttle
Program. In order to support the 5 major projects--orbiter, Space
Shuttle main engine, solid rocket booster, reusable solid rocket motor,
and external tank--that comprise the Space Shuttle Program, NASA has
654 facilities that utilize more than 980,000 line items of equipment
and employs over 2,000 civil service and more than 15,000 contractor
personnel. NASA has several space centers, but the three that hold the
majority of this workforce are Johnson Space Center in Houston; Kennedy
Space Center, in Cape Canaveral, Fla; and Marshall Space Flight Center
in Huntsville, Ala. The Space Operations Mission Directorate also
manages the International Space Station.
NASA's New Plans and Processes Establish a Foundation for Managing
Transition, Retirement, and the Supplier Base:
NASA has developed plans intended to help the agency sort through a
myriad of decisions relating to transition and retirement, with some
aspects focused on NASA's transition management structure and others
specifically addressing the supplier base. NASA has an overarching
agency-level transition plan, a joint acquisition plan, and a Space
Shuttle Program Transition Management Plan, which demonstrate an
initial effort to establish a strategy for managing change. Monitoring
risk at different levels of the agency is one of the issues addressed
in the plans. Also addressed, in general, is the decision-making
process related to transitioning the supplier based from the Space
Shuttle Program to the Constellation Program.
New Plans Reflect NASA's Overall Strategy to Manage Transition and
Retirement:
In response to a legislative mandate,[Footnote 1] NASA developed the
Human Space Flight Transition Plan. This agencywide plan describes the
overarching strategy for transition from the Shuttle to the
Constellation Program's new exploration activities and discusses
desired outcomes, processes, roles, responsibilities, and certain
program-level requirements. The plan also includes a range of issues
that NASA will need to address to achieve a successful transition--
budget, acquisition, human capital, and property and environmental
management. NASA expects the Human Space Flight Transition Plan to
serve as initial, top-level strategic guidance and a governance
framework for the development of lower-level directorate, program, and
project transition planning guidance documents. NASA officials say they
are revising the plan to incorporate guidelines that the inspector
general recommended with respect to program and project
management.[Footnote 2]
The Space Operations and Exploration Systems Mission Directorates are
developing a joint acquisition road map to avoid substantial
duplication of acquisition costs. For example, the Constellation
Program has begun work under a current NASA follow-on contract for
Shuttle-related support to the Constellation Program and intends to
begin work on the engine that will be used in the Ares V Cargo Launch
Vehicle through an interagency agreement with the Air Force and
National Reconnaissance Office.
NASA also recently approved the Space Shuttle Program Transition
Management Plan, which defines how the Space Shuttle Program should
organize and manage its retirement and transition activities to support
the agency-level Human Space Flight Transition Plan and overall Vision.
The plan describes the organizational structure, management approach,
processes, products, and tools used to manage the transition and
retirement of Space Shuttle Program capabilities. The shuttle program's
five project offices are developing separate transition plans, as are
three of NASA's space centers. Figure 2 shows the various plans and the
NASA organizations affected by the plans.
Figure 2: NASA's Plans for Transition and Retirement:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
Note: The Projects depicted are the ones with major supplier
transitions, but the list is not inclusive of all of the Projects
within the respective programs.
[End of figure]
In addition to the plans mentioned above, NASA has developed a
communications strategy to keep the Shuttle workforce informed about
the activities, intentions, and goals related to retirement of the
Shuttle and transition to new exploration activities. Weekly
teleconferences, monthly reports, quarterly newsletters and magazines,
and Transition Quarterly Program Manager's Reviews will strive to
lessen confusion and frustration in this environment of change. NASA
and the prime contractors are conducting supplier visits to better
inform the subcontractor workforce about transition activities and the
opportunities available for future work.
To measure progress on Shuttle retirement and transition, NASA has
identified a collection of metrics that can be used at an agencywide or
program level to assess cost, schedule, technical, and risks. NASA
officials say they intend, on a quarterly basis, to analyze progress
made and to look ahead for opportunities to, for example, save money,
mitigate risks, and see what decisions need to be made about which
suppliers. Key metrics at the agency level include cost avoidance,
schedule variances, and government personnel time charges for work on
single versus multiple programs. Various tools will be used to track
risks related to transition and retirement activities. Such risks
include loss of critical Shuttle personnel, transfer of facilities
funding from the Space Shuttle Program to the Constellation Program,
and cargo transportation shortfalls for the International Space Station
after 2010.
NASA Has Developed New Decision-Making Process to Manage Supplier Base:
NASA has developed a new decision-making process to manage supplier
decisions related to the retirement of the Shuttle and transition to
the Constellation Program. The new process defines key areas of
authority and responsibility and lines of reporting. Control boards,
comprising representatives from the Space Shuttle, Constellation, and
International Space Station programs, are expected to provide guidance
and facilitate decisions on important transition issues. Transition
managers have been appointed at the directorate, program, and center
levels. Table 1 provides an overview of the various processes.
Table 1: Overview of NASA's Decision-Making Process:
Directorate level.
Joint Integration Control Board;
Focuses on long-range strategic decisions, such as budgets, schedules,
and conflicting directorate priorities; ensures successful integration
of development with operations in support of exploration architecture.
Transition Control Board;
Serves as short-term decision-making forum; for example, if it is
unclear which program (Shuttle or Constellation) should provide funding
to sustain a given supplier during the gap[A] between the Shuttle's
retirement and on start of the Constellation Program, this board would
make the determination.
Program level.
Joint Program Requirements Control Board;
Will resolve technical or programmatic problems and approve joint
program requirements and milestones; this board, which existed prior to
the President's vision, was expanded to include the Constellation
Program.
Transition Program Requirements Control Board;
Recommends courses of action with regard to existing capabilities and
associated suppliers; prime contractors for the Shuttle Program can
provide input to this board; this board has its own budget to fund
transition-related activities and was allocated $10 million in fiscal
year 2006 and $30 million in fiscal year 2007 from the Shuttle
Program's budget. Will fund shutdowns of suppliers, transitions of
suppliers to Constellation Program, and gap funding. Still in
development is the creation of a control board that will deal
specifically with the Constellation Program's transition requirements.
Center level.
Kennedy Space Center Working Group.
Marshall Space Flight Center Working Group.
Project level.
Johnson Space Center Working Group;
Provide intra-center forums for exchanging information relevant to
transition and elevating significant issues to senior management;
center-level transition plans are still in development.
Five Shuttle project offices (orbiter, Space Shuttle main engine, solid
rocket booster, reusable solid rocket motor, external tank);
Transition managers at each of the five Shuttle project offices are
responsible for planning and implementing project-specific transition
plans, which are still in development; most of the coordination between
the Shuttle and Constellation programs is occurring at the project
level and done through informal means with participation by the
Constellation Program Transition Manager.
Source: NASA (data); GAO (presentation and analysis).
[A] Gap funding can take place, according to NASA, when the Space
Shuttle Program no longer needs a supplier and the Constellation
Program does not have an immediate need but may have a future need for
the same supplier. NASA can then choose to fund the supplier, which is
typically a subcontractor to a NASA prime contractor, for work that
would maintain the supplier's capability/skills during the gap.
[End of table]
To make better informed decisions, the boards obtain supplier
assessments, known as Space Shuttle Management Resource Transition
(SMRT) documents, usually completed by the project offices, which
provide rationale and potential impact for recommended courses of
action. Shuttle capabilities with potential use for the Constellation
Program are usually elevated to Transition Control Board for
coordination and review.
NASA is using the Critical Single Source Supplier List and the new
Strategic Capabilities Assessment database to manage its supplier base
through the retirement of the Shuttle and transition to the
Constellation Program. The Critical Single Source Supplier List existed
prior to the announcement of the Shuttle's retirement and is used to
monitor the unique capabilities provided by critical single source
suppliers and note any supportability issues that could arise.[Footnote
3] NASA considers a supplier to be a critical single source supplier if
it is the only known or only certified source of particular hardware or
services and has received hardware or services from them in the past 5
years or expects to do business with them again in the future. The list
contains over 230 suppliers identified by each of the five major
Shuttle project offices (see app. II for a list of NASA's critical
single source suppliers). NASA can exercise various options to ensure
that certain key capabilities and the critical suppliers associated
with those capabilities are maintained until no longer needed. For
example, a skills retention contract can be put in place by Shuttle
program officials through the prime contractor to ensure that a
subcontractor will maintain the minimum skills necessary to perform
failure analysis until the end of the Shuttle Program.
The Strategic Capabilities Assessment database, created after the
Shuttle's retirement was announced, provides an initial review and
categorization of Shuttle's assets and is used for tracking,
controlling, maintaining, and updating information associated with
Shuttle capabilities. Each capability comes bundled with property,
personnel, suppliers, contracts, and Shuttle last-need date, which
together produce a product or service, and the database tracks risk
associated with each capability. Using the information gathered in the
database, NASA can generate a master schedule that provides the basis
for transition plans and adds insight into the progress of transition
and retirement activities. The Transition Program Requirements Control
Board plans to use the master schedule to estimate how many decisions
need to be made each quarter. The Shuttle Program has identified most
of the last-need dates and release dates for the 300 or so capabilities
that are contained in the Strategic Capabilities Assessment database,
according to NASA officials. Constellation Program officials have
completed in the spring of 2007 a preliminary assessment of which
capabilities will be needed in the future, but acknowledged that
further requirements refinement and definitions are needed.
Effectiveness of NASA's Transition Plans and Processes Not Known until
Constellation's Supplier Base Needs Become Clearer and More Decisions
Have Been Processed:
Whether NASA's transition plans and processes will be effective is
unclear because NASA has not set requirements for Constellation's
supplier base needs and few decisions about suppliers have worked their
way through the new processes.
Constellation Lacks Detailed Supplier Base Needs Requirements:
While the Shuttle is, in some cases, ready to release or transfer
certain suppliers, its ability to do so has been impacted by the lack
of detailed requirements from the Constellation Program. According to
NASA officials, because the Constellation Program is early in its
design cycle, it is not able to "pull" suppliers to Constellation as a
counter to the "push" from the Shuttle Program to release or transfer
suppliers. For instance, according to the Space Shuttle Main Engine
(SSME) project manager, even though his office has identified, to the
best of its abilities, the suppliers that could be needed for the J-2X
engine (which will be used on the Crew Launch Vehicle), the
Constellation Program is still working on the requirements for the J-2X
and has not made any determinations about which Shuttle suppliers will
be needed. The SSME project office was able to identify suppliers that
could be used for new exploration activities because the same prime
contractor that produces the Shuttle main engines will produce the J-2X
engine. There is a risk that the SSME project will have to make
decisions prior to the establishment of defined requirements at a risk
of losing some key capabilities. When NASA makes decisions as whether
to maintain an existing supplier that might not be needed in the
future, NASA is attempting to balance the risk associated with losing
that supplier and unnecessarily spending funds that could be used for
other priorities. As a result of Constellation's lack of detailed
requirements, there are cases where NASA has provided funding for
certain Shuttle suppliers' work through its prime contractor's
subcontracts because of a possible future need for the suppliers with
the Constellation Program and the need to maintain the critical skills.
Following are examples of such cases.
* One subcontractor is a critical single source supplier that makes
tubes for nozzles and heat exchange coils. At the time of our review,
the last delivery from the subcontractor is scheduled for summer of
2007, after which the prime contractor could end its relationship with
the subcontractor. However, the SSME project office will seek gap
funding for work that would maintain the subcontractor's capability/
skills because SSME project office officials believe that Constellation
Program will likely have a future, but not an immediate need for the
subcontractor's services. SSME project office officials pointed out
that the subcontractor may go out of business without NASA funding.
* Another subcontractor is a critical single source supplier certified
to refurbish and re-certify the post-flight Solid Rocket Booster (SRB)
actuators. The SRB project currently has inventories that can support
the remaining Shuttle flights plus eight spares. Therefore, the SRB
project office could have informed the prime contractor that it no
longer needed the subcontractor's services as of January 2007. However,
because the subcontractor's refurbishment capability may be needed for
the Ares 1 Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV), the SRB project office sought and
obtained $1.8 million in gap funding from the Transition Program
Requirements Control Board for work that would preserve the
subcontractor's capability/skills for the CLV through the end of fiscal
year 2007. Otherwise, according to analysis completed by NASA, if the
Constellation Program needed to restart the subcontractor's
refurbishment capability in the future through a new subcontract with
the CLV's prime, it would cost $15 million. At the time of our review,
the Space Shuttle Program Transition Manager stated that the
Constellation Program should decide by summer of 2007 whether it needs
the subcontractor as its supplier.
The lack of a "pull" from the Constellation Program--that would
identify current Shuttle suppliers that will be used in the new
exploration program--may result in additional gap funding for some
critical suppliers, costly production restarts in the event that some
suppliers are let go but found to be needed later, or the capability
could be lost altogether.
Increasing Number of Supplier and Capability Decisions to Be Made in
Coming Years Could Overwhelm NASA's Processes:
The lack of requirements for the Constellation Program is not the only
factor impacting NASA's transition plans and decision-making processes.
NASA's plans and decision-making processes are relatively untested
because only a small number of supplier decisions have been vetted
through the decision-making process thus far. The Strategic Capability
Assessment database, as described earlier, was created to efficiently
and effectively manage the transition and retirement of Shuttle
capabilities. The database divides each Shuttle project element into a
list of capabilities that comprise the entire project. Each capability
covers property, personnel, suppliers, and contracts data. A key
decision date, last-need date, and estimated release date are
determined for each capability.
Documenting decisions is an important part of the decision-making
process. Each transition-ready capability in the Strategic Capabilities
Assessment database should be paired with a corresponding SMRT document
that will wind its way through the decision-making process and then be
approved by the program-level Transition Program Requirements Control
Board and/or the Transition Control Board at the directorate level. The
document provides a body of relevant information from which decisions
can be rendered, communicated, documented, and tracked. This paperwork
is needed for any Shuttle capability that is being partially or fully
terminated before the Shuttle Program ends--including those to be
transferred to the Constellation Program.
As of January 2007, Shuttle program officials predicted they would need
to set 42 key decision dates for fiscal year 2007; in May 2007, after
realizing that this target was too optimistic, officials reduced the
number to 21 and rescheduled a number of key decision dates to later
years. Future dates also were adjusted. Figure 3 shows the number of
dates set in January 2007 and then revised in May 2007.
Figure 3: Revision of NASA's Anticipated Key Decision Dates for Shuttle
Capabilities:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
[End of figure]
As the number of key decision dates and the corresponding SMRT
documents to be processed increase in the coming years, the ability of
the transition process to function effectively will be tested. NASA
officials acknowledge that the increasing number of SMRT documents
scheduled for upcoming years has the potential to overwhelm the
transition decision-making process.
Obsolescence, Workforce Issues, and Transition Cost Estimates Pose
Other Challenges to NASA's Transition Efforts:
NASA is likely to encounter other issues as it transitions to new
exploration activities, including:
* obsolescence, particularly with regard to outdated materials for
which no replacements have yet been developed;
* supplier viability;
* potential loss of NASA personnel with science and engineering
expertise;
* safe disposal and cleanup of Shuttle facilities and equipment; and:
* developing estimates of transition costs.
Obsolescence:
To lower development costs for the Constellation Program, NASA plans to
leverage some of the Space Shuttle Program's existing technologies. In
doing so, the Constellation Program stands to inherit problems, such as
the continued use of obsolete materials for which replacements have yet
to be found. Some long-used Shuttle materials are now known to pose
environmental or health hazards. Examples include chrysotile fiber
(asbestos), a component in rubber insulation; hydrazine, a type of
fuel; methyl chloroform, a cleaning solvent and degreaser; and HCFC-
141b, a foam-blowing agent. The Environmental Protection Agency
classifies asbestos as a known carcinogen and hydrazine as a probable
carcinogen, while both methyl chloroform and the foam-blowing agent are
classified as ozone-depleting substances. If the Constellation Program
continues to use these materials, health and environmental concerns
will persist and administrative and technical burdens will likely
increase.
Supplier Viability:
Supplier viability presents another challenge. Over the years, the
Shuttle Program has experienced many instances of suppliers dropping
off unpredictably, making supply chain management more difficult and
costly. The Integrated Space Operations Summit, attended by
representatives from NASA, industry, and academia, issued a report in
April of 2005 that stated the following: "the average mitigation cost
from a loss of supplier, based on over 100 industry case studies, is
between $200,000 and $700,000. Inventory, tooling, design, freight,
people time, rush premiums, and extraordinary costs add to this
figure."[Footnote 4] NASA created the Critical Single Source Supplier
List as a way to monitor critical suppliers that were the only known
source or only certified source of a certain component or material. In
addition, the statement of work in Shuttle's Space Program Operations
contract specifies that the prime contractors need to identify and
resolve issues pertaining to loss of repair capabilities, failure
analysis, or production capabilities. This information allows Space
Shuttle Program officials to proactively monitor the supplier base and
formulate appropriate risk mitigation plans, if needed. Given that the
Constellation Program is the Shuttle's replacement and will likely span
decades, supplier viability issues could arise as they did during the
Shuttle Program. Appropriately monitoring the supplier base early on,
especially during the production and sustainment phases of the
Constellation Program, could help to mitigate potential supplier
viability issues.
Potential Loss of NASA Expertise:
NASA acknowledges that it must realign employee resources and plan for
a smaller workforce. NASA projects fewer resources will be required for
operating and sustaining hardware, especially during vehicle processing
and launch operations. By fiscal year 2012, the total number of
personnel needed to meet NASA's strategic goals is likely to drop from
18,100 to 17,000. As new space systems are designed, emphasis will
shift to personnel with skills in systems development and engineering,
program management, and systems integration. NASA made the decision to
maintain program management and systems engineering competencies within
the civil service workforce to ensure that it has the capabilities it
needs to develop programs and projects for its missions. NASA
acknowledges that, in coming years, these very skills will be in high
demand across the federal government and in the private sector. NASA's
senior leaders recognize the need for an effective workforce in
achieving mission success and to ensure the agency has the scientific
and technical expertise necessary to preserve the nation's role as a
leader in aeronautics, earth and space science, and technology. NASA
has a strategic human capital plan and Shuttle strategic human capital
plan, but more work is needed in workforce planning and deployment. In
a separate review requested by Congress, GAO is assessing the extent to
which NASA's human framework is aligned with its strategic mission and
programmatic goals; whether NASA is effectively recruiting, developing,
and retaining critically skilled staff; and what internal or external
challenges NASA faces in achieving its workforce needs.
Environmental Disposal and Cleanup:
While executing the remaining Shuttle missions, NASA will
simultaneously begin the process of disposing Shuttle facilities that
are no longer needed and transitioning facilities that can be used by
other NASA programs. NASA officials say that a much smaller number of
facilities than the current 654 Shuttle facilities will probably be
required to support the development or operation of future exploration
systems. Environmental management encompasses a wide range of
activities, including identifying and mitigating the environmental
consequences of program and project activities, informing systems
engineering decisions to enhance safety, preventing pollution,
correcting environmental damage from past operations, and maintaining
compliance with federal, state, and local environmental laws and
regulations. Although NASA has an approach for identifying
environmental risks, the agency does not have a comprehensive estimate
of the environmental cleanup costs associated with the transition and
disposal of the Shuttle Program's facilities and equipment. In our
report on major challenges facing the nation in the 21st century, we
pointed out that frequently the costs associated with environmental
cleanup dramatically exceed available funding levels.[Footnote 5] For
example, it cost the Titan IV Program[Footnote 6] approximately $300
million over 6 years on cleaning facilities, equipment, and tools.
Paying for environmental cleanup may require a significant future
outflow of funds at the same time that NASA will be facing many other
competing demands for its limited dollars, such as development of
Orion, Ares I, and other exploration projects.
Transition Cost Estimates:
Developing cost estimates is a complex task for a transition of this
magnitude. Although NASA has identified its funding needs through
fiscal year 2010 for transition activities--such as planning and
initial asset/facilities screening and disposition--the total cost of
retiring the Shuttle and transitioning to new exploration activities is
currently being developed. The last Shuttle flight is scheduled to be
flown in 2010, but many transition and retirement activities will occur
after that date. Disposal of program facilities, contract closeouts,
and transition and/or severance of the remaining workforce are among
the tasks ahead. According to NASA officials, such efforts could last
through 2020. At this time, NASA does not know the extent of the
Shuttle Program's environmental liabilities. Paying for such
liabilities later may complicate NASA's future fiscal landscape,
especially when there will be other competing demands, such as
Constellation's crew exploration vehicle, the crew launch vehicle, and
other new exploration activities.
In 2006, NASA developed a cost estimate of $2.8 billion for transition
and retirement activities through fiscal year 2020. NASA officials say
the estimate was based on a preliminary set of assumptions that were
not properly validated and was calculated without the involvement of
the NASA's space centers and other institutions. Thus, NASA officials
consider the estimate immature and, in its fiscal year 2008 budget
submission to Congress identifying funding needs for fiscal year 2008
plus the required 4 out-years through fiscal year 2012, NASA elected
not to include any funds for transition and retirement activities for
fiscal years 2011 and 2012. Without cost estimates, NASA does not have
the information needed to support the budget preparation process or
assess the costs of addressing its supplier challenges. The Shuttle
Program's risk assessment states that not having secured funds for
transition and retirement activities for fiscal year 2011 and 2012 is a
risk to follow-on programs and institutions and to the agency as a
whole.
As stated in NASA's Inspector General report[Footnote 7] issued in
January 2007, NASA's own program and project management guidelines, the
Integrated Space Operations Summit Transition Panel Report, and one of
the Shuttle's benchmarking studies (the Titan IV Program) all call for
the establishment of a detailed cost estimate for the Shuttle's
retirement and transition. NASA officials say they are in the process
of recalculating the total cost estimate through fiscal year 2020 and
are deciding how to budget for transition and retirement activities
beyond 2010. NASA officials told us that transition and retirement
costs past 2010 will likely be absorbed by the other NASA programs--
including the Constellation Program--and the space centers when the
Shuttle Program ceases to exist. This will likely affect the scope of
those activities as well.
Conclusions:
NASA's transition plans and processes increase the chances that key
decisions about the supplier base will be made with sufficient input
from the right people with the right expertise. The lack of defined
requirements for the Constellation Program is having an impact on
supplier transition decisions. Even if all of Constellation's
requirements were known today, NASA still may not be prepared to
process the myriad of decisions ahead. Only after NASA funnels more
supplier decisions through its new processes will the agency be able to
declare success or failure. The sheer volume of decisions could create
bottlenecks, with some critical suppliers getting lost in the mix,
dropping out altogether before NASA makes up its mind, and adding risk
that NASA will have nowhere to turn for certain capabilities. Lastly,
the costs of transition and managing suppliers will be affected by many
decisions yet to be made, including gap funding requirements and
environmental remediation efforts. As a result, it is important that
NASA begin estimating its transition and retirement costs and
continually revisit these estimates to reflect final decisions on
requirements and additional knowledge gained on technology development
and supplier needs. Such cost estimates also need to be part of NASA's
budget submission to ensure Congress and NASA can balance investments
and negotiate between competing priorities.
Recommendation:
Given the fact that many of NASA's transition and retirement activities
will continue to occur following the Shuttle retirement in 2010, it is
important that NASA identify and estimate the costs associated with
these activities in an accountable and transparent manner. Therefore,
we are recommending that the NASA Administrator direct the Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate and Space Operations Mission Directorate to
jointly develop cost estimates for transition and retirement activities
beyond fiscal year 2010 so that, in NASA's fiscal year 2009 budget
submission, NASA can include transition and retirement funding needs
for the required out-years through fiscal year 2013. We would expect
these estimates to be adjusted every year and have more fidelity as
NASA gains more knowledge and makes more decisions.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. IV), NASA
concurred with our recommendation, but stated that NASA management will
work with the Office of Management and Budget to determine the
appropriate timing for including transition and retirement costs in the
President's Budget Proposal. We also received technical comments from
NASA, which have been addressed in the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of the report to NASA's Administrator and
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or at
ChaplainC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. GAO staff that made key contributions to this report are listed
in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Cristina T. Chaplain:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
(1) To determine what plans and processes the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) has established to effectively manage its
supplier base to ensure both sustainment of the Shuttle Program and
successful transition to planned exploration activities, we performed
the following:
* Obtained and reviewed documents from NASA describing plans and
processes for managing retirement and transition activities, including
the Human Space Flight Transition Plan, Space Shuttle Program
Transition Management Plan, Space Shuttle Program Transition and
Retirement Requirements, and the Space Shuttle Program Risk Management
Plan.
* Reviewed various NASA reports and studies on similar retirement and
transition efforts elsewhere in the federal government.
* Examined databases relevant to NASA's transition, specifically the
Strategic Capabilities Assessment database and the Shuttle Integrated
Risk Management Application.
* Reviewed Space Shuttle Management Resource Transition documents and
meeting minutes.
* Interviewed NASA's transition management officials at NASA
Headquarters and the NASA Centers.
* Compared NASA's plans and processes to GAO's Standards for Internal
Control in the Federal Government.
(2) To describe factors that could impact the effectiveness of such
plans and processes for managing NASA's supplier base and to (3)
identify any other issues that NASA will likely encounter as the agency
transitions to and implements its planned exploration activities, we
performed the following:
* Reviewed NASA's 2008 Budget Request along with Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution Guidance for 2008 and 2009.
* Collected and analyzed information derived from the Strategic
Capabilities Assessment Database, including last need dates and key
decision dates.
* Interviewed NASA Constellation, Space Shuttle, and International
Space Station Program officials for information on coordination between
programs.
* Discussed transition challenges with NASA officials at the agency,
program, and project level, with prime contractors for the Space
Shuttle and Exploration programs, and with representatives of the
Aerospace Industries Association.
* Reviewed past GAO testimonies and reports.
* Identified obsolescence and supplier viability issues noted in NASA
and contractor reports and briefing charts that might impact new
exploration activities.
To accomplish our work, we interviewed NASA and prime contractor
officials for the Orbiter project at Kennedy Space Center in Cape
Canaveral, Florida; NASA and prime contractor officials for the
External Tank, Solid Rocket Booster, Reusable Solid Rocket Motor and
Space Shuttle Main Engine projects at Marshall Space Flight Center in
Huntsville, Alabama; and NASA officials for the Constellation, Space
Shuttle and International Space Station programs at Johnson Space
Center in Houston, Texas. We also attended the January 2007 Transition
Quarterly Program Manager's Review to garner information on the status
of transition. At NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., we met with
the SOMD and ESMD Transition Managers, the Deputy Associate
Administrator for Program Integration, the ESMD Special Procurement
Advisor, and representatives from the SOMD and ESMD Resources
Management Offices.
We conducted our work from September 2006 to June 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II Space Shuttle Program Critical Single Source Suppliers:
Table 2:
External tank.
Company: Tru-Circle Metal and Tool, Inc;
Material/part/service: Manhole Frames.
Company: Summa Technology, Inc;
Material/part/service: Fittings.
Company: AMRO Fabricating Corp;
Material/part/service: Thrust Panels.
Company: Klune Industries, Inc;
Material/part/service: Feedline Fairings.
Company: Machine Craft, Inc;
Material/part/service: Miscellaneous Detail Parts.
Company: GKN Aerospace Monitor, Inc;
Material/part/service: Longerons.
Company: Chromalox, Inc;
Material/part/service: Heaters.
Company: Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp;
Material/part/service: Diffusers.
Company: General Tool Co;
Material/part/service: LO2 Elbow, Ball fitting, SRB End Fitting.
Company: Goodrich Corp. - Rosemount Aerospace, Inc;
Material/part/ service: Pressure Transducers.
Company: Goodrich Corp. - Simmonds Precision Products, Inc;
Material/ part/service: Level Sensors.
Company: Plastic Fabricating Co., Inc;
Material/part/service: Fittings.
Company: Tayco Engineering, Inc;
Material/part/service: Heaters.
Company: Senior Operations, Inc. - DBA Ketema Aerospace;
Material/part/ service: Vent Relief Valves.
Company: Senior Operations, Inc;
Material/part/service: GH2 Ventline, LH2 Feedline Bellows Assembly.
Company: Ecliptic Enterprises Corp;
Material/part/service: ET Camera Electronic Box.
Company: Arrowhead Products Corp;
Material/part/service: Propulsion Lines.
Company: Meggitt Thermal Systems, Inc;
Material/part/service: Pressurization Lines.
Company: Lord Corp;
Material/part/service: 7450, 391 Adhesives.
Company: North Carolina Foam Industries;
Material/part/service: NCFI 26-007, NCFI 24-57 Foam, NCFI 24-124 Foam.
Company: Cytec Olean, Inc;
Material/part/service: Conathane.
Company: Stepan Co;
Material/part/service: BX-265 Foam.
Company: Trelleborg Emerson & Cuming, Inc;
Material/part/service: Silica Microspheres.
Company: National Process Industries;
Material/part/service: Vitrolube.
Company: PRC-DeSoto International, Inc;
Material/part/service: MMSK 719 Primer.
Orbiter.
Company: Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp;
Material/part/service: PRSD Tank, Vac-Ion Pumps, DC/DC Converters,
Solid State Star Trackers.
Company: Hamilton Sundstrand Space Systems International, Inc;
Material/part/service: Water Spray Boiler, Flash Evaporator Subsystem.
Company: Edo Corp. - Antenna Products & Technologies Division;
Material/part/service: S-Band Preamp.
Company: Sypris Data Systems, Inc;
Material/part/service: MADS Recorder.
Company: Albany International Corp. - DBA Albany International Research
Company;
Material/part/service: Thermal Protection System - Reusable Surface
Insulation.
Company: Applied Resources Corp;
Material/part/service: Round Meters, Switches.
Company: PerkinElmer OptoElectronics;
Material/part/service: Interior Lights.
Company: Hamilton Sundstrand Corp. - DBA Hamilton Sundstrand Aerospace;
Material/part/service: Auxiliary Power Units, Flight Control Hardware.
Company: Goodrich Corp.-Universal Propulsion Company, Inc. (UPCO);
Material/part/service: Emergency Egress Slide, Thruster Assembly,
Window Pyrotechnic Devices.
Company: Michelin Aircraft Tire Corp;
Material/part/service: Tires.
Company: Glenair, Inc;
Material/part/service: Connectors & Connector/ Protectors.
Company: Hi Temp Insulation, Inc;
Material/part/service: Insulation.
Company: Arrowhead Products Corp;
Material/part/service: MPS Feed Lines.
Company: Carleton Technologies, Inc;
Material/part/service: O2/N2 Sensors, PPO2 Sensors, Valves.
Company: Corning Glass Works;
Material/part/service: Window Panes.
Company: Senior Operations Inc. - Metal Bellows Division;
Material/ part/service: ECLSS Waste and Potable Water Tank, Bellows
Assembly (Lines, Tanks).
Company: 3M Co;
Material/part/service: Surface Modifier.
Company: Aerojet General Corp. - Propulsion Division;
Material/part/ service: APU Gas Generators, Vernier Thrusters, Small
Parts.
Company: Ametek, Inc;
Material/part/service: Pressure Transducers.
Company: Argo Tech Corp. - Carter Ground Fueling Division;
Material/ part/service: Seals, Springs.
Company: Barry Controls;
Material/part/service: APU Isolation Mounts.
Company: BASF Corp;
Material/part/service: Polyurethane Foam.
Company: Cox & Co., Inc;
Material/part/service: Heater Lines.
Company: Parker Hannifin Corp. - Stratoflex Product Division;
Material/ part/service: Hoses and Fittings; Lift Off QD; Ground Probes.
Company: Eldec Corp;
Material/part/service: Dedicated Signal Conditioners, Proximity Switch.
Company: Endevco Corp;
Material/part/service: Low Pass Filter.
Company: FMH Corp. - DBA Flexible Metal Hose;
Material/part/service: Flex Hoses.
Company: Florida Seal & Rubber, LLC;
Material/part/service: Seals.
Company: Richards, Gary E;
Material/part/service: Retainer Bearings.
Company: Irvin Aerospace, Inc;
Material/part/service: Quick Disconnects.
Company: Kirkhill - TA Co;
Material/part/service: Seals.
Company: Long-Lok Fasteners Corp;
Material/part/service: Fasteners.
Company: M/A - COM, Inc;
Material/part/service: RF Cables.
Company: Magellan Aerospace Turbine Services;
Material/part/service: SSME Interface Seals.
Company: Pacific Scientific Co;
Material/part/service: Piece Parts - MADS.
Company: Parker Hannifin Corp. - Parker Stratoflex Division;
Material/ part/service: Fluid Disconnects.
Company: RBC Transport Dynamics Corp;
Material/part/service: Bearing Housings.
Company: RDF Corp;
Material/part/service: Temperature Transducers.
Company: Saint Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. - High Performance
Seals Division;
Material/part/service: Seals.
Company: Saint Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. - Coated Fabrics
Division;
Material/part/service: Various Materials.
Company: Dover Diversified, Inc. - DBA Sargent Controls & Aerospace;
Material/part/service: Shell Assembly (Salad Bowl).
Company: Senior Operations, Inc. - DBA Ketema Aerospace;
Material/part/ service: MPS Feed Lines/Gimble Joints/ Re-circulation
Manifold, GN2 Isolation Valve.
Company: Smiths Tubular Systems - Laconia, Inc;
Material/part/service: Pressure Equalization Check Valves.
Company: Stillman Seal Corp;
Material/part/service: Window Seals.
Company: Wyle Laboratories;
Material/part/service: Connectors.
Company: Teledyne Wireless, Inc;
Material/part/service: S-Band Switch Assembly.
Company: Senior Operations, Inc;
Material/part/service: Bellows Assembly for Class I GSE.
Company: Wintec, LLC;
Material/part/service: Filters.
Company: Cerac, Inc;
aterial/part/service: Tetraboron Silicide.
Company: Momentive Performance Materials, Inc;
Material/part/service: RTVs (Room Temperature Vulcanization Adhesives),
Adhesives.
Company: Tayco Engineering, Inc;
Material/part/service: Sensor, Heater (Thermocouple).
Company: BAE Systems Information & Electronic Systems Integration, Inc;
Material/part/service: Multiplexer Interface Adapters, S-MIA, D- MIA.
Company: The Boeing Co. - Integrated Defense Systems - NASA Systems
Division;
Material/part/service: Coldplates.
Company: PTI Technologies, Inc;
Material/part/service: Check Valve and Filter.
Company: Lockheed Martin Corp. - Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire
Control;
Material/part/service: RCC, LESS, RFCA (Used in the Thermal Protection
System).
Company: Arkwin Industries, Inc;
Material/part/service: Hydraulic 3- Way Valves, Hydraulic Control Valve
& Bootstrap Reservoir.
Company: Curtiss-Wright Controls, Inc;
Material/part/service: Actuators.
Company: Eaton Corp,;
Material/part/service: Valves.
Company: Goodrich Corp;
Material/part/service: MLG-NLG Landing Gear Production and Storage for
Special Tooling/Special Test Equipment.
Company: Honeywell International, Inc. - Torrance, CA;
Material/part/ service: Actuators.
Company: Honeywell International, Inc. - Clearwater, FL;
Material/part/ service: Controllers.
Company: Honeywell International, Inc. - Glendale, AZ;
Material/part/ service: Enhanced Multiplexer/De-multiplexer,
Multifunction Electronic Display System.
Company: Honeywell International, Inc. - Tucson, AZ;
Material/part/ service: Air Data Transducer Assembly, Annunciator
Control Unit.
Company: Kearfott Guidance and Navigation Corp;
Material/part/ service: Inertial Measurement Units (IMU).
Company: L3 Communications Corp;
Material/part/service: Frequency Division Multiplexer (FDM).
Company: Lockheed Martin Corp. - System Integration;
Material/part/ service: General Purpose Computer, Multi-function CRT
Display System.
Company: Lockheed Martin Corp. - Space Systems Company;
Material/part/ service: Pyrotechnic Initiator Controller.
Company: Moog, Inc;
Material/part/service: Hydraulic Actuators / Power Valve Assembly.
Company: Moog, Inc;
Material/part/service: Thrust Vector Control Fuel Isolation Valve.
Company: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp;
Material/part/service: Master Timer Unit.
Company: Eaton Corp. - Fluid Conveyance Systems;
Material/part/service: 2-3 Way Valves.
Company: Rockwell Collins, Inc;
Material/part/service: TACAN, GPS, DDU, HIS (Used for Guidance,
Navigation and/or Control).
Company: SEAKR Engineering, Inc;
Material/part/service: Modular Memory Unit.
Company: Tavis Corp;
Material/part/service: Flowmeter.
Company: Telair International;
Material/part/service: Actuators.
Company: Telephonics Corp;
Material/part/service: Microwave Scan Beam Landing System Decoders,
Transmitters, Antenna, RF Assemblies.
Company: The Boeing Co. - C3 Networks Division;
Material/part/service: Advanced Master Events Controller, Enhanced
Master Events Controller.
Company: UTC Power Corp;
Material/part/service: Fuel Cells.
Company: Vacco Industries;
Material/part/service: Filters, Valves, Regulators, Disconnects.
Company: Hamilton Sundstrand Management Services, Inc;
Material/part/ service: Waste Collection System.
Company: Smiths Aerospace, LLC;
Material/part/service: Device Drive Unit (DDU).
Company: Aerodyne Controls, Inc;
Material/part/service: Shut Off Valves.
Company: Ellanef Manufacturing Corp;
Material/part/service: Vent Door Actuators.
Company: Gardner Bellows Corp;
Material/part/service: Hypergolic & Power Reactant Storage and
Distribution Bellow Assembly for Quick Disconnects.
Company: Goodrich Corp. - Aerospace Division (Aircraft Wheels and
Brakes);
Material/part/service: MLG Wheels & Brakes.
Company: Goodrich Corp. - Aerospace Flight Systems Division (Optical
and Space Systems);
Material/part/service: Storage of Miscellaneous Parts.
Company: Degussa Corp;
Material/part/service: Dimethylethoxysilane (DMES).
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor.
Company: Kayco Composites;
Material/part/service: Foam Billets.
Company: Standard Tool & Die Co. (STADCO);
Material/part/service: Case Nozzle Hardware.
Company: Krayden, Inc;
Material/part/service: Permabond, Sealing Compound, & Molykote 321.
Company: SPS Technologies, Inc;
Material/part/service: Igniter Fasteners.
Company: Glenair, Inc;
Material/part/service: Cables.
Company: Irvin Aerospace, Inc;
Material/part/service: Heater Retainer Straps.
Company: Dodge-Regupol, Inc;
Material/part/service: Cork (External).
Company: Unitech Composites, Inc;
Material/part/service: Railcar, End Grain, and Nozzle Shipping Covers.
Company: Aceto Corp;
Material/part/service: MAPO (Inhibitor Curative).
Company: Noveon, Inc;
Material/part/service: HC Polymer.
Company: Votaw Precision Technologies, Inc;
Material/part/service: Nozzle Hardware.
Company: Cytec Engineered Materials, Inc;
Material/part/service: Glass, Carbon, Silica Cloth.
Company: Cytec Engineered Materials, Inc;
Material/part/service: Glass, Carbon, Silica Cloth.
Company: Highland Industries;
Material/part/service: Rayon Fabric Weaver (Nozzle).
Company: Alcoa, Inc;
Material/part/service: Aluminum Powder.
Company: American Pacific Corp;
Material/part/service: Ammonium Perchlorate.
Company: American Synthetic Rubber Corp. (ASRC);
Material/part/ service: HB Polymer.
Company: Dow Chemical;
Material/part/service: Liquid Epoxy Resin.
Company: Hitco Carbon Composites, Inc;
Material/part/service: Carbon Fiber-filled EPDM.
Company: Kirkhill - TA Company;
Material/part/service: EPDM Rubber/NBR.
Company: MS Aerospace, Inc;
Material/part/service: Nozzle Fasteners.
Company: Stellar Technology, Inc;
Material/part/service: Igniter.
Company: 3M Co;
Material/part/service: Witness Pad Adhesives.
Company: Borden Chemicals Co;
Material/part/service: Phenolic Resin (Nozzle).
Company: Dow Corning Corp;
Material/part/service: RTV's & Primers.
Company: Momentive Performance Materials, Inc;
Material/part/service: RTV's & Primers.
Company: Loctite Aerospace;
Material/part/service: Adhesives, Epoxy.
Company: Parker Hannifin Corp. - O-Ring Division;
Material/part/ service: Igniter Gaskets.
Company: Parker Hannifin Corp. - O-Ring Division;
Material/part/ service: O-Ring, Performed Packing, Gaskets.
Company: Resin Technology Group, LLC;
Material/part/service: Ablation Compound.
Company: SGL Polycarbon - USA;
Material/part/service: Carbonization of cloth.
Company: Tayco Engineering, Inc;
Material/part/service: Heaters, Sensor Cables.
Company: Vacco Industries;
Material/part/service: Safe & Arm Devices.
Solid Rocket Booster.
Company: L3 Communications Corp. - Space and Navigation Division;
Material/part/service: Integrated Electronic Assembly (IEA), SRB Range
Safety Distributor, Command Receiver Decoder, Attitude Switch Assembly.
Company: Honeywell International, Inc;
Material/part/service: Enhanced Multiplexer/De-multiplexer,
Multiplexer/De-multiplexer.
Company: Moog, Inc;
Material/part/service: Servoactuator.
Company: Hamilton Sundstrand Corp;
Material/part/service: Auxiliary Power Unit.
Company: Aerojet General Corp. - Propulsion Division;
Material/part/ service: Gas Generator.
Company: Marotta Controls, Inc;
Material/part/service: Gas Generator Valve Module.
Company: Parker Hannifin Corp. - Hydraulic Systems Division;
Material/ part/service: Hydraulic Pump.
Company: Pacific Scientific Energetic Materials Co;
Material/part/ service: Frangible Nut, Separation Nuts, Separation
Bolts.
Company: Goodrich Corp. - Universal Propulsion Co., Inc. (UPCO);
Material/part/service: Linear Shaped Charges (LSC), Nose Cap Thrusters,
Pressure Cartridges, Confined Detonating Fuse Manifold, Range Safety
System LSC, Frustum LSC.
Company: General Products, LLC;
Material/part/service: ET Bolt Catchers, Struts, ETA Rings, Spherical
Washers.
Company: Aerocraft Industries, Inc;
Material/part/service: ET Strut Cover & Fairing Assembly, Zinc Anodes.
Company: C & M Machine Holding, Inc;
Material/part/service: Tunnel Floor Components.
Company: Consolidated Hinge & Manufactured Products, Inc. - DBA The
Champ Co;
Material/part/service: Aeroheat Shield.
Company: Eaton Aerospace;
Material/part/service: K & E Seals.
Company: Herley Industries, Inc;
Material/part/service: C-Band Antenna/Power Divider/Transponder.
Company: LaBarge, Inc;
Material/part/service: Range Safety Antenna.
Company: Oceaneering International, Inc. - DBA Oceaneering Space
Systems - Space and Thermal Division;
Material/part/service: Thermal Curtains.
Company: Parker Hannifin Corp. - Stratoflex Product Division;
Material/ part/service: Dynatube Fittings.
Company: Parker Hannifin Corp. - O-Ring Division;
Material/part/ service: Forward Skirt Door Seal, Gaskets.
Company: Pneudraulics, Inc;
Material/part/service: Fluid Manifolds.
Company: PRC-DeSoto CDP, Inc;
Material/part/service: PR 855, Sealant 1422.
Company: 3M Co;
Material/part/service: Epoxy Resin (2216).
Company: AMORIM Industrial Solutions, Inc;
Material/part/service: P- 50 Sheet Cork.
Company: Cabot Corp. - Cab-O-Sil Division;
Material/part/service: Cab- o-Sil, Fumed Silicon Dioxide.
Company: Lord Corp;
Material/part/service: Primer, Adhesive.
Company: Conax Florida Corp;
Material/part/service: Sea Water Activated Release (SWAR) (parachute
line cutting system), SWAR batteries.
Company: E/M Coating Services;
Material/part/service: Dry Film Lube.
Company: Loctite Aerospace;
Material/part/service: Hysol EA 934 NA (Epoxy Paste Adhesive),
Thixotropic Epoxy Adhesive.
Company: Maryland Cork Co., Inc;
Material/part/service: Granular Cork.
Company: Richmond Technology Solutions (RTSI);
Material/part/service: RCAS 2400 (Anti-static Packaging Material).
Company: Rust-Oleum Corp;
Material/part/service: Top Coat, Primer.
Company: LaBarge, Inc;
Material/part/service: Cables.
Company: Wyle Laboratories, Inc;
Material/part/service: Instrumented Hold-down Studs.
Company: Air Products & Chemicals, Inc;
Material/part/service: K54 Hardener.
Company: Everlube Products;
Material/part/service: LubeLok 1000X.
Company: Deft, Inc;
Material/part/service: Primer.
Company: Dow Corning Corp;
Material/part/service: 6077 Foam, RTV, DC 1200.
Company: Dow Chemical;
Material/part/service: Instafoam.
Company: EMF, Inc - Engravers Metal Fabricators;
Material/part/service: EPDM Covers.
Company: Momentive Performance Materials, Inc;
Material/part/service: Adhesive (RTV 133).
Company: Henkel Corp;
Material/part/service: Alodine Coatings.
Company: Hentzen Coatings, Inc;
Material/part/service: Epoxy Primer.
Company: Summa Technology, Inc;
Material/part/service: SRB Nose Caps.
Company: National Starch and Chemical Co., Emerson & Cuming - Specialty
Polymers Division;
Material/part/service: Glass Ecospheres.
Company: Puroflow Corp;
Material/part/service: Auxiliary Power Unit Flush & Purge Filter.
Company: Pro Battery, Inc;
Material/part/service: CBC Batteries.
Company: Kirkhill - TA Co;
Material/part/service: EPDM.
Company: Resin Technology Group, LLC;
Material/part/service: RT-455.
Company: Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc;
Material/part/service: EPON-828.
Company: Gaco Western, Inc;
Material/part/service: Hypalon Paint.
Company: BST Systems, Inc;
Material/part/service: Operational Flight Instrumentation Battery.
Company: Space Shuttle Main Engines;
Material/part/service: [Empty].
Company: Valley Metals;
Material/part/service: Tubing Raw Materials.
Company: Morgan Advanced Ceramics, Inc. - DBA Wesgo Div;
Material/ part/service: Precious Metal Braze Alloys.
Company: Precision Tube Bending;
Material/part/service: Tube Bending.
Company: Schlosser Forge Co;
Material/part/service: Liner - Main Combustion Chamber (MCC), Forging
Inlet Manifold Splitter.
Company: Hi Temp Insulation, Inc;
Material/part/service: Insulation Nozzle Thermal.
Company: Le Fiell Manufacturing Co;
Material/part/service: Heat Exchange Coil Assembly, Nozzle Coolant
Tubes, Nozzle Steerhorn Tubes.
Company: Thermal Vac, Inc;
Material/part/service: Nickel Plating of Nozzle Tubes.
Company: Arcturus Manufacturing Corp;
Material/part/service: Forging Jacket MCC, Forging Inducer Low Pressure
Fuel Turbopump (LPFTP).
Company: Industrial Tectonics Bearing (ITB) Corp. - (Subsidiary of
Roller Bearing Co.);
Material/part/service: Stainless Steel Bearings.
Company: Magellan Aerospace Turbine Services, LLC;
Material/part/ service: Seals for Pumps.
Company: Hoefner Corp;
Material/part/service: Machining of Valves.
Company: Size Control Plating Co;
Material/part/service: Chrome Plating.
Company: Precision Castparts Corp. (PCC);
Material/part/service: MCC AFT Manifold;
FWD Manifold.
Company: PCC Airfoils, LLC;
Material/part/service: Small Castings.
Company: Eaton Aerospace, LLC - Aerospace Controls Division - Sensing &
Controls;
Material/part/service: Pressure Sensor.
Company: G & N Rubicon Gear, Inc;
Material/part/service: Machine Splines.
Company: Hemphill Spring Co. A Corp;
Material/part/service: Spring, Anti-Flood Valve.
Company: Winsted Precision Ball Corp;
Material/part/service: Balls for Bearings (Metal & SiN3).
Company: Metal Surfaces Inc. (MSI);
Material/part/service: Precious Metal and Nickel Plating.
Company: Metalex Manufacturing, Inc;
Material/part/service: Complex Machine Parts, Housings.
Company: The Balancing Co., Inc;
Material/part/service: Balance Components.
Company: G & D Industries, Inc;
Material/part/service: Protective Covers, Closers, Caps.
Company: Circlemaster, Inc;
Material/part/service: Roll Nozzle Hatbands.
Company: GKN Aerospace Chem-Tronics, Inc;
Material/part/service: Nozzle Jacket.
Company: Coast Plating, Inc;
Material/part/service: Hard Anodize of Low Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
(LPOTP) Housing.
Company: Dell Aerospace, Inc;
Material/part/service: Burst Diaphragms for Valves.
Company: Dixon Hard Chrome, Inc;
Material/part/service: Chrome Plating.
Company: JPM of Mississippi, Inc;
Material/part/service: Machining of Bearing Cages.
Company: FPI, Inc;
Material/part/service: Seals, HPTP Turbine Inlet Bellows.
Company: FAG/Aircraft Super Precision Bearings;
Material/part/service: Silicon Nitride Bearings.
Company: Honeywell International, Inc;
Material/part/service: Block II Controller.
Company: Aerospace Techniques, Inc;
Material/part/service: Turbine Blade and Vane Fabrication.
Company: Howmet Corp. - Hampton Casting Division;
Material/part/ service: Large Castings for Turbopumps.
Company: FMH Corp. - DBA Flexible Metal Hose;
Material/part/service: Bellows Assembly (Lines, Tanks).
Company: Thermtech Corp;
Material/part/service: Fluorinated Ethylene- Propylene Coating for
Bearing Cages.
Company: HR Textron, Inc;
Material/part/service: Propellant Valve/ Hydraulic Actuator Main
Oxidizer Valve Actuator (MOVA), Main Fuel Valve Actuator (MFVA),
Preburner Fuel Oxidizer Valve Actuator (FPOVA), Oxidizer Preburner
Oxidizer Valve Actuator(OPOVA), Chamber Coolant Valve Actuator( CCVA).
Company: Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne;
Material/part/service: HPOTP, HPFTP (High Pressure Oxidizer and Fuel
Turbopumps).
Source: NASA.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Office of the Administrator:
Washington, DC 20546-0001:
July 17, 2007:
Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Chaplain:
NASA appreciates the opportunity to comment on your draft report
entitled "NASA Supplier Base: Challenges Exist in Transitioning from
the Space Shuttle Program to the Next Generation of Human Space Flight
Systems" (GAO-07-940).
In the draft report, GAO makes one recommendation to the NASA
Administrator:
Recommendation: Given the fact that many of NASA's transition and
retirement activities will continue to occur following the shuttle
retirement in 2010, it is important that NASA identify and estimate the
costs associated with these activities in an accountable and
transparent manner. Therefore, we are recommending that the NASA
Administrator direct the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate and
the Space Operations Mission Directorate to jointly develop cost
estimates for transition and retirement activities beyond fiscal year
2010 so that, in NASA's fiscal year 2009 budget submission, NASA can
include transition and retirement funding needs for the required out
years through fiscal year 2013. We expect these estimates to be
adjusted every year and have more fidelity as NASA gains more knowledge
and makes more decisions.
Response: NASA concurs with the recommendation. We agree that it is
important that NASA identify and estimate the costs associated with
NASA's transition and retirement activities, that estimates are
required for activities beyond FY 2010, and that these estimates will
probably be adjusted in future years and have more fidelity as NASA
gains more knowledge and makes more decisions. The Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate and the Space Operations Mission Directorate are
jointly developing cost estimates for transition and requirements as
part of the 2009 NASA Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
cycle. NASA management will work with the Office of Management and
Budget to determine the appropriate timing for including transition and
retirement costs in the President's Budget Proposal.
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft
report and for the insight it provides. If you have any question,
please contact Mr. Joel Kearns at (202) 358-1223 or Dr. John Olson at
(202) 358-3626.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Shana Dale:
Deputy Administrator:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Cristina T. Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or ChaplainC@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, James L. Morrison, Assistant
Director; Lily Chin; Hillary Loeffler; Jeffrey Niblack; Shelby S.
Oakley; Sylvia Schatz; and John P.K. Ting made key contributions to
this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] NASA Authorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-155, § 502 (b)
(2005).
[2] NASA Office of Inspector General, NASA's Plan for Space Shuttle
Transition Could Be Improved by Following Project Management
Guidelines, IG-07-005 (Washington, D.C.: January 2007).
[3] NASA assigns a supplier code to each critical single source
supplier that defines the risk to the program including the inability
to deliver hardware and the impact on meeting the launch schedule.
Identification of these risks varies depending on whether alternate
paths exist for obtaining the hardware, such as cannibalizing other
shuttle components. NASA also identifies "generic causes" for the
defined risk, including, for example, obsolescence, no longer in
business, or lack of skills to perform the work.
[4] NASA Integrated Space Operations Summit, Space Shuttle Program
Transition Panel Final Report (April 2005).
[5] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
[6] Titan IV was an Air Force program that produced rockets for
launching satellites.
[7] NASA Office of Inspector General, NASA's Plan for Space Shuttle
Transition Could Be Improved by Following Project Management
Guidelines, IG-07-005 (Washington, D.C.: January 2007).
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