NASA
Challenges in Completing and Sustaining the International Space Station Gao ID: GAO-08-581T April 24, 2008The International Space Station (ISS), the most complex scientific space project ever attempted, remains incomplete. NASA expects the station's final construction cost will be $31 billion and expects sustainment costs through the station's planned retirement in fiscal year 2016 to total $11 billion. The space shuttle, the only vehicle capable of transporting large segments of the station into orbit, is critical to its completion. NASA plans to complete ISS assembly and retire the shuttle in 2010 in order to pursue a new generation of space flight vehicles, which will not begin to be available until 2015. To provide crew rotation and logistical support during this 5-year gap, NASA plans to rely on spacecraft developed by the commercial sector and other countries. In light of these circumstances, GAO examined the risks and challenges NASA faces in (1) completing assembly of the ISS by 2010 and (2) providing logistics and maintenance to the ISS after 2010. GAO's work to accomplish this included reviewing budget, planning, and other documents from NASA; reviewing NASA officials' testimonies; and interviewing NASA and foreign space program officials.
NASA faces significant challenges in its plans to complete assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) prior to the scheduled retirement of the space shuttle in 2010. Since GAO testified on this issue in July 2007, the shuttle flight schedule has remained aggressive--slating the same number of launches in a shorter period. While NASA thinks the proposed schedule is still achievable, the schedule (1) is only slightly less demanding than it was prior to the Columbia disaster when the agency launched a shuttle every other month with a larger shuttle fleet and (2) leaves little room for the kinds of weather-related, technical, and logistical problems that have delayed flights in the past. Unanticipated delays could result in changes to the station's configuration, that is, some components may not be delivered. We have previously testified that such changes could limit the extent of scientific research that can be conducted on board the ISS. After assembly is completed and the shuttle retires, NASA's ability to rotate crew and supply the ISS will be impaired because of the absence of a vehicle capable of carrying the 114,199 pounds of additional supplies and spares needed to sustain the station until its planned retirement in 2016. For crew rotation and logistics, NASA plans to rely on Russian, European and Japanese vehicles--these vehicles were designed to augment the capabilities of the shuttle, not replace them, and have far less capacity to haul cargo. Furthermore, aside from a single Russian vehicle that can bring back 132 pounds of cargo, no vehicle can return cargo from the ISS after the shuttle is retired; and Commercially developed vehicles--NASA has pledged approximately $500 million for the development of commercial vehicles. NASA expects these vehicles will be ready for cargo use in 2010 and crew use in 2012, even though none of the vehicles currently under development has been launched into orbit yet and their aggressive development schedule leaves little room for the unexpected. If one of these vehicles cannot be delivered according to NASA's current expectations, NASA will have to rely on Russian vehicles to maintain U.S. crew presence on the ISS until the new generation of U.S. spacecraft becomes available.
GAO-08-581T, NASA: Challenges in Completing and Sustaining the International Space Station
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science
and Technology, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:30 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, April 24, 2008:
NASA:
Challenges in Completing and Sustaining the International Space
Station:
Statement of Cristina T. Chaplain:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-08-581T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-581T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Space
and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The International Space Station (ISS), the most complex scientific
space project ever attempted, remains incomplete. NASA expects the
station‘s final construction cost will be $31 billion and expects
sustainment costs through the station‘s planned retirement in fiscal
year 2016 to total $11 billion. The space shuttle, the only vehicle
capable of transporting large segments of the station into orbit, is
critical to its completion. NASA plans to complete ISS assembly and
retire the shuttle in 2010 in order to pursue a new generation of space
flight vehicles, which will not begin to be available until 2015. To
provide crew rotation and logistical support during this 5-year gap,
NASA plans to rely on spacecraft developed by the commercial sector and
other countries.
In light of these circumstances, GAO examined the risks and challenges
NASA faces in (1) completing assembly of the ISS by 2010 and (2)
providing logistics and maintenance to the ISS after 2010.
GAO‘s work to accomplish this included reviewing budget, planning, and
other documents from NASA; reviewing NASA officials‘ testimonies; and
interviewing NASA and foreign space program officials.
What GAO Found:
NASA faces significant challenges in its plans to complete assembly of
the International Space Station (ISS) prior to the scheduled retirement
of the space shuttle in 2010. Since GAO testified on this issue in July
2007, the shuttle flight schedule has remained aggressive”slating the
same number of launches in a shorter period. While NASA thinks the
proposed schedule is still achievable, the schedule:
* is only slightly less demanding than it was prior to the Columbia
disaster when the agency launched a shuttle every other month with a
larger shuttle fleet and;
* leaves little room for the kinds of weather-related, technical, and
logistical problems that have delayed flights in the past.
Unanticipated delays could result in changes to the station‘s
configuration, that is, some components may not be delivered. We have
previously testified that such changes could limit the extent of
scientific research that can be conducted on board the ISS.
After assembly is completed and the shuttle retires, NASA‘s ability to
rotate crew and supply the ISS will be impaired because of the absence
of a vehicle capable of carrying the 114,199 pounds of additional
supplies and spares needed to sustain the station until its planned
retirement in 2016. For crew rotation and logistics, NASA plans to rely
on:
* Russian, European and Japanese vehicles. These vehicles were designed
to augment the capabilities of the shuttle, not replace them, and have
far less capacity to haul cargo. Furthermore, aside from a single
Russian vehicle that can bring back 132 pounds of cargo, no vehicle can
return cargo from the ISS after the shuttle is retired.
* Commercially developed vehicles. NASA has pledged approximately $500
million for the development of commercial vehicles. NASA expects these
vehicles will be ready for cargo use in 2010 and crew use in 2012, even
though none of the vehicles currently under development has been
launched into orbit yet and their aggressive development schedule
leaves little room for the unexpected. If one of these vehicles cannot
be delivered according to NASA‘s current expectations, NASA will have
to rely on Russian vehicles to maintain U.S. crew presence on the ISS
until the new generation of U.S. spacecraft becomes available.
We are not making recommendations as a result of our review as NASA is
well aware of the predicament it faces with the station and has weighed
options and trade-offs for the remainder of the schedule manifest.
However, it is important that flexibility continue to be maintained as
events impacting schedule occur and that decisions be made with the
goal of maximizing safety and results.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-581T]. For more
information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or
chaplainc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here to discuss challenges that the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) faces in completing and
sustaining the International Space Station (ISS). After delays and
redesigns, efforts are under way for a long-envisioned expansion of the
station so it can support a larger crew and more scientific research.
NASA officials estimate the entire cost to complete the station will
total $31 billion, and another $11 billion will be needed to sustain it
through its planned decommissioning in fiscal year 2016.
The space shuttle has been and is critical to completion of the space
station and re-supplying the station. The shuttle remains the only
vehicle capable of transporting large segments of the station into
orbit for assembly. NASA plans to complete ISS assembly duties and
retire the shuttle fleet in 2010 in order to pursue a new generation of
space flight vehicles for exploration. To that end, NASA has begun the
process of making key decisions on suppliers that will no longer be
needed. NASA officials told us that in many cases, restarting suppliers
after these decisions are made would be cost prohibitive and time
consuming. However, a new NASA vehicle will not be available until 2015
at the earliest, when the Crew Launch Vehicle (Ares I) and Crew
Exploration Vehicle (Orion) are expected to fly. To fill the gap
following retirement of the shuttle and provide crew rotation and
logistical support, NASA plans to rely on a variety of spacecraft
developed by the commercial sector and other countries.
In July 2007, we testified on a number of challenges NASA was facing
with regard to completing the ISS within the time constraints created
by the shuttle's retirement. Those challenges are still relevant. In
light of these issues, we examined the risks and challenges NASA faces
in (1) completing assembly of the ISS by 2010, and (2) providing
logistics and maintenance support to the ISS after 2010.
In short, our work continued to find that NASA's plans to complete
assembly of the International Space Station prior to the scheduled
retirement of the space shuttle at end of fiscal year 2010 require much
to happen and very little to go wrong. While NASA believes the schedule
is still achievable, the flight rate that NASA is projecting is only
slightly less aggressive than it was prior to the Columbia disaster
[Footnote 1] when, from 1992 to 2003, the agency launched a shuttle
every other month. At that time, NASA used four vehicles to maintain
its flight schedule. To complete the station by 2010, NASA will need to
maintain a similar flight rate with fewer shuttles and with a shuttle
fleet that is aging and continuing to face fuel sensor challenges. NASA
remains confident that the current manifest can be accomplished within
the given time, and in fact, it has several months of reserve time in
its manifest. However, agency officials readily admit that the schedule
is aggressive. If delays continue, NASA may need to reduce the number
of flights to the station, which could prevent delivery of items
currently scheduled for assembly and the pre-positioning of critical
spares. Further, while NASA still expects to be able to increase crew
capacity from three to six persons, changes it may need to make to the
space station's configuration could limit the extent of scientific
research that can be conducted onboard the ISS or quality of life for
the crew.
After assembly is completed and the shuttle is retired, NASA's ability
to rotate crew and supply the ISS will be impaired because of the
absence of a vehicle capable of carrying the 114,199 pounds (or 51.8
metric tons) of additional supplies needed to sustain the station until
its planned retirement in fiscal year 2016. NASA plans to rely on
Russian, European and Japanese vehicles to service the station. Even
with these vehicles, this shortfall remains. While the Russian vehicles
are already in service, the European vehicle just completed its first
operational test flight, and development efforts are still under way on
the Japanese vehicle. In addition, these vehicles were designed to
augment the capabilities of the shuttle, not replace them. Both the
European and Japanese vehicles were designed to deliver supplies to the
station but their capacities are not equal to the shuttle's 37,864
pounds of capacity. Furthermore, aside from a single Russian vehicle
that can bring back 132 pounds of cargo and rotate crew, no vehicle can
return cargo from the International Space Station after the shuttle is
retired. NASA plans to rely on commercially developed vehicles to
address some of these shortfalls and has pledged approximately $500
million for their development. NASA expects one of these vehicles will
be ready for cargo use in 2010 and crew use in 2012. However, no
vehicle has successfully been launched into orbit and their development
schedules may leave little room for the unexpected. If these vehicles
cannot be delivered according to NASA's current expectations, NASA will
have to rely on Russian vehicles to maintain U.S. crew on the
International Space Station until the new generation of U.S. spacecraft
becomes available.
To conduct our work, we reviewed documents and testimonies by NASA
officials relating to the challenges associated with ISS completion,
the delivery schedule for ISS assembly and replacement units, and the
space shuttle manifest. We reviewed key ISS budget and strategic
maintenance plans, the ISS Independent Safety Task Force Report, and
previous GAO reports relating to the ISS. We visited and interviewed
officials responsible for ISS operations at NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C., and the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. At
NASA Headquarters, we met with officials from the Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate and the Space Operations Mission Directorate,
including representatives from the International Space Station and
space shuttle programs. We met with ISS and space shuttle officials at
the Johnson Space Center. We also talked to a commercial developer of
space vehicles and met with representatives of foreign space efforts.
Complete details of our scope and methodology can be found in appendix
I. We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to April 2008, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
The International Space Station program began in 1993 with several
partner countries: Canada, the 11 member nations of the European Space
Agency (ESA), Japan, and Russia. The ISS has served and is intended to
expand its service as a laboratory for exploring basic questions in a
variety of fields, including commercial, scientific, and engineering
research. The first assembly flight of the station, in which the space
shuttle Endeavor attached the U.S. laboratory module to the Russian
laboratory module, occurred in early December of 1998. However, since
the program's inception, NASA has struggled with cost growth, schedule
delays and re-designs of the station. As we reported in the past, these
challenges were largely due to poorly defined requirements, changes in
program content and inadequate program oversight. Due to these
challenges, the configuration of the station has devolved over time. In
the spring of 2001, NASA announced that it would make major changes in
the final configuration of the ISS to address cost overruns. In 2003,
the National Academies reported that this reconfiguration greatly
affected the overall ability of the ISS to support science. NASA
estimates that assembly and operating costs of the ISS will be between
$2.1 billion to $2.4 billion annually for FY2009-FY2012. The ISS as of
February 19, 2008, is approximately 65 percent complete.
The shuttle program and the ISS program are inherently intertwined. The
shuttle has unique capabilities in that it can lift and return more
cargo to and from orbit than any other current or planned space
vehicle. Figure 1 shows the capabilities of the shuttle in various
configurations. Most segments of ISS cannot be delivered by any other
vehicle. For example, the Columbia disaster in 2003 put ISS assembly on
hiatus as NASA ceased shuttle launches for 2½ years while it
investigated the safety of the fleet. During this period, the Russian
Soyuz became the means of transportation for crewmembers traveling to
and returning from the ISS.
Figure 1: Cargo Capabilities of the Shuttle:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains a photograph of the Space Shuttle, as well as the
following information:
The shuttle‘s different capabilities:
Mixed Flight Capability: 16,480 lbs./7,475 mass kg.
Consisting of internal cargo (8,818 lbs./4,000 kg.), external (2,205
lbs./1,000 kg.), water (882 lbs./400 kg.), nitrogen (55 lbs./25 kg.),
oxygen (110 lbs./50 kg.) and propellants which are fuel and oxidizer
(4,409 lbs./2,000 kg.). The majority of internal cargo is packaged in
cargo transfer bags and then flown in either a rack or middeck locker.
External Capability: 14,716 lbs./6,675 mass kg.
Consisting of internal cargo (441 lbs./200 kg.), external (8,818
lbs./4,000 kg.), water (882 lbs./400 kg.), nitrogen (55 lbs./25 kg.),
oxygen (110 lbs./50 kg.) and propellant (4,409 lbs./2,000 kg.). Two
Express Logistics Carriers (ELC) can be loaded on the Shuttle payload
bay. The ELC‘s can be left on the ISS for stowage of science payloads
and maintenance of spares”each holding up to 10 orbital replacement
units (ORU), and each has the ability to deliver up to two science
payloads.
Assembly Capability: 37,864 lbs./17,175 mass kg.
Consisting of internal cargo (441 lbs./200 kg.), external (31,967
lbs./14,500 kg.), water (882 lbs./400 kg.), nitrogen (55 lbs./25 kg.),
oxygen (110 lbs./50 kg.) and propellant (4,409 lbs./2,000 kg.). The
assembly configuration enables the delivery of assembly hardware, such
as the ESA‘s Columbus module.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
[End of figure]
In a major space policy address on January 14, 2004, President Bush
announced his "Vision for U.S. Space Exploration" (Vision) and directed
NASA to focus its future human space exploration activities on a return
to the Moon as prelude to future human missions to Mars and beyond. As
part of the Vision, NASA is developing new crew and cargo vehicles,
with the first crew vehicle currently scheduled to be available in
2015. The President also directed NASA to retire the space shuttle
after completion of the ISS, which is planned for the end of the
decade. Based on that directive, NASA officials told us that they
developed a manifest consisting of 17 shuttle launches to support ISS
assembly and supply between 2005 and 2010.[Footnote 2] Nine of these
have taken place. In response to the President's Vision, NASA formally
set September 30, 2010, as the date that the shuttle program will cease
because agency officials believe that continuing the program beyond
that date will slow development of the agency's new vehicles--
specifically, the agency budget cannot support both programs at costs
of $2.5 billion to $4 billion above current budget. As shown in Table
1, the shuttle program costs NASA several billion dollars annually and
projected funding is phased out in fiscal year 2011. NASA officials
stated that the majority of shuttle program cost is fixed at roughly $3
billion a year whether it flies or not. NASA officials stated that the
average cost per flight is $150 million to $200 million.[Footnote 3]
Table 1: Space Shuttle Program Costs (Dollars in millions):
Space Shuttle program:
FY 2007: $3,315.3;
FY 2008: $3,266.7;
FY 2009: $2,981.7;
FY 2010: $2,983.7;
FY 2011: $95.7;
FY 2012: [Empty];
FY 2013: [Empty].
Source: President's FY 2009 Budget Request.
[End of table]
The 2005 NASA Authorization Act designated the U.S segment of the ISS
as a national laboratory and directed NASA to develop a plan to
increase the utilization of the ISS by other federal entities and the
private sector. In response, NASA has been pursuing relationships with
these entities. NASA expects that as the nation's newest national
laboratory, the ISS will strengthen NASA's relationships with other
federal entities and private sector leaders in the pursuit of national
priorities for the advancement of science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics. The ISS National Laboratory is also intended to open new
paths for the exploration and economic development of space.
The Retirement of the Shuttle Poses Challenges to NASA's Ability to
Complete the International Space Station:
It will be a challenge for NASA to complete the space station by 2010
given the compressed nature of the schedule, maintenance and safety
concerns, as well as events beyond its control such as weather. Any of
these factors can cause delays that may require NASA to re-evaluate and
reconstitute the assembly sequence. NASA remains confident that the
current manifest can be accomplished within the given time and there
are tradeoffs NASA can make in terms of what it can take up to support
and sustain the station should unanticipated delays occur. However,
failure to complete assembly as currently planned would further reduce
the station's ability to fulfill its research objectives and short the
station of critical spare parts that only the shuttle can currently
deliver.
Shuttle Flight Schedule Is Aggressive:
In our July 2007 testimony, we reported that NASA planned to launch a
shuttle once every 2.7 months. The plan for launches remains
aggressive, partly because NASA plans on completing the ISS with the
last assembly mission in April 2010, with two contingency flights in
February and July 2010 to deliver key replacement units. The 5 months
between the last assembly launch and shuttle retirement in September
2010 act as a schedule reserve, which can be used to address delays.
There are 8 shuttle flights left to complete the station and two
contingency flights left to deliver key components necessary to sustain
the ISS after the retirement of the shuttle. There is an average of 2 ½
months between each shuttle launch.[Footnote 4] Table 2 shows the
current shuttle manifest.
Table 2: Remaining Flights of the Space Shuttles:
Space shuttles: Discovery;
Expected launch dates: May 31, 2008.
Space shuttles: Atlantis[A];
Expected launch dates: August 28, 2008.
Space shuttles: Endeavor;
Expected launch dates: October 16, 2008.
Space shuttles: Discovery;
Expected launch dates: December 4, 2008.
Space shuttles: Endeavor;
Expected launch dates: March 2009.
Space shuttles: Discovery;
Expected launch dates: April 2009.
Space shuttles: Endeavor;
Expected launch dates: August 2009.
Space shuttles: Discovery;
Expected launch dates: October 2009.
Space shuttles: Endeavor[B];
Expected launch dates: February 2010.
Space shuttles: Discovery;
Expected launch dates: April 2010.
Space shuttles: Endeavor[B];
Expected launch dates: July 2010.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA's shuttle manifest.
[A] Mission to repair the Hubble Space Telescope.
[B] Contingency flights.
[End of table]
NASA has launched shuttles at this rate in the past. In fact, the
agency launched a shuttle, on average, every two months from 1992
through the Columbia disaster in 2003. However, at that time the agency
was launching a fleet of four shuttles.[Footnote 5] The shuttles
require maintenance and refurbishing that can last four to five months
before they can be re-launched. Launching at such a rate means that the
rotation schedule can handle few significant delays, such as those
previously experienced due to weather and fuel sensor difficulties.
Lastly, NASA officials said that Shuttle Atlantis, which was to go out
of service after the Hubble mission, will return to servicing the ISS
for two more flights, which NASA believes will add more schedule
flexibility.
Figure 2: Completed and Projected Space Shuttle Flights Needed for ISS
Assembly:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Completed and Projected Space Shuttle Flights Needed for ISS Assembly:
Year: 1998;
Number of flights (with 4 shuttles): 5.
Year: 1999;
Number of flights (with 4 shuttles): 3.
Year: 2000;
Number of flights (with 4 shuttles): 5.
Year: 2001;
Number of flights (with 4 shuttles): 6.
Year: 2002;
Number of flights (with 4 shuttles): 5.
Year: 2003;
Number of flights (with 4 shuttles): 1.
Year: 2004;
Number of flights: 0.
Year: 2005;
Number of flights (with 3 shuttles): 1.
Year: 2006;
Number of flights (with 3 shuttles): 3.
Year: 2007;
Number of flights (with 3 shuttles): 3.
Year: 2008;
Number of flights (with 3 shuttles): 6.
Year: 2009;
Number of flights (with 3 shuttles): 4.
Year: 2010;
Number of flights (with 3 shuttles): 3.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
[End of figure]
Potential Launch Delays Remain:
NASA officials stated repeatedly that NASA is committed to safely
flying the shuttle until its retirement and will not succumb to
schedule pressure. However, the compressed nature of the manifest will
continue to test that commitment. Fuel sensor challenges continue to
surface in the shuttle fleet. For example, the recent shuttle Atlantis
launch was delayed two months while NASA addressed a fuel sensor
problem associated with the shuttle's liquid hydrogen tank. This is the
same system that caused a 2-week delay in the launch of the shuttle
Discovery in 2005.
There are also challenges associated with the shuttle launch window.
NASA officials told us that the duration of that window is dependent on
a number of factors, which include changes in the position of the earth
and spacecraft traffic restrictions. NASA must consider its traffic
model constraints for vehicles docking at the space station. According
to the traffic model for ISS, no other vehicle can dock while the
shuttle is docked, and each vehicle has constraints on how long it can
stay docked. For example, the shuttle can dock for a maximum of 10
days, while the Soyuz can dock a maximum of 200 days. The docking of
these two vehicles must be coordinated and meet other technical
restrictions.
In addition, the shuttle has experienced delays due to severe weather,
such as when Atlantis's external tank was damaged by a hailstorm in
2007. In this case the delay was about three months. Figure 3 shows the
delays in recent shuttle launches related to weather and other causes.
Figure 3: Causes of Recent Space Shuttle Flight Delays:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a horizontal bar graph depicting the following data:
Original launched date: July 13, 2005;
Actual launched date: July 26, 2005;
Reasons for delay: Fuel sensor;
Days of delay: 13.
Original launched date: July 1, 2006;
Actual launched date: July 4, 2006;
Reasons for delay: Weather;
Days of delay: 3.
Original launched date: August 27, 2006;
Actual launched date: September 9, 2006;
Reasons for delay: Weather/fuel sensor;
Days of delay: 13.
Original launched date: December 7, 2006;
Actual launched date: December 9, 2006;
Reasons for delay: Weather;
Days of delay: 2.
Original launched date: March 15, 2007;
Actual launched date: June 8, 2007;
Reasons for delay: Weather;
Days of delay: 85.
Original launched date: December 6, 2007;
Actual launched date: February 7, 2008;
Reasons for delay: Fuel sensor;
Days of delay: 63.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
[End of figure]
Completion of ISS Needed to Expand Scientific Research:
The ISS is scheduled to support a six-person crew as early as 2009 and
maintain that capability through 2016. NASA officials said that
equipment essential to support a six-person crew, such as systems for
oxygen recycling, removal of carbon dioxide and transforming urine into
water as well as an exercise machine will be delivered to the station
this fall. In addition, there are two components that have been planned
to hold this and other equipment needed for the six-person crew, which
are scheduled to go up in April 2010. If unanticipated delays occur,
NASA may need to hold back these two components--known as the Node 3
and the Cupola--which could constrain the ability to conduct research
and the quality of life on the station for the crew.
NASA officials emphasized that NASA's intent was to have most science
conducted on ISS only after the assembly of the ISS was completed. The
ISS currently supports three crewmembers. NASA stated that the majority
of the crew's time is spent maintaining the station, rather than
conducting scientific study. According to NASA, the crew spends no more
than 3 hours per week on science. Completion of the ISS would allow
NASA to expand to a six-person crew who could conduct more research.
Since the ISS is designated as a national laboratory, the expectation
is that it will support scientific experimentation. NASA is in the
process of negotiating agreements with scientific organizations to
support scientific research on the ISS. NASA officials told us that
they are negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding with the National
Institutes of Health to explore the possibility of scientific
experimentation onboard the ISS. These officials also told us that NASA
is in the process of negotiating with at least two other agencies.
The Need to Pre-Position Replacement Units to Sustain the ISS May Also
Affect Assembly:
NASA's efforts to complete the ISS are further complicated by the need
to put replacement units--the spare parts that are essential to
sustaining the ISS--into position before the shuttle retires. The two
contingency flights of the shuttle have been designated to deliver
these key replacement units, which only the shuttle is capable of
carrying. According to NASA, the original approach to deal with these
key components (also known as orbital replacement units--ORU[Footnote
6]) was to take the ones that failed or reached the end of their
lifetime back to Earth on the shuttle, refurbish them and launch them
back to ISS for use. As a result of the shuttle retirement, NASA will
no longer be bringing down ORUs to fix. Instead, NASA officials stated
they have adopted a "build and burn" philosophy, which means that after
the shuttle retires, instead of being brought down to be refurbished,
ORUs will be discarded and disintegrate upon re-entry into the
atmosphere. To determine how many replacement units need to be
positioned at the station, NASA officials told us they are using data
modeling that has been very effective in determining how long ORUs will
last. Table 3 illustrates the shuttle manifest. This includes elements
needed for the planned configuration to complete the station and
delivery of critical spares.
Table 3: Manifest of Remaining Space Shuttle Flights:
Dates: May 31, 2008;
Space shuttle: Discovery;
Element being delivered: Kibo Japanese Experiment Module Pressurized
Module (JEM-PM), one of two Japanese's research facilities; Japanese
Remote Manipulator System (JEM RMS) are two robotic arms that support
operations on the outside of Kibo.
Dates: Aug. 28, 2008;
Space shuttle: Atlantis;
Element being delivered: Final shuttle Mission to Hubble Space Station.
Dates: Oct. 16, 2008;
Space shuttle: Endeavor;
Element being delivered: Multi-Purpose Logistics Module (MPLM) are a
reusable "moving van" carrying equipments, experiments, and supplies to
and from the ISS.
Dates: Dec. 4, 2008;
Space shuttle: Discovery;
Element being delivered: Fourth starboard truss segment (ITS S6), power
element; Fourth set of solar arrays and batteries-power element.
Dates: March 2009;
Space shuttle: Endeavor;
Element being delivered: Kibo Japanese Experiment Module Exposed
Facility (JEM EF), the second Japanese research facility; Logistics
Module Exposed Section (ELM-ES) is a pallet that can hold three
experiment payloads; Spacelab Pallet Deployable 2 (SLP-D2) is a
platform for mounting instruments.
Dates: April 2009;
Space shuttle:
Discovery; Element being delivered: MPLM; Lightweight Multi-Purpose
Experiment Support Structure Carrier (LMC) is the carrier to carry
experiments to the ISS; Galley-multi-purpose facility to handle meal
preparations; Second treadmill; Crew Health Care System 2 (CHeCS 2) are
a suite of hardware on the ISS that provides the medical and
environmental capabilities to ensure the health and safety of
crewmembers during long-duration missions.
Dates: Aug. 2009;
Space shuttle: Endeavor;
Element being delivered: EXPRESS Logistics Carrier 1 (ELC1) and 2
(ELC2) are designed to carry external payloads and Orbital Replacement
Units (ORUs).
Dates: Oct. 2009;
Space shuttle: Discovery;
Element being delivered: MPLM; LMC.
Dates: Feb. 2010; Contingency Flight;
Space shuttle: Endeavor;
Element being delivered: ELC3 and ELC4 are designed to carry external
payloads and ORUs.
Dates: April 2010;
Space shuttle: Discovery;
Element being delivered: Node 3 is a habitation system with the Cupola
observatory.
Dates: July 2010; Contingency Flight;
Space shuttle: Endeavor;
Element being delivered: ELC5 and ELC1 are designed to carry external
payloads and ORUs.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA's shuttle manifest.
[End of table]
NASA currently plans to use two contingency flights for these
replacements because all other flights are planned with assembly cargo.
Recently, the NASA Administrator publicly stated that these flights are
considered necessary to sustain the ISS and have been scheduled to
carry key spare units.
Alternative Vehicle Options to Service the International Space Station
Pose Challenges:
In the event that NASA completes assembly of the ISS on schedule and
prepositions an adequate number of critical spares, the agency still
faces a myriad of challenges in sustaining the research facility until
its retirement, currently planned for fiscal year 2016. Without the
shuttle, NASA officials told us that they face a significant cargo
supply shortfall and very limited crew rotation capabilities. NASA will
rely on an assortment of vehicles in order to provide the necessary
logistical support and crew rotation capabilities required by the
station. Some of these vehicles are already supporting the station.
Others are being developed by international partners, the commercial
sector, and NASA. (See Figure 4) Furthermore, some of these
transportation services may face legal restrictions, and still others
face cost, schedule, and performance issues that raise serious
questions about their development and utilization. These issues will
challenge NASA's ability to close the sustainment gap between the
retirement of the shuttle in 2010 and the availability of the Crew
Exploration Vehicle (CEV) in 2015. Failure of any or some of these
efforts would also seriously restrict NASA's options to sustain and
maintain a viable space station.
Figure 4: Availability of Vehicles Serving the International Space
Station:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a horizontal timeline depicting the following data:
Availability of Vehicles Serving the International Space Station:
Shuttle services ISS (currently servicing ISS): 2006-2010;
Soyuz and Progress (currently servicing ISS): 2006-2012; (awaiting
congressional action: 2012-2015);
ATV: European Space Agency Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV)
(Development and not yet operational): 2008 (test flight)-2016;
HTV: Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV)
(Development and not yet operational): 2009 (test flight)-2016;
COTS[A]: Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) (Development
and not yet operational): 2009 (demonstration of cargo vehicle)-2016;
CEV: NASA‘s Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) (Development and not yet
operational): 2006-2014 (development phase); 2015-2016 (estimated
operational date).
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
[A] Represents space exploration technologies only:
[End of figure]
Russian Vehicles:
With the exception of the Shuttle and the recently completed
demonstration flight of the ATV, the only vehicles currently capable of
supporting the space station are the Russian Progress and Soyuz
vehicles. NASA officials stated that both of these vehicles have
provided reliable service to the ISS. From the Columbia disaster in
2003 until return to flight in 2005, the Russian vehicles were the sole
source of logistical support and crew rotation capability for the
station. The Progress provides atmospheric gas, propellant, water, and
pressurized cargo. It also has the capability to use its thrusters to
change the Station's altitude and orientation. The Soyuz provides crew
delivery and rescue capability for three crew members. Progress
vehicles are expendable and offer no recoverable return capability, but
provide important trash removal capabilities. Soyuz vehicles have a
limited recoverable cargo capacity. However, some NASA officials have
suggested that their limited capabilities restrict the capacity of the
station to move to a six-member crew and significantly limit the
scientific research because the vehicles cannot bring experiments to
earth for assessment.
NASA currently purchases crew and cargo transport services from Russia
through a contract with the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos).
NASA officials told us that after the initial ISS contract between
Roscosmos and NASA expired, NASA entered into another contract that
runs through 2011. However, according to NASA, the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 restricted certain payments in connection
to the ISS that may be made to the Russian government. In 2005, NASA
requested relief from the restrictions of the Act, and Congress amended
the Act.[Footnote 7] Through this amendment, NASA and Roscosmos have
negotiated quantities and prices for services through January 1, 2012.
NASA officials anticipate the use of 4 Soyuz flights per year and
approximately 6 Progress flights beginning in approximately 2010. While
NASA officials stated that they are making every effort to limit amount
of fees they pay for usage of Russian vehicles, to date, NASA officials
told us that they anticipate that from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year
2012, NASA will spend $589 million on cargo and crew services from the
Russians.[Footnote 8] NASA officials also told us that the Roscosmos
has suggested that it will charge NASA higher fees for usage of its
vehicles.
European and Japanese Vehicles:
NASA has stated it will use its international partners' vehicles to
conduct some supply activities. Specifically, Japan's Aerospace
Exploration Agency (JAXA) H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV) and the European
Space Agency's (ESA) Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) vehicles will be
used for bringing up cargo. NASA's reliance on the ATV and HTV assumes
that these vehicles will be ready to service the ISS by the time the
shuttle stops flying in 2010.
The new vehicles being developed by the European and Japanese space
agencies are very complex. The ATV had a development timeline of 20
years. Its first operational test flight to the ISS was in March 2008.
NASA has stated that both the European and Japanese vehicle development
programs experienced technical hurdles and budgetary constraints, but
are committed to fulfilling their roles as partners in the ISS program.
NASA officials told us they have confidence the European vehicle will
be available for ISS operations before retirement of the shuttle, but
they are not as confident about the Japanese vehicle's being ready by
that time. The Japanese vehicle is still under development and has
faced some setbacks. NASA officials told us that the HTV's first test
launch is planned for July 2009.
Figure 5: The European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV):
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains an illustration of the European Automated Transfer
Vehicle (ATV), as well as the following information:
The European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) capability:
Maximum capability:
16,535 lbs./7,500 mass kg. The ATV is capable of performing many ISS
reboost and altitude burns and resupplying ISS with water and
atmospheric gas. The ATV has no external capability and is expendable
and offers no recoverable return capability.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
[End of figure]
Figure 6: The Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV):
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains an illustration of the Japanese H-II Transfer
Vehicle (HTV), as well as the following information:
The Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV) capability:
Maximum capability:
13,228 lbs./6,000 mass kg. The HTV can provide atmospheric gas and
water re-supply to the ISS. The HTV can also deliver limited
unpressurized external cargo. The HTV has no re-boost capability
and is an expendable vehicle like the ATV.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
[End of figure]
International Partner Vehicles Have Constraints in Ability to Ferry
Crew and Cargo to and from the ISS in Comparison to the Shuttle:
In addition to potential development challenges, the international
partner vehicles have constraints in terms of what they can take to and
from the ISS in comparison to the shuttle. NASA's current plans to
manage the gap after the shuttle retirement do not take into account
the possibility of delays in the development of these vehicles, and
even if they do come on line on time, NASA officials estimate that
there will be a significant shortfall to the ISS of at least 114,199
pounds (or 51.8 metric tons) in cargo re-supply capability. These
vehicles were designed to augment the capabilities of the shuttle and
have significantly less capability to deliver cargo to the ISS. The
shuttle can carry a maximum cargo of close to 38,000 pounds (17,175
kg.). In comparison, the European ATV's maximum capability is 16,535
pounds (7,500 kg.) and the Japanese HTV's average capability is 13,228
pounds (6,000 kg.). The HTV and ATV are expendable vehicles. NASA can
use them for trash removal, but cannot carry cargo or scientific
experiments back to earth because the vehicles disintegrate when re-
entering the atmosphere.
The Russian Progress and Soyuz vehicles also have very limited cargo
capacity. For example, the Progress has an average capability of 5,732
pounds (2,600 kg.)--roughly one-seventh the shuttle's capability. The
Progress, like the ATV and HTV, is an expendable vehicle. The Soyuz can
transport three crew persons to the ISS and can serve as a rescue
vehicle capable of taking three crew members back to earth. Unlike the
ATV and HTV, the Soyuz does have the capacity to bring down cargo--
roughly 132 pounds (60 kg.). NASA officials have stated that until NASA
deploys its new crew exploration vehicles or commercial vehicles become
available, NASA will be dependent on the Russian vehicles for crew
transportation services and on the Japanese and European vehicles for
limited cargo services whenever they become available.
Figure 7 compares the up mass capabilities of the various vehicles.
Figure 7: Upmass capability by vehicle:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph that depicts the following data:
Upmass capability by vehicle:
Vehicle: Space shuttle;
Maximum up mass (in kilograms): 37,864 (17,175);
Minimum up mass (in kilograms): 14,716 (6,6750.
Vehicle: ATV;
Total capability (kilograms): 16,535 (7,500).
Vehicle: HTV;
Total capability (kilograms): 13,228 (6,000).
Vehicle: Progress;
Total capability (kilograms): 5,732 (2,600).
Vehicle: Soyuz[A];
Total capability (kilograms): 132 (60).
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
[A] The Soyuz has the capability to bring down from the ISS up to 132
pounds of cargo.
[End of figure]
Commercial Vehicles:
NASA is working with the commercial space sector through its Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program to develop and produce
vehicles that can take equipment and crew to and from the space
station. NASA expects that these vehicles will be ready for cargo use
in 2010 and crew use in 2012. However, these vehicles have yet to be
successfully launched into orbit, and some NASA officials have
acknowledged that their development schedules leave little room for the
unexpected.
Under the COTS program, NASA has pledged $500 million to promote
commercial opportunities for space transportation vehicles. Using Space
Act agreements[Footnote 9] instead of traditional contracting
mechanisms, NASA will make payments to companies based on the
achievement of key milestones during the development of their vehicles.
These agreements are both funded and unfunded. For the two funded
agreements that have been reached, NASA stated that the commercial
suppliers for space transportation services will have customers outside
of ISS, including NASA's Constellation program, which plans to send
humans back to the moon and eventually Mars. The COTS program will
occur in phases. In the first phase companies will demonstrate the
vehicle launch and docking capabilities with the ISS. The second phase
is the procurement of services for transportation of cargo and crew to
the ISS, which is scheduled to begin sometime in the 2010 timeframe.
NASA had seven COTS agreements through the Space Act. NASA signed five
unfunded Space Act agreements, which facilitate the sharing of
technical and ISS integration information between commercial companies
and NASA. NASA has funded two companies, Rocketplane Kistler (RpK) and
Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX). NASA officials stated that
through the funded Space Act agreements, SpaceX has received $139
million for its project and is still working on successfully launching
a vehicle that can reach low-Earth orbit. The company successfully
completed a critical design review in August 2007 and told us that it
is planning its first orbital demonstration test flight for June 2009.
NASA officials told us that RpK received $37 million in funding, but
then forfeited the remainder of its share because it did not meet
certain financial development milestones. When NASA began to
redistribute these forfeited funds, RpK filed a bid protest with GAO,
which GAO denied. NASA officials then moved forward and awarded $170
million to Orbital Sciences Corporation in February 2008.
NASA officials acted quickly to award the forfeited money and expect
that SpaceX will have cargo capability available in 2010 (by the time
the shuttle is retired) and crew capability in 2012. While Space X has
been meeting key milestones in the development of its vehicle, some
officials at the Johnson Space Center were skeptical that COTS would be
available on the current projected schedule. Additionally, the
International Space Station Independent Safety Task Force (IISTF)
reported that design, development and certification of the new COTS
program was just beginning and that "if similar to other new program
development activities, it most likely will take much longer than
expected and will cost more than anticipated." In our opinion, the
schedule is optimistic when compared to other government and commercial
space programs we have studied. We will be studying the COTS program
and schedules in more detail in response to a request of members of
congress.
Ares I and Orion:
NASA is under pressure to develop its own vehicles quickly as the space
shuttle's retirement in 2010 means that there could be at least a 5-
year gap in our nation's ability to send humans to space. Among the
first major items of NASA's development efforts to implement the Vision
program are the development of new space flight systems--including the
Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle. Ares
I and Orion are currently targeted for operation no later than 2015.
NASA plans to use these vehicles as they become available to service
the space station.
However, we recently testified that there are considerable unknowns as
to whether NASA's plans for the Ares I and Orion vehicles can be
executed within schedule goals, as well as what these efforts will
ultimately cost. This is primarily because NASA is still in the process
of defining many of the project's performance requirements and some of
these uncertainties could affect the mass, loads, and weight
requirements for the vehicles. Such uncertainty has created knowledge
gaps that are affecting many aspects of both projects. For example, a
design analysis cycle completed in May 2007 revealed an unexpected
increase in ascent loads (the physical strain on the spacecraft during
launch) that could result in increases to the weight of the Orion
vehicle and both stages of the Ares I.
NASA recognizes the risks involved with its approach and it is taking
steps to mitigate those risks. However, given the complexity of the
Orion and Ares I efforts and their interdependencies, any significant
requirements changes can have reverberating effects and make it
extremely difficult to establish firm cost estimates and schedule
baselines. If knowledge gaps persist, programs will cost more, fail to
meet their schedules, or deliver less than originally envisioned.
Ultimately, NASA's aggressive schedule leaves little room for the
unexpected. If something goes wrong with the development of the Crew
Launch Vehicle or the Crew Exploration Vehicle, the entire
Constellation Program could be thrown off course and the return to
human spaceflight further delayed.
Concluding Observations:
The decision to retire the space shuttle in 2010 has had profound
effects on the ISS program. It leaves little flexibility in the shuttle
schedule. Any delays could require NASA to choose between completing
the station as planned and the pre-positioning of needed critical
spares. The decision also leaves NASA dependent on Russia for crew
rotation services until other vehicles are developed and demonstrated.
And even with the development of these vehicles, NASA still faces a
significant capacity shortfall in its ability to provide logistical
support to the station. The shortfall may well impact support for a six
person crew and the quality of research that can be conducted on the
ISS. At the same time, it also provides opportunities to commercial
suppliers to demonstrate capabilities that could have long-term
benefits for future U.S. space exploration and development. We are not
making recommendations as a result of our review as NASA is well aware
of the predicament it faces with the station and has weighed options
and trade-offs for the remainder of the schedule manifest. However, it
is important that flexibility continue to be maintained as events
impacting schedule occur and that decisions be made with the goal of
maximizing safety and results.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or the other members may have at this time.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further questions about this statement, please contact Cristina T.
Chaplain at (202) 512-4841. Individuals making key contributions to
this statement include James L. Morrison, Greg Campbell, Brendan S.
Culley, Masha P. Pastuhov-Purdie, Keo Vongvanith, and Alyssa B. Weir.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To identify the risks and challenges NASA faces in completing assembly
of the International Space Station by 2010, we:
* analyzed key documents and testimonies by NASA officials relating to
the challenges associated with ISS completion. This included: the
delivery schedule for ISS parts for assembly and the delivery schedule
for replacement units, the space shuttle manifest, budget documents and
the strategic maintenance plan, the ISS Independent Safety Task Force
Report, and previous GAO reports relating to the ISS.
* interviewed NASA mission officials to obtain information on the
status of the ISS. We also discussed these issues with the
International Partners (Canadian Space Agency, European Space Agency
and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency) to get their perspectives.
To determine the risks and challenges NASA faces in providing logistics
and maintenance support to the International Space Station after 2010,
we:
* analyzed documents related to the up-mass and down-mass capabilities
of the International Partners and SpaceX vehicles, the shortfall in ISS
up-mass for re-supply and sustainment, the new vehicles that will
support ISS NASA's plans for using Russian vehicles to support ISS
through what NASA refers to as its "exemption," and the impacts to the
utilization of the ISS.
* We interviewed key NASA officials from NASA Headquarters, the Space
Operations Mission Directorate, NASA's Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services program, and the ISS program officials, and
interviewed officials representing the International Partners:
To accomplish our work, we visited and interviewed officials
responsible for the ISS operations at NASA Headquarters, Washington,
D.C., and the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. At NASA
Headquarters, we met with officials from the Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate and the Space Operations Mission Directorate,
including representatives from the International Space Station and
space shuttle programs. We also met with ISS and space shuttle mission
officials at the Johnson Space Center.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to April 2008, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] In 2003, the space shuttle Columbia broke up as it returned to
Earth after 16 days in orbit. After the accident of Columbia, the
shuttle fleet was grounded for approximately 2 ½ years. During that the
time, U.S. crew and supplies were launched in the Russian Soyuz and
Progress.
[2] The manifest includes 18 total flights, but one of the launches is
reserved for repairs to the Hubble Space Telescope.
[3] This cost is based on hardware, such as the booster rocket, used
for the shuttles.
[4] This includes one mission to repair the Hubble Space Telescope and
two contingency flights.
[5] The remaining three shuttles are the Atlantis, Discovery, and
Endeavor.
[6] Orbital Replacement Units (ORU), according to NASA officials, are
critical spares are necessary to sustain the ISS.
[7] The 2005 Amendment to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 altered
the Acts definition of "extraordinary payments in connection with the
International Space Station." NASA refers to this amendment as its
"exemption."
[8] NASA and Roscosmos have negotiated quantities and prices for
services through calendar year 2011. According to NASA it will require
additional relief from the restrictions of the Act, currently entitled
the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act.
[9] COTS agreements are Space Act agreements issued pursuant to NASA's
other transactions authority. These types of agreements are not
contracts, and are therefore generally not subject to those federal
laws and regulations that apply to government contracts. NASA has
budgeted $500 million in fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2010 as an
investment for the demonstration of commercial orbital capabilities and
will be executed in two phases. The first phase consists of technical
development/demonstration funded by the Space Act agreements. The
second phase may include the competitive procurement of orbital
transportation services.
[End of section]
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