NASA
Commercial Partners Are Making Progress, but Face Aggressive Schedules to Demonstrate Critical Space Station Cargo Transport Capabilities Gao ID: GAO-09-618 June 16, 2009After the planned retirement of the space shuttle in 2010, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will face a cargo resupply shortfall for the International Space Station of approximately 40 metric tons between 2010 and 2015. NASA budgeted $500 million in seed money to commercial partners to develop new cargo transport capabilities through its Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) project. NASA used its other transaction authority to award agreements to commercial partners. These agreements are not federal government contracts, and are therefore generally not subject to federal laws and regulations that apply to federal government contracts. GAO previously reported concerns about whether COTS vehicles would be developed in time to meet the shortfall. Subsequently, GAO was directed by the explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, to examine NASA's management of the COTS project and its expenditures. In addition, GAO was asked to examine (1) NASA's reliance on commercial partners to meet the space station's cargo resupply needs; and (2) progress or challenges in developing commercial space transport capabilities. GAO analyzed NASA reports, briefings, and other information and held interviews with NASA and commercial partner officials. NASA concurred with GAO's findings.
During the course of our review, we found NASA's management of the COTS project has generally adhered to critical project management tools and activities and the vast majority of project expenditures were for milestone payments to COTS partners. NASA has established fixed-price, performance-based milestones in its agreements with commercial partners and partners are only paid once the milestone has been successfully completed. NASA has also taken several steps since the beginning of the COTS project to ensure that risks were identified, assessed, and documented, and that mitigation plans were in place to reduce these risks. NASA has communicated regularly with its partners through quarterly and milestone reviews and provided them with technical expertise to assist in their development efforts and to facilitate integration with the space station. As of the end of fiscal year 2008, NASA has spent $290.1 million, with 95 percent of project funding spent on milestone payments to COTS partners. The vehicles being developed by commercial partners Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) and Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital) through the COTS project have become essential to NASA's ability to fully utilize the space station after its assembly is completed and the space shuttle is retired in 2010. NASA estimates that it will need a total of 82.7 metric tons of dry cargo delivered to the space station between 2010 and 2015 to meet crew needs and to support maintenance and scientific experiments. Commercial partners' vehicles will transport almost half of this cargo and are scheduled to fly more cargo delivery missions than the space shuttle and international partners' vehicles combined--including 14 of the last 19 missions. Delays in the availability of commercial partners' vehicles to fill the cargo resupply gap would result in diminished usage of the space station. While SpaceX and Orbital have completed most of the development milestones required thus far on time, both companies are working under aggressive schedules and have recently experienced schedule slips that have delayed upcoming demonstration launch dates by several months. SpaceX successfully completed its first 14 development milestones on time and is in the process of testing, fabricating, and assembling key components. However, a schedule slip in the development of its launch vehicle has contributed to anticipated delays of 2 to 4 months in most of its remaining milestones, including upcoming demonstration missions. Its first demonstration mission has been delayed from June 2009 to no earlier than September 2009, and its third demonstration mission has been delayed from March 2010 to no earlier than May 2010. NASA is currently evaluating the effect of potential further delays. Orbital has successfully completed 7 of 19 development milestones thus far, but has experienced delays in the development of its launch vehicle. Orbital and NASA have recently amended their agreement to demonstrate a different cargo transport capability than had been originally planned, delaying its demonstration mission date from December 2010 until March 2011.
GAO-09-618, NASA: Commercial Partners Are Making Progress, but Face Aggressive Schedules to Demonstrate Critical Space Station Cargo Transport Capabilities
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Report to Congressional Addressees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2009:
NASA:
Commercial Partners Are Making Progress, but Face Aggressive Schedules
to Demonstrate Critical Space Station Cargo Transport Capabilities:
GAO-09-618:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-618, a report to congressional addressees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
After the planned retirement of the space shuttle in 2010, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will face a cargo resupply
shortfall for the International Space Station of approximately 40
metric tons between 2010 and 2015. NASA budgeted $500 million in seed
money to commercial partners to develop new cargo transport
capabilities through its Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
(COTS) project. NASA used its other transaction authority to award
agreements to commercial partners. These agreements are not federal
government contracts, and are therefore generally not subject to
federal laws and regulations that apply to federal government
contracts.
GAO previously reported concerns about whether COTS vehicles would be
developed in time to meet the shortfall. Subsequently, GAO was directed
by the explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008, to examine NASA‘s management of the COTS
project and its expenditures. In addition, GAO was asked to examine (1)
NASA‘s reliance on commercial partners to meet the space station‘s
cargo resupply needs; and (2) progress or challenges in developing
commercial space transport capabilities.
GAO analyzed NASA reports, briefings, and other information and held
interviews with NASA and commercial partner officials. NASA concurred
with GAO‘s findings.
What GAO Found:
During the course of our review, we found NASA‘s management of the COTS
project has generally adhered to critical project management tools and
activities and the vast majority of project expenditures were for
milestone payments to COTS partners. NASA has established fixed-price,
performance-based milestones in its agreements with commercial partners
and partners are only paid once the milestone has been successfully
completed. NASA has also taken several steps since the beginning of the
COTS project to ensure that risks were identified, assessed, and
documented, and that mitigation plans were in place to reduce these
risks. NASA has communicated regularly with its partners through
quarterly and milestone reviews and provided them with technical
expertise to assist in their development efforts and to facilitate
integration with the space station. As of the end of fiscal year 2008,
NASA has spent $290.1 million, with 95 percent of project funding spent
on milestone payments to COTS partners.
The vehicles being developed by commercial partners Space Exploration
Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) and Orbital Sciences Corporation
(Orbital) through the COTS project have become essential to NASA‘s
ability to fully utilize the space station after its assembly is
completed and the space shuttle is retired in 2010. NASA estimates that
it will need a total of 82.7 metric tons of dry cargo delivered to the
space station between 2010 and 2015 to meet crew needs and to support
maintenance and scientific experiments. Commercial partners‘ vehicles
will transport almost half of this cargo and are scheduled to fly more
cargo delivery missions than the space shuttle and international
partners‘ vehicles combined”including 14 of the last 19 missions.
Delays in the availability of commercial partners‘ vehicles to fill the
cargo resupply gap would result in diminished usage of the space
station.
While SpaceX and Orbital have completed most of the development
milestones required thus far on time, both companies are working under
aggressive schedules and have recently experienced schedule slips that
have delayed upcoming demonstration launch dates by several months.
SpaceX successfully completed its first 14 development milestones on
time and is in the process of testing, fabricating, and assembling key
components. However, a schedule slip in the development of its launch
vehicle has contributed to anticipated delays of 2 to 4 months in most
of its remaining milestones, including upcoming demonstration missions.
Its first demonstration mission has been delayed from June 2009 to no
earlier than September 2009, and its third demonstration mission has
been delayed from March 2010 to no earlier than May 2010. NASA is
currently evaluating the effect of potential further delays. Orbital
has successfully completed 7 of 19 development milestones thus far, but
has experienced delays in the development of its launch vehicle.
Orbital and NASA have recently amended their agreement to demonstrate a
different cargo transport capability than had been originally planned,
delaying its demonstration mission date from December 2010 until March
2011.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-618] or key
components. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202)
512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
NASA Has Adhered to Critical Project Management Tools and Project
Expenditures Track Closely with Achieved Milestones:
NASA Will Rely on Commercial Partners to Meet Much of the Space Station
Cargo Resupply Needs:
Commercial Partners Are Making Progress, but Face Challenges Meeting
Aggressive Development Schedules:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: COTS Project Funding, Obligations, and Expenditures through
Fiscal Year 2008:
Table 2: SpaceX's Progress Completing COTS Development Milestones:
Table 3: Orbital's Progress Completing COTS Development Milestones:
Figures:
Figure 1: Key Events in the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
Project:
Figure 2: COTS Project Expenditures to Partners and Project Operations
through Fiscal Year 2008:
Figure 3: NASA's Strategy for Meeting Space Station Usable Dry Cargo
Needs--2010 to 2015:
Abbreviations:
ATK: Alliant Techsystems, Inc.
CDR: critical design review:
COTS: Commercial Orbital Transportation Services:
CRS: Commercial Resupply Services:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Orbital: Orbital Sciences Corporation:
PDR: preliminary design review:
RpK: Rocketplane Kistler:
SLC-40: Space Launch Complex 40:
SpaceX: Space Exploration Technologies Corporation:
USAF: U.S. Air Force:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 16, 2009:
Congressional Addressees:
After the planned retirement of the space shuttle in 2010, the United
States will lack a domestic capability to send crew and cargo to the
International Space Station. As a consequence, the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) faces a cargo resupply shortfall of 40
metric tons (approximately 88,000 pounds) between 2010 and 2015 that
cannot be met by international partners' space vehicles.[Footnote 1] To
fill the gap, NASA plans to rely on vehicles being developed by the
private sector through NASA's Commercial Orbital Transportation
Services (COTS) project. However, we previously reported concerns about
whether these vehicles will be developed in time to address the
shortfall.[Footnote 2]
GAO was directed through the explanatory statement accompanying the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 to review NASA's management of
the COTS project and its expenditures, the first objective of this
report.[Footnote 3] Subsequently, you asked us to cover two additional
objectives: examine the extent to which (1) NASA is reliant on
commercial partners to meet the space station's cargo resupply needs,
and (2) commercial partners have made progress or experienced
challenges in developing cargo transport capabilities.
To examine NASA's management of the COTS project and its expenditures,
we interviewed NASA and company officials and analyzed project
documentation, including agreements between NASA and its commercial
partners, NASA's guidance for implementing these agreements,
development milestone and quarterly reviews and other briefings, and
project funding and expenditures data. We also evaluated NASA's
management of the COTS project by comparing COTS management activities
with critical project management tools and activities identified in
NASA guidance and in prior GAO work on NASA projects with similarities
to COTS.
To determine the extent to which NASA is reliant on commercial partners
to meet the space station's cargo resupply needs, we interviewed NASA
officials and reviewed International Space Station program office
documentation on the space station's cargo resupply needs and risks,
NASA's plans to meet its cargo resupply needs between 2010 and 2015,
and international and commercial partners' vehicle capabilities. We
also reviewed NASA studies that assessed the impact of the COTS project
on NASA's cargo resupply strategy.
To determine the extent to which commercial partners have made progress
or experienced challenges in developing cargo transport capabilities,
we reviewed each partner's agreement with NASA, commercial partners'
supporting documentation submitted for each milestone, partners'
development schedules and technical risks, NASA's requirements for
integrating with the space station, commercial transportation space
regulations, launch safety requirements, and prior GAO work. We also
conducted field visits and interviewed commercial partners to determine
partners' progress against performance milestones and to identify
development challenges.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to June 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Since the 1980s, U.S. law and policy have directed NASA to encourage
growth and promote opportunities within the commercial space industry.
[Footnote 4] NASA's Authorization Act of 2005 directed NASA to work
closely with the private sector to encourage entrepreneurs to develop
new means to launch satellites, crew, or cargo, and to contract for
crew and cargo transport services to the space station.[Footnote 5] In
accordance with its long-term goals, NASA plans to retire the space
shuttle upon completing assembly of the space station in 2010. NASA
plans on using a mixed fleet of vehicles, including those developed by
international partners, to service the space station.[Footnote 6]
However, international partners' vehicles alone cannot fully satisfy
the space station's cargo resupply needs. Without a domestic cargo
resupply capability to augment this mixed fleet approach, NASA faces a
40 metric ton (approximately 88,000 pounds) usable cargo resupply
shortfall between 2010 and 2015.[Footnote 7]
In November 2005, NASA established the Commercial Crew and Cargo
program office at Johnson Space Center to challenge the commercial
space industry to establish capabilities and services that can open new
space markets and support the space station's crew and cargo
transportation needs. NASA directed the program office to establish the
COTS project and budgeted $500 million for fiscal years 2006 through
2010 for the development and demonstration of cargo transport
capabilities. NASA structured the COTS project as a partnership with
the commercial space industry, sharing the risks, costs, and rewards of
developing new space transportation capabilities. NASA expected
commercial partners participating in the project to develop their own
technology solutions to meet NASA's crew and cargo needs and raise
additional funding to demonstrate their solutions. Once the
capabilities have been demonstrated, NASA and other customers would be
able to purchase space transportation services directly from commercial
partners.
The COTS project was originally intended to be executed in two
sequential phases: (1) private industry development and demonstration
of cargo and crew transport capabilities in coordination with NASA and
(2) procurement of commercial resupply services to the space station
once cargo transport capabilities had been successfully demonstrated.
NASA asked commercial partners to meet the following cargo transport
capabilities: capability A--external cargo delivery (unpressurized) and
disposal; capability B--internal cargo delivery (pressurized) and
disposal; capability C--internal cargo delivery and return to Earth;
and capability D--crew transportation. The COTS project is initially
focused on developing cargo transport capabilities because NASA has
identified cargo transport as a more pressing need and incremental step
toward crew transport. Furthermore, the Commercial Crew and Cargo
program office reported that it has not yet received funding for crew
transport capability development.[Footnote 8]
NASA designed the COTS project to be a technology development and
demonstration effort. To implement the COTS project, NASA issued Space
Act agreements utilizing its "other transaction authority" under the
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.[Footnote 9] Generally
speaking, other transaction authority enhances the government's ability
to acquire cutting-edge science and technology, in part through
attracting companies that typically have not pursued government
contracts because of the cost and impact of complying with government
procurement requirements. These types of agreements are not federal
government contracts, and are therefore generally not subject to those
federal laws and regulations that apply to federal government
contracts. Consequently, agreements formed using other transaction
authority permit considerable latitude by agencies and companies in
negotiating agreement terms. NASA has established guidance on how to
implement agreements under this authority.
In August 2006, NASA competitively awarded Space Act agreements to two
commercial partners, Space Exploration Technologies Corporation
(SpaceX) and Rocketplane Kistler (RpK), to develop and demonstrate end-
to-end transportation systems, including the development of launch and
space vehicles, ground and mission operations, and berthing with the
space station. SpaceX was awarded a $278 million agreement to develop
and demonstrate the three COTS cargo capabilities. The agreement was
amended in February 2008 to reschedule milestones, including the three
demonstration flights to occur from June 2009 through March 2010.
[Footnote 10] NASA's agreement with SpaceX includes an option for
SpaceX to demonstrate crew transport capabilities. RpK was awarded a
$207 million agreement, but the agreement was terminated in October
2007 after RpK had missed financial and technical milestones. NASA held
a second competition and awarded Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital)
a $170 million agreement in February 2008 to develop two of the COTS
cargo capabilities (unpressurized and pressurized cargo delivery and
disposal), culminating in an unpressurized demonstration flight
scheduled for December 2010. In March 2009, Orbital and NASA amended
this agreement, removing its unpressurized cargo demonstration and
replacing it with a pressurized demonstration, scheduled for March
2011.[Footnote 11] Each partner proposed its own development milestone
schedule in their respective agreements, which were then negotiated and
agreed to by NASA. NASA conducts milestone reviews to determine whether
the milestone has been met and payment only occurs if the partner has
successfully completed the milestone. Five additional companies signed
nonreimbursable agreements with NASA, but these partners have either
terminated their agreements or made limited progress due in part to
difficulty attracting external investment.
In order to demonstrate cargo transport capabilities, commercial
partners must comply with NASA and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) requirements or regulations, and SpaceX must satisfy U.S. Air
Force (USAF) requirements since it is launching from Cape Canaveral Air
Force Station.
* Space Station Integration. The International Space Station program
office manages the process of integrating COTS vehicles with the space
station. Before COTS partners' vehicles may approach and berth with the
space station, they must provide verification that all of the technical
requirements described in NASA's International Space Station to
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Interface Requirements
Document have been met and NASA must approve each requirement's
closure.[Footnote 12] The partners must also pass three rounds of
review by the International Space Station program office's Safety
Review Panel.[Footnote 13]
* Launch Range Safety. The USAF 45th Space Wing manages, monitors, and
enforces launch range safety requirements for users, including SpaceX,
at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. SpaceX must demonstrate that its
operations meet the 45th Space Wing's launch range safety requirements
or that it can provide an equivalent level of safety.[Footnote 14] USAF
launch range safety requirements may be modified by users to meet the
specifications of a given launch, with the USAF's approval of the
changes. Orbital's demonstration launch is planned to take place at
Wallops Flight Facility, Virginia, where launch range safety
requirements are overseen by NASA.[Footnote 15]
* Launch Licensing. The FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation
has the authority to issue licenses for commercial launches and
reentries and launch and reentry site operations.[Footnote 16] The FAA
reviews and makes a decision on an application within 180 days of
receiving a complete application.[Footnote 17] Prior to accepting the
application, the FAA can review draft applications and provide feedback
to the applicant.
Prior to the successful demonstration of COTS cargo transport
capabilities, NASA put the International Space Station program office
in charge of procuring commercial resupply services to the space
station rather than the Commercial Crew and Cargo program office. The
International Space Station program office awarded, under a separately
competed procurement from COTS, two commercial resupply services
contracts in December 2008 to SpaceX and Orbital to deliver at least 40
metric tons (approximately 88,000 pounds) to the space station between
2010 and 2015.[Footnote 18] NASA's current plan estimates that
commercial partners will transport 36.9 metric tons (approximately
81,400 pounds) of usable dry cargo and 3.1 metric tons (approximately
6,800 pounds) of water, propellant, and atmospheric gas.[Footnote 19]
SpaceX was awarded 12 cargo resupply missions for approximately $1.6
billion and Orbital was awarded eight cargo resupply missions for
approximately $1.9 billion. Figure 1 provides a timeline of key events
in the COTS project.
Figure 1: Key Events in the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
Project:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
2005:
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services(COTS) Project:
* NASA establishes Commercial Crew and Cargo program office (Nov.
2005).
2006:
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Project:
* NASA issues first COTS announcement for proposals (Jan. 2006);
* NASA awards agreements to SpaceX and RpK (Aug. 2006).
2007:
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Project:
* NASA terminates its agreement with RpK after it missed financial and
technical milestones (Oct. 2007);
* NASA issues second COTS announcement for proposals (Oct. 2007).
2008:
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services(COTS) Project:
* NASA awards agreement to Orbital (Feb. 2008);
Commercial Resupply Services(CRS) Contract:
* NASA issues CRS request for proposal (Apr. 2008);
* NASA awards CRS contracts (Dec. 2008).
2009:
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services(COTS) Project:
* SpaceX to conduct two COTS demonstration missions (Jun. and Nov.
2009)[A].
2010:
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services(COTS) Project:
* SpaceX to conduct third COTS demonstration mission (Mar. 2010)[B];
Commercial Resupply Services(CRS) Contract:
* SpaceX to deliver cargo to space station in initial CRS mission.
2011-2015:
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services(COTS) Project:
* Orbital to conduct COTS demonstration mission (Mar. 2011)[C];
Commercial Resupply Services(CRS) Contract:
* By 2011, NASA anticipates commercial partners will be able to deliver
cargo to the space station under separate CRS contracts.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
[A] NASA reported in February 2009 that SpaceX plans to delay its first
demonstration flight from June 2009 to no earlier than September 2009.
[B] NASA also reported in February 2009 that SpaceX plans to delay its
third demonstration flight from March 2010 to no earlier than May 2010.
[C] NASA and Orbital amended the original agreement to replace
Orbital's unpressurized cargo capability demonstration milestones with
pressurized ones and changed the date of the demonstration mission from
December 2010 to March 2011.
[End of figure]
NASA Has Adhered to Critical Project Management Tools and Project
Expenditures Track Closely with Achieved Milestones:
During the course of our review, we found NASA's management of the COTS
project has generally adhered to critical project management tools and
activities and the vast majority of project expenditures were for
milestone payments to COTS partners. Because the COTS project utilized
NASA's other transaction authority to enter into agreements, NASA was
not required to follow its program management requirements. However, it
used them as a guide to ensure that it had the proper planning
documentation in place. NASA has established fixed-price, performance-
based milestones in its agreements with commercial partners and only
pays them once the milestone has been successfully completed. NASA has
also taken several steps since the beginning of the COTS project to
ensure that risks were identified, assessed, and documented, and that
mitigation plans were in place to reduce these risks. NASA has
communicated regularly with its partners through quarterly and
milestone reviews and provided them with technical expertise to assist
in their development efforts and to facilitate integration with the
space station. For example, NASA created the Transportation Integration
Office to streamline the requirements for integrating with the space
station and provided access to critical space station integration
technologies. As of the end of fiscal year 2008, 95 percent of project
funding had been spent on milestone payments, 3 percent on project
operations, and the remaining 2 percent had been obligated, but not yet
expended.
NASA's Use of Critical Project Management Tools Has Enabled It to
Monitor Partners' Development Efforts:
Undertaking ambitious, technically challenging efforts like the COTS
project--which involves multiple contractors and technologies that have
yet to be fully developed and proven--requires careful oversight and
management. Due to the COTS project's emphasis on partnering with the
private sector, NASA served in a supervisory or advisory role rather
than being in charge of developing the COTS project's space and launch
vehicles. In this capacity, for example, NASA was responsible for
reviewing milestone documentation, including risk assessments, making
associated milestone payments, and sharing technical expertise. NASA's
Space Act Agreements Guide and prior GAO work have identified several
critical project management tools and activities which NASA generally
followed, including (1) developing program planning documentation; (2)
establishing performance-based, fixed-price milestones; (3) developing
risk management plans; and (4) facilitating communication and
coordination between NASA and its partners. Our prior work on NASA
development programs with similarities to COTS, such as the X-33
program, has shown that not carefully implementing such project
management tools and activities is a recipe for failure.[Footnote 20]
Program Planning Documentation:
Due to NASA's use of its other transaction authority for the COTS
project and because it did not intend to take ownership of any flight
or ground systems, it was not required to follow its program management
requirements, which included developing program authorization and
planning documentation. Nonetheless, NASA used these management
requirements as a guide to ensure that it had the proper program
authorization and planning documentation in place for the COTS project.
Such plans help define realistic time frames, identify responsibility
for key tasks and deliverables, and provide a yardstick by which to
measure the progress of the effort. NASA developed a program
authorization document that outlined NASA's management structure,
project objectives, acquisition strategy, project scope, funding
profile, and planned program reviews. In addition, the first
performance milestone in NASA's agreements with its commercial partners
required the partners to develop a program or project management plan
that included the overall project schedule with milestones and
described how the partner would manage the development process and
identify and mitigate risks. Each commercial partner successfully
passed this milestone.
Performance-Based Milestones:
NASA has established fixed-price, performance-based milestones in its
agreements with commercial partners that include entrance and success
criteria, payment amounts, and specific due dates. NASA reviews the
documentation submitted for each milestone--which includes design
documentation, risk identification and mitigation strategies,
development schedules, and test plans and results--and only pays its
partners once it has determined the milestone has been successfully
completed. Our prior work has emphasized the importance of developing
performance-based milestones with fixed payments in order to minimize
financial and performance risks.[Footnote 21] NASA's use of performance-
based milestones has enabled it to minimize these risks. For example,
NASA modified its agreement with SpaceX in February 2008 to include
several milestones that were focused on conducting tests of critical
hardware, such as the space vehicle's thrusters and the launch
vehicle's first-stage engines. SpaceX passed these milestones on time,
successfully demonstrating the maturation of key technologies. In
another instance, NASA terminated an agreement with RpK when it failed
to meet financial and technical milestones. NASA paid RpK only for the
milestones that it completed ($32.1 million) and was able to award the
remaining funding--$170 million--to Orbital approximately 4 months
later.
Risk Management Plans:
Although NASA has held partners responsible for their own risk
management planning, it has taken several steps since the inception of
the COTS project to ensure that risks were identified, assessed, and
documented, and that mitigation plans were in place to reduce these
risks. Our prior work has highlighted the importance of risk management
plans, which identify, assess, and document risks associated with cost,
schedule, and technical aspects of a project and determine the
procedures that will be used to manage those risks.[Footnote 22] These
plans help ensure that a system will meet performance requirements and
be delivered on schedule and within budget. In our prior work, we found
that NASA did not prepare risk management plans for both the X-33 and X-
34 programs until several years after they were initiated. Both
programs were subsequently terminated because of significant cost
increases caused by problems developing the necessary technologies and
flight demonstration vehicles. Through the COTS announcement for
proposal process, NASA required companies to identify programmatic and
technical risks and strategies for mitigating each risk. After each
partner had been awarded an agreement, NASA required them to develop
program or project management plans that outlined each partner's risk
management approach and identified key project risks and mitigation
efforts. Furthermore, the Commercial Crew and Cargo program office has
continued to monitor these risks through quarterly and milestone design
reviews with its partners. The program office has also ensured that
these project and program office-specific risks and mitigations have
been reported to senior NASA management through program management
reviews.
Facilitating Communication and Coordination:
NASA and its partners have successfully fulfilled their respective
responsibilities as outlined in the agreements, which has helped to
facilitate communication and coordination between the parties. Our
prior work has found that ambitious, technically challenging efforts
require a high level of communication and coordination.[Footnote 23]
For example, in the case of the X-33 program, ineffective communication
between NASA and its contractor regarding concerns about the X-33's
fuel tank design contributed to its failure. The COTS partners'
agreements outline several responsibilities that are directly related
to fostering communication and coordination, such as holding quarterly
and milestone reviews and providing partners with technical expertise
to assist with their development efforts and to facilitate integration
with the space station. In addition, NASA and SpaceX have amended their
agreement to define how they will collaborate to integrate critical
communications hardware into the space station and to test a relative
navigation sensor. NASA has worked closely with SpaceX, as these items
will be flown on an upcoming space shuttle flight. Another example of
NASA's efforts to facilitate communication and coordination with its
partners is through the creation of the Transportation Integration
Office within the International Space Station program office. This
office has streamlined the requirements for integrating with the space
station and provided access to critical space station integration
technologies, such as the grapple fixtures, Common Berthing Mechanism
design, and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency's proximity operations
communications system.[Footnote 24] NASA has also assigned a project
executive for each partner to provide day-to-day oversight of the
partners' development efforts and to coordinate technical assistance.
Vast Majority of Project Expenditures Are for Milestone Payments to
COTS Partners:
As of the end of fiscal year 2008, 95 percent of project funding had
been spent on milestone payments, 3 percent on project operations, and
the remaining 2 percent had been obligated, but not yet expended.
[Footnote 25] NASA's Administrator budgeted $500 million in 2005 for
the development and demonstration of cargo transport capabilities
between fiscal years 2006 and 2010.[Footnote 26] For fiscal year 2009,
NASA requested $173 million in funding for the COTS project and plans
to request $31.3 million for fiscal year 2010. See table 1 below for
COTS project funding, obligations, and expenditures through fiscal year
2008.
Table 1: COTS Project Funding, Obligations, and Expenditures through
Fiscal Year 2008 (Dollars in millions):
Fiscal year: 2005;
Project funding: $22.8;
Obligations: N/A[A];
Expenditures: N/A.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Project funding: $51.3;
Obligations: $63.6;
Expenditures: $39.1.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Project funding: $91.1;
Obligations: $99.0;
Expenditures: $93.7.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Project funding: $130.5;
Obligations: $133.1;
Expenditures: $157.3.
Fiscal year: Total;
Project funding: $295.7;
Obligations: $295.7;
Expenditures: $290.1.
Source: NASA.
[A] NASA did not obligate fiscal year 2005 funding until fiscal year
2006. Therefore, fiscal year 2005 funding was included in all fiscal
year 2006 calculations.
[End of table]
Figure 2 illustrates how the $290.1 million in project expenditures
have been divided between COTS partners' milestone payments and project
operations from fiscal years 2006 to 2008.
Figure 2: COTS Project Expenditures to Partners and Project Operations
through Fiscal Year 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
SpaceX: $199 million;
Orbital: $50 million;
Rocketplane Kistler: $32.1 million;
Project operations: $9 million.
Source: NASA.
[End of figure]
In fiscal year 2009, SpaceX has received an additional $35 million for
completing two milestones, bringing its total milestone payments to
date to $234 million.[Footnote 27] SpaceX could potentially earn an
additional $44 million in future milestone payments. Orbital has been
paid $30 million for completing three milestones in fiscal year 2009,
increasing its total milestone payments to date to $80 million.
[Footnote 28] Orbital has $90 million remaining in potential milestone
payments.
NASA Will Rely on Commercial Partners to Meet Much of the Space Station
Cargo Resupply Needs:
The vehicles being developed by commercial partners have become
essential to NASA's ability to fully utilize the space station after
the retirement of the space shuttle in 2010. NASA's 2006 Strategic Plan
established a goal of supporting a crew of six astronauts on the space
station by the end of 2009 in order to fully utilize the space
station's research capabilities. NASA is in the process of installing
the necessary equipment to support a six-person crew, and has estimated
that the space station's final construction cost will be $31 billion.
[Footnote 29] NASA estimates that it will need 82.7 metric tons
(approximately 182,000 pounds) of usable dry cargo delivered to the
space station between 2010 and 2015 to meet crew needs and to support
maintenance and scientific experiments. NASA plans to transport this
cargo using several vehicles, including the space shuttle and
commercial and international partners' vehicles.[Footnote 30] Between
2010 and 2015, commercial partners' vehicles will transport almost half
of this cargo and are scheduled to fly more cargo delivery missions
than the space shuttle and international partners' vehicles combined--
including 14 of the last 19 missions. Furthermore, after the retirement
of the space shuttle, SpaceX's space vehicle will be the only vehicle
capable of safely returning significant amounts of cargo to Earth--
which is an essential capability to accomplish NASA's scientific
research program.[Footnote 31] Figure 3 outlines NASA's strategy for
meeting the space station's usable dry cargo resupply needs between
2010 and 2015, identifies which vehicles are capable of returning cargo
to Earth, and highlights NASA's increasing reliance on U.S. commercial
partners' vehicles. Figure 3 does not include the amount of propellant,
water, and atmospheric gas to be delivered to the space station between
2010 and 2015 nor does it depict the maximum cargo mass delivery
capacities of each vehicle, which range from more than 17 metric tons
for the space shuttle to as little as 2 metric tons for Orbital's space
vehicle in its standard configuration.
Figure 3: NASA's Strategy for Meeting Space Station Usable Dry Cargo
Needs--2010 to 2015:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Space vehicles (number of missions planned): Commercial partners‘
vehicles (20);
Capable of returning cargo to earth: [Check][A];
2010: 1 cargo mission to space station;
2011: 2 cargo missions to space station;
2012: 3 cargo missions to space station;
2013: 5 cargo missions to space station;
2014: 5 cargo missions to space station;
2015: 4 cargo missions to space station;
Cargo mass to be delivered (metric tons): 36.9.
Space vehicles (number of missions planned): Space shuttle (4);
Capable of returning cargo to earth: [Check];
2010: 4 cargo missions to space station;
2011: [Empty];
2012: [Empty];
2013: [Empty];
2014: [Empty];
2015: [Empty];
Cargo mass to be delivered (metric tons): 9.8.
Space vehicles (number of missions planned): Russian Progress (3);
Capable of returning cargo to earth: [Empty];
2010: 2 cargo missions to space station;
2011: 1 cargo mission to space station;
2012: [Empty];
2013: [Empty];
2014: [Empty];
2015: [Empty];
Cargo mass to be delivered (metric tons): 4.0.
Space vehicles (number of missions planned): European Automated
Transfer Vehicle (4);
Capable of returning cargo to earth: [Empty];
2010: 1 cargo mission to space station;
2011: 1 cargo mission to space station;
2012: 1 cargo mission to space station;
2013: 1 cargo mission to space station;
2014: [Empty];
2015: [Empty];
Cargo mass to be delivered (metric tons): 6.6.
Space vehicles (number of missions planned): Japanese H-II Transfer
Vehicle (6);
Capable of returning cargo to earth: [Empty];
2010: 1 cargo mission to space station;
2011: 1 cargo mission to space station;
2012: 1 cargo mission to space station;
2013: 1 cargo mission to space station;
2014: 1 cargo mission to space station;
2015: 1 cargo mission to space station;
Cargo mass to be delivered (metric tons): 24.0.
Space vehicles (number of missions planned): Undetermined vehicle[B]
(1);
Capable of returning cargo to earth: [Empty];
2010: [Empty];
2011: [Empty];
2012: [Empty];
2013: [Empty];
2014: [Empty];
2015: 1 cargo mission to space station;
Cargo mass to be delivered (metric tons): 1.4.
Space vehicles (number of missions planned): Total: missions planned
(38);
Cargo mass to be delivered (metric tons): 82.7 metric tons cargo mass.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
Note: This figure reflects NASA's November 2008 estimate of the space
station's projected usable dry cargo needs and identifies which
vehicles are capable of returning cargo to Earth. Propellant, water,
and atmospheric gas are not included in these figures. The exact cargo
mix for a particular mission is not determined until several months
prior to launch and the cargo mass to be delivered for a particular
mission may therefore be subject to change.
[A] Of the two commercial providers, only SpaceX's Dragon space vehicle
is designed to return cargo to Earth.
[B] The International Space Station program office has reported that
the vehicle that will be used for this 2015 mission has not been
determined, and it will depend on what is needed to decommission the
space station in late 2015 or early 2016.
[End of figure]
Other options for transporting cargo to the space station are limited.
NASA has purchased the equivalent of three Russian Progress vehicles
for use in 2010 and 2011, but it has no plans to purchase any
additional vehicles beyond 2011.[Footnote 32] According to NASA
officials, there is a 24-to 30-month lead time to manufacture the
Progress should NASA decide to procure additional vehicles. NASA plans
to use six Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicles for missions between 2010
and 2015 and four European Automated Transfer Vehicles between 2010 and
2013. NASA officials told us that the Japanese and European space
agencies have no plans to manufacture additional vehicles beyond their
current commitments. In addition, NASA's new crew exploration and
launch vehicles, Orion and Ares I, designed to replace the space
shuttle, are not expected to be available until 2015.[Footnote 33]
Delays in the availability of commercial vehicles to fill the cargo
resupply gap would result in diminished usage of the space station. The
International Space Station program office has identified the 40 metric
ton (approximately 88,000 pound) cargo resupply shortfall as a top
program risk, and its risk summary report states that a delay in 2010
in the availability of commercial partners' vehicles would lead to a
significant scaling back of NASA's use of the space station for
scientific research. If there were a delay in 2011, NASA could no
longer maintain a space station crew of six astronauts and its ability
to conduct scientific research would be compromised.
Commercial Partners Are Making Progress, but Face Challenges Meeting
Aggressive Development Schedules:
While SpaceX and Orbital have completed most of the development
milestones required thus far on time, both companies are working under
aggressive schedules and have recently experienced schedule slips which
have delayed upcoming demonstration launch dates by several months.
SpaceX successfully completed its first 14 development milestones on
time and is in the process of testing, fabricating, and assembling key
components. However, a schedule slip in the development of its launch
vehicle's second-stage engine components has contributed to anticipated
delays of 2 to 4 months in most of its remaining milestones, including
upcoming demonstration missions. NASA is currently evaluating the
effect of potential further delays. Orbital has successfully completed
7 of 19 development milestones thus far, including several preliminary
design reviews (PDR), but has experienced delays in the development of
its launch vehicle's first-stage engine components. Orbital and NASA
recently amended their Space Act agreement to conduct a pressurized
cargo delivery and disposal demonstration mission instead of an
unpressurized mission, delaying its demonstration mission date by 3
months, from December 2010 until March 2011.
Space development programs are by nature complex and rife with
technical obstacles that can easily result in development delays. In
our recent report on selected large-scale NASA projects, we found that
10 of the 13 projects that we reviewed had experienced significant cost
and/or schedule growth from their project baselines.[Footnote 34]
Commercial partners must develop and demonstrate new launch and space
vehicles, launch and mission operations capabilities, and achieve
integration with the space station in a 3-to 4-year period.
SpaceX Has Made Progress Completing Milestones as Scheduled, but
Challenges Are Likely to Delay Demonstration Missions:
SpaceX completed its first 14 development milestones on time, and has
made progress developing its space transport capabilities; however,
several schedule and regulatory challenges are likely to delay upcoming
demonstration missions by at least 2 to 4 months. SpaceX's agreement
with NASA established 22 development milestones that SpaceX must
complete in order to successfully demonstrate COTS cargo capabilities.
Although it completed its first 14 COTS development milestones on
schedule, SpaceX experienced a delay completing the fabrication,
assembly, and integration of its launch vehicle's second-stage
components, and delayed its first demonstration mission readiness
review (milestone 15) from March 2009 until no earlier than June 2009.
In addition, SpaceX has a significant amount of work remaining to
complete technical requirements for integrating its space vehicle with
the space station. SpaceX must also obtain required licenses and
approvals from the FAA and the USAF before its scheduled demonstration
mission launch dates. SpaceX has informed NASA that its first
demonstration mission will be delayed from June 2009 until no earlier
than September 2009, and its third demonstration mission is likely to
be delayed from March 2010 to no earlier than May 2010.[Footnote 35]
NASA reported it has yet to modify SpaceX's agreement to reflect these
changes, but it is closely monitoring SpaceX's activity and is
consulting with SpaceX to ascertain the cause of SpaceX's failure to
meet milestone 15 in the timeframe identified in the current agreement.
[Footnote 36] SpaceX has received $234 million in milestone payments
thus far, with $44 million yet to be paid. Table 2 describes SpaceX's
progress meeting the COTS milestones in its agreement with NASA.
Table 2: SpaceX's Progress Completing COTS Development Milestones:
Milestone number: 1;
Milestone description: Project Management Plan Review;
Scheduled completion date: September 2006;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $23.1 million.
Milestone number: 2;
Milestone description: Demo 1 System Requirements Review;
Scheduled completion date: November 2006;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 3;
Milestone description: Demo 1 Preliminary Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: February 2007;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $18.1 million.
Milestone number: 4;
Milestone description: Financing Round 1;
Scheduled completion date: March 2007;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 5;
Milestone description: Demo 2 System Requirements Review;
Scheduled completion date: March 2007;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $31.1 million.
Milestone number: 6;
Milestone description: Demo 1 System Critical Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: August 2007;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $8.1 million.
Milestone number: 7;
Milestone description: Demo 3 System Requirements Review;
Scheduled completion date: October 2007;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $22.3 million.
Milestone number: 8;
Milestone description: Demo 2 Preliminary Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: December 2007;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $21.1 million.
Milestone number: 9;
Milestone description: Draco Initial Hot-Fire;
Scheduled completion date: March 2008;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $6 million.
Milestone number: 10;
Milestone description: Financing Round 2;
Scheduled completion date: March 2008;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 11;
Milestone description: Demo 3 Preliminary Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: June 2008;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $22 million.
Milestone number: 12;
Milestone description: Multi-engine Test;
Scheduled completion date: September 2008;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $22 million.
Milestone number: 13;
Milestone description: Demo 2/Demo 3 System Critical Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: December 2008;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $25 million.
Milestone number: 14;
Milestone description: Financing Round 3;
Scheduled completion date: March 2009;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 15;
Milestone description: Demo 1 Readiness Review;
Scheduled completion date: March 2009;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 16;
Milestone description: Communications Unit Flight Unit Design, Accept,
Delivery;
Scheduled completion date: May 2009;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $9 million.
Milestone number: 17;
Milestone description: Demo 1 Mission;
Scheduled completion date: June 2009;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 18;
Milestone description: Demo 2 Readiness Review;
Scheduled completion date: September 2009;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 19;
Milestone description: Demo 2 Mission;
Scheduled completion date: November 2009;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 20;
Milestone description: Cargo Integration Demonstration;
Scheduled completion date: January 2010;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 21;
Milestone description: Demo 3 Readiness Review;
Scheduled completion date: January 2010;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 22;
Milestone description: Demo 3 Mission;
Scheduled completion date: March 2010;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Total:
Payment amount (millions): $278 million for the completion of all
milestones; $234 million paid to date.
Source: NASA and SpaceX.
Note: SpaceX did not complete milestone 15 in March 2009 as scheduled.
NASA reported that SpaceX has delayed delivery of milestone 15 from
March 2009 until no earlier than June 2009. In addition, SpaceX has
informed NASA that it anticipates a 2 to 4 month delay in most of its
remaining milestones; including a delay in its first demonstration
mission (milestone 17) from June 2009 until no earlier than September
2009, and a delay in its third demonstration milestone (milestone 22)
from March 2010 until no earlier than May 2010.
[End of table]
SpaceX's Technical Approach and Development Status:
To accomplish its COTS objectives, SpaceX is developing a medium-class
launch vehicle (Falcon 9) and a space vehicle (Dragon), which is
designed to ferry crew and cargo to and from the space station.
[Footnote 37] The Falcon 9 launch vehicle is a two-stage rocket that
uses nine liquid-fueled engines for its first-stage booster and one
similar engine for its second-stage booster.[Footnote 38] The Falcon 9
is designed to lift payloads, such as the Dragon spacecraft, into
various orbits--including low-Earth orbit where the space station is
located. On a single mission, the Dragon spacecraft is designed to
deliver and dispose of 3 metric tons (approximately 6,600 pounds) of
cargo distributed between its pressurized and unpressurized cargo
carriers. Dragon is designed to return up to 2.5 metric tons
(approximately 5,500 pounds) of pressurized cargo mass to Earth, but
will likely be limited by volume constraints to about 1.7 metric tons
(3,748 pounds).[Footnote 39] SpaceX reported that it is developing and
manufacturing almost all of the components for the Falcon 9 and Dragon
in-house to keep development costs low and to remove dependencies on
external suppliers. For example, SpaceX is developing a thermal
protection system to enable the Dragon to safely re-enter the Earth's
atmosphere, and its own hardware and software components to enable the
Dragon to integrate with the space station. A summary of SpaceX's
progress developing its COTS system is provided below.
Launch vehicle. SpaceX has made progress developing and testing the
first-stage engines on its Falcon 9 launch vehicle; however, it has
experienced a schedule slip in the development, assembly, and
integration of the Falcon 9's second-stage engine components. From the
beginning of the COTS project, SpaceX has tracked the development of
its nine first-stage engines as a significant technological risk and
has conducted several multi-engine tests at the company's Texas testing
facility to reduce this risk. SpaceX reported that it successfully
completed a 178-second test of its nine engines intended to simulate
operations during a typical COTS launch. SpaceX also reported that it
completed qualification testing of these engines in December 2008;
however, NASA's Commercial Crew and Cargo program manager reported that
NASA has yet to review the documentation for these and other
qualification tests conducted by SpaceX, but plans on doing so during
milestone 15, SpaceX's first demonstration mission readiness review.
This review has been delayed from March 2009 until no earlier than June
2009, in part to provide SpaceX with more time to address issues with
the fabrication, assembly, and integration of the Falcon 9's second
stage components. For example, SpaceX experienced a 3-month delay in
the delivery of the domes that go on top of its second-stage booster,
which delayed its ability to integrate these components as scheduled.
Although SpaceX recently reported that it completed a 6-minute firing
of its second-stage engine, additional testing remains before the
Falcon 9 second-stage engine components can be qualified for flight and
integrated with the corresponding tanks and structures.
Space vehicle. SpaceX has made progress developing key components for
its Dragon space vehicle; however it faces an aggressive schedule
completing technical requirements to integrate the Dragon with the
space station. SpaceX reported that it has completed 120 hot-fire tests
of the Dragon's engines--including a 15-minute firing in a vacuum
chamber designed to simulate orbital firing operations. According to
NASA, SpaceX considers these engines sufficiently qualified for
SpaceX's first demonstration mission, which does not include
integration with the space station. However, NASA reported that SpaceX
must modify the design of its thruster valves and will need to
requalify these engines before it can attempt its third demonstration
mission, when it will first attempt to integrate with the space
station. SpaceX is also manufacturing its own heat-shield tiles for the
Dragon's thermal protection system, and reported that it has completed
qualification testing and analyses of its material at NASA's Ames
Research Center.
Before SpaceX can attempt its third demonstration mission, it must
demonstrate that it has met all of the technical requirements in NASA's
International Space Station to COTS Interface Requirements Document.
For example, SpaceX must develop and test new hardware and software
components designed to enable the Dragon to share positioning data and
communicate with the space station.[Footnote 40] SpaceX and NASA have
made arrangements to fly the two components on separate space shuttle
missions scheduled this summer in order to conduct development tests on
them prior to SpaceX's second demonstration mission, scheduled for
November 2009. SpaceX and NASA have set a goal for SpaceX to
demonstrate compliance with 75 percent of NASA's space station
interface requirements by the second demonstration mission, with the
remaining 25 percent to be completed before the third demonstration
mission. NASA officials reported that SpaceX's schedule to complete its
space station integration activities is aggressive and that all aspects
of integrating a new space vehicle with the space station are
technically challenging.
Launch readiness. Before SpaceX may launch its first demonstration
mission from the USAF's Space Launch Complex 40 (SLC-40), it must
receive the approval of the 45th Space Wing Commander that its launch
infrastructure and operations meet the USAF's launch range safety
requirements. SpaceX has cited the range safety approval process as a
significant risk that could result in schedule slips. SpaceX has made
progress addressing many of the USAF's requirements, and it has
installed launch infrastructure at SLC-40--including components of the
Falcon 9 fueling system and the hangar structure where the Falcon 9
stages will be integrated and mated with the Dragon space vehicle.
[Footnote 41] However, officials from the 45th Space Wing expressed
concerns that SpaceX's aggressive schedule may not give SpaceX
sufficient time to submit its requests to modify USAF range safety
requirements or give the USAF sufficient time to review, validate, and
approve SpaceX's facilities and launch operations before upcoming
demonstrations. USAF officials reported that SpaceX has yet to submit
its requests to modify Dragon fueling requirements, which the USAF
considers to be a potential public safety hazard, and subject to its
review and approval. SpaceX reported that it intends to submit its
requests to modify these requirements in the summer of 2009. SpaceX
plans to conduct independent tests to demonstrate that its launch
facilities meet USAF requirements for a launch safety critical design
review (CDR) that will also be held in the summer of 2009.
Prior to its first demonstration mission, SpaceX must also receive from
the FAA a launch license for the Falcon 9 and a re-entry license for
the Dragon space vehicle. FAA reported that SpaceX has yet to submit a
sufficiently complete launch license application for the Falcon 9 for
SpaceX's first COTS demonstration mission.[Footnote 42] However, in
April 2009 FAA accepted a sufficiently complete re-entry license
application from SpaceX for the Dragon space vehicle. FAA must decide
within 180 days after accepting a license application whether to
approve it. FAA officials reported that they do not anticipate making a
determination much sooner than 180 days after acceptance of SpaceX's
applications. Although it remains to be seen when SpaceX will deliver
and the FAA will accept its Falcon 9 launch license application for the
first COTS demonstration, there appears to be little margin for SpaceX
to obtain its FAA-required licenses in time for its September 2009 COTS
demonstration mission.
Orbital Has Completed Several Preliminary Design Reviews, but Faces
Challenges Completing Development in Time for Its Demonstration
Mission:
Orbital--which entered the COTS project about 18 months after SpaceX--
has successfully completed 7 of 19 required milestones thus far,
including several preliminary design reviews for its systems, but
challenges lie ahead in its efforts to complete its recently revised
milestone schedule. Orbital's February 2008 agreement with NASA
required it to conduct a single mission demonstrating the capability to
deliver unpressurized cargo to the space station. Although Orbital was
preparing a preliminary design of a pressurized cargo module, it was
not required in its agreement with NASA to demonstrate this capability.
However, in December 2008 NASA awarded Orbital a commercial resupply
services contract calling for eight pressurized cargo missions, but no
unpressurized missions. Subsequently, in March 2009, Orbital and NASA
amended their COTS demonstration agreement and replaced the
unpressurized demonstration with a pressurized one. This required
adding several new milestones to demonstrate this capability and
delaying existing milestones, including Orbital's single demonstration
mission from December 2010 until March 2011. Orbital has completed a
PDR for its pressurized cargo capability and other development
milestones for its Taurus II launch vehicle.[Footnote 43] However,
Orbital reported that it has experienced delays completing design
reviews for the first-stage engine components for its launch vehicle,
which have resulted in further compressing its already aggressive
development schedule. In addition, NASA reported that Orbital faces an
aggressive schedule to complete the technical requirements to integrate
its space vehicle with the space station. Orbital has received $80
million in milestone payments thus far, with $90 million yet to be paid
(see table 3).
Table 3: Orbital's Progress Completing COTS Development Milestones:
Milestone number: 1;
Milestone description: Program Plan Review;
Scheduled completion date: March 2008;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 2;
Milestone description: Demo Mission System Requirements Review;
Scheduled completion date: June 2008;
Completed on time: [Check][A];
Payment amount: $20 million.
Milestone number: 3;
Milestone description: Unpressurized Cargo Module Preliminary Design
Review;
Scheduled completion date: July 2008;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 4;
Milestone description: COTS System Preliminary Design Review was
milestone 4, but it has been renumbered as milestone 10;
Scheduled completion date: No longer applicable;
Completed on time: No longer applicable;
Payment amount: No longer applicable.
Milestone number: 5;
Milestone description: COTS Integration/Operations Facility Review;
Scheduled completion date: September 2008[B];
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 6;
Milestone description: Pressurized Cargo Module Preliminary Design
Review;
Scheduled completion date: October 2008;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount): $10 million.
Milestone number: 7; Milestone description: DELETED: Unpressurized
Cargo Module Critical Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: No longer applicable;
Completed on time: No longer applicable;
Payment amount: No longer applicable.
Milestone number: 8;
Milestone description: Instrumentation Program and Command List;
Scheduled completion date: February 2009;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 9;
Milestone description: Completion of ISS Phase 1 Safety Review;
Scheduled completion date: March 2009;
Completed on time: [Check];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 10;
Milestone description: COTS System Preliminary Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: April 2009;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $20 million.
Milestone number: 11;
Milestone description: Deleted: Unpressurized Cargo Module Fabrication
Started;
Scheduled completion date: No longer applicable;
Completed on time: No longer applicable;
Payment amount: No longer applicable.
Milestone number: 11;
Milestone description: Pressurized Cargo Module Critical Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: July 2009;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 12; Milestone description: Cygnus Avionics Test;
Scheduled completion date: August 2009;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 13;
Milestone description: Completion of ISS Phase 2 Safety Review;
Scheduled completion date: August 2009;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 14;
Milestone description: COTS System Critical Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: September 2009;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 15;
Milestone description: Service Module Core Assembly Completed;
Scheduled completion date: December 2009;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $7.5 million.
Milestone number: 16;
Milestone description: Service Module Test Readiness Review;
Scheduled completion date: April 2010;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $7.5 million.
Milestone number: 17;
Milestone description: Service Module Initial Comprehensive Performance
Test;
Scheduled completion date: July 2010;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 18;
Milestone description: Launch Vehicle Stage 1 Assembly Complete;
Scheduled completion date: October 2010;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $2.5 million.
Milestone number: 19;
Milestone description: Cargo Integration Demonstration;
Scheduled completion date: December 2010;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $2.5 million.
Milestone number: 20;
Milestone description: Mission Readiness Review;
Scheduled completion date: February 2011;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $2.5 million.
Milestone number: 21;
Milestone description: System Demonstration Flight;
Scheduled completion date: March 2011;
Completed on time: [Empty];
Payment amount: $2.5 million.
Total: Payment amount: $170 million for completion of all milestones;
$80 million paid to date.
Source: NASA and Orbital.
Note: When Orbital amended its agreement with NASA in March 2009, it
deleted milestones 7 and 11, and moved milestone 4 to become milestone
10. These changes are indicated in this revised schedule.
[A] Orbital submitted its milestone documentation for milestones 2 and
3 about 2 weeks later than originally planned; however, NASA approved
both milestones. Orbital's demo mission system requirements review
(milestone 2) was completed in July 2008 and its unpressurized cargo
module preliminary design review (milestone 3) was completed in August
2008.
[B] Milestone 5 (COTS integration/operations facility review) was
originally scheduled for October 2008, but was accelerated to September
2008 as requested by Orbital. Milestone 6 (pressurized cargo module
preliminary design review) was also accelerated 1 month at Orbital's
request from November 2008 to October 2008.
[End of table]
Orbital's Technical Approach and Development Status:
Orbital is developing a new, medium-class launch vehicle (Taurus II)
and a modular visiting vehicle (Cygnus), which is designed to transport
pressurized cargo to and dispose of trash from the space station.
[Footnote 44] Orbital has teamed with several external space companies
to develop the Taurus II and serves as its prime integrator.[Footnote
45] The first-stage engines, known as AJ26-62s, are being developed by
Orbital and Aerojet and are derived from Russian NK-33 engines.
Orbital's Ukrainian subcontractor Yuzhnoye/Yuzmash is responsible for
the development of the first-stage fuel tanks. The Taurus II's second-
stage motor, known as the Castor-30, is being developed by Alliant
Techsystems, Inc. (ATK), which has developed solid rocket motors used
by the space shuttle and Japan's H-IIA launch vehicle. The Cygnus space
vehicle uses a service module to provide propulsion and power to
deliver a pressurized cargo module to the space station.[Footnote 46]
The service module draws from the avionics systems of NASA's Dawn
spacecraft, developed by Orbital, and propulsion and power systems from
its flight-proven STAR GEO communications satellites.[Footnote 47] To
develop its pressurized cargo module, Orbital has teamed with Thales-
Alenia Space--which was the prime contractor of several pressurized
logistics modules currently used by the space shuttle to transport
cargo to the space station.[Footnote 48] A summary of the progress made
by Orbital in developing its COTS system follows.
Launch vehicle. Orbital has completed several early design reviews of
its Taurus II launch vehicle; however, delays in the development of
first-stage tanks and ongoing development tests of first-stage engine
components have compressed Orbital's already aggressive development
schedule. Orbital began Taurus II development as an independent
research and development project in 2007 and completed a Taurus II
system requirements review and PDR in July 2007 and February 2008,
respectively. Orbital officials reported that since joining the COTS
project, it has completed separate subsystem design reviews with its
partners: in October 2008, Orbital completed a CDR of the first-stage
engine assembly with Aerojet, a PDR of the first-stage tanks with
Yuzhnoye, and a CDR of the second-stage motor with ATK in March 2008.
However, Orbital reported that it has experienced schedule slips for
other Taurus II development milestones. Orbital's joint CDR with
Aerojet and Yuzhnoye for the first-stage engine and tanks slipped 4
months from November 2008 until March 2009.[Footnote 49] Orbital also
delayed a separate CDR with Yuzhnoye for the first-stage tanks 6 months
from February 2009 to August 2009 to address issues with the engine
feed lines and fuel tank mass.
Although Orbital has moved its COTS demonstration date 3 months, from
December 2010 until March 2011, Orbital's schedule to complete Taurus
II first-stage development appears to provide little margin to respond
to future technical issues, should they arise. Orbital is tracking the
delivery of its first-stage engine components as a significant Taurus
II risk. Its Taurus II risk summary report indicates that given the
compressed schedule for developing these components, there is a
possibility that the Taurus II program schedule for its COTS
demonstration mission may not be met. In addition, Orbital and Aerojet
are in the process of conducting development tests of components from
heritage NK-33 rocket engines that will be used to produce the Taurus
II first-stage engines. Orbital reported that the NK-33 engines have
been in storage since 1972 and tests are being done to ensure that
components have not degraded over time.
Space vehicle. Orbital has completed several early design reviews of
key components for its Cygnus space vehicle; however, technical and
schedule obstacles must be overcome before Orbital may attempt its COTS
demonstration. Orbital completed a system requirements review for its
demonstration mission in July 2008, a PDR for its pressurized cargo
module in October 2008, and the first of three space station Safety
Review Panel reviews in March 2009. Orbital also reported that
procurement of long-lead systems for the Cygnus has begun, with
production scheduled to begin before the end of 2009 and integration
tests scheduled to begin in February 2010. However, NASA officials
reported that Orbital had a late start in developing its capabilities
to integrate its space vehicle with the space station. According to
NASA officials, this is due, in part, to Orbital's late entry to the
COTS project and because there was some question over whether Orbital
would demonstrate a pressurized or unpressurized cargo delivery
capability in its COTS demonstration mission.
Orbital's aggressive schedule could present challenges with completing
requirements in NASA's International Space Station to COTS Interface
Requirements Document in time for its March 2011 demonstration mission
launch date.[Footnote 50] To help address the technical challenges of
integrating with the space station, Orbital plans to use hardware and
software developed by Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency for the H-II
Transfer Vehicle to facilitate proximity and berthing operations. NASA
officials reported that Orbital may benefit from its partnerships with
experienced subcontractors, such as Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency
and Thales-Alenia Space, but a significant amount of work remains to be
done under a compressed development schedule before Orbital can be
certified to integrate with the space station.
Launch readiness. Orbital has begun the development of its COTS launch
site at the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport in Wallops Island,
Virginia, but more work remains to be done to complete NASA's launch
safety requirements and acquire FAA launch licenses. As required by its
agreement, Orbital completed an initial review of the launch site
facilities to be developed and prepared a concept of operations for its
launch activities. To support its COTS demonstration mission, Orbital
and the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport intend to construct several new
facilities, including a horizontal integration facility (to integrate
the Taurus II with the Cygnus); a launch pad, mount, and ramp; and
separate fueling facilities for the Taurus II and the Cygnus. Orbital's
construction schedule indicates that its launch pad, mount, and ramp
will be completed by the end of 2009. Orbital reported that
construction of the horizontal integration facility is planned for
completion in May 2010, and the Cygnus space vehicle fueling facility
is planned to be completed by October 2010. Before it may attempt its
demonstration mission, Orbital must receive NASA's approval that its
new launch site facilities in development meet NASA's range safety
requirements, which apply at the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport. These
requirements are scheduled for completion by Orbital's demonstration
mission readiness review, scheduled for February 2011. Orbital must
also submit applications to the FAA for a launch license for the Taurus
II and a re-entry license for the Cygnus space vehicle. A draft of its
launch license application is required as part of its COTS System CDR,
scheduled for September 2009.
Concluding Observations:
With the approaching retirement of the space shuttle in 2010, NASA
faces the difficult challenge of securing sufficient and reliable cargo
transportation capabilities to the space station from 2010 to 2015.
NASA has taken several steps recently to finish its $31 billion
investment in the construction of the space station, which include
installing the necessary equipment to support a crew of six astronauts
and to fully utilize the space station's research capabilities. While
commercial partners have made progress in developing cargo
transportation capabilities, they have recently fallen behind their
development schedules. Furthermore, the most critical steps lie ahead,
including successfully launching new vehicles and completing
integration with the space station. The impending retirement of the
space shuttle leaves NASA with little margin to address future COTS
development delays. Should commercial partners suffer future delays or
be unable to provide cargo resupply services when anticipated, NASA
will be unable to fully utilize the space station as intended.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a copy of the draft report to the Department of Defense
(DOD), FAA, and NASA for comment. We also gave SpaceX and Orbital an
opportunity to comment on the findings related to their development
efforts. DOD and FAA did not submit comments. In commenting on a draft
of our report, NASA found it to be "thorough, objective, and helpful in
addressing commercial crew and cargo demonstration efforts." NASA's
written comments appear in appendix II. NASA, SpaceX, and Orbital also
provided technical comments which we have incorporated as appropriate.
We will send copies of the report to NASA's Administrator and
interested congressional committees. The report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staffs have any questions on matters discussed in
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who
made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Cristina Chaplain:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Congressional Addressees:
The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Alan B. Mollohan:
Chairman:
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Gabrielle Giffords:
Chairwoman:
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Mark Udall:
United States Senate:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To examine the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA)
management of the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS)
project and its expenditures, we analyzed project documentation,
including the Space Act agreements NASA entered into with its
commercial partners, NASA's guidance for implementing these agreements,
[Footnote 51] development milestone and quarterly reviews and other
briefings, and project funding and expenditures. We evaluated NASA's
management of the COTS project by comparing COTS management activities
with critical project management tools and activities identified in
NASA's Space Act Agreements Guide and in prior GAO work on NASA
projects with similarities to COTS.[Footnote 52] We also analyzed NASA
budget and funding documentation, confirmed this data with relevant
milestone payment documentation, and evaluated the processes used for
validating expenditures. In addition, we interviewed NASA and company
officials to assess NASA's management of the project and to verify
project funding and expenditures.
To determine the extent to which NASA is reliant on commercial partners
to meet the space station's cargo resupply needs, we reviewed
International Space Station program office documentation on the space
station's cargo resupply needs and risks, NASA's plans to meet its
cargo resupply needs between 2010 and 2015, and international and
commercial partners' vehicle capabilities. We interviewed officials at
NASA's Commercial Crew and Cargo and International Space Station
program offices to confirm NASA's cargo resupply plans and to verify
cargo resupply needs and risks and vehicle capabilities. We also
reviewed NASA studies that assessed the impact of the COTS project on
NASA's cargo resupply strategy.
To determine the extent to which commercial partners have made progress
or experienced challenges in developing cargo transport capabilities,
we reviewed each partner's agreement with NASA, supporting
documentation submitted by commercial partners to NASA for each
milestone, partners' development schedules and technical risks, NASA's
requirements for integrating with the space station,[Footnote 53] and
prior GAO reports. We also reviewed the commercial transportation space
regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of
Commercial Space Transportation[Footnote 54] and U.S. Air Force Space
Command's range safety requirements[Footnote 55] to evaluate commercial
partners' progress in obtaining required licenses and in developing
their launch sites and operations procedures. We conducted field visits
and interviewed commercial partners to determine partners' development
progress against performance milestones and to identify technical and
schedule challenges. In addition, we interviewed officials at NASA's
Headquarters, Johnson Space Center, and Wallops Flight Facility; the
Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Office of Commercial Space
Transportation; Patrick Air Force Base and Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station; and Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport. Our review did not
attempt to independently identify risks and challenges or assess
whether a partner successfully accomplished a particular milestone. We
relied on the commercial partners' assessments of the technical
challenges they faced and NASA's determination that a milestone had
been successfully completed.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Headquarters:
Washington, DC 20546-0001:
June 5, 2009:
Reply to Attn. of: Exploration Systems Mission Directorate:
Ms. Christina T. Chaplain:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Chaplain:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) appreciates
the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled, "Commercial
Partners Are Making Progress, but Face Aggressive Schedules to
Demonstrate Critical Space Station Cargo Transport Capabilities," GAO-
09-618.
Overall, NASA finds the draft report to be thorough, objective, and
helpful in addressing commercial crew and cargo demonstration efforts.
We are pleased with your recognition of our positive steps and progress
in this area and generally agree and support the conclusions you have
reached.
There are a few recommended technical changes that we believe will help
clarify some details in the report. Those technical comments have been
sent to your staff via e-mail.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please
contact Mr. Marc Timm at (202) 358-0373.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Douglas R. Cooke:
Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems Mission Directorate:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Cristina Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Jim Morrison, Assistant
Director; Matt Barranca; Greg Campbell; Brian Hartman; Jeff Hartnett;
Arturo Holguin; Kenneth E. Patton; Tim Persons; and Alyssa Weir made
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The 40 metric ton shortfall refers to usable cargo, which does not
include the mass of any required packing materials and/or flight
support equipment. Usable cargo combined with packing materials and/or
flight support equipment is referred to as customer cargo.
[2] GAO, NASA: Challenges in Completing and Sustaining the
International Space Station, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-581T] (Washington, D.C.: April 24,
2008).
[3] See Explanatory Statement, Cong. Rec. H 15471, 15821 (daily ed.
Dec. 17, 2007) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-161, § 4 (2007).
[4] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 98-361, § 110 (c), (1984) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2451) declared that the general welfare of the United States
requires that NASA seek and encourage, to the maximum extent possible,
the fullest commercial use of space. The Commercial Space Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-303, § 101, directed NASA to identify opportunities for
the private sector to play a role in servicing the International Space
Station. Following the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003,
President George W. Bush's A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The
President's Vision for U.S. Space Exploration called for the shuttle's
retirement in 2010 upon completing space station assembly, and for
pursuit of commercial opportunities for providing transportation and
other services. The August 2006 U.S. National Space Policy also
directed departments and agencies to encourage innovation in the
commercial space sector.
[5] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-155, § 101.
[6] International partners' vehicles include the Russian Federal Space
Agency's Progress (cargo) and Soyuz (crew), the European Space Agency's
Automated Transfer Vehicle (cargo), and the Japan Aerospace Exploration
Agency's H-II Transfer Vehicle (cargo), which is currently in
development.
[7] The 40 metric ton shortfall includes 36.9 metric tons of dry usable
cargo and 3.1 metric tons for water, propellant, and atmospheric gases.
Dry usable cargo includes food, spare parts, and materials to support
scientific experiments.
[8] The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-422, § 101 authorized $100 million for COTS
demonstration of a crew transport capability, but the COTS program
office has not yet received any funding for this capability.
[9] Pub. L. No. 85-568, § 203 (1958). This act is commonly referred to
as the Space Act and agreements signed utilizing NASA's other
transaction authority are known as Space Act agreements.
[10] SpaceX officials reported to NASA in January 2009 that they
expected a 2- to 4-month delay for most of the remaining milestones,
including the first and third demonstration flights.
[11] This amendment was made because NASA awarded a commercial resupply
services contract to Orbital in December 2008 in which NASA ordered
pressurized cargo delivery and disposal services rather than
unpressurized cargo delivery and disposal services. The commercial
resupply services contract was a separate procurement from NASA's
February 2008 Space Act agreement with Orbital.
[12] NASA's International Space Station to Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services Interface Requirements Document defines the
applicable physical and functional interface requirements between COTS
partners' visiting vehicles and space station systems.
[13] The purpose of the International Space Station Safety Review Panel
is to independently identify and track all critical hazards that
visiting space vehicles may pose to the space station and its crew and
to evaluate plans to mitigate these hazards. The Safety Review Panel is
comprised of NASA and contractor personnel from across the agency. The
panel holds three reviews that generally correspond with COTS partners'
preliminary design review, critical design review, and fabrication and
testing activities. COTS partners must complete all three phases of the
Safety Review Panel process before they are allowed to berth with the
space station.
[14] The USAF 45th Space Wing's Range Safety Office is responsible for
ensuring the public's safety both within and beyond the launch range
user's complex and the safety of nearby range sites. The launch range
safety requirements are published in U.S. Air Force Space Command
Manual 91-710.
[15] NASA's top-level launch range safety requirements are set by NASA
Procedural Requirements, NPR 8715.5, under the responsibility of NASA's
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. Vehicles launched from NASA's
Wallops Flight Facility must also comply with the Range Safety Manual
for Goddard Space Flight Center/Wallops Flight Facility (RSM-2002 Rev.
B).
[16] FAA issues several commercial space licenses, including (1) launch
license (for expendable launch vehicles), (2) a reusable launch vehicle
mission license, (3) a re-entry license, and (4) a launch or re-entry
site operator license. FAA requires a launch license for SpaceX's
Falcon 9 launch vehicle and a re-entry license for its Dragon space
vehicle. Orbital must obtain a launch license for its Taurus II launch
vehicle and a re-entry license for its Cygnus space vehicle.
[17] Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, § 9 (1984) (as
amended), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 70105.
[18] These contracts also include a clause guaranteeing a minimum of 3
metric tons in return cargo downmass.
[19] NASA awarded SpaceX and Orbital indefinite-delivery/indefinite-
quantity contracts, which provide for an indefinite quantity, within
stated limits, of supplies or services during a fixed period. The
contracts contain firm-fixed-price contract line items, where a
specified price is paid regardless of the contractor's costs, thereby
minimizing the financial risk to the government. NASA issues orders
under these contracts for cargo resupply missions. Each mission is
divided into a series of performance milestones with set payments. NASA
may withhold milestone payments due to non performance. To earn the
full amount for each mission, a partner must complete all milestones,
including the successful delivery of cargo to the space station.
[20] GAO, Space Transportation: Critical Areas NASA Needs to Address in
Managing Its Reusable Launch Vehicle Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-826T] (Washington, D.C.: June 20,
2001). The X-33 program was part of an effort to build a full-scale,
commercially developed, reusable launch vehicle reaching orbit in one
stage. NASA's goal was to reduce payload launch costs from $10,000 per
pound on the space shuttle to $1,000 per pound by using innovative
design methods, streamlined acquisition procedures, and creating
industry-led partnerships with cost sharing to manage the development
of advanced technology demonstration vehicles. The program did not
adhere to critical project management tools and activities and was
terminated due to significant cost increases.
[21] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Improvements Could Further
Enhance Ability to Acquire Innovative Technologies Using Other
Transaction Authority, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1088] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23,
2008).
[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-826T].
[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-826T].
[24] Proximity operations refer to maneuvers by vehicles visiting the
space station that are conducted in close proximity to the space
station. These operations include maneuvers to properly position the
space vehicle in relation to the space station so that it can be
captured by the space station's robotic arm prior to berthing.
[25] COTS project operations expenditures include funding for civil
service labor; civil service travel; technical assistance provided to
COTS partners; and procurement activities, which consist of technical
and business support, information technology, and safety and mission
assurance.
[26] The International Space Station program office's Transportation
Integration Office has estimated that it will spend an additional $56
million to support COTS partners' space station integration efforts.
[27] SpaceX completed milestone 13, Demo 2/Demo 3 System Critical
Design Review, in December 2008 ($25 million) and milestone 14, its
third and final financial milestone, in March 2009 ($10 million).
[28] NASA paid Orbital for milestone 6, Pressurized Cargo Module
Preliminary Design Review, in November 2008 ($10 million); milestone 8,
Instrumentation Program and Command List, in March 2009 ($10 million);
and milestone 9, Completion of International Space Station Phase 1
Safety Review, in March 2009 ($10 million).
[29] Equipment necessary to support a six-person crew includes systems
for oxygen recycling, removal of carbon dioxide, and transforming urine
into water. NASA plans to install a new module, known as Tranquility
(formerly Node 3), in February 2010 and it will hold some of this
equipment. In addition to the $31 billion for the space station's
construction, NASA expects sustainment costs through the space
station's planned retirement in fiscal year 2016 to total $11 billion.
[30] The European Space Agency's Automated Transfer Vehicle
successfully completed its first demonstration mission to dock with the
space station in April 2008. The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency has
yet to attempt a demonstration mission for its H-II Transfer Vehicle.
The first demonstration mission is planned for September 2009.
[31] SpaceX's Dragon is designed to return up to 2.5 metric tons
(approximately 5,500 pounds) to Earth, but will likely be limited by
volume constraints to about 1.7 metric tons (3,748 pounds). The
international partners' vehicles and Orbital's Cygnus do not provide
this capability. NASA could use the Russian crew transport vehicle to
carry a small amount of cargo (50 kg) to Earth, but this vehicle cannot
bring experiments to Earth for assessment.
[32] Space Station program officials told us that they expect Russia to
launch six Progress flights each year between 2009 and 2011. They
stated the NASA cargo will be spread across four Progress flights in
2009 and will represent the equivalent cargo capacity of a single
Progress (1.4 metric tons). NASA will be procuring the equivalent of
two Progress vehicles in 2010 and one Progress vehicle in 2011.
[33] These vehicles were designed to implement President George W.
Bush's A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President's Vision for U.S.
Space Exploration, which included a return to the moon and future
exploration of Mars. NASA had also planned to utilize these vehicles to
transport cargo to the space station as early as 2011. However,
schedule and technical setbacks have delayed the anticipated
availability of these vehicles until 2015.
[34] GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-306SP] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009). For purposes of our analysis, significant cost and
schedule growth occurs when a project's cost and/or its schedule growth
exceeds the thresholds established for Congressional reporting. See 42
U.S.C. § 16613. Of the projects that we reviewed with launch delays,
delays ranged from 5 months to as many as 26 months.
[35] SpaceX has not announced plans to delay to its second
demonstration mission, scheduled for November 2009.
[36] According to NASA's agreements with the partners, should either
partner fail to meet milestones, NASA and the partner must meet to
determine why the failure occurred and whether it is in the best
interests of the parties to continue the agreement. NASA may terminate
the agreement 30 days after providing written notification to the
partner that it has failed to perform.
[37] SpaceX's technical approach is intended to meet each of the four
COTS capabilities: capability A--unpressurized cargo delivery and
disposal, capability B--pressurized cargo delivery and disposal,
capability C--pressurized cargo delivery and return to Earth, and
capability D--crew transportation. SpaceX's Space Act agreement
includes an option to demonstrate crew transportation. COTS project
officials told us that they have not yet received funding for crew
transport capability development.
[38] The Falcon 9's first-and second-stage engines are derived from
engines used in SpaceX's Falcon 1 launch vehicle, which had its first
successful orbital launch in September 2008. The Falcon 1 uses one
Merlin 1C engine for its first-stage booster, while the Falcon 9 uses
nine similar engines for its first-stage and a single engine modified
to operate in a space environment for its second-stage booster. The
Merlin engines are fueled by liquid oxygen and rocket propellant grade
kerosene. SpaceX plans to retrieve its first-and second-stage engines
after launch and refurbish them for use in other missions.
[39] The Dragon will be propelled by 18 "Draco" thruster engines which
are fueled by nitrogen tetroxide and monomethylhydrazine hypergolic
fuels. Because the Dragon is yet to be fully qualified and flown, the
ultimate cargo capacity of this vehicle is yet to be known. SpaceX
estimates the upmass cargo capacity of the vehicle may be as high as
3.3 metric tons (approximately 7,300 pounds). The Dragon's cargo
capacity for a given mission will also vary depending on the density
and volume of the cargo and how it is packed. SpaceX estimates that the
Dragon is likely to carry about 2.55 metric tons (approximately 5,620
pounds) of cargo on a typical mission. To demonstrate this capability,
SpaceX plans to carry 1.7 metric tons (3,748 pounds) of pressurized and
0.85 metric tons (1,874 pounds) of unpressurized simulated cargo on its
third demonstration mission.
[40] The two components in development by SpaceX to enable these
operations are its relative navigation sensor, known as DragonEye, and
its COTS ultra high frequency communications unit. SpaceX is equipping
its Dragon with three DragonEye units to create a redundant system for
the Dragon to share positioning data with the space station during
proximity operations. The ultra high frequency communications units
will be installed in both the Dragon and the space station to transmit
telemetry data during proximity operations.
[41] The Falcon 9 fueling system includes tanks and distribution
systems for liquid oxygen and rocket propellant grade kerosene, helium,
and nitrogen. SpaceX reported that the hangar is operational for the
integration of its launch and space vehicles; however, the hangar has
yet to be approved for Dragon fueling. SpaceX reported that it has also
fabricated, assembled, and successfully completed a dry-run test of its
transporter erector system, which will be used to transport the
integrated Falcon 9 and Dragon from the hangar and erect it for launch.
[42] FAA reported that SpaceX has submitted and FAA has accepted a
sufficiently complete launch license for a separate, non-COTS Falcon 9
mission. SpaceX intends to attempt an inaugural Falcon 9 demonstration
mission prior to attempting its first COTS demonstration mission. NASA
officials reported that they did not have a firm launch date for this
inaugural Falcon 9 mission, but said that SpaceX is working toward a
launch in late summer or early fall 2009.
[43] Generally speaking, most of the Taurus II development milestones
are not included in Orbital's agreement with NASA. However, Orbital has
invited NASA officials to participate in several Taurus II design
reviews. Orbital has completed several other development milestones for
its Taurus II launch vehicle.
[44] Orbital's amended technical approach is designed to meet one of
the four COTS capabilities, pressurized cargo delivery and disposal
(capability B).
[45] The Taurus II is a two-stage rocket with two liquid-fueled engines
for its first stage and a single solid rocket motor for its upper
stage. The first stage engines are fueled by rocket propellant grade
kerosene and liquid oxygen. Orbital reported that it is also developing
an optional liquid-fueled third stage engine that will not be used for
COTS and commercial resupply services missions.
[46] Orbital's Cygnus visiting vehicle is not designed to return cargo
to Earth, although it can dispose of trash from the space station.
Orbital estimates that Cygnus will be able to deliver or dispose of
about 2 metric tons (approximately 4,400 pounds) of pressurized cargo
on a single mission. Because the Cygnus is yet to be qualified and
flown, the final cargo capacity of the Cygnus is yet to be known. Once
development is completed, Orbital estimates that in an enhanced
configuration, its pressurized cargo module could provide as much as
2.7 metric tons (approximately 5,950 pounds) of cargo delivery and
disposal in a given mission. The Cygnus's cargo capacity for a given
mission will vary depending on the density of the cargo and how it is
packed.
[47] Orbital is working with Draper Laboratory to develop guidance,
navigation, and fault tolerant computer support, and plans to use
hardware and software developed by Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency
for the H-II Transfer Vehicle to facilitate proximity and berthing
operations with the space station.
[48] Thales-Alenia Space was the prime contractor to NASA and the
Italian Space Agency in the development of the three multipurpose
pressurized logistics modules used by the space shuttle to ferry
pressurized cargo to and from the space station. Thales-Alenia Space
was also the prime contractor to the European and Italian Space
Agencies for the development of Nodes 2 and 3 of the space station.
COTS vehicles are intended to berth with the space station at Node 2
during their COTS demonstrations.
[49] This slip was due, in part, to difficulties establishing and
negotiating testing and delivery requirements with Yuzhnoye for the
development of the first-stage tanks.
[50] NASA's International Space Station to COTS Interface Requirements
Document requires COTS vehicles to have two-fault tolerant systems to
mitigate against catastrophic hazards that could occur during
integrated operations with the space station. Orbital reported that it
typically builds its components with one-fault tolerance and has cited
the development and verification of hardware and software needed for
space station rendezvous and proximity operations as a high risk.
[51] NASA Advisory Implementing Instruction (NAII) 1050-1A is also
known as NASA's Space Act Agreements Guide.
[52] GAO, Space Transportation: Critical Areas NASA Needs to Address in
Managing Its Reusable Launch Vehicle Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-826T] (Washington, D.C.: June 20,
2001).
[53] The International Space Station to Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services Interface Requirements Document (SSP 50808)
provides interface and performance requirements between the space
station and COTS partners, performance and design requirements for the
COTS ground systems supporting COTS vehicle flights to space station,
and design requirements on the COTS vehicle to ensure safe integration
with the space station.
[54] The commercial space licensing regulations are outlined at 14
C.F.R. §§ 413-437 (2009).
[55] The range safety requirements are published in U.S. Air Force
Space Command Manual 91-710, which is divided into seven volumes.
[End of section]
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