NASA
Constellation Program Cost and Schedule Will Remain Uncertain Until a Sound Business Case Is Established Gao ID: GAO-09-844 August 26, 2009NASA's Constellation program is developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle as the agency's first major efforts in a plan to return to the moon and eventually send humans to Mars. GAO has issued a number of reports and testimonies on various aspects of this program, and made several recommendations. GAO was asked to assess NASA's progress in implementing GAO's recommendations for the Ares I and Orion projects, and identify risks the program faces. GAO analyzed NASA plans and schedules, risk mitigation information, and contract performance data relative to knowledge-based acquisition practices identified in prior GAO reports, and interviewed government officials and contractors.
NASA is still struggling to develop a solid business case--including firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time--needed to justify moving the Constellation program forward into the implementation phase. Gaps in the business case include significant technical and design challenges for the Orion and Ares I vehicles, such as limiting vibration during launch, eliminating the risk of hitting the launch tower during lift off, and reducing the mass of the Orion vehicle, represent considerable hurdles that must be overcome in order to meet safety and performance requirements; and a poorly phased funding plan that runs the risk of funding shortfalls in fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being completed to support schedules and milestones. This approach has limited NASA's ability to mitigate technical risks early in development and precludes the orderly ramp up of workforce and developmental activities. In response to these gaps, NASA delayed the date of its first crewed-flight and changed its acquisition strategy for the Orion project. NASA acknowledges that funding shortfalls reduce the agency's flexibility in resolving technical challenges. The program's risk management system warned of planned work not being completed to support schedules and milestones. Consequently, NASA is now focused on providing the capability to service the International Space Station and has deferred the capabilities needed for flights to the moon. Though these changes to the overarching requirements are likely to increase the confidence level associated with a March 2015 first crewed flight, these actions do not guarantee that the program will successfully meet that deadline. Nevertheless, NASA estimates that Ares I and Orion represent up to $49 billion of the over $97 billion estimated to be spent on the Constellation program through 2020. While the agency has already obligated more than $10 billion in contracts, at this point NASA does not know how much Ares I and Orion will ultimately cost, and will not know until technical and design challenges have been addressed.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-844, NASA: Constellation Program Cost and Schedule Will Remain Uncertain Until a Sound Business Case Is Established
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Science and Technology, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2009:
NASA:
Constellation Program Cost and Schedule Will Remain Uncertain Until a
Sound Business Case Is Established:
GAO-09-844:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-844, a report to the Chairman, Committee on
Science and Technology, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
NASA‘s Constellation program is developing the Ares I Crew Launch
Vehicle and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle as the agency‘s first
major efforts in a plan to return to the moon and eventually send
humans to Mars. GAO has issued a number of reports and testimonies on
various aspects of this program, and made several recommendations. GAO
was asked to assess NASA‘s progress in implementing GAO‘s
recommendations for the Ares I and Orion projects, and identify risks
the program faces. GAO analyzed NASA plans and schedules, risk
mitigation information, and contract performance data relative to
knowledge-based acquisition practices identified in prior GAO reports,
and interviewed government officials and contractors.
What GAO Found:
NASA is still struggling to develop a solid business case”including
firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition
strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time”
needed to justify moving the Constellation program forward into the
implementation phase. Gaps in the business case include:
* significant technical and design challenges for the Orion and Ares I
vehicles, such as limiting vibration during launch, eliminating the
risk of hitting the launch tower during lift off, and reducing the mass
of the Orion vehicle, represent considerable hurdles that must be
overcome in order to meet safety and performance requirements; and;
* a poorly phased funding plan that runs the risk of funding shortfalls
in fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being
completed to support schedules and milestones. This approach has
limited NASA‘s ability to mitigate technical risks early in development
and precludes the orderly ramp up of workforce and developmental
activities.
In response to these gaps, NASA delayed the date of its first crewed-
flight and changed its acquisition strategy for the Orion project. NASA
acknowledges that funding shortfalls reduce the agency‘s flexibility in
resolving technical challenges. The program‘s risk management system
warned of planned work not being completed to support schedules and
milestones. Consequently, NASA is now focused on providing the
capability to service the International Space Station and has deferred
the capabilities needed for flights to the moon. Though these changes
to the overarching requirements are likely to increase the confidence
level associated with a March 2015 first crewed flight, these actions
do not guarantee that the program will successfully meet that deadline.
Nevertheless, NASA estimates that Ares I and Orion represent up to $49
billion of the over $97 billion estimated to be spent on the
Constellation program through 2020. While the agency has already
obligated more than $10 billion in contracts, at this point NASA does
not know how much Ares I and Orion will ultimately cost, and will not
know until technical and design challenges have been addressed.
Figure: Artist‘s Rendition of Ares I and Orion:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
The rendition includes a depicting of the following:
Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle;
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle.
Source: GAO analysis and presentation of NASA photos and data.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that as NASA addresses the findings and recommendations
of an ongoing review of U.S. human space flight being conducted per
direction from the President, the new NASA Administrator direct the
Constellation program, or its successor, to develop a sound business
case before proceeding into its next phase. NASA concurred with our
recommendation.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-844] or key
components. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202)
512-4841 or ChaplainC@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Constellation Program Has Not Yet Developed the Sound Business Case
Needed to Justify Entry into the Implementation Phase:
Conclusion:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Figures:
Figure 1: Constellation Program Schedule:
Figure 2: Artist Conception of Constellation Elements:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 26, 2009:
The Honorable Bart Gordon:
Chairman:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA)
Constellation program is approaching a crossroads in development as it
nears entry into the implementation phase. The Constellation program is
developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle, the agency's first major efforts to support
implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration.[Footnote 1] These
efforts represent a substantial investment for NASA. Over $10 billion
has already been obligated and NASA budget estimates indicate that over
$97 billion is to be spent on the Constellation program through 2020.
[Footnote 2] NASA initiated the Constellation program in November 2005
and expected the program to enter implementation in 2009. The program
has delayed its entry into implementation, however, and is still
modifying its overall architecture and specific requirements. Our
previous work on best practices and NASA's own acquisition policies
indicate that the program's architecture and requirements should be
finalized and system designs expected to meet requirements in hand
before a program enters the implementation phase.[Footnote 3] NASA
recognized that the program faces challenges and in December 2008
reported that the current program was high risk and unachievable within
current budget and schedule constraints.[Footnote 4] Since then, NASA
has taken steps to decrease risk, including delaying the first crewed
flight from September 2014 to March 2015 and deferring work on lunar
requirements.
In May 2009, the Obama Administration announced an independent review
of U.S. human space flight plans and activities with the stated goal of
ensuring that the nation is pursuing the best course for the future of
human space flight. This Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans
Committee is composed of space industry experts, former astronauts,
government officials, and academics. It is tasked with providing a
range of options for U.S. human space flight activities and has been
examining ongoing and planned NASA development activities and potential
alternatives in order to present options for advancing a safe,
innovative, affordable, and sustainable human space flight program
following the space shuttle's retirement. Among alternatives that have
received attention is the use of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
program, which already provides launch capability to the Department of
Defense, the National Reconnaissance Office, and NASA, but has not been
used to transport humans into space. The committee plans to complete
this review by August 2009 and include any changes to current plans in
an amended submission to its fiscal year 2010 budget request. NASA is
continuing to execute the Constellation program as this review is
conducted.
We have issued a number of reports and testimonies that touch on
various aspects of NASA's Constellation program and in particular the
development efforts under way for the Orion and Ares I projects. These
reports and testimonies have questioned the affordability and overall
acquisition strategy for each project and have stressed repeatedly
NASA's need to develop a sound business case --which includes firm
requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition
strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time -
-to support the Constellation program before making long-term
commitments. In the past, we recommended that NASA modify the Orion
Crew Vehicle acquisition strategy to ensure the agency did not commit
itself to a long-term contractual obligation prior to establishing a
sound business case.[Footnote 5] Although initially NASA disagreed with
our recommendation, the agency subsequently revised its acquisition
strategy to address some of the concerns we raised. We have also
recommended that NASA ensure the business case for the Ares I project
is established before proceeding beyond preliminary design review.
[Footnote 6] NASA concurred with this recommendation and subsequently
delayed the Ares I preliminary design review. In February 2009 NASA
determined that the Orion project was not ready to begin the
preliminary design review process and delayed initiation of the Orion
review until August 2009 (see fig. 1). In response to your request that
we review the Constellation program, this report assesses the extent to
which NASA has implemented our prior recommendations, including
establishing a sound business case for the Ares I and Orion projects,
and identifies risks, if any, facing the program.
To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed Constellation
plans and schedules, risk mitigation information, and contract
performance data relative to knowledge-based acquisition practices
identified in prior reports. We also interviewed government and
contractor officials at relevant NASA centers and NASA headquarters.
For our full scope and methodology, see appendix I. We conducted this
performance audit from December 2008 through August 2009, in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
Background:
NASA's Vision for Space Exploration calls for a return of humans to the
Moon and eventual human spaceflight to Mars. In September 2005, NASA
outlined an initial architecture for implementing the Vision in its
Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). NASA is implementing
this architecture under the Constellation program. Among the first
major efforts of this program are the developments of new space flight
systems--including the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle. Ares I and Orion are currently targeted for
operation no later than 2015 (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Constellation Program Schedule:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated schedule]
Formulation (2008-May, 2010):
Ares I:
Current preliminary design review: July 2008[A].
Orion:
Preliminary design review as of 2007: August 2008;
Current preliminary design review: August 2009.
Constellation:
Preliminary design review as of 2007: June 2009;
Current preliminary design review: March 2010;
Current non-advocate review: May 2010.
Implementation (May 2010-2015):
Orion:
First crewed flight as of 2007: September 2014;
Current first crewed flight: March 2015.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
Note: The non-advocate review is the analysis of a proposed program or
project by a team composed of management, technical, and resources
experts from outside the advocacy chain of the proposed program or
project. It provides agency management with an independent assessment
of the readiness of the program/project to proceed into implementation.
[A] Ares I preliminary design review was completed in September 2008
but significant technical issues were deferred until the Constellation
program's preliminary design review.
[End of figure]
As illustrated by figure 1 above, the Constellation program, including
the Ares I and Orion projects, is approaching the end of the
formulation phase of NASA's acquisition life-cycle for spaceflight
programs and projects. The purpose of the formulation phase is to
establish a cost-effective program that is demonstrably capable of
meeting the agency's objectives. The formulation phase concludes with
the preliminary design review and a non-advocate review which marks the
end of the formulation phase and the beginning of the implementation
phase. During the implementation phase, the program will execute plans
developed during the formulation phase.
Under the ESAS architecture, the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle would
be an Apollo-like capsule capable of carrying six astronauts to the
International Space Station (ISS) and four to the moon. It would
include a launch abort system that would allow the crew to escape
unharmed if a launch fails. The Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle would be a
two-stage, vertically stacked vehicle with the first stage derived
directly from the Space Shuttle solid rocket booster (see figure 2).
Constellation would develop crew and cargo capabilities for missions to
the lunar surface, no later than 2020. As currently planned, this
system will include the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle, Earth Departure
Stage, Lunar Lander, and associated support capabilities. Further
development will provide crew, cargo, and infrastructure to support
human exploration of Mars and beyond.
Figure 2: Artist Conception of Constellation Elements:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
The following elements are depicted in the illustration:
Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle:
* Launch Abort System;
* J-2X engine tucked inside;
* Five segments.
Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle:
* J-2X engine tucked inside;
* Five segments.
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle.
Source: GAO analysis and presentation of NASA photos and data.
Note: The Earth Departure Stage and Lunar Lander are encapsulated in
the Ares V.
[End of figure]
When it completed the ESAS study, NASA indicated it would maximize the
use of heritage hardware and established technology in order to reduce
cost and minimize risk. NASA also planned to retire the Space Shuttle
in 2010 to make resources available for the Constellation program. NASA
was confident this technical approach, in conjunction with a "go as you
can afford to pay" funding approach, would support a first crewed
flight no later than September 2014. Furthermore, NASA indicated that
it would strive to bring that date as close as possible to 2010--the
planned retirement date for the Shuttle--in order to minimize the gap
between the Space Shuttle's retirement and deployment of new
transportation vehicles. In fact, NASA was working to an internal date
of 2013 for first crewed launch, with an initial flight to the Moon
targeted for 2018 but no later than 2020.
Human spaceflight development programs are complex and difficult by
nature. Over the past decade, there have been a number of instances
where NASA pursued costly efforts to build a second generation of
reusable human spaceflight vehicles without attaining critical
knowledge about requirements and resources. These programs experienced
significant problems--including cost and schedule delays. They include
the National Aero-Space Plane, the X-33 and X-34, and the Space Launch
Initiative, which were eventually canceled. While these endeavors have
helped to advance scientific and technical knowledge, none of these
projects accomplished NASA's objective of fielding a new reusable space
vehicle. By emphasizing heritage technology, the Constellation program
was designed to avoid problems associated with the prior shuttle
replacement efforts, which were largely rooted in the desire to
introduce vehicles that significantly advanced technologies. Thus far,
however, the Constellation program has encountered daunting challenges
in terms of design, testing, manufacturing, and poorly phased funding
that have led the program to slip its target for a first crewed flight
to no later than March 2015.
Our Work on Best Practices Support Business Case Establishment Prior to
Product Development:
Our work on best practices over the past decade has shown that success
in large-scale development efforts like Constellation depends on
establishing an executable business case before committing resources to
a new product development effort. In its simplest form, a business case
requires a balance between the concept selected to satisfy customer
needs and the resources--technologies, design knowledge, funding, time,
and management capacity--needed to transform the concept into a
product. At the heart of a business case is a knowledge-based approach
that requires that managers demonstrate high levels of knowledge as the
program proceeds from technology development to system development and,
finally, production. Ideally, in such an approach, key technologies are
demonstrated before development begins, the design is stabilized before
prototypes are built or production begins, and testing is used to
validate product maturity at each level. At each decision point, the
balance among time, money, and capacity is confirmed. In essence,
knowledge supplants risk over time. Having adequate knowledge about
requirements and resources is particularly important for a program like
Constellation because human spaceflight development projects are
inherently complex, difficult, and costly.
We have reported on several occasions that within NASA's acquisition
framework, the preliminary design/non-advocate review--the hurdle
marking transition from program formulation to program implementation--
is the point at which development projects should have a sound business
case in hand.[Footnote 7] NASA's Systems Engineering Policy states that
the preliminary design review demonstrates that the preliminary design
meets all system requirements with acceptable risk and within the cost
and schedule constraints. NASA realized that the Orion project was not
ready to complete the preliminary design review process as planned and
delayed its initiation from summer 2008 to summer 2009.[Footnote 8]
Furthermore, although NASA officially closed the Ares I preliminary
design review process in September 2008, it deferred resolution of the
thrust oscillation issue until the Constellation program preliminary
design review in March 2010.
The business case is the essential first step in any acquisition
program that sets the stage for the remaining stages of a program,
namely the business or contracting strategy and actual execution or
performance. If the business case is not sound, execution may be
subpar. This does not mean that all potential problems can be
eliminated and perfection achieved, but rather that sound business
cases can help produce better outcomes and better return on investment.
If any one element of the business case is weak, problems are more
likely in implementation. Thus far in the Constellation program, the
failure of NASA to establish a sound business case for both the Ares I
and Orion projects early is manifesting itself in schedule delays and
cost increases.
The Constellation Program Has Not Yet Developed the Sound Business Case
Needed to Justify Entry into the Implementation Phase:
The Constellation program has not yet developed all of the elements of
a sound business case needed to justify entry into implementation.
Progress has been made; however, technical and design challenges are
still significant and until they are resolved NASA will not be able to
reliably estimate the time and money needed to execute the program. In
addition, cost issues and a poorly phased funding plan continue to
hamper the program. Consequently, NASA is changing the acquisition
strategy for the Orion project as the agency attempts to increase
confidence in its ability to meet a March 2015 first crewed launch.
However, technical design and other challenges facing the program are
not likely to be overcome in time to meet the 2015 date, even with
changes to scope and requirements.
Constellation Faces Significant Technical and Design Challenges:
Technical and design challenges within the Constellation are proving
difficult, costly, and time intensive to resolve. The Constellation
program tracks technical challenges in its Integrated Risk Management
Application (IRMA). NASA procedures recommend that programs identify
and track risks as part of continuous risk management. As of June 9,
2009, IRMA was tracking 464 risks for Ares I and Orion--207 high risks,
206 medium risks, and 51 low risks.[Footnote 9] We have reported on
some of these areas of technical challenge in the past, including
thrust oscillation, thermal protection system, common bulkhead, and J-
2X nozzle extension. In addition to these challenges, our recent work
has highlighted other technical challenges, including Orion mass
control, vibroacoustics, lift-off drift, launch abort system, and
meeting safety requirements. While NASA has made progress in resolving
each of these technical challenges, significant knowledge gaps remain
in each of these areas. Descriptions of these technical challenges
follow.[Footnote 10]
Thrust Oscillation:
Thrust oscillation, which causes shaking during launch and ascent,
occurs in some form on every solid rocket engine. Last year, we
reported that computer modeling indicated that there was a possibility
that the thrust oscillation frequency and magnitude may be outside the
limits of the Ares I design and could potentially cause excessive
vibration in the Orion capsule. Agency officials stated that thrust
oscillation is well understood and they are pursuing multiple
solutions. These include incorporating a passive damping system inside
the first stage solid rocket booster aft skirt that will act like a
shock absorber during launch; adding a composite structure and springs
between the first and second stages to isolate the upper stage and crew
vehicle from the first stage; and could possibly use the upper stage
propellant fuel tanks to offset thrust oscillation in the first stage.
Officials said that NASA will be unable to verify the success of
solutions until thrust oscillation occurs during an integrated flight.
Officials noted that because thrust oscillation is not expected to
occur in every flight, it is difficult to forecast when the solutions
will be verified.
Thermal Protection System:
The Orion vehicle requires a large-scale ablative heat shield, at the
base of the spacecraft, to survive reentry from earth orbit. These heat
shields burn up, or ablate, in a controlled fashion, transporting heat
away from the crew module during its descent through the atmosphere.
NASA is using an ablative material derived from the substance used in
the Apollo program. After some difficulties, NASA was successful in
recreating the material. Because it uses a framework with many
honeycomb-shaped cells, each of which must be individually filled
without voids or imperfections, it may be difficult to repeatedly
manufacture to consistent standards. According to program officials,
during the Apollo program the cells were filled by hand. The contractor
plans to automate the process for the Orion Thermal Protection System,
but this capability is still being developed.
Common Bulkhead:
The common bulkhead separates the hydrogen and oxygen fuel within the
Ares I upper stage fuel tank. The initial Ares I design employed a
simpler two-tank configuration with lower manufacturing costs but did
not meet mass requirements. According to project officials, the common
bulkhead represents the critical path in both the development and
manufacturing of the upper stage. Lessons learned from the Apollo
program indicate that common bulkheads are complex and difficult to
manufacture and recommend against their use. According to NASA
officials, the difficulty of designing and manufacturing common
bulkheads stems from the sheer size of components and the tight
tolerances to which they must be manufactured. To accelerate the
manufacturing process NASA is exploring using an oven with a vacuum bag
instead of an autoclave[Footnote 11] to bond and cure the metallic and
composite materials used in the manufacture of the common bulkhead. If
this process proves unsuccessful, the program may encounter schedule
delays.
J-2X Nozzle Extension:
We have reported in prior years that although the J-2X engine is based
on the J-2 and J-2S engines used on the Saturn V and leverages
knowledge from subsequent engine development efforts, the number of
planned changes is such that, according to NASA review boards, the
effort essentially represents a new engine development. A risk within
this development is a requirement for a nozzle extension to meet
performance requirements. NASA originally planned to pursue a composite
nozzle. However, NASA eliminated the composite nozzle extension from
the J-2X design because of cost and other considerations, and went with
a unique aluminum alloy design, which, according to agency officials,
should reduce costs, but has the potential to decrease engine
performance and increase mass. Analysis indicates that the alloy nozzle
is more likely to be affected by heat than a composite nozzle. In
essence, while the alloy nozzle should withstand the heat environment,
the composite nozzle allowed for improved performance margins.
According to officials, to mitigate the potential problem, NASA is
using a proven aluminum alloy with a honeycomb design, similar
structurally to the Space Shuttle external tank, which will reduce
weight. Contractor officials stated that they will continue to modify
the nozzle design as test results are received and analyzed.
Orion Mass Control:
Controlling for mass has led to significant design changes to the Orion
vehicle. Our previous work has shown that controlling for mass is a key
factor in the development of space systems. As the mass of a particular
system increases, the power or thrust required to launch that system
will also increase. This could result in the need to develop additional
power or thrust capability to lift the system, leading to additional
costs, or to stripping down the vehicle to accommodate current power or
thrust capability. For example, NASA went through the process in 2007
to zero-base the design for the Orion to address mass concerns. In its
efforts to reduce the mass of the Orion vehicle, NASA chose to move
from land nominal landing to water nominal landing to reduce mass by
eliminating air bags and, according to officials, by reducing the
number of parachutes. NASA also incorporated jettisonable, load-bearing
fairings[Footnote 12] into the Orion's service module design that,
according to officials, saved 1,000 pounds. This change, however,
increased development risk because the fairing design has no historical
precedent and the fairing panels may not deploy properly and could
recontact the Orion vehicle or the Ares I rocket after they are
jettisoned.
Vibroacoustics:
Another issue related to vibration is vibroacoustics--the pressure of
the acoustic waves--produced by the firing of the Ares I first stage
and the rocket's acceleration through the atmosphere--which may cause
unacceptable structural vibrations throughout Ares I and Orion.
According to agency officials, NASA is still determining how these
vibrations and acoustic environments may affect the vehicles. NASA is
concerned that severe vibroacoustics could force NASA to qualify Ares I
and Orion components to higher vibration tolerance thresholds than
originally expected. For example, if current concerns are realized, key
subsystems within the Upper Stage would be unable to meet requirements,
would fail qualification testing, and would have to be redesigned.
Lift-Off Drift:
Analysis of the Ares I flight path as it lifts off from the launch pad
indicates the rocket may drift during launch and could possibly hit the
launch tower or damage the launch facilities with the rocket plume.
Factors contributing to lift-off drift include wind speed and
direction, misalignment of the rocket's thrust, and duration of lift-
off. NASA plans to establish a clear, safe, and predicted lift-off
drift curve by steering the vehicle away from the launch tower and not
launching when southerly winds exceed 15 to 20 knots.
Launch Abort System:
NASA continues to address challenges designing the launch abort system,
which pulls the Orion capsule away from the Ares I launch vehicle in
the case of a catastrophic problem during launch. The Orion contractor
had trouble finding a subcontractor who could design and build a
working attitude control motor that steers the system during an abort.
According to agency officials, previous attitude control motors have
had 700 pounds of thrust, while the requirement for the attitude
control motor is 7,000 pounds of thrust. Developing an attitude control
motor with high levels of thrust and long burn durations that is
steerable is proving to be a difficult technical challenge. A year
after the initial contract was awarded, the first subcontractor did not
have a viable design and had to be replaced. The current subcontractor,
however, is making progress. For example, although the valves used by
the complex steering system failed during high-thrust testing in April
2008, redesigned valves have subsequently passed two high-thrust tests.
Safety Requirements:
Orion's safety requirements are no more than one loss of crew event in
1,700 flights and one loss of mission event for every 250 flights for
the ISS mission. According to Orion officials, these requirements are
an order of magnitude higher than the Space Shuttle's safety
requirements, were arbitrarily set by ESAS, and may be unattainable.
According to the Constellation program manager, NASA has added
robustness to current systems as well as redundant systems to increase
safety margins. However, these added redundancies and system robustness
have added mass to the system.
The technical challenges presented here do not capture all of the
risks, technical or programmatic, which the Constellation program
faces. As noted earlier, there are over 200 risks categorized as "high"
for the Ares I/Orion programs, meaning that if not successfully
mitigated, these risks (1) are either nearly certain, highly likely, or
may occur, and (2) will have major effects on system cost, schedule,
performance, or safety. These risks range in nature from highly complex
technical risks, such as those noted above, to straightforward
programmatic risks related to areas such as transitioning support work
from the Marshall Space Flight Center to Michoud Assembly Facility for
long-term vehicle production, compressing the software development
cycle for the Orion vehicle, and creating a test program for Orion's
communication and tracking system.
Funding Issues and Cost Increases Continue to Hamper the Program:
The Constellation program's poorly phased funding plan has affected the
program's ability to deal with technical challenges. In our October
2007 report, we noted that NASA initiated the Constellation program
recognizing that the agency's total budget authority would be
insufficient to fund all necessary activities in fiscal years 2009 and
2010.[Footnote 13] NASA's funding strategy relied on the accumulation
of a large rolling budget reserve in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 to fund
Constellation activities in fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010.
Thereafter, NASA anticipated that the retirement of the space shuttle
program in 2010 would free funding for the Constellation program. In
our October 2007 report, we noted that NASA's approach to funding was
risky and that the approved budget profile at that time was
insufficient to meet Constellation's estimated needs. The Constellation
program's integrated risk management system also identified this
strategy as high risk and warned that funding shortfalls could occur in
fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being
completed to support schedules and milestones. According to project
officials, these shortfalls limited NASA's ability to mitigate
technical risks early in development and precluded the orderly ramp-up
of workforce and developmental activities.
According to the Constellation program manager, these funding
shortfalls are reducing his flexibility to resolve technical
challenges. The Constellation program tracks unfunded risk mitigation--
engineering work identified as potentially needed but not currently
funded--as cost threats in IRMA. The Constellation IRMA system
currently tracks 192 cost threats for the Ares I and Orion projects
totaling about $2.4 billion through fiscal year 2015.[Footnote 14] Of
this $2.4 billion, NASA classifies 36 threats valued at $730 million as
likely to be needed, 54 threats valued at $670 million as may or may
not be needed, and 103 threats valued at $1.0 billion as not likely to
be needed. Our analysis of the cost threats indicates these cost
threats may be understated. For example, of the 157 threats classified
as may or may not be needed or not likely to be needed, IRMA likelihood
scores[Footnote 15] indicate that 68 cost threats worth $695 million
are either highly likely or nearly certain to occur. Some examples of
cost threats include $4.7 million to develop and mature Orion's data
network technology and $12.5 million for an Upper Stage and First Stage
separation test.
The cost of the Constellation program's developmental contracts have
increased as NASA added new effort to resolve technical and design
challenges. Constellation program officials and contractor cost reports
indicate that the new effort has increased the value of the
Constellation program's developmental contracts from $7.2 billion in
2007 to $10.2 billion in June 2009. Some of these modifications
remained undefinitized for extended periods as NASA worked through
design issues and matured program requirements in response to technical
challenges.[Footnote 16] Undefinitized contract actions authorize
contractors to begin work before reaching a final agreement on contract
terms. By allowing undefinitized contract actions to continue for
extended periods, NASA loses its ability to monitor contractor
performance because the cost reports are not useful for evaluating the
contractor's performance or for projecting the remaining cost of the
work under contract. With a current, valid baseline, the reports would
indicate when cost or schedule thresholds had been exceeded, and NASA
could then require the contractor to explain the reasons for the
variances and to identify and take appropriate corrective actions. Yet,
NASA allowed high-value modifications to the Constellation contracts to
remain undefinitized for extended periods, in one instance, more than
13 months.[Footnote 17]
Tradeoffs Made to Address Cost Increases and Funding Shortfalls Are
Changing Constellation Program Test Strategy:
In August 2008, when faced with cost increases and funding shortfalls,
the Constellation program responded by reducing program reserves and
deferring development effort and test activities. These changes
resulted in a minimized flight test program that was so success
oriented there was no room for test failures. During the course of our
review, NASA test officials expressed multiple concerns about the test
approach the program was then pursuing. NASA test officials also
expressed concerns about the sufficiency of planned integrated system
flight testing. NASA was planning only one integrated system flight
test prior to the first crewed flight. Officials stated that while NASA
would have been able to address each of the programs' specific test
objectives during the planned flight tests, additional integrated
system flight tests could have provided the agency increased confidence
that the system performed as planned and allowed the agency the
opportunity to design and implement solutions to performance problems
without affecting the first crewed flight. According to agency
officials, any problems encountered during integrated system flight
testing could lead to significant delays in the first crewed flight.
Test officials were also concerned that the highly concurrent test
schedule had significant overlap between component qualification and
fabrication of flight hardware. This concurrency could have resulted in
schedule slips and increased costs if any component failed
qualification tests. Our past work indicates that it is unlikely that
the program will complete its test program without encountering
developmental problems or test failures. The discovery of problems in
complex products is a normal part of any development process, and
testing is perhaps the most effective tool for discovering such
problems. According to the Constellation program manager, the test plan
strategy for the Constellation program is currently evolving as the
program reshapes its acquisition strategy to defer all work on lunar
content beyond the March 2015 first crewed flight. The test strategy is
likely to continue to evolve until the Constellation program's Systems
Integration Plan[Footnote 18] is finalized when the project enters the
implementation phase.
Changing Acquisition Strategy:
In response to technical challenges and cost and funding issues, NASA
is changing the Orion project acquisition strategy. In December 2008,
NASA determined that the current Constellation program was high risk
and unachievable within the current budget and schedule. To increase
its level of confidence in the Constellation program baseline NASA
delayed the first crewed flight from September 2014 to March 2015 and
according to officials, adopted a two-phased approach to developing the
Orion vehicle. NASA's original strategy for the Orion project was to
develop one vehicle capable of supporting both ISS and lunar missions.
According to the Constellation program manager, the Constellation
program is currently deferring work on Orion lunar content beyond 2015
to focus its efforts on developing a vehicle that can fly the ISS
mission. This phased approach, however, could require two qualification
programs for the Orion vehicle--one pre-2015 Orion qualification
program for ISS mission requirements and a second post-2015 Orion
qualification program for lunar mission requirements.
According to the program manager, the knowledge gained from flying the
initial Orion to the ISS will inform the design of the lunar vehicle.
The Constellation program manager also told us that NASA is unwilling
to further trade schedule in order to reduce risk. He asserted that
delaying the schedule is an inefficient means of mitigating risk
because of the high costs of maintaining fixed assets and contractor
staff.
Though these changes to overarching requirements are likely to increase
the confidence level associated with the March 2015 first crewed
flight, they do not guarantee that the program will conduct a
successful first crewed flight in March 2015. For example, in May 2009
the program announced its plan to reduce the number of crew for the ISS
mission from six to four. According to project officials, NASA does not
plan to finalize the preliminary design of the four-crew ISS
configuration until after the Orion preliminary design review. Revising
the ISS design for four crew and optimizing the area freed up by
removing two crew for the ISS mission will entail additional effort on
the part of the Orion design team. Furthermore, as noted above, both
the Ares I and Orion projects continue to face technical and design
challenges that will require significant time, money, and effort to
resolve irrespective of the decision to defer lunar requirements. While
deferring the lunar requirement is likely to relieve pressure on
Orion's mass margins allowing increased flexibility to deal with some
Orion-specific technical challenges, the lunar requirement has little
bearing on many of the Ares I technical challenges discussed above.
Furthermore, it is unclear how deferring the lunar requirement will
affect the technical challenges faced in the development of the Orion
launch abort system and in dealing with vibroacoustics.
Conclusion:
NASA's human spaceflight program is at a crossroads. Efforts to
establish a sound business case for Constellation's Ares I and Orion
projects are complicated by (1) an aggressive schedule, (2) significant
technical and design challenges, (3) funding issues and cost increases,
and (4) an evolving acquisition strategy that continues to change Orion
project requirements. Human spaceflight development programs are
complex and difficult by nature and NASA's previous attempts to build
new transportation systems have failed in part because they were
focused on advancing technologies and designs without resources--
primarily time and money--to adequately support those efforts. While
the current program, Constellation, was originally structured to rely
on heritage systems and thus avoid problems seen in previous programs,
the failure to establish a sound business case has placed the program
in a poor risk posture to proceed into implementation as planned in
2010. In the past, NASA has recognized these shortfalls and has delayed
design reviews for both the Ares I and Orion vehicles in an effort to
gain the knowledge needed for a sound business case. NASA's current
approach, however, is based on changing requirements to increase
confidence in meeting the schedule. Nevertheless, the need to establish
a sound business case, wherein resources match requirements and a
knowledge-based acquisition strategy drives development efforts, is
paramount to any successful program outcome. Until the Constellation
program has a sound business case in hand, it remains doubtful that
NASA will be able to reliably estimate cost and schedule to complete
the program.
Meanwhile, the new Administration is conducting an independent review
of NASA's human spaceflight activities, with the potential for
recommendations of broad changes to the agency's approach toward future
efforts. While the fact that the review is taking place does not
guarantee wholesale changes to the current approach, it does implicitly
recognize the challenges facing the Constellation program. We believe
this review is appropriate as it presents an opportunity to reassess
both requirements and resources for Constellation as well as
alternative ways for meeting requirements.
Recommendations:
Regardless of NASA's final plans for moving forward, the agency faces
daunting challenges developing human rated spacecraft for use after the
Space Shuttle is retired, and it is important that the agency lay out
an acquisition strategy grounded in knowledge-based principles that is
executable with acceptable levels of risk within the program's
available budget. As NASA addresses the findings and recommendations of
the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee, we recommend
that the new NASA Administrator direct the Constellation program, or
its successor, to develop a sound business case--supported by firm
requirements, mature technologies, a preliminary design, a realistic
cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time--before proceeding into
implementation, and, if necessary, delay the preliminary design review
until a sound business case demonstrating the program's readiness to
move forward into implementation is in hand.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report (see appendix II), NASA
concurred with our recommendation. NASA acknowledged that, while
substantial work has been completed, the Constellation program faces
knowledge gaps concerning requirements, technologies, funding,
schedule, and other resources. NASA stated that it is working to close
these gaps before committing to significant, long-term investments in
the Constellation program. NASA stated that the Constellation program
manager is required to demonstrate at the preliminary design review
that the program and its projects meet all system requirements with
acceptable risk and within cost and schedule constraints, and that the
program has established a sound business case for proceeding into the
implementation phase. At this point, the NASA Agency Program Management
Council will review the Constellation program and determine the
program's readiness to proceed into the implementation phase and begin
detailed design. Separately, NASA provided technical comments, which
have been addressed in the report, as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you announce its contents earlier,
we will not distribute this report further until 30 days from its date.
At that time, we will send copies to NASA's Administrator and
interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or at
ChaplainC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. GAO staff that made key contributions to this report are listed
in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Cristina T. Chaplain:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess NASA's progress toward establishing a sound business case for
the Ares I and Orion projects and identify key technical challenges
NASA faces in developing the Ares I Crew Launch and the Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicles, we obtained and analyzed Constellation plans and
schedules, risk mitigation information, and contract performance data
relative to the standards in our knowledge-based acquisition practices
including program and project plans, contracts, schedules, risk
assessments, funding profile, budget documentation, earned value
reports, and the results of NASA's assessments of the program. We
interviewed and received briefings from officials associated with the
Constellation program office, including Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate officials at NASA headquarters in Washington, D.C.; Orion
project and Constellation program officials at the Johnson Space Center
in Houston, Texas; and, Ares I and J-2X officials at the Marshall Space
Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, regarding the program and
projects' risk areas and test strategy, technical challenges, the
status of requirements, acquisition strategy and the status of awarded
contracts.
We also conducted interviews and received briefings from NASA
contractors on heritage hardware and design changes, and top risks and
testing strategy, for the J-2X engine, Ares I First Stage, Ares I Upper
Stage, Launch Abort System, and Orion vehicle. We analyzed risk
documented through the Constellation program's Integrated Risk
Management Application and followed up with project officials for
clarification and updates to these risks. We also attended the
Constellation Program's Quarterly Risk Review at the Johnson Space
Center.
In addition, we interviewed Constellation program officials from
Johnson Space Center about program risks, requirements, and the impact
of budget reductions. We also spoke with NASA headquarters officials
from the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate's Resources Management
Office in Washington, D.C., to gain insight into the program's top
risks and the basis for fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010
budget requests as well as the funding strategy employed by the
Constellation program. Furthermore, we reviewed NASA's program and
project management directives and systems engineering directives. Our
review and analysis of these documents focused on requirements and
goals set for spaceflight systems. We compared examples of the centers'
implementation of the directives and specific criteria included in
these directives with our best practices work on system acquisition.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2008 through August
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Office of the Administrator:
Washington, DC 20546-0001:
August 10, 2009:
Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Chaplain:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) appreciates
the opportunity to review and comment on your draft report entitled,
"NASA: Constellation Program Lacks a Sound Business Case" (GAO-09-844).
Recommendation: "As NASA addresses the findings and recommendations of
the Review of the U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee, we recommend
that the new NASA Administrator direct the Constellation Program, or
its successor, to develop a sound business case--supported by firm
requirements, mature technologies, a preliminary design, a realistic
cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time-before proceeding into
implementation, and, if necessary, delay the preliminary design review
until a sound business case demonstrating the project's readiness to
move forward into implementation is in hand."
Response: NASA concurs with this recommendation. NASA's acquisition
approach is consistent with GAO's knowledge-based recommendation from
previous audits and recognition that knowledge replaces risk over time.
NASA fully recognizes the importance of investing its resources wisely
and maintaining stakeholder confidence in its performance. NASA has the
appropriate level of knowledge to proceed with its knowledge and
performance-based acquisition plan and has executed all acquisitions
using this knowledge base. NASA diligently continues to invest
significant time and resources in the formulation phase of the
Constellation Program in order to develop the confidence necessary to
commit to a long-term design and development effort and enter into the
implementation phase at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) milestone
of the program life cycle. The PDR is the point when the formulation
phase will have been completed and when a formal baseline is approved
and authorization to enter the implementation phase is given.
Many of the Constellation Program contracts are phased to contract
first for the Design, Development Test & Evaluation (DDT&E) phase and
later for the Production phase where the design is fully mature. This
acquisition approach allows NASA to utilize the contractor's knowledge
during the DDT&E contracting phase to develop a set of validated
requirements, including component specifications and mature
technologies by the project and program PDRs, thus enabling an informed
firm cost, schedule, and risk assessment for the follow-on development
activities. It is not until after the program PDR and the independent
review of the program based on an integrated cost, schedule, and
technical risk that the Agency will commit to any business case, at
which point it will transition into the implementation phase. Until PDR
is reached, refinement of requirements to achieve an optimal system
solution will continue. These requirement enhancements and
modifications are a natural result of the trade decisions in the
formulation phase for any major spaceflight vehicle. Consequently, NASA
had anticipated that it would need to modify the original Orion and
Ares I contracts at several points to incorporate refined requirements
and advanced technologies that would lead to an updated configuration.
NASA had already budgeted for the anticipated cost of these contract
changes within the Constellation Program.
Human spaceflight is not an easy task nor is the process of building
human spaceflight vehicles. Technical challenges will be experienced
during development of a highly complex program such as the
Constellation Program. That is why NASA has a rigorous risk-management
process that identifies technical challenges early in the process and
aggressively works solutions. All known technical risks have been
identified and have active mitigation plans in place. NASA is executing
a well-established plan to ensure that each project reaches the
appropriate level of maturity for its milestones before proceeding
further. The PDR is the final step of the initial design process
(formulation phase), and thus it is a crucial milestone during which
the overall program verifies that the preliminary design can meet all
requirements within acceptable risk limits and within cost and schedule
constraints. Following PDR, the Constellation Program Manager is
required to demonstrate that the program and its projects meet all
system requirements with acceptable risk and within cost and schedule
constraints, and that it has established a sound business case to
proceed into the implementation phase after PDR. The Agency Program
Management Council will review the Constellation Program at this key
juncture, Key Decision Point II (KDP-II), and determine readiness for
the program to proceed into the implementation phase. As such, NASA
will continue to ensure that each project within the Constellation
Program reaches the appropriate level of maturity on each milestone
before proceeding further along the design life cycle.
NASA's aggressive internal goal for Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) of Orion and Ares I is often confused with NASA's commitment to
achieve IOC no later than March 2015. NASA maintains the goal of
meeting IOC by March 2015. NASA has consistently stated that the
ability to meet internal schedule goals was contingent upon sufficient
funding profiles and adequate time to achieve technical milestones.
NASA had been working toward an aggressive internal goal to reach IOC
by September 2013. The Agency had established this more aggressive goal
in order to fly Orion/Ares I as soon as possible following the
Shuttle's retirement in 2010. As such, NASA aligned Constellation
contracts and internal milestones against this more aggressive date in
order to incentivize an earlier IOC. In August 2008, NASA announced
that, based on budget projections at that time, the Agency could no
longer achieve its 2013 goal. The rephasing of internal goals is not
unusual for a complex development program that is still in the
formulation phase as work matures and schedules and resources are
aligned.
As part of the FY 2010 budget, and at the direction of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, NASA has initiated an independent review
of human spaceflight activities to ensure that the Nation is pursuing
the best solution for future human spaceflight - one that is safe,
innovative, sustainable and affordable. The results of the committee
review will support an Administration decision on how best to proceed
with NASA's human spaceflight programs. NASA will fully support the
review, and the Agency looks forward to working closely with the
Administration during and after this process.
In summary, NASA concurs with the GAO recommendation that the
Constellation Program "...develop a sound business case - supported by
firm requirements, mature technologies, a preliminary design, a
realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time--before
proceeding to implementation...." The Agency is working toward closing
knowledge gaps about the Constellation Program requirements,
technologies, funding, schedule, and other resources so that it can be
positioned to succeed when decisions are made to commit to significant,
long-term investments in the Constellation Program. Substantial work in
defining the program and its projects' requirements, cost, and schedule
estimates has been completed, and this work will continue as the
program progresses through its formulation phase. The Constellation
Program Manager is required to demonstrate that the program and its
projects meet all system requirements with acceptable risk and within
cost and schedule constraints and that it has established a sound
business case to proceed into the implementation phase after PDR. The
Agency Program Management Council will review the Constellation Program
at this key juncture, Key Decision Point II (KDP-II), and determine
readiness for the program to proceed into the implementation phase.
Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Lori B. Garver:
Deputy Administrator:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Cristina Chaplain (202)512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Jim Morrison, Assistant
Director; Jessica M. Berkholtz; Greg Campbell; Jennifer K. Echard;
Nathaniel J. Taylor; John S. Warren Jr.; and Alyssa Weir made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-306SP]. Washington, D.C.: March 2,
2009.
NASA: Agency Faces Challenges Defining Scope and Costs of Space Shuttle
Transition and Retirement. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1096]. Washington, D.C.: September
30, 2008.
NASA: Ares I and Orion Project Risks and Key Indicators to Measure
Progress. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-186T].
Washington, D.C.: April 3, 2008.
NASA: Agency Has Taken Steps Toward Making Sound Investment Decisions
for Ares I but Still Faces Challenging Knowledge Gaps. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-51]. Washington, D.C.: October 31,
2007.
NASA: Issues Surrounding the Transition from the Space Shuttle to the
Next Generation of Human Space Flight Systems. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-595T]. Washington, D.C.: March 28,
2007.
NASA: Long-Term Commitment to and Investment in Space Exploration
Program Requires More Knowledge. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-817R]. Washington, D.C.: July 17,
2006.
NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework Could Lead
to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-218]. Washington, D.C.: December 21,
2005.
Defense Space Activities: Continuation of Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle Program's Progress to Date Subject to Some Uncertainty.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-778R]. Washington, D.C.:
June 24, 2004.
Best Practices: Using a Knowledge-Based Approach to Improve Weapon
Acquisition. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-386SP].
Washington, D.C.: January 2004.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] In 2004, President George W. Bush established a new space
exploration policy--A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President's
Vision for U.S. Space Exploration (Vision)--which calls for the
retirement of the space shuttle and development of a new family of
exploration systems to facilitate a return of humans to the moon and
eventual human spaceflight to Mars. NASA estimates that implementing
this policy will cost nearly $230 billion through 2025. This estimate
includes programs such as the Commercial Crew and Cargo program that
are separate from the Constellation program.
[2] The estimate includes development of all Constellation projects
including the Ares V and the Altair Lunar Lander. Up to $49 billion is
estimated to be spent on the Ares I and Orion projects.
[3] GAO, NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework
Could Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-218] (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 21, 2005)
[4] NASA, Constellation Acceleration Study Report (Dec. 18, 2008).
[5] GAO, NASA: Long-Term Commitment to and Investment in Space
Exploration Program Requires More Knowledge. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-817R] (Washington, D.C.: July 17,
2006).
[6] GAO, NASA: Agency Has Taken Steps Toward Making Sound Investment
Decisions for Ares I but Still Faces Challenging Knowledge Gaps.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-51] (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 31, 2007).
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-218]; [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-817R]; and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-51].
[8] NASA delayed the Orion preliminary design review in part to allow
time for another design analysis cycle aimed primarily at improving
performance against safety requirements for the International Space
Station Mission.
[9] NASA is currently using IRMA as a tool for implementing continuous
risk management within the Constellation program. IRMA identifies and
documents risks, categorizes risks--as high, medium, and low based on
both the likelihood of an undesirable event as well as the consequences
of that event to the project--and tracks performance against mitigation
plans.
[10] The technical challenges presented here do not capture all of the
risks, technical or programmatic, facing the Constellation program. The
technical challenges presented here represent our compiled summary of
the challenges identified by, and discussed with, Ares I and Orion
project management during the time frames of our review.
[11] An autoclave uses a combination of heat and pressure to bond
dissimilar materials.
[12] The fairings are load-bearing in that they support the weight of
the Orion capsule and service module.
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-51].
[14] As of June 9, 2009.
[15] Likelihood scores are assessments of the probability that a risk
will actually occur.
[16] We evaluated the contractor cost reporting data using best
practice techniques found in the GAO Cost Assessment Guide, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP], Cost Estimating and Assessment
Guide (March 2009).
[17] The NASA Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 1843.7005(a)
states that NASA's goal is to definitize contract modifications within
180 days from date of issuance.
[18] The System Integration Plan will identify all testing and
verification events needed to ensure the systems meet requirements.
[End of section]
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