NASA
Medium Launch Transition Strategy Leverages Ongoing Investments but Is Not Without Risk Gao ID: GAO-11-107 November 22, 2010The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has long relied on the Delta II medium class launch vehicle to launch science missions. Delta II, however, is no longer in production, and no other vehicle in the relative cost and performance range is currently certified for NASA use. Thus, NASA faces a potential gap in the availability of medium class launch vehicles that could cause design challenges, delays, or funding issues. GAO was asked to assess (1) NASA's and the Delta II contractor's, steps to ensure resources (budget, workforce, and facilities) are available to support safe Delta II operations through the last planned NASA flight in 2011; (2) NASA's plans and contingencies for ensuring a smooth transition from current small and medium class launch vehicles to other launch vehicles for future science missions; (3) the risks associated with NASA's planned approach to fill the medium launch capability gap; and (4) technical and programmatic implications to science missions if NASA commits to new launch vehicles before they are certified and proven. GAO identified and assessed transition plans and mitigation activities and interviewed responsible NASA and government officials.
NASA's Launch Services Program (LSP) is taking steps to address risks and ensure the success of the last planned Delta II launched missions through a combination of specific government approvals and targeted government insight into contractor activities and designs. For example, LSP uses government systems engineers with technical expertise to review or repeat the contractors' engineering analyses. This is a key factor in high launch success rates. From 1990 through 2009, LSP has achieved a 98 percent launch success rate. LSP is conducting additional reviews of launch vehicle processing to mitigate risk associated with the remaining Delta II flights. LSP has also identified several specific areas of concern with the remaining Delta II flights--including contractor workforce expertise, postproduction subcontractor support, spare parts, and launch pads--and is taking steps where possible to mitigate risks and ensure the success of the remaining missions. NASA plans to leverage ongoing investments to acquire a new medium launch capability for science missions in the relative cost and performance range of the Delta II. The agency expects to eventually certify the vehicles being developed for space station resupply for use by NASA science missions. NASA has been in coordination with agency and contractor officials responsible for these efforts. Further, the agency revised its policy to allow for faster certification of new providers. Due to an active small class launch vehicle market and NASA's relative low need for vehicles in this class, the agency has no plans to develop additional small class launch vehicles. Rather, the agency will acquire these services through the NASA Launch Services II Contract. NASA's plan has inherent risks that need to be mitigated. NASA has not developed detailed estimates of the time and money required to resolve technical issues likely to arise during the launch vehicle certification process. As these costs are currently unknown, according to Science Mission Directorate officials, NASA has not yet budgeted for them. Further, both space station resupply vehicles have experienced delays and more delays are likely as launch vehicle development is an inherently risky endeavor. Neither potential provider currently has the facilities needed to launch the majority of NASA earth science missions requiring a medium capability. NASA medium class science missions that are approaching their preliminary design review face uncertainties related to committing to as yet uncertified and unproven launch vehicles. Launch vehicle decisions for these missions will be made before new vehicles are certified. Because changing the launch vehicle of a science mission after its preliminary design review is likely to lead to significant cost growth and schedule delays, NASA's intention is to select a launch vehicle and accept the impacts that any delays in the certification process could have to the cost and schedule of the science mission. NASA officials also indicated that future science missions might be asked to accommodate multiple launch vehicle possibilities if the availability of future vehicles is delayed. GAO recommends that NASA perform a detailed cost estimate based on knowledge gained during launch vehicle certification and adequately budget for potential additional costs. NASA concurred.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Cristina T. Chaplain Team: Government Accountability Office: Acquisition and Sourcing Management Phone: (202) 512-4859GAO-11-107, NASA: Medium Launch Transition Strategy Leverages Ongoing Investments but Is Not Without Risk
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Science and Technology, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2010:
NASA:
Medium Launch Transition Strategy Leverages Ongoing Investments but Is
Not Without Risk:
GAO-11-107:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-107, a report to the Chairman, Committee on
Science and Technology, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has long
relied on the Delta II medium class launch vehicle to launch science
missions. Delta II, however, is no longer in production, and no other
vehicle in the relative cost and performance range is currently
certified for NASA use. Thus, NASA faces a potential gap in the
availability of medium class launch vehicles that could cause design
challenges, delays, or funding issues.
GAO was asked to assess (1) NASA‘s and the Delta II contractor‘s,
steps to ensure resources (budget, workforce, and facilities) are
available to support safe Delta II operations through the last planned
NASA flight in 2011; (2) NASA's plans and contingencies for ensuring a
smooth transition from current small and medium class launch vehicles
to other launch vehicles for future science missions; (3) the risks
associated with NASA‘s planned approach to fill the medium launch
capability gap; and (4) technical and programmatic implications to
science missions if NASA commits to new launch vehicles before they
are certified and proven. GAO identified and assessed transition plans
and mitigation activities and interviewed responsible NASA and
government officials.
What GAO Found:
NASA‘s Launch Services Program (LSP) is taking steps to address risks
and ensure the success of the last planned Delta II launched missions
through a combination of specific government approvals and targeted
government insight into contractor activities and designs. For
example, LSP uses government systems engineers with technical
expertise to review or repeat the contractors‘ engineering analyses.
This is a key factor in high launch success rates. From 1990 through
2009, LSP has achieved a 98 percent launch success rate. LSP is
conducting additional reviews of launch vehicle processing to mitigate
risk associated with the remaining Delta II flights. LSP has also
identified several specific areas of concern with the remaining Delta
II flights”including contractor workforce expertise, postproduction
subcontractor support, spare parts, and launch pads”and is taking
steps where possible to mitigate risks and ensure the success of the
remaining missions.
NASA plans to leverage ongoing investments to acquire a new medium
launch capability for science missions in the relative cost and
performance range of the Delta II. The agency expects to eventually
certify the vehicles being developed for space station resupply for
use by NASA science missions. NASA has been in coordination with
agency and contractor officials responsible for these efforts.
Further, the agency revised its policy to allow for faster
certification of new providers. Due to an active small class launch
vehicle market and NASA‘s relative low need for vehicles in this
class, the agency has no plans to develop additional small class
launch vehicles. Rather, the agency will acquire these services
through the NASA Launch Services II Contract.
NASA‘s plan has inherent risks that need to be mitigated. NASA has not
developed detailed estimates of the time and money required to resolve
technical issues likely to arise during the launch vehicle
certification process. As these costs are currently unknown, according
to Science Mission Directorate officials, NASA has not yet budgeted
for them. Further, both space station resupply vehicles have
experienced delays and more delays are likely as launch vehicle
development is an inherently risky endeavor. Neither potential
provider currently has the facilities needed to launch the majority of
NASA earth science missions requiring a medium capability.
NASA medium class science missions that are approaching their
preliminary design review face uncertainties related to committing to
as yet uncertified and unproven launch vehicles. Launch vehicle
decisions for these missions will be made before new vehicles are
certified. Because changing the launch vehicle of a science mission
after its preliminary design review is likely to lead to significant
cost growth and schedule delays, NASA‘s intention is to select a
launch vehicle and accept the impacts that any delays in the
certification process could have to the cost and schedule of the
science mission. NASA officials also indicated that future science
missions might be asked to accommodate multiple launch vehicle
possibilities if the availability of future vehicles is delayed.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that NASA perform a detailed cost estimate based on
knowledge gained during launch vehicle certification and adequately
budget for potential additional costs. NASA concurred.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-107] or key
components. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202)
512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
NASA Is Taking Steps to Address Risk and Ensure Success of Remaining
Delta II Missions:
NASA Plans to Leverage Falcon 9 and Taurus II Investments to Fill
Medium Class Capability Gap While Its Approach for Small Class
Vehicles Remains Unchanged:
NASA Plan to Acquire Future Medium Class Launch Vehicles Includes
Inherent Risk:
Science Missions in Development Face Uncertainties Related to
Committing to Launch Vehicles before They Are Certified and Proven:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Criteria for NASA Science Payload Risk Classification for
Certified Launch Vehicles:
Table 2: Summary of Category 2 and 3 Certification Alternatives:
Figures:
Figure 1: Delta II Launch:
Figure 2: Launch Vehicles and Capability:
Figure 3: LSP Relationships with Key NASA Offices Involved in
Developing New Commercial Launch Vehicles:
Figure 4: RP-1 Fuel Tank at Space Launch Complex 17B:
Figure 5: Certification Time Line for Falcon 9 Based on Potential
Launch Services Task Order Award:
Figure 6: Launch Vehicle Decision Dates (or Preliminary Design Review
Dates) and Planned Launch Dates for Missions Potentially Needing
Medium Launch Capability Vehicles:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 22, 2010:
The Honorable Bart Gordon:
Chairman:
Committee on Science and Technology:
U.S. House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) relies on the
U.S. commercial market to provide launch services for its space and
Earth science missions. Over the past decade, NASA has launched 60
percent of its science missions on the Delta II medium class launch
vehicle.[Footnote 1] The United States Air Force, which had previously
shared Delta II infrastructure costs with NASA, concluded its use of
United Launch Alliance's Delta II launch vehicle in August 2009 with
the launch of the last in a series of eight modernized global
positioning satellites.[Footnote 2] NASA now bears the Delta II
infrastructure costs and plans to continue to use the Delta II as a
launch vehicle for three remaining science missions--Aquarius, Gravity
Recovery and Interior Laboratory, and National Polar-orbiting
Operational Satellite System Preparatory Project--the last of which is
currently scheduled to be launched in October 2011. NASA officials
indicate that these costs are currently over $45 million a year and
could increase to over $60 million per year, should the launches be
delayed beyond 2012. Further, NASA contends that continuing to use the
Delta II beyond the last projected launch in 2011 would be a
significant expense beyond NASA's budget.
NASA projects that about 40 percent of science missions through 2020
could be launched on medium class launch vehicles depending on budget
and launch vehicle availability. In addition, no U.S. company is
actively developing a new medium class launch vehicle with all the
capabilities required for science missions. NASA science spacecraft
often carry sensitive instruments that require unique interfaces and
special processing and handling. Although NASA has a continuing need
for medium class launch vehicles for science missions, the agency
maintains that its need is insufficient to sustain the Delta II
program at prices traditionally paid. Therefore, NASA faces a
potential gap in the availability of medium class launch vehicles for
science missions as the Delta II goes out of operation. Until this gap
is closed, NASA science missions may face design challenges or delays
due to uncertainties with the missions' launch vehicle.
Based on your request, we assessed (1) NASA's and United Launch
Alliance's steps to ensure resources (budget, workforce, and
facilities) are available to support safe Delta II operations through
the last planned NASA flight; (2) NASA's plans and contingencies for
ensuring a smooth transition from current small and medium class
launch vehicles to other launch vehicles for future science missions;
(3) the risks associated with NASA's planned approach to fill the
medium launch capability gap; and (4) technical and programmatic
implications to science missions if NASA commits to new launch
vehicles before they are certified and proven.
To conduct our work, we interviewed NASA and United Launch Alliance
officials and obtained, reviewed, and discussed their launch vehicle
transition plans. We compared NASA's transition strategy to NASA and
national space policies. We reviewed United Launch Alliance's process
for certifying its processing and manufacturing workforce through the
last NASA Delta II flight. We interviewed officials from Orbital
Sciences Corporation (Orbital) and Space Exploration Technologies
(SpaceX) to discuss their plans and schedules for certifying their
launch vehicles that are currently being designed to support the
International Space Station's Commercial Resupply Services contract
for future medium class science missions. We also obtained and
reviewed launch manifests, market projections, cost estimates,
workforce estimates, and launch infrastructure maintenance needs from
agency and contractor officials. We examined implications of
committing to new launch vehicles before they are certified and proven
through discussions with NASA's Launch Services Program (LSP) and
Science Mission Directorate officials, including various science
mission project managers, and through review of NASA's systems
engineering policy. For our full scope and methodology, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2010 to November 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Delta II has historically been NASA's preferred medium class launch
vehicle for its science missions, launching 36, or nearly 60 percent,
of the agency's science missions since October 1998. Known as the
workhorse of the launch industry, the Delta II comprises a group of
expendable rockets that can be configured as two or three-stage
vehicles and with three, four, or nine strap-on solid rocket motors
depending on mission needs. The largest configuration is referred to
as Delta II Heavy.
Figure 1: Delta II Launch:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: NASA Kennedy Space Center (NASA-KSC).
[End of figure]
The Commercial Space Act of 1998, U.S. Space Transportation Policy,
and National Space Policy of the U.S. require NASA, to the maximum
practical extent, to acquire launch vehicles from the U.S. commercial
sector.[Footnote 3] NASA uses the NASA launch services contract to
acquire small, medium, and intermediate launch vehicles for NASA's
science, exploration, and operational missions. The launch services
contract is a multiple award indefinite delivery indefinite quantity
(IDIQ) task order contract.[Footnote 4] The original launch services
contract competition in 2000 resulted in the award of firm-fixed price
IDIQ launch services contracts with not-to-exceed prices[Footnote 5]
to Boeing Launch Services Incorporated (Boeing) and Lockheed Martin
Commercial Launch Services Incorporated (Lockheed), which later merged
to form United Launch Alliance, for the Delta and Atlas vehicles. In
2005, NASA awarded Orbital an IDIQ launch services contract for the
small class launch vehicles Taurus, Taurus XL, and Pegasus XL, and in
2008 NASA awarded SpaceX an IDIQ launch services contract for the
small class Falcon 1 and medium class Falcon 9 vehicles. Pursuant to
the "on-ramp" clause in the launch services contract, the original
solicitation remains open during the life of the contract to allow
launch services providers--including contractors who have already been
awarded an IDIQ launch services contract as well as other contractors--
to introduce launch vehicles or technologies that were not available
at the time of the award of the initial contract. See figure 2 for
launch vehicles discussed in detail in this report.
Figure 2: Launch Vehicles and Capability:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Name: Minotaur IV;
Model: N/A;
Contractor: Orbital;
Class: Small;
Maximum payload to escape Earth orbit: N/A.
Name: Delta II;
Model: 7325;
Contractor: United Launch Alliance;
Class: Medium;
Maximum payload to escape Earth orbit: 750 kg.
Name: Delta II Heavy;
Model: 7925H;
Contractor: United Launch Alliance;
Class: Medium;
Maximum payload to escape Earth orbit: 1400 kg.
Name: Taurus II;
Model: N/A;
Contractor: Orbital;
Class: Medium;
Maximum payload to escape Earth orbit: 1075 kg.
Name: Falcon 9;
Model: Block I;
Contractor: SpaceX;
Class: Medium;
Maximum payload to escape Earth orbit: 1975 kg.
Name: Atlas V;
Model: 401;
Contractor: United Launch Alliance;
Class: Intermediate;
Maximum payload to escape Earth orbit: 3035 kg.
Source: NASA.
Note: Atlas V 401 is the smallest Atlas V available.
[End of figure]
When NASA needs to acquire launch services for science missions,
NASA's LSP, which is responsible for acquiring launch vehicles for
NASA's Science Mission Directorate, issues a request for launch
service proposals. All contractors who have been awarded a launch
services contract at the time NASA issues the request for launch
service proposals are contractually obligated to submit a proposal,
unless the contracting officer waives the requirement. NASA considers
each proposal according to specified criteria and awards the task
order to the contractor who provides the best value in launch services
that meet NASA's requirements. The ordering period under the NASA
Launch Services I contract began in 2000 and expired in summer 2010.
On September 16, 2010, NASA announced the award of the NASA Launch
Services II contract which, like the NASA Launch Services I contract,
is a multiple award IDIQ contract. NASA selected four companies for
awards: Lockheed, Orbital, SpaceX, and United Launch Alliance, and
each contract has an ordering period through 2020. Orbital did not
respond to the contract solicitation for its Taurus II vehicle.
According to Orbital officials, it plans to take advantage of the on-
ramp clause of the NASA Launch Services contract in summer 2011.
According to LSP officials, competition between the launch service
providers is intended to lead the providers to sell NASA launch
services at prices less than the negotiated not-to-exceed prices. This
competition is limited in the medium and intermediate classes,
however, because of the small number of providers who have been
awarded a contract. For example, United Launch Alliance is currently
the only provider of intermediate class launch vehicles for Earth
orbit escape missions and Space X is currently the only provider of a
medium class launch vehicle on the Launch Services II contract.
While NASA's LSP is responsible for acquiring launch services for
science missions, several NASA offices are involved in the development
of the new commercial launch vehicles that NASA plans to use to
replace the Delta II. NASA's LSP is part of NASA's Space Operations
Mission Directorate but also supports, and has formal relationships
with, the International Space Station Cargo Crew Services program
within the Space Operations Mission Directorate and the Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services program within NASA's Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate. See figure 3.
Figure 3: LSP Relationships with Key NASA Offices Involved in
Developing New Commercial Launch Vehicles:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Science:
Science Missions:
Launch Services Program.
Space Operations:
Launch Services Program:
ISS Cargo Crew Services.
Exploration:
Commercial Orbital Transportation System:
Launch Services Program:
ISS Cargo Crew Services.
LSP responsible for acquiring launch services for Science Missions;
LSP supports ISS Cargo Crew Services and Commercial Orbital
Transportation.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
[End of figure]
NASA Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program: The
COTS program, which began in 2006, is intended to facilitate the
development and demonstration of end-to-end transportation systems,
including the development of launch and space vehicles, ground and
mission operations, and berthing with the International Space Station.
Under this program, NASA provides funding to SpaceX and Orbital
through funded Space Act Agreements to help offset International Space
Station-related developmental costs of the Falcon 9 and Taurus II,
respectively. [Footnote 6] Both the SpaceX vehicle, Falcon 9, and the
Orbital vehicle, Taurus II, are medium class launch vehicles similar
in capability to the Delta II.[Footnote 7] SpaceX plans three
demonstration flights under the COTS agreement, while Orbital plans
one such flight. Under these agreements NASA provides progress
payments, offsetting a portion of the developer's costs, when the
partners meet established milestones.
NASA's Cargo Crew Services program: The program is responsible for
acquiring commercial cargo resupply services for the International
Space Station through the Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) contract
with SpaceX and Orbital for flights beginning in calendar year 2011.
NASA has ordered 12 resupply missions to the International Space
Station from SpaceX, and 8 from Orbital. SpaceX and Orbital will use
their respective launch vehicles, Falcon 9 and Taurus II, to provide
these services.
NASA Is Taking Steps to Address Risk and Ensure Success of Remaining
Delta II Missions:
NASA's LSP is taking steps to address risk and ensure the success of
the last planned Delta II launched missions. LSP's risk mitigation
strategy uses established oversight mechanisms to address areas of
concern and to assure the success of all remaining Delta II launched
missions. LSP has issued task orders to United Launch Alliance for the
final three Delta II missions through the Launch Services I contract.
LSP exercises oversight of United Launch Alliance through a
combination of specific government approvals and targeted government
insight into contractor activities and designs.[Footnote 8] Specific
areas requiring government approval include spacecraft-to-launch
vehicle interface control documents, mission-unique hardware and
software design, top-level test plans, and requirements and success
criteria for integrated vehicle systems. The government also has
insight into baseline vehicle design, analyses, models and
configuration management, critical flight hardware pedigree and
postflight anomaly, and compliance evaluations.
An important element in LSP's oversight approach is the use of
engineering review boards to independently review and validate the
competency and adequacy of the contractor's technical efforts.
[Footnote 9] According to LSP officials, having government systems
engineers with the technical expertise to review or repeat the
contractors' engineering analyses is a key factor in high launch
success rates. From 1990 through 2009, NASA has achieved about a 98
percent launch success rate--compared to about a 69 percent success
rate for U.S. commercial launches without significant U.S. government
involvement.[Footnote 10] Likewise, United Launch Alliance officials
indicate that their company has never had a mission failure,
successfully launching 37 missions in a 36-month period from December
2006 through December 2009.[Footnote 11]
LSP is taking some additional actions to mitigate risk associated with
the remaining Delta II flights. Due to the current low flight rate of
the vehicle, LSP is conducting targeted field site closeout photo
reviews during vehicle processing for each remaining NASA Delta II
mission. According to agency officials, a closeout photo review
includes photographing system components as assembly and processing
steps are completed, and reviewing photographs to ensure assembly and
processing steps were conducted as required. NASA conducts similar
closeout photo reviews on the Pegasus and Taurus launch vehicle
missions for the same reason--low flight rates.
LSP has also identified several specific areas of concern with the
remaining Delta II flights--including contractor workforce expertise,
postproduction subcontractor support, spare parts, and launch pads--
that must be mitigated where possible to ensure the success of the
remaining missions.
Workforce Expertise: United Launch Alliance is taking steps to
mitigate the risk that workforce expertise may be lost. For example,
it actively tracks the certifications necessary for assembly,
integration, ground operations, processing, and launch of the Delta
II. United Launch Alliance also tracks the current certifications of
the Delta II workforce and provides training necessary to retain the
required certifications. To retain critical skills, United Launch
Alliance uses essentially the same workforce for the Delta II and
Delta IV, a vehicle that shares significant commonality. LSP officials
indicated that the LSP workforce would remain essentially unchanged
through the last missions as LSP is responsible not only for Delta II
but for all NASA science mission launches.
Postproduction Subcontractor Support: LSP is funding an approximately
$8 million per year, postproduction support relationship, managed by
United Launch Alliance, with key Delta II subcontractors. According to
agency officials, this will ensure that subcontractors with knowledge
and expertise needed to manufacture or repair subcomponents are
available if needed. United Launch Alliance has contracted with
Alliant Techsystems, Incorporated for solid rocket motors, Pratt &
Whitney Rocketdyne for the first stage engine, and Aerojet for the
second stage engine through fiscal year 2011.
Spare Parts: United Launch Alliance has implemented a process, which
has previously been used on the last flights of other vehicles, to
ensure key spare parts are available to support the final Delta II
missions. This process identifies irreplaceable or critical hardware
the unavailability, loss, or damage of which cannot be remedied
without serious impact to program cost, schedule, or technical
performance. United Launch Alliance has identified 28 such items for
Delta II and will mitigate the risk of spare parts availability by
either purchasing additional spares beyond planned needs or
implementing quality assurance activities to minimize risk. In
addition, LSP personnel have been assigned to assess and monitor Delta
II launch vehicle spare parts during the retirement of the Delta II.
United Launch Alliance also indicated the five currently unsold Delta
II vehicles in the heavy configuration could be cannibalized for
parts, if needed, for the remaining NASA Delta II missions.
Launch Pads: NASA has assumed responsibility for the operation and
maintenance of the Delta II launch pads--Space Launch Complexes 17A
and 17B at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and Space Launch Complex 2
at Vandenberg Air Force Base--from the Air Force. NASA will perform
continuing periodic maintenance through the final planned NASA Delta
II flights from Space Launch Complex 17B in September 2011 and Space
Launch Complex 2 in June and October 2011. The cost of ongoing
operation and maintenance is included in the launch services contracts
between LSP and United Launch Alliance. In some instances, however,
efforts beyond continuing maintenance are necessary. For instance,
NASA is recertifying the fuel storage and water deluge systems at
Space Launch Complex 17B.[Footnote 12] See figure 4.
Figure 4: RP-1 Fuel Tank at Space Launch Complex 17B:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
Note: RP-1 fuel container at SLC 17B with insulation removed from
welds so they can be inspected as part of recertifying fuel storage.
[End of figure]
NASA officials estimate this effort will cost about $500,000 beyond
normal operation and maintenance costs. NASA has also placed Space
Launch Complex 17A in a "safe and secure" mode so that it can be
cannibalized for spare parts to support remaining launches, if needed.
Space Launch Complex 2 at Vandenberg Air Force Base has been
undergoing more extensive renovations over the past few years to
reduce risk, including the replacement of hydraulic systems and
repairs to the lightning protection and water deluge systems. The
renovation projects at Space Launch Complex 2 cost approximately $18
million and were funded by LSP.
NASA Plans to Leverage Falcon 9 and Taurus II Investments to Fill
Medium Class Capability Gap While Its Approach for Small Class
Vehicles Remains Unchanged:
NASA plans to leverage ongoing investments in the COTS and CRS
vehicles--Falcon 9 and Taurus II--to acquire a new medium launch
capability for science missions in the relative cost and performance
range of the Delta II.[Footnote 13] LSP has been coordinating with
NASA and contractor officials responsible for these efforts. Further,
NASA revised its policy directive on launch vehicle
certification[Footnote 14] to allow the providers to certify their
vehicles more quickly than would have been possible under the previous
policy. Due to an active small class launch vehicle market and NASA's
relative low need for vehicles in this class, the agency has no
immediate plans to develop additional small class launch vehicles.
Rather, the agency will acquire small class launch services using the
NASA Launch Services II contract.
NASA Plans to Leverage Falcon 9 and Taurus II Investments to Fill
Medium Class Capability Gap:
NASA's plan to transition from Delta II to other medium class launch
providers is to eventually certify the vehicles being developed for
space station resupply for use by NASA science missions. This plan
originated from a series of studies beginning in 2006 which examined
launch market conditions and assessed whether the agency should
continue to fly Delta II beyond the then-current Delta II manifest.
These studies found that NASA should phase out Delta II, begin working
with alternative launch providers to acquire a new medium class launch
vehicle, and use vehicles--such as Atlas V or Delta IV--as an interim
solution until alternative launch providers are ready. These studies
culminated in an August 2009 report to Congress which laid out NASA's
plans for transitioning to future small and medium class launch
vehicles and discussed contingencies, each of which could involve
additional time or funding, should the preferred solution not come to
fruition as planned.[Footnote 15] For example, NASA could:
* Continue indefinitely to launch medium class science missions on the
Atlas V, which is capable of launching payloads with more size and
mass than Falcon 9 or Taurus II but is about twice as expensive.
* Launch multiple missions simultaneously on larger launch vehicles,
which is a viable option in some instances, but according to NASA is
difficult to coordinate due to specific factors such as orbit,
destination, and development and launch schedule.
* Use the five remaining Delta II heavy configuration vehicles.
Considering the additional infrastructure and postproduction support
costs that Delta II would require, however, its costs could exceed
that of the Atlas V and further it cannot easily be used for most
earth science missions because of launch facility constraints.
* Use foreign launch vehicles or decommissioned excess Department of
Defense (DOD) intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as Minotaur,
as space transportation vehicles. The use of such vehicles, however,
is governed by law and policy and would require time to be approved.
NASA believes that its preferred approach would leverage ongoing NASA
investments in Falcon 9 and Taurus II made by the COTS and CRS
programs and allow it to negotiate discounted prices for increased
quantities of a common launch vehicle.
NASA's Launch Services Program Involvement in COTS and CRS Is Intended
to Smooth Transition:
LSP's involvement in the COTS and CRS efforts is intended, in part, to
smooth NASA's transition to future medium class launch vehicles for
science missions by giving LSP detailed, firsthand technical knowledge
of the candidate vehicles. NASA's LSP has been in coordination with
Orbital, SpaceX, and NASA's COTS and CRS programs for several years.
For example, in addition to the funded Space Act Agreements under the
COTS program, LSP entered into a nonreimbursable Space Act Agreement
[Footnote 16] with Orbital for technical insight into the development
and design of the Taurus II in 2008. According to LSP officials, this
partnership is expected to result in the agency gaining a better
understanding of the launch vehicle, which will assist LSP when they
begin the certification process for science missions and will allow
Orbital access to NASA expertise for review of launch vehicle
development documentation and independent assessments of various
Taurus II systems and performance. This relationship has already
provided benefits. For example, through this relationship, LSP
persuaded Orbital to include additional engine testing into the Taurus
II test strategy that will ultimately contribute to the certification
effort for science missions. LSP does not have such an agreement in
place with SpaceX; however, LSP may gain insight into SpaceX's design
for Falcon 9 that should provide similar benefits because SpaceX was
awarded a NASA Launch Services contract in 2008 and 2010. SpaceX was
awarded a Launch Services I and II contract, but NASA has not awarded
SpaceX any task orders under those contracts. If NASA had awarded
SpaceX a task order, its technical insight to Falcon 9 would be
greater.
In 2007, LSP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the
Commercial Crew and Cargo Program Office which manages the COTS
demonstration missions. Although LSP is not responsible for mission
success, under this agreement it serves in a consulting role. For
example, LSP is a member of the COTS advisory team and provides
technical guidance, mentoring, and lessons learned relating to launch
system development. LSP also attends technical meetings, such as
preliminary design reviews, as requested.
LSP also has a Memorandum of Agreement in place with the International
Space Station program to support the CRS missions. Under the terms of
this agreement, LSP will perform nonrecurring and limited recurring
technical assessments and make recommendations for specific launch
vehicle hardware, software, and analyses. While LSP is not responsible
for mission success, it will perform launch vehicle mission and fleet
risk assessments, focusing on systems that have been historical causes
of mission failure. The assessments that LSP will conduct include:
* a postflight data review for each flight;
* a mission-unique design review for the first flight of each launch
vehicle configuration;
* a "test like you fly" hardware qualification assessment for launch
vehicle propulsion, flight controls, and separation systems; and:
* an assessment of the launch vehicles' guidance, navigation, and
control design and an assessment of flight software and recurring
software development practices.
Some of these assessments, such as the "test like you fly" hardware
qualification assessment, could be applicable to the eventual
certification process for science missions and LSP technical oversight
of new launch providers, as long as the same launch vehicle
configuration is used. This could shorten the length of time required
to certify the vehicles for science missions.
The formal certification process for each launch vehicle will commence
after LSP awards a task order to the contractor for a science mission.
Under the Launch Services II contract, a vehicle cannot be considered
for a launch service task order for a science mission until it has had
a successful first flight. Falcon 9 had a successful first flight in
June 2010, but has not been awarded a science mission. The Taurus II's
first flight will be no sooner than September 2011. According to NASA,
on average it takes about 3 years once a task order is awarded to
complete certification. Therefore, if Falcon 9 is awarded one of the
first science missions under the Launch Services II contract, assuming
only limited technical challenges and only minor changes are needed
for certification, NASA could certify Falcon 9 to category 2 by mid
2013 and to category 3 by late 2013 or early 2014.[Footnote 17]
According to NASA, if resources are available, LSP may proactively
begin the formal certification process for Falcon 9 or Taurus II prior
to award of a task order for a science mission under the Launch
Services II contract. See figure 5 for a time line for certifying
Falcon 9 based on a potential task order award in early 2011.
Figure 5: Certification Time Line for Falcon 9 Based on Potential
Launch Services Task Order Award:
[Refer to PDF for image: time line]
June 2010:
First successful flight. Now eligible to be awarded science missions.
2011:
Potential task order award.
2011-2013:
Category 2 certification.
2013-2014:
Category 3 certification.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
[End of figure]
NASA's Revision of Certification Requirements Allows Faster
Certification of Launch Vehicles:
NASA revised its launch policy to enable more certification
opportunities for emerging launch vehicle providers, and according to
LSP officials, these changes could also speed up the certification
process. LSP officials indicate that the former policy could have
required 10 or more years to certify a new vehicle to category 3, the
highest level of vehicle certification, and given the imminent
retirement of the Delta II, NASA considered this gap too
large.[Footnote 18] NASA eventually plans to certify the Falcon 9 and
Taurus II vehicles to category 3. However, NASA may initially certify
the vehicles to category 2, the next highest certification depending
on the payload risk classification of the initial mission or missions
to use the new vehicle. The Science Mission Directorate assigns
payload risk classifications, A through D, with A being least tolerant
to risk. See table 1. The risk posture then becomes a requirement in
securing a launch vehicle through the Launch Services contract.
Table 1: Criteria for NASA Science Payload Risk Classification for
Certified Launch Vehicles:
Characterization: Required Launch Vehicle Category;
Class A: Category 3;
Class B: Category 3, Sometimes Category 2;
Class C: Category 3 or 2;
Class D: Category 3, 2, or 1.
Characterization: Priority (Criticality to Agency Acceptable Risk
Level Strategic Plan);
Class A: High priority, very low (minimized) risk;
Class B: High priority, low risk;
Class C: Medium priority, medium risk;
Class D: Low priority, high risk.
Characterization: National significance;
Class A: Very high;
Class B: High;
Class C: Medium;
Class D: Low to medium.
Characterization: Complexity;
Class A: Very high to high;
Class B: High to medium;
Class C: Medium to low;
Class D: Medium to low.
Characterization: Mission Lifetime (Primary Baseline Mission);
Class A: Long, more than 5 years;
Class B: Medium, 2-5 years;
Class C: Short;
Class D: Short, less than 2 years.
Characterization: Cost;
Class A: High;
Class B: High to medium;
Class C: Medium to low;
Class D: Low.
Source: NASA.
[End of table]
Under the revised policy,[Footnote 19] there are three alternative
approaches to certification to category 3, as shown in table 2.
Table 2: Summary of Category 2 and 3 Certification Alternatives:
Category 2 certification alternatives: Alternative 1:
1 successful flight of a common launch vehicle configuration,
instrumented to provide design verification and flight performance
data;
Postflight operations/anomaly resolution process;
NASA flight margin verification;
Additional NASA analyses and review.
Category 2 certification alternatives: Alternative 2:
3 successful flights (minimum 2 consecutive) of a common launch
vehicle configuration, instrumented to provide design verification and
flight performance data;
Postflight operations/anomaly resolution process;
NASA flight margin verification;
Additional NASA analyses and review;
NASA independent validation and verification.
Category 3 certification alternatives: Alternative 1:
14 consecutive successful flights (95 percent demonstrated reliability
at 50 percent confidence) of a common launch vehicle configuration,
instrumented to provide design verification and flight performance
data;
Postflight operations/anomaly resolution process;
NASA flight margin verification.
Category 3 certification alternatives: Alternative 2:
6 successful flights (minimum 3 consecutive) of a common launch
vehicle configuration instrumented to provide design verification and
flight performance data;
Postflight operations/anomaly resolution process;
NASA flight margin verification;
Additional NASA analyses and review;
NASA independent validation and verification.
Category 3 certification alternatives: Alternative 3:
3 successful flights (minimum 2 consecutive) of a common launch
vehicle configuration instrumented to provide design verification and
flight performance data;
Postflight operations/anomaly resolution process;
NASA flight margin verification.
Additional NASA analyses and review including a full root cause or
"fishbone" analysis;
NASA independent validation and verification;
Hardware qualification.
Source: NASA data.
[End of table]
When a category 3 certification is required of one of the new
vehicles, NASA plans to use the certification alternative that
requires 3 successful flights (2 of which must be consecutive) of the
same vehicle configuration, a flight margin verification, and a full
vehicle root cause analysis, among other analyses, to certify the
vehicles.[Footnote 20] If the first NASA mission using one of the new
vehicles only requires a category 2 certified vehicle, then NASA will
use one of the category 2 alternatives as appropriate. Currently,
Orbital has 8 Taurus II CRS missions under contract with NASA, and
SpaceX has 12 Falcon 9 CRS missions under contract with NASA, as well
as commercial contracts. These flights, if successful, may be applied
to NASA's certification requirements, as long as at least 3 successful
flights are based upon the same vehicle configuration. Changes to a
vehicle's configuration--the distinct combination of core propulsive
stages and hardware--will reset the number of required successful
flights.
NASA Plans to Rely on Existing Small Class Launch Vehicles Providers:
NASA's near-term plan for small class launch vehicles is to rely on
small class providers through the NASA Launch Services II contract
because the number of small class launch vehicles currently available
is sufficient to meet NASA's needs. The small class launch services
market currently has five U.S. launch vehicles--SpaceX's Falcon 1;
Orbital's Taurus and Pegasus; Lockheed's Athena; and DOD's Minotaur--
although Minotaur is not readily available to NASA.[Footnote 21]
NASA's strategy is to seek competition without encouraging oversupply,
which will allow the market to stabilize over the next several years.
According to agency officials, the fostering of a small class of
launch vehicles is important because new launch service providers have
tended to start with smaller vehicles before moving on to develop
larger ones. However, NASA forecasts only about one science mission in
the small class per year. Because DOD has typically used Minotaur
launch vehicles in the small class, NASA asserts that its needs, along
with the needs of the commercial market, can only provide enough
business to support about one to two providers in the small class.
NASA Plan to Acquire Future Medium Class Launch Vehicles Includes
Inherent Risk:
NASA has a reasonable plan for addressing the medium launch capability
gap, but its approach has inherent risks that need to be mitigated.
First, NASA has not developed detailed estimates of the time and money
required to resolve technical issues likely to arise during the launch
vehicle certification process. Second, both Taurus II and Falcon 9
have already experienced delays and history indicates more delays are
likely as launch vehicle development is an inherently risky endeavor.
Finally, neither potential provider currently has the proper
facilities, such as a West Coast launch site, needed to launch the
majority of NASA earth science missions requiring a medium capability.
NASA Lacks Detailed Estimates for Time and Money Needed to Ensure
Adequate Resources Are Available:
NASA has not prepared a detailed estimate of the potential costs to
resolve technical issues and implement modifications and upgrades
required for NASA's specific science mission needs that are likely to
arise during the certification process for Falcon 9 and Taurus II.
Based on the historical costs of certifying launch vehicles such as
Atlas V, LSP estimates about $15 million could be required for each
vehicle. LSP officials noted that if serious problems or shortfalls
are discovered during the certification process, or extensive changes
need to be made to the basic launch vehicle design to accommodate
science mission needs, these costs could be higher. For example, if
the certification process uncovers inadequacies with the contractors'
qualification test program or the flight margin verifications uncover
significant differences between predicted and actual system
performance in flight, NASA or the contractor may be faced with
significant cost increases or delays. Ancillary changes to components
such as connectors and payload adapters needed to accommodate the
science mission spacecraft are unlikely to increase estimated costs.
According to NASA officials, relative immaturity of a vehicle and
inexperience of a provider could contribute to higher costs and
additional time needed for certification. Further, any additional work
needed may not be achievable within the expected 3-year time frame of
the certification process.
Based on anticipated labor rates, LSP estimates that the total cost to
conduct the assessments necessary to certify each vehicle will be
about $10 million. These costs are in addition to the approximately
$15 million NASA anticipates will be required to resolve technical
issues and implement required modifications and upgrades resulting
from the certification assessment. According to program officials,
these costs would be passed on to the customer, the Science Mission
Directorate, which would determine how to budget for these costs. For
example, the directorate could assign these costs to the first mission
to use a new launch vehicle, or amortize the cost over the first
several missions. However, it is currently undetermined who would pay
the costs for fixes needed to meet NASA's specific science mission
requirements. In the case of the Atlas V, such costs were shared by
NASA, DOD, and the contractor. The responsibility for these costs will
have to be negotiated as needed between LSP, the Science Mission
Directorate, and the contractors. As additional costs are currently
unknown, according to Science Mission Directorate officials, NASA has
yet to budget for them. GAO's Cost Estimating Guide, however,
indicates that assumptions should be made about the costs of unknowns
and that contingency funding should be reserved to cover potential
costs.[Footnote 22]
Schedule Delays with Taurus II and Falcon 9 Have Occurred and More Are
Likely:
Both SpaceX and Orbital have experienced delays in the development and
testing of Falcon 9 and Taurus II, respectively. We reported in June
2009 that both companies were working under aggressive schedules and
their vehicles were experiencing schedule delays--at the time, the
first flight of the Falcon 9 was scheduled for June 2009 but slipped
to June 2010, whereas the first flight of the Taurus II was scheduled
for December 2010 and has now slipped to no earlier than September
2011.[Footnote 23] Further, our past work and NASA's experience
indicate that more delays are likely, given that developing launch
vehicles is an inherently complex and risky endeavor.[Footnote 24] For
example, we reported in 2005 that the Air Force's Delta IV Heavy Lift
Vehicle's first operational flight was delayed 6 months, due in part
to design problems discovered in testing.[Footnote 25] Likewise,
according to NASA, vehicle histories from SpaceX, Orbital, and United
Launch Alliance indicate that the average delay in the third
successful launch of a new vehicle is 31 months from the manifested
date of launch.[Footnote 26] The contractors for Falcon 9 and Taurus
II are not currently awarded any task orders for science missions;
therefore the formal certification process for each has not begun.
Consequently, the schedule and budget of any science mission that is
assigned to one of these vehicles could be negatively impacted if
delays occur in the certification process. While NASA expects these
vehicles will eventually become a viable option for medium class
science missions, it is uncertain how long the process might take.
SpaceX and Orbital Lack Facilities Necessary to Meet Requirements for
Some Science Missions:
Neither SpaceX nor Orbital currently has a high-inclination launch
site option for its medium class vehicle, yet the majority of NASA's
Earth science missions require such a site due to the high inclination
required to achieve a polar orbit.[Footnote 27] Launches from the East
Coast of the United States are suitable only for low-inclination
orbits because major population centers underlie the trajectory
required for high-inclination launches. High-inclination launches are
accomplished from the West Coast because the flight trajectory avoids
populated areas. Orbital is conducting a site selection survey and its
West Coast options include Kodiak, Alaska; Space Launch Complex 2 at
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California; and Space Launch Complex 8,
also at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, which Orbital currently
uses to launch the Minotaur. According to Orbital officials, the site
selection decision is expected in 2011, with the site ready for
operations as early as 2014. According to SpaceX officials, SpaceX
plans are underway to secure a Falcon 9 launch site at Vandenberg Air
Force Base for high-inclination launches. This capability is planned
to be ready for operation by late 2012. However, if the launch sites
are not available when needed, NASA's planned science mission manifest
could be negatively impacted, as 12 of the 14 medium class science
missions planned through 2020 that do not yet have assigned launch
vehicles require a high-inclination launch.
Science Missions in Development Face Uncertainties Related to
Committing to Launch Vehicles before They Are Certified and Proven:
NASA science missions requiring a medium class launch vehicle that are
approaching their preliminary design review face uncertainties related
to committing to as-yet uncertified and unproven launch vehicles. The
preliminary design review marks the point at which it is demonstrated
that the preliminary design meets system requirements with acceptable
risk and within cost and schedule constraints, and establishes the
basis for proceeding with detailed design. Shortly after the
preliminary design review, a project establishes its commitment
baseline which documents the project's estimated cost and schedule.
From this point on, almost all changes to baselines are expected to
represent successive refinements, not fundamental changes. NASA
program managers indicated that the launch vehicle of a science
mission should be assigned by the preliminary design review to allow
the science mission design team to optimize their spacecraft based on
the operational characteristics of the launch vehicle. A number of
NASA science missions are approaching the preliminary design review;
therefore, decisions need to be made about the launch vehicle for
these missions. However, as indicated by figure 6, some decisions will
have to be made before either the Falcon 9 or Taurus II is certified
for science missions.
Figure 6: Launch Vehicle Decision Dates (or Preliminary Design Review
Dates) and Planned Launch Dates for Missions Potentially Needing
Medium Launch Capability Vehicles:
[Refer to PDF for image: table]
Mission name: SMAP;
Launch vehicle decision needed: 03/2011;
Planned launch date: 11/2014.
Mission name: JPSS-1;
Launch vehicle decision needed: TBD;
Planned launch date: 2014.
Mission name: ICESat-2;
Launch vehicle decision needed: 11/2011;
Planned launch date: 10/2015.
Mission name: Discovery 12;
Launch vehicle decision needed: TBD;
Planned launch date: 2016.
Mission name: EX-1;
Launch vehicle decision needed: TBD;
Planned launch date: 2016.
Mission name: Grace-FO;
Launch vehicle decision needed: TBD;
Planned launch date: 2016.
Mission name: EX-2;
Launch vehicle decision needed: TBD;
Planned launch date: 2017.
Mission name: DESDynl-L;
Launch vehicle decision needed: 2013;
Planned launch date: 2017.
Earliest Falcon 9 category 3 certification: Late 2013; Early 2014.
Mission name: CLARREO-1;
Launch vehicle decision needed: 2014;
Planned launch date: 2017.
Mission name: Discovery 13;
Launch vehicle decision needed: TBD;
Planned launch date: 2018.
Mission name: JPSS-2;
Launch vehicle decision needed: TBD;
Planned launch date: 2018.
Mission name: PACE;
Launch vehicle decision needed: TBD;
Planned launch date: 2018;
Mission name: ASCENDS;
Launch vehicle decision needed: TBD;
Planned launch date: 2019.
Mission name: EX-3;
Launch vehicle decision needed: TBD;
Planned launch date: 2019.
Mission name: CLARREO-2;
Launch vehicle decision needed: TBD;
Planned launch date: 2020.
Mission name: EX-4;
Launch vehicle decision needed: TBD;
Planned launch date: 2020.
Mission name: STP-5;
Launch vehicle decision needed: TBD;
Planned launch date: 2020.
Mission name: SWOT;
Launch vehicle decision needed: TBD;
Planned launch date: 2020.
Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.
Note: EX-1, EX-2, EX-3, and EX-4 could be launched on a small or
medium class vehicle depending on budget and launch vehicle
availability. The launch vehicle decision is most optimally made prior
to the preliminary design review, which as indicated above generally
occurs 3-4 years prior to the planned launch date.
[End of figure]
The Soil Moisture Active and Passive (SMAP), Joint Polar Satellite
System (JPSS-1), and Ice, Cloud, and land Elevation Satellite (ICESat-
2) missions are approaching their preliminary design reviews and are
the first three missions requiring a medium capability for which a
Falcon 9 could potentially be selected for launch services. Falcon 9
had a successful first flight in June 2010 and could potentially be
certified as a category 3 vehicle by late 2013 or early 2014. NASA is
planning for the imminent release of a request for launch service
proposals for the SMAP mission and tentatively plans to issue requests
for proposals for the JPSS and ICESat-2 missions in spring 2011. If
Falcon 9, the only medium class launch vehicle currently available
under the Launch Services II contract, is selected for any of these
missions, the mission launch date will be tied to a successful
certification of the Falcon 9 launch vehicle. Because the preliminary
design review establishes the basis for proceeding with detailed
design, according to NASA officials, any changes to accommodate a new
launch vehicle after the preliminary design review are fundamental
changes and rarely, if ever, occur.[Footnote 28] Therefore, NASA's
intention is to select a launch vehicle and accept any delays and
residual cost increases to the science mission associated with delays
in the certification process. According to NASA officials, changing
the planned launch vehicle of a science mission after its preliminary
design review is a fundamental change to the mission design and would
lead to significant cost growth and schedule delays.[Footnote 29] As
figure 6 illustrates, several NASA missions require a launch vehicle
decision prior to the certification of Falcon 9. While NASA expects
that Falcon 9 could be certified to a category 3 prior to the planned
launch dates of these missions, given the relative immaturity of the
launch vehicle and the likelihood of further delays, the schedule for
these missions could be at risk if the Falcon 9, or any other unproven
launch vehicle, is selected.
NASA officials indicated that science missions within the next few
years might be asked to design to accommodate multiple launch vehicle
possibilities if the availability of future vehicles is delayed or
until the task order is issued for the particular mission. Science
Mission Directorate officials indicated that while designing to
accommodate multiple launch vehicles is possible, the practice is
cumbersome, especially when continued beyond the preliminary design
review. Under this type of design scenario, every decision is
constrained to the worst case performance characteristic of the
competing vehicles. Consequently, overall mission effectiveness is
reduced, because benefits associated with a particular vehicle are
traded away to design to the lesser set of capabilities of another
vehicle. Thus, if the less constrained vehicle is chosen, that
capability is left unused. Ultimately, the scientific benefit of the
planned mission is reduced, because the science payload may have to be
adjusted to accommodate reduced launch capability.
Conclusions:
NASA is taking an appropriate approach to help ensure the success of
the remaining Delta II missions by adequately addressing workforce,
support, and launch infrastructure risks. Nevertheless, an affordable
and reliable medium launch capability is critical to NASA meeting its
scientific goals. NASA has a plan in place for obtaining this
capability through Orbital and SpaceX's vehicles, but past experience
with other development programs and recent history with both vehicles
indicate that maturing and certifying these vehicles for use by
science missions is likely to prove more difficult and costly than
currently anticipated. If the companies are not successful in
delivering, in a timely manner, reliable and cost-effective upgraded
launch vehicles that can be used for NASA science missions, NASA will
lack an affordable domestic launch capability in the medium
performance vehicle class and could be forced to use more costly or
time-consuming options. Further, costs associated with addressing any
issues discovered during the certification process and resulting from
the need to delay missions or use other alternatives will require
trade-offs to be made that will likely impact the number of science
missions the agency can afford.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Given the likelihood of delays and additional costs associated with
developing and fielding a medium class launch vehicle fully certified
for science missions and the implications to funding available to
support science missions, we recommend that as LSP gains a more
complete understanding of the detailed designs and actual performance
of the Falcon 9 and Taurus II, the NASA Administrator require,
* NASA's Science Mission Directorate--in conjunction with NASA's Space
Operations Mission Directorate--to perform a detailed cost estimate to
determine the likely costs of certification and the trade-offs
required to fund these costs. This estimate should at a minimum
examine the need for funds to resolve technical issues with the Falcon
9 and Taurus II launch vehicles discovered through the certification
process. The estimate should also examine the costs associated with
delaying science missions if necessary until launch vehicles are
available or contingencies such as selecting more costly or time-
consuming launch options.
Given that NASA's Science Mission Directorate could have to fund
additional significant costs for certification and the use of
contingencies, we recommend that the NASA Administrator require,
* that the costs identified through developing the detail cost
estimate are adequately budgeted for and identified by the Science
Mission Directorate.
Until such time, however, that these costs are better understood, we
recommend that the NASA Administrator require,
* the Science Mission Directorate to identify and budget for
additional contingency funding for the projects requiring a medium
launch capability vehicle and approaching their preliminary design
review prior to certification of Falcon 9 and Taurus II that could be
impacted by additional costs associated with certification of these
vehicles, including the need to address technical issues and shoulder
delays in the certification process.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report (see appendix II), NASA
concurred with our recommendations. NASA acknowledged the risks
associated with its transition strategy for medium class launch
vehicles and recognized the importance of developing detailed cost
estimates, budgeting for known costs, and identifying and budgeting
additional contingency funding for unknown costs. NASA stated that the
Space Operations Mission Directorate will develop detailed estimates
of the costs to certify the new vehicles as well as to resolve
technical issues during certification, and the Science Mission
Directorate will estimate the costs for its missions if certification
is delayed. Based on these estimates, the Science Mission Directorate
will appropriately budget for certification costs and potential
contingencies in future budget cycles. Separately, NASA provided
technical comments, which have been addressed in the report, as
appropriate.
We will send copies of the report to NASA's Administrator and
interested congressional committees. The report will be available at
no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or at
ChaplainC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. GAO staff that made key contributions to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Cristina T. Chaplain:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To examine the National Space and Aeronautics Administration's (NASA)
and United Launch Alliance's steps to ensure resources (budget,
workforce, and facilities) are available to support safe Delta II
operations through the last planned NASA flight, we interviewed NASA
Launch Services Program (LSP) program officials and United Launch
Alliance program officials and reviewed their launch vehicle
transition plans. We obtained contract documents, launch manifests,
risk information sheets, and engineering review board documentation
from LSP to examine NASA's planned contracting and technical approach
for managing NASA's remaining Delta II missions. We also compared
NASA's transition strategy to NASA and national space policies. We
reviewed United Launch Alliance's processes for certifying its work
force for processing and manufacturing, launch manifests, market
projections, cost estimates, workforce estimates, and launch
infrastructure maintenance needs through the last planned NASA Delta
II flight in October 2011. We also visited Space Launch Complex 17B at
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida and visually inspected
ongoing efforts to maintain Delta II launch capability through the
last planned Delta II flight from this facility in 2011 and
interviewed relevant NASA and contractor personnel at the launch
complex regarding their maintenance efforts.
To examine NASA's plans and contingencies for ensuring a smooth
transition from current small and medium class launch vehicles to
other launch vehicles for future science missions, we interviewed
relevant program officials and obtained and reviewed agency documents
related to their transition plans. We interviewed officials within
NASA's Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, Space Operations
Mission Directorate, and Science Mission Directorate regarding these
plans. We also discussed these plans with NASA's Office of Inspector
General. We further interviewed officials from Orbital Sciences
Corporation and Space Exploration Technologies to discuss their plans
for certifying their launch vehicles, which are currently being
designed to support the Commercial Resupply Services contract for
future medium class science missions. We reviewed the launch
providers' launch vehicle manifests and launch vehicle histories. We
compared the agency's plans for certifying these vehicles to relevant
NASA policy directives, risk mitigation strategies, U.S. law, and
National Space Policy. We also examined how the agency's certification
requirements have evolved to facilitate transition to future launch
services providers.
To examine the risks associated with NASA's planned approach to fill
the medium launch capability gap, we interviewed officials with NASA's
Launch Services Program and identified and analyzed risks, and their
accompanying mitigation strategies. We interviewed NASA Science
Mission Directorate and Space Operations Mission Directorate and
contractor officials responsible for both the Falcon 9 and Taurus II
development programs and determined where their programs are in the
development process and obtained their estimates of when these
vehicles might be ready to launch science missions. We also reviewed
prior GAO reports and identified risks common to all spacecraft
development efforts.
To examine technical and programmatic implications to science missions
if NASA commits to new launch vehicles before they are certified and
proven, we reviewed NASA's systems engineering policy and interviewed
officials with NASA's Science Mission Directorate, NASA science
mission project managers, and the Launch Services Program and
discussed potential cost and schedule effects of committing to
unproven launch vehicles.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2010 to November 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Office of the Administrator:
Washington, DC 20546-0001:
November 19 2010:
Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Chaplain:
NASA appreciates the opportunity to comment on your draft report
entitled, "NASA Medium Launch Transition Strategy Leverages Ongoing
Investments But Is Not Without Risk" (GA0-11-107). Given the current
changes in the commercial launch vehicle market and the outlook for
the next several years, NASA has been actively engaged in managing
risks associated with launch vehicle availability and cost, including
those risks related to the close out and/or start up of launch vehicle
lines. NASA activities to date are consistent with those recommended
by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Agency concurs
with the recommendations as outlined below.
As part of this engagement, the GAO evaluated the steps NASA is taking
to ensure the safe fly-out of the three remaining science missions
that will use the Delta II launch vehicle and NASA's plans for future
launch vehicles, including the Falcon 9 and Taurus II. NASA agrees
with the conclusions of this report. However, it should be noted that
implementation of recommendations relative to Taurus II will be
accomplished at a later date. As the draft report indicates, in
September 2010, NASA announced contract awards of the NASA Launch
Services (NLS) II contract to Lockheed Martin, Orbital Sciences Corp.,
SpaceX, and United Launch Services. Based on these contract awards,
the Falcon 9 may be proposed as a launch vehicle for future NASA
missions while the Taurus II must be on-ramped at a later time in
accordance with the contract before it may be proposed for use. NASA
also notes that the Falcon 9 has had a successful first flight while
the Taurus II has not. While NASA intends to follow a similar process
to certify both vehicles at the appropriate time, currently the
Agency's activities in support of launch services for science missions
are focused on the Falcon 9.
In the draft report, GAO makes three recommendations to address NASA's
need for a detailed estimate of the costs to certify a Medium Class
Launch Vehicle capability as well as adequate budget planning for
these and additional contingency costs.
Recommendation 1: GAO recommends the NASA Administrator require the
NASA Science Mission Directorate - in conjunction with the Space
Operations Mission Directorate - to perform a detailed cost estimate
to determine the likely costs of certification and the trade-offs
required to fund these costs. This estimate should at a minimum
examine the need for funds to resolve technical issues with the Falcon
9 and Taurus II launch vehicles discovered through the certification
process. The estimate should also examine the costs associated with
delaying science missions if necessary until launch vehicles are
available or contingencies such as selecting more costly or time-
consuming launch options.
Response: NASA concurs with this recommendation. The NASA Space
Operations Mission Directorate will provide an estimate to the Science
Mission Directorate of the cost to certify the Falcon 9 launch vehicle
as well as to resolve technical issues during certification. The
Science Mission Directorate will estimate costs for its science
missions if certification is delayed. The initial budget estimates
will be completed in time for the Fiscal Year 2013 budget cycle and
may be updated in subsequent ones. NASA will follow a similar process
for the Taurus II launch vehicle once it becomes available under NLS
II.
Recommendation 2: Given that the NASA Science Mission Directorate
could have to fund additional significant costs for certification and
the use of contingencies, we recommend that the NASA Administrator
require that the costs identified through developing the detail cost
estimate are adequately budgeted for and identified by the Science
Mission Directorate.
Response: NASA concurs with this recommendation. For the Falcon 9, the
Science Mission Directorate will appropriately budget for such costs
for certification and use of contingencies identified through the
Space Operations Mission Directorate review, effective with the Fiscal
Year 2013 budget cycle. NASA will follow a similar process for the
Taurus II launch vehicle once it becomes available under NLS II.
Recommendation 3: Until such time, however, that these costs are
better understood, we recommend that the NASA Administrator require
the Science Mission Directorate to identify and budget for additional
contingency funding for the projects requiring a medium launch
capability vehicle and approaching their preliminary design review
prior to certification of Falcon 9 and Taurus II that could be
impacted by additional costs associated with certification of these
vehicles, including the need to address technical issues and shoulder
delays in the certification process.
Response: NASA concurs with this recommendation. For the Falcon 9, the
Science Mission Directorate will factor preliminary certification cost
estimates into the Fiscal Year 2012 budget. NASA will follow a similar
process for the Taurus II launch vehicle once it becomes available
under NLS II.
We will continue to work to address the issues identified by the GAO.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please
contact Ms. Ellen Cohen, Policy Analyst in the Science Mission
Directorate, at 202-358-0812.
Thank you again for the opportunity to review this draft report, and
we are looking forward to your final report to Congress.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Edward J. Weiler:
Associate Administrator for Science Mission Directorate:
[End of section]
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Cristina T. Chaplain (202)512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Shelby S. Oakley, Assistant
Director; Dr. Timothy M. Persons, Chief Scientist; Morgan Delaney
Ramaker; Laura Greifner; Kristine R. Hassinger; Carrie W. Rogers;
Roxanna T. Sun; and John S. Warren Jr. made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] NASA typically uses small, medium, and intermediate class launch
vehicles for science missions. These classifications are explained in
greater detail in figure 2.
[2] United Launch Alliance builds and sells the Delta II, and other
launch vehicles, to the government and private industry.
[3] Commercial Space Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-303, § 201(a); U.S.
Space Transportation Policy Fact Sheet, paragraph IV.(1)(a) (Jan. 6,
2005); and National Space Policy of the U.S., page 10 (June 28, 2010).
[4] An IDIQ contract requires the government to order and the
contractor to furnish at least a stated minimum quantity of supplies
or services during a fixed period. The government orders supplies or
services under an IDIQ contract by issuing delivery orders or task
orders, as appropriate. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 16.504.
[5] Launch services provided under the contract include the basic
launch vehicle, mission-specific implementation, and all necessary
processing and handling, both standard to all launches and specific to
individual launches.
[6] Funded Space Act Agreements are agreements under which
appropriated funds are transferred to a domestic agreement partner to
accomplish a NASA mission. Funded agreements may be used only when
NASA's objective cannot be accomplished through the use of a
procurement contract, grant, or cooperative agreement.
[7] Falcon 9 can launch intermediate class payloads to low earth orbit.
[8] Government approval entails providing the launch service
contractor formally documented authority to proceed and/or formal
acceptance of requirements, plans, tests, or success criteria in
specified areas. Government insight means acquiring knowledge and
understanding of contractors' actions by the monitoring of selected
metrics and/or milestones through insight, documentation review,
meeting attendance, and other means.
[9] Engineering review boards are multidisciplinary, systems-
engineering based reviews of requirements and designs.
[10] LSP has had 64 successful launches and 1 launch failure since the
organization was formed in 1998.
[11] Both Lockheed and Boeing had failures in their respective Atlas
and Delta programs before the United Launch Alliance merger.
[12] Water deluge systems flood the launch pad during launch to dampen
vibrations and reduce fire risks.
[13] The price for standard launch services on a Falcon 9 is roughly
equivalent to the price paid in the past for Delta II standard launch
services.
[14] NASA's approach to determining a launch vehicle's risk is through
a launch vehicle certification process, which is laid out in NASA
Policy Directive 8610.7D, Launch Services Risk Mitigation Policy for
NASA-Owned and/or NASA-Sponsored Payloads/Missions (Jan. 31, 2008).
[15] NASA: Strategy for Small and Medium-Class Launch Services
pursuant to Section 621 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 (P.L.
110-422) (Aug. 2009).
[16] A nonreimbursable Space Act Agreement involves NASA and one or
more partners in a mutually beneficial activity that furthers NASA's
mission, where each party bears the cost of its participation and
there is no exchange of funds between the parties. Under such
arrangements, NASA can offer personnel, support services, equipment,
expertise, information, or facilities. These agreements can be used
for collaborative efforts that build on each partner's areas of
expertise and for which the end results are of interest to both
parties.
[17] A category 3 launch vehicle is a low-risk vehicle certified to
launch missions of all risk classifications A, B, C, and D missions. A
category 2 launch vehicle is a medium-risk vehicle certified to launch
risk classification B, C, and D missions. See table 1 for more details.
[18] NASA Policy Directive 8610.7C, Launch Services Risk Mitigation
Policy for NASA-Owned and/or NASA-Sponsored Payloads/Missions (Apr. 5,
2005) required 14 consecutive successful flights of a new launch
vehicle for certification to category 3.
[19] NASA Policy Directive 8610.7D, Launch Services Risk Mitigation
Policy for NASA-Owned and/or NASA-Sponsored Payloads/Missions (Jan.
31, 2008).
[20] Flight margin verification compares the predicted performance of
a launch vehicle design to the actual performance of a launch vehicle
system during flight with the intent of ensuring that demonstrated
performance margins are sufficient to ensure safety and reliability.
Root cause analysis is a structured evaluation method that identifies
the root causes for an undesired outcome and the actions adequate to
prevent recurrence. A root cause is one of multiple factors (events,
conditions, or organizational factors) that contributed to or created
the proximate cause and subsequent undesired outcome and, if
eliminated, or modified, would have prevented the undesired outcome.
Root cause analysis should continue until organizational factors have
been identified, or until data are exhausted.
[21] SpaceX, Orbital, and Lockheed were awarded Launch Services II
contracts in 2010. Minotaur is derived from decommissioned
intercontinental ballistic missiles and its use by NASA is governed by
law and policy.
[22] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2009).
[23] GAO, NASA: Commercial Partners are Making Progress, but Face
Aggressive Schedules to Demonstrate Critical Space Station Cargo
Transport Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-618] (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 16,
2009).
[24] GAO, NASA: Constellation Program Cost and Schedule Will Remain
Uncertain Until a Sound Business Case Is Established, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-844] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 26,
2010).
[25] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-301]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005).
[26] Vehicles include all configurations of the Delta IV, two
configurations of Atlas V, Falcon 1, Pegasus, and Taurus.
[27] Inclination is the angular distance of the orbital plane from the
plane of the planet's equator. An inclination of 0 degrees means the
spacecraft orbits the planet at its equator and in the same direction
as the planet rotates. An inclination of 90 degrees indicates a polar
orbit in which the spacecraft passes over the north and south poles of
the planet.
[28] The changes required to several mission launch vehicles after the
1986 Challenger accident illustrate the impact. For example, NASA
moved the Cosmic Background Explorer Mission from the Space Shuttle to
a Delta I launch vehicle. Consequently, every design element of the
Cosmic Background Explorer mission spacecraft had to be reconsidered,
from how its solar panels would deploy to how the science instruments
would be affected by the vibrations they would encounter on the new
launch vehicle. Ultimately, the mission was successfully launched in
November 1989, 16 months later than originally scheduled on the Space
Shuttle, but only after NASA collocated engineers and scientists and
worked in some instances 7 days a week in three around-the-clock
shifts.
[29] In 1997, GAO reported that several Department of Defense
satellite systems were transitioned to Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicles after they had been designed to launch on other vehicles.
These changes resulted in approximately $117 million in additional
costs to the programs. GAO, Access to Space: Issues Associated with
DOD's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-97-130] (Washington, D.C.: Jun.
24, 1997).
[End of section]
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