NASA
Issues Implementing the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 Gao ID: GAO-11-216T December 1, 2010NASA projects drive critical innovation in and understanding of space, but our work has shown that most cost more and take longer to develop than planned. Today's fiscal environment highlights why that pattern is unsustainable, now more than ever. The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 challenged NASA to develop new technologies for space exploration. GAO issued two legal opinions this summer based on a request from several members of the House of Representatives about whether NASA's actions related to the Constellation program complied with restrictions in the 2010 Appropriations Act. Building on that request and prior GAO work, this testimony discusses (1) how the Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011 continues the restrictions in the fiscal year 2010 Appropriations Act, and how they relate to the recently enacted NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and (2) steps NASA should take to increase the likelihood of success as it implements its new direction. This statement is based on prior and ongoing GAO work. The audit work was done in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
NASA's fiscal year 2010 Appropriations Act contained a restriction prohibiting NASA from terminating any program, project, or activity of the Constellation program or creating new ones until provided for in a subsequent appropriations act. Currently, NASA is operating under a continuing resolution--a temporary funding mechanism that allows the agency to operate until a new appropriations bill is signed into law. The continuing resolution continues the restrictions of the 2010 appropriations Act. Therefore, NASA must carry out the recently enacted Authorization Act but without terminating or creating programs, projects, or activities of the Constellation program. In recent legal opinions, GAO found NASA had not violated any restrictions of its 2010 Appropriations Act. GAO found that while NASA conducted planning activities, this did not violate the restriction prohibiting it from using funds to begin a new program, project, or activity. Second, GAO found that NASA did not terminate a program, project, or activity, as it continued to fund the existing programs, projects, and activities. As long as NASA does not improperly create or terminate a program, project, or activity, it has discretion in how to carry out the Constellation program. Regardless of its current restrictions, NASA will need to continue to implement new ways of doing business going forward to reduce acquisition risks that have plagued projects in the past. Critical to this will be ensuring the needs and expectations for a project match the resources available for it, effectively managing costs, increasing transparency into critical phases of development, and strengthening accountability. GAO work has shown a project's likelihood of success can increase when it has developed a sound business case, based on high levels of knowledge, before committing to a new development effort that matches the project's requirements to resources that are available or reasonably expected for it--including time, money, technology, and people. Over past several years NASA has taken steps to incorporate a more knowledge-based approach to managing its projects and instill a stronger focus on managing costs. However, recent studies and our ongoing work indicate that NASA has not fully addressed the following. (1) Establish a common measure to assess design stability before allowing programs to move from the design phase to the test and integration phases of the development process. Recent studies and our work have tied acquisition problems to design issues. (2) Provide enough transparency in the early, critical phases of development to help Congress identify risks and inefficiencies and ensure earlier accountability. For example, although NASA has already spent over $9 billion combined on the Ares and Orion projects, they have yet to be baselined and therefore NASA is not required to publicly report cost and schedule data. (3) Enhance its oversight and accountability functions to ensure that projects base their decisions on sound knowledge so that inherent risks are not exacerbated by poor management and oversight practices. GAO has made several recommendations in prior work and NASA has implemented many. We are not making any new recommendations in this testimony, but are considering recommendations in our ongoing work.
GAO-11-216T, NASA: Issues Implementing the NASA Authorization Act of 2010
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-11-216T
entitled 'NASA: Issues Implementing the NASA Authorization Act of
2010' which was released on December 1, 2010.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S.
Senate:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Wednesday, December 1, 2010:
NASA:
Issues Implementing the NASA Authorization Act of 2010:
Statement of:
Cristina T. Chaplain, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
Susan A. Poling, Managing Associate General Counsel:
GAO-11-216T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-216T, a testimony before the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
NASA projects drive critical innovation in and understanding of space,
but our work has shown that most cost more and take longer to develop
than planned. Additionally, we have found that projects are often
approved without ensuring the projects‘ needs match the resources
available. Today‘s fiscal environment highlights why that pattern is
unsustainable, now more than ever.
The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 challenged NASA to develop new
technologies for space exploration. GAO issued two legal opinions this
summer based on a request from several members of the House of
Representatives about whether NASA‘s actions related to the
Constellation program complied with restrictions in the 2010
appropriation. Building on that request and prior GAO work, this
testimony discusses (1) how the Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011
continues the restrictions in the fiscal year 2010 Appropriations Act,
and how they relate to the recently enacted NASA Authorization Act and
(2) steps NASA should take to increase the likelihood of success as it
implements its new direction.
This statement is based on prior GAO work. The audit work was done in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found:
NASA‘s fiscal year 2010 appropriations contained a restriction
prohibiting NASA from terminating any program, project, or activity of
the Constellation program or creating new ones until provided for in a
subsequent appropriation act. Currently, NASA is operating under a
continuing resolution”a temporary funding mechanism that allows the
agency to operate until a new appropriations bill is signed into law.
The continuing resolution continues the restrictions of the 2010
appropriation. Therefore, NASA must carry out the recently enacted
Authorization Act but without terminating or creating programs,
projects, or activities of the Constellation program. In recent legal
opinions, GAO found NASA had not violated any restrictions of its 2010
appropriation. GAO found that while NASA conducted planning
activities, this did not violate the restriction prohibiting it from
using funds to begin a new program, project, or activity. Second, GAO
found that NASA did not terminate a program, project, or activity, as
it continued to fund the existing programs, projects, and activities.
As long as NASA does not improperly create or terminate a program,
project, or activity, it has discretion in how to carry out the
Constellation program.
Regardless of its current restrictions, NASA will need to adopt new
ways of doing business going forward to reduce acquisition risks that
have plagued projects in the past. Critical to this will be ensuring
the needs and expectations for a project match the resources available
for it, effectively managing costs, increasing transparency into
critical phases of development, and strengthening accountability. GAO
work has shown a project‘s likelihood of success can increase when it
has developed a sound business case, based on high levels of
knowledge, before committing to a new development effort that matches
the project‘s requirements to resources that are available or
reasonably expected for it”including time, money, technology, and
people. Over past several years NASA has taken steps to incorporate a
more knowledge-based approach to managing its projects and instill a
stronger focus on managing costs. More needs to be done, however, as
NASA implements its authorization to ensure that inherent risks do not
continue to be exacerbated by poor management and oversight practices.
For example NASA needs to:
* Establish a common measure to assess design stability before
allowing programs to move from the design phase to the test and
integration phases of the development process.
* Provide enough transparency in the early, critical phases of
development to help Congress identify risks and inefficiencies and
ensure earlier accountability. For example, although NASA has already
spent over $9 billion combined on the Ares and Orion projects, they
have yet to be baselined and therefore NASA is not required to
publicly report cost and schedule data.
* Enhance its oversight and accountability functions to ensure that
projects base their decisions on sound knowledge.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO has made several recommendations in prior work and NASA has
implemented many. We are not making any new recommendations in this
testimony.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-216T] or key
components. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202)
512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov or Susan Poling at (202) 512-2667 or
polings@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting us here today to discuss issues NASA faces as
it transitions to and implements the direction outlined by the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010.[Footnote 1] The steps that NASA takes to
implement the direction in the Authorization Act will set the stage
for whether it can accomplish the goals of the authorization within
the time frames and resources as directed. NASA projects have produced
ground-breaking research and advanced our understanding of the
universe. However, our work shows that another common theme binds most
of the projects--they cost more and take longer to develop than
planned. Frequently they are approved without evidence of a sound
business case that ensures a match between requirements and reasonably
expected resources. In today's fiscal environment, it is clear that
this condition cannot be sustained.
In March, several members of the House of Representatives asked us for
information and our views on, among other things, whether NASA
complied with restrictions in the 2010 Exploration appropriation when
it took certain actions pertaining to the Constellation program. Based
on that request, we issued two legal opinions this summer.[Footnote 2]
The NASA Authorization Act of 2010, as signed into law by the
President in October 2010, challenges NASA to develop new human
spaceflight systems and use the commercial space industry and
international partnerships to develop new technologies for space
exploration, but NASA must still comply with the restrictions in the
fiscal year 2010 Exploration appropriation. Regardless of the changes
resulting from the Authorization Act, one thing that will remain
constant is NASA's need to efficiently and effectively manage programs
and projects. Against this backdrop, our testimony today will focus
on: (1) how the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011[Footnote 3]
continues the restrictions in the fiscal year 2010 Commerce, Justice,
Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,[Footnote 4] and how
they relate to the recently enacted NASA Authorization Act and (2)
steps NASA should take to reduce its acquisition risk and increase the
likelihood of success as it implements its new direction outlined in
the NASA Authorization Act.
In preparing this statement, we relied on work completed between 2005
and 2010. Our audit work examining best practices for system
development and assessing NASA's major projects was performed in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appropriation Restrictions Remain in Effect:
In October 2009, the Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee
issued a report which concluded that the human spaceflight program is
on an "unsustainable trajectory."[Footnote 5] The conference report
accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 stated that
"the committee's work raises issues requiring thoughtful consideration
by the Administration and the Congress" but that "it is premature for
the conferees to advocate or initiate significant changes to the
current program absent a bona fide proposal from the Administration
and subsequent assessment, consideration and enactment by Congress."
[Footnote 6] Accordingly, Congress appropriated about $3.7 billion for
"exploration research and development activities," but provided that
none of the funds from 2010 or prior years:
"shall be available for the termination or elimination of any program,
project or activity of the architecture for the Constellation program
nor shall such funds be available to create or initiate a new program,
project or activity, unless such program termination, elimination,
creation, or initiation is provided in subsequent appropriations
Acts."[Footnote 7]
These are the restrictions that we addressed in our recent legal
opinions. Currently, NASA is operating under the Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2011 (Continuing Resolution), which Congress
enacted on September 30. Continuing resolutions are temporary
appropriations acts that Congress enacts to keep existing programs
functioning after the expiration of previous budget authority. Most
continuing resolutions, including the one under which NASA is
currently operating, incorporate by reference the conditions and
restrictions contained in prior years' appropriations acts or the
appropriations bills currently under consideration. In this case, the
Continuing Resolution provided amounts to NASA:
"at a rate for operations as provided in the applicable appropriations
Acts for fiscal year 2010 and under the authority and conditions
provided in such Acts, for continuing projects or activities ... that
are not otherwise specifically provided for in this Act."[Footnote 8]
(Emphasis added.) Like most continuing resolutions, the current
Continuing Resolution also prohibits new activities and projects for
which funds were not available in the prior fiscal year.[Footnote 9]
About a month ago, Congress enacted the NASA Authorization Act of 2010
(Authorization Act),[Footnote 10] which provided specific direction on
a number of issues related to human space flight and space technology.
The Authorization Act requires that NASA undertake a number of
initiatives, but NASA still needs appropriations to carry out these
activities. As you know, under the Constitution, "no Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law."[Footnote 11] The Continuing Resolution provides funds for NASA,
but only "under the authority and conditions provided" in the fiscal
year 2010 Exploration appropriation.[Footnote 12]
One of the conditions in the fiscal year 2010 NASA appropriation is
the limitation discussed in our recent opinions that funds are not
available "for the termination or elimination of any program, project
or activity of the architecture for the Constellation program" nor are
they available to "create or initiate a new program, project or
activity, unless such program termination, elimination, creation, or
initiation is provided in subsequent appropriations Acts" (emphasis
added). Thus NASA must still comply with the restrictions contained in
the fiscal year 2010 Exploration appropriation. What this means for
NASA's implementation of the Authorization Act is that NASA must carry
out the Authorization Act[Footnote 13] but without terminating,
eliminating any program, project, or activity of the Constellation
program and without creating or initiating a new program, project, or
activity.[Footnote 14]
Because the continuing resolution subjects NASA's current
appropriation to the fiscal year 2010 restriction, our two opinions
this year may offer NASA some guidance as it goes forward since we
analyzed various actions related to the Constellation program to
determine if NASA was complying with the restriction. In both
opinions, we concluded that NASA did not violate the restrictions in
the fiscal year 2010 Exploration appropriation. In May,[Footnote 15]
we noted that Congress prohibited NASA from using Exploration funds to
bring into being a new program, project, or activity.[Footnote 16] We
concluded that NASA did not violate this restriction when it convened
study teams to conduct planning activities. Agencies must conduct
planning activities as part of the budget process, and the prohibition
in the Exploration appropriation did not preclude the use of funds for
planning purposes. Further, NASA's planning activities did not result
in the use of funds to create or initiate a new program, project, or
activity.[Footnote 17]
In July,[Footnote 18] we considered whether NASA improperly terminated
or eliminated any program, project, or activity of the Constellation
program. We determined that NASA had five programs, projects, or
activities within the "Constellation Systems" category:
* Program Integration and Operations,
* Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle,
* Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle,
* Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle, and:
* Commercial Crew and Cargo.[Footnote 19]
We concluded that NASA did not terminate or eliminate any program,
project, or activity of the Constellation program because NASA
continued to obligate Exploration appropriations to all five of the
Constellation programs, projects, and activities. NASA diverted no
Exploration funds to create a new program, project, or activity. We
also noted that as long as NASA does not improperly create or
terminate a program, project, or activity, the agency has discretion
in how it carries out the Constellation program consistent with
Congress's statutory direction. Shifts in priority do not in
themselves constitute the termination or elimination of a program,
project, or activity.
Steps NASA Should Take to Reduce Acquisition Risk and Increase the
Likelihood of Success as it Implements the Authorization Act:
Regardless of its current restrictions, once NASA begins to implement
the new direction outlined in the Authorization Act, it will need to
adopt new ways of doing business--particularly with respect to
matching requirements to resources, managing costs, increasing
transparency into the most critical phases of development, and
strengthening accountability--to reduce acquisition risk and increase
likelihood of success. Our work has consistently shown that NASA's
projects cost more and take longer to develop than planned. This year,
for example, we reported that 10 NASA projects that had their cost and
schedule baselines set within the last 3 years experienced cost growth
averaging $121 million, or 18.7 percent, and schedule growth averaging
15 months.[Footnote 20] Many of the projects we reviewed experienced
challenges developing new or retrofitting older technologies,
stabilizing engineering designs, and managing the performance of
contractors and development partners. These challenges, and the
significant cost growth experienced by NASA projects after they were
baselined, occurred as a result of projects being approved with
considerable unknowns about requirements, technologies, costs, or
other resources. Our reports have highlighted the risk that the
Constellation Program was headed in this same direction. For example,
in 2009 we reported that Constellation program had significant
technical and design challenges that until resolved would hinder
NASA's ability to reliably estimate the time and funding needed to
execute the program. In addition, the Constellation program's poorly
phased funding plan has affected the program's ability to deal with
technical challenges.[Footnote 21] Similarly, the Review of U.S. Human
Spaceflight Plans Committee reported that "the U.S. human spaceflight
program appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory. It is
perpetuating the perilous practice of pursuing goals that do not match
allocated resources."[Footnote 22]
While space development projects are complex and difficult by nature,
and most are one-time efforts, the nature of the work should not
preclude NASA from being accountable for achieving what it promises
when requesting and receiving funds. Moreover, measures can be taken
to better position programs for success, which we believe should be
emphasized as the Authorization Act is implemented. Specifically, our
past work has shown that developing a sound business case, based on
matching requirements to available and reasonably expected resources--
including time, dollars, technology, and people--before committing to
a new development effort, reduces risk and increases the likelihood of
success.[Footnote 23] GAO's work has shown that how well an agency
matches resources with requirements sets the stage for the eventual
outcome--desirable or problematic--of the project. The match is
ultimately achieved in every development project, but in successful
development projects, it occurs before significant commitments and
investments are made.
We have reported that steps agencies should take prior to undertaking
new projects include:
* Prioritizing investments so projects can be fully funded and it is
clear where projects stand in relation to the overall portfolio.
* Following an evolutionary path toward meeting needs rather than
attempting to satisfy all needs in a single step.
* Matching requirements to resources--that is, time, money,
technology, and people--before undertaking a new development effort.
* Researching and defining requirements before projects start and
limiting changes after they start.
* Ensuring cost estimates are complete, accurate, and updated
regularly.
* Committing to fully fund projects before they begin.
* Ensuring critical technologies are proven to work as intended before
projects start.
* Assigning more ambitious technology development efforts to research
departments until they are ready to be added to future generations
(increments) of a project.
* Using systems engineering to close gaps between resources and
requirements before launching the development process.[Footnote 24]
Our work has shown that projects that have not attained the level of
knowledge needed to support a sound business case that proceed to
development have been plagued by cost overruns, schedule delays,
decreased capability, and overall poor performance. This phenomenon is
not unique to NASA--the Department of Defense and the Department of
Homeland Security experience the same outcomes with many of their
acquisition programs. If the knowledge the project has attained does
not confirm the business case on which the acquisition was originally
justified, the best practice organizations we have studied do not
allow the project to proceed.
Critical to success is performance and requirements flexibility in
early phases of development. NASA needs to be open to reducing
expectations, deferring them to future projects, or to investing more
resources up front to eliminate gaps between resources and
expectations. In successful projects we have studied, requirements
were flexible until a decision was made to commit to development given
the desire to obtain the capability as soon as possible. This makes it
acceptable to reduce, eliminate, or defer some capabilities so the
project's requirements could be matched with the resources available
to deliver it within the desired time frame.
In addition to ensuring projects establish a business case before they
are approved for long-term financial commitments, both program
officials and senior leaders need to be held accountable for executing
the project by the most efficient and effective means. To that end,
the NASA projects need to be structured to ensure that decision
makers, including NASA and Congress, have the insight necessary to
make informed, knowledge-based decisions and hold project managers
accountable for managing projects effectively and efficiently. We have
reported that during development, NASA should ensure its decision
makers do the following:
* Use quantitative data and demonstrable knowledge to make go/no-go
decisions, covering critical facets of the project such as cost,
schedule, technology readiness, design readiness, production
readiness, and relationships with suppliers.
* Establish consistent metrics to measure design readiness and ensure
they are met before development proceeds.
* Empower project managers to make decisions about the direction of
the project and to resolve problems and implement solutions and hold
them accountable for their choices.
* Ensure contractors are holding suppliers accountable to deliver high-
quality parts for their products through such activities as regular
supplier audits and performance evaluations of quality and delivery,
among other things.
* Encourage project managers to share bad news, and promote
collaboration and communication.
Over the past several years NASA has moved to incorporate a more
knowledge-based approach to managing its development projects and
instill a stronger focus on managing costs. For example, NASA has
taken steps to enhance cost-estimating methodologies and ensure that
independent estimates are used to provide decision makers with an
objective representation of likely project cost and schedule. As a
result, NASA has begun to budget its projects at a higher degree of
confidence. Broader steps NASA is taking focus on strengthening
program and project management, facilitating monitoring of contractor
cost performance, improving agencywide business processes, and
improving financial management.[Footnote 25]
While NASA has laid out a broad plan for reducing acquisition risk,
more needs to be done as the Authorization Act is implemented. For
example,
* NASA does not use a common measure to assess design stability before
allowing programs to move from the design phase to the test and
integration phases of the development process. At the same time, our
studies and others have found that significant cost growth occurs in
these phases and, in some instances, has tied these problems to issues
related to design. Moreover, a recent study by the National Research
Council found that the critical design review milestone for many
missions may be held prematurely--driven by schedule rather than
driven by design maturity. GAO reports and this study have found that
critical design review approval of an immature design can cause
downstream problems for complex acquisitions such as integration
difficulties and late changes.
* NASA does not provide enough transparency in the early, critical
phases of development to help Congress identify risks and
inefficiencies and ensure earlier accountability. Currently, NASA only
begins to publicly share cost and schedule information for projects
that have been formally approved to enter development. To add some
perspective to this timing, neither the Ares nor Orion projects have
reached this point, despite having spent over $9 billion dollars
combined; and the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) just reached this
point in 2008, despite having spent nearly $2 billion prior to that
time. While there is a need to allow projects a period of time for
discovery and to pursue different concepts--particularly highly
complex efforts such as JWST--inadequate transparency into their
progress for what sometimes amounts to 5 or more years can preclude
effective oversight and accountability and make it even more difficult
to stop projects that are not on track to meet the agency's goals with
available resources.
* An independent study released just last week of problems affecting
the James Webb Telescope program concluded that significant changes
are still needed in NASA's oversight and accountability functions to
ensure that programs base their decisions on sound knowledge, noting
that NASA's governance policy is not consistent with accountability
for project execution. In particular, the study found that lack of
clear lines of authority and accountability contributed to a lack of
executive leadership in resolving the broken JWST life-cycle cost
baseline. The study found that JWST's flawed budget should have been
discovered as part of the Goddard Spaceflight Center's execution
responsibility, but the interpretation of the agency's governance
policy on the role of the center in this regard is ambiguous and not
uniformly interpreted within NASA. The study also noted that ongoing,
regular independent assessment and oversight processes at the agency
are missing.
Because NASA is pushing the exploratory envelope, it is reasonable for
unexpected problems and discoveries to occur. Not all projects will go
as planned. On the other hand, it is clear from recent findings from
the JWST Independent Review, the National Research Council (NRC), and
GAO's continued assessments of major projects that inherent risks to
spacecraft development are being exacerbated by poor management and
oversight practices. While NASA still needs to make fundamental
changes to how it plans, manages, and oversees its major investments,
it will be a challenging endeavor as the agency is faced with
implementing a new direction for its human spaceflight programs,
retiring the space shuttle, and balancing investments among its
science portfolios. Our reports, as well as recent studies by the NRC
and the JWST Independent Review Team, however, provide a map that can
help NASA adopt best practices and more effectively manage
investments. As stressed in our 2009 high-risk report, to maximize
NASA's investment dollars, implementation of these steps needs to be
complemented by vigorous executive leadership to foster the expansion
of a business-oriented culture and a sustained commitment to identify
and take action on projects that are not achieving cost, schedule, or
performance goals upon which they were based when they were initiated.
[Footnote 26]
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be glad
to answer any questions that you or Members of the Committee have at
this time.
[End of section]
Appendix I: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Cristina T. Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management,
on (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov:
Susan A. Poling, Managing Associate General Counsel, on (202) 512-2667
or polings@gao.gov:
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony.
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contacts above, Thomas H. Armstrong (Assistant
General Counsel for Appropriations Law), Julia Matta (Assistant
General Counsel for Budget Issues), Shelby S. Oakley (Assistant
Director), Kristine R. Hassinger, Morgan Delaney-Ramaker, Omari
Norman, and Jose Ramos all made key contributions to this testimony.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No. 111-267, 124 Stat. 2805 (Oct. 11, 2010).
[2] B-320091, July 23, 2010; B-319488, May 21, 2010.
[3] Pub. L. No. 111-242, 124 Stat. 2607 (Sept. 30, 2010).
[4] Pub. L. No. 111-117, div. B, tit. III, 123 Stat. 3034, 3113 (Dec.
16, 2009).
[5] Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, Seeking a Human
Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation, available at [hyperlink,
http://www.nasa.gov/offices/hsf/home/index.html] (last visited Nov.
12, 2010). The Committee is commonly known as the Augustine
Commission, after its chairman, Norman R. Augustine.
[6] H.R. Rep. No. 111-366, at 755 (2009).
[7] Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, div. B, title III, 123 Stat. 3034,
3113, 3143 (Dec. 16, 2009).
[8] Pub. L. No. 111-242, § 101.
[9] Pub. L. No. 111-242, § 104.
[10] Pub. L. No. 111-267.
[11] U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
[12] Pub. L. No. 111-242, § 101.
[13] "When two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of
the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the
contrary, to regard each as effective." Andrus v. Glover Construction
Co., 446 U.S. 608, 618-619 (1980).
[14] In addition to the restriction pertaining specifically to the
Constellation program, the Continuing Resolution also bars the use of
funds "to initiate or resume any project or activity for which
appropriations, funds, or other authority were not available during
fiscal year 2010." Pub. L. No. 111-242, § 104.
[15] B-319488, May 21, 2010.
[16] A "program, project, or activity" is "an element within a
budget account. For annually appropriated accounts, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies identify [programs, projects,
or activities] by reference to committee reports and budget
justifications." GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget
Process, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-734SP]
(Washington, D.C.: September 2005).
[17] NASA's actions differed from those of the Department of Energy
(DOE) when it began to implement a loan guarantee program. B-308715,
Apr. 20, 2007. There we found that DOE had staffed and operated a
program office, drafted regulations, and solicited and evaluated "pre-
applications." Therefore, we concluded that DOE violated a statutory
provision that barred it from using funds to "implement or finance"
the loan guarantee program. In contrast, NASA had not created a new
office or drafted any regulations; instead, NASA staff developed
preliminary plans.
[18] B-320091, July 23, 2010.
[19] NASA, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Estimates, at EXP-2, available at
[hyperlink, http://www.nasa.gov/news/budget/FY2010.html] (last visited
Nov. 10, 2010).
[20] GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-227SP] (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 1, 2010).
[21] GAO, NASA: Constellation Program Cost and Schedule Will Remain
Uncertain Until a Sound Business Case Is Established, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-844] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 26,
2009).
[22] Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, Seeking a Human
Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation, available at [hyperlink,
http://www.nasa.gov/offices/hsf/home/index.html].
[23] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future
Combat System, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-376]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007); Defense Acquisitions: Improved
Business Case Key for Future Combat System's Success, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-564T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4,
2006); NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework
Could Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-218] (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 21, 2005); NASA's Space Vision: Business Case for Prometheus 1
Needed to Ensure Requirements Match Available Resources, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-242] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28,
2005).
[24] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Major Space Programs Still at Risk for
Cost and Schedule Increases, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-552T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4,
2008).
[25] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: January
2009).
[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271].
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
