NASA
Key Management and Program Challenges Gao ID: GAO-10-387T February 3, 2010The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the midst of many changes and one of the most challenging periods in its history. The space shuttle is slated to retire this year, the International Space Station nears completion but remains underutilized, and a new means of human space flight is under development. Most recently, the administration has proposed a new direction for NASA. Amid all this potential change, GAO was asked to review the key issues facing NASA. This testimony focuses on four areas: 1) retiring the space shuttle; 2) utilizing and sustaining the International Space Station; 3) continuing difficulty developing large-scale systems, including the next generation of human spaceflight systems; and 4) continuing weaknesses in financial management and information technology systems. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on completed work. To address some of these challenges, GAO has recommended that NASA: provide greater information on shuttle retirement costs to Congress, take actions aimed at more effective use of the station research facilities, develop business cases for acquisition programs, and improve financial and IT management. NASA concurred with GAO's International Space Station recommendations, and has improved some budgeting and management practices in response.
The major challenges NASA faces include: (1) Retiring the Space Shuttle. The impending end of shuttle missions poses challenges to the completion and operation of the International Space Station, and will require NASA to carry out an array of activities to deal with shuttle staff, equipment, and property. This year the shuttle is scheduled to fly its final six missions to deliver hardware, supplies, and an international laboratory to the International Space Station. NASA officials remain confident that the current manifest can be accomplished within the given time, and add that should delays occur, the space station can still function. According to NASA, there are trade-offs the agency can make in what it can take up to support and sustain the station. However, failure to complete assembly would further reduce the station's ability to fulfill its research objectives and short the station of critical spare parts that only the shuttle can currently deliver. Retirement of the shuttle will require disposing of facilities; ensuring the retention of critical skills within NASA's workforce and its suppliers; and disposing of more than 1 million equipment items. (2) Utilizing the International Space Station. The space station, which is nearly complete, faces several significant challenges that may impede efforts to maximize utilization of its research facilities. These include the retirement of the shuttle and the loss of its unmatched capacity to move cargo and astronauts to and from the station; the uncertain future for the station beyond 2015; and the limited time available for research due to competing demands for the crew's time. (3) Developing Systems. A common theme in NASA projects--including the next generation of space flight efforts--is that they cost more and take longer to develop than planned. GAO again found this outcome in a recently completed assessment of NASA's 19 most costly projects--with a combined life-cycle cost of $66 billion. Within the last 3 years, 10 of the 19 projects experienced cost growth averaging $121.1 million or 18.7 percent, and the average schedule growth was 15 months. A number of these projects had experienced considerable cost growth before the most recent baselines were set. (4) Managing Finances and IT. NASA continues to struggle to put its financial house in order. GAO and others have reported for years on these efforts. The NASA Inspector General identified financial management as one of NASA's most serious challenges. In addition, NASA remains vulnerable to disruptions in its information technology network. NASA has made important progress in implementing security controls and aspects of its information security program. However, it has not always implemented sufficient controls to protect information and systems supporting its mission directorates.
GAO-10-387T, NASA: Key Management and Program Challenges
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-10-387T
entitled 'NASA: Key Management and Program Challenges' which was
released on February 3, 2010.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science
and Technology, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Wednesday, February 3, 2010:
NASA:
Key Management and Program Challenges:
Statement of Cristina Chaplain, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-10-387T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-387T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the
midst of many changes and one of the most challenging periods in its
history. The space shuttle is slated to retire this year, the
International Space Station nears completion but remains
underutilized, and a new means of human space flight is under
development. Most recently, the administration has proposed a new
direction for NASA.
Amid all this potential change, GAO was asked to review the key issues
facing NASA. This testimony focuses on four areas: 1) retiring the
space shuttle; 2) utilizing and sustaining the International Space
Station; 3) continuing difficulty developing large-scale systems,
including the next generation of human spaceflight systems; and 4)
continuing weaknesses in financial management and information
technology systems.
In preparing this statement, GAO relied on completed work.
To address some of these challenges, GAO has recommended that NASA:
provide greater information on shuttle retirement costs to Congress,
take actions aimed at more effective use of the station research
facilities, develop business cases for acquisition programs, and
improve financial and IT management. NASA concurred with GAO‘s
International Space Station recommendations, and has improved some
budgeting and management practices in response.
What GAO Found:
The major challenges NASA faces include:
* Retiring the Space Shuttle. The impending end of shuttle missions
poses challenges to the completion and operation of the International
Space Station, and will require NASA to carry out an array of
activities to deal with shuttle staff, equipment, and property. This
year the shuttle is scheduled to fly its final six missions to deliver
hardware, supplies, and an international laboratory to the
International Space Station. NASA officials remain confident that the
current manifest can be accomplished within the given time, and add
that should delays occur, the space station can still function.
According to NASA, there are trade-offs the agency can make in what it
can take up to support and sustain the station. However, failure to
complete assembly would further reduce the station‘s ability to
fulfill its research objectives and short the station of critical
spare parts that only the shuttle can currently deliver. Retirement of
the shuttle will require disposing of facilities; ensuring the
retention of critical skills within NASA‘s workforce and its
suppliers; and disposing of more than 1 million equipment items.
* Utilizing the International Space Station. The space station, which
is nearly complete, faces several significant challenges that may
impede efforts to maximize utilization of its research facilities.
These include the retirement of the shuttle and the loss of its
unmatched capacity to move cargo and astronauts to and from the
station; the uncertain future for the station beyond 2015; and the
limited time available for research due to competing demands for the
crew‘s time.
* Developing Systems. A common theme in NASA projects”including the
next generation of space flight efforts”is that they cost more and
take longer to develop than planned. GAO again found this outcome in a
recently completed assessment of NASA‘s 19 most costly projects”with a
combined life-cycle cost of $66 billion. Within the last 3 years, 10
of the 19 projects experienced cost growth averaging $121.1 million or
18.7 percent, and the average schedule growth was 15 months. A number
of these projects had experienced considerable cost growth before the
most recent baselines were set.
* Managing Finances and IT. NASA continues to struggle to put its
financial house in order. GAO and others have reported for years on
these efforts. The NASA Inspector General identified financial
management as one of NASA‘s most serious challenges. In addition, NASA
remains vulnerable to disruptions in its information technology
network. NASA has made important progress in implementing security
controls and aspects of its information security program. However, it
has not always implemented sufficient controls to protect information
and systems supporting its mission directorates.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-387T] or key
components. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202)
512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to discuss the challenges facing the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). NASA is in the
midst of many changes and one of the most challenging periods in its
history: the space shuttle is slated to retire this year after flying
for 29 years; the International Space Station draws closer both to its
completion but remains underutilized; and the future vehicles for
human space flight are experiencing problems in development and have
been hotly debated and recently reviewed by an independent commission.
The Administration in its 2011 budget is proposing to cancel the
Constellation Systems program and replace it with a new approach that
uses the commercial space industry and international partnerships to
develop new technologies for space exploration. Amid all this
potential change, one thing that will most likely remain constant is
NASA's need to manage programs and projects within a fiscally
constrained environment. This will require hard choices among
competing priorities within the organization, which must balance its
core missions in science, aeronautics, and human space flight and
exploration. In addition, NASA will be competing for an ever-shrinking
share of discretionary spending against other national priorities such
as the economy, fighting terrorism, and health care reform.
Over the years NASA has had significant achievements exploring space,
helping us understand Earth's environment, and conducting fundamental
research in the aeronautical disciplines. Unfortunately, it has not
achieved the same level of results on its business side. For 20 years,
NASA acquisition management has been on GAO's list of federal programs
and operations at high risk and vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement. To its credit, NASA has made a concerted effort to
improve its acquisition management and continues to work
constructively with GAO to address systemic weaknesses in
program/project management, contractor performance, business
processes, financial management, and information technology.
The broad changes proposed for NASA do not change the basic challenges
facing the agency. Against this backdrop, my testimony today focuses
on four management and program challenges: (1) retiring of the space
shuttle, (2) utilizing and sustaining the International Space Station,
(3) continuing difficulty developing large-scale systems, and (4)
continuing weaknesses in financial management and information
technology systems.
In preparing this statement, we relied on completed and ongoing work.
All of the work used in preparing this statement was performed in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We have made a
number of recommendations to address some of the challenges we
identified.
NASA Challenges:
Retiring of the Space Shuttle:
This year the space shuttle is scheduled to fly its final six missions
to deliver hardware, supplies, and an international scientific
laboratory to the International Space Station. NASA officials remain
confident that the current flight manifest can be accomplished within
the given time, and add that should delays occur, the International
Space Station can still function. According to NASA, there are trade-
offs the agency can make in what it can take up to support and sustain
the station. However, failure to complete assembly as currently
planned would further reduce the station's ability to fulfill its
research objectives and deprive the station of critical spare parts
that only the shuttle can deliver. The recent review completed by the
U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee included the option of flying
the space shuttle through 2011 in order to complete the International
Space Station. However, the Committee noted that there are currently
no funds in NASA's budget for additional shuttle flights. Most
recently, the Administration is proposing over $600 million in the
fiscal year 2011 budget to ensure that the space shuttle can fly its
final missions, in case the space shuttle's schedule slips into fiscal
year 2011.
Retirement of the shuttle will involve many activities that warrant
special attention. These include: disposing of the facilities that no
longer are needed while complying with federal, state, and local
environmental laws and regulations; ensuring the retention of critical
skills within NASA's workforce and its suppliers; and disposing of
over 1 million equipment items. In addition, the total cost of shuttle
retirement and transition--to include the disposition of the orbiters
themselves--is not readily transparent in NASA's budget. We have
recommended that NASA clearly identify all direct and indirect shuttle
transition and retirement costs, including any potential sale proceeds
of excess inventory and environmental remediation costs in its future
budget requests. NASA provided this information to the House and
Senate Appropriations committees in July 2009 but did not identify all
indirect shuttle transition and retirement costs in its fiscal year
2010 budget request. We look forward to examining the fiscal year 2011
budget request to determine whether this information is identified.
Lastly, NASA has recognized that sustaining the shuttle workforce
through the retirement of the shuttle while ensuring that a viable
workforce is available to support future activities is a major
challenge. We commend NASA for its efforts to understand and mitigate
the effect of the space shuttle's retirement on the civil service and
contractor workforce. Nevertheless, how well NASA executes its
workforce management plans as they retire the space shuttle will
affect the agency's ability to maintain the skilled workforce to
support space exploration.
Utilizing and Sustaining the International Space Station:
Although it is nearing completion, the International Space Station
faces several significant challenges that may impede efforts to
maximize utilization of research facilities available onboard. These
include: the retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010 and the loss of
its unmatched capacity to move cargo and astronauts to and from the
station; the uncertain future for the station beyond 2015; and the
limited time available for research due to competing demands for the
crew's time.
We have previously reported that the International Space Station will
face a significant cargo supply shortfall without the Space Shuttle's
great capacity to deliver cargo to the station and return it to earth.
[Footnote 1] NASA plans on using a mixed fleet of vehicles, including
those developed by international partners, to service the space
station on an interim basis. However, international partners' vehicles
alone cannot fully satisfy the space station's cargo resupply needs.
Without a domestic cargo resupply capability to augment this mixed
fleet approach, NASA faces a 40 metric ton (approximately 88,000
pounds) cargo resupply shortfall between 2010 and 2015. While NASA is
sponsoring commercial efforts to develop vehicles capable of carrying
cargo to the station and the administration has endorsed this
approach, none of those currently in development has been launched
into orbit, and the vehicles' aggressive development schedules leave
little room for the unexpected.
Furthermore, upon completion of construction, unless the decision is
made to extend station operations, NASA has only 5 years to execute a
robust research program before the International Space Station is
deorbited. The leaves little time to establish a strong utilization
program. At present, NASA projects that its share of the International
Space Station research facilities will be less than fully utilized by
planned NASA research. Specifically, NASA plans to utilize only 48
percent of the racks that accommodate scientific research facilities
onboard, with the remainder available for use by others.[Footnote 2]
Congress has directed NASA to take all necessary steps to ensure that
the International Space Station remains a viable and productive
facility capable of potential utilization through at least 2020.
[Footnote 3] The Administration is proposing in its fiscal year 2011
budget to extend operations of the International Space Station to 2020
or beyond in concert with its international partners.
Lastly, NASA faces a significant constraint for science on board the
space station because of limited crew time. There can only be six crew
members aboard the station at one time due to the number of spaces
available in the "lifeboats," or docked spacecraft that can transport
the crew in case of an emergency. As such, crew time cannot presently
be increased to meet increased demand. Though available crew time may
increase as the six-person crew becomes more experienced with
operating the space station efficiently or if the crew volunteers its
free time for research, crew time for U.S. research remains a limiting
factor. According to NASA officials, potential National Laboratory
researchers should design their experiments to be as automated as
possible or minimize crew involvement required for their experiments
to ensure that they are accepted for flight.
We have recommended that NASA implement actions, such as developing a
plan to broaden and enhance ongoing outreach to potential users and
creating a centralized body to oversee U.S. space station research
decision making, including the selection of all U.S. research to be
conducted on board and ensuring that all U.S. International Space
Station National Laboratory research is meritorious and valid. NASA
concurred with our recommendation and is researching the possibility
of developing a management body to manage space station research,
which would make the International Space Station National Laboratory
similar to other national laboratories.
Continuing Difficulty Developing Large-scale Systems:
NASA projects have produced ground-breaking research and advanced our
understanding of the universe. However, one common theme binds most of
the projects--they cost more and take longer to develop than planned.
As we reported in our recently completed assessment of NASA's 19 most
costly projects--which have a combined life-cycle cost that exceeds
$66 billion--the agency's projects continue to experience cost growth
and schedule delays.[Footnote 4] Ten of the 19 projects, which had
there baselines set within the last 3 years, experienced cost growth
averaging $121.1 million or 18.7 percent and the average schedule
growth was 15 months.[Footnote 5] For example, the Glory project has
recently breached its revised schedule baseline by 16 months and
exceeded its development cost baseline by over 14 percent--for a total
development cost growth of over 75 percent in just 2 years.[Footnote
6] Project officials also indicated that recent technical problems
could cause additional cost growth. Similarly, the Mars Science
Laboratory project is currently seeking reauthorization from Congress
after experiencing development cost growth in excess of 30 percent.
Many of the other projects we reviewed experienced challenges,
including developing new or retrofitting older technologies,
stabilizing engineering designs, and managing the performance of
contractors and development partners.
Our work has consistently shown that reducing these kinds of problems
in acquisition programs hinges on developing a sound business case for
each project. Such a business case provides for early recognition of
challenges, allows managers to take corrective action, and places
needed and justifiable projects in a better position to succeed.
Product development efforts that have not followed a knowledge-based
business case approach have frequently suffered poor cost, schedule,
and performance outcomes. A sound business case includes development
of firm requirements, mature technologies, a preliminary design, a
realistic cost estimate, and sound estimates of available funding and
time needed before the projects proceed beyond preliminary design
review. If necessary, the project should be delayed until a sound
business case, demonstrating the project's readiness to move forward
into product development, is in hand.
In particular, two of NASA's largest projects--Ares I and Orion, which
are part of NASA's Constellation program to return to the moon--face
considerable technical, design, and production challenges. NASA is
actively addressing these challenges. Both projects, however, still
face considerable hurdles to meeting overarching safety and
performance requirements, including limiting vibration during launch,
mitigating the risk of hitting the launch tower during liftoff, and
reducing the mass of the Orion vehicle. In addition, we found that the
Constellation program, from the onset, has faced a mismatch between
funding and program needs. This finding was reinforced by the Review
of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, which reported that NASA's
plans for the Constellation program to return to the moon by 2020 are
unexecutable without increases to NASA's current budget.
To its credit, NASA has acknowledged that the Constellation program,
for example, faces knowledge gaps concerning requirements,
technologies, funding, schedule, and other resources. NASA stated that
it is working to close these gaps and at the preliminary design review
the program will be required to demonstrate that the program and its
projects meet all system requirements with acceptable risk and within
cost and schedule constraints, and that the program has established a
sound business case for proceeding into the implementation phase. Even
though NASA has made progress in developing the actual vehicles, the
mismatch between resources and requirements remains and the
administration's proposed fiscal year 2011 budget leaves the future of
the program in question.
Continuing Weakness in Financial Management and Information Technology
Systems:
NASA has continually struggled to put its financial house in order.
GAO and others have reported for years on these efforts.[Footnote 7]
In fact, GAO has made a number of recommendations to address NASA's
financial management challenges. Moreover, the NASA Inspector General
has identified financial management as one of NASA's most serious
challenges. In a November 2008 report, the Inspector General found
continuing weaknesses in NASA's financial management process and
systems, including internal controls over property accounting. It
noted that these deficiencies have resulted in disclaimed audits of
NASA's financial statements since fiscal year 2003. The disclaimers
were largely attributed to data integrity issues and poor internal
controls. NASA has made progress in addressing some of these issues,
but the recent disclaimer on the fiscal year 2009 audit shows that
more work needs to be done.
We have also reported that NASA remains vulnerable to disruptions in
its information technology network.[Footnote 8] Information security
is a critical consideration for any organization reliant on
information technology and especially important for NASA, which
depends on a number of key computer systems and communication networks
to conduct its work. These networks traverse the Earth and beyond,
providing critical two-way communication links between Earth and
spacecraft; connections between NASA centers and partners, scientists,
and the public; and administrative applications and functions. NASA
has made important progress in implementing security controls and
aspects of its information security program. However, NASA has not
always implemented sufficient controls to protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of the information and systems supporting
its mission directorates. Specifically, NASA did not consistently
implement effective controls to prevent, limit, and detect
unauthorized access to its networks and systems. A key reason for
these weaknesses is that NASA has not yet fully implemented key
activities of its information security program to ensure that controls
are appropriately designed and operating effectively.
During fiscal years 2007 and 2008, NASA reported 1,120 security
incidents that resulted in the installation of malicious software on
its systems and unauthorized access to sensitive information. NASA
established a Security Operations Center in 2008 to enhance prevention
and provide early detection of security incidents and coordinate
agency-level information related to its security posture.
Nevertheless, the control vulnerabilities and program shortfalls--
which GAO identified--collectively increase the risk of unauthorized
access to NASA's sensitive information, as well as inadvertent or
deliberate disruption of its system operations and services. They make
it possible for intruders, as well as government and contractor
employees, to bypass or disable computer access controls and undertake
a wide variety of inappropriate or malicious acts. As a result,
increased and unnecessary risk exists that sensitive information is
subject to unauthorized disclosure, modification, and destruction and
that mission operations could be disrupted.
GAO has recommended actions the NASA Administrator should take to
mitigate control vulnerabilities and fully implement a comprehensive
information security program including: developing and implementing
comprehensive and physical risk assessments; conducting sufficient or
comprehensive security testing and evaluation of all relevant security
controls; and implementing an adequate incident detection program. In
response to our report, the Deputy Administrator noted that NASA is
implementing many of our recommendations as part of an ongoing NASA
strategic effort to improve information technology management and
information technology security program deficiencies. The Deputy
Administrator also stated that NASA will continue to mitigate the
information security weaknesses identified in our report. The actions
identified by the Deputy Administrator, if effectively implemented,
will improve the agency's information security program.
Concluding Observations:
In executing NASA's space exploration, scientific discovery, and
aeronautics research missions, NASA must use its resources as
effectively and efficiently as possible because of the severity of the
fiscal challenges our nation faces and the wide range of competing
national priorities. Establishing a sound business case before a
project starts should also better position NASA management to deliver
promised capability for the funding it receives. While space
development programs are complex and difficult by nature, and most are
one-time efforts, the nature of its work should not preclude NASA from
being accountable for achieving what it promises when requesting and
receiving funds. Congress will also need to do its part to ensure that
NASA has the support to hold poorly performing programs accountable in
order to provide an environment where the systems portfolio as a whole
can succeed with the resources NASA is given. NASA shows a willingness
to face these challenges. We look forward to continuing work with NASA
to develop tools to enhance the management of acquisitions and agency
operations to optimize its investment in space and aeronautics
missions.
Madam Chairwoman, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For additional information, please contact Cristina Chaplain at 202-
512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Individuals making contributions to
this testimony include Jim Morrison, Assistant Director; Greg
Campbell; Richard A. Cederholm; Shelby S. Oakley; Kristine R.
Hassinger; Kenneth E. Patton; Jose A. Ramos; John Warren; and Gregory
C. Wilshusen.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, NASA: Commercial Partners Are Making Progress, but Face
Aggressive Schedules to Demonstrate Critical Space Station Cargo
Transport Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-618] (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2009).
[2] Scientific research facilities currently available inside the
space station are generally mounted in modular, refrigerator-sized
mounts called racks or ExPRESS racks, which provide the utilities
necessary for conducting research.
[3] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-422 § 601.
[4] GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-227SP] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2010.
[5] Of the 19 projects included in our review, 4 are still in the
formulation phase, including Ares I and Orion, where cost and schedule
baselines have yet to be established. Five of the projects just
entered the implementation phase in fiscal year 2009 and therefore
have not experienced cost and schedule growth.
[6] If development cost of a program will exceed the baseline estimate
by more than 30 percent, then NASA is required to seek reauthorization
from Congress in order to continue the program. If the program is
reauthorized, NASA is required to establish new cost and schedule
baselines. 42 U.S.C. § 16613(e).
[7] GAO, Property Management: NASA's Goal of Increasing Equipment
Reutilization May Fall Short without Further Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-187] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2009);
GAO; Business Modernization: NASA Must Consider Agencywide Needs to Reap
the Full Benefits of Its Enterprise Management System Modernization Effort,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-691] (Washington, D.C.: July 20,
2007); and GAO, Financial Management Systems: Additional Efforts Needed to
Address Key Causes of Modernization Failures, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-184] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006).
[8] GAO, Information Security: NASA Needs to Remedy Vulnerabilities in
Key Networks, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-4] (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 15, 2009).
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
