Commercial Launch Vehicles
NASA Taking Measures to Manage Delays and Risks
Gao ID: GAO-11-692T May 26, 2011
Since the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) created the strategy for the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) project in 2005, the space landscape has changed significantly--the Space Shuttle program is retiring and the Ares I will not be available--increasing the importance of the timely development of COTS vehicles. The lack of alternatives for supplying the International Space Station and launching science missions have all contributed to an increased need for the COTS vehicles. The two COTS project partners, Orbital and SpaceX, have made progress in the development of their respective vehicles; however, both providers are behind schedule. As a result, the project recently received an additional $300 million to augment development efforts with risk reduction milestones. This testimony focuses on: (1) COTS development activities, including the recent funding increase; (2) the extent to which any COTS demonstration delays have affected commercial resupply services (CRS) missions and NASA's plans for meeting the space station's cargo resupply needs; and (3) lessons learned from NASA's acquisition approach for COTS. To prepare this statement, GAO used its prior relevant work and conducted additional audit work, such as analyzing each partner's agreement with NASA and interviewing NASA officials. New data in this statement was discussed with agency and company officials who provided technical comments, which we included as appropriate.
SpaceX and Orbital continue to make progress completing milestones under their COTS agreements with NASA, but both partners are working under aggressive schedules and have experienced delays in completing demonstration missions. SpaceX successfully flew its first demonstration mission in December 2010, but the mission was 18 months late and the company's second and third demonstration missions have been delayed by almost 2 years due to design, development, and production challenges with the Dragon spacecraft and Falcon 9 launch vehicle. Orbital faced technical challenges developing the Taurus II launch vehicle and the Cygnus spacecraft and in constructing launch facilities, leading to multiple delays in completing program milestones, including its demonstration mission. NASA has amended its agreements with the partners to include a number of new milestones, such as additional ground and flight tests, to reduce remaining developmental and schedule risks; most of the new milestones completed thus far were finished on time, but many milestones remain. Based on the current launch dates for SpaceX's and Orbital's upcoming COTS demonstration missions, it is likely that neither will launch its initial CRS mission on time, but NASA has taken steps to mitigate the short-term impact to the space station. The launch windows for SpaceX's first and second CRS flights are scheduled to occur either before or during its upcoming COTS demonstration flights and will need to be rescheduled. Orbital's first CRS flight will also likely shift due to a Taurus II test flight. NASA officials said that the agency will have to renegotiate the number of flights needed from each partner and re-baseline the launch windows for future CRS missions once COTS demonstration flights are completed. NASA has taken steps to mitigate the short-term impact of CRS delays through prepositioning of cargo, some of which will be delivered on the last space shuttle flight. Despite these efforts, NASA officials said they would still need one flight in 2012 from SpaceX's and Orbital's vehicles to meet science-related cargo needs. In considering the use of a Space Act agreement for COTS, NASA identified several advantages. These advantages include sharing costs with agreement partners and promoting innovation in the private sector. A disadvantage, however, is that NASA is limited in its ability to influence agreement partners in their approach. At the time the agreements were awarded, NASA was willing to accept the risks of using a Space Act agreement given the goals of the project and alternative vehicles that were available to deliver goods to the space station. As the project has progressed, however, and these alternatives are no longer viable or available, NASA has become less willing to accept the risk involved and has taken steps aimed at risk mitigation. Given a critical need, the risk is present that the government will be required to make additional investments to meet mission needs. The amount of investment can be lessened by ensuring that accurate knowledge about requirements, cost, schedule, and risks is achieved early on. GAO has made recommendations to NASA and NASA is taking steps to help ensure that these fundamentals are present in its major development efforts to increase the likelihood of success.
GAO-11-692T, Commercial Launch Vehicles: NASA Taking Measures to Manage Delays and Risks
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on
Science, Space and Technology, House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Thursday, May 26, 2011:
Commercial Launch Vehicles:
NASA Taking Measures to Manage Delays and Risks:
Statement of Cristina T. Chaplain, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-11-692T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-692T, a report to the Subcommittee on Space and
Aeronautics, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) created
the strategy for the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS)
project in 2005, the space landscape has changed significantly”the
Space Shuttle program is retiring and the Ares I will not be available”
increasing the importance of the timely development of COTS vehicles.
The lack of alternatives for supplying the International Space Station
and launching science missions have all contributed to an increased
need for the COTS vehicles. The two COTS project partners, Orbital and
SpaceX, have made progress in the development of their respective
vehicles; however, both providers are behind schedule. As a result,
the project recently received an additional $300 million to augment
development efforts with risk reduction milestones.
This testimony focuses on: (1) COTS development activities, including
the recent funding increase; (2) the extent to which any COTS
demonstration delays have affected commercial resupply services (CRS)
missions and NASA‘s plans for meeting the space station‘s cargo
resupply needs; and (3) lessons learned from NASA‘s acquisition
approach for COTS.
To prepare this statement, GAO used its prior relevant work and
conducted additional audit work, such as analyzing each partner‘s
agreement with NASA and interviewing NASA officials. New data in this
statement was discussed with agency and company officials who provided
technical comments, which we included as appropriate.
What GAO Found:
SpaceX and Orbital continue to make progress completing milestones
under their COTS agreements with NASA, but both partners are working
under aggressive schedules and have experienced delays in completing
demonstration missions. SpaceX successfully flew its first
demonstration mission in December 2010, but the mission was 18 months
late and the company‘s second and third demonstration missions have
been delayed by almost 2 years due to design, development, and
production challenges with the Dragon spacecraft and Falcon 9 launch
vehicle. Orbital faced technical challenges developing the Taurus II
launch vehicle and the Cygnus spacecraft and in constructing launch
facilities, leading to multiple delays in completing program
milestones, including its demonstration mission. NASA has amended its
agreements with the partners to include a number of new milestones,
such as additional ground and flight tests, to reduce remaining
developmental and schedule risks; most of the new milestones completed
thus far were finished on time, but many milestones remain.
Based on the current launch dates for SpaceX‘s and Orbital‘s upcoming
COTS demonstration missions, it is likely that neither will launch its
initial CRS mission on time, but NASA has taken steps to mitigate the
short-term impact to the space station. The launch windows for
SpaceX‘s first and second CRS flights are scheduled to occur either
before or during its upcoming COTS demonstration flights and will need
to be rescheduled. Orbital‘s first CRS flight will also likely shift
due to a Taurus II test flight. NASA officials said that the agency
will have to renegotiate the number of flights needed from each
partner and re-baseline the launch windows for future CRS missions
once COTS demonstration flights are completed. NASA has taken steps to
mitigate the short-term impact of CRS delays through prepositioning of
cargo, some of which will be delivered on the last space shuttle
flight. Despite these efforts, NASA officials said they would still
need one flight in 2012 from SpaceX‘s and Orbital‘s vehicles to meet
science-related cargo needs.
In considering the use of a Space Act agreement for COTS, NASA
identified several advantages. These advantages include sharing costs
with agreement partners and promoting innovation in the private
sector. A disadvantage, however, is that NASA is limited in its
ability to influence agreement partners in their approach. At the time
the agreements were awarded, NASA was willing to accept the risks of
using a Space Act agreement given the goals of the project and
alternative vehicles that were available to deliver goods to the space
station. As the project has progressed, however, and these
alternatives are no longer viable or available, NASA has become less
willing to accept the risk involved and has taken steps aimed at risk
mitigation. Given a critical need, the risk is present that the
government will be required to make additional investments to meet
mission needs. The amount of investment can be lessened by ensuring
that accurate knowledge about requirements, cost, schedule, and risks
is achieved early on. GAO has made recommendations to NASA and NASA is
taking steps to help ensure that these fundamentals are present in its
major development efforts to increase the likelihood of success.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-692T] or key
components. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at
(202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the status of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) project. GAO conducted work
examining the COTS project in 2009 and reported that progress was
being made, but several risks persisted given aggressive project
schedules.[Footnote 1] Since NASA devised its strategy for the COTS
project in 2005, the space landscape has changed quite significantly,
increasing the importance of the timely development and success of
COTS vehicles to NASA. Specifically, with the impending retirement of
the space shuttle in July 2011, the United States will lack a domestic
capability to send crew and cargo to the International Space Station
and face a cargo resupply shortfall between 2012 and 2020 that cannot
be met by international partners' space vehicles alone.[Footnote 2]
The Ares I project, which was originally intended to be operational in
2010 and to fill the gap between the retirement of the Space Shuttle
program and the availability of the COTS vehicles, pushed its launch
readiness date to 2015 and is now being restructured into a new
program that will not be operational until at least 2016. Further, the
Delta II launch vehicle, which has carried the majority of NASA's
science missions over the last several years, is retiring, the impact
of which is beginning to be felt by NASA's science projects.[Footnote
3] These changes have resulted in an increased need for the vehicles
being developed for COTS not only to address the cargo resupply
shortfall as intended, but also to support a large number of future
science missions at a reasonable cost to NASA. While COTS partners
have made progress in the development of their vehicles, they have
also experienced delays and NASA has provided additional funding to
the partners to reduce the risk that their vehicles would experience
further delays.
Against this backdrop, my testimony today will focus on: (1) the COTS
development activities, including a discussion of the need for the
recent funding augmentation; (2) the extent to which any COTS
demonstration delays have affected Commercial Resupply Services (CRS)
missions to the space station and NASA's plans for meeting space
station cargo resupply needs; and (3) lessons learned from NASA's
acquisition approach for COTS.
In preparing this statement, we relied on our prior report related to
the COTS project and conducted additional audit work in May 2011 to
update information from that report.[Footnote 4] Specifically, we
analyzed each COTS partner's agreement with NASA, amendments to those
agreements, documentation from NASA and partner quarterly program
management reviews, and each partner's CRS contract. We interviewed
NASA COTS and International Space Station program officials and
company officials. We discussed new information presented in this
statement with agency and company officials who provided technical
comments that we incorporated as appropriate. Our prior work on the
COTS project, as well as the work conducted for this statement, was
performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
In 2004, President George W. Bush announced his Vision for Space
Exploration that included direction for NASA to pursue commercial
opportunities for providing transportation and other services to
support the space station after 2010. When the project was established
in 2005, the approach that NASA laid out was a marked change in
philosophy for how the agency planned to service the space station--by
encouraging innovation in the private sector with the eventual goal of
buying services at a reasonable price. As a result, the agency chose
to utilize its other transaction authority under the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,[Footnote 5] as opposed to a more
traditional Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) based contract.
Generally speaking, other transaction authority enhances the
government's ability to acquire cutting-edge science and technology,
in part through attracting companies that typically have not pursued
government contracts because of the cost and impact of complying with
government procurement requirements. These types of agreements are not
considered federal government contracts, and are therefore generally
not subject to those federal laws and regulations that apply to
federal government contracts.
NASA established the Commercial Crew and Cargo program office at
Johnson Space Center in 2005 and budgeted $500 million for fiscal
years 2006 through 2010 for the development and demonstration of cargo
transport capabilities. COTS partners, Orbital Sciences Corporation
(Orbital) and Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX),
have also made significant investments in developing these
capabilities. The COTS project was originally intended to be executed
in two sequential phases: (1) private industry development of cargo
transport capabilities in coordination with NASA and (2) procurement
of commercial resupply services to the space station once cargo
transport capabilities had been successfully demonstrated. In August
2006, NASA competitively awarded a $278 million Space Act agreement to
SpaceX to develop and demonstrate end-to-end transportation systems,
including the development of the Falcon 9 launch vehicle and Dragon
spacecraft, ground operations, and berthing with the space station. In
February 2008, NASA awarded a $170 million Space Act agreement to
Orbital to develop two COTS cargo capabilities, unpressurized and
pressurized[Footnote 6] cargo delivery and disposal, to culminate in
one demonstration flight of its Taurus II launch vehicle and Cygnus
spacecraft.[Footnote 7]
Before either partner had successfully demonstrated its COTS cargo
transport capabilities, the International Space Station program office
awarded two CRS contracts in December 2008 to Orbital and SpaceX under
a separate competitive procurement from COTS. These FAR-based
contracts were for the delivery of at least 40 metric tons
(approximately 88,000 pounds) to the space station between 2010 and
2015. Orbital was awarded 8 cargo resupply missions for approximately
$1.9 billion and SpaceX was awarded 12 cargo resupply missions for
approximately $1.6 billion.
In June 2009, we found that while SpaceX and Orbital had made progress
against development milestones, the companies were working under
aggressive schedules and had experienced schedule slips that delayed
upcoming demonstration launch dates by several months. In addition, we
reported that the vehicles being developed through the COTS project
were essential to NASA's ability to fully utilize the space station
after its assembly was completed and the space shuttle was retired.
Finally, we found that NASA's management of the COTS project generally
adhered to critical project management tools and activities.
Since our 2009 report, the two COTS project partners, Orbital and
SpaceX, have made progress in the development of their respective
vehicles. SpaceX successfully flew its first COTS demonstration
mission in December 2010 and Orbital is planning to fly its COTS
demonstration mission in December 2011. Both providers, however, are
behind schedule--SpaceX's first COTS demonstration mission slipped 18
months and Orbital's first mission was initially planned for March
2011. Such delays are not atypical of development efforts, especially
efforts that are operating under such aggressive schedules.
Nonetheless, the criticality of these vehicles to the space station's
operations, as well as NASA's ability to affordably execute its
science missions has heightened the importance of their timely and
successful completion and lessened the level of risk that NASA is
willing to accept in this regard. As a result, the project recently
requested and received an additional $300 million to augment the
partner development efforts with, according to NASA, risk reduction
milestones.
Demonstration Missions Have Been Delayed, but Progress Against New
Milestones Could Reduce Further Technical and Schedule Risk:
SpaceX: Performance Against Prior Milestones:
SpaceX has successfully completed 18 of 22 milestones to date, but has
experienced lengthy delays in completing key milestones since we last
reported on the company's progress in June 2009. SpaceX's agreement
with NASA established 22 development milestones that SpaceX must
complete in order to successfully demonstrate COTS cargo capabilities.
SpaceX's first demonstration mission readiness review was completed 15
months behind schedule and its successful first demonstration mission
was flown in December 2010, 18 months late. The company's second and
third demonstration missions have been delayed by almost 2 years to
November 2011 and January 2012, respectively.[Footnote 8] Several
factors contributed to the delay in SpaceX's first demonstration
mission readiness review and demonstration mission. These factors
include, among others, delays associated with (1) launching the maiden
Falcon 9 (non-COTS mission), such as Falcon 9 software and database
development; (2) suppliers; (3) design instability and production; (4)
Dragon spacecraft testing and software development; and (5) obtaining
flight safety system approval. For example, SpaceX encountered welding
issues during production of the Dragon propellant tanks and also had
to redesign the Dragon's battery.
In preparing for its second COTS demonstration flight, SpaceX has
experienced additional design, development, and production delays. For
example, several propulsion-related components needed to be
redesigned, the Dragon spacecraft's navigation sensor experienced
development testing delays, and delays were experienced with launch
vehicle tank production. For example, SpaceX's decision to incorporate
design changes to meet future CRS mission requirements has delayed the
company's second demonstration mission. Integration challenges on the
maiden Falcon 9 launch and the first COTS demonstration mission have
also kept SpaceX engineers from moving on to the second COTS
demonstration mission.
SpaceX officials cited the completion of Dragon development efforts,
NASA's safety verification process associated with berthing with the
space station, and transitioning into efficient production of the
Falcon 9 and Dragon to support space station resupply missions as key
drivers of technical and schedule risk going forward. For completing
18 of the 22 milestones, SpaceX has received $258 million in milestone
payments thus far, with $20 million yet to be paid. Appendix I
describes SpaceX's progress meeting the COTS development milestones in
its agreement with NASA.
Orbital: Performance Against Prior Milestones:
Orbital has successfully completed 15 of 19 COTS milestones to date--8
more than when we initially reported on the program in June 2009.
Programmatic changes and developmental difficulties, however, have led
to multiple delays of several months' duration and further delays are
projected for completing the remaining milestones. For example,
according to Orbital officials, the demonstration mission of Orbital's
Taurus II launch vehicle and Cygnus spacecraft has been delayed
primarily due to an increase in design effort to develop a pressurized
cargo carrier in place of the original Cygnus unpressurized cargo
design. After NASA awarded Orbital a CRS contract for eight
pressurized cargo missions, NASA and Orbital amended their COTS
demonstration agreement to replace the unpressurized cargo
demonstration mission with a pressurized cargo demonstration. This
delayed existing milestones, and the schedule was revised to shift the
COTS demonstration mission from December 2010 to March 2011. Since
that time, the schedule for some of Orbital's milestones has been
revised again and the demonstration mission is now planned for
December 2011.
COTS program and Orbital officials also noted technical challenges as
reasons for milestone delays. For example, Orbital officials said
there are several critical Taurus II engine and stage one system tests
that need to be completed by the end of the summer, but that the risk
inherent in these tests is mitigated through an incremental approach
to testing. Specifically, single engine testing has been successfully
completed, and testing will be extended this summer to the full stage
one (i.e., two-engine) testing. COTS program and Orbital officials
also noted delays in Cygnus avionics manufacturing, primarily driven
by design modifications aimed at increasing the safety and robustness
of the system. According to these officials, integration and assembly
of the first Cygnus spacecraft has begun and is now in the initial
electrical testing phase.
Additionally, the completion of the company's launch facilities at the
Mid-Atlantic Regional Space Port in Wallops Island, Virginia, remains
the key component of program risk. NASA COTS program and Orbital
officials cite completion of the Wallops Island launch facilities as
the critical factor for meeting the COTS demonstration mission
schedule. Orbital officials said additional resources have been
allocated to development of the launch complex to mitigate further
slips, and an around-the-clock schedule will be initiated later this
summer to expedite the completion of verification testing of the
liquid fueling facility, which is the primary risk factor in
completing the launch facility.
For completing 15 of the 19 milestones, Orbital has received $157.5
million, with $12.5 million remaining to be paid. Appendix I depicts
Orbital's progress in meeting the COTS development milestones in its
agreement with NASA.
Risk Reduction Milestones Recently Added to COTS Agreements:
In addition to the prior milestones negotiated under the COTS project,
NASA has amended its agreements with SpaceX and Orbital to include a
number of additional milestones aimed at reducing remaining
developmental and schedule risks. COTS officials told us that some
milestones reflect basic risk reduction measures, such as thermal
vacuum testing, that NASA would normally require on launch vehicle or
spacecraft development. A series of amendments were negotiated from
December 2010 to May 2011 after Congress authorized $300 million for
commercial cargo efforts in fiscal year 2011. These amendments add
milestones to (1) augment ground and flight testing, (2) accelerate
development of enhanced cargo capabilities, or (3) further develop the
ground infrastructure needed for commercial cargo capabilities. These
milestones were added incrementally due to NASA operating under
continuing resolutions through the first half of fiscal year 2011.
In May 2009, the President established a Review of U.S. Human Space
Flight Plans Committee composed of space industry experts, former
astronauts, government officials, and academics.[Footnote 9] In its
report, the committee stated that it was concerned that the space
station, and particularly its utilization, may be at risk after
Shuttle retirement as NASA would be reliant on a combination of new
international vehicles and as-yet-unproven U.S. commercial vehicles
for cargo transport. The committee concluded that it might be prudent
to strengthen the incentives to the commercial providers to meet the
schedule milestones. NASA officials stated that if funding were
available, negotiating additional, risk reduction milestones would
improve the chance of mission success, referring specifically to the
companies' COTS demonstration missions. Of the $300 million, $236
million, divided equally between SpaceX and Orbital, will be paid upon
completion of the additional milestones.[Footnote 10] Additionally,
NASA officials stated the International Space Station program office
will pay SpaceX and Orbital $10 million each to fund early cargo
delivery to the space station on the companies' final COTS
demonstration missions. The COTS program manager stated that SpaceX
and Orbital recognize their responsibility under the COTS agreements
for any cost overruns associated with their development efforts, and
that the companies did not come to NASA with a request for additional
funding.
SpaceX has completed 4 of its new milestones on time but has
experienced minor delays in completing 3 others. SpaceX's agreement
with NASA was amended three times between December 2010 and May 2011
to add 18 development milestones that SpaceX must complete in order to
successfully demonstrate COTS cargo capabilities. Some of the new
milestones, for example, are designed to increase NASA's confidence
that SpaceX's Dragon spacecraft will successfully fly approach
trajectories to the space station while others are intended to improve
engine acceptance rates and vehicle production time frames. Milestones
completed thus far include a test of the spacecraft's navigation
sensor and thermal vacuum tests. For completing 7 of the 18
milestones, SpaceX has received $40 million in milestone payments thus
far, with $78 million yet to be paid.
Orbital has completed 4 of its 10 new milestones on schedule and 1 of
the new milestones was delayed by about 1 month. In concurrence with
NASA's request, Orbital agreed to add an initial flight test of the
Taurus II launch vehicle to reduce overall cargo service risk. The
test flight not only separates the risks of the first flight of Taurus
II from the risks of the first flight of the Cygnus spacecraft, but
provides the opportunity to measure the Taurus II flight environments
using an instrumented Cygnus mass simulator. The Taurus II test flight
is scheduled for October 2011. Overall technical risks associated with
Cygnus development are expected to be reduced through additional
software and avionics tests. Milestones completed thus far include
early mission analyses and reviews, as well as delivery of mission
hardware. For completing the first 5 new milestones, Orbital has
received $69 million, with $49 million remaining to be paid. Appendix
I describes SpaceX's and Orbital's progress meeting the new COTS
development milestones in their agreements with NASA.
COTS Delays Will Likely Cause Resupply Flights to Slip, but NASA Has
Taken Steps to Mitigate Short-Term Impact:
Based on the current launch dates for SpaceX's and Orbital's upcoming
COTS demonstration missions, it is likely that both commercial
partners will not launch their initial CRS missions on time, but NASA
has taken steps to mitigate the short-term impact to the space
station. The launch window for SpaceX's first CRS flight is from April
to June 2011 and from October to December 2011 for its second CRS
flight. These launch windows are either scheduled to occur before or
during SpaceX's upcoming COTS demonstration flights and thus will need
to be rescheduled. In the case of Orbital, NASA officials told us that
the launch window for its first CRS flight is from January to March
2012, but will likely slip from those dates given the Taurus II test
flight added to its milestone schedule. NASA officials added that once
SpaceX and Orbital have finished completing their COTS demonstration
flights, NASA will have to renegotiate the number of flights needed
from each partner and re-baseline the launch windows for future CRS
missions.
International Space Station program officials told us they have taken
steps to mitigate the short-term impact of CRS flight delays through
prepositioning of cargo on the last space shuttle flights, including
cargo that is being launched on the planned contingency space shuttle
flight in early July 2011. Officials added that these flights and the
planned European Space Agency's Automated Transfer Vehicle and Japan's
H-II Transfer Vehicle flights in 2012 will carry enough cargo to
sustain the six person space station crew through 2012 and to meet
science-related cargo needs through most of 2012. Despite these steps,
NASA officials said they would still need one flight each from
SpaceX's and Orbital's vehicles in order to meet science-related cargo
needs in 2012. Beyond 2012, NASA is highly dependent on SpaceX's and
Orbital's vehicles in order to fully utilize the space station. For
example, we reported in April 2011 that 29 percent of the flights
planned to support space station operations through 2020 were
dependent on those vehicles.[Footnote 11] In addition, NASA officials
confirmed that the agency has no plans to purchase additional cargo
flights on Russian Progress vehicles beyond 2011 and the European
Space Agency and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency have no
current plans to manufacture additional vehicles beyond their existing
commitments or to accelerate production of planned vehicles. We
reported previously that if the COTS vehicles are delayed, NASA
officials said they would pursue a course of "graceful degradation" of
the space station until conditions improve. In such conditions, the
space station would only conduct minimal science experiments.[Footnote
12]
Even With Identified Advantages, NASA Has Taken Measures to Address
Risks to COTS Strategy:
NASA's intended use of the COTS Space Act agreements was to stimulate
the space industry rather than acquiring goods and services for its
direct use. Traditional FAR contracts are to be used when NASA is
procuring something for the government's direct benefit.[Footnote 13]
NASA policy provides that funded Space Act agreements can only be used
if no other instrument, such as a traditional FAR contract, can be
used.[Footnote 14] Therefore, Space Act agreements and FAR-based
contracts are to be used for different purposes. In considering the
use of funded Space Act agreements for COTS, NASA identified several
advantages. For example:
* The government can share costs with the agreement partner with fixed
government investment.
* Payment to partner is made only after successful completion of
performance-based milestones.
* The government can terminate the agreement if the partner is not
reasonably meeting milestones.
* Limited government requirements allow optimization of systems to
meet company's commercial business needs.
These types of agreements can also have disadvantages, however. For
example, Space Act agreements may have more limited options for
oversight as compared to other science mission and human spaceflight
development efforts that are accomplished under more traditional FAR
contracts. NASA identified other disadvantages of using a Space Act
agreement. For example:
* The government has limited ability to influence agreement partners
in their approach.
* The government lacks additional management tools (beyond performance
payments at milestones) to incentivize partners to meet technical and
schedule performance.
Given the intended goals of the project and the availability of
alternative vehicles to deliver goods to the space station when the
COTS agreements were signed, NASA was willing to accept the risks
associated with the disadvantages of using a Space Act agreement.
[Footnote 15] As the project has progressed, however, and these
alternatives are no longer viable or available, NASA has become less
willing to accept the risks involved. As a result, the agency took
steps aimed at risk mitigation, primarily through additional funding.
I would like to point out that neither Space Act agreements nor more
traditional FAR contracts guarantee positive outcomes. Further, many
of the advantages and disadvantages identified by NASA for using a
Space Act agreement can also be present when using FAR-based
contracts, depending on how the instrument is managed or written. For
example, both a FAR contract and a Space Act agreement can provide for
cost sharing and the government also has the ability to terminate a
FAR contract or a Space Act agreement if it is dissatisfied with
performance. The ineffective management of the instrument can be an
important contributor to poor outcomes. For example, although a Space
Act agreement may lack management tools to incentivize partners, we
have reported in the past that award fees, which are intended to
incentivize performance on FAR-based contracts, are not always applied
in an effective manner or even tied to outcomes.[Footnote 16]
Additionally, the oversight that NASA conducts under a FAR-based
contract has not always been used effectively to ensure that projects
meet cost and schedule baselines.[Footnote 17]
Even with the advantages and disadvantages that can be present in
various instruments, given a critical need, the government bears the
risk for having to make additional investments to get what it wants,
when it wants it. The additional investment required, however, can be
lessened by ensuring that accurate knowledge about requirements, cost,
schedule, and risks is achieved early on. We have reported for years
that disciplined processes are key to ensuring that what is being
proposed can actually be accomplished within the constraints that bind
the project, whether they are cost, schedule, technical, or any other
number of constraints.[Footnote 18] We have made recommendations to
NASA and NASA is taking steps to address these recommendations to help
ensure that these fundamentals are present in its major development
efforts to increase the likelihood of success.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy
to respond to any questions you may have at this time.
[End of section]
Appendix I: COTS Partners' Progress Completing Prior and New
Milestones:
Table 1: SpaceX's Progress Completing Prior COTS Development
Milestones:
Milestone number: 1;
Milestone description: Project Management Plan Review;
Scheduled completion date: September 2006;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $23.1 million.
Milestone number: 2;
Milestone description: Demo 1 System Requirements Review;
Scheduled completion date: November 2006;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 3;
Milestone description: Demo 1 Preliminary Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: February 2007;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $18.1 million.
Milestone number: 4;
Milestone description: Financing Round 1;
Scheduled completion date: March 2007;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 5;
Milestone description: Demo 2 System Requirements Review;
Scheduled completion date: March 2007;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $31.1 million.
Milestone number: 6;
Milestone description: Demo 1 System Critical Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: August 2007;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $8.1 million.
Milestone number: 7;
Milestone description: Demo 3 System Requirements Review;
Scheduled completion date: October 2007;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $22.3 million.
Milestone number: 8;
Milestone description: Demo 2 Preliminary Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: December 2007;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $21.1 million.
Milestone number: 9;
Milestone description: Draco Initial Hot-Fire;
Scheduled completion date: March 2008;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $6 million.
Milestone number: 10;
Milestone description: Financing Round 2;
Scheduled completion date: March 2008;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 11;
Milestone description: Demo 3 Preliminary Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: June 2008;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $22 million.
Milestone number: 12;
Milestone description: Multi-engine Test;
Scheduled completion date: September 2008;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $22 million.
Milestone number: 13;
Milestone description: Demo 2/Demo 3 System Critical Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: December 2008;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $25 million.
Milestone number: 14;
Milestone description: Financing Round 3;
Scheduled completion date: March 2009;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 15;
Milestone description: Demo 1 Readiness Review;
Scheduled completion date: March 2009;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay if applicable (months): 15;
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 16;
Milestone description: Communications Unit Flight Unit Design, Accept,
Delivery;
Scheduled completion date: May 2009;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay if applicable (months): 2;
Payment amount: $9 million.
Milestone number: 17;
Milestone description: Demo 1 Mission;
Scheduled completion date: June 2009;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay if applicable (months): 18;
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 18;
Milestone description: Demo 2 Readiness Review;
Scheduled completion date: September 2009[A];
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay if applicable (months): 24 (projected);
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 19;
Milestone description: Demo 2 Mission;
Scheduled completion date: November 2009[A];
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay if applicable (months): 24 (projected);
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 20;
Milestone description: Cargo Integration Demonstration;
Scheduled completion date: Jan. 2010;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 21;
Milestone description: Demo 3 Readiness Review;
Scheduled completion date: Jan. 2010[A];
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay if applicable (months): 23 (projected);
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 22;
Milestone description: Demo 3 Mission;
Scheduled completion date: Mar. 2010[A];
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay if applicable (months): 22 (projected);
Payment amount: $5 million.
Total:
Payment amount: $278 million for the completion of all milestones;
$258 million paid to date.
Source: NASA and SpaceX.
[A] NASA is currently reviewing a proposed amendment that would change
the completion dates for milestones 18, 19, 21, and 22. In particular,
Demo Mission 2 (milestone 19) would take place in November 2011 and
Demo Mission 3 in January 2012.
[End of table]
Table 2: Orbital's Progress Completing Prior COTS Development
Milestones:
Milestone number: 1;
Milestone description: Program Plan Review;
Scheduled completion: date: March 2008;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 2;
Milestone description: Demo Mission System Requirements Review;
Scheduled completion: date: June 2008;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $20 million.
Milestone number: 3;
Milestone description: Unpressurized Cargo Module Preliminary Design
Review;
Scheduled completion: date: July 2008;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 4;
Milestone description: Deleted; COTS System Preliminary Design Review
was milestone 4, but it has been renumbered as milestone 10;
Scheduled completion: date: No longer applicable;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No longer applicable;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: No longer applicable.
Milestone number: 5;
Milestone description: COTS Integration/Operations Facility Review;
Scheduled completion: date: September 2008;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 6;
Milestone description: Pressurized Cargo Module Preliminary Design
Review;
Scheduled completion: date: October 2008;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 7;
Milestone description: Deleted; Unpressurized Cargo Module Critical
Design Review;
Scheduled completion: date: No longer applicable;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No longer applicable;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: No longer applicable.
Milestone number: 8;
Milestone description: Instrumentation Program and Command List;
Scheduled completion: date: February 2009;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 9;
Milestone description: Completion of ISS Phase 1 Safety Review;
Scheduled completion: date: March 2009;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 10;
Milestone description: COTS System Preliminary Design Review;
Scheduled completion: date: April 2009;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay, if applicable (months): 1;
Payment amount: $20 million.
Milestone number: 11;
Milestone description: Deleted; Unpressurized Cargo Module Fabrication
Started;
Scheduled completion: date: No longer applicable;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No longer applicable;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: No longer applicable.
Milestone number: 11;
Milestone description: Pressurized Cargo Module Critical Design Review;
Scheduled completion: date: July 2009;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 12;
Milestone description: Cygnus Avionics Test;
Scheduled completion: date: August 2009;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 13;
Milestone description: Completion of ISS Phase 2 Safety Review;
Scheduled completion: date: August 2009;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay, if applicable (months): 3;
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 14;
Milestone description: COTS System Critical Design Review;
Scheduled completion: date: September 2009;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay, if applicable (months): 6;
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 15;
Milestone description: Service Module Core Assembly Completed;
Scheduled completion: date: December 2009;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay, if applicable (months): 8;
Payment amount: $7.5 million.
Milestone number: 16;
Milestone description: Service Module Test Readiness Review;
Scheduled completion: date: April 2010;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay, if applicable (months): 7;
Payment amount: $7.5 million.
Milestone number: 17;
Milestone description: Service Module Initial Comprehensive
Performance Test;
Scheduled completion: date: July 2010[A];
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay, if applicable (months): 11 (projected);
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 18;
Milestone description: Launch Vehicle Stage 1 Assembly Complete;
Scheduled completion: date: October 2010[A];
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay, if applicable (months): 11 (projected);
Payment amount: $2.5 million.
Milestone number: 19;
Milestone description: Cargo Integration Demonstration;
Scheduled completion: date: December 2010;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $2.5 million.
Milestone number: 20;
Milestone description: Mission Readiness Review;
Scheduled completion: date: February 2011[A];
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay, if applicable (months): 8 (projected);
Payment amount: $2.5 million.
Milestone number: 21;
Milestone description: System Demonstration Flight;
Scheduled completion: date: March 2011[A];
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay, if applicable (months): 9 (projected);
Payment amount: $2.5 million.
Total:
Payment amount: $170 million for completion of all milestones; $157.5
million paid to date.
Source: NASA and Orbital.
Note: When Orbital amended its agreement with NASA in March 2009, it
deleted milestones 7 and 11, and moved milestone 4 to become milestone
10. These changes are indicated in this revised schedule.
[A] Milestones 17, 18, 20, and 21 were amended in March 2011 to
reflect updated milestone descriptions and completion dates. In
particular, the System Demonstration Flight (milestone 21) is now
planned for December 2011.
[End of table]
Table 3: SpaceX's Progress Completing New COTS Development Milestones:
Milestone number: 23;
Milestone description: Modal Test Plan and Setup;
Scheduled completion date: November 2010;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes[A];
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 24;
Milestone description: Modal Test;
Scheduled completion date: December 2010;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 25;
Milestone description: Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) Test (open
loop);
Scheduled completion date: December 2010;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 26;
Milestone description: Solar Array Deployment and Component Thermal
Vacuum Tests;
Scheduled completion date: December 2010;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 27;
Milestone description: Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) Test Plan
(closed loop);
Scheduled completion date: March 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay if applicable (months): less than 1[B];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 28;
Milestone description: Thermal Vacuum System Test Plan and Procurement;
Scheduled completion date: March 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay if applicable (months): less than 1[C];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 29;
Milestone description: Overall Infrastructure Plan and Long Lead
Procurement;
Scheduled completion date: March 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay if applicable (months): less than 2[D];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 30;
Milestone description: Thermal Vacuum System Tests;
Scheduled completion date: July 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $20 million.
Milestone number: 31;
Milestone description: Test Site Infrastructure Implementation;
Scheduled completion date: June 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 32;
Milestone description: Dragon Trunk Acoustic Test;
Scheduled completion date: June 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 33;
Milestone description: Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) Test
(closed loop);
Scheduled completion date: August 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 34;
Milestone description: Design Review of Enhanced Powered Cargo
Accommodations;
Scheduled completion date: August 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 35;
Milestone description: Design Review of Pressurized Cargo Volume
Increase;
Scheduled completion date: August 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 36;
Milestone description: Full Dragon Electromagnetic
Interference/Capability Test and Second Flight-Like Hardware in the
Loop Simulator;
Scheduled completion date: July 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 37;
Milestone description: Dragon Cargo Racks and Hatch Simulator;
Scheduled completion date: August 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $3 million.
Milestone number: 38;
Milestone description: Ground Demonstration of Enhanced Powered Cargo;
Scheduled completion date: September 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 39;
Milestone description: Launch Site Infrastructure Implementation;
Scheduled completion date: September 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 40;
Milestone description: Production Infrastructure Implementation;
Scheduled completion date: September 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Total:
Payment amount: $118 million for the completion of all milestones;
$40 million paid to date.
Source: NASA and SpaceX.
[A] The fifth amendment to SpaceX's agreement with NASA included
Milestone 23 with a due date of November 2010. Because NASA did not
sign this amendment until December 2010 and SpaceX completed the
milestone that same month, NASA views this milestone as having been
completed on time.
[B] SpaceX successfully completed Milestone 27 on April 18, 2011.
[C] SpaceX successfully completed Milestone 28 on April 28, 2011.
[D] SpaceX successfully completed Milestone 29 on May 10, 2011.
[End of table]
Table 4: Orbital's Progress Completing New COTS Development Milestones:
Milestone number: 22;
Milestone description: Mission Concept Review for Taurus II Maiden
Test Flight;
Scheduled completion date: December 2010;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $20 million.
Milestone number: 23;
Milestone description: Taurus II Maiden Flight Preliminary Mission
Analysis;
Scheduled completion date: February 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 24;
Milestone description: Cygnus Mass Simulator Design Review;
Scheduled completion date: March 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 25;
Milestone description: Installation of Additional Processor in the
Loop Simulators;
Scheduled completion date: April 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): No;
Delay, if applicable (months): less than 1[A];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 26;
Milestone description: PROX Flight Equivalent Unit Test Unit;
Scheduled completion date: May 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $5 million.
Milestone number: 27;
Milestone description: Taurus II Maiden Flight Stage 1 Core delivered
to Wallops Flight Facility (WFF);
Scheduled completion date: April 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): Yes;
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $24 million.
Milestone number: 28;
Milestone description: Taurus II Maiden Flight Upper Stage delivered
to WFF;
Scheduled completion date: June 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $20 million.
Milestone number: 29;
Milestone description: Taurus II Maiden Flight Cygnus Mass Simulator
at WFF in preparation for integration with Taurus II Maiden Flight
Launch Vehicle;
Scheduled completion date: June 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 30;
Milestone description: Taurus II Maiden Flight Launch Vehicle Stage 1
Assembly Complete;
Scheduled completion date: July 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $10 million.
Milestone number: 31;
Milestone description: Taurus II Maiden Flight;
Scheduled completion date: October 2011;
Completed on time (Yes/No): [Empty];
Delay, if applicable (months): [Empty];
Payment amount: $4 million.
Total:
Payment amount: $118 million for the completion of all milestones;
$69 million paid to date.
Source: NASA and Orbital:
[A] Orbital successfully completed Milestone 25 on May 20, 2011.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
For questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512-
4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this testimony.
Staff Acknowledgments:
Individuals making key contributions to this statement include Shelby
S. Oakley, Assistant Director; Jeff Hartnett; Andrew Redd; Megan
Porter; Laura Greifner; and Alyssa Weir.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, NASA: Commercial Partners Are Making Progress, but Face
Aggressive Schedules to Demonstrate Critical Space Station Cargo
Transport Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-618] (Washington, D.C.: June 16,
2009).
[2] International partners' vehicles include the Russian Federal Space
Agency's Progress (cargo) and Soyuz (crew), the European Space
Agency's Automated Transfer Vehicle (cargo), and the Japan Aerospace
Exploration Agency's H-II Transfer Vehicle (cargo).
[3] GAO, NASA: Medium Launch Transition Strategy Leverages Ongoing
Investments but is Not Without Risk, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-107] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22,
2010).
[4] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-618].
[5] Pub. L. No. 85-568, § 203 (1958). This act is commonly referred to
as the Space Act and agreements signed utilizing NASA's other
transaction authority are known as Space Act agreements.
[6] Pressurized cargo refers to cargo that is carried inside the
spacecraft. This cargo includes items such as food, water, and
materials to support scientific experiments.
[7] NASA originally awarded a $207 million Space Act agreement to
Rocketplane Kistler (RpK), but the agreement was terminated in October
2007 after RpK had missed technical and financial milestones.
Subsequently, Orbital was awarded the remaining funds--$170 million.
In March 2009, Orbital and NASA amended this agreement, removing its
unpressurized cargo demonstration and replacing it with a pressurized
demonstration, scheduled for March 2011.
[8] According to the COTS program manager, NASA is also discussing
with SpaceX about the possibility of combining the second and third
demonstration missions into a single mission. SpaceX officials told us
they have already begun building the Dragon spacecraft for the second
COTS demonstration mission so that it can be fully capable of berthing
with the space station.
[9] Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, Seeking a Human
Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation (Washington, D.C.:
October 2009).
[10] The COTS program manager reported that $34 million of the $300
million was for NASA Headquarters and Johnson Space Center program
support and administration as well as technical and mission support
for the remaining COTS demonstration flights and $10 million would be
spent on milestone payments for Orbital's Milestones 20 and 21 and
SpaceX's Milestone 22.
[11] GAO, International Space Station (ISS) - Ongoing Assessments for
Life Extension Appear to be Supported, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-519R] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11,
2011).
[12] GAO, International Space Station: Significant Challenges May
Limit Onboard Research, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-9] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 25,
2009).
[13] 31 U.S.C. § 6303.
[14] NASA Policy Directive 1050.1I, Authority to Enter into Space Act
Agreements (Dec. 23, 2008).
[15] NASA goals were to: (1) implement Space Exploration policy with
investments to stimulate the commercial space industry; (2) facilitate
U.S. private industry demonstrations of cargo and crew space
transportation capabilities with the goal of achieving safe, reliable,
cost-effective access to low-Earth orbit; and (3) create a market
environment where commercial services are available to the government
and private sector customers.
[16] GAO, NASA Procurement: Use of Award Fees for Achieving Program
Outcomes Should Be Improved, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-58] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17,
2007).
[17] GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-239SP] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 3, 2011).
[18] GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-306SP] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009); GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale
Projects, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-227SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2010); and GAO-11-239SP.
[End of section]
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