Nuclear Regulation
NRC Needs More Effective Analysis to Ensure Accumulation of Funds to Decommission Nuclear Power Plants Gao ID: GAO-04-32 October 30, 2003Following the shutdown of a nuclear power plant a significant radioactive waste hazard remains until the waste is removed and the plant site decommissioned. In 1999, GAO reported that the combined value of the owners' decommissioning funds was insufficient to ensure enough funds would be available for decommissioning. GAO was asked to update its 1999 report and to evaluate the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) analysis of the owners' funds and its process for acting on reports that show insufficient funds.
Although the collective status of the owners' decommissioning fund accounts has improved considerably since GAO's last report, some individual owners are not on track to accumulate sufficient funds for decommissioning. Based on our analysis and most likely economic assumptions, the combined value of the nuclear power plant owners' decommissioning fund accounts in 2000--about $26.9 billion--was about 47 percent greater than needed at that point to ensure that sufficient funds will be available to cover the approximately $33 billion in estimated decommissioning costs when the plants are permanently shutdown. This value contrasts with GAO's prior finding that 1997 account balances were collectively 3 percent below what was needed. However, overall industry results can be misleading. Because funds are generally not transferable from funds that have more than sufficient reserves to those with insufficient reserves, each individual owner must ensure that enough funds are available for decommissioning its particular plants. We found that 33 owners with ownership interests in a total of 42 plants had accumulated fewer funds than needed through 2000 to be on track to pay for eventual decommissioning. In addition, 20 owners with ownership interests in a total of 31 plants recently contributed less to their trust funds than we estimate they needed to put them on track to meet their decommissioning obligations. NRC's analysis of the owners' 2001 biennial reports was not effective in identifying owners that might not be accumulating sufficient funds to cover their eventual decommissioning costs. In reviewing the 2001 reports, NRC reported that all owners appeared to be on track to have sufficient funds for decommissioning. In reaching this conclusion, NRC relied on the owners' future plans for fully funding their decommissioning obligations. However, based on the owners' recent actual contributions, and using a different method, GAO found that several owners could be at risk of not meeting their financial obligations for decommissioning when these plants stop operating. In addition, for plants with more than one owner, NRC did not separately assess the status of each co-owner's trust funds against each co-owner's contractual obligation to fund decommissioning. Instead, NRC assessed whether the combined value of the trust funds for the plant as a whole was reasonable. Such an assessment for determining whether owners are accumulating sufficient funds can produce misleading results because owners with more than sufficient funds can appear to balance out owners with less than sufficient funds even, though funds are generally not transferable among owners. Moreover, NRC has not established criteria for taking action if it determines that an owner is not accumulating sufficient funds.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-32, Nuclear Regulation: NRC Needs More Effective Analysis to Ensure Accumulation of Funds to Decommission Nuclear Power Plants
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Report to the Honorable Edward J. Markey, House of Representatives:
October 2003:
NUCLEAR REGULATION:
NRC Needs More Effective Analysis to Ensure Accumulation of Funds to
Decommission Nuclear Power Plants:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-32] GAO-04-32:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-32, a report to the Honorable Edward J. Markey,
House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Following the shutdown of a nuclear power plant a significant
radioactive waste hazard remains until the waste is removed and the
plant site decommissioned. In 1999, GAO reported that the combined
value of the owners‘ decommissioning funds was insufficient to ensure
enough funds would be available for decommissioning. GAO was asked to
update its 1999 report and to evaluate the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission‘s (NRC) analysis of the owners‘ funds and its process for
acting on reports that show insufficient funds.
What GAO Found:
Although the collective status of the owners‘ decommissioning fund
accounts has improved considerably since GAO‘s last report, some
individual owners are not on track to accumulate sufficient funds for
decommissioning. Based on our analysis and most likely economic
assumptions, the combined value of the nuclear power plant owners‘
decommissioning fund accounts in 2000”about $26.9 billion”was about 47
percent greater than needed at that point to ensure that sufficient
funds will be available to cover the approximately $33 billion in
estimated decommissioning costs when the plants are permanently
shutdown. This value contrasts with GAO‘s prior finding that 1997
account balances were collectively 3 percent below what was needed.
However, overall industry results can be misleading. Because funds are
generally not transferable from funds that have more than sufficient
reserves to those with insufficient reserves, each individual owner
must ensure that enough funds are available for decommissioning its
particular plants. We found that 33 owners with ownership interests in
a total of 42 plants had accumulated fewer funds than needed through
2000 to be on track to pay for eventual decommissioning. In addition,
20 owners with ownership interests in a total of 31 plants recently
contributed less to their trust funds than we estimate they needed to
put them on track to meet their decommissioning obligations.
NRC‘s analysis of the owners‘ 2001 biennial reports was not effective
in identifying owners that might not be accumulating sufficient funds
to cover their eventual decommissioning costs. In reviewing the 2001
reports, NRC reported that all owners appeared to be on track to have
sufficient funds for decommissioning. In reaching this conclusion, NRC
relied on the owners‘ future plans for fully funding their
decommissioning obligations. However, based on the owners‘ recent
actual contributions, and using a different method, GAO found that
several owners could be at risk of not meeting their financial
obligations for decommissioning when these plants stop operating. In
addition, for plants with more than one owner, NRC did not separately
assess the status of each co-owner‘s trust funds against each co-
owner‘s contractual obligation to fund decommissioning. Instead, NRC
assessed whether the combined value of the trust funds for the plant
as a whole was reasonable. Such an assessment for determining whether
owners are accumulating sufficient funds can produce misleading
results because owners with more than sufficient funds can appear to
balance out owners with less than sufficient funds even, though funds
are generally not transferable among owners. Moreover, NRC has not
established criteria for taking action if it determines that an owner
is not accumulating sufficient funds.
What GAO Recommends:
NRC should (1) develop an effective method for determining whether
owners are accumulating decommissioning funds at sufficient rates and
(2) establish criteria for taking action when it is determined that an
owner is not accumulating sufficient funds. NRC disagreed with these
recommendations suggesting that its method is effective and that it is
better to deal with unacceptable levels of financial assurance on a
case-by–case basis. GAO continues to believe that limitations in NRC‘s
method reduce its effectiveness and without criteria, NRC might not be
able to ensure owners are accumulating decommissioning funds at
sufficient rates.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-32.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Jim Wells, at (202)
512-6877 or WellsJ@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Despite Industry-wide Improvement, Some Owners of Nuclear Power Plants
Are Not Accumulating Sufficient Decommissioning Funds:
NRC's Analysis Did Not Effectively Determine Whether Each Owner Was
Accumulating Sufficient Decommissioning Funds:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology of Our Analysis of the
Decommissioning Trust Funds:
Appendix II: Detailed Results of Our Analysis of the Decommissioning
Trust Funds:
Appendix III: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
GAO Comments:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Status of Individual Owners' Trust Fund Balances through 2000,
Compared with Benchmark Trust Fund Balances, under Most Likely
Assumptions:
Table 2: Status of Individual Owners' Recent Trust Fund Contributions,
Compared with Benchmark Trust Fund Contributions, under Most Likely
Assumptions:
Table 3: Status of Combined Trust Funds Compared with Benchmarks for
Balances and Contributions (by Percentage above or below Benchmarks):
Table 4: Owners with More, or Less, Than Benchmark Trust Fund Balances
and Contributions, under Most Likely Assumptions (by Percentage above
or below Benchmarks):
Table 5: Selected Owners with More, or Less, Than Benchmark Trust Fund
Balances and Contributions, under Optimistic Assumptions (by Percentage
above or below Benchmarks):
Table 6: Selected Owners with More, or Less, Than Benchmark Trust Fund
Balances and Contributions, under Pessimistic Assumptions (by
Percentage above or below Benchmarks):
Abbreviations:
FERC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:
GDP: Gross Domestic Product:
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
SAFSTOR: Safe Storage:
Letter October 30, 2003:
The Honorable Edward J. Markey:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Markey:
Following the retirement of a nuclear power plant and removal of the
plant's spent or used fuel, a significant radioactive waste hazard
remains until the waste is removed and disposed of, and the plant site
decommissioned.[Footnote 1] Decommissioning of existing plants is
expected to cost nuclear power plant owners about $33 billion
dollars.[Footnote 2] The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which
licenses nuclear power plants, requires plant owners to submit biennial
reports on decommissioning funding that, among other things, provide
financial assurance that enough funding will be available when the
power plants are retired.
In 1999, we reported that the combined value of the owners'
decommissioning trust fund accounts (as of the end of 1997) was 3
percent less than needed to ensure that enough funds would be available
when the plants are retired.[Footnote 3] In addition, we found that NRC
had not established criteria for responding to unacceptable levels of
financial assurance. In December 2001, we reported that transfers of
plant licenses among companies stemming from economic deregulation and
the restructuring of the electricity industry had, in many cases,
increased assurances that new plant owners would have sufficient
decommissioning funds when their plants are retired.[Footnote 4]
Nevertheless, in some instances, NRC's evaluation of the adequacy of
funding arrangements was not rigorous enough to ensure that
decommissioning funds would be adequate.
In this context, you asked us to update our earlier findings on the
adequacy of owners' decommissioning funds. Specifically, this report
(1) assesses the extent to which nuclear plant owners are accumulating
funds at sufficient rates to pay decommissioning costs when their
plants' licenses expire and (2) evaluates NRC's analysis of the owners'
2001 biennial reports and its process for acting on reports that show
unacceptable levels of financial assurance.
As part of our review, we collected data from the 2001 biennial reports
on estimated decommissioning costs and actual decommissioning trust
fund balances, generally as of December 31, 2000, for 122 nuclear power
plants licensed by NRC. In addition, we surveyed the owners of the
plants to determine how the trust fund balances were invested in 2000
and to identify the annual amounts that the owners had contributed to
the trust funds in recent years. Eighty-two percent of the owners
responded to our survey.[Footnote 5] Using an approach similar to that
used for our 1999 report,[Footnote 6] we analyzed both the combined
efforts of all owners to accumulate funds to decommission all of the
nuclear plants and each individual owner's efforts to accumulate funds
for decommissioning each of its plants. For our analysis, we estimated
the most likely future values of key assumptions, such as
decommissioning costs, earnings on the decommissioning funds' assets,
and the operating life of each plant. To address the inherent
uncertainty associated with forecasting outcomes many years into the
future, we also analyzed the effect of using pessimistic and optimistic
values for these key assumptions. To evaluate NRC's analysis of the
biennial reports and its process for acting on reports that have not
satisfied decommissioning funding assurance requirements, we reviewed
NRC's guidelines and policies for analyzing these reports and
interviewed NRC's officials about how they conducted their analysis.
Appendix I provides more detail on the scope and methodology of our
review.
Results in Brief:
Although the collective status of the owners' decommissioning fund
accounts has improved since our last report, some individual owners are
not on track to accumulate sufficient funds for decommissioning. Using
our most likely economic assumptions, the combined value of the nuclear
plant owners' trust funds in 2000--about $26.9 billion--was about 47
percent greater than needed at that point to ensure that sufficient
funds will be available to cover the approximately $33 billion in
estimated decommissioning costs when the plants are retired. This value
contrasts with account balances that collectively were 3 percent below
what was needed by the end of 1997. Overall industry results can be
misleading, however. Because NRC does not allow owners to transfer
funds from a trust fund with sufficient reserves to one without
sufficient reserves, each individual owner must ensure that enough
funds are available for decommissioning its particular plants. We found
that 33 owners of all or parts of 42 different plants had accumulated
less funds than we estimated they needed to have through 2000 to be on
track to pay for eventual decommissioning. Under our most likely
assumptions, these owners will have to increase the rates at which they
accumulate funds to meet their future decommissioning obligations. Of
the 33 owners, 26 provided contributions information for our survey. Of
these 26 owners, only 8 appeared to be making up their shortfalls with
recent increases in contributions to their trust funds.
NRC's analysis of the owners' 2001 biennial reports was not effective
in identifying owners that might not be accumulating sufficient funds
to cover their eventual decommissioning costs. In reviewing the 2001
reports, NRC reported that all owners appeared to be on track to have
sufficient funds for decommissioning. In reaching this conclusion, NRC
relied on the owners' future plans for fully funding their
decommissioning obligations. However, based on the actual contributions
the owners recently made to their trust funds, we found that several
owners could risk not meeting their financial obligations for
decommissioning when these plants are retired. In addition, for the
plants with more than one owner, NRC did not separately assess the
status of each co-owner's trust funds against the co-owner's
contractual obligation to fund decommissioning. Instead, NRC assessed
whether the combined value of the trust funds for each plant as a whole
was reasonable. Such an assessment for determining whether owners are
accumulating sufficient funds can produce misleading results because
owners with more than sufficient funds can appear to balance out owners
with less than sufficient funds, even though funds are generally not
transferable among owners. Furthermore, NRC has not established
criteria for responding to any unacceptable levels of financial
assurance. Accordingly, we are recommending that NRC develop and use an
effective method for determining whether owners are accumulating funds
at sufficient rates and establish criteria for responding to
unacceptable levels of financial assurance.
Background:
NRC's primary mission is to protect the public health and safety, and
the environment, from the effects of radiation from nuclear plants,
materials, and waste facilities. Because decommissioning a nuclear
power plant is a safety issue, NRC has authority to ensure that owners
are financially qualified to decommission these plants.
Of the 125 nuclear power plants that have been licensed to operate in
the United States since 1959, 3 have been completely decommissioned. Of
the remaining 122 plants, 104 currently have operating licenses
(although 1 has not operated since 1985), 11 plants are in safe storage
(SAFSTOR) awaiting active decommissioning,[Footnote 7] and 7 plants are
being decommissioned. At the time of our analysis, 43 plants were co-
owned by different owners.
NRC regulations limit commercial nuclear power plant licenses to an
initial 40 years of operation but also permit such licenses to be
renewed for additional 20 years if NRC determines that the plant can be
operated safely over the extended period. NRC has approved license
renewals for 16 plants (as of August 20, 2003).
In 1988, NRC began requiring owners to (1) certify that sufficient
financial resources would be available when needed to decommission
their nuclear power plants and (2) require them to make specific
financial provisions for decommissioning.[Footnote 8] In 1998, NRC
revised its rules to require plant owners to report to the NRC by March
31, 1999, and at least once every 2 years thereafter on the status of
decommissioning funding for each plant or proportional share of a plant
they own.[Footnote 9] Under NRC requirements, the owners can choose
from one or more methods, including the following, to provide
decommissioning financial assurance:
* prepayment of cash or liquid assets into an account segregated from
the owner's assets and outside the owner's administrative control;
* establishment of an external sinking fund maintained through periodic
deposit of funds into an account segregated from the owner's assets and
outside the owner's administrative control;
* use of a surety method (i.e., surety bond, letter of credit, or line
of credit payable to a decommissioning trust account), insurance, or
other method that guarantees that decommissioning costs will be paid;
and:
* for federal licensees, a statement of intent that decommissioning
funds will be supplied when necessary.
In September 1998, NRC amended its regulations to restrict the use of
the external sinking fund method in deregulated electricity markets.
Prior to this time, essentially all nuclear plant owners chose this
method for accumulating decommissioning funds. However, under the
amended regulations, owners may rely on periodic deposits only to the
extent that those deposits are guaranteed through regulated rates
charged to consumers.
In conjunction with its amended regulations, NRC issued internal
guidance, describing the process for reviewing the adequacy of a
prospective owner's financial qualifications to safely operate and
maintain its plant(s) and the owner's proposed method(s) for ensuring
the availability of funds to eventually decommission the
plant(s).[Footnote 10] The guidance outlines a method for evaluating
the owner's financial plans for fully funding decommissioning costs. In
addition, the guidance states that, except under certain conditions,
the NRC reviewer should, when plants have multiple owners, separately
evaluate each co-owner's funding schedule for meeting its share of the
plant's decommissioning costs.[Footnote 11]
Despite Industry-wide Improvement, Some Owners of Nuclear Power Plants
Are Not Accumulating Sufficient Decommissioning Funds:
Using our most likely economic assumptions, the combined value of the
nuclear power plant owners' decommissioning trust funds was about 47
percent higher at the end of 2000 than necessary to ensure accumulation
of sufficient funds by the time the plants' licenses expire. This
situation contrasts favorably with the findings in our 1999 report,
which indicated that the industry was about 3 percent below where it
needed to be at the end of 1997 to ensure that enough funds would be
available. However, because owners are not allowed to transfer funds
from a trust fund with sufficient reserves to one without sufficient
reserves, overall industry sufficiency can be misleading. When we
individually analyzed the owners' trust funds, we found that 33 owners
for several different plants had not accumulated funds at a rate that
would be sufficient for eventual decommissioning.
Collectively the Nuclear Power Industry Is on Pace to Accumulate More
Than Sufficient Funds for Decommissioning:
Through 2000, the owners of 122 operating and retired nuclear power
plants collectively had accumulated about 47 percent more funds than
would have been sufficient for eventually decommissioning, using our
most likely economic assumptions. Specifically, the owners had
accumulated about $26.9 billion--about $8.6 billion more than we
estimate they needed at that point to ensure sufficient funds. This
situation contrasts with the findings in our 1999 report, which
indicated that the industry had accumulated about 3 percent less than
the amount we estimated it should have accumulated by the end of 1997.
Using alternative economic assumptions changes these results. For
example, under higher decommissioning costs and other more pessimistic
assumptions, the analysis shows that the combined value of the owners'
accounts would be only about 0.2 percent above the amount we estimate
the industry should have collected by the end of 2000. (See app. II for
our results using more optimistic assumptions.):
The collective improvement in the status of the owners' trust funds
(under most likely assumptions) since our last report is due to three
main factors. First, all or parts of the estimated decommissioning
costs were prepaid for 15 plants when they were sold to new owners. For
example, the seller prepaid $396 million when the Pilgrim 1 nuclear
plant was sold in 1998 for the plant's scheduled decommissioning in
2012. Second, for 16 other plants, NRC approved 20-year license
renewals, which will provide additional time for the owners to make
contributions and for the earnings to accumulate on the decommissioning
fund balances. Third, owners earned a higher rate of return on their
trust fund accounts than we projected in our 1999 report. For example,
the average return on the trust funds of owners who responded to our
survey was about 8.5 percent[Footnote 12] (after-tax nominal return)
per year, from 1998 through 2000, instead of the approximately 6.25
percent per year we had assumed. The higher return was a result of the
stronger than expected performance of financial markets in the late
1990s.[Footnote 13] Since that time, however, the economy has slowed
and financial markets--equities in particular--have generally
performed poorly.
Several Owners Are Not Accumulating Sufficient Funds for
Decommissioning Their Plants:
In contrast to the encouraging industry-wide results, when we analyzed
the owners' trust fund accounts individually, we found that several
owners were not accumulating funds at rates that would be sufficient to
pay for decommissioning if continued until their plants are retired.
Each owner has a trust fund for each plant that it owns in whole or in
part. For example, the Exelon Generation Company owns all or part of 20
different plants. For this analysis, we assessed the status of 222
trust funds for 122 plants owned in whole or part by 99 owners. As
shown in table 1, using our most likely assumptions, 33 owners of all
or parts of 42 different plants (50 trust funds) had accumulated less
funds than needed through 2000 to be on track to pay for eventual
decommissioning (see app. II for details).[Footnote 14] Thirteen of
these plants were shut down before sufficient funds had been
accumulated for decommissioning. Although the remaining 78 owners of
all or parts of 93 plants (172 trust funds) had accumulated more funds
than we estimate they needed to have at the end of 2000, funds are
generally not transferable from owners who have more than sufficient
reserves to other owners who have insufficient reserves. Under our most
likely assumptions, the owners whom we estimate to be behind will have
to increase the rates at which they accumulate funds to meet their
eventual decommissioning financial obligations.
For our analysis, we compared the trust fund balance that individual
owners had accumulated for each plant by the end of 2000 with a
"benchmark" amount of funds that we estimate they should have
accumulated by that date. In setting the benchmark, we assumed that the
owners would contribute increasing (but constant present-value) amounts
annually to cover eventual decommissioning costs.[Footnote 15] For
example, at the end of 2000, an owner's decommissioning fund for a
plant that had operated one-half of a 40-year license period (begun in
1980) should contain one-half of the present value of the estimated
cost to decommission the owner's share of that plant in 2020. Although
this benchmark is not the only way an owner could accrue enough funds
to pay future decommissioning costs, it provides both a common standard
for comparisons among owners and, from an equity perspective among
ratepayers in different years, a financially reasonable growing
current-dollar funding stream over time. Appendix I describes our
methodology in more detail.
Table 1: Status of Individual Owners' Trust Fund Balances through 2000,
Compared with Benchmark Trust Fund Balances, under Most Likely
AssumptionsA:
Status: Above benchmark balance; Trust funds: 172; Owners: 78; Plants
currently operating: 88; Plants shut down: 5.
Status: Below benchmark balance; Trust funds: 50; Owners: 33; Plants
currently operating: 29; Plants shut down: 13.
Status: Total; Trust funds: 222; Owners: [B]; Plants currently
operating: [B]; Plants shut down: [B].
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Most likely assumptions include 20-year license renewals that have
been approved by NRC for 16 plants as of August 20, 2003.
[B] Not applicable.
[End of table]
The status of each owner's fund balance at the end of 2000 is not, by
itself, the only indicator of whether an owner will have enough funds
for decommissioning. Whether the owner will accumulate the necessary
funds also depends on the rate at which the owner contributes funds
over the remaining operating life of the plant; by increasing their
contribution rates, owners whose trust fund balances were below the
benchmark level could still accumulate the needed funds. Consequently,
for the owners who provided contributions information to us, we also
analyzed whether their recent contribution rates would put them on
track to meet their decommissioning obligations. For this second
analysis, we compared the average of the amounts contributed in 1999
and 2000 (cost-adjusted to 2000) with a benchmark amount equivalent to
the average yearly present value of the amounts the owners would have
to accumulate each year over the remaining life of their share of the
plants to have enough decommissioning funds.
As table 2 shows, 28 owners with ownership shares in 44 different
plants (50 trust funds) contributed less than the amounts we estimate
they will need to meet their decommissioning obligations, under our
most likely assumptions.
Table 2: Status of Individual Owners' Recent Trust Fund Contributions,
Compared with Benchmark Trust Fund Contributions, under Most Likely
AssumptionsA:
Status: Above benchmark contributions; Trust funds: 122; Owners: 58;
Plants currently operating: 76; Plants shut down: 5.
Status: Below benchmark contributions; Trust funds: 50; Owners: 28;
Plants currently operating: 34; Plants shut down: 10.
Status: Total; Trust funds: 172[B]; Owners: [C]; Plants currently
operating: [C]; Plants shut down: [C].
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Most likely assumptions include 20-year license renewals that have
been approved by NRC for 16 plants as of August 20, 2003.
[B] Contributions not available for 50 other trust funds.
[C] Not applicable.
[End of table]
We compared the owners in table 1 with those in table 2 to see whether
owners who are behind in balances were making up their shortfalls with
recent increases in contributions. Of the 33 owners who we estimate had
less than the benchmark balances through 2000, 26 owners of all or
parts of 38 plants provided contributions information. Of these owners,
only 8 owners of all or parts of 9 plants appeared to be making up
their shortfalls with recent increases in contributions. By contrast,
20 owners with ownership interests in 31 plants recently contributed
less to their trust funds than we estimate they needed to put them on
track to meet their decommissioning obligations.[Footnote 16]
These results would change under alternative economic assumptions. For
example, if economic conditions improve to those assumed in our
optimistic scenario, of the 20 owners who were below the benchmark
under most likely assumptions on both balances and contributions, 12
owners would still be below the benchmark in both categories, even
under optimistic assumptions.
However, if economic conditions worsen to those in our pessimistic
scenario, 34 owners who were above the benchmark under most likely
assumptions on either balances or contributions would be below either
of these benchmarks under pessimistic assumptions. (See app. II for
detailed results.):
NRC's Analysis Did Not Effectively Determine Whether Each Owner Was
Accumulating Sufficient Decommissioning Funds:
NRC's analysis of the 2001 biennial decommissioning status reports was
not effective in identifying owners that might not be accumulating
funds at sufficient rates to pay for decommissioning costs when their
plants are permanently shut down. Although the NRC reported in 2001
that all owners appeared to be on track to have sufficient funds for
decommissioning,[Footnote 17] our analysis indicated that several
owners might not be able to meet financial obligations for
decommissioning. NRC's analysis was not effective for two reasons.
First, NRC overly relied on the owners' future funding plans, or on
rate-setting authority decisions, in concluding that the owners were on
track to fully fund decommissioning. However, as discussed earlier,
based on actual contributions the owners had recently made to their
trust funds, several owners are at risk of not accumulating enough
funds to pay for decommissioning. Second, for the plants with more than
one owner, NRC did not separately assess the status of each co-owner's
trust funds relative to the co-owner's contractual obligation to fund a
certain portion of decommissioning. Instead, NRC combined funds on a
plant-wide basis and assessed whether the combined trust funds would be
sufficient for decommissioning. Such an assessment method can produce
misleading results because the owners with more than sufficient trust
funds can appear to balance out those with insufficient trust funds.
Furthermore, if NRC had identified an owner with unacceptable levels of
financial assurance, it would not have had an explicit basis for acting
to remedy potential funding deficiencies because it has not established
criteria for responding to unacceptable levels of financial assurances.
NRC officials said that their oversight of the owners' decommissioning
funds is an evolving process and that they intend to learn from their
review of prior biennial reports and make changes to improve their
evaluation of the 2003 biennial reports. However, they also said that
any specific changes they are considering are predecisional, and final
decisions have not yet been made.
NRC's Review Relied on Owners' Future Plans for Making Contributions:
According to NRC officials, in reviewing the 2001 biennial reports,
they used a "straight-line" method to establish a screening criterion
for assessing whether owners were accumulating decommissioning funds at
sufficient rates. Specifically, NRC compared the amount of funds
accumulated through 2000 (expressed as a percentage of the total
estimated cost as of 2000 to decommission the plant) to the expended
plant life (expressed as a percentage of the total number of years the
plant will operate). Under this method, the owner of a plant that has
operated for one-half of its operating life would be expected to have
accumulated at least one-half of the plant's estimated decommissioning
costs (that is, it would be collecting at or above the straight-line
rate). NRC found that the owners of 64 out of 104 plants currently
licensed to operate were collecting at the above a straight-line rate,
and that the owners of the remaining 40 plants were collecting at the
less than a straight-line rate.[Footnote 18]
On a plant-wide basis, NRC then reviewed the owners' "amortization"
schedules for making future payments to fully fund decommissioning. The
schedules, required as part of the biennial reports, consist of the
remaining funds that the owners expect to collect each year over the
remaining operating life of the plants. In estimating the funds to be
collected, the owners may factor in the earnings expected from their
trust fund investments. To account for such earnings, NRC regulations
allow an owner to increase its trust fund balance by up to 2 percent
per year (net of estimated cost escalation), or higher, if approved by
its regulatory rate-setting authority, such as a state public utility
commission. Because these owners' amortization schedules identified
sufficient future funds to enable them to reach the target funding
levels, NRC concluded that all licensees appear to be on track to fund
decommissioning when their plants are retired.
However, relying on amortization schedules is problematic, in part
because the actual amounts the owners contribute to their funds in the
future could differ (that is, worsen) from their planned amounts if
economic conditions or other factors change. NRC officials said that
owners are not required by regulation to report their recent actual
contributions to the trust funds, and NRC does not directly monitor
whether the owners' actual contributions match their planned
contributions. Consequently, NRC relies on the owners' amortization
schedules as reported in the biennial reports.
Such reliance is also problematic because in developing their
amortization schedules, the owners could use widely varying rates of
return to project the earnings on their trust fund investments. For
example, each of the three co-owners of the Duane Arnold Energy Center
nuclear plant assumed a different rate, ranging from 2 to 7 percent
(net of estimated cost escalation). Other factors being equal, the
owners using the higher rates would need to collect fewer funds than
the owner using the lower rate of return. While the return that each
owner actually earns on its investments may be higher or lower than
these rates, by relying on the owners' amortization schedules, NRC
effectively used a different set of assumptions to evaluate the
reasonableness of the trust funds accumulated by each owner.
Consequently, NRC did not use a consistent "benchmark" in assessing the
owners' trust funds. By contrast, we used historical trends and
economic forecasts to develop assumptions about rates of earnings and
other economic variables, applied the same assumptions in evaluating
the adequacy of each owner's trust fund, and based expected future
contributions on actual amounts contributed in recent years.
NRC's Analysis Focused on the Adequacy of Trust Funds on a Plant-by-
Plant Basis:
NRC's internal guidance for evaluating the biennial reports states that
for plants having more than one owner, except in certain circumstances,
each owner's amortization schedule should be separately assessed for
its share of the plant's decommissioning costs.[Footnote 19] For those
plants that have co-owners, NRC used the total amount of funds
accumulated for the plant as a whole in its analysis. However, as we
demonstrated with our industry-wide analysis, such an assessment for
determining whether owners are accumulating sufficient funds can
produce misleading results because owners with more than sufficient
funds can appear to balance out owners with less than sufficient funds,
even though funds are generally not transferable among owners.
In explaining their approach, NRC officials said that the section of
the guidance that calls for a separate evaluation of each owner's
amortization schedule for its share of the plant is not compulsory. In
addition, they said that they consider each owner's schedule to
determine the total funds for the plant as a whole, but they believe
that the same level of effort is not required for each individual trust
fund balance unless there is a manifest reason to do so. They also
stated that NRC's regulations do not prohibit each co-owner from being
held responsible for decommissioning costs, even if these costs are
more than the co-owner's individual ownership share. However, assessing
the adequacy of decommissioning costs on a plant-wide basis is not
consistent with the industry view, held by most plant owners, that each
co-owner's responsibility should be limited to its pro rata share of
decommissioning expenses and that NRC should not look to one owner to
"bail out" another owner by imposing joint and several liability on all
co-owners.[Footnote 20] NRC has implicitly accepted this view and has
incorporated it into policy to continue it. In a policy statement on
deregulation,[Footnote 21] NRC stated that it will not impose
decommissioning costs on co-owners in a manner inconsistent with their
agreed-upon shares,[Footnote 22] except in highly unusual circumstances
when required by public health and safety considerations and that it
would not seek more than the pro rata shares from co-owners with de
minimis ownership. Nevertheless, unless NRC separately evaluates each
co-owner's trust fund, NRC might eventually need to look to require
some owners to pay more than their share.
NRC Has Not Established Criteria for Responding to Unacceptable Levels
of Financial Assurance:
While the NRC has conducted two reviews of the owners' biennial reports
to date, it has not established specific criteria for responding to any
unacceptable levels of financial assurances that it finds in its
reviews of the owners' biennial reports. As we noted in our 1999
report, without such criteria, NRC will not have a logical, coherent,
and predictable plan of action if and when it encounters owners whose
plants have inadequate financial assurance. NRC officials said that
their oversight of the owners' decommissioning funds is an evolving
process, and they are learning from their prior reviews. However, they
also said that any specific changes they are considering are
predecisional and final decisions have not yet been made.
The absence of any specific criteria for acting on owners'
decommissioning financial reports contrasts with the agency's practices
for overseeing safety activities at nuclear power plants. According to
NRC, its safety assessment process allows it to integrate information
relevant to licensee safety performance, make objective conclusions
regarding the information, take actions based on these conclusions in a
predictable manner, and effectively communicate these actions to the
licensees and to the public. Its oversight approach uses criteria for
identifying and responding to levels of concern for nuclear plant
performance. In determining its regulatory response, NRC uses an
"Action Matrix" that provides for a range of actions commensurate with
the significance of inspection findings and performance indicators. If
the findings indicate that a plant is operating in a way that has
little or no impact on safety, then NRC implements only its baseline
inspection program. However, if the findings indicate that a plant is
operating in a way that implies a greater degree of safety
significance, NRC performs additional inspections and initiates other
actions commensurate with the significance of the safety issues. A
similar approach in the area of financial assurance for decommissioning
would appear to offer the same benefits of objectivity and
predictability that NRC has established in its safety oversight.
Conclusions:
Ensuring that nuclear power plant owners will have sufficient funds to
clean up the radioactive waste hazard left behind when these plants are
retired is essential for public health and safety. As our analysis
identified, some owners may be at risk of not accumulating sufficient
trust funds to pay for their share of decommissioning. NRC's analysis
was not effective in identifying such owners because it relied too
heavily on the owners' future funding plans without confirming that the
plans were consistent with recent contributions. Moreover, it
aggregated the owners' trust funds plant-wide instead of assessing
whether each individual owner was on track to accumulate sufficient
funds to pay for its share of decommissioning costs. In addition, NRC
has not explained to the owners and the public what it intends to do if
and when it determines an owner is not accumulating sufficient trust
funds. Without a more effective method for evaluating owners'
decommissioning trust funds, and without criteria for responding to any
unacceptable levels of financial assurance, NRC will not be able to
effectively ensure that sufficient funds will be available when needed.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that owners are accumulating sufficient funds to decommission
their nuclear power plants, we recommend that the Chairman, NRC,
develop an effective method for determining whether owners are
accumulating funds at sufficient rates to pay for decommissioning. For
plants having more than one owner, this method should include
separately evaluating whether each owner is accumulating funds at
sufficient rates to pay for its share of decommissioning. We further
recommend that the Chairman, NRC, establish criteria for taking action
when NRC determines that an owner or co-owner is not accumulating
decommissioning funds at a sufficient rate to pay for its share of the
cost of decommissioning.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to NRC for its review and comment.
NRC's written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III, expressed
three main concerns regarding our report. First, NRC disagreed with our
observation that its analyses of funding levels of the co-owners of a
nuclear plant are inconsistent with its internal guidance. We revised
the report to remove any inferences that NRC was not complying with its
own guidance. While clarifying this point, we remained convinced that
NRC needs to do more to develop an effective method for assessing the
adequacy of nuclear power plant owner's trust funds for
decommissioning. NRC's current practice is to combine the trust funds
for all co-owners of a nuclear plant, then assess whether the combined
value of the trust funds is sufficient. However, as our analysis
indicates, NRC's practice of combining the trust funds of several
owners for its assessment can produce misleading results because co-
owners with more than sufficient funds can appear to balance out those
with less than sufficient funds. As a practical matter, owners have a
contractual agreement to pay their share of decommissioning costs, and
owners generally cannot transfer funds from a trust fund with
sufficient reserves to one without sufficient reserves. While NRC
recognizes that private contractual arrangements among co-owners exist,
the agency stated that it reserves the right, in highly unusual
situations where adequate protection of public health and safety would
be compromised if such action were not taken, to consider imposing
joint and several liability on co-owners for decommissioning funding
when one or more co-owners have defaulted. Nonetheless, we believe that
NRC should take a proactive approach, rather than simply wait until one
or more co-owners default on their decommissioning payment expenses, to
ensure that sufficient funds will be available for decommissioning and
that the adequate protection of public health and safety is not
compromised. Such an approach, we believe, would involve developing an
effective method that, among other things, separately evaluates the
adequacy of each co-owner's trust fund.
Second, NRC disagreed with our view that some owners are not on track
to accumulate sufficient funds for decommissioning. NRC's position is
that it has a method for assessing the reasonableness of the owners'
trust funds and that our method has not been reviewed and accepted by
NRC. While we recognize that NRC has neither reviewed nor accepted our
method, our report identifies several limitations in NRC's method that
raise doubts about whether the agency's method can effectively identify
owners who might be at risk of not having sufficient funds for
decommissioning. A particularly problematic aspect of this method is
NRC's reliance on the owners' future funding plans to make up any
shortfalls without verifying whether those plans are consistent with
the owners' recent contributions. We found some owners' actual
contributions in 2001 were much less than what they stated in their
2001 biennial reports to NRC that they planned to contribute. For
example, one owner contributed about $1.5 million (or 39 percent) less
than the amount they told NRC that they planned to contribute. In
addition, based on our analysis using actual contributions the owners
had recently made to their trust funds, we found that 28 owners with
ownership shares in 44 different plants contributed less than the
amounts we estimate they will need to make over the remaining operating
life of their plants to meet their decommissioning obligations.
Therefore, we continue to believe that some owners are not on track to
accumulate sufficient funds to pay for decommissioning.
Finally, NRC disagreed with our view that it should establish criteria
for responding to owners with unacceptable levels of financial
assurance. NRC stated that its practice is to review the owners' plans
on a case-by-case basis, engage in discussions with state regulators,
and issue orders as necessary and appropriate. Since NRC has never
identified an owner with unacceptable levels of financial assurance, it
has never implemented this practice. We believe that NRC should take a
more proactive approach to providing owners and the public with a more
complete understanding of NRC's expectations of how it will hold owners
who are not accumulating sufficient funds accountable. As stated in our
draft report, this lack of criteria is in contrast to NRC's practices
in overseeing safety issues at nuclear plants, where the NRC uses an
"Action Matrix" that provides for a range of actions commensurate with
the significance of safety inspection findings and performance
indicators. In the area of financial assurance, a similar approach
could involve monitoring the trust fund deposits of those owners who
NRC determines are accumulating insufficient funds to verify that the
deposits are consistent with the owners' funding plans.
We conducted our review from June 2001 to September 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Unless you
publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no
further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time,
we will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Chairman, NRC; Director, Office of Management and
Budget; and other interested parties. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://
www.gao.gov] http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any
questions, please call me at (202) 512-6877. Key contributors to this
report are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Jim Wells:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I Scope and Methodology of Our Analysis of the Decommissioning
Trust Funds:
This appendix describes the scope and methodology of our review for our
first objective: the extent to which nuclear power plant owners are
accumulating funds at sufficient rates to pay decommissioning costs
when their plants' licenses expire.
In addressing this objective, we analyzed the status of the
decommissioning trust funds from two perspectives. First, we analyzed
whether the industry as a whole is accumulating funds at rates that
would be sufficient for decommissioning. For this analysis, we combined
the trust funds of the owners of 122 nuclear plants. We then compared
our results with those of our 1999 report to see whether the industry's
status had changed.
Second, because owners generally cannot transfer funds from a trust
fund with sufficient reserves to one without sufficient reserves, we
also analyzed the status of each owner's trust fund for each plant in
which the owner had an ownership share. For this analysis, we analyzed
the status of 222 individual trust funds, representing 99 owners of all
or parts of 122 plants.
For both the combined industry-wide trust funds and the individual
owners' trust funds, we conducted two separate analyses (hereafter
described in terms of our analysis of the individual owners' trust
funds). This method is the same as that used in our earlier report on
the adequacy of decommissioning funding.[Footnote 23] First, we looked
backward from a base year--2000--and assessed whether, when taking into
account key economic factors such as decommissioning cost-escalation
rates and after-tax rates of return on the funds (the discount rate),
each owner's decommissioning fund balance for its ownership share of
each of its plants was consistent with the expended portion of the
licensed operating life of that plant. In other words, we assessed
whether the monies the owner had contributed to its fund as of the end
of 2000, together with the past earnings on these monies, equaled a
benchmark or expected balance the owner should have accumulated by that
time.
To determine the benchmark balance for 2000 for each plant (owner's
share), we multiplied the present value of the plant's estimated future
decommissioning costs (owner's share) by the fraction of the plant's
operating life used up by 2000. For example, a plant that began
operating in 1980 would have used up one-half of its 40-year operating
life by the end of 2000. Therefore, by the end of 2000, the owner for
this plant should be expected to have accumulated in its trust fund
one-half of the present value (in constant 2000 dollars) of the
estimated decommissioning costs. Over the life of a plant, our
benchmark measure presumes that an owner would contribute an annual
amount that increases (but constant in present-value terms) at the
trust fund's after-tax rate of return. The sum of these annual amounts
plus the income earned on the investment of the funds would equal the
total estimated (present value of) the decommissioning costs when the
plant's operating license expires.[Footnote 24]
Although recent deregulation and restructuring of the electricity
industry have led some owners to prepay decommissioning costs, many
owners continue to fund the trust funds by collecting fees from
electricity users. Thus, under our benchmark measure, by paying
decommissioning "fees" that are deposited into the trust funds,
electricity users pay for the present value of each year's accrued
decommissioning costs. As a result, the benchmark embodies the
principle of economic efficiency in that the price of a product (i.e.,
electricity) should, if possible, equal all of its costs--current and
accrued. In addition, by assuming that current and future users pay the
same decommissioning fees, in constant present-value terms, our
benchmark ensures that decommissioning costs are accrued transparently
over time.
In addition to the looking-backward analysis, we conducted a second
analysis, a "looking forward" from a base year--end of 2000--and
assessed whether each owner's recent contributions to its
decommissioning funds for respective shares of each of its nuclear
power plants were at a level consistent with the remaining portions of
the licensed operating lives of each plant. In other words, we assessed
whether the owner recently added monies to its decommissioning trust
fund for each plant at the benchmark contribution necessary to have
enough funds to decommission the plant when its operating license
expires. For example, an owner who is behind in terms of trust fund
balance through the end of 2000 could have recently contributed to its
fund at much higher rates than it had in the past to make up for its
shortfall over the remaining operating life of the plant.
To determine an owner's benchmark annual contribution, for each of its
plants, we computed the annual-average present value of the required
future contributions that are summed over the remaining life of the
plant. The total present value contribution must equal the present
value of the total future decommissioning costs minus the value of the
current trust fund balance. We then compared this annual amount with
the average contribution to the trust fund that the owner made in 1999
and 2000 (cost adjusted to 2000). We assume that an owner will annually
increase its most recent contribution (2-year average, cost adjusted to
2000) over the remaining life of its plant by the assumed after-tax
rate of return on its decommissioning fund. Owners whose recent average
contributions exceeded the benchmark amount would be adding funds at a
rate that would be more than sufficient, while owners whose recent
average contributions were below the benchmark rate would be adding
funds at an insufficient rate to pay for future decommissioning costs
(under our specific economic assumptions).
For our assessment of the status of the industry as a whole (and for
both the looking-backward and looking-forward analyses), we developed
three different scenarios: baseline (i.e., most likely), pessimistic,
and optimistic. For the baseline analysis, we used our most likely
economic assumptions. For the pessimistic and optimistic scenarios, we
used different values for several key assumptions, as described later
in this appendix.
For our assessment of the status of each individual owner's trust
funds, we looked at the status of each owner's trust funds under
baseline (most likely) assumptions (for both the looking-backward and
looking-forward analyses). In addition, for owners who were below the
benchmark on both balances and contributions under the baseline
assumptions, we reviewed the 2003 and 2001 biennial reports to
ascertain whether the owner has and/or had an additional method (e.g.,
parent company guarantee) to support financial assurance obligations.
We indicate in our detailed results when an owner reported having an
additional method (see app. II, table 4). However, we did not evaluate
the adequacy of these methods.
In addition, for selected owners depending upon our baseline results,
we analyzed how these results might change under alternative
conditions--optimistic or pessimistic assumptions. For example, for
owners who were below the benchmark on both balances and contributions
under the baseline (see app. II, table 5), we assessed the status of
their trust funds under optimistic conditions to determine which of
these owner's funds would still remain below benchmark on both our
looking-backward and looking-forward measures. In addition, for owners
who were from zero to 100 percent above the benchmark, under baseline
assumptions for either balances or contributions, we assessed the
status of their funds under pessimistic assumptions to determine
whether their funds would fall below benchmarks for both balances and
contributions (see app. II, table 6).[Footnote 25]
Key Data Used in Analysis:
To conduct our analysis we used a spreadsheet simulation model that
uses a base year of 2000. In addition, for the key data in our
analysis, we used the owner's 2001 biennial reports and responses from
a mail survey that we administered to nuclear power plant owners.
More specifically, the key data used in the model are the following:
(1) Owner's name, percentage of each plant in which the owner has a
share, year the plant was licensed to operate (or commenced operation,
if earlier), and year the plant's license will expire. We obtained
these data using the owners' 2001 biennial reports to Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other NRC publications.
(2) A decommissioning cost estimate for each plant (that is, a current
dollar amount for the year that the estimate was made). When available,
we used a site-specific estimate of NRC-related costs (that is,
radiation-related costs). If a site-specific estimate was not
available, we used cost estimates derived from NRC's generic formula
for these NRC-related costs. We obtained these data using the owners'
2001 biennial reports to NRC.
(3) Decommissioning fund balances as of December 31, 2000 for each
owner and its plant share. When indicated, we used that portion of the
fund balance that the owner designated for NRC-type costs (that is,
excluding the costs relating to nonradiation or spent-fuel activities).
Otherwise we used the entire fund balance. We obtained these data from
the owners' responses to our survey or from their 2001 biennial
reports.
(4) Decommissioning fund contributions for 1999 and 2000 for each owner
and its plant share. We assumed these contributions were for NRC-
related costs only. We obtained these data from the responses to our
survey, and for owners who did not respond to our survey, we do not
report on the adequacy of their contributions.
In some cases, the ownership shares of plants have changed hands since
our survey and the 2001 biennial reports. In these cases, to make our
analysis as current as possible, we assess the adequacy of the funds
that were accumulated by the previous owner but report the results
under the name of the new owner of the trust fund (see app. II, table
4). Nonetheless, the new owner might accumulate trust funds at a
different rate than the former owner.
Key Assumptions Used in the Analysis:
The analysis of the industry-wide trust funds and the individual
owners' trust funds depends on the following six key assumptions. The
values for these six assumptions vary based upon the scenario: baseline
(most likely), pessimistic, or optimistic. For each scenario, we used
the same assumption values for each owner and each plant in order to
apply an "even-handed" standard.
(1) Future after-tax rate of return on decommissioning fund assets
(discount rate): An after-tax rate of return was used to discount
future trust fund contributions and plant decommissioning costs. In our
survey, we asked owners for information on the financial assets
contained in their respective decommissioning funds. We grouped these
assets into five basic financial categories and calculated estimated,
industry-wide, average weights for each type, these asset weights
themselves reflecting the weights of the varying fund sizes. These
categories, and calculated weighted-averages were: equities (e.g.,
common stocks), 47.1 percent; U.S. securities (e.g., federal government
bonds), 26.7 percent; corporate bonds, 9.8 percent; municipal bonds,
10.4 percent; and cash and short-term instruments, 6.0 percent.
Therefore, on average, these decommissioning funds contained roughly a
50-50 split between equities and bonds. We used these results for all
of the decommissioning funds, for all three scenarios, but recognize
three qualifications: (1) the variation in these asset weights among
individual funds for 2000 was quite large, (2) our asset composition
data represent only a time "snapshot" of such allocation--for year 2000
only, and (3) these same (baseline) asset weights are also assumed for
our other two scenarios, because appropriate data were lacking to do
otherwise.
Using a long-term forecast from Global Insight (an economic forecasting
company),[Footnote 26] we developed a forecast for each asset category
under a baseline, pessimistic, and optimistic forecast scenario. For
the baseline scenario, we used Global Insight's trend forecast; for the
pessimistic scenario, we used their pessimistic forecast (representing
slower real gross domestic product (GDP) growth); and for the
optimistic scenario, we used their optimistic forecast (representing
faster real GDP growth).
For the baseline scenario, we calculated a forecast (current-dollar)
growth rate of 6.26 percent for equities, 6.83 percent for U.S.
securities, 7.83 percent for corporate bonds, 6.27 percent for
municipal bonds, and 5.02 percent for cash and short-term
instruments.[Footnote 27] Multiplying these forecast rates with their
respective asset weights in the owners' portfolios yielded a baseline
"portfolio average" forecast pretax annual-average rate of return of
6.49 percent. Similarly, we calculated pretax rates of return for the
pessimistic and optimistic forecasts of 7.27 percent and 6.45 percent,
respectively. The rate under the pessimistic forecast is higher than
the rate under the baseline or optimistic forecasts because of higher
inflation in the Global Insight pessimistic forecast and because of the
owners' relatively high average allocation of trust fund investments in
bonds. (In Global Insight's pessimistic forecast, the nominal-rate
return on bonds is greater than on equities.):
To convert the "portfolio average" forecast pretax rate of return to an
after-tax rate of return, we used the pre-and post-tax rates of return
data that owners provided in our survey. Based on these data we
determined that the pretax rate should be reduced by 0.87 percentage
points to derive a baseline after-tax rate of return of 5.62 (6.49 -
0.87) percent.[Footnote 28] Similarly, we calculated an after-tax rate
of return of 6.40 (7.27 - 0.87) percent for the pessimistic scenario
and an after-tax rate of return of 5.58 (6.45 - 0.87) percent for the
optimistic scenario.
(2) Future decommissioning cost escalation rate: For our baseline
scenario, we assumed that decommissioning costs would increase annually
at a nominal rate of 4.60 percent.[Footnote 29] Combining the after-tax
rate of return and the cost escalation rate gave us an implied real
(cost-adjusted) after-tax rate of return of 1.02 (5.62 - 4.60) percent
for the baseline scenario.
To calculate real after-tax rates of return for the pessimistic and
optimistic scenarios, we first adjusted the nominal after-tax rates of
return using Global Insight's inflation forecasts. Its annual-average
inflation forecast was about 2.47 percent for trend, or baseline, 3.04
percent for pessimistic, and 2.15 percent for optimistic. Using these
forecasts, the real forecast rates of return are 3.15 (5.62 - 2.47)
percent for baseline, 3.36 (6.40 - 3.04) percent for pessimistic, and
3.43 (5.58 - 2.15) percent for optimistic. We then used proportionality
ratios to obtain real cost adjusted after-tax rates of return of 1.09
percent for the pessimistic scenario and 1.11 percent for the
optimistic scenario.[Footnote 30] From these real after-tax rates of
return, we
computed implied cost-escalation rates of 5.31 percent and 4.47 percent
for the pessimistic and optimistic scenarios, respectively.[Footnote
31]
Note that the real (cost-adjusted) after-tax rates of return are quite
similar in value among our scenarios; therefore, any differing effect
on model results caused by the combination of the fund rate of return
and decommissioning cost-escalation assumptions will be fairly minimal.
Nonetheless, all other things being equal, for these two assumptions
only, the balance and contribution adequacy results for the pessimistic
scenario will be slightly above those of the baseline scenario, and
only slightly below those of the optimistic scenario.
(3) Alternative initial decommissioning cost estimates: In our baseline
scenario, for the "initial" decommissioning (NRC-related) costs, we
used the site-specific estimates when available. Otherwise, we used the
cost estimates derived from NRC's generic formula. For the pessimistic
and optimistic scenarios, we used professional judgment to adjust the
estimate used in the baseline. For example, to reflect a general
concern among industry observers that future decommissioning costs
could be much higher than expected, we increased the initial cost
estimate by 40 percent for the pessimistic scenario, and reduced the
initial decommissioning cost estimate by only 5 percent for the
optimistic scenario.
(4) Alternative start of decommissioning--years after shutdown: For the
baseline scenario, we assumed that decommissioning would occur within
the immediate 5 years after license termination; for simplification, we
assumed "instantaneous" decommissioning at 2.5 years after
shutdown.[Footnote 32] For the pessimistic assumption, decommissioning
is assumed to occur within the first 4 years--at 2 years after
shutdown. For the optimistic assumption, we assumed a 5-year delayed
start of decommissioning--within 5-10 years after license termination-
-at 7.5 years after shutdown. Under certain circumstances (e.g., co-
located plants), NRC may permit a decommissioning delay. As long as the
assumed after-tax rate of return exceeds the assumed cost-escalation
rate (i.e., a positive, real, cost-adjusted rate of return), a delay in
decommissioning will improve the outlook for an owner's trust fund in
both the looking-backward (trust fund balance) and looking-forward
(trust fund contributions) analysis, all else the same.
(5) Alternative operating license expiration year: The year of plant
operating-license expiration is assumed to vary among our three
scenarios to reflect that NRC has approved license renewals for some
plants, and it may approve 20-year license renewals for other plants in
the future. For the baseline and pessimistic scenarios, we include the
renewals that have been approved for 16 plants, as of August 20,
2003.[Footnote 33] In addition, because NRC has received renewal
applications from owners of 14 plants, and it anticipates applications
from owners of another 8 plants by the end of 2003 (as of August 20,
2003), we assume in the optimistic scenario that license renewals will
be approved for an additional 22 plants.[Footnote 34] In general, these
plant license renewals suggest that the electricity market today is
robust and owners expect higher electricity prices in the
future.[Footnote 35]
(6) Alternative market values for decommissioning funds: For the
baseline and optimistic scenarios, we use the actual market value of
the trust fund balances as of the end of 2000. In contrast, for the
pessimistic scenario, we reduced the actual market value of the funds
by 5 percent for 2000 to simulate the effect of a slowing economy on
investment returns from 2000 through 2002. The simulated decline is
modest, and over the period, the overall increase in bond prices would
have offset to some degree the overall decline in the value of common
stocks.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Detailed Results of Our Analysis of the Decommissioning
Trust Funds:
This appendix presents the detailed results of our analysis of the
decommissioning trust funds. Specifically, table 3 shows industry-wide,
weighted-average results under three scenarios--baseline (most likely)
assumptions, pessimistic assumptions, and optimistic assumptions.
Table 4 presents the results for individual owners under baseline, or
most likely assumptions. Table 5 shows the results of our analysis
under optimistic assumptions for individual owners whose trust funds
were below the benchmarks for both balances and recent contributions
under the baseline scenario. Table 6 presents the results under
pessimistic assumptions for individual owners whose trust funds were
zero to 100 percent above the benchmark balances and/or contributions
under the baseline scenario. See appendix I for a description of our
methodology.
Table 3: Status of Combined Trust Funds Compared with Benchmarks for
Balances and Contributions (by Percentage above or below Benchmarks):
Analysis category: Balances through 2000; Number of owners: 99; Number
of plants: 122; Scenario: Baseline[A]: (percent): 46.9;
Scenario: Pessimistic[A]: (percent): 0.2; Scenario: Optimistic[B]:
(percent): 82.5.
Analysis category: Recent Contributions[C]; Number of owners: 75;
Number of plants: 109; Scenario: Baseline[A]: (percent):
106.5; Scenario: Pessimistic[A]: (percent): -18.0; Scenario:
Optimistic[B]: (percent): 224.4.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Percentages are weighted averages, measured relative to the
benchmark balances or benchmark contributions.
[A] The baseline and pessimistic scenarios include the 20-year license
renewals already granted for 16 plants, as of August 20, 2003.
[B] The optimistic scenario includes 20-year license renewals for 38
plants, including renewals: (1) already granted for 16 plants, (2) for
another 14 plants whose owners have applied for but not yet received
renewals, and (3) for another 8 plants whose owners are expected to
apply by December 2003 (all as of August 20, 2003).
[C] Adequacy of recent contributions is based on responses to our
survey. The percentages are more, or less, than the benchmark
contribution, meaning the owner has contributed more, or less, on
average for 1999 and 2000 (cost adjusted to 2000) than the annual
average of the present value of the amounts required in each subsequent
year until the plant's license expires.
[End of table]
Table 4: Owners with More, or Less, Than Benchmark Trust Fund Balances
and Contributions, under Most Likely Assumptions (by Percentage above
or below Benchmarks):
Plant name: Arkansas; Nuclear 1[B]; Owner: Entergy Arkansas, Inc.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Arkansas; Nuclear 2[C]; Owner: Entergy Arkansas, Inc.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _.
Plant name: Beaver Valley 1; Owner: Ohio Edison Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 35; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy
of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: +.
Plant name: Beaver Valley 1; Owner: Pennsylvania Power Co.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 65; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: _ _
_.
Plant name: Beaver Valley 2; Owner: Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Co.; Ownership share of plant (percent): 24.47; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: +.
Plant name: Beaver Valley 2; Owner: Ohio Edison Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 41.88; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: _.
Plant name: Beaver Valley 2; Owner: Pennsylvania Power Co.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 13.74; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Beaver Valley 2; Owner: Toledo Edison Co.; Ownership share
of plant (percent): 19.91; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + +.
Plant name: Big Rock Point[D]; Owner: Consumers Energy Co.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Braidwood 1; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Braidwood 2; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Browns Ferry 1[C]; Owner: Tennessee Valley Authority;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _
_; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Browns Ferry 2[C]; Owner: Tennessee Valley Authority;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _
_; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Browns Ferry 3[C]; Owner: Tennessee Valley Authority;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _
_; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Brunswick 1; Owner: North Carolina Eastern Municipal;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 18.33; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: +.
Plant name: Brunswick 1[F]; Owner: Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 81.67; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _
_; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _.
Plant name: Brunswick 2; Owner: North Carolina Eastern Municipal;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 18.33; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: +.
Plant name: Brunswick 2[ F]; Owner: Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 81.67; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _
_; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: +.
Plant name: Byron 1; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership share
of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]:
_ _ _.
Plant name: Byron 2; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership share
of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]:
+ + +.
Plant name: Callaway; Owner: AmerenUE; Ownership share of plant
(percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of
trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: _ _.
Plant name: Calvert Cliffs 1[B]; Owner: Constellation Energy Group;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Calvert Cliffs 2[B]; Owner: Constellation Energy Group;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Catawba 1[H]; Owner: Duke Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 12.50; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + +
+.
Plant name: Catawba 1[H]; Owner: North Carolina Electric Membership;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 28.1; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Catawba 1[H]; Owner: North Carolina Municipal Power;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 37.50; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: +.
Plant name: Catawba 1[H]; Owner: Piedmont Municipal Power Agency;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 12.50; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + +.
Plant name: Catawba 1[H]; Owner: Saluda River Electric Cooperative;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 9.38; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Catawba 2[H]; Owner: Duke Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 12.5; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + + +
+.
Plant name: Catawba 2[H]; Owner: North Carolina Electric Membership;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 28.1; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Catawba 2[H]; Owner: North Carolina Municipal Power;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 37.5; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: +.
Plant name: Catawba 2[H]; Owner: Piedmont Municipal Power Agency;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 12.5; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + +.
Plant name: Catawba 2[H]; Owner: Saluda River Electric Cooperative;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 9.38; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Clinton; Owner: AmerGen Energy Co., Inc.; Ownership share
of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]:
+ + +.
Plant name: Columbia Generating Station; Owner: Energy Northwest;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _.
Plant name: Comanche Peak 1; Owner: Texas Utility Electric Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Comanche Peak 2; Owner: Texas Utility Electric Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Cook, D.C. 1[C]; Owner: Indiana Michigan Power Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Cook, D.C. 2[C]; Owner: Indiana Michigan Power Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Cooper; Owner: Nebraska Public Power District; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner: City of Alachua Electric Dept.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 0.08; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner: City of Bushnell Utility Dept.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 0.04; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner: City of Gainesville Regional
Utilities; Ownership share of plant (percent): 1.41; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner: City of Kissimmee Utilities;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 0.68; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner: City of Leesburg Municipal
Electric; Ownership share of plant (percent): 0.82; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner: City of Ocala Utilities Division;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 1.33; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner: New Smyrna Beach Utilities Comm.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 0.56; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[ E].
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner: Orlando Utilities Comm.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 1.60; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner: Progress Energy Florida; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 91.8; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[ E].
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner: Seminole Electric Cooperative,
Inc.; Ownership share of plant (percent): 1.7; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + +.
Plant name: Davis-Besse; Owner: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 51.38; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Davis-Besse; Owner: Toledo Edison Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 48.62; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + + +
+.
Plant name: Diablo Canyon 1; Owner: Pacific Gas & Electric Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Diablo Canyon 2; Owner: Pacific Gas & Electric Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Dresden 1[D]; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _ _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Dresden 2[H]; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Dresden 3[H]; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Duane Arnold; Owner: Central Iowa Power Cooperative;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 20; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _ _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Duane Arnold; Owner: Corn Belt Power Cooperative; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 10; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: _ _.
Plant name: Duane Arnold; Owner: IPL; Ownership share of plant
(percent): 70; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of
trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: _ _.
Plant name: Farley 1[C]; Owner: Alabama Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + + +
+.
Plant name: Farley 2[C]; Owner: Alabama Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + + +
+.
Plant name: Fermi 1[D]; Owner: Detroit Edison Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: _ _
_.
Plant name: Fermi 2; Owner: Detroit Edison Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]:
+ + + +.
Plant name: FitzPatrick; Owner: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Fort Calhoun[H]; Owner: Omaha Public Power District;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Ginna[H]; Owner: Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Grand Gulf 1; Owner: South Mississippi Electric Power;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 10; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Grand Gulf 1; Owner: System Energy Resources, Inc.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 90; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Haddam Neck[D]; Owner: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[ E].
Plant name: Harris 1; Owner: North Carolina Eastern Municipal;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 16.17; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _.
Plant name: Harris 1; Owner: Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 83.83; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: +.
Plant name: Hatch 1[B]; Owner: City of Dalton (Georgia); Ownership
share of plant (percent): 2.2; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: Hatch 1[B]; Owner: Georgia Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 50.1; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]:
+ + + +.
Plant name: Hatch 1[B]; Owner: Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 17.7; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Hatch 1[B]; Owner: Oglethorpe Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 30; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy
of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Hatch 2[B]; Owner: City of Dalton (Georgia); Ownership
share of plant (percent): 2.2; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: Hatch 2[B]; Owner: Georgia Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 50.1; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]:
+ + + +.
Plant name: Hatch 2[B]; Owner: Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 17.7; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Hatch 2[B]; Owner: Oglethorpe Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 30; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy
of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + +.
Plant name: Hope Creek 1; Owner: PSEG Nuclear, LLC; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +[ I];
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Humboldt Bay 3[D]; Owner: Pacific Gas & Electric Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Indian Point 1[D, F]; Owner: Entergy Nuclear Operations,
Inc.; Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _
_ _[ I]; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _[I].
Plant name: Indian Point 2; Owner: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Indian Point 3; Owner: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Kewaunee; Owner: Wisconsin Power & Light; Ownership share
of plant (percent): 41; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]:
+ + + +[E].
Plant name: Kewaunee; Owner: Wisconsin Public Service Corporation;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 59; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +
+[I]; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E, I].
Plant name: LaCrosse[D, F]; Owner: Dairyland Power Cooperative;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: LaSalle County 1; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _.
Plant name: LaSalle County 2; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + +.
Plant name: Limerick 1[J]; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Limerick 2[J]; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _.
Plant name: Maine Yankee[D]; Owner: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _
_; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _.
Plant name: McGuire 1[H]; Owner: Duke Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + +
+.
Plant name: McGuire 2[H]; Owner: Duke Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + + +
+.
Plant name: Millstone 1[D, F, J]; Owner: Dominion; Nuclear Connecticut;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Millstone 2; Owner: Dominion; Nuclear Connecticut;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Millstone 3; Owner: Central Vermont Public Service; Corp.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 1.73; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Millstone 3; Owner: Dominion; Nuclear Connecticut;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 93.47; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: Millstone 3; Owner: Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale
Electric Co.; Ownership share of plant (percent): 4.80;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of
end of 2000: + + + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of
recent trust fund contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Monticello; Owner: Xcel Energy; Ownership share of plant
(percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of
trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + +.
Plant name: Nine Mile Point 1[F]; Owner: Constellation Energy Group;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000:
_[I]; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Nine Mile Point 2; Owner: Constellation Energy Group;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 82; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +[ I];
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Nine Mile Point 2; Owner: Long Island Power Authority;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 18; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: North Anna 1[B, K]; Owner: Old Dominion Cooperative;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 10.4; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: North Anna 1[B, K]; Owner: Virginia Electric & Power Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 89.6; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: North Anna 2[B, K]; Owner: Old Dominion Cooperative;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 10.4; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: North Anna 2[B, K]; Owner: Virginia Electric & Power Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 89.6; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Oconee 1[B]; Owner: Duke Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + + +
+.
Plant name: Oconee 2[B]; Owner: Duke Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + + +
+.
Plant name: Oconee 3[B]; Owner: Duke Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]:
+ + + +.
Plant name: Oyster Creek; Owner: AmerGen Energy Co., Inc.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Palisades; Owner: Consumers Energy Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]:
+ + + +[E].
Plant name: Palo Verde 1; Owner: Arizona Public Service Co.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 29.1; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Palo Verde 1; Owner: El Paso Electric Co.; Ownership share
of plant (percent): 15.8; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: +.
Plant name: Palo Verde 1; Owner: Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 5.7; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Palo Verde 1; Owner: Public Service Company of New Mexico;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 10.2; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Palo Verde 1; Owner: Salt River Project Agricultural
Improvement & Power District; Ownership share of plant (percent):
17.49; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund
balances as of end of 2000: + + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Palo Verde 1; Owner: Southern California Edison Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 15.8; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: Palo Verde 1; Owner: Southern California Public Power;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 5.91; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Palo Verde 2; Owner: Arizona Public Service Co.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 29.1; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Palo Verde 2; Owner: El Paso Electric Co.; Ownership share
of plant (percent): 15.8; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: _.
Plant name: Palo Verde 2; Owner: Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 5.70; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Palo Verde 2; Owner: Public Service Company of New Mexico;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 10.2; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + +.
Plant name: Palo Verde 2; Owner: Salt River Project Agricultural
Improvement & Power District; Ownership share of plant (percent):
17.49; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund
balances as of end of 2000: + + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Palo Verde 2; Owner: Southern California Edison Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 15.8; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: Palo Verde 2; Owner: Southern California Public Power;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 5.91; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Palo Verde 3; Owner: Arizona Public Service Co.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 29.1; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + +.
Plant name: Palo Verde 3; Owner: El Paso Electric Co.; Ownership share
of plant (percent): 15.80; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: +.
Plant name: Palo Verde 3; Owner: Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 5.7; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Palo Verde 3; Owner: Public Service Company of New Mexico;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 10.2; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Palo Verde 3; Owner: Salt River Project Agricultural
Improvement & Power District; Ownership share of plant (percent):
17.49; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund
balances as of end of 2000: + + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Palo Verde 3; Owner: Southern California Edison Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 15.8; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: Palo Verde 3; Owner: Southern California Public Power;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 5.91; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Peach Bottom 1[D, J]; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _
_ _; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Peach Bottom 2[B, J]; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 50; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +[I];
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + +.
Plant name: Peach Bottom 2[B]; Owner: PSEG Nuclear, LLC; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 50; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +[ I]; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]:
[G].
Plant name: Peach Bottom 3[B, J]; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 50; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +[ I];
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Peach Bottom 3[B]; Owner: PSEG Nuclear, LLC; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 50; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +[ I];
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Perry 1; Owner: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 44.85; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Perry 1; Owner: Ohio Edison Co.; Ownership share of plant
(percent): 30; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of
trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + + +.
Plant name: Perry 1; Owner: Pennsylvania Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 5.24; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + +
+.
Plant name: Perry 1; Owner: Toledo Edison Co.; Ownership share of plant
(percent): 19.91; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of
trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Pilgrim 1; Owner: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Point Beach 1; Owner: Wisconsin Electric Power Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Point Beach 2; Owner: Wisconsin Electric Power Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Prairie Island 1; Owner: Xcel Energy; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + + +
+.
Plant name: Prairie Island 2; Owner: Xcel Energy; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + + +
+.
Plant name: Quad Cities 1[H]; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 75; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + +.
Plant name: Quad Cities 1[H]; Owner: MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 25; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Quad Cities 2[H]; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 75; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Quad Cities 2[H]; Owner: MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 25; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: +.
Plant name: Rancho Seco[D]; Owner: Sacramento Municipal Utility
District; Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _ _; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: River Bend 1; Owner: Entergy Gulf States, Inc.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Robinson 2[F, H]; Owner: Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _
_; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _.
Plant name: Salem 1; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership share
of plant (percent): 42.59; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: _ _.
Plant name: Salem 1; Owner: PSEG Nuclear, LLC; Ownership share of plant
(percent): 57.41; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of
trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +[ I]; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: [E,
G].
Plant name: Salem 2; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership share
of plant (percent): 42.59; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: _.
Plant name: Salem 2; Owner: PSEG Nuclear, LLC; Ownership share of plant
(percent): 57.41; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of
trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +[ I]; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: San Onofre 1[D]; Owner: San Diego Gas & Electric Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 20; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: San Onofre 1[D]; Owner: Southern California Edison Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 80; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: San Onofre 2; Owner: Anaheim Public Utilities Dept.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 3.16; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: San Onofre 2; Owner: Riverside Utilities Dept.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 1.79; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: San Onofre 2; Owner: San Diego Gas & Electric Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 20; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: San Onofre 2; Owner: Southern California Edison Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 75.05; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: San Onofre 3; Owner: Anaheim Public Utilities Dept.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 3.16; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: San Onofre 3; Owner: Riverside Utilities Dept.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 1.79; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: San Onofre 3; Owner: San Diego Gas & Electric Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 20; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: San Onofre 3; Owner: Southern California Edison Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 75.05; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: Saxton[D]; Owner: GPU Nuclear; Ownership share of plant
(percent): 100; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of
trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: Seabrook 1; Owner: FPL Energy; Ownership share of plant
(percent): 88.2; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of
trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +[ I]; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + + +
+[I].
Plant name: Seabrook 1; Owner: Hudson Light & Power Dept.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 0.08; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Seabrook 1; Owner: Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale
Electric Co.; Ownership share of plant (percent): 11.6;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of
end of 2000: + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent
trust fund contributions[A]: + + +.
Plant name: Seabrook 1; Owner: Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 0.1; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Sequoyah 1; Owner: Tennessee Valley Authority; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Sequoyah 2; Owner: Tennessee Valley Authority; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: South Texas Project 1; Owner: AEP (Texas Central Co.);
Ownership share of plant (percent): 25.20; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +[ I]; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[A]: + + + +[ I].
Plant name: South Texas Project 1; Owner: City of Austin--Austin;
Energy; Ownership share of plant (percent): 16; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: South Texas Project 1; Owner: City Public Service Board of
San Antonio; Ownership share of plant (percent): 28; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: + + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: South Texas Project 1; Owner: Texas Genco; Ownership share
of plant (percent): 30.80; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +[ I];
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[I].
Plant name: South Texas Project 2; Owner: AEP (Texas Central Co.);
Ownership share of plant (percent): 25.20; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +[ I]; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[A]: + + + +[ I].
Plant name: South Texas Project 2; Owner: City of Austin--Austin
Energy; Ownership share of plant (percent): 16; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: South Texas Project 2; Owner: City Public Service Board of
San Antonio; Ownership share of plant (percent): 28; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: + + + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent
trust fund contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: South Texas Project 2; Owner: Texas Genco; Ownership share
of plant (percent): 30.80; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +[ I];
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E, I].
Plant name: St Lucie 1[H]; Owner: Florida Power & Light Co.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: St Lucie 2[H]; Owner: Florida Municipal Power Agency;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 8.7; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: St Lucie 2[H]; Owner: Florida Power & Light Co.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 85.2; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: St Lucie 2[H]; Owner: Orlando Utilities Comm.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 6.05; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [E, G].
Plant name: Summer[H]; Owner: South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 66.67; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _
_; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Summer[H]; Owner: South Carolina Public Service Authority;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 33.33; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Surry 1[B]; Owner: Virginia Electric & Power Co.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Surry 2[B]; Owner: Virginia Electric & Power Co.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Susquehanna 1; Owner: Allegheny Electric Cooperative;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 10; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _.
Plant name: Susquehanna 1; Owner: PPL Susquehanna, LLC; Ownership share
of plant (percent): 90; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: +.
Plant name: Susquehanna 2; Owner: Allegheny Electric Cooperative;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 10; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _.
Plant name: Susquehanna 2; Owner: PPL Susquehanna, LLC; Ownership share
of plant (percent): 90; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: + + +
+.
Plant name: Three Mile Island 1; Owner: AmerGen Energy Co., Inc.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Three Mile Island; 2[D]; Owner: Jersey Central Power &
Light; Ownership share of plant (percent): 25; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _[
I]; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Three Mile Island; 2[D]; Owner: Metropolitan Edison Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 50; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _[ I];
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Three Mile Island; 2[D]; Owner: Pennsylvania Electric Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 25; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _[ I];
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Trojan[D, F, J]; Owner: Eugene Water & Electric Board;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 30; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _ _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: [G].
Plant name: Trojan[D, F, J]; Owner: Pacific Power & Light Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 2.50; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Trojan[D, F, J]; Owner: Portland General Electric Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 67.50; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _
_ _; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Turkey Point 3[B]; Owner: Florida Power & Light Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Turkey Point 4[B]; Owner: Florida Power & Light Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +[E].
Plant name: Vermont Yankee; Owner: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +[
I]; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + +[I].
Plant name: Vogtle 1; Owner: City of Dalton (Georgia); Ownership share
of plant (percent): 1.60; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]:
[E, G].
Plant name: Vogtle 1; Owner: Georgia Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 45.70; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]:
+ + + +.
Plant name: Vogtle 1; Owner: Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 22.70; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Vogtle 1; Owner: Oglethorpe Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 30; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy
of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Vogtle 2; Owner: City of Dalton (Georgia); Ownership share
of plant (percent): 1.60; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]:
[E, G].
Plant name: Vogtle 2; Owner: Georgia Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 45.70; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +; Baseline
(most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]:
+ + + +.
Plant name: Vogtle 2; Owner: Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 22.70; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +
+ + +; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Vogtle 2; Owner: Oglethorpe Power Co.; Ownership share of
plant (percent): 30; Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy
of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Waterford 3; Owner: Entergy Louisiana, Inc.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: +.
Plant name: Watts Bar 1; Owner: Tennessee Valley Authority; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + + + +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Wolf Creek 1; Owner: Kansas City Power & Light Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 47; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _.
Plant name: Wolf Creek 1; Owner: Kansas Electric Power Cooperative;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 6; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Wolf Creek 1; Owner: Kansas Gas & Electric Co.; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 47; Baseline (most likely) scenario:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[A]: +.
Plant name: Yankee Rowe[D]; Owner: Yankee Atomic Electric Co.;
Ownership share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most
likely) scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: + + + +.
Plant name: Zion 1[D]; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Zion 2[D]; Owner: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership
share of plant (percent): 100; Baseline (most likely)
scenario: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _ _;
Baseline (most likely) scenario: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[A]: _ _ _.
Legend:
+ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 0 to 25 percent
more than benchmark.
++ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 26 to 50 percent
more than benchmark.
+++ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 51 to 100 percent
more than benchmark.
++++ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 101 percent or
more than benchmark.
_ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 0.1 to 25 percent
less than benchmark.
_ _ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 26 to 50 percent
less than benchmark.
_ _ _ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 51 to 100
percent less than benchmark.
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Adequacy of recent contributions is based on responses to our
survey. The percentages are more, or less, than the benchmark, meaning
the owner has contributed more, or less, on average for 1999 and 2000
(cost adjusted to 2000) than the annual average of the present value
amounts required in each subsequent year until its plant is retired.
[B] Plant's operating license extended for 20 years.
[C] Plants whose owners are expected to apply for 20-year license
renewals by December 2003.
[D] Plant has permanently shut down.
[E] Trust fund balance exceeds present value of estimated
decommissioning costs.
[F] Owner has, as of March 31, 2003, an additional method to support
financial assurance obligations (e.g., parent company guarantee,
statement of intent).
[G] Contributions data are not available.
[H] Plants whose owners have applied for 20-year license renewals, as
of August 20, 2003.
[I] Includes balances and/or contributions from a previous owner's
biennial report and/or responses to our survey.
[J] Owner had, as of March 31, 2001, an additional method to support
financial assurance obligations (e.g., parent company guarantee,
statement of intent).
[K] Liability is for decommissioning share and not ownership share.
[End of table]
Table 5: Selected Owners with More, or Less, Than Benchmark Trust Fund
Balances and Contributions, under Optimistic Assumptions (by Percentage
above or below Benchmarks):
Plant name: Beaver Valley 1; Owner[A]: Pennsylvania Power Co.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 65; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _ _.
Plant name: Browns Ferry 1[D]; Owner[A]: Tennessee Valley Authority;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _ _.
Plant name: Browns Ferry 2[D]; Owner[A]: Tennessee Valley Authority;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _ _.
Plant name: Browns Ferry 3[D]; Owner[A]: Tennessee Valley Authority;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _ _.
Plant name: Brunswick 1; Owner[A]: Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 81.67; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
+.
Plant name: Columbia Generating Station; Owner[A]: Energy Northwest;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _.
Plant name: Dresden 1[E]; Owner[A]: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _ _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _ _ [G].
Plant name: Duane Arnold; Owner[A]: Central Iowa Power Cooperative;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 20; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _ _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _ _.
Plant name: Duane Arnold; Owner[A]: Corn Belt Power Cooperative;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 10; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _.
Plant name: Duane Arnold; Owner[A]: IPL; Ownership: share of plant
(percent): 70; Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund
balances as of end of 2000: _; Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of
recent trust fund contributions[C]: _.
Plant name: Fermi 1[E]; Owner[A]: Detroit Edison Co.; Ownership: share
of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of
trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Optimistic scenario[B]:
Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]: + + + +[F].
Plant name: Grand Gulf 1; Owner[A]: South Mississippi Electric Power;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 10; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _ _.
Plant name: Indian Point 1[E]; Owner[A]: Entergy Nuclear Operations,
Inc.; Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _
_[G]; Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[C]: _ _ _[G].
Plant name: LaCrosse[E]; Owner[A]: Dairyland Power Cooperative;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
+ + + +[ F].
Plant name: Limerick 1; Owner[A]: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _.
Plant name: Limerick 2; Owner[A]: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
+.
Plant name: Maine Yankee[E]; Owner[A]: Maine Yankee; Atomic Power Co.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_.
Plant name: Palo Verde 2; Owner[A]: El Paso Electric Co.; Ownership:
share of plant (percent): 15.80; Optimistic scenario[B]:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]: +.
Plant name: Peach Bottom 1[E]; Owner[A]: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _ _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _ _.
Plant name: Rancho Seco[E]; Owner[A]: Sacramento Municipal Utility
District; Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _ _.
Plant name: Robinson 2[D]; Owner[A]: Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
+ + + +.
Plant name: Salem 1; Owner[A]: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership:
share of plant (percent): 42.59; Optimistic scenario[B]:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]: _.
Plant name: Salem 2; Owner[A]: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership:
share of plant (percent): 42.59; Optimistic scenario[B]:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]: +.
Plant name: Sequoyah 1; Owner[A]: Tennessee Valley Authority;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _ _.
Plant name: Sequoyah 2; Owner[A]: Tennessee Valley Authority;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _ _.
Plant name: Summer[D]; Owner[A]: South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 66.67; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: + +;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
+ +.
Plant name: Susquehanna 1; Owner[A]: Allegheny Electric Cooperative;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 10; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
+.
Plant name: Susquehanna 2; Owner[A]: Allegheny Electric Cooperative;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 10; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
+.
Plant name: Trojan[E]; Owner[A]: Portland General Electric Co.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 67.50; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _.
Plant name: Vogtle 2; Owner[A]: Oglethorpe Power Co.; Ownership: share
of plant (percent): 30; Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of
trust fund balances as of end of 2000: +; Optimistic scenario[B]:
Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Wolf Creek 1; Owner[A]: Kansas Electric; Power Cooperative;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 6; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Optimistic scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]:
_ _.
Plant name: Zion 1[E]; Owner[A]: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership:
share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic scenario[B]:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Zion 2[E]; Owner[A]: Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Ownership:
share of plant (percent): 100; Optimistic scenario[B]:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _; Optimistic
scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Legend:
+ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 0 to 25 percent
more than benchmark.
++ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 26 to 50 percent
more than benchmark.
+++ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 51 to 100 percent
more than benchmark.
++++ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 101 percent or
more than benchmark.
_ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 0.1 to 25 percent
less than benchmark.
_ _ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 26 to 50 percent
less than benchmark.
_ _ _ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 51 to 100
percent less than benchmark.
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Owners' funds were selected to be screened under optimistic
assumptions based on our baseline results; namely, that the status of
their trust funds was below baseline benchmarks on both balances and
contributions.
[B] See appendix I for description of optimistic assumptions.
[C] Adequacy of recent contributions is based on responses to our
survey. The percentages are more, or less, than the benchmark, meaning
the owner has contributed more, or less, on average for 1999 and 2000
(cost adjusted to 2000) than the annual average of the present value
amounts required in each subsequent year until its plant is retired.
[D] Plant whose owners have applied for 20-year license renewals or are
expected to apply by December 2003, as of August 20, 2003.
[E] Plant has permanently shut down.
[F]Trust fund balance exceeds present value of estimated
decommissioning cost.
[G] Includes balances and/or contributions from a previous owner's
biennial report and/or responses to our survey.
[End of table]
Table 6: Selected Owners with More, or Less, Than Benchmark Trust Fund
Balances and Contributions, under Pessimistic Assumptions (by
Percentage above or below Benchmarks):
Plant name: Arkansas Nuclear 2[D]; Owner[A]: Entergy Arkansas, Inc.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Beaver Valley 1; Owner[A]: Ohio Edison Co.; Ownership:
share of plant (percent): 35; Pessimistic assumptions
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Beaver Valley 2; Owner[A]: Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Co.; Ownership: share of plant (percent): 24.47; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Beaver Valley 2; Owner[A]: Ohio Edison Co.; Ownership:
share of plant (percent): 41.88; Pessimistic assumptions
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Beaver Valley 2; Owner[A]: Toledo Edison Co.; Ownership:
share of plant (percent): 19.91; Pessimistic assumptions
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _;
Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[C]: _.
Plant name: Big Rock Point[E]; Owner[A]: Consumers Energy Co.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _ _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent
trust fund contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Brunswick 1; Owner[A]: North Carolina Eastern Municipal;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 18.33; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _ _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent
trust fund contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Brunswick 2; Owner[A]: North Carolina Eastern Municipal;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 18.33; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _ _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent
trust fund contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Brunswick 2; Owner[A]: Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 81.67; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _ _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent
trust fund contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Callaway; Owner[A]: AmerenUE; Ownership: share of plant
(percent): 100; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy
of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _; Pessimistic assumptions
scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Calvert Cliffs 1[F]; Owner[A]: Constellation Energy Group;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: [G].
Plant name: Calvert Cliffs 2[F]; Owner[A]: Constellation Energy Group;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: [G].
Plant name: Catawba 1[D]; Owner[A]: Duke Power Co.; Ownership: share of
plant (percent): 12.50; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[C]: _.
Plant name: Catawba 1[D]; Owner[A]: North Carolina Electric Membership;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 28.1; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _ _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent
trust fund contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Catawba 1[D]; Owner[A]: Piedmont Municipal Power Agency;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 12.5; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _.
Plant name: Catawba 2[D]; Owner[A]: North Carolina Electric Membership;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 28.1; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner[A]: City of Alachua Electric Dept.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 0.08; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: [G].
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner[A]: City of Bushnell Utility Dept.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 0.04; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: [G].
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner[A]: City of Kissimmee Utilities;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 0.68; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _ _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent
trust fund contributions[C]: [G].
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner[A]: City of Leesburg Municipal
Electric; Ownership: share of plant (percent): 0.82;
Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as
of end of 2000: _ _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of
recent trust fund contributions[C]: [G].
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner[A]: City of Ocala Utilities
Division; Ownership: share of plant (percent): 1.33;
Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as
of end of 2000: _ _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of
recent trust fund contributions[C]: [G].
Plant name: Crystal River 3; Owner[A]: Seminole Electric Cooperative,
Inc.; Ownership: share of plant (percent): 1.70; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Dresden 2[D]; Owner[A]: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _.
Plant name: Dresden 3[D]; Owner[A]: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _.
Plant name: Farley 1[D]; Owner[A]: Alabama Power Co.; Ownership: share
of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[C]: _.
Plant name: Haddam Neck[E]; Owner[A]: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power
Co.; Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Harris 1; Owner[A]: North Carolina Eastern Municipal;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 16.17; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Harris 1; Owner[A]: Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 83.83; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Humboldt Bay 3[E]; Owner[A]: Pacific Gas & Electric Co.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _ _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent
trust fund contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Indian Point 2; Owner[A]: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _.
Plant name: Millstone 2; Owner[A]: Dominion Nuclear Connecticut;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: [G].
Plant name: Monticello; Owner[A]: Xcel Energy; Ownership: share of
plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Palo Verde 1; Owner[A]: El Paso Electric Co.; Ownership:
share of plant (percent): 15.8; Pessimistic assumptions
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Palo Verde 3; Owner[A]: El Paso Electric Co.; Ownership:
share of plant (percent): 15.8; Pessimistic assumptions
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Palo Verde 3; Owner[A]: Public Service Co. of New Mexico;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 10.20; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Peach Bottom 2[F]; Owner[A]: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 50; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _[H]; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent
trust fund contributions[C]: _.
Plant name: Pilgrim 1; Owner[A]: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Prairie Island 1; Owner[A]: Xcel Energy; Ownership: share
of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[C]: _.
Plant name: Quad Cities 1[D]; Owner[A]: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 75; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Quad Cities 2[D]; Owner[A]: Exelon Generation Co., LLC;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 75; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Quad Cities 2[D]; Owner[A]: MidAmerica Energy Holdings;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 25; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _ _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent
trust fund contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Susquehanna 1; Owner[A]: PPL Susquehanna, LLC; Ownership:
share of plant (percent): 90; Pessimistic assumptions
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Vermont Yankee; Owner[A]: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _ _[H]; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent
trust fund contributions[C]: _ _[H].
Plant name: Vogtle 1; Owner[A]: Oglethorpe Power Co.; Ownership: share
of plant (percent): 30; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]:
Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Plant name: Waterford 3; Owner[A]: Entergy Louisiana, Inc.; Ownership:
share of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic assumptions
scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of 2000: _ _;
Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust fund
contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Wolf Creek 1; Owner[A]: Kansas City Power & Light Co.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 47; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _ _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent
trust fund contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Wolf Creek 1; Owner[A]: Kansas Gas & Electric Co.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 47; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent trust
fund contributions[C]: _ _.
Plant name: Yankee Rowe[E]; Owner[A]: Yankee Atomic Electric Co.;
Ownership: share of plant (percent): 100; Pessimistic
assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of trust fund balances as of end of
2000: _ _; Pessimistic assumptions scenario[B]: Adequacy of recent
trust fund contributions[C]: _ _ _.
Legend:
+ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 0 to 25 percent
more than benchmark.
++ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 26 to 50 percent
more than benchmark.
+++ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 51 to 100 percent
more than benchmark.
++++ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 101 percent or
more than benchmark.
_ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 0.1 to 25 percent
less than benchmark.
_ _ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 26 to 50 percent
less than benchmark.
_ _ _ means that fund balance/recent contributions were 51 to 100
percent less than benchmark.
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Owners' funds were selected to be screened under pessimistic
assumptions based on our baseline results; namely, that the status of
their trust funds was 0 to 100 percent above baseline benchmark on
balances and/or contributions.
[B] See app. I for description of pessimistic assumptions.
[C] Adequacy of recent contributions is based on responses to our survey.
The percentages are more, or less, than the benchmark, meaning the
owner has contributed more, or less, on average for 1999 and 2000 (cost
adjusted to 2000) than the annual average of the present value amounts
required in each subsequent year until its plant is retired.
[D] Plant whose owners have applied for 20-year license renewals or are
expected to apply by December 2003, as of August 20, 2003.
[E] Plant has permanently shut down.
[F] Plant's operating license extended for 20 years.
[G] Contributions data are not available.
[H] Includes balances and/or contributions from a previous owner's
biennial report and/or responses to our survey.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
UNITED STATES:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001:
October 3, 2003:
Mr. James E. Wells:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
United States General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Wells:
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to review and submit
comments on the draft of the General Accounting Office's (GAO's) report
entitled "Nuclear Regulation - NRC Needs More Effective Analysis to
Ensure Accumulation of Funds to Decommission Nuclear Power Plants." The
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) appreciates the time
and effort that you and your staff have taken to review this topic.
GAO concludes that the NBC's analyses of funding levels of co-owners of
a nuclear power plant are inconsistent with its internal guidance, the
NRC does not have a method of determining whether licensees are
accumulating funds at sufficient rates to pay for decommissioning, and
the NRC needs to establish criteria for taking action when licensees
are at unacceptable levels of funding assurance.
The NRC disagrees with GAO's first two conclusions and believes that to
establish criteria for taking action when licensees are at unacceptable
funding levels is secondary to its primary concern which is to assure
that licensees are accumulating funds at appropriate rates. Further, in
NBC's view, it is questionable whether the development of criteria to
address insufficient funding levels is warranted, given the unique set
of circumstances and considerations that would apply to each licensee.
Therefore, the NRC recommends that GAO state, in its report, that: (1)
NBC's practice with respect to analyzing decommissioning funds where
nuclear power plants have co-owners is consistent with its internal
guidance; (2) the NRC has a methodology that is different from GAO's
for assessing whether funds are being accumulated appropriately, and
GAO's conclusions regarding sufficient accumulation of funds is based
on GAO's methodology that has not been reviewed and accepted by the
NRC; and (3) the NBC's practice is to review licensees who have not
accumulated sufficient funds on a case-by-case basis due, in part, to
the complexity and range of circumstances that may arise with any given
licensee, particularly those that are subject to the jurisdiction of
State regulators. Specific comments are provided on the three main GAO
conclusions, as described below, and are elaborated on in greater
detail in the enclosure.
* First, the GAO report states that NBC's internal guidance requires NRC
to separately assess the status of each co-owner's trust funds against
each co-owner's contractual obligations with other co-owners to fund
decommissioning. We do not agree that the guidance requires assessment
against co-owners' contractual obligations. The NRC:
reviews the accumulated balances and planned future contributions of
each co-owner in order to evaluate the total trust fund balance
expected for each reactor. Where a nuclear power plant has multiple
owners, it is the owners' collective responsibility to meet the funding
requirements for the plant.
Second, while the GAO report suggests that the NRC use a "benchmark"
amount of funds that owners should have accumulated by the end of year
2000 to determine if owners are "on track" to pay for eventual
decommissioning, NRC regulations do not establish intermediate
benchmarking levels, but rather establish the minimum balance that must
be obtained at the permanent termination of operations. The NRC has
always deferred to the State public utility commission, or other
regulatory authority with rate making powers, to set rates to fund
decommissioning trusts. The NRC determines whether there is reasonable
assurance that adequate funds will be available for decommissioning by
reviewing a licensee's current fund balance, its plan for future
deposits, and its projected earnings, to the extent provided by NRC
regulations, consistent with and in recognition of the significant role
State regulatory authorities and FERC have in setting the rates at
which licensees collect decommissioning funds.
Third, the NBC's practice is to deal with licensees who have not
accumulated sufficient funds on a case-by-case basis due in part, to
the complexity and range of circumstances that may arise with any given
licensee, particularly those that are subject to the jurisdiction of
State regulators.
The NRC will continue to evaluate its processes and policies associated
with the decommissioning of power reactor facilities. The enclosed NRC
comments are intended to provide a more comprehensive perspective
related to the conclusions and recommendations contained in the draft
GAO report.
Should you have any questions about these comments, please contact
either Mr. William Dean at 301-415-1703 or Ms. Melinda Malloy at 301-
415-1785, of my staff.
Sincerely,
William D. Travers:
Executive Director for Operations:
Signed by William D. Travers:
Enclosure: As stated:
NRC Comments on the Draft General Accounting Office Report "Nuclear
Regulation - NRC Needs More Effective Analysis to Ensure Accumulation
of Funds to Decommission Nuclear Power Plants" (GAO-04-32):
1. The GAO report states on page 4: "Although the collective status of
the owners' decommissioning fund accounts has improved since our last
report, some individual owners are not on track to accumulate
sufficient funds for decommissioning.":
The NRC disagrees with GAO's conclusion that some individual owners are
not on track to accumulate sufficient funds for decommissioning because
GAO's conclusion is based on GAO's methodology which is different from
the NBC's and has not been reviewed and accepted by NRC.
The NRC recommends that GAO state, in its report, that NRC has a
different methodology than GAO for assessing whether an owner is "on
track." The NBC's methodology with respect to licensees who are
authorized to accumulate funds over time assesses the reasonableness of
the collection schedules proffered by licensees by weighing several
factors such as the current fund balance, the licensee's plan for
future deposits, and the projected earnings to the extent provided by
NRC regulations, consistent with and in recognition of the significant
role State regulatory authorities and FERC have in setting the rates at
which licensees collect decommissioning funds.
2. On page 5, the GAO report states: ". . . contrary to NBC's internal
guidance, for the plants with more than one owner, NRC did not
separately assess the status of each co-owner's trust funds against the
co-owner's contractual obligation to fund decommissioning.":
The NRC does not agree that its assessment of plants is contrary to
NBC's internal guidance. The NRC review process for decommissioning
trust fund assurance does, in fact, incorporate the information
regarding each licensee's amortization schedule, where multiple owners
per license exist, and where such information for each licensee has
been submitted individually (in some cases, a lead licensee will report
information for all co-owners). The phrase "for its share of the
facility" as taken from page 11 of NUREG-1577, Rev. 1, "Standard Review
Plan on Power Reactor Licensee Financial Qualifications and
Decommissioning Funding Assurance," only reflects that an individual
co-owner should report its own information (absent other arrangements
for a lead licensee to report on behalf of the other co-owners), and is
not obligated to provide information for other co-owners. The phrase
does not indicate that the NRC must analyze each co-owner's
decommissioning funds with regard to its private contractual
obligations. The NRC does not separately assess the status of each co-
owner's decommissioning funding against the co-owner's private
contractual obligation to fund decommissioning.
Enclosure:
While the NRC recognizes that private contractual arrangements among
co-owners exist, the NBC's primary concern is that on a plant basis,
there are adequate funds available from the licensees of the plant on a
collective or aggregate basis. The NRC reserves the right, in highly
unusual situations where adequate protection of public health and
safety would be compromised if such action were not taken, to consider
imposing joint and several liability on co-owners for decommissioning
funding when one or more co-owners have defaulted. The NBC's practice
is consistent with this policy.
The NRC recommends that GAO revise its report to state that the staff's
practice in analyzing decommissioning funding for plants with multiple
owners is consistent with its internal guidance.
3. On page 6, the GAO report states: ". . . NRC has not established
criteria for responding to any unacceptable levels of financial
assurance. Accordingly, we are recommending that NRC develop and use an
effective method for determining whether owners are accumulating funds
at sufficient rates and establish criteria for responding to
unacceptable levels of financial assurance.":
The NRC disagrees with GAO's finding that the NRC has not developed and
used a method of determining whether owner utilizing sinking funds are
accumulating funds at sufficient rates. The NRC has a method which
assesses the reasonableness of the collection schedule by weighing
several factors. Therefore, the NRC recommends that GAO revise its
report to state that the NRC has a method for determining whether
owners are reasonably accumulating sufficient funds. If it is
determined that unacceptable levels of financial assurance exist, the
NRC will immediately seek licensees' plans to provide acceptable
funding mechanisms, review those plans on a case-by-case basis in light
of the specific circumstances involved, engage in discussions with
relevant State regulators, and issue orders as necessary and
appropriate. Beyond the general activities, the NRC has not established
criteria for responding to unacceptable levels of financial assurance
nor do we believe that such a criteria is worthwhile given the
complexity and range of circumstances that may arise with any given
licensee, particularly those who are subject to jurisdiction of State
regulators.
4. On page 10, the GAO report includes a section entitled "Several
Owners Are Not Accumulating Sufficient Funds for Decommissioning Their
Plants.":
The NRC analyzed a sample of licensees in 2001 to determine whether
they were accumulating sufficient funds for decommissioning their
plants. Based on the sample, the NRC did not find any owners who were
not accumulating sufficient funds. The NRC recognizes that GAO's
conclusions are based on GAO's own method of analysis, however, that
method of analysis has not been accepted by the NRC.
Therefore, the NRC recommends that GAO clarify its report to state that
its conclusion that several owners are not accumulating sufficient
funds is based on a GAO methodology or criteria that has not been
accepted by the NRC. The NRC further recommends that GAO acknowledge in
its report that there may be other acceptable methodologies or criteria
to determine whether adequate funds are being collected that could
yield different conclusions, particularly since there are many
variables that reasonably can be incorporated into a given methodology.
5. On page 16, the GAO report states: "They [NRC official] also stated
that NBC's regulations do not prohibit each co-owner from being held
responsible for decommissioning costs even if these costs are more than
the co-owner's individual ownership share. However, assessing the
adequacy of decommissioning costs on plant-wide basis is not consistent
with the industry view, held by most plant owners, that each co-owner
should be limited to its pro rata share of decommissioning
expenses....":
The NRC recognizes the existence of licensee arrangements via private
contracts where licensees are responsible for decommissioning costs in
proportion to their ownership interests, and does not object to these
private contractual arrangements. However, the NRC reserves the right,
in highly unusual situations where adequate protection of public health
and safety would be compromised if such action were not taken, to
consider imposing joint and several liability on co-owners for
decommissioning funding when one or more co-owners have defaulted.
Therefore, the GAO should revise its report to clarify that while there
are a variety of industry practices and views, the NBC's primary intent
is assuring the collective accumulation of decommissioning funds.
The following are GAO's comments on NRC's letter dated October 3, 2003.
GAO Comments:
1. Rather than concluding that NRC does not have a method, we stated
that the agency's analysis was not effective in identifying owners who
might be at risk of accumulating insufficient funds to pay for
decommissioning. For example, NRC relied on the owners' future funding
plans to make up any shortfalls without verifying whether the plans are
consistent with the owners' recent contributions. See also our response
in the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section on page 16.
2. We agree that NRC should be primarily concerned with ensuring that
owners of nuclear power plants will have sufficient funds for
decommissioning. However, we believe that NRC should take a proactive,
rather than reactive, approach to providing owners and the public with
a more complete understanding of NRC's expectations as to how they will
hold owners who are not accumulating sufficient funds accountable. As
discussed in the report, the lack of any specific criteria for acting
on owners' decommissioning financial reports contrasts with NRC's
practices in overseeing safety issues at nuclear plants, where the
agency uses an "Action Matrix" that provides for a range of actions
commensurate with the significance of safety inspection findings and
performance indicators. Without similar criteria in its oversight of
decommissioning funding assurance, NRC will not have a logical,
coherent, consistent, and predictable plan of action if and when it
encounters owners whose plants have inadequate financial assurance. See
also our response in the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section on
page 16.
3. See our responses to comments 5, 6, and 9 in this appendix.
4. See our responses to comment 9.
5. We agree that current NRC regulations do not establish intermediate
benchmarking levels, but rather establish the minimum balance that must
be obtained when plants are retired. We also agree that the state
regulatory authorities and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission play a
role. However, we believe that NRC should take a more proactive
approach in developing an effective method for ensuring that sufficient
funds will be available for decommissioning. For example, a common
expected rate of return could be used to project the earnings of each
owner's trust fund. NRC's current method allows the owners to use up to
2 percent (real) or another rate if approved by its state regulator. As
we stated in our report, one state regulator approved owners of the
same plant to use widely varying rates of return to project earnings on
their trust fund investments. Other factors being equal, the owner
using the higher rate would need to collect fewer funds than the owner
using a lower rate of return. While the actual rate the owners will
earn on their funds could be higher or lower, NRC accepted the state
regulator-approved rates without assessing whether they were consistent
with market expectations.
In another example, in its 2001 biennial report, one owner using NRC's
2 percent rate of return estimated that the amount of funds needed for
decommissioning under NRC's regulations would be insufficient at five
of its nuclear power plants. Therefore, the owner provided additional
assurance in the form of a parent guarantee. However, the owner sought
and subsequently received approval from its state regulator to use a
higher real rate of return. After receiving the approval, the owner
withdrew its parent guarantee since under the higher rate, the
projected trust funds were sufficient to cover estimated
decommissioning costs. We believe that by being more proactive, and not
simply deferring to others, the NRC can develop a more effective and
consistent method and better achieve its primary concern of ensuring
that owners are accumulating funds at sufficient rates.
6. We found no evidence during our review that NRC has ever determined
that an owner is not accumulating sufficient funds. Therefore, without
any experience that its "practice" has been applied, we believe that
without clear criteria, NRC will not have a logical, coherent,
consistent, and predictable plan of action if and when it encounters
owners whose plants have inadequate financial assurance. Accordingly,
we are recommending that NRC establish criteria for responding to
unacceptable levels of financial assurance.
7. We agree that our method is different from that used by NRC. Our
draft discussed and reviewed NRC's analysis. Based on our review, we
concluded that NRC's analysis was not effective in identifying owners
who might be at risk of accumulating insufficient funds to pay for
eventual decommissioning. For example, NRC relied on the owners' future
funding plans, or on rate-setting authority decisions, in concluding
that the owners were on track to fully fund decommissioning. However,
we found some owners' actual contributions in 2001 were much less than
what they stated in their 2001 biennial reports to NRC that they
planned to contribute. For example, one owner contributed about $1.5
million (or 39 percent) less than the amount it told NRC that it
planned to contribute. Moreover, using actual contributions the owners
had recently made to their trust funds, we identified several owners
that are at risk of accumulating insufficient funds to pay for eventual
decommissioning.
8. We do not believe any changes are needed.
9. We agree, and the our draft report stated, that NRC does not
separately assess the status of each co-owner's decommissioning funding
against the co-owner's private contractual obligation to fund
decommissioning. The NRC guidance states: "Some licensees are part
owners of power reactors. In such cases, the [NRC] reviewer should
evaluate separately each licensee's [co-owner's] amortization schedule
[i.e., decommissioning funding] for its share of the facility, unless
the lead licensee has agreed to coordinate funding documentation and
reporting for all co-owners." Nonetheless, we revised the report to
remove any inferences that NRC's practice is inconsistent with its
internal guidance. Notwithstanding NRC's characterization of its
practice, we believe that both the guidance and NRC's actions do not go
far enough. For example, the guidance allows for an exception when the
lead licensee agrees to coordinate documentation and reporting. More
importantly, the critical issue is that NRC should do more to develop
an effective method for assessing the adequacy of nuclear power plant
owner's trust funds for decommissioning. Under NRC's current method, it
combines the trust funds for all co-owners of a nuclear plant and then
assesses the adequacy of decommissioning funds on a plant-wide basis.
However, as our analysis indicates, combining the trust funds of
several owners can produce misleading results because those co-owners
with more than sufficient funds can appear to balance out those with
less than sufficient funds. In addition, as a practical matter, owners
have contractual agreements to pay for their share of decommissioning,
and the trust funds are generally not transferable among owners. Unless
NRC separately evaluates the adequacy of each co-owners'
decommissioning trust fund, the agency's existing process would appear
to require some co-owners to pay more than their fair share of
decommissioning costs. We believe this would be inconsistent with NRC's
stated policy of generally not looking to one co-owner to bail out
another.
10. Rather than state that NRC has not developed and used a method, we
found that the agency's method was not effective in identifying owners
who might be at risk of accumulating insufficient funds to pay for
decommissioning. For example, we identified several limitations in
NRC's method, including the agency's practice of combining the trust
funds for all the co-owners of a nuclear plant and then assessing
whether the combined value of the trust funds is sufficient. We believe
that this practice can produce misleading results because those co-
owners with more than sufficient funds can appear to balance out those
with less than sufficient funds.
In addition, we agree that NRC has not established criteria for taking
action when it finds cases of unacceptable levels of financial
assurance. According to NRC officials we spoke to, NRC has never
identified an owner with unacceptable levels of financial assurance.
Moreover, the general activities that NRC stated above are not included
in its internal guidance for reviewing the owners' biennial reports. We
believe that NRC should take a more proactive approach to providing
owners and the public with a more complete understanding of NRC's
expectations as to how they will hold owners who are not accumulating
sufficient funds accountable. We believe having established criteria
for taking action when it is determined that unacceptable levels of
financial assurance exist will better prepare NRC to make this
determination. Furthermore, having such criteria would not only
increase public confidence that NRC has a plan to take action to ensure
sufficient funds will be available for decommissioning but also would
make its determination of inadequacy more transparent to owners.
11. As indicated in our draft report, we reviewed NRC's analysis of the
owners' 2001 biennial reports. Our review clearly points out that the
agency's method has limitations that reduce its effectiveness. For
example, NRC relied on the owners' future funding plans to make up any
shortfalls without verifying whether those plans are consistent with
the owners' recent contributions. We found that some owners' actual
contributions in 2001 were much less than what they stated in their
2001 biennial reports to NRC that they planned to contribute. For
example, one owner contributed about $1.5 million (or 39 percent) less
than the amount they told NRC that they planned to contribute. In
addition, based on our analysis using the actual contributions the
owners recently made to their trust funds, we found that 28 owners with
ownership shares in 44 plants contributed less than the amounts we
estimate they will need to contribute over the remaining life of their
plants to meet their decommissioning obligations. Accordingly, we
believe that our recommendation to NRC to develop an effective method
is clearly warranted to ensure that all owners are accumulating funds
at sufficient rates. See also our response to comment 12.
12. As stated in our draft, our conclusions are based on a method that
uses a benchmark to assess the adequacy of each nuclear plant owner's
decommissioning trust fund. In addition, our draft stated that this
benchmark is not the only way an owner could accrue enough funds to pay
future decommissioning costs. Still, we believe that our benchmark is
useful for assessing the status of the owners' decommissioning trust
funds because it (1) provides a common standard for comparisons among
owners, (2) embodies the principle of economic efficiency in that the
price of a product (i.e., electricity) should, if possible, equal all
of its costs--current and accrued, and (3) provides for transparency in
that it assumes that current and future users pay the same
decommissioning fees, in constant present-value terms.
13. As we stated in our draft, NRC stated that it will not impose
decommissioning costs on co-owners in a manner inconsistent with their
agreed-upon shares, except in highly unusual circumstances when
required by public health and safety considerations and that it would
not seek more than the pro rata shares from co-owners with de minimis
ownership. Nevertheless, unless NRC separately evaluates the adequacy
of each co-owners' decommissioning trust fund, the agency's existing
process would appear to require some co-owners to pay more than their
fair share of decommissioning costs. We believe this would be
inconsistent with NRC's stated policy of generally not looking to one
co-owner to bail out another one.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Tim Guinane (202) 512-4939:
Acknowledgments:
In addition, Ronald La Due Lake, Carolyn McGowan, Cynthia Norris,
Michael Sagalow, Barbara Timmerman, Daniel G. Williams, and Dwayne
Weigel made key contributions to this report.
:
(360094):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Retirement means the permanent cessation of a plant's operation.
[2] Costs in 2000 present value dollars and are for decommissioning the
plant site only and exclude costs for cleaning up nonradiological
hazards and storing spent fuel.
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Regulation: Better
Oversight Needed to Ensure Accumulation of Funds to Decommission
Nuclear Power Plants, GAO/RCED-99-75 (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 1999).
[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Regulation: NRC's
Assurances of Decommissioning Funding during Utility Restructuring
Could Be Improved, GAO-02-48 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 3, 2001).
[5] We administered the survey to 110 owners. Since then, the ownership
of some plants has changed and as a result, the total number of owners
has declined. Our analysis assesses 222 trust funds held by 99 owners.
[6] GAO/RCED-99-75.
[7] SAFSTOR involves placing the stabilized and defueled facility in
storage for a time followed by final decontamination and dismantlement,
and license termination.
[8] NRC licenses include all co-owners as co-licensees; in general, one
owner is authorized to operate the facility while the others are
authorized only to have an ownership interest. Co-owners generally
divide costs and output from their power plants by using a
contractually defined pro rata share standard.
[9] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Financial Assurance
Requirements (Sept. 22, 1998), 63 Fed. Reg. 50465.
[10] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standard Review Plan on Power
Reactor Licensee Financial Qualifications and Decommissioning Funding
Assurance, NUREG 1577, Rev. 1, March 1999.
[11] Under NRC's guidance, co-owners trust funds can be collectively
evaluated when the lead licensee agrees to coordinate funding
documentation and reporting for all the co-owners.
[12] Based on 72 owners who provided after-tax rates of return for
1998, 1999, and 2000. These owners' trust funds accounted for about 71
percent of the total trust funds in 2000.
[13] For 2000 (the only year for which we have data on fund
allocations), on average, owners allocated their funds rather evenly
between equities and fixed income assets (see app. I for details).
Investment plans such as pension funds that invested more heavily in
equities may have earned a greater overall return during this period.
[14] Some owners whom we estimate are below the benchmark have a parent
company guarantee or other method to support financial assurance
obligations. However, we did not evaluate the adequacy of these
provisions. See app. II, table 4.
[15] Our analysis simulates that the owners will increase their yearly
future funding at the assumed after-tax rate of return on the
investments of the funds, and that once in the fund, these yearly
contributions will grow at this same rate. See appendix I for a
discussion of our methodology.
[16] Some of these owners were also making up their shortfalls on other
plants.
[17] Summary of Decommissioning Trust Funding Status Reports For Power
Reactors, SECY-01-0197, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 5,
2001.
[18] One plant--Browns Ferry 1--has a license but is currently not
operating.
[19] Requirement is waived if lead owner has agreed to coordinate
funding documentation and reporting for all co-owners. In such cases,
the guidance does not require a separate evaluation of each co-owner's
amortization schedule.
[20] Joint and several liability refers to the legal doctrine, which
would allow holding all or any one of the co-owners financially
responsible for the default of any co-owner.
[21] Final Policy Statement on the Restructuring and Economic
Deregulation of the Electric Utility Industry, 62 Fed. Reg. 44071 (Aug.
19, 1997).
[22] Co-owners generally divide costs from their facilities using a
contractually defined pro rata share.
[23] GAO/RCED-99-75.
[24] We assume that decommissioning will most likely occur within 5
years of a plant being retired. For simplicity, our model therefore
decommissions a plant "instantaneously" at 2.5 years after the 40-year
lifespan. Thus, the present value of decommissioning costs after the
first year of operation is computed by discounting the estimated future
costs by 41.5 years (39+2.5). Under our benchmark, the first
contribution to the fund at the end of the first year should equal 1/
40TH of the present value of the costs, discounted over 41.5 years. At
the end of the second year of the plant's operation, the trust fund
(including earnings) would equal 2/40TH of the present value of the
future costs, discounted back by 40.5 years. Finally, at the end of the
40TH and final year of operation, the fund would contain 40/40TH of the
present value of the future costs, discounted back by 2.5 years. At
"instantaneous" decommissioning, 2.5 years hence, the trust fund
balance would equal the entire current-dollar decommissioning costs.
[25] Table 6 includes some trust funds for which we did not have
contributions data but whose balance adequacy percentage for the
baseline fell below zero under the pessimistic assumptions.
[26] Forecast as of January 30, 2003.
[27] To forecast the growth in equities, we used Global Insight's
forecast for the S&P 500. We assumed that dividends would be
reinvested. For example, for our baseline scenario, we combined the
compound annual-average growth rate for the S&P 500 Index with its
corresponding annual-average dividend yield rate to obtain a total
growth rate. For U.S. securities, we used the forecast for 30-year
federal government bonds. For corporate bonds and municipal bonds, we
used the forecast for Aaa-rated corporate and municipal bonds,
respectively. For cash, we used the forecast for 6-month U.S. Treasury
Bills.
[28] Using rate of return data provided by 84 owners, we calculated a
weighted-average difference between their pretax and after-tax rates of
return for each fund and year over 1997-2001, weighted by the relative
size of their funds. We then calculated the simple mean of the weighted
average differences for each year to obtain an overall weighted average
difference of about 0.87 of a percentage point.
[29] The 4.60 percent cost-escalation rate is fund-weighted average
based on the owners' assumptions about future nominal-dollar cost-
escalation, as reported in their 2001 biennial reports.
[30] To calculate a cost-adjusted real rate-of-return for the
pessimistic and optimistic scenarios, we formed proportionality ratios.
For pessimistic, 3.36% / 3.15% = x% / 1.02%; therefore, x = 1.09%. For
optimistic, 3.43% / 3.15% = y% /1.02%; therefore, y = 1.11%.
[31] For pessimistic, 6.40% - x% = 1.09%; therefore, x = 5.31%. For
optimistic, 5.58% - y% = 1.11%; therefore, y = 4.47%.
[32] To test this simplifying assumption in the looking-backward
analysis, we assessed the impact of assuming that one-fifth of
decommissioning occurred over each of the 5 years. The result was
virtually identical to that obtained when we assumed that all
decommissioning occurred at 2.5 years after shutdown.
[33] The 16 plants are: Arkansas Nuclear Unit 1; Calvert Cliffs Units 1
and 2; Hatch Units 1 and 2; North Anna Units 1 and 2; Oconee Units 1,
2, and 3; Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3; Surry Units 1 and 2; and Turkey
Point Units 3 and 4.
[34] The 14 plants are: Catawba Units 1 and 2; Dresden Units 2 and 3;
Fort Calhoun; Ginna; McGuire Units 1 and 2; Quad Cities Units 1 and 2;
Robinson 2; St. Lucie Units 1 and 2; and Summer. The other 8 plants
are: Arkansas Nuclear Unit 2; Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3; Cook,
D.C. Units 1 and 2; and Farley Units 1 and 2.
[35] This expectation is in contrast to conditions reported in our 1999
report, when the market for electricity appeared much weaker. In that
report, we assumed in the baseline scenario that 6 plants would be
prematurely retired during 1998 to 2002.
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