Nuclear Nonproliferation
DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors Gao ID: GAO-04-807 July 30, 2004Nuclear research reactors worldwide use highly enriched uranium (HEU) as fuel and for the production of medical isotopes. Because HEU can also be used in nuclear weapons, the Department of Energy's (DOE) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program is developing low enriched uranium (LEU), which would be very difficult to use in weapons, to replace HEU. To date, 39 of the 105 research reactors in the United States and abroad targeted by DOE have converted to LEU fuel. GAO was asked to examine (1) the status of the remaining research reactors in converting to LEU fuel, (2) DOE's progress in developing new LEU fuels for reactors where conversion is not yet technically feasible, (3) DOE's progress in developing LEU for the production of medical isotopes, and (4) the status of DOE and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to improve security at research reactors.
Currently, conversion to LEU fuel is technically feasible for 35 of the 66 research reactors in DOE's program that still use HEU fuel, but most do not have plans to convert. In the United States, 8 research reactors, including 6 university research reactors, have not converted because DOE has not provided the necessary funding. Of the 20 foreign research reactors that use U.S.-origin HEU fuel, 14 do not have plans to convert because they have a sufficient supply of HEU fuel and either do not want to incur the additional cost of conversion or do not have the necessary funding. Finally, only 1 of 7 Russian-supplied research reactors that could use LEU fuel is scheduled to convert. Conversion to LEU fuel is not technically feasible for 31 research reactors worldwide that still use HEU fuel. DOE has experienced technical setbacks in fuel development that have postponed the conversion of the 31 reactors until 2010 at the earliest. One fuel failed unexpectedly in testing, and DOE may cancel further development, depending on the results of additional tests. Initial testing of another LEU fuel produced positive results, but additional testing is required and the fuel will not be developed until 2010 at the earliest. Separately from the development of LEU fuel, DOE is developing LEU to replace HEU in the production of medical isotopes. DOE has not yet completed the work that would enable conversion of large-scale medical isotope production to LEU. One reactor has converted to LEU for smallscale production. However, large-scale producers are concerned that the cost of converting to LEU could be prohibitive. DOE and NRC have taken steps to improve security at foreign and U.S. research reactors. While operators at most research reactors we visited said that security had been upgraded through DOE or NRC efforts, we observed areas where further improvements could be made. Recognizing the possible need for further improvements, DOE and NRC are engaged in separate efforts to assess and improve security.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-807, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
July 2004:
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION:
DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable
Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors:
GAO-04-807:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-807, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
Nuclear research reactors worldwide use highly enriched uranium (HEU)
as fuel and for the production of medical isotopes. Because HEU can
also be used in nuclear weapons, the Department of Energy‘s (DOE)
Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program is developing
low enriched uranium (LEU), which would be very difficult to use in
weapons, to replace HEU. To date, 39 of the 105 research reactors in
the United States and abroad targeted by DOE have converted to LEU
fuel. GAO was asked to examine (1) the status of the remaining
research reactors in converting to LEU fuel, (2) DOE‘s progress in
developing new LEU fuels for reactors where conversion is not yet
technically feasible, (3) DOE‘s progress in developing LEU for the
production of medical isotopes, and (4) the status of DOE and Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to improve security at research
reactors.
What GAO Found:
Currently, conversion to LEU fuel is technically feasible for 35 of the
66 research reactors in DOE‘s program that still use HEU fuel, but most
do not have plans to convert. In the United States, 8 research
reactors, including 6 university research reactors, have not converted
because DOE has not provided the necessary funding. Of the 20 foreign
research reactors that use U.S.-origin HEU fuel, 14 do not have plans
to convert because they have a sufficient supply of HEU fuel and either
do not want to incur the additional cost of conversion or do not have
the necessary funding. Finally, only 1 of 7 Russian-supplied research
reactors that could use LEU fuel is scheduled to convert.
Conversion to LEU fuel is not technically feasible for 31 research
reactors worldwide that still use HEU fuel. DOE has experienced
technical setbacks in fuel development that have postponed the
conversion of the 31 reactors until 2010 at the earliest. One fuel
failed unexpectedly in testing, and DOE may cancel further development,
depending on the results of additional tests. Initial testing of
another LEU fuel produced positive results, but additional testing is
required and the fuel will not be developed until 2010 at the earliest.
Separately from the development of LEU fuel, DOE is developing LEU to
replace HEU in the production of medical isotopes. DOE has not yet
completed the work that would enable conversion of large-scale medical
isotope production to LEU. One reactor has converted to LEU for
small-scale production. However, large-scale producers are concerned
that the cost of converting to LEU could be prohibitive.
DOE and NRC have taken steps to improve security at foreign and U.S.
research reactors. While operators at most research reactors we
visited said that security had been upgraded through DOE or NRC
efforts, we observed areas where further improvements could be made.
Recognizing the possible need for further improvements, DOE and NRC are
engaged in separate efforts to assess and improve security.
Conversion Status of Research Reactors Included in DOE‘s Reactor
Conversion Program:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOE consider converting the 6 U.S. university
research reactors, remove the HEU fuel from the reactors after their
conversion, and evaluate providing additional incentives to foreign
research reactors to convert to LEU. DOE agreed with our
recommendations. GAO did not fully evaluate, and is not making
recommendations on, DOE and NRC efforts to improve security at research
reactors.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-807.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202)
512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Many Domestic and Foreign Research Reactors Are Still Using Weapons-
Usable Uranium Even Though They Could Operate on Low Enriched Uranium:
Technical Setbacks in Developing New Fuels Limit Progress in Converting
the Largest Remaining Research Reactors:
Using Low Enriched Uranium for Medical Isotope Production Is Feasible,
but Concerns over Cost Could Limit Its Use:
DOE and NRC Are Addressing Security at Foreign and Domestic Research
Reactors:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Reactor Conversion Program Expenditures and Projected
Costs:
Appendix II: 39 Research Reactors That Converted to LEU Fuel under the
Reactor Conversion Program:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
Tables:
Table 1: U.S. Research Reactors Using HEU Fuel That Could Convert to
LEU:
Table 2: 20 Foreign Research Reactors Still Using HEU Obtained from the
United States:
Table 3: Seven Foreign Research Reactors Using HEU from Russia That
Could Convert to LEU:
Table 4: 31 Research Reactors That Cannot Convert Using Currently
Available LEU Fuels:
Table 5: Number of Research Reactors Selected for Site Visits or Phone
Interviews:
Table 6: DOE's Projected Costs to Complete the Reactor Conversion
Program:
Figures:
Figure 1: Locations of 105 Research Reactors Included in DOE's Reactor
Conversion Program:
Figure 2: Conversion Status of 105 Research Reactors Included in DOE's
Reactor Conversion Program:
Figure 3: Reactor Conversion Program Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1978 to
2003:
Abbreviations:
Argonne: Argonne National Laboratory:
DOE: Department of Energy:
HEU: highly enriched uranium:
INEEL: Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory:
LEU: low enriched uranium:
NDF: Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund:
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
RERTR: Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548
July 30, 2004:
The Honorable Pat Roberts:
Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Nuclear research reactors located throughout the world play a vital
role in medicine, agriculture, industry, and basic scientific research.
Many of the research reactors use highly enriched uranium (HEU) in one
of two ways, either as fuel or as an ingredient for the production of
medical isotopes used to treat cancer or conduct medical diagnoses. HEU
is also a key component in the construction of nuclear weapons--it
takes as little as 25 kilograms of HEU to build a nuclear weapon. The
amount of HEU located at research reactors worldwide ranges from
several kilograms to in excess of 20 kilograms.
The United States has a long-standing policy of reducing and, to the
extent possible, eliminating the use of HEU in civilian research
reactors. To support this policy, the Department of Energy (DOE)
initiated the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR)
program in 1978 to develop the technology to reduce and eventually
eliminate the use of HEU in civilian research reactors
worldwide.[Footnote 1] DOE's Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) is
the technical lead for the program and conducts research and
development to find alternatives to the two uses of HEU in research
reactors. The program's goal is to replace HEU with low enriched
uranium (LEU), which would be very difficult to use in nuclear
weapons.[Footnote 2] The Secretary of Energy reiterated DOE's support
for the reactor conversion program and committed to the conversion of
all U.S. civilian research reactors by 2013 in a speech on May 26,
2004.
To achieve the program's objectives, Argonne conducts extensive tests
on new LEU fuels and materials for isotope production to find suitable
alternatives that do not negatively affect research reactors'
performance, operating costs, or operational safety. Part of Argonne's
strategy is to have multiple fuels under development to address the
unique fuel needs of the different types of research reactors included
in DOE's reactor conversion program. Research reactors are designed for
different purposes and have operating characteristics that affect their
ability to convert to LEU. As a result, an LEU fuel that can be used in
one research reactor may not be suitable for another.
The scope of DOE's reactor conversion program includes LEU fuel
development for 105 research reactors located in the United States and
40 other countries. Since the inception of the program through July
2004, 39 of the 105 reactors have either converted or are in the
process of converting to LEU. Argonne officials estimate that prior to
converting to LEU, these 39 research reactors used over 240 kilograms
of HEU fuel per year, enough to build about 10 nuclear weapons. In
contrast, they estimate that the remaining 66 research reactors, which
have not converted to LEU, continue to use over 800 kilograms of HEU
fuel per year. Thirty-five of these reactors could convert using
currently available LEU fuels, and Argonne is developing new LEU fuels
for 31 research reactors that cannot convert using any of the fuels
already developed. In particular, after screening a large number of
potential LEU fuels, Argonne has identified two fuels, dispersion fuel
and monolithic fuel, for further testing and development. Both of these
fuels use an alloy of uranium and another metal called molybdenum and
differ in how the fuel is manufactured. Dispersion fuel consists of
spherical particles of uranium-molybdenum alloy that are randomly
dispersed in a thin layer of aluminum. In contrast, monolithic fuel
consists of a thin sheet of solid uranium-molybdenum alloy.[Footnote 3]
The reactor conversion program also develops LEU alternatives for six
medical isotope producers, all located outside the United States, that
use an estimated 85 kilograms of HEU per year in their production
processes. The use of HEU for medical isotope production is separate
from the type of fuel used in research reactors. Developing the
technology to convert to LEU for medical isotope production requires a
technical effort that is separate from the development of new LEU
fuels.
Concerned about the potential theft or diversion of HEU from research
reactors, DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are engaged
in efforts to monitor and improve security at research reactors, many
of which are located on university campuses or other facilities used by
students and researchers. Since 1974, DOE has engaged in efforts to
improve nuclear material security in over 50 countries, including
security over nuclear material at research reactors. In the United
States, NRC regulates research reactors to ensure an acceptable level
of safety and security and conducts regular inspections to ensure
compliance with regulations on safety and security.
In response to your request concerning the use of HEU at civilian
research reactors, we examined (1) the status of research reactors
worldwide in converting to LEU fuels developed by DOE's reactor
conversion program, (2) the program's progress in developing new LEU
fuels for use in research reactors that cannot convert to currently
available LEU fuels, and (3) the program's progress in developing LEU
for use in the production of medical isotopes. In addition, because HEU
continues to be used and stored at research reactors worldwide, we
gathered information on the status of DOE and NRC efforts to improve
the security of research reactors in the United States and other
countries.
To address these objectives, we analyzed documentation on the reactor
conversion program from DOE and Argonne, including information on the
status of reactors in converting to LEU, development of LEU fuels, and
development of LEU for medical isotope production. We visited research
reactors in the United States, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine; attended an annual
international conference on DOE's reactor conversion program; and
obtained information on the status of developing LEU fuels and LEU for
the production of medical isotopes from reactor conversion program
officials at Argonne. We also discussed the status of the program and
security of HEU at foreign and domestic research reactors with foreign
officials in the countries we visited and with DOE and NRC officials.
However, we did not evaluate the effectiveness of the security at
research reactors or DOE and NRC efforts to improve security. We
conducted our review from July 2003 to July 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
You also asked that we examine two other DOE programs closely related
to the reactor conversion program: the Foreign Research Reactor Spent
Nuclear Fuel Acceptance program and the Russian Research Reactor Fuel
Return program. The Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel
Acceptance program is intended to recover and store U.S.-origin
research reactor fuel, including both HEU and LEU, from 41 eligible
countries throughout the world. The Russian Research Reactor Fuel
Return program assists in the return of Russian-origin research reactor
fuel to Russia, mostly from countries of the former Soviet Union and
Central and Eastern Europe. Together with DOE's reactor conversion
program, these programs support the objective of reducing and
eventually eliminating the use of HEU for civilian applications. As
agreed with your office, we will address these two programs in a
follow-on report.
Results in Brief:
According to Argonne's analysis, conversion to LEU fuel is technically
feasible for 35 of the 66 research reactors in DOE's reactor conversion
program that still use HEU fuel, but most do not have plans to convert.
In the United States, 8 research reactors, including 6 university
reactors, could convert to LEU fuel, but DOE has not provided the
necessary funding (estimated by DOE at about $5 million to $10 million
per reactor). In addition, a university research reactor that converted
to LEU in 2000 is still storing HEU fuel because DOE has not removed
it. DOE officials said they have not made the conversion of the 6
university research reactors a priority because the reactors use only a
small amount of HEU fuel. Officials at NRC, which regulates most of the
U.S. research reactors included in DOE's reactor conversion program,
said that they consider the conversion of the university reactors a
security enhancement and one of their priorities and that the delay is
purely a matter of funding. Operators of the 6 reactors said they would
convert to LEU fuel when DOE provides the funding. DOE's reactor
conversion program cooperates closely with operators of foreign
research reactors and promotes conversion from HEU to LEU. Ultimately,
however, it is the owners of the foreign reactors that make the
decision to convert to LEU. Of the 20 foreign research reactors that
use U.S.-origin HEU fuel, 14 do not have plans to convert to LEU
because they generally have a sufficient supply of HEU and either do
not want to incur the additional cost of conversion or do not have the
necessary funding. Finally, since DOE's reactor conversion program
initiated cooperation with Russia in 1993, no research reactors that
use HEU fuel supplied by Russia have converted. Only 1 of 7 Russian-
supplied research reactors that could use LEU fuel is scheduled to
convert. DOE officials said that 5 other Russian-supplied reactors are
also likely to convert to LEU fuels that are currently available or are
expected to become available within the next year.
Technical setbacks in developing new LEU fuels have postponed the
conversion of 31 research reactors worldwide that cannot use currently
available LEU fuels until 2010 at the earliest. According to Argonne
officials, unexpected failures that occurred when testing dispersion
fuel--the worst they have ever experienced during fuel development--
could render the fuel unusable for most research reactors. As a result
of the test failures, Argonne has delayed the completion of dispersion
fuel until 2010 and may recommend that DOE cancel further development
altogether if the fuel cannot be sufficiently improved. Canceling
development of dispersion fuel would leave monolithic fuel as the
reactor conversion program's only remaining option for converting the
remaining 31 reactors. Initial testing of monolithic fuel has produced
positive results, and if tests continue to be successful, it should
perform better than dispersion fuel. However, the development process
is still at the beginning stages; additional testing is required, and
the fuel will not be developed until 2010 at the earliest. Argonne
officials said that the current fuel development schedule is already
compressed and that no further acceleration is possible. Rather, any
technical problems would likely result in further delays. Furthermore,
if both fuels fail, Argonne is not working on any other LEU fuel that
could replace HEU in the remaining research reactors.
DOE's reactor conversion program has not yet completed the work that
would enable conversion of large-scale medical isotope production to
LEU, and large-scale producers are concerned that the cost of
converting to LEU could be prohibitive. Currently, one reactor in
Argentina has converted from using HEU to LEU for the small-scale
production of medical isotopes. Argonne officials said that further
development is necessary on using LEU for large-scale production.
Large-scale producers have built expensive facilities designed to
produce medical isotopes using HEU. Any attempt to adapt the facilities
to use LEU would involve additional costs. Furthermore, using LEU
instead of HEU would increase the amount of waste generated by the
production process. Argonne officials said they are working to overcome
these challenges and expect to complete development of LEU for large-
scale medical isotope production in 2 to 3 years. Two large producers
of medical isotopes told us that conversion to LEU would be difficult
and costly, and one of them is currently assessing the economic
feasibility of conversion.
While operators at most research reactors we visited said that security
had been upgraded through DOE or NRC efforts, we also observed areas
where further improvements could be made. Recognizing the possible need
for further improvements, DOE and NRC are engaged in separate efforts
to assess and improve security at foreign and domestic research
reactors, respectively. A DOE task force established in 2004 is
currently gathering information on all research reactors worldwide,
including reactors that have been shut down, and prioritizing the need
for increased security at reactors based on a number of factors,
including how much HEU is stored on site. According to DOE officials,
the task force addresses the need to combine data from different
sources to identify potential security gaps. The task force has
submitted a report to the Secretary of Energy with recommendations for
possible implementation by DOE. The task force efforts are in addition
to assistance that DOE has provided since 1974 to other countries to
improve security at their research reactors. In the United States, NRC
is conducting assessments of the security at research reactors under
its jurisdiction and may increase security requirements based on the
results of the assessments. NRC took actions after the attacks of
September 11, 2001, to improve the security at domestic research
reactors--for example, by requiring that some reactors consider
installing additional physical barriers.
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and the
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration to
consider placing a higher priority on converting the 6 U.S. university
research reactors that are able to convert with existing LEU fuel, to
place a high priority on removing the HEU fuel from the reactors after
their conversion and transporting it to the appropriate DOE facility,
and to evaluate the costs and benefits of providing additional
incentives to foreign research reactors that currently use U.S.-origin
HEU fuel to convert to LEU.
We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of Energy
and State and to NRC for their review and comment. DOE, State, and NRC
generally agreed with the recommendations in our report and provided
detailed comments, which we incorporated into the report as
appropriate.
Background:
Nuclear research reactors are used for training and research purposes
throughout the world. Research reactors are generally smaller than
nuclear power reactors, ranging in size from less than 1 to 250
megawatts compared with 3,000 megawatts generated by a typical power
reactor. In addition, unlike power reactors, many research reactors use
HEU fuel instead of LEU in order to produce the appropriate conditions
in the reactor cores for conducting a wide variety of research. DOE has
identified 161 operating research reactors that were designed to use
HEU fuel and has included 105 of them in the reactor conversion
program. The research reactors included in the program are spread out
among the United States and 40 other countries, including Canada,
France, Germany, and Russia (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Locations of 105 Research Reactors Included in DOE's Reactor
Conversion Program:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition to the 105 research reactors covered under the reactor
conversion program, DOE has targeted six medical isotope producers that
use HEU as an ingredient in their production processes, including four
large medical isotope producers located in Belgium, Canada, the
Netherlands, and South Africa.
For a variety of reasons, DOE has excluded from its reactor conversion
program 56 research reactors that use HEU fuel, including 9 in the
United States. Some of the reactors are used for military or other
purposes, such as space propulsion, that require HEU. Others are
located in countries such as China that so far have not cooperated with
the United States on converting their reactors to LEU. Finally, the
time and costs associated with developing LEU fuel for some of the
reactors may exceed their expected lifetime and usefulness.
The United States has historically provided nuclear technology to
foreign countries in exchange for a commitment not to develop nuclear
weapons. Starting in 1953, the Atoms for Peace program supplied
research reactors and the fuel needed to operate them to countries
around the world. The research reactors supplied by the Atoms for Peace
program initially used LEU fuel, but many countries gradually switched
from LEU to HEU in order to conduct more advanced research. In
addition, HEU fuel could remain in the reactor core longer and was less
expensive than LEU fuel. By the late 1970s, most research reactors were
using HEU fuel and the United States was exporting about 700 kilograms
of HEU a year to foreign research reactors. Like the United States, the
Soviet Union also exported research reactors and the HEU fuel to
operate them to other countries.
In order to achieve the program's objective of reducing the use of HEU
in civilian research reactors, Argonne is developing new LEU fuels in
cooperation with counterparts in other countries, including Argentina,
France, and Russia. Developing LEU fuels involves testing fuel samples
in research reactors to determine how the fuels behave under normal
operating conditions. Fuel manufacturers and reactor operators around
the world participate in the program by manufacturing and testing LEU
fuels. Owners of foreign research reactors fund conversion of their
reactors from HEU to LEU. In 1993, Argonne expanded the reactor
conversion program to include cooperation with Russia on the conversion
of Russian-supplied research reactors to LEU fuel. The Soviet Union had
independently initiated a program in 1978 to reduce the enrichment of
HEU fuel in research reactors but suspended the program in 1989 due to
lack of funding. Russian-supplied research reactors use fuels
manufactured in Russia that are not interchangeable with fuels used by
U.S.-supplied research reactors. Therefore, DOE's reactor conversion
program differentiates between U.S.-supplied and Russian-supplied
research reactors.
Since the reactor conversion program's inception in 1978, 39 of the 105
research reactors included in the program have either converted or are
in the process of converting to LEU fuel. (See app. II for a list of
converted research reactors.)[Footnote 4] Of the remaining 66 research
reactors that still use HEU fuel, 35 can convert using currently
available LEU fuels but have not done so, and 31 cannot convert to any
currently available LEU fuels and still require HEU in order to conduct
the research for which they were designed (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: Conversion Status of 105 Research Reactors Included in DOE's
Reactor Conversion Program:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
A research reactor can begin the conversion process after a suitable
LEU fuel is developed and available commercially. The decision to
convert from HEU to LEU also depends on research reactor owners having
the necessary financial resources, including for the purchase of new
fuel. In the United States, NRC regulations require that research
reactors under its jurisdiction, including reactors operated by
universities, convert to LEU fuel when an LEU fuel that can be used to
replace HEU fuel has been developed and when federal funding is made
available for the conversion.[Footnote 5] The conversion process begins
with analyses to determine whether the reactor can safely convert and
the impact of conversion on the reactor's performance. After the
analyses are completed and regulatory approval for conversion is
obtained, the operator can remove the HEU from the reactor and replace
it with the new LEU fuel. The HEU fuel can be disposed of once it has
been removed from the reactor core and has cooled.
Many Domestic and Foreign Research Reactors Are Still Using Weapons-
Usable Uranium Even Though They Could Operate on Low Enriched Uranium:
According to Argonne's analysis, conversion to LEU fuel is technically
feasible for 35 of the 66 research reactors worldwide that still use
HEU fuel. However, only 4 of the reactors--3 foreign reactors that use
U.S.-origin HEU and 1 Russian-supplied reactor--currently have plans to
convert. Eight U.S. research reactors, including 6 university reactors,
could convert to LEU fuel, but according to DOE officials, DOE has not
provided the funding to convert them. In addition, DOE has not removed
HEU fuel from a university research reactor that has been storing HEU
since it converted to LEU in 2000. According to Argonne officials, of
the 20 foreign research reactors that currently use U.S.-origin HEU
fuel, 14 do not have plans to convert to LEU because they generally
have a sufficient supply of HEU and either do not want to incur the
additional cost of conversion or do not have the necessary funding.
Finally, since DOE's reactor conversion program initiated cooperation
with Russia in 1993, no research reactors that use HEU fuel supplied by
Russia have converted. According to Argonne officials, only 1 of 7
Russian-supplied research reactors that could use LEU fuel is scheduled
to convert. They said that 5 other Russian-supplied reactors are likely
to convert to LEU fuels that are currently available or are expected to
become available within the next year.
Eight Research Reactors in the United States Could Convert to Low
Enriched Uranium but Still Use Weapons-Usable Uranium:
In the United States, there are 6 university research reactors and 2
other research reactors that could convert to LEU fuel but still use
HEU fuel. Although DOE has funded the conversion of 11 university
research reactors to LEU fuel, the last university reactor converted in
2000. DOE officials said DOE has not provided the funding to convert
the 6 remaining U.S. university reactors. DOE recently added 2 other
domestic reactors to the reactor conversion program, and neither of
these reactors currently has plans to convert to LEU, also because DOE
has not provided the necessary funding. (See table 1 for a list of the
8 reactors."
Table 1: U.S. Research Reactors Using HEU Fuel That Could Convert to
LEU:
Reactor:
Oregon State University.
Purdue University.
Texas A&M University.
University of Florida.
University of Wisconsin.
Washington State University.
General Electric NTR Reactor.
DOE NRAD Reactor.
Source: Argonne.
Note: The amount of HEU fuel used by these research reactors ranges
from 0 to 0.2 kilograms per year. Reactors that use zero kilograms of
HEU per year use HEU fuel but operate at such low power levels that
they use up the fuel very slowly and can operate for many years or for
their entire lifetime without replacing fuel.
[End of table]
In addition, the university research reactor that converted to LEU in
2000 is still storing HEU fuel because DOE has not removed it. Because
the reactor now uses LEU fuel and has no need for HEU, the reactor
operator told us that he is eager to return the HEU to DOE for long-
term storage and disposal. DOE has a separate program that supports
university research reactors, including provision of DOE-owned fuel,
and funds their conversion to LEU and removal of spent fuel.[Footnote
6] According to the DOE official in charge of the university reactor
support program, the program has limited funding, and requests for
additional funding to support conversion have not been approved by the
Office of Management and Budget. Furthermore, the university reactor
support program did not receive additional funding to remove HEU fuel
from the research reactor that converted to LEU in 2000 until fiscal
year 2004, after a group of domestic research reactor operators
successfully lobbied Congress to add $2.5 million to the program's
budget to pay for the removal of spent fuel from the reactors.
Officials at NRC, which regulates the 6 university reactors, told us
that they consider the conversion of the reactors to LEU, the timely
removal of HEU fuel after conversion, and the removal of HEU from the
reactor that converted to LEU in 2000 as a security enhancement and one
of their priorities. NRC officials said that converting the 6 reactors
is technically feasible and that the delay in converting the reactors
is purely a matter of funding and should be expedited by DOE. However,
DOE officials said that DOE had not made the conversion of these
reactors a priority. Furthermore, while operators at all 6 universities
told us they are willing to convert to LEU fuel, they said it is not a
high priority because they do not consider their HEU fuel to be a
likely target for theft. For example, one reactor operator explained
that the reactor is structured in such a way that the HEU is located
inside a concrete enclosure that even experienced reactor staff need
almost 2 days to access. These 6 reactors use only a small amount of
HEU fuel--less than a kilogram per year, which is not enough to make a
nuclear weapon. In contrast, there are other research reactors included
in DOE's reactor conversion program that are larger than the 6
university reactors and use tens of kilograms per year.
Nevertheless, operators of the 6 university research reactors said they
would convert to LEU when DOE provides funding. Furthermore, the DOE
official in charge of the university reactor support program said that
converting domestic university reactors is an issue of U.S.
nonproliferation policy. He said that converting domestic reactors to
LEU would support U.S. efforts to influence foreign reactors to convert
to LEU in accordance with the U.S. nonproliferation policy to reduce
the use of HEU in civilian research reactors worldwide. Although they
did not consider conversion a priority from a security perspective, two
of the university reactor directors we spoke with recognized the
importance of converting university reactors to LEU as part of U.S.
nonproliferation policy.
According to DOE officials, conversion for each reactor is projected to
cost between $5 million and $10 million. However, a project engineer at
DOE's Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory who
tracks DOE expenditures on conversions of U.S. university reactors had
originally told us that conversion would cost between $2 million and $4
million per reactor, depending on the type of reactor. DOE could not
provide documentation to support either of the estimates. DOE officials
said that conversion costs for 4 of the university reactors are higher
because their fuel is no longer manufactured in the United States and
must be purchased in France.[Footnote 7]
Other than funding, there are no significant obstacles to converting
the 6 university reactors to LEU. Based on our visits to 3 converted
university research reactors and interviews with Argonne officials and
the operators of the 6 remaining university reactors, converting to LEU
does not reduce the performance of the reactors to the point that they
cannot be used to conduct research and train students effectively.
Operators at 5 of the 6 university reactors still using HEU fuel told
us they expected performance to be adequate after conversion. In
addition, operators of converted reactors told us that using LEU
instead of HEU reduced security concerns and had a minimal impact on
the cost of operating the reactors. Argonne officials said that one of
their objectives when providing technical assistance to convert
reactors to LEU is to complete the process with only minimal effects on
performance and operating costs. In fact, two reactor operators (one in
Rhode Island and one in Massachusetts) told us that performance at
their reactors had improved as a result of conversion.
According to Argonne officials, 2 other reactors in the United States
(the DOE NRAD and General Electric NTR reactors) could convert to LEU
but are not currently planning to do so. The officials said they
recently added these 2 reactors to the scope of the reactor conversion
program so that the program would be comprehensive in its coverage of
civilian research reactors that use HEU. The NRAD research reactor is a
DOE reactor, and DOE would have to fund the purchase of new LEU fuel if
a decision were made to convert the reactor. According to a DOE
official responsible for the reactor, the budget for the NRAD reactor
is limited, and purchasing new LEU fuel to convert the reactor would
take funding away from other activities at the facility where the
reactor is located. The DOE official considers the conversion of this
reactor a lower priority because it has a sufficient supply of HEU fuel
to last for the life of the reactor and because the facility has other
nuclear material that would be more attractive to terrorists than the
HEU fuel in the reactor. The General Electric NTR is a privately owned
reactor and is also not required to convert until DOE provides funding.
Twenty Foreign Research Reactors Continue to Use Weapons-Usable Uranium
Fuel:
Fourteen of the 20 foreign research reactors that currently use U.S.-
origin HEU fuel do not have plans to convert to LEU. According to
Argonne officials, these reactors generally have a supply of HEU
sufficient to last many years (in some cases for the life of the
reactor) and either do not want to incur the additional cost of
conversion or do not have the necessary funding. Three of the reactors
are planning to convert to LEU, and 3 others currently plan to shut
down (or, in the case of 2 reactors, convert to LEU fuel if they do not
shut down). See table 2 for a list of the 20 reactors.
Table 2: 20 Foreign Research Reactors Still Using HEU Obtained from the
United States:
Country: Argentina;
Reactor: RA-6;
Status: Conversion planned.
Country: Canada;
Reactor: Slowpoke-Alberta.
Country: Canada;
Reactor: Slowpoke-Halifax.
Country: Canada;
Reactor: Slowpoke-Saskatchewan.
Country: France;
Reactor: MINERVE.
Country: France;
Reactor: Ulysee-Saclay.
Country: Germany;
Reactor: FRJ-2;
Status: Conversion planned.
Country: Israel;
Reactor: IRR-1;
Status: Shutdown planned.
Country: Jamaica;
Reactor: Slowpoke.
Country: Japan;
Reactor: KUCA.
Country: Japan;
Reactor: UTR-10 Kinki.
Country: Japan;
Reactor: KUR;
Status: Shutdown or conversion planned.
Country: Mexico;
Reactor: TRIGA.
Country: Netherlands;
Reactor: HFR Petten;
Status: Conversion planned.
Country: Netherlands;
Reactor: LFR.
Country: Portugal;
Reactor: RPI;
Status: Shutdown or conversion planned.
Country: South Africa;
Reactor: SAFARI.
Country: United Kingdom;
Reactor: Consort.
Country: United Kingdom;
Reactor: Neptune.
Country: United Kingdom;
Reactor: Viper.
Source: Argonne.
Note: The amount of HEU fuel used by these research reactors ranges
from 0 to 38.3 kilograms per year. Reactors that use zero kilograms of
HEU per year use HEU fuel but operate at such low power levels that
they use up the fuel very slowly and can operate for many years or for
their entire lifetime without replacing fuel.
[End of table]
Some of the foreign research reactors would like to convert but do not
have the necessary funding. For example, the operator of a research
reactor in Jamaica told us that converting to LEU would improve the
reactor performance but that purchasing LEU fuel for the reactor would
cost $1.5 million, which is more than the reactor operator can afford.
Therefore, the reactor operator is planning to continue using its
current supply of HEU, which will last possibly 20 years. Similarly,
according to Argonne officials, the reactor operator in Mexico would be
willing to convert to LEU but does not have the necessary funding.
While funding may not be an issue for other foreign reactors, many of
them are designed to operate on a small amount of fuel meant to last
for the life of the reactor. Converting to LEU would require the
disposal of the fuel that the reactor operator had already purchased
and is still usable. According to Argonne officials, operators of
certain reactors in France, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom do not have plans to convert because the reactors have lifetime
cores that do not need to be replaced.
To support the objective of the reactor conversion program to reduce
and eventually eliminate the use of HEU in research reactors, the
United States has implemented policies designed to influence foreign
research reactors to convert to LEU. For example, DOE's Foreign
Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance program provides foreign
reactors that use HEU fuel of U.S.-origin the opportunity to return
their spent fuel to the United States if they agree to convert their
reactors to LEU fuel. In addition, the Energy Policy Act of 1992
authorizes NRC to approve the export of HEU to foreign research
reactors only if the recipients agree to convert the reactors once a
suitable LEU fuel is developed.[Footnote 8] Since there are limited
suppliers of HEU fuel and few options for disposing of spent fuel, the
U.S. policies in support of the reactor conversion program have been
effective in influencing some research reactors to convert to LEU. In
particular, of the 20 foreign reactors that can convert to LEU but are
still using HEU, the 2 that use the greatest amount of HEU per year are
planning to convert by 2006. One research reactor in the Netherlands
(HFR Petten) formally agreed with the United States to convert to LEU
in order to continue receiving U.S.-origin HEU fuel until conversion
could take place and to ship spent fuel back to the United States. The
U.S. policies in support of conversion were effective in influencing
the reactor operator because the reactor uses 38 kilograms of HEU fuel
per year and regularly needs to obtain new HEU fuel and dispose of
spent fuel. Similarly, the FRJ-2 reactor in Germany has an agreement
with DOE to convert to LEU fuel as a condition of returning spent fuel
to the United States.
However, U.S. policies in support of the reactor conversion program do
not influence foreign reactors using so little HEU that they can
operate for many years without replacing their fuel or disposing of
spent fuel. While Argonne provides technical assistance for conversion,
current DOE policy precludes purchasing new LEU fuel for foreign
reactors that use U.S.-origin HEU fuel. Under this policy, purchasing
new LEU fuel--which, according to a DOE project engineer, is the main
cost of conversion--is the responsibility of the reactor operator.
According to a DOE official, DOE has paid for new LEU fuel only once,
in Romania, in exchange for the return of Russian-origin HEU fuel to
Russia. DOE spent $4 million to purchase LEU fuel for the Romanian
reactor, which is still only partially converted and requires more LEU
fuel before conversion is complete. DOE officials said that current DOE
policy allows purchasing LEU fuel for research reactors that use
Russian-origin HEU fuel in exchange for returning the HEU to Russia.
However, DOE does not have a similar policy for research reactors that
use U.S.-origin HEU fuel. DOE officials said they are considering
revising this policy to allow purchasing LEU fuel for U.S.-supplied
research reactors.
Only One of Seven Russian-Supplied Reactors That Can Use Low Enriched
Uranium Is Scheduled to Convert:
According to Argonne officials, 7 Russian-supplied research reactors,
all located outside Russia, could convert using LEU fuels that are
currently available or are expected to become available within the next
year. However, only 1 of the 7 reactors, located in Ukraine, is
scheduled to convert.[Footnote 9] (See table 3 for a list of the 7
reactors."
Table 3: Seven Foreign Research Reactors Using HEU from Russia That
Could Convert to LEU:
Country: Bulgaria;
Reactor: IRT-Sofia.
Country: Germany;
Reactor: ZLFR.
Country: Hungary;
Reactor: VVR-SZM.
Country: Libya;
Reactor: IRT-1.
Country: Libya;
Reactor: Critical Facility.
Country: Ukraine;
Reactor: VVR-M.
Country: Vietnam;
Reactor: DRR.
Source: Argonne.
Note: The amount of HEU fuel used by these research reactors ranges
from 0 to 13.9 kilograms per year. Reactors that use zero kilograms of
HEU per year use HEU fuel but operate at such low power levels that
they use up the fuel very slowly and can operate for many years or for
their entire lifetime without replacing fuel.
[End of table]
The Ukrainian reactor operators told us that they expect to begin
conversion to LEU at the end of 2004 at the earliest and that they are
currently analyzing the safety of converting to LEU with the assistance
of DOE's reactor conversion program. Unlike many of the U.S.-supplied
research reactors that are not planning to convert because they have an
adequate supply of HEU, the Ukrainian reactor is running out of HEU
fuel and will have to place an order for new fuel by the end of 2004.
The reactor operators told us they support conversion to LEU fuel
because the negative impact on the reactor's performance will be
tolerable, the operating costs will be about the same after conversion
to LEU, and converting to LEU would eliminate the threat that HEU could
be stolen from the facility. The reactor operators are scheduled to
complete the safety analysis in November 2004 and then submit an
application to obtain approval for conversion from the Ukrainian
nuclear regulatory authority. However, Argonne officials said the
schedule for converting the Ukrainian reactor is ambitious and
conversion of the reactor could be delayed. According to Argonne
officials, if the Ukrainian reactor does not get regulatory approval
for conversion to LEU before it runs out of fuel, it may decide to
place an order with the Russian supplier for more HEU fuel instead.
According to DOE officials, 5 other Russian-supplied reactors that can
use LEU fuel are likely to convert. Conversion of the reactors in
Bulgaria and Libya depends on the commercialization of the Russian-
origin LEU fuel, which DOE expects to take place in 2004. DOE has also
engaged in discussions on conversion with the operators of the research
reactor in Vietnam. According to Argonne officials, conversion of the
research reactor in Hungary requires at least several more years of
analysis. In particular, the reactor must test an LEU fuel sample
before the Hungarian government approves conversion, and this process
will take several years. Argonne officials said the research reactor in
Germany has a sufficient supply of HEU fuel and therefore is not
planning to convert to LEU.
Technical Setbacks in Developing New Fuels Limit Progress in Converting
the Largest Remaining Research Reactors:
Technical setbacks in developing new LEU fuels have postponed the
conversion of 31 research reactors worldwide that cannot use currently
available LEU fuels until 2010 at the earliest. Argonne is pursuing the
development of LEU dispersion fuel and LEU monolithic fuel to convert
these reactors. Argonne officials said the failures during testing of
dispersion fuel are the worst they have ever experienced during fuel
development. As a result, Argonne has delayed completion of dispersion
fuel until 2010 and may recommend that DOE cancel further development
altogether if solutions cannot be found. This would leave the reactor
conversion program with only one alternative LEU fuel--monolithic fuel.
According to Argonne officials, monolithic fuel has performed well in
the one test conducted so far. However, many more tests are required.
Because of lessons learned from dispersion fuel failures, Argonne
recently delayed the projected completion date of monolithic fuel from
2008 to 2010 in anticipation of the need for additional tests. Argonne
officials said they have compressed the development schedule of both
dispersion and monolithic fuel as much as possible and any further
technical problems will result in additional delays. Moreover, Argonne
is focusing all LEU fuel development efforts on dispersion and
monolithic fuel, and if both fuels fail, no LEU fuel will be available
to convert the remaining reactors in the reactor conversion program.
DOE May Cancel Development of One Low Enriched Uranium Fuel That Has
Had Significant Problems:
The 31 research reactors worldwide that cannot convert to currently
available LEU fuels include some of the largest reactors in terms of
amount of HEU used per year. Argonne officials estimate the reactors
use a total of about 728 kilograms of HEU per year. Many of the 31
reactors are used to conduct advanced scientific research that could
not be done if they were to convert to currently available LEU fuels.
Representatives of 8 of the research reactors told us they need HEU
fuel to operate and conduct research until LEU fuel with the right
performance characteristics is developed. (See table 4 for a list of
the 31 reactors."
Table 4: 31 Research Reactors That Cannot Convert Using Currently
Available LEU Fuels:
Country: Belgium;
Reactor: BR-2.
Country: Czech Republic;
Reactor: LWR-15.
Country: Czech Republic;
Reactor: VR-1.
Country: France;
Reactor: ORPHEE.
Country: France;
Reactor: RHF.
Country: Germany;
Reactor: FRM-II.
Country: Kazakhstan;
Reactor: VVR-K.
Reactor: VVR-K Critical Facility.
Country: North Korea;
Reactor: IRT-DPRK.
Country: Poland;
Reactor: MARIA.
Country: Russia;
Reactor: IRT-MEPhI.
Country: Russia;
Reactor: IR-8.
Country: Russia;
Reactor: IRT-T.
Country: Russia;
Reactor: VVR-TS.
Country: Russia;
Reactor: VVR-M.
Country: Russia;
Reactor: IVV-2M.
Country: Russia;
Reactor: MIR-M1.
Country: Russia;
Reactor: CA.MIR-M1.
Country: Russia;
Reactor: SM-3.
Country: Russia;
Reactor: CA.SM-3.
Country: Russia;
Reactor: RBT-6.
Reactor: RBT-10/2.
Country: Russia;
Reactor: PIK.
Country: Russia;
Reactor: PIK Physical Model.
Country: United States;
Reactor: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MITR).
Country: United States;
Reactor: University of Missouri (MURR).
Country: United States;
Reactor: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NBSR).
Country: United States;
Reactor: DOE HIFR.
Country: United States;
Reactor: DOE ATR.
Country: United States;
Reactor: DOE ATRC.
Country: Uzbekistan;
Reactor: VVR-CM.
Source: Argonne.
Notes: The amount of HEU fuel used by these research reactors ranges
from 0 to 120 kilograms per year. Reactors that use zero kilograms of
HEU per year use HEU fuel but operate at such low power levels that
they use up the fuel very slowly and can operate for many years or for
their entire lifetime without replacing fuel.
Research reactors located in the Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, North
Korea, Poland, Russia, and Uzbekistan are Russian-supplied reactors.
[End of table]
DOE's reactor conversion program has run into problems in developing
new LEU fuels intended to replace HEU in these research reactors. The
most serious problems have occurred in tests of dispersion fuel, the
development of which began in 1996. According to Argonne officials,
dispersion fuel would be usable in the Russian-supplied research
reactors and 1 U.S. reactor.[Footnote 10] Most recently, tests of the
dispersion fuel have revealed weaknesses that would make the fuel
unsuitable for use in research reactors. In particular, when samples of
dispersion fuel were tested in research reactors, the fuel failed
unexpectedly under reactor operating conditions the fuel was designed
to withstand.
A number of factors illustrate the seriousness of the problems with the
dispersion fuel. First, according to Argonne officials, the same
problems have been encountered in separate tests and under different
operating conditions in reactors in the United States, Belgium, France,
and Russia. Second, the problems were unexpected and worse than
encountered in previous LEU fuel development efforts. Finally, if the
failures were serious enough, the fuel could leak radioactive material
into the reactor coolant and cause facility contamination. If this
occurred, the dispersion fuel would not be approved for use in research
reactors.
Argonne officials said that, as a result of these test failures, they
have delayed projected completion of dispersion fuel from 2006 until
2010 to allow time for additional development and testing. Argonne
officials plan to pursue options to modify dispersion fuel to make it
resistant to failures. However, they said they would also consider
recommending that DOE cancel further development of dispersion fuel if
it is determined the fuel cannot be sufficiently improved. In addition,
because of the problems encountered in the development of dispersion
fuel, Argonne has shifted its primary focus to the development of
monolithic fuel.
More Time Is Needed to Develop an Alternative Low Enriched Uranium
Fuel:
Initial testing of monolithic fuel has produced positive results under
the same operating conditions under which dispersion fuel failed.
According to Argonne officials, if they are successful in developing
monolithic fuel, it will offer better reactor performance than
dispersion fuel and could be used to convert the remaining research
reactors in the reactor conversion program to LEU.
Nevertheless, the successful development of this fuel is still
uncertain, and Argonne has not yet demonstrated that all remaining
research reactors still using HEU could convert to it. Argonne
officials said they began developing monolithic fuel relatively
recently, in 2000, and to date have conducted only one test. Additional
testing could reveal problems that have not yet surfaced. Furthermore,
this fuel requires development of a new manufacturing method because
the methods used to manufacture other research reactor fuels are not
suitable for monolithic fuel. Argonne is conducting research on
different manufacturing options but has not yet demonstrated that
monolithic fuel can be manufactured on a large scale. Three reactor
operators hoping to convert to this fuel told us it is impossible to
predict whether the new LEU fuel will be successfully developed and
that creating a reliable LEU fuel could take many years more than
expected.
Development of monolithic fuel may be delayed if Argonne encounters any
problems in the fuel development process. Argonne officials said they
have already delayed projected completion from 2008 to 2010 to allow
time for additional testing. The schedule for developing monolithic
fuel does not factor in any technical problems that may occur during
testing but rather assumes that every phase of development will be
successful. Argonne officials said they have already compressed the
schedule as much as possible and that it would be difficult to
significantly accelerate fuel development any further because each set
of tests requires a fixed amount of time. The officials also stated
that fuel development would have been delayed even further had Congress
not increased funding for the reactor conversion program from $6.1
million in fiscal year 2003 to $8.5 million in fiscal year 2004, which
enabled Argonne to pursue a more aggressive fuel development schedule.
Assuming no further delays in fuel development, Argonne officials said
the first research reactors could begin ordering new LEU for conversion
within 6 months of completing the development of either dispersion fuel
or monolithic fuel in 2010.
Support for Conversion to Low Enriched Uranium Fuel Varies among
Research Reactor Operators:
In our visits to foreign and domestic research reactors that cannot
convert to currently available LEU fuels, we found that reactor
operators' response to the prospect of conversion to LEU fuels varies
widely. For example, the operator of the BR-2 reactor in Belgium said
it had agreed to convert to LEU when feasible as a condition for
continuing to receive U.S.-origin HEU fuel. In contrast, a new German
reactor at the Technical University Munich designed to use HEU (the
FRM-II reactor) may still not be able to convert to LEU even if Argonne
is successful in developing monolithic fuel. The reactor operator has
agreed to convert to a lower enrichment of HEU that is less usable in
nuclear weapons. However, during our visit to the reactor, the operator
said it had no plans to convert the reactor to LEU fuel because
conversion would require expensive reconstruction.
Argonne has contracted with Russia to work jointly on development of
new LEU fuels, but DOE has not negotiated a formal agreement with the
Russian government to convert research reactors in Russia to LEU. DOE's
reactor conversion program includes 14 research reactors operating in
Russia that, combined, use 225 kilograms of HEU fuel per year. In 2002,
the Secretary of Energy and Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy issued a
joint statement identifying acceleration of LEU fuel development for
both Russian-supplied and U.S.-supplied research reactors as an area
where joint cooperation could lead to reduction in the use of HEU.
However, the Russian officials responsible for developing LEU fuels
told us they are focusing on converting Russian-supplied reactors in
other countries first. The officials also do not consider the
conversion of research reactors in Russia to LEU a priority because
security has been improved at the reactors and the reactors need HEU
fuel to conduct advanced research. Furthermore, Russian officials told
us that under Russian law, operators of HEU reactors in Russia are not
required to convert to LEU. In fact, since 1986, Russia has been
building a new research reactor that is designed to use HEU fuel rather
than LEU.
Three U.S. research reactors (at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, the University of Missouri, and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology) where conversion is not currently feasible
fall under NRC regulations that would require conversion to LEU if the
reactor conversion program is successful in developing new LEU
fuels.[Footnote 11] Furthermore, the Secretary of Energy committed to
the conversion of all U.S. research reactors by 2013 in a speech on May
26, 2004. However, without federal funding to support the conversion,
the reactors may continue to use HEU. For example, the operator of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology reactor said that conversion to
LEU could be delayed even after a new LEU fuel is developed if DOE does
not provide funding in a timely manner.
Using Low Enriched Uranium for Medical Isotope Production Is Feasible,
but Concerns over Cost Could Limit Its Use:
The reactor conversion program has demonstrated the potential for using
LEU to produce medical isotopes on a small scale, but large-scale
producers are concerned that the cost of conversion could be
prohibitive. With assistance from the reactor conversion program, one
reactor in Argentina used for the production of medical isotopes
converted from HEU to LEU in 2003. However, Argonne officials said the
conversion was feasible only because the reactor produces medical
isotopes on a small scale, using a relatively small amount of material
in the production process. (Prior to converting to LEU, the Argentine
reactor used less than a kilogram of HEU per year. In contrast, four
large medical isotope producers targeted by the reactor conversion
program, located in Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and South Africa,
each use as much as 25 kilograms of HEU per year.) Argonne is still
working to overcome problems with using LEU that limit the ability of
the Argentine reactor to increase its production capacity.
Argonne officials said they are 2 to 3 years away from completing work
that would allow the large medical isotope producers to convert from
HEU to LEU. Argonne officials said they have developed LEU materials
that can be used by all medical isotope producers and only the
adaptation of the production processes from using HEU to LEU remains.
They said that adapting the medical isotope producers' processes, each
of which is unique in some aspect, is technically feasible and is just
a matter of time. One reason why the production processes must be
modified is that almost five times more LEU than HEU is required to
produce the same amount of medical isotopes. The increased amount of
nuclear material creates obstacles to conversion. For example, using
LEU would produce more waste, which in turn could increase the burden
of treating and storing the waste. In addition, the facilities,
chemical processes, and waste management systems for producing medical
isotopes are customized to use HEU and would require modifications to
accommodate LEU.
In discussions with the two large medical isotope producers in Belgium
and Canada, both cited a number of factors that would make conversion
to LEU costly and difficult, including the fivefold increase in the
amount of LEU that would be required to achieve the same level of
output when using HEU. As part of its technical analysis, the Canadian
producer is currently conducting an assessment of converting to LEU to
determine whether conversion would be economically feasible. The
Canadian producer currently uses U.S.-origin HEU and, under U.S. law,
must agree to convert to LEU when a suitable LEU alternative is
developed.[Footnote 12] (The other three large medical isotope
producers currently receive their HEU from countries other than the
United States and are therefore not subject to U.S. requirements to
convert to LEU.) U.S. law also allows for an exception to the
requirement to convert to LEU if conversion would result in a large
percentage increase in operating costs. Officials at DOE and NRC, which
implements the law governing U.S. HEU exports, acknowledge that medical
isotope producers operate on small profit margins, and as a result, the
cost of converting to LEU may be prohibitive. However, Argonne
officials said that conversion to LEU could result in a more economic
process. DOE officials said they would not accept a statement by the
Canadian producer that conversion of medical isotope production to LEU
is not economically feasible without documentation to support that
conclusion.
DOE and NRC Are Addressing Security at Foreign and Domestic Research
Reactors:
Research reactor operators at most reactors we visited said that
security had been improved because of DOE or NRC efforts. However, DOE
and NRC have recognized the need to further improve security at
research reactors throughout the world, including in the United States,
and are engaged in separate efforts to assess research reactor security
and its effectiveness.
At the foreign research reactors we visited, we observed security
improvements to storage areas for HEU fuel, systems for controlling
personnel access to the reactors, and alarm systems, including motion
detectors and camera monitoring. DOE provided assistance to some of the
foreign reactors to make the security improvements; other reactor
operators had made the improvements with their own funding based on DOE
recommendations. At U.S. research reactors, we saw physical security
improvements around the reactor buildings, such as new fences and
concrete barriers. Several operators of university research reactors
told us they were using funding from DOE's university reactor support
program to purchase new security equipment.
We also observed areas where further improvement could be made. For
example, we visited one foreign research reactor's facility for storing
spent HEU fuel where DOE had provided only minimal assistance to
improve security. According to DOE officials, DOE has generally not
provided assistance to improve the security of spent HEU fuel because
it is radioactive and too dangerous for potential terrorists to handle.
DOE has placed a higher priority on protecting fresh fuel--fuel that
has not been irradiated in a reactor--because it is easier to handle.
However, operators of the fuel storage facility said that the spent
fuel had been in storage for a long time and had lost enough
radioactivity to be handled and potentially stolen.
During a visit to another foreign research reactor, we observed a new
alarm system monitoring the entrance to the reactor building, a fresh
fuel vault, and motion detectors that had been installed with DOE
assistance. DOE is in the process of adding further enhancements to the
security of the facility. However, we also observed that the fence
surrounding the facility was in poor condition, security guards at the
front gate were unarmed, and there were no guards at the reactor
building, which we entered without escort. At another research reactor,
DOE identified security weaknesses and offered assistance to make
security improvements. However, according to the U.S. embassy in the
country where the reactor is located, the improvements had not been
made as of March 2004 because the reactor operator did not act on DOE's
offer of assistance. We discussed examples that raised questions about
security of foreign research reactors with DOE officials during
meetings on March 12 and 22, 2004, and they agreed that DOE needs to do
more to address potential security concerns.
Recognizing that the security at some research reactors may need to be
improved, DOE established a task force in 2004 to identify the highest
risk reactors and to develop options for improving security at reactors
believed to be of greatest concern. The task force is currently
gathering information on all research reactors worldwide, including
reactors that are shut down, and prioritizing them based on a number of
factors, including how much HEU is stored on site, the vulnerability of
the reactors to theft of HEU or sabotage, plans for conversion to LEU
and removal of HEU fuel, and the potential terrorist threat to
countries where the reactors are located. The scope of the initiative
comprises 802 research reactors and associated facilities, including
128 facilities possessing 20 kilograms or more of HEU on site.[Footnote
13] DOE officials said the task force addresses the need to combine and
coordinate information from different sources within DOE, which did not
have a comprehensive database prior to the task force to document
visits and security observations made by various DOE program officials
to foreign research reactors. According to DOE officials, the task
force has submitted a report to the Secretary of Energy with
recommendations for possible implementation by DOE, such as expediting
conversion to LEU and providing additional assistance to foreign
research reactors to improve security. According to task force members,
security assistance to foreign reactors could be provided by DOE, the
International Atomic Energy Agency, or countries other than the United
States.
NRC is also engaged in efforts to assess and improve the security at
the U.S. research reactors it regulates. NRC took actions after the
attacks of September 11, 2001, to improve security at U.S. research
reactors--for example, by requiring some reactor operators to consider
installing additional physical barriers and strengthening screening
requirements for entrance to facilities. In addition, NRC is conducting
assessments of the security at the research reactors it regulates and
may increase security requirements based on the results of the
assessments. According to NRC officials, the agency's security
evaluations of U.S. research reactors will be completed in December
2004. Based on the results of the evaluations, NRC will decide to
strengthen current regulations, leave regulations as they are, or
address security concerns at each reactor on a case-by-case approach.
Conclusions:
While several research reactors are scheduled to convert to LEU fuel in
the next few years, progress in converting many remaining reactors has
stalled. In part, converting these reactors is a matter of completing
development of new LEU fuels, which has been delayed by unforeseen
technical problems. However, if DOE's reactor conversion program is to
achieve its objective to reduce and eventually eliminate the use of HEU
in civilian research reactors, DOE may need to re-evaluate its policies
with regard to the program. Many of the research reactors that could
use currently available LEU fuels have not converted because they lack
incentives, funding, or both. Until recently, the policy of DOE's
reactor conversion program has been to provide technical assistance to
support conversion of research reactors to LEU but not to pay for
conversion or, in particular, purchase new LEU fuel. In the case of six
U.S. university reactors, DOE has not made purchasing LEU fuel for
conversion (and completing the conversion process at another reactor by
removing HEU fuel and shipping it to a DOE facility for disposal) a
high priority. While many of the U.S. reactors that could convert to
LEU use only a small amount of HEU per year, converting them would
demonstrate DOE's commitment to the nonproliferation objective of the
reactor conversion program.
DOE has generally expected the operators of foreign research reactors
that use U.S.-origin HEU fuel to purchase new LEU fuel with their own
funds. The policies DOE has relied on to influence operators to convert
to LEU--requiring that reactor operators agree to convert as a
condition of receiving U.S. HEU exports or returning spent fuel to the
United States--do not work for reactors using so little HEU that they
can operate for many years without replacing their fuel. Without
funding for conversion, it is possible these reactors could continue
using HEU for years. DOE may need to consider offering additional
incentives to foreign reactors, including purchasing new LEU fuel, to
influence them to convert to LEU.
Regardless of progress in converting domestic and foreign research
reactors to LEU in the near term, delays in completing the development
of new LEU fuels mean that other research reactors will continue to use
HEU until at least 2010. If the reactor conversion program experiences
additional problems in one or both of the two LEU fuels currently under
development, some research reactors could be left without a viable
option for conversion to LEU. Given the continuing use of HEU at these
research reactors, DOE and NRC efforts to evaluate and improve reactor
security are essential components of the overall effort to reduce the
risk of proliferation of HEU at civilian research reactors.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to further reduce the use of HEU in research reactors in the
United States and abroad, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and
the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take
the following three actions:
* consider placing a higher priority on converting the six remaining
university research reactors in the United States that can use
currently available LEU fuel;
* once a reactor has been converted, place a high priority on removing
the HEU fuel and transporting it to the appropriate DOE facility; and:
* evaluate the costs and benefits of providing additional incentives to
foreign research reactors that use U.S.-origin HEU fuel to convert to
LEU, particularly to reactor operators that are willing to convert but
do not have sufficient funding to do so.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of Energy
and State and to NRC for their review and comment. Comments from the
Departments of Energy and State are presented as appendixes III and IV,
respectively. NRC's written comments were not for publication. DOE,
State, and NRC generally agreed with the recommendations in our report
and provided detailed comments, which we incorporated into the report
as appropriate.
In its comments, DOE noted that the United States has 11 more research
reactors to convert to the use of LEU fuels, with conversion currently
feasible for 6 of the reactors. However, DOE's February 2004 project
execution plan for its reactor conversion program identifies 14 U.S.
research reactors still using HEU fuel that are included in DOE's
reactor conversion program, with conversion currently feasible for 8 of
the reactors. We used the number of reactors from DOE's project
execution plan in our report.
In its comments, State questioned DOE's cost estimate for converting
U.S. research reactors where conversion to LEU fuel is currently
feasible. State noted that DOE's cost estimate of $5 million to $10
million per reactor where conversion to LEU fuel is currently feasible
seems much too high, especially in comparison with DOE's expenditures
of about $0.4 million to $1.6 million per reactor to convert 11 U.S.
university reactors to LEU fuel between 1984 and 2000. State wrote that
the DOE office that administers the program for supporting U.S.
university research reactors has been reluctant to fund the conversion
of more research reactors and has a tendency to overstate the potential
costs to deflect pressure to spend money on conversions. We asked DOE
officials what support they had for the cost estimate. In response, a
DOE official said that DOE does not have documentation to support its
cost estimate.
In another comment, State suggested we include recognition of the
growing number of new and planned research reactors around the world
that have been designed to use LEU fuel. State wrote that modern world-
class reactors do not need HEU fuel to conduct high-quality research.
DOE officials also provided information on the use of LEU fuel in new
research reactors constructed since the inception of its reactor
conversion program in 1978. Although our report does not focus on new
research reactors designed to use LEU fuel, we agree that this is a
positive development in keeping with the objective of DOE's reactor
conversion program and we added a footnote recognizing these new
reactors.
Scope and Methodology:
To review the progress of the reactor conversion program, we analyzed
program documentation, including DOE's February 2004 RERTR Program
Project Execution Plan. We also interviewed key DOE, Argonne, NRC, and
State Department officials; conducted site visits to foreign and U.S.
research reactors and interviewed reactor operators by telephone; and
attended an annual international conference organized by DOE's reactor
conversion program.
For site visits and telephone interviews, we selected foreign and
domestic research reactors from three categories: reactors that had
converted to LEU, reactors that could convert using currently available
LEU fuels but were still using HEU, and reactors that could not convert
using currently available LEU fuels. Within each of the three
categories of reactors, we selected a nonprobability sample of reactors
based on a number of criteria such as reactor types, including U.S.-
supplied reactors, Russian-supplied reactors, and reactors that use HEU
in the production of medical isotopes.[Footnote 14] We visited 5
research reactors in the United States, including 3 that had converted
to LEU and 2 that cannot convert to currently available LEU fuels and
are still using HEU. We conducted phone interviews with reactor
operators from 1 other U.S. reactor that cannot use currently available
LEU fuels and all 6 of the U.S. university research reactors that can
convert to LEU but are still using HEU. We also visited 10 foreign
research reactors in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. These included 2 converted
reactors, 4 reactors that can use LEU fuel but have not yet converted,
and 4 reactors that still require HEU. (See table 5.)
Table 5: Number of Research Reactors Selected for Site Visits or Phone
Interviews:
Reactor status: Converted;
U.S.-supplied: In the U.S.: 3 of 11;
U.S.-supplied: Abroad: 2 of 28;
Russian-supplied: In Russia: N/A;
Russian-supplied: Abroad: N/A;
Total: 5 of 39.
Reactor status: Convertible;
U.S.-supplied: In the U.S.: 8 of 8;
U.S.-supplied: Abroad: 3 of 20;
Russian-supplied: In Russia: N/A;
Russian-supplied: Abroad: 1 of 7;
Total: 12 of 35.
Reactor status: Not yet convertible;
U.S.-supplied: In the U.S.: 4 of 6;
U.S.-supplied: Abroad: 2 of 4;
Russian-supplied: In Russia: 2 of 14;
Russian-supplied: Abroad: 1 of 7;
Total: 9 of 31.
Total;
U.S.-supplied: In the U.S.: 15 of 25;
U.S.-supplied: Abroad: 7 of 52;
Russian-supplied: In Russia: 2 of 14;
Russian-supplied: Abroad: 2 of 14;
Total: 26 of 105.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
In our site visits and telephone interviews, we asked a standard set of
questions (depending on the conversion status of the reactor) on
technical aspects of converting to LEU, cost of conversion, impact of
conversion on reactor performance, and assistance provided by DOE's
reactor conversion program.
To review the progress in developing new LEU fuels for use in research
reactors, we conducted in-depth interviews with Argonne officials
responsible for managing LEU fuel development; operators of reactors
that plan to convert to new LEU fuels when they are developed; and fuel
development experts at the Bochvar Institute in Russia, which is
collaborating with Argonne. At the annual international conference
organized by DOE's reactor conversion program, we participated in
sessions on LEU fuel development, and we reviewed technical papers on
the progress of fuel development. For technical expertise, we relied on
GAO's Chief Technologist, who participated in meetings with Argonne
officials and reviewed the information that Argonne provided. We used
the interviews and annual conference to also review progress in the
development of LEU for use in the production of medical isotopes. In
addition, we interviewed two of the four large medical isotope
producers (in Belgium and Canada) that are currently using HEU to
produce medical isotopes and that would be candidates for conversion to
LEU once Argonne completes development.
To gather information on DOE and NRC efforts to improve research
reactor security, we interviewed officials at those agencies and
discussed security improvements with reactor operators we interviewed.
We also observed security improvements at research reactors we visited.
However, we did not evaluate the effectiveness of the security at
research reactors or DOE and NRC efforts to improve security.
We obtained data from DOE and Argonne on the conversion status of the
105 research reactors included in the reactor conversion program, the
amount of HEU used per year by the 105 reactors (including the amount
used prior to conversion for the 39 research reactors now using LEU),
and DOE expenditures for the reactor conversion program since its
inception in 1978. All amounts are in constant 2003 dollars, unless
otherwise noted. We assessed the reliability of data we obtained
through discussions with Argonne officials. We also obtained responses
from Argonne officials to a series of data reliability questions
covering issues such as quality control procedures and the accuracy and
completeness of the data. Based on our assessment, we determined that
the data we obtained from DOE and Argonne was sufficiently reliable for
our purposes.
We conducted our work from July 2003 to July 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy; the
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the Secretary
of State; the Chairman, NRC; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional
committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request.
In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call
me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report include Joseph
Cook, Jonathan McMurray, Kirstin B.L. Nelson, Peter Ruedel, F. James
Shafer Jr., and Keith Rhodes, GAO's Chief Technologist.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Acting Director, Natural:
Resources and Environment:
Appendix I: Reactor Conversion Program Expenditures and Projected
Costs:
DOE estimates that the reactor conversion program will cost
approximately $213 million through the program's projected end in
2012.[Footnote 15] Expenditures since the program's inception in 1978
through fiscal year 2003 totaled approximately $139 million in constant
2003 dollars. (See fig. 3.)
Figure 3: Reactor Conversion Program Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1978 to
2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Costs for the reactor conversion program are broken into four
categories:
* Fuel development includes all of the activities associated with
testing and analyzing new LEU fuels, such as the LEU dispersion and
monolithic fuels that are currently under development. This activity
also includes developing the methods for manufacturing new LEU fuels.
Most of the reactor conversion program costs over the life of the
program are in this category.
* Reactor analysis includes studying the conversion of individual
research reactors, both domestic and foreign, once a suitable LEU has
been developed. For example, Argonne provides technical assistance to
research reactors to determine the impact of conversion on the
reactors' performance and safety. This category does not include the
cost of purchasing LEU fuel for research reactors. For example, the
responsibility for purchasing LEU fuel for U.S. university reactors
belongs to another program in DOE that is separate from the reactor
conversion program.
* Development of LEU for medical isotope production includes activities
associated with testing and analyzing LEU materials to replace HEU in
the production of medical isotopes. This activity also includes
development of manufacturing and waste management processes for using
LEU instead of HEU and technical assistance to medical isotope
producers.
* Assistance to Russia includes funding to support research and
development on new LEU fuels for Russian-supplied reactors. It also
includes analysis of the impact of conversion to LEU on Russian-
supplied reactors. The assistance to Russia was previously funded
through a one-time grant of approximately $1.7 million, about two-
thirds of which has been spent, from the State Department's
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF).
In addition to the $139 million spent by the reactor conversion
program, DOE's university reactor support program spent approximately
$10 million between 1984 and 2000 to convert 11 university research
reactors in the United States, according to an official at the Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). The cost of
converting each reactor varied from around $400,000 to $1.6 million and
was primarily for the cost of fabricating the fuel. The costs varied
depending on the type of fuel and where it was manufactured.
DOE's projected costs for completing the reactor conversion program
total about $74.7 million.[Footnote 16] (See table 6.) This amount
includes $26.3 million for reactor analysis, $25.8 million for fuel
development, $4.8 million for the development of LEU for medical
isotope production, and $17.8 million for assistance to Russia.
Table 6: DOE's Projected Costs to Complete the Reactor Conversion
Program (in thousands):
Fiscal Year: 2004;
Reactor analysis: $1,125;
Fuel development: $4,122;
Development of LEU for medical isotope production: $890;
Assistance to Russia: $2,404;
Total: $8,541.
Fiscal Year: 2005;
Reactor analysis: $1,586;
Fuel development: $4,286;
Development of LEU for medical isotope production: $946;
Assistance to Russia: $2,709;
Total: $9,527.
Fiscal Year: 2006;
Reactor analysis: $1,494;
Fuel development: $3,426;
Development of LEU for medical isotope production: $1,000;
Assistance to Russia: $3,604;
Total: $9,523.
Fiscal Year: 2007;
Reactor analysis: $1,692;
Fuel development: $4,526;
Development of LEU for medical isotope production: $986;
Assistance to Russia: $2,917;
Total: $10,121.
Fiscal Year: 2008;
Reactor analysis: $3,259;
Fuel development: $3,023;
Development of LEU for medical isotope production: $638;
Assistance to Russia: $1,984;
Total: $8,904.
Fiscal Year: 2009;
Reactor analysis: $3,835;
Fuel development: $2,189;
Development of LEU for medical isotope production: $200;
Assistance to Russia: $1,680;
Total: $7,903.
Fiscal Year: 2010;
Reactor analysis: $5,320;
Fuel development: $2,284;
Development of LEU for medical isotope production: $75;
Assistance to Russia: $1,064;
Total: $8,743.
Fiscal Year: 2011;
Reactor analysis: $4,784;
Fuel development: $1,544;
Development of LEU for medical isotope production: $60;
Assistance to Russia: $842;
Total: $7,230.
Fiscal Year: 2012;
Reactor analysis: $3,250;
Fuel development: $409;
Development of LEU for medical isotope production: $0;
Assistance to Russia: $560;
Total: $4,219.
Total;
Reactor analysis: $26,345;
Fuel development: $25,809;
Development of LEU for medical isotope production: $4,795;
Assistance to Russia: $17,763;
Total: $74,712.
Source: GAO analysis of Argonne data.
[End of table]
DOE's cost estimates are based on the assumption that at least one of
the two LEU fuels that Argonne is developing will be successful and
will be used for the reactor conversion program. DOE also assumes that
Russia and other countries will continue to assist Argonne in
conducting fuel tests as necessary for fuel development. DOE's
estimates do not include the cost of purchasing new LEU fuel to convert
research reactors. These costs are expected to be funded by other DOE
programs or by the operators of foreign research reactors.
[End of section]
Appendix II: 39 Research Reactors That Converted to LEU Fuel under the
Reactor Conversion Program:
Country: Argentina;
Reactor: RA-3;
Fully converted.
Country: Australia;
Reactor: HIFAR;
Partially converted.
Country: Austria;
Reactor: ASTRA;
Fully converted.
Country: Austria;
Reactor: TRIGA;
Partially converted.
Country: Brazil;
Reactor: IEA-R1;
Fully converted.
Country: Canada;
Reactor: MNR;
Partially converted.
Country: Canada;
Reactor: NRU;
Fully converted.
Country: Canada;
Reactor: Slowpoke-Montreal;
Fully converted.
Country: Chile;
Reactor: La Reina;
Partially converted.
Country: Colombia;
Reactor: IAN-R1;
Fully converted.
Country: Denmark;
Reactor: DR-3;
Fully converted.
Country: France;
Reactor: OSIRIS;
Fully converted.
Country: Germany;
Reactor: BER-II;
Fully converted.
Country: Germany;
Reactor: FRG-1;
Fully converted.
Country: Greece;
Reactor: GRR-1;
Partially converted.
Country: Iran;
Reactor: NRCRR;
Fully converted.
Country: Japan;
Reactor: JMTR;
Fully converted and Partially converted.
Country: Japan;
Reactor: JRR-4;
Fully converted.
Country: Netherlands;
Reactor: HOR;
Fully converted.
Country: Pakistan;
Reactor: PARR;
Fully converted.
Country: Philippines;
Reactor: PRR-1;
Fully converted.
Country: Romania;
Reactor: TRIGA;
Partially converted.
Country: Slovenia;
Reactor: TRIGA;
Fully converted.
Country: Sweden;
Reactor: R2;
Fully converted and Partially converted.
Country: Sweden;
Reactor: R2-0;
Fully converted.
Country: Switzerland;
Reactor: SAPHIR;
Partially converted.
Country: Taiwan;
Reactor: THOR;
Fully converted.
Country: Turkey;
Reactor: TR-2;
Partially converted.
Country: United States;
Reactor: Georgia Institute of Technology;
Fully converted.
Country: United States;
Reactor: Iowa State University;
Fully converted.
Country: United States;
Reactor: University of Massachusetts at Lowell;
Fully converted.
Country: United States;
Reactor: Manhattan College Zero Power Reactor;
Fully converted.
Country: United States;
Reactor: University of Michigan;
Fully converted.
Country: United States;
Reactor: Ohio State University;
Fully converted.
Country: United States;
Reactor: Rhode Island Nuclear Science Center;
Fully converted.
Country: United States;
Reactor: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute;
Fully converted.
Country: United States;
Reactor: University of Missouri at Rolla;
Fully converted.
Country: United States;
Reactor: University of Virginia;
Fully converted.
Country: United States;
Reactor: Worcester Polytechnic Institute;
Fully converted.
Source: Argonne.
Note: The amount of HEU fuel used by these research reactors prior to
conversion ranged from 0 to 70.1 kilograms per year. Reactors that use
zero kilograms of HEU per year use HEU fuel but operate at such low
power levels that they use up the fuel very slowly and can operate for
many years or for their entire lifetime without replacing fuel.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington, DC 20585:
JUL 14 2004:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Acting Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
General Accounting Office:
Washington, D.C.:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the
opportunity to have reviewed the General Accountability Office (GAO)
Draft Report, NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: DOE Needs To Take Action To
Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research
Reactors." We understand that the intent of this audit was for GAO to
review the risks to national security of highly enriched uranium used
in research reactors in Russia and countries of proliferation concern.
NNSA agrees with the recommendations contained within the draft report
and notes that the U.S. has converted eleven of its research reactors
to the use of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel - by far the largest
number of reactor conversions in any single country. The U.S. has
eleven more reactors to convert to the use of LEU fuels with six of
these reactors currently being capable of using LEU fuels.
On May 26, 2004, in Vienna, Austria, the Secretary announced the Global
Threat Reduction Initiative. The principal mission of the Initiative is
to identify, secure, remove, or facilitate disposal of vulnerable high-
risk nuclear and other radioactive materials around the world that pose
a threat to the international community. This mission will be carried
out by, among other things, accelerating ongoing nuclear material
removal and research reactor conversion efforts. This will include
accelerating efforts to convert the six domestic University research
reactors that can convert using currently existing fuels. The new
Office of Global Threat Reduction will work with other offices, such as
the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science & Technology, as well as the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in order to achieve this goal.
Conversion of the remaining five domestic reactors is not possible
until higher-density LEU fuels have been developed, qualified, and made
commercially available. Once such fuels are available, we will complete
conversion of all U.S. research reactors.
Through the U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) minimization policy, we
are working to ensure that no nation has a reason to continue to use
HEU in civil nuclear activities. In order to achieve the goal of
minimization and eventual elimination of the civil use of HEU, we are
working through the RERTR program to convert reactor cores from HEU to
LEU. Under the Initiative, we will work closely with the Department of
State, other U.S. agencies, and our international partners to address
holdouts to our efforts through a revised, re-invigorated, and
comprehensive diplomatic and operation action plan, to include
incentives. This strategy is intended to encourage full participation
in the program.
Should you have any questions related to this response, please contact
Richard Speidel, Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management. He
may be contacted at 202-586-5009.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Michael C. Kane:
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
JUL 1 2004:
Ms. Jacqueline Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION: DOE Needs To Take Action To Further Reduce the Use of
Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors," GAO Job Code
360374.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Allan Krass, Action Officer, Bureau of Nonproliferation, at
(202) 646-3272.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Christopher B. Burnham
cc: GAO - James Shafer:
NP - John Wolf:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
State/H - Paul Kelly:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft report: NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION: DOE Needs To Take Action To Further Reduce the Use of
Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors (GAO-04-807, GAO
job Code 360374):
The Department of State (DOS) thanks the General Accounting Office
(GAO) for the opportunity to respond to their review of Nuclear
"Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action To Further Reduce the Use
of Weapons-Usable Uranium in civilian Research Reactors". The report is
generally fair and accurate. State has only one criticism and one
suggestion for additional content.
The criticism involves the parenthetical statement near the bottom of
p. 4 that it will cost $5 to $10 million to convert each of the eight
remaining US research reactors. This seems much too high, especially in
view of the statement on p. 37 that DOE spent only about $10 million to
convert 11 reactors between 1984 and 2000. Cost per reactor ranged from
$0.4 to $1.6 million, with an average of less than $1 million. The DOE
office that manages research reactors, Nuclear Energy Affairs (NE) has
been reluctant to fund more conversions and has a tendency to overstate
the potential costs to deflect pressure to spend money on them. Maybe
there's a good reason why the final 8 should be 5 to 10 times more
expensive to convert than the first 11, but frankly we doubt it.
State's suggestion is to include recognition of the growing number of
new and planned research reactors that have decided to use low enriched
uranium (LEU). This represents an understanding that modern world class
reactors do not require high enriched uranium (HEU) to do high quality
research and isotope production. The only exception to the rule is the
reactor in Munich that GAO visited. It resisted for nearly a decade US
efforts to get it to use LEU. The resistance was predicated on
technical grounds, and the operators of the Research (Forschungs)
Reactor Munich (FRM-1I) still insist that only HEU is satisfactory for
a high quality reactor. But more and more countries are taking the
other path, and there are new reactors in South Korea and Canada and
planned reactors in Thailand, France, China, Australia and Morocco that
are designed to use LEU. This should be mentioned, perhaps on p. 6 at
the end of the discussion on new fuel development, and perhaps again on
p. 31 just before the recommendations section.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] In this report, we refer to the RERTR program as the reactor
conversion program.
[2] HEU is enriched in the isotope uranium-235 to 20 percent or
greater. LEU is enriched to less than 20 percent.
[3] In this report, we use the terms "dispersion fuel" and "monolithic
fuel" to refer specifically to the new LEU fuels being developed by the
reactor conversion program that use an alloy of uranium and molybdenum.
[4] In comments on a draft of this report, the State Department also
noted that a growing number of new and planned research reactors have
decided to use LEU fuel.
[5] 10 C.F.R. § 50.64. The NRC regulates most of the U.S. research
reactors included in DOE's reactor conversion program, with the
exception of 4 DOE research reactors.
[6] DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology administers
the program for supporting domestic university reactors. The program
has an annual budget of about $18 million and provides a variety of
assistance such as research grants, tuition assistance for nuclear
engineering students, and funding to upgrade reactor facilities.
[7] If DOE provides funding for converting these 4 university reactors,
the schedule depends on the ability of the French manufacturer to
supply the fuel in a timely manner. However, the French supplier is not
accepting new requests for reactor fuel until 2007.
[8] 42 U.S.C. § 2160d.
[9] The reactor conversion program includes 28 Russian-supplied
reactors--14 in Russia and 14 outside Russia (primarily in countries of
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe). Conversion of 21 of the
reactors, including the 14 in Russia, requires development of new LEU
fuels.
[10] The development of LEU dispersion fuel also has important
consequences for U.S.-supplied foreign research reactors that have
already converted to LEU and participate in the Foreign Research
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance program. Many of these reactors
had planned to switch to LEU dispersion fuel from the LEU fuel they are
currently using because spent dispersion fuel could be disposed of
through reprocessing. With the program scheduled to stop accepting fuel
in 2009 and development of dispersion fuel delayed until 2010, foreign
research reactors that have already converted to LEU fuel that cannot
be reprocessed may not have a way to dispose of spent fuel. We will
address this issue in more detail in a forthcoming report on the
program.
[11] 10 C.F.R. § 50.64.
[12] 42 U.S.C. § 2160d.
[13] The task force is looking at all research reactors worldwide,
while the reactor conversion program targets operating research
reactors that use HEU. Not every research reactor that possesses HEU is
part of the conversion program because some of the reactors have
military applications that require HEU fuel or use a unique HEU fuel
that would require a separate LEU fuel development effort.
[14] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population because, in a nonprobability sample, some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[15] Dollar figures cited throughout appendix I are in constant 2003
dollars, unless otherwise noted.
[16] The projected costs for the reactor conversion program are not in
constant 2003 dollars. Argonne adjusted these costs for inflation with
an increase of 5 percent for every year after 2004 and using 2004 as
the base year.
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