Border Security
Investigators Successfully Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation's Borders at Selected Locations Gao ID: GAO-06-545R March 28, 2006This report responds to a Congressional request that we investigate potential security weaknesses related to the installation of radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry. We focused our efforts on testing whether the radiation portal monitors installed at the U.S. ports of entry would detect radioactive material transported in vehicles attempting to enter the United States. We also agreed to provide our observations regarding the procedures that Department of Homeland Security U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors followed when the radiation portal monitors detected such material. We have reported on the security of our nation's northern border in terms of detection of illegal transport of radioactive material into the United States in our previous work.
For the purposes of this undercover investigation, we purchased a small amount of radioactive sources and one container used to store and transport the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company located in Washington, D.C., stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detection pagers. The purchase was not challenged because suppliers are not required to determine whether buyers have legitimate uses for the radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask the buyer to produce an NRC document when making purchases in small quantities.The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of radioactive material when our two teams of investigators conducted simultaneous border crossings. Our investigators' vehicles were inspected in accordance with most of the CBP policy at both the northern and southern borders. However, our investigators were able to enter the United States with enough radioactive sources to make two dirty bombs using counterfeit documents. Specifically, they were able to successfully represent themselves as employees of a fictitious company and present a counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit NRC document during the secondary inspections at both locations. The CBP inspectors never questioned the authenticity of the investigators' counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources.
GAO-06-545R, Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation's Borders at Selected Locations
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March 28, 2006:
The Honorable Norm Coleman:
Chairman:
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Subject: Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported
Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation's Borders at Selected Locations:
This report responds to your request that we investigate potential
security weaknesses related to the installation of radiation detection
equipment at U.S. ports of entry. Based on discussions with your staff,
we focused our efforts on testing whether the radiation portal monitors
installed at the U.S. ports of entry would detect radioactive material
transported in vehicles attempting to enter the United States. We also
agreed to provide our observations regarding the procedures that
Department of Homeland Security U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) inspectors followed when the radiation portal monitors detected
such material.
We have reported on the security of our nation's northern border in
terms of detection of illegal transport of radioactive material into
the United States in our previous work.
Scope and Methodology:
We selected two land ports of entry that had radiation portal monitors
installed: one at the U.S.-Canadian border and one at the U.S.-Mexican
border. Radiation portal monitors are large pieces of stationary
equipment that CBP uses as part of its overall strategy to thwart
radiological terrorism by detecting the presence of radioactive
materials by screening people, vehicles, and cargo as they pass through
ports of entry. In order to safely plan and execute our undercover
operation, several of our investigators attended training at the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in Gaithersburg,
Maryland. Our investigators received training on the safe handling,
storage, and transport of radioactive materials.
When considering the type of radioactive sources to use in our
undercover operation, we decided to use one of the most common
radioisotopes used in industry for its strong radioactivity. After
consulting with an outside expert, we used an amount of radioactive
sources that we determined was sufficient to manufacture a dirty
bomb.[Footnote 1]
As part of our investigation, we purchased a small quantity of the
radioactive sources from a commercial source by posing as an employee
of a fictitious company. This was to demonstrate that anyone can
purchase small quantities of radioactive sources for stockpiling
because suppliers are not required to exercise any due diligence in
determining whether the buyer has a legitimate use for the radioactive
sources and suppliers are not required to ask the buyer to produce a
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) document when making purchases in
small quantities. We then deployed two teams of investigators to the
field to make simultaneous border crossings at the northern and
southern borders in an attempt to transport radioactive sources into
the United States.
While making our simultaneous crossings, we focused our investigation
on whether the radiation portal monitors would detect the radioactive
sources we carried and whether CBP inspectors exercised due diligence
to determine the authenticity of paperwork presented by individuals
attempting to transport radioactive sources across our borders.
Although we offer observations on the procedures that CBP inspectors
followed for our two border crossings, we did not evaluate the adequacy
of the design or effectiveness of those procedures. Our investigation
also tested whether an NRC document could be counterfeited using data
easily accessible and available to the public. We conducted our
investigation from July 2005 through December 2005 in accordance with
quality standards for investigations as set forth by the President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
Summary of Investigation:
For the purposes of this undercover investigation, we purchased a small
amount of radioactive sources and one container used to store and
transport the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One
of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company
located in Washington, D.C., stated that the purpose of his purchase
was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation
detection pagers. The purchase was not challenged because suppliers are
not required to determine whether buyers have legitimate uses for the
radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask the buyer to
produce an NRC document when making purchases in small quantities.
The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of
radioactive material when our two teams of investigators conducted
simultaneous border crossings. Our investigators' vehicles were
inspected in accordance with most of the CBP policy at both the
northern and southern borders. However, our investigators were able to
enter the United States with enough radioactive sources to make two
dirty bombs using counterfeit documents. Specifically, they were able
to successfully represent themselves as employees of a fictitious
company and present a counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit NRC
document during the secondary inspections at both locations. The CBP
inspectors never questioned the authenticity of the investigators'
counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing
them to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources.
Background:
A dirty bomb, or a radiological dispersal device, combines a
conventional explosive with radioactive material. In most cases, the
conventional explosive would have more immediate lethality than the
radioactive material. A dirty bomb would most likely result in small
radiation exposures and would typically not contain enough radiation to
kill people or cause severe illnesses. However, by scattering the
radioactive material, the dirty bomb has the effect of contaminating an
area. The extent of local contamination depends on several factors,
including the size of the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive
material used, and weather conditions. While there could be an increase
in the cancer risk among those exposed to radiation from a dirty bomb,
the more significant effect of a dirty bomb could be the closing of
contaminated areas. The direct costs of cleanup and the indirect losses
in trade and business in the contaminated areas could be large. Hence,
dirty bombs are generally considered to be weapons of mass disruption
instead of weapons of mass destruction.
Many radioactive materials are used in a variety of industrial,
scientific, and medical applications. For instance, radioactive
materials are used in smoke detectors and for cancer treatments.
However, few of the materials are considered suitable for use in a
dirty bomb. A Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Interagency Working Group identified radioactive materials of highest
concern based on the potential dose impacts of the materials and the
availability of such materials in sufficient quantities.[Footnote 2]
To address the threat of dirty bombs and other nuclear material, the
federal government has programs in place that regulate the
transportation of radioactive material and to prevent illegal transport
of radioactive material across our nation's borders. CBP uses radiation
detection equipment at ports of entry to prevent the illicit transport
of radioactive material into the United States. The goal of CBP's
inspection program is to "—thwart the operations of terrorist
organizations by detecting, disrupting, and preventing the cross-border
travel of terrorists, terrorist funding, and terrorist implements,
including Weapons of Mass Destruction and their precursors." Deploying
radiation detection equipment is part of CBP's strategy for thwarting
radiological terrorism and CBP is using a range of such equipment to
meet its goal of screening all cargo, vehicles, and individuals coming
into the United States.
Most travelers enter the United States through the nation's 154 land
border ports of entry. CBP inspectors at ports of entry are responsible
for the primary inspection of travelers to determine their
admissibility into the United States and to enforce laws related to
preventing the entry of contraband, such as drugs and weapons of mass
destruction.
Radiation Detection Devices:
To help detect the presence of radiation and identify the type of
radiation present, CBP generally relies on three types of radiation
detection devices - radiation portal monitors, Personal Radiation
Detectors (PRDs), and Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices (RIIDs).
Radiation portal monitors have the ability to detect the presence of
gamma radiation, which is emitted by all radioactive materials of
greatest concern,[Footnote 3] and neutrons, which are emitted by only a
limited number of materials, including plutonium. CBP uses PRDs that
detect the presence of gamma radiation but not neutrons. CBP requires
its inspectors to wear PRDs while on duty and ensure that the PRDs are
activated. PRDs alert inspectors to the presence of harmful levels of
radiation when they are conducting cargo and vehicle searches. PRDs can
detect radioactive materials that could be used in a radiological
dispersal device, also known as a dirty bomb. Another type of radiation
detection equipment that CBP uses are RIIDs, which are handheld devices
designed to determine the identity of the radioactive material, whether
it is a radiological source used in medicine or industry, a naturally
occurring source of radiation, or weapons-usable nuclear material.
Radiation Detection Alerts:
For the purposes of this report, we focused only on the procedures for
gamma radiation, the type of radiation used in our tests. To identify
the type of radiation present, inspectors use a handheld RIID. If the
radiation portal monitor and the RIID do not detect the presence of
neutrons, inspectors follow gamma radiation procedures, which require
that they first use their PRDs to determine the safe distance at which
to conduct an inspection.
If, after reviewing documentation or obtaining advice from Laboratories
and Scientific Services personnel, the CBP inspectors are satisfied
that the radioactive source is properly documented or is consistent
with innocent radiation sources, the vehicle and passengers can be
released. If CBP inspectors are not satisfied that the source is
documented or innocent, they must obtain guidance from the Laboratory
and Scientific Services.
Documentation Was Produced to Support Undercover Investigation:
As part of our undercover investigation, we produced counterfeit
documents before sending our two teams of investigators out to the
field. We found two NRC documents and a few examples of the documents
by searching the Internet.[Footnote 4] We subsequently used commercial,
off-the-shelf computer software to produce two counterfeit NRC
documents authorizing the individual to receive, acquire, possess, and
transfer radioactive sources.
To support our investigators' purported reason for having radioactive
sources in their possession when making their simultaneous border
crossings, a GAO graphic artist designed a logo for our fictitious
company and produced a bill of lading using computer software.
With Ease, Investigators Purchased, Received, and Transported
Radioactive Sources across Both Borders:
Our two teams of investigators each transported an amount of
radioactive sources sufficient to manufacture a dirty bomb when making
their recent, simultaneous border crossings. In our earlier work, we
had purchased radioactive sources, two containers to store and
transport the material, and we had obtained a genuine NRC document.
For the purposes of our current undercover investigation, we purchased
a small amount of radioactive sources and one container for storing and
transporting the material from a commercial source over the telephone.
One of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious
company, stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the
radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detectors.
According to the NRC, suppliers are not required to determine whether
the buyer has a legitimate use for the radioactive sources, nor are
suppliers required to ask the buyer to produce an NRC document when
making purchases in small quantities. The amount of radioactive sources
our investigator sought to purchase did not require an NRC document.
The company mailed the radioactive sources to an address in Washington,
D.C. We could have purchased all of the radioactive sources used in our
two undercover border crossings by making multiple purchases from
different suppliers, using similarly convincing cover stories, using
false identities, and had all of the radioactive sources conveniently
shipped to our nation's capital.
We have pointed out the weaknesses in federal and state controls over
the security[Footnote 5] of sealed sources in our prior work,[Footnote
6] noting that it is possible that these materials can be obtained for
malicious intent. Sealed radioactive sources, radioactive material
encapsulated in stainless steel or other metal, are used worldwide in
medicine, industry, and research. We recommended in August 2003 that
NRC modify its process of issuing specific licenses to ensure that
sealed sources cannot be purchased before NRC's verification - through
inspection or other means - that the materials will be used as
intended. NRC has not implemented our licensing recommendation to date,
more than 2 years later. However, NRC has recently established an
interagency task force to evaluate the licensing, use, and security of
radioactive materials. Further delays in implementing our licensing
recommendation, given today's security environment, continues to leave
NRC's licensing process vulnerable to compromise and inadequate in
terms of precluding the smuggling of radioactive material across our
nation's borders.
Two Teams of Investigators Conducted Simultaneous Crossings at the U.S.-
Canadian Border and U.S.-Mexican Border:
Northern Border Crossing:
On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of
radioactive sources into the trunk of their rental vehicle. Our
investigators - acting in an undercover capacity --drove to an official
port of entry between Canada and the United States. They also had in
their possession a counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a
fictitious company and a counterfeit NRC document.
At the primary checkpoint, our investigators were signaled to drive
through the radiation portal monitors and to meet the CBP inspector at
the booth for their primary inspection. As our investigators drove past
the radiation portal monitors and approached the primary checkpoint
booth, they observed the CBP inspector look down and reach to his right
side of his booth. Our investigators assumed that the radiation portal
monitors had activated and signaled the presence of radioactive
sources. The CBP inspector asked our investigators for identification
and asked them where they lived. One of our investigators on the two-
man undercover team handed the CBP inspector both of their passports
and told him that he lived in Maryland while the second investigator
told the CBP inspector that he lived in Virginia.
The CBP inspector also asked our investigators to identify what they
were transporting in their vehicle. One of our investigators told the
CBP inspector that they were transporting specialized equipment back to
the United States. A second CBP inspector, who had come over to assist
the first inspector, asked what else our investigators were
transporting. One of our investigators told the CBP inspectors that
they were transporting radioactive sources for the specialized
equipment. The CBP inspector in the primary checkpoint booth appeared
to be writing down the information. Our investigators were then
directed to park in a secondary inspection zone, while the CBP
inspector conducted further inspections of the vehicle.
During the secondary inspection, our investigators told the CBP
inspector that they had an NRC document and a bill of lading for the
radioactive sources. The CBP inspector asked if he could make copies of
our investigators' counterfeit bill of lading on letterhead stationery
as well as their counterfeit NRC document. Although the CBP inspector
took the documents to the copier, our investigators did not observe him
retrieving any copies from the copier.
Our investigators watched the CBP inspector use a RIID, which he said
is used to identify the source of radioactive material, to examine the
investigators' vehicle. He used the RIID to identify the source of
radiation emanating from the investigators' vehicle. He told our
investigators that he had to perform additional inspections. After
determining that the investigators were not transporting additional
sources of radiation, the CBP inspector made copies of our
investigators' drivers' licenses, returned their drivers' licenses to
them, and our investigators were then allowed to enter the United
States. At no time did the CBP inspector question the validity of the
counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document.
Southern Border Crossing:
On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of
radioactive sources into the trunk of their vehicle. Our investigators
drove to an official port of entry at the southern border. They also
had in their possession a counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a
fictitious company and a counterfeit NRC document.
At the primary checkpoint, our two-person undercover team was signaled
to drive through the radiation portal monitors through the use of a
traffic light signal and stopped at the primary checkpoint for their
primary inspection. As our investigators drove past the portal monitors
and approached the primary checkpoint, they observed that the CBP
inspector remained in the primary checkpoint for several moments prior
to approaching our investigators' vehicle. Our investigators assumed
that the radiation portal monitors had activated and signaled the
presence of radioactive sources.
The CBP inspector asked our investigators for identification and asked
them if they were American citizens. Our investigators told the CBP
inspector that they were both American citizens and handed him their
state issued driver's licenses. The CBP inspector also asked our
investigators about the purpose of their trip to Mexico and asked
whether they were bringing anything into the United States from Mexico.
Our investigators told the CBP inspector that they were returning from
a business trip in Mexico and were not bringing anything into the
United States from Mexico.
While our investigators remained inside their vehicle, the CBP
inspector used what appeared to be a RIID to scan the outside of the
vehicle. One of our investigators told him that they were transporting
specialized equipment. The CBP inspector asked one of our investigators
to open the trunk of the rental vehicle and to show him the specialized
equipment. Our investigator told the CBP inspector that they were
transporting radioactive sources in addition to the specialized
equipment. The primary CBP inspector then directed our investigators to
park in a secondary inspection zone for further inspection.
During the secondary inspection, the CBP inspector said he needed to
verify the type of material our investigators were transporting, and
another CBP inspector approached with what appeared to be a RIID to
scan the cardboard boxes where the radioactive sources was placed. The
instrumentation confirmed the presence of radioactive sources.
When asked again about the purpose of their visit to Mexico, one of our
investigators told the CBP inspector that they had used the radioactive
sources in a demonstration designed to secure additional business for
their company. The CBP inspector asked for paperwork authorizing them
to transport the equipment to Mexico. One of our investigators provided
the counterfeit bill of lading on letterhead stationery, as well as
their counterfeit NRC document. The CBP inspector took the paperwork
provided by our investigators and walked into the CBP station. He
returned several minutes later and returned the paperwork. At no time
did the CBP inspector question the validity of the counterfeit bill of
lading or the counterfeit NRC document.
Corrective Action Briefings:
We conducted corrective action briefings with CBP officials and NRC
officials shortly after completing our undercover operations. On
December 21, 2005, we briefed CBP officials about the results of our
border crossing tests. CBP officials agreed to work with the NRC and
CBP's Laboratories and Scientific Services to come up with a way to
verify the authenticity of NRC materials documents.
We conducted two corrective action briefings with NRC officials on
January 12 and January 24, 2006, about the results of our border
crossing tests. NRC officials disagreed with the amount of radioactive
material we determined was needed to produce a dirty bomb, noting that
NRC's "concern threshold" is significantly higher. We continue to
believe that our purchase of radioactive sources and our ability to
counterfeit an NRC document are matters that NRC should address.
Further, we believe that the amount of radioactive sources that we were
able to transport into the United States during our operation would be
sufficient to produce two dirty bombs, which could be used as weapons
of mass disruption. Finally, NRC officials told us that they are aware
of the potential problems of counterfeiting documents and that they are
working to resolve these issues.
As agreed with your office, unless you announce the contents of this
report earlier, we will not distribute it until 30 days after its
issuance date. At that time, we will send it to the appropriate
congressional committees. We will also provide copies to the Department
of Homeland Security and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. If you or
your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-7455 (kutzg@gao.gov). Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in enclosure I.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Gregory D. Kutz:
Managing Director:
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations:
Signed by:
Keith A. Rhodes:
Chief Technologist:
Center for Technology and Engineering:
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources And Environment:
Enclosure --1:
Enclosure I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact: Gregory D. Kutz (202) 512-7455:
Acknowledgments: In addition to the individual named above, Andrew
O'Connell, Richard Egan, John Cooney, Paul Desaulniers, Christine
Hodakievic, George Ogilvie, Rich Hung, Jim Shafer, Stockton Butler,
Kord Basnight, and Renee McElveen made key contributions to this
report.
(192203):
FOOTNOTES
[1] According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a
dirty bomb is a mix of explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive
powder or pellets. When the dynamite or other explosives are set off,
the blast carries radioactive material into the surrounding area.
[2] Department of Energy/Nuclear Regulatory Commission Interagency
Working Group on Radiological Dispersion Devices. Radiological
Dispersal Devices: An Initial Study to Identify Radioactive Materials
of Greatest Concern and Approaches to Their Tracking, Tagging, and
Disposition, Report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
Secretary of Energy (May 2003).
[3] Radioactive materials of greatest concern are those materials that
could be used in a nuclear weapon such as plutonium and highly enriched
uranium.
[4] None of these documents were available on NRC's Web site.
[5] As used in this report, "security" refers to measures to prevent
unauthorized access to, loss, and/or theft of sealed sources, or
radioactive materials used for medical and industrial purposes. See
GAO, Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve
Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources, GAO-03-804 (Washington, D.C.:
August 6, 2003).
[6] GAO-03-804.
