Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Oversight of Nuclear Power Plant Safety Has Improved, but Refinements Are Needed Gao ID: GAO-06-1029 September 27, 2006The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for overseeing the nation's 103 commercial nuclear power plants to ensure they are operated safely. The safety of these plants has always been important, since an accident could release harmful radioactive material. NRC's oversight has become even more critical as the potential resurgence of nuclear power is considered. NRC implemented a new Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) in 2000 to address weaknesses in its oversight of nuclear plant safety. In this report, GAO reviewed (1) how NRC oversees nuclear power plants, (2) the results of the ROP over the past several years, and (3) the status of NRC's efforts to improve the ROP. To complete this work, GAO analyzed programwide information, inspection results covering 5 years of ROP operations, and detailed findings from a nonprobability sample of 11 plants.
NRC uses various tools and takes a risk-informed and graded approach to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants. These tools consist of physical inspections of plants and quantitative measures or indicators of plant performance. They are risk-informed in that they focus on the aspects of operations considered most important to plant safety. On the basis of the results of this information, NRC takes a graded approach to its oversight, increasing the level of regulatory attention to plants where safety is declining. NRC assesses overall plant performance and communicates the results to the public, including providing detailed results of its oversight process through a Web site devoted to the ROP. Since 2001, the ROP has resulted in more than 4,000 inspection findings concerning plants' failure to fully comply with safe operating procedures, and NRC has subjected more than 75 percent (79) of the 103 plants to increased oversight for varying periods. Almost all of the inspection findings were for actions NRC considered important to correct but of low significance to safe plant operations. While the majority of plants received some level of increased oversight, only 5 plants were subjected to NRC's highest level of oversight. Plants in this category were generally subjected to this higher oversight for long periods due to the more systemic nature of their performance problems. NRC has improved its oversight process in various areas, but it has been slow to act on needed improvements, particularly in improving the agency's ability to identify and address early indications of declining safety performance. NRC is improving its oversight process on the basis of feedback from stakeholders, including better focusing inspections on areas most important to safety. NRC also is addressing what GAO believes has been a significant shortcoming by modifying the ROP to improve its ability to address plants' safety culture--that is, the organizational characteristics that ensure issues affecting nuclear plant safety receive the attention their significance warrants. GAO and others, including some stakeholders, believe these changes could enable NRC to better identify safety culture issues and thus provide earlier indications of declining plant safety performance. However, some in the industry have opposed the changes because they believe the changes could introduce undue subjectivity to NRC's oversight, given the difficulty in measuring these often intangible and complex concepts. NRC has been reluctant to incorporate safety culture into the ROP because it considered this type of activity as a management function, and NRC did not believe that it should be directly involved in managing licensees' plants. NRC program officials view the current changes as the beginning of an incremental approach and acknowledge that they will need to assess their effectiveness at identifying declining safety performance at plants before significant safety events occur.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-1029, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Nuclear Power Plant Safety Has Improved, but Refinements Are Needed
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
September 2006:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Oversight of Nuclear Power Plant Safety Has Improved, but Refinements
Are Needed:
GAO-06-1029:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-1029, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for overseeing
the nation‘s 103 commercial nuclear power plants to ensure they are
operated safely. The safety of these plants has always been important,
since an accident could release harmful radioactive material. NRC‘s
oversight has become even more critical as the potential resurgence of
nuclear power is considered. NRC implemented a new Reactor Oversight
Process (ROP) in 2000 to address weaknesses in its oversight of nuclear
plant safety.
In this report, GAO reviewed
(1) how NRC oversees nuclear power plants, (2) the results of the ROP
over the past several years, and (3) the status of NRC‘s efforts to
improve the ROP. To complete this work, GAO analyzed programwide
information, inspection results covering 5 years of ROP operations, and
detailed findings from a nonprobability sample of 11 plants.
What GAO Found:
NRC uses various tools and takes a risk-informed and graded approach to
ensure the safety of nuclear power plants. These tools consist of
physical inspections of plants and quantitative measures or indicators
of plant performance. They are risk-informed in that they focus on the
aspects of operations considered most important to plant safety. On the
basis of the results of this information, NRC takes a graded approach
to its oversight, increasing the level of regulatory attention to
plants where safety is declining. NRC assesses overall plant
performance and communicates the results to the public, including
providing detailed results of its oversight process through a Web site
devoted to the ROP.
Since 2001, the ROP has resulted in more than 4,000 inspection findings
concerning plants‘ failure to fully comply with safe operating
procedures, and NRC has subjected more than 75 percent (79) of the 103
plants to increased oversight for varying periods. Almost all of the
inspection findings were for actions NRC considered important to
correct but of low significance to safe plant operations. While the
majority of plants received some level of increased oversight, only 5
plants were subjected to NRC‘s highest level of oversight. Plants in
this category were generally subjected to this higher oversight for
long periods due to the more systemic nature of their performance
problems.
NRC has improved its oversight process in various areas, but it has
been slow to act on needed improvements, particularly in improving the
agency‘s ability to identify and address early indications of declining
safety performance. NRC is improving its oversight process on the basis
of feedback from stakeholders, including better focusing inspections on
areas most important to safety. NRC also is addressing what GAO
believes has been a significant shortcoming by modifying the ROP to
improve its ability to address plants‘ safety culture”that is, the
organizational characteristics that ensure issues affecting nuclear
plant safety receive the attention their significance warrants. GAO and
others, including some stakeholders, believe these changes could enable
NRC to better identify safety culture issues and thus provide earlier
indications of declining plant safety performance. However, some in the
industry have opposed the changes because they believe the changes
could introduce undue subjectivity to NRC‘s oversight, given the
difficulty in measuring these often intangible and complex concepts.
NRC has been reluctant to incorporate safety culture into the ROP
because it considered this type of activity as a management function,
and NRC did not believe that it should be directly involved in managing
licensees‘ plants. NRC program officials view the current changes as
the beginning of an incremental approach and acknowledge that they will
need to assess their effectiveness at identifying declining safety
performance at plants before significant safety events occur.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that NRC aggressively monitor;
evaluate;
and, if needed, implement additional measures to increase the
effectiveness of its safety culture changes and make publicly available
more information on nuclear power plants‘ safety culture. In commenting
on a draft of this report, NRC generally agreed with GAO‘s findings,
conclusions, and recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1029].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jim Wells at (202) 512-
3841 or wellsj@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
NRC Uses Various Tools and Takes a Risk-Informed and Graded Approach to
Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants:
NRC Has Identified Low Risk Problems at Nuclear Power Plants, Resulting
in Increased Oversight for Varying Periods:
NRC Is Addressing Weaknesses in Various Areas of Its Oversight Process,
but More Effort Is Needed:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Key Safety-Related Events at the Salem and Hope Creek
Nuclear Power Plants from 2000 to 2006:
Summary of Key Safety-Related Events at Salem and Hope Creek, April
2000 to June 2006:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Nuclear Power Plant Performance Data on the Basis of the
Results of NRC's Reactor Oversight Process, 2001 Through 2005:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables Tables:
Table 1: Key ROP Plant Inspection Areas, or Cornerstones:
Table 2: NRC Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix:
Table 3: Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Licensed to Operate in the
United States:
Table 4: Total Number of Green Inspection Findings, 2001 Through 2005:
Table 5: Total Number of Greater-Than-Green Inspection Findings Issued,
2001 Through 2005:
Table 6: Type of Substantive Cross-cutting Issue Open At Least Some
Portion of the Year, 2001 Through 2005:
Table 7: Total Number of Greater-Than-Green Performance Indicators,
2001 Through 2005:
Table 8: Highest NRC Oversight Level Applied during at Least Some
Portion of the Year, 2001 Through 2005:
Figures Figures:
Figure 1: NRC Regions and Operating Nuclear Power Plant Sites in the
United States:
Figure 2: NRC's Oversight Process in Determining Plant Placement on the
Action Matrix:
Figure 3: Number of Inspection Findings at All Plants, 2001 Through
2005:
Figure 4: Number of Inspection Findings and Inspection Findings with
Cross-Cutting Aspects at All Plants, 2001 Through 2005:
Figure 5: Number of Plants with Substantive Cross-Cutting Issues, 2001
Through 2005:
Abbreviations:
ACRS: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards:
ECP: Employee Concerns Program:
ERB: Executive Review Board:
INPO: Institute of Nuclear Power Operations:
NEI: Nuclear Energy Institute:
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
PRA: Probabilistic Risk Assessment:
ROP: Reactor Oversight Process:
RPS: Reactor Program System:
SALP: Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance:
SCWE: safety-conscious work environment:
SDP: Significance Determination Process:
UCS: Union of Concerned Scientists:
September 27, 2006:
Congressional Requesters:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for overseeing
the safe operation of the nation's 103 operating commercial nuclear
power plants, which provide about 20 percent of U.S. electricity. The
safety of these plants, which are located at 65 sites in 31 states, has
always been important, since an accident could result in the release of
radioactive material and potentially harm public health and the
environment. NRC's oversight has become even more critical as the
Congress and the nation consider the potential resurgence of nuclear
power in helping to meet the nation's growing energy needs. No new
orders for plants have been placed since the 1979 accident at the Three
Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania. However, in the face of concerns
about energy security, global warming, aging plants, and the ever
increasing need for energy to fuel the nation's economy, nuclear power
is resurfacing as a principal option. An accident, even on a relatively
small scale, could threaten public confidence in nuclear power just as
it begins to emerge from the shadows of the Three Mile Island accident.
It is critical that NRC be able to ensure that nuclear power plants are
operated safely and that public confidence about their safety is high.
NRC is responsible for issuing regulations, licensing and overseeing
plants, and requiring necessary actions to protect public health and
safety, up to and including shutting down a plant, if it is not meeting
licensing conditions and it poses an undue risk to public health and
safety. Plant operators are responsible for safely operating their
plants in accordance with their licenses. Prior to 2000, NRC's
oversight of plants' compliance, which is a critical part of the
agency's regulatory program, was criticized because it did not always
focus on the most important safety issues, and because some activities
were redundant, inefficient, and overly subjective. While its new
process--which NRC refers to as the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP)--is
similar to its prior process in that the oversight activities largely
consist of physical plant inspections, the inspections now focus on
more important safety issues. NRC's goal is to ensure that its
oversight of plants' safety performance is objective, predictable,
understandable, and conducted openly to inform the public and maintain
confidence about plant safety. The unexpected discovery in March 2002
of extensive corrosion and a pineapple-size cavity in the reactor
vessel head--one of the vital barriers preventing a radioactive
release--at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio led NRC to
reexamine its safety oversight and other regulatory processes to
determine how such corrosion could have been missed. On the basis of
the lessons learned from that event, NRC made several changes to the
ROP. NRC also has assessed the ROP annually since it was implemented in
2000 by obtaining feedback from the industry and other stakeholders,
such as public interest groups.
In this report, we examined (1) how NRC oversees nuclear power plants
to ensure that they are operated safely, (2) the results of the ROP
over the past several years, and (3) the status of NRC's efforts to
improve the ROP.[Footnote 1] In addition, this report provides details
on recent safety-related events at the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear
power plants in New Jersey and on NRC's and the licensee's actions in
response to these events (see app. I).
To examine how NRC oversees plants, we reviewed the various tools and
processes that comprise the ROP. In this regard, we reviewed NRC's
policies, inspection manuals, and other guidance documents; interviewed
NRC headquarters and regional program officials and regional and on-
site inspectors; visited the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear power plants;
and attended several public meetings covering various nuclear power
plant oversight topics. To examine the results of the ROP over the past
several years, we reviewed the number and types of inspection findings
NRC issued, along with other performance measures or indicators it
collected from the plants, and the level of oversight it provided as a
result of its findings. We analyzed NRC data on nuclear plant safety
for 2001 through 2005, the years since implementation of the ROP for
which data were available for the full year, and discussed our analysis
with NRC program officials. We assessed the reliability of these data
and determined that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
our report. To examine the status of NRC's efforts to improve the ROP,
we analyzed NRC documents, including annual self-assessment reports;
interviewed officials from NRC, including a former Commission Chairman
who is largely credited with leading the development of the ROP, and
outside stakeholder groups, including the Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI), the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), and Greenpeace;
and attended several key public meetings covering proposed changes to
oversight procedures. We also reviewed various external evaluations of
the ROP, including our prior reports and those of the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)[Footnote 2] and the NRC Office
of the Inspector General. In addition, we selected a nonprobability
sample of 6 nuclear power sites (totaling 11 plants, including Salem
and Hope Creek) that spanned each of NRC's four regions and represented
varying levels of plant performance and NRC oversight since 2000. We
reviewed relevant inspection reports and assessment documents and
interviewed NRC and industry officials at each site to examine how NRC
applies the ROP to identify and correct safety problems. Appendix II
presents a detailed discussion of our scope and methodology. We
conducted our work from July 2005 through July 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
NRC uses various tools and takes a risk-informed and graded approach to
ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. These tools include
physical inspections of plants' equipment and records and quantitative
measures or indicators of plant performance, such as the number of
unplanned reactor shutdowns and the reliability of alert and
notification system sirens that notify residents living near the plant
in the event of an accident. NRC uses a risk-informed approach--that
is, an approach that considers safety significance in selecting the
equipment or operating procedures to be inspected--to apply these
tools. NRC inspectors conduct baseline inspections of plant operations
almost continuously at each nuclear power plant site. When NRC becomes
aware of a performance problem at a plant, it uses a process to assign
the inspection finding one of four colors to reflect the finding's risk
significance, which is set on the basis of measures that reflect the
potential health effects that could occur from radiological exposure.
Green inspection findings equate to very low risk significance, while
white, yellow, and red colors represent increasing levels of risk,
respectively. In response to greater-than-green (white, yellow, or red)
inspection findings, NRC conducts supplemental inspections, which
expand the scope of baseline inspections and review (1) the extent of
the problem, (2) the sufficiency of the licensee's evaluation of the
root cause of the problem, and (3) the licensee's proposed corrective
actions in response to the identified performance problem. NRC conducts
special inspections to investigate specific safety incidents or events-
-such as reactor shutdowns due to equipment failures--that are of
particular interest to NRC because of their potential significance to
safety. Nuclear power plants also self-report on their safety
performance, using performance measures or indicators in quarterly
reports that they submit to NRC. The plants' reports are verified by
NRC's on-site inspectors. On the basis of the number and risk
significance of inspection findings and performance indicators, NRC
places each plant into one of five oversight categories on its action
matrix, which correspond to graded or increasing levels of oversight,
largely consisting of supplemental inspections that increase in the
breadth and depth of issues covered as plants move into higher
oversight categories. NRC provides an overall assessment of each
plant's performance through assessment letters issued to plants at the
end of each 6-month period describing their specific performance and
the level of oversight that will result. In addition, NRC has other
mechanisms to make available its oversight results, such as an Internet
Web site devoted to the ROP that provides detailed summaries of each
plant's performance.
Since 2001, the ROP has resulted in more than 4,000 inspection findings
concerning nuclear power plant licensees' failure to fully comply with
NRC regulations and industry standards for safe plant operation, and
NRC has subjected more than 75 percent (79) of the 103 operating plants
to increased oversight for varying periods. (See app. III for
additional site-specific plant data.) About 97 percent of the
inspection findings were green, meaning they were for actions or
failures NRC considered important to correct but of very low
significance to overall safe plant operations. For example, a finding
of very low risk significance was issued at one plant after a worker
failed to wear the proper radiation detector, and at another plant
because the operator failed to properly evaluate and approve the
storage of flammable materials in the vicinity of safety-related
equipment. The other 3 percent (98) of the inspection findings were
greater-than-green. Most of these findings (86 of the 98) were white,
meaning they were considered to be of low-to-moderate risk
significance. The other 12 inspection findings, or less than 1 percent,
were of the highest levels of significance to safety (yellow and red).
For example, NRC issued a finding of the highest risk significance
(red) at one plant after a steam generator tube failed, causing an
increased risk of the release of radioactive material. In the area of
performance indicators, there were 156 instances out of more than
30,000 reports, or less than 1 percent, in which data reported for
individual indicators were outside of NRC's acceptable performance
category. On the basis of greater-than-green inspection findings and
performance indicators, NRC has subjected more than 75 percent (79) of
the 103 operating plants to oversight beyond the baseline inspections
for varying periods. Most of these plants received the lowest level of
increased oversight, consisting of a supplemental inspection to follow
up on the corrective actions taken for performance problems identified
through the issuance of 1 or 2 white inspection findings or performance
indicators. Over the past 5 years, 5 plants have been subjected to the
highest level of NRC oversight that still allows continued operations.
Plants in this category were generally subjected to this higher
oversight for long periods due to the more intensive supplemental
inspections conducted by NRC and the more systemic nature of the
plants' performance problems and subsequent corrective actions NRC
expected the licensees to take. NRC inspectors at the plants we
reviewed indicated that when plant performance declines, it is often
the result of ineffective corrective action programs, problems related
to human performance, or complacent management. In assessing the
results of the ROP between 2001 and 2005, we found an association
between poorer performing plants and deficiencies in the plants' human
performance and problem identification and resolution programs.
NRC has improved its oversight process in various areas, but continued
efforts will be needed to address other shortcomings or opportunities
for improvement, particularly in improving the agency's ability to
identify and address early indications of declining plant safety
performance. NRC has made several improvements, largely in response to
independent reviews and feedback from stakeholders, including its
regional and on-site inspectors, usually obtained during NRC's annual
self-assessment of its oversight process. These improvements include
better focusing its inspections on those areas most important to
safety, reducing the time needed to determine the risk significance of
inspection findings, and modifying the way that some performance
indicators are measured to improve their quality. NRC also is assessing
whether it needs to modify its oversight, including developing
additional inspection procedures, as a result of some problems that
have surfaced in areas not fully inspected by NRC, such as the recent
discovery of groundwater contamination from radioactive materials at a
number of sites. For the most part, NRC considers these efforts to be
refinements to its oversight process, rather than significant changes.
One important shortcoming in the ROP that we and others have found is
that it is not as effective as it could be in identifying and
addressing early indications of deteriorating safety at nuclear power
plants before problems develop. In response to this concern, NRC
recently undertook a major initiative to improve its ability to address
plants' safety culture--that is, the organizational characteristics
that ensure issues affecting nuclear plant safety receive the attention
their significance warrants. NRC and others have long recognized that
safety culture attributes, such as attention to detail, adherence to
procedures, and effective corrective and preventative actions, have a
significant impact on a plant's safety performance, and that the
lessening of these attributes can indicate a decline in safety
performance before safety problems occur. However, NRC has been
somewhat slow to react and only recently modified its oversight process
by redefining and increasing its focus on cross-cutting safety issues-
-issues that comprise many of the elements of safety culture--and
developing new requirements under the ROP to more directly assess
safety culture at poorer performing plants. However, some of NRC's
changes have been controversial. While some industry officials have
expressed concern that the changes could introduce undue subjectivity
to NRC's oversight, given the difficulty in measuring these often
intangible and complex concepts, other stakeholders believe the changes
will provide NRC with better tools to identify safety culture issues at
plants and thus provide earlier indications of declining safety
performance. NRC has been reluctant to incorporate safety culture into
the ROP because it considered this type of activity a management
function, and NRC did not believe that it should be directly involved
in managing licensees' plants. NRC program officials view these changes
as the beginning step in an incremental approach and acknowledge that
they will need to assess the changes they made to the ROP to determine
their effectiveness in better allowing inspectors to detect
deteriorating safety conditions at plants before significant safety
events occur.
Given the importance of this initiative to the ROP's effectiveness, we
are recommending that NRC aggressively monitor; evaluate; and, if
needed, implement additional measures to increase the effectiveness of
its safety culture changes. In line with NRC's desire to make the ROP
an open process, we are also recommending that the agency make
available additional information on plants' safety culture to the
public and its other stakeholders to provide a more comprehensive
picture of plant performance. In commenting on a draft of this report,
NRC generally agreed with our findings, conclusions, and
recommendations. Appendix IV contains a reproduction of NRC's letter.
Background:
NRC is an independent agency of over 3,200 employees established by the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to regulate civilian--that is,
commercial, industrial, academic, and medical--use of nuclear
materials. NRC is headed by a five-member Commission. The President
appoints the Commission members, who are confirmed by the Senate, and
designates one of them to serve as the Chair and official spokesperson.
The Commission as a whole formulates policies and regulations governing
nuclear reactor and materials safety, issues orders to licensees, and
adjudicates legal matters brought before it. NRC's staff work out of
its headquarters office in Rockville, Maryland; out of its four
regional offices; and at each of the operating commercial nuclear power
plant sites (see fig. 1). NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
provides overall direction for the oversight process and the Office of
Enforcement is responsible for ensuring that appropriate enforcement
actions are taken when performance issues are identified. NRC's
regional offices are responsible for implementing the ROP, along with
the inspectors who work directly at each of the nuclear power plant
sites.
Figure 1: NRC Regions and Operating Nuclear Power Plant Sites in the
United States:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: NRC and Map Resources (map).
[End of figure] - graphic text:
Nuclear power plant licensees have the primary responsibility for
safely operating their plants in accordance with their licenses and NRC
regulations. The plants have many physical structures, systems, and
components, and licensees have numerous activities under way 24 hours a
day to ensure that plants operate safely. NRC relies on, among other
things, its on-site inspectors to assess plant conditions and the
licensees' quality assurance programs, such as those required for
maintenance and problem identification and resolution. Given the
numerous activities going on during complex plant operations, NRC can
inspect only a relatively small sample of the plants' activities.
According to NRC, its focus on the more safety-significant activities
is made possible because safety performance at plants has improved as a
result of more than 25 years of operating experience, and because
improvements have been made in the risk assessment tools available to
NRC inspectors.
Commercial nuclear power plants are designed according to a "defense-
in-depth" philosophy revolving around redundant, diverse, and reliable
safety systems. For example, two or more key safety components are put
in place so that if one fails, there is another to back it up. Plants
have numerous built-in sensors to monitor important indicators, such as
water temperature and pressure. Plants also have physical barriers to
contain radiation and provide emergency protection. For example,
nuclear fuel is contained in a ceramic pellet to lock in the
radioactive byproducts, the fuel pellets are sealed inside rods made of
special material designed to contain fission products, and the fuel
rods are placed in reactors housed in containment buildings made of
several feet of concrete and steel.
In addition, the nuclear power industry formed an organization, the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), whose mission is to
"promote the highest levels of safety and reliability, to promote
excellence, in the operation of nuclear electric generating plants."
INPO provides a system of personnel training and qualification for all
key positions at nuclear power plants, and workers undergo both
periodic training and assessment. INPO also conducts periodic
evaluations of operating plants, focusing on plant safety and
reliability, in the areas of operations, maintenance, engineering,
radiological protection, chemistry, and training. Licensees make the
results of these evaluations available to NRC for review, and NRC staff
use the evaluations as a means to determine whether its oversight
process has missed any performance issues.
Prior to the ROP, NRC conducted Systematic Assessment of Licensee
Performance (SALP) evaluations. SALP evaluations were largely based on
physical plant inspections conducted at each operating plant. Every 12
to 24 months, NRC provided an overall assessment of plant safety
performance. As part of the assessment process, NRC's senior management
met to evaluate plants' performance and develop a "watch list" of those
plants requiring increased regulatory attention. The SALP process was
heavily criticized by the industry and other internal and external
stakeholders, however, for being inconsistently applied among NRC
regions and for lacking clear and consistent responses once issues were
identified. In 1997 and 1998, we reported that NRC's oversight needed
substantial revisions to achieve its purpose as an early-warning tool,
and that NRC did not consistently apply the SALP across the
industry.[Footnote 3] We found the inconsistency could be attributed,
in part, to a lack of specific criteria, the subjective nature of the
process, and an ineffective process for ensuring that the licensees
maintain competent management at their plants.
To address these concerns, NRC undertook a major effort to revise its
oversight process. NRC held a series of public meetings and workshops
and formed several task groups to involve its internal and external
stakeholders, including NEI, UCS, state agencies, and others. In 1999,
NRC conducted a 6-month pilot program to implement the ROP at various
sites across the country. On the basis of the input it received from
its stakeholders and the results from the pilot program, NRC finalized
its new process and implemented the ROP at all plants in April 2000,
which was a significant departure from its prior SALP process.
Soon after the ROP was implemented, NRC faced a number of unanticipated
events--including the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the discovery
of the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head degradation in 2002--that
challenged its ability to complete its baseline inspection activities
at all plants in 2002 and 2003. Therefore, NRC staff implemented
"coping strategies," which consisted of increasing the use of overtime
and scheduling flexibility for its inspectors, reducing the level of
effort for some of its inspection procedures, reducing some of the
inspection preparation time, and deferring some inspections, among
other things. A 2004 audit by the NRC Office of the Inspector General
found that the resource challenges were largely due to changes in NRC's
staffing policy, a hiring policy change, an increase in inspection
activities due to unanticipated events such as Davis-Besse, and a loss
of qualified inspectors.[Footnote 4] NRC increased its inspection
resources by 9 percent in 2004, and then by another 5 percent in 2005,
and reported that it was able to fully implement its baseline
inspection program at all plants for both years. NRC reports show that
resources expended in 2005 were almost 20 percent higher than those
expended in 2002, the lowest level of inspection resources devoted to
the ROP since its inception in 2000. According to NRC, the additional
resources expended in 2005 were due, in part, to increased oversight
that was based on lessons learned from the Davis-Besse incident and on
the increased focus on security and emergency preparedness. With its
current resource levels, NRC program officials believe they will be
able to continue to implement all program requirements without the need
to employ coping strategies.
NRC Uses Various Tools and Takes a Risk-Informed and Graded Approach to
Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants:
NRC's tools to oversee the safe operation of nuclear power plants
generally consist of physical inspections of the various complex plant
equipment and operations, reviews of plant records, and quantitative
measures or indicators of plant performance. These tools are risk-
informed in that they focus on the aspects of operations considered
most important to plant safety. NRC bases its oversight process on the
principle and requirement that licensees have programs in place to
routinely identify and address performance issues without NRC's direct
involvement. Thus, an important aspect of NRC's inspection process is
ensuring the effectiveness of licensee programs designed to identify
and correct problems. On the basis of the number and risk significance
of inspection findings and performance indicators, NRC places each
plant into one of five performance categories on its action matrix,
which corresponds to graded, or increasing, levels of oversight. NRC
assesses overall plant performance and communicates the results to
licensees and the public on a semiannual basis.
NRC Collects Information about Plant Performance from Physical
Inspections and Quantitative Measures Reported by the Licensees:
Physical plant inspections are the main tool NRC uses to oversee plant
safety performance. NRC defined specific inspection areas by developing
a list of those elements most critical to meeting the overall agency
mission of ensuring nuclear power plant safety. These safety elements-
-or key plant inspection areas--are known as cornerstones. Table 1
summarizes the objectives of each cornerstone.
Table 1: Key ROP Plant Inspection Areas, or Cornerstones:
Cornerstone: Initiating events;
Objective: Limit the frequency of those events that upset plant
operating stability and challenge critical safety functions.
Cornerstone: Mitigating systems;
Objective: Ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of
systems that mitigate initiating events to prevent reactor accidents.
Cornerstone: Barrier integrity;
Objective: Ensure that physical barriers, such as fuel cladding and
containment structures, protect the public from radioactive releases
caused by accidents.
Cornerstone: Emergency preparedness;
Objective: Ensure that actions taken by the emergency plan would
provide protection of the public health and safety during a
radiological emergency.
Cornerstone: Occupational radiation safety;
Objective: Ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from
exposure to radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear
reactor operation.
Cornerstone: Public radiation safety;
Objective: Ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from
exposure to radioactive material released into the public domain as a
result of routine civilian nuclear reactor operations.
Cornerstone: Physical protection[A];
Objective: Provide assurance that the physical protection system can
protect against radiological sabotage.
Source: NRC.
[A] The physical protection cornerstone consists of physical security
issues and, therefore, is outside the scope of this review.
[End of table]
During fiscal year 2005, NRC reported that inspectors spent 411,490
hours (an average of 77 hours per week at each plant) on plant
inspections, which consist of baseline, supplemental, and special
inspections. About 73 percent of this time was devoted to baseline
inspections, which are the minimum level of inspections that all plants
receive regardless of performance, and are conducted on an almost
continuous basis. Baseline inspections are conducted by the two or
three NRC inspectors located at each site and specialists who travel to
each site from NRC's regional offices. These inspections are designed
to detect declining safety performance in each of the cornerstones, and
to review licensee effectiveness at identifying and resolving its
safety problems. There are more than 30 baseline inspection procedures
conducted at intervals that range from quarterly to triennially. These
procedures involve both physical observations of plant activities and
reviews of plant reports and data. Each of the baseline procedures
specify a range of sample activities to inspect. Inspectors then select
the type and number of activities to review on the basis of factors
such as the sample activities available; their risk significance; the
amount of time since a particular system or component was last
inspected; and the inspector's judgment, which is based on information
such as reviews of the licensee's corrective action program,
allegations, or plant employee interviews. Risk is factored into the
baseline inspection procedures in the following four ways: (1) areas of
inspection are included in the set of baseline procedures, in part, on
the basis of their risk importance; (2) risk information is used to
help determine the frequency and scope of inspections; (3) the
selection of activities to inspect within each procedure is informed
with plant-specific risk information; and (4) the inspectors are
trained in the use of risk information in planning their inspections.
In addition to the more than 30 baseline inspection procedures,
inspectors spend an average of 750 to 1,100 hours per year (14 to 21
hours per week), depending on the size of the site, conducting plant
status reviews. These reviews are to ensure that inspectors are aware
of plant conditions on a routine basis and include such activities as
reviewing control room activities and status, attending licensee
meetings, and conducting walk-downs of various plant areas.
When NRC inspectors identify a finding they consider to be more than
minor,[Footnote 5]they use a significance determination process (SDP)
to assign the finding one of four colors to reflect the finding's risk
significance. The SDP assesses how an identified inspection finding
increases the risk that a nuclear accident could occur, or how the
finding affects the ability of the plant safety systems or personnel to
prevent such an accident. Risk thresholds for each color were set on
the basis of measures that reflect the potential health effects that
could occur from radiological exposure.[Footnote 6] Green inspection
findings equate to very low risk significance, while white, yellow, and
red colors represent increasing levels of risk, respectively. For
greater-than-green (white, yellow, or red) inspection findings, NRC
issues a preliminary color determination after an initial analysis. It
then analyzes any readily available information from the licensee
pertinent to the finding to ensure that the final determination of risk
significance is made with the best available information.
When NRC issues one or more greater-than-green inspection findings at a
plant, it conducts supplemental inspections. Supplemental inspections,
performed by regional staff, expand the scope beyond baseline
inspection procedures and focus on diagnosing the cause of the
performance deficiency. There are three levels of supplemental
inspections that are increasingly expansive in the breadth and depth of
their analysis. The level of supplemental inspection to be carried out
depends on the number and type of performance problem identified. The
lowest level of supplemental inspection assesses the licensee's
corrective actions to ensure they were sufficient in both correcting
the problem and identifying and addressing the root and contributing
causes to prevent recurrence. The second level of supplemental
inspection has an increased scope that includes independently assessing
the extent of the condition for both the specific and any broader
performance problems. The highest level of supplemental inspection is
even more comprehensive and includes determining whether the plant can
continue to operate and whether additional regulatory actions are
necessary. The highest level of supplemental inspection is usually
conducted by a multidisciplinary team of NRC inspectors and may take
place over several months. Also, as a part of this supplemental
inspection, NRC inspectors assess the adequacy of the licensee's
overall programs for identifying, evaluating, and correcting its
performance issues, among other things.
NRC conducts special inspections at plants when specific events occur
that are of particular interest to NRC because of their potential
safety significance at the plant or because of potential generic safety
concerns important to all plants. Special inspections determine the
cause of the event and assess the licensee's response to the event. For
special inspections, a team of experts is often formed and an
inspection charter issued that describes the scope of the inspection
efforts. At one plant we reviewed, for example, a special inspection
was conducted to investigate the circumstances surrounding the
discovery of leakage from a spent fuel storage pool.[Footnote 7] Among
the objectives of this inspection were to assess the adequacy of the
plant licensee's determination of the source and cause of the leak, the
risk significance of the leakage, and the proposed strategies to
mitigate leakage that had already occurred and repair the problem to
prevent additional leakage.
As part of its inspection process, NRC evaluates all of its findings to
determine if certain elements of plant performance, referred to as
cross-cutting aspects, were a contributing cause to the performance
problem. Cross-cutting aspects represent licensee performance elements
that extend across all of the cornerstones of safety. There are three
cross-cutting aspect areas: (1) problem identification and resolution,
(2) human performance, and (3) a safety-conscious work environment. For
example, in analyzing the failure of a valve to operate properly at one
plant, NRC inspectors determined that plant employees had not followed
the correct maintenance procedures. Thus, NRC concluded that the
finding was associated with the human performance cross-cutting area.
Every 6 months, NRC analyzes all findings issued at each plant during a
12-month assessment period. If more than three findings have similar
causes within the same cross-cutting area and if NRC is concerned about
the licensee's progress in addressing these issues, it determines that
the licensee has a "substantive" cross-cutting issue. NRC notifies the
licensee that it has opened a substantive cross-cutting issue, and it
may ask the licensee to respond with the corrective actions it plans to
take. Also, NRC inspectors said they provide additional focus on any
substantive cross-cutting issues open through their baseline inspection
efforts. For example, one regional official said that if a substantive
cross-cutting issue in the problem identification and resolution area
is identified, it is the region's practice to increase the frequency of
certain baseline inspections that focus on the licensee's problem
identification and resolution processes.
In addition to its various inspections, NRC also collects plant
performance information through its performance indicator program,
which it maintains in cooperation with the nuclear power industry. On a
quarterly basis, each plant submits data for 15 separate performance
indicators[Footnote 8]--quantitative measures of plant performance
related to safety in the different aspects of plant operations. For
example, one indicator measures the number of unplanned reactor
shutdowns during the previous four quarters, while another measures the
capability of alert and notification systems that notify residents
living near the plant in the event of an accident. Working with the
nuclear power industry, NRC set thresholds for acceptable performance
and assigned colors to each of the indicators to reflect increasing
risk. In contrast to inspection findings, a green indicator does not
indicate a performance deficiency but instead reflects performance
within the acceptable range, while white, yellow, and red represent
decreasing levels of plant performance. NRC inspectors review and
verify the data submitted for each performance indicator annually
through their baseline inspections. If questions arise during the
review and verification process about how to calculate a particular
indicator or what the correct value should be, there is a formal
feedback process to resolve the issue. Similar to its process for
conducting supplemental inspections when greater-than-green inspection
findings are identified, NRC conducts supplemental inspections in
response to any greater-than-green performance indicators.
NRC Uses Its Action Matrix to Categorize Plant Performance and Apply
Increased Oversight in a Graded Fashion:
Under the ROP, NRC places each nuclear power plant into one of five
performance categories on its action matrix, which corresponds to
graded, or increasing, levels of oversight.[Footnote 9] The action
matrix is NRC's formal method of determining how much additional
oversight--mostly in the form of supplemental inspections--is required
on the basis of the number and risk significance of inspection findings
and performance indicators. (See fig. 2 for an overview of the process
that leads to plant placement on the action matrix.)
Figure 2: NRC's Oversight Process in Determining Plant Placement on the
Action Matrix:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO analysis of NRC guidance.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
The definitions for the categories of the action matrix indicate more
pervasive and systematic declines in licensee performance as a licensee
moves from left to right on the action matrix (see table 2). Also, as
the licensee moves to the right on the action matrix, NRC's response
and the corrective actions it expects of the licensee become more
extensive. In determining a plant's placement on the action matrix,
greater-than-green inspection findings are considered for additional
oversight for a minimum of four quarters, regardless of whether the
licensee corrected the problem, to allow sufficient time to identify
additional findings that may indicate more pervasive performance
problems. If a licensee fails to correct the performance problem within
the initial four quarters, the finding may be held open and considered
for additional oversight. NRC regional officials, with the approval of
the Executive Director for Operations, can also increase or decrease
oversight beyond the actions specified by the action matrix through
deviations to the ROP. Deviations are for rare instances when the
regulatory actions dictated by the action matrix are not appropriate
and a more tailored approach is warranted.
Table 2: NRC Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix:
Oversight category: Plant performance;
Lowest level: All green findings and performance indicators;
Second level: One white finding or performance indicator, or two white
findings or performance indicators in different cornerstones;
Third level: Two or more white findings or performance indicators in
one cornerstone, or one yellow finding or performance indicator, or any
three white findings or performance indicators;
Highest level (while allowing continued operations): Two white findings
or performance indicators or one yellow finding or performance
indicator in one cornerstone for five or more quarters, or multiple
yellow or one red finding or performance indicator;
Unacceptable performance (plant shutdown): Overall unacceptable
performance due to unacceptable margin of safety.
Oversight category: NRC oversight actions;
Lowest level: Baseline inspections only;
Second level: Baseline inspections and first level, or least intensive,
supplemental inspection;
Third level: Baseline inspections and second level, or more intensive,
supplemental inspection;
Highest level (while allowing continued operations): Baseline
inspections and third level, or most intensive, supplemental
inspection.[A];
Unacceptable performance (plant shutdown): Order to modify, suspend, or
revoke licensed activities.
Source: NRC.
Note: In addition to the actions listed in this table, increasingly
higher levels of NRC management will meet with the licensee as it moves
to the right on the action matrix.
[A] For plants at this oversight level, at a minimum, the licensee and
NRC are to document agreement on the corrective actions the licensee
will take through a performance improvement plan. NRC may also take
actions including making a demand to the licensee for information or
issuing an order up to and including a plant shutdown.
[End of table]
Whether NRC takes enforcement actions in response to plant performance
problems depends on whether there is a violation of a specific
regulatory requirement.[Footnote 10] Some findings can have risk
significance without violating a regulatory requirement because the ROP
is a risk-informed process, while the underlying regulations are not
all risk-informed. For example, regulatory requirements govern plants'
safety-related equipment, which licensees define when their licenses
are granted as equipment that would be employed to mitigate the effects
of an accident. NRC's risk-informed oversight process considers the
condition of all of the equipment at a plant, not necessarily just that
included in its definition of safety-related equipment. As such,
performance deficiencies could be identified through inspection
findings that were not associated with safety-related equipment and,
thus, were not violations of a regulatory requirement. More
specifically, fire pumps are not typically defined as safety-related
equipment under the regulations defining safety-related equipment, but
they could be employed to provide water to cool the reactor in the
event of an accident. If a licensee specified the use of fire pumps as
part of its strategy to mitigate the effects of an accident, a
performance problem associated with the pumps would not necessarily
violate regulatory requirements, but the problem could be determined to
be an inspection finding. Even though there is not a regulation
requiring the licensee to correct such a problem, the finding would be
considered for additional oversight under the ROP, thus providing an
incentive for the licensee to correct it. NRC program officials
acknowledge that applying the risk-informed ROP to regulations that are
not risk-informed allows for these types of situations. The officials
said NRC has efforts under way to risk-inform some of its regulations,
which should reduce the likelihood of these types of situations
occurring.
On the basis of the results of its oversight process, NRC provides
plant licensees and the public with an overall assessment of each
plant's performance. At the end of each 6-month period, NRC issues an
assessment letter to each plant to describe what level of oversight the
plant will receive according to its placement on the action matrix,
what actions NRC is expecting the plant licensee to take as a result of
the performance issues identified, any specific enforcement actions NRC
has taken, and any documented substantive cross-cutting issues. If a
substantive cross-cutting issue is identified, the letter will describe
what actions NRC intends to take to monitor the issue and how the
licensee is expected to respond to NRC with the corrective actions it
intends to take. NRC also holds an annual public meeting at or near
each site to review its performance and address questions from members
of the public and other interested stakeholders. In addition, NRC
reviews the conclusions of independent plant assessments, such as those
conducted by INPO. The purpose of this review is to self-assess the NRC
inspection and assessment process to ensure that NRC is identifying
similar performance issues.
NRC communicates the results of much of its oversight process to
members of the public through an Internet Web site devoted to the ROP.
This Web site makes available plants' inspection reports and assessment
letters, and other general materials related to NRC's oversight
process. NRC also provides a quarterly summary of every plant's
performance, consisting of its inspection findings, the color of each
performance indicator, and its placement on the action matrix. NRC also
provides a short description of each inspection finding issued during
the quarter. While each description contains information about whether
the finding was associated with a cross-cutting issue, the Web site
itself does not provide information on those plants that have open
substantive cross-cutting issues. This information can only be found on
the Web site by linking to each plant's individual assessment letters.
NRC program officials acknowledge that, without having the information
available in summary form, it is difficult to determine which plants
have substantive cross-cutting issues open. They said that they may
look at the possibility of including such information on the Web site,
although doing so is not part of their current plans.
In addition to its plant-level assessments, NRC assesses the results of
its oversight process on an industry-level basis. NRC management holds
an annual meeting to (1) discuss any significant performance issues
identified at specific plants and (2) analyze the overall results of
its inspection and performance indicator programs and compare them with
other industry- collected and reported performance data. NRC program
officials said that if they identified any negative trends or
inconsistencies, they would take action to better understand and
address the cause.
NRC Has Identified Low Risk Problems at Nuclear Power Plants, Resulting
in Increased Oversight for Varying Periods:
The ROP has identified thousands of performance deficiencies through
inspection findings at nuclear power plants between 2001 and 2005, but
most of these findings were considered to be of very low risk to safe
plant operations. In the performance indicator program, there have been
very few instances in which performance indicator data were below
acceptable standards during this period. While the majority of plants
received some level of increased oversight due to greater-than-green
inspection findings and performance indicators, only 5 plants were
subjected to NRC's highest levels of oversight. Plants in this category
were generally subjected to this higher oversight for long periods due
to the more intensive supplemental inspections conducted by NRC and to
the more systemic nature of the plants' performance problems and
subsequent corrective actions NRC expected the licensees to take. In
assessing the results of the ROP between 2001 and 2005, we found an
association between poorer performing plants and deficiencies in the
cross-cutting areas of human performance and problem identification and
resolution.
Of the more than 4,000 inspection findings identified between 2001 and
2005, 97 percent were green. (See app. III for additional site-specific
inspection findings data.) The number of green findings ranged from 15
at one site to 141 at another site, with an overall site average of 59
for the 5-year period. While green findings are considered to be of
very low safety significance, they represent a performance deficiency
on the part of the licensee and it is important that they be corrected.
Green findings consist of such things as finding that a worker failed
to wear the proper radiation detector, or finding that a licensee did
not properly evaluate and approve the storage of flammable materials in
the vicinity of safety-related equipment. NRC does not follow up on the
corrective action taken for every green finding; rather, it relies on
the licensee to address and track the finding's resolution through the
plant's corrective action program. NRC does, however, periodically
follow up on some of the actions taken by the licensee to address green
findings through an inspection specifically designed to evaluate the
effectiveness of the licensee's corrective action program. NRC program
officials stated that even though they do not increase oversight as a
result of green findings, green findings are assessed for the presence
of cross-cutting aspects and provide useful information on plant
performance. NRC inspectors told us they use green findings to identify
performance trends in the various safety areas and these findings help
inform their selection of future inspection samples.
The other 3 percent of the inspection findings identified between 2001
and 2005, or 98 of the more than 4,000, were greater-than-green (see
app. III). Eighty-six findings were white, meaning they were considered
to be of low to moderate risk significance. The white findings were
well-distributed among the sites, with only 11 sites receiving more
than 2 white findings during the period. Twenty-three sites were not
issued any white (or greater) findings during this period. White
findings were issued for such things as (1) a licensee's failing to
correct a condition in which the auxiliary service water pump could not
be aligned in sufficient time to mitigate the loss of feedwater during
a simulated tornado exercise and (2) a licensee's having an improper
validation process for its licensed operator requalification
examinations, which compromised the integrity of the exams. Less than 1
percent of the inspection findings issued since 2001 were of the
highest risk significance--yellow or red. During this time, NRC issued
7 yellow findings and 5 red findings. The 7 yellow findings were in the
mitigating systems and emergency preparedness cornerstones and included
issues such as the failure to develop and maintain emergency plans at
one plant, the failure to ensure that safety-related equipment was
adequately protected from flooding at another plant, and the failure to
pass an annual licensed operator requalification examination by over
half of the operator crews at one plant. Of the 5 red findings, 1 was
issued for the degradation of the reactor vessel head at the Davis-
Besse plant, 1 was issued for a steam generator tube failure at another
plant, and the remaining 3 red findings were issued at 2 other plants
for problems related to their auxiliary feedwater pumps.
NRC's inspection results have remained relatively consistent from 2001
to 2005. During this time frame, the number of green findings at all
plants ranged from 657 to 889 per year, and the number of other
findings ranged from 10 to 30 per year, with no strong trend (see fig.
3).
Figure 3: Number of Inspection Findings at All Plants, 2001 Through
2005:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO analysis of NRC data.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
Only in the area of inspection findings for which one or more cross-
cutting aspect was associated, is an increasing trend evident (see fig.
4). According to NRC, the increase in findings with cross-cutting
aspects is due, in part, to the recent development of additional
guidance for inspectors on the identification and documentation of
cross-cutting aspects. The number of plants where the existence of
cross-cutting aspects resulted in NRC's opening a substantive cross-
cutting issue is shown in figure 5. (See app. III for additional data
on plant-specific, substantive cross-cutting issues.)
Figure 4: Number of Inspection Findings and Inspection Findings with
Cross-Cutting Aspects at All Plants, 2001 Through 2005:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO analysis of NRC data.
Note: Almost all inspection findings with cross-cutting aspects were in
the areas of human performance and problem identification and
resolution; only 5 out of 1,890 inspection findings were assigned to
the safety-conscious work environment cross-cutting area.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
Figure 5: Number of Plants with Substantive Cross-Cutting Issues, 2001
Through 2005:
[See PDF for image] - graphic text:
Source: GAO analysis of NRC data.
Note: The totals include those plants that had one or more substantive
cross-cutting issue open during at least some portion of the year. If a
plant had more than one substantive cross-cutting issue open, only one
was counted.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
In the performance indicator program, almost all of the indicator data
were reported to be within the acceptable levels of performance
(green). Only 156, or less than 1 percent of over 30,000 indicator
reports from 2001 to 2005, did not meet the acceptable performance
threshold. (See app. III for additional plant-specific performance
indicator data.) Four of the 15 performance indicators have always been
reported within acceptable performance levels. These 4 indicators
include 1 that measures the amount of time that the residual heat
removal safety system is unavailable, 1 that monitors the integrity of
a radiation barrier, 1 that measures the participation of emergency
response organizations in emergency drills or exercises, and 1 that
monitors radiological releases. In addition, 46 plants have never had a
performance indicator fall outside of the acceptable performance level,
and no yellow or red indicators were reported during the period.
On the basis of the greater-than-green inspection findings and
performance indicators, NRC has subjected more than three quarters (79)
of the 103 operating plants to at least some level of increased
oversight for varying periods. (See app. III for additional plant-
specific oversight level data.)[Footnote 11] Most of these plants
received the lowest level of increased oversight, consisting of the
least intensive supplemental inspection, due to the identification of
one or two white inspection findings or performance indicators. In most
of these instances, the licensees did not accumulate additional greater-
than-green findings, so oversight did not have to be increased to
higher levels on the action matrix. For example, at one plant, NRC
issued a white finding after a degraded valve resulted in the failure
of a drain line from a moisture separator. After allowing time for the
licensee to analyze the root cause, NRC completed a supplemental
inspection to assess the licensee's evaluation and concluded that the
licensee's actions were adequate. As a result, NRC did not require any
further actions of the licensee, and NRC inspectors did not conduct
further inspections beyond the baseline procedures. In some cases,
however, either the licensee was not able to sufficiently correct the
performance problem, thus triggering increased oversight, or additional
greater-than-green inspection findings or performance indicators were
identified, also triggering increased oversight. For example, a white
finding was issued at one plant because the licensee's fire response
procedures were not effective in ensuring a safe shutdown of the
reactor during a postulated severe fire. Because this finding was
issued during the same time that one of the plant's performance
indicators was white, the plant was moved from the second to the third
highest level of oversight and NRC conducted a second-level, more-
intensive supplemental inspection. In this case, NRC determined that
the licensee's corrective actions were sufficient to resolve the
deficiencies related to both the inspection finding and performance
indicator and thus reduced its oversight back to baseline inspections
only.
While more than three quarters of nuclear power plants received some
level of increased oversight from 2001 through 2005, only 5 plants were
placed into NRC's highest oversight category on the action matrix that
still allows continued operations, and no plants were placed into NRC's
unacceptable performance category.[Footnote 12] Plants subject to the
highest level of NRC oversight generally remain in this category for
longer periods of time than the other performance categories on the
action matrix. It usually takes NRC longer to conduct the more
intensive supplemental inspections and the licensees longer to
implement the actions that NRC expects to correct the broader and more
systemic performance issues that led to their placement in the highest
oversight category. For example, one plant was subject to NRC's highest
oversight level for approximately 2 years because of several greater-
than-green inspection findings and performance indicators, including a
red inspection finding for the failure of a steam generator tube. In
this case, NRC conducted its most intensive supplemental inspection 2
months after the final significance of the red inspection finding was
determined. NRC inspectors found a number of underlying problems with
the licensee's programs for design control, human and equipment
performance, problem identification and resolution, and emergency
preparedness. The licensee prepared a plan to address its performance
deficiencies, as is required for all plants placed into this oversight
category, and determined that a multiyear effort was necessary to
adequately develop and implement all corrective actions. Once the
corrective actions were in place, NRC inspectors conducted follow-up
inspections to examine the adequacy of the licensee's efforts in
implementing its corrective actions. NRC inspectors at the plants we
reviewed explained that plants subjected to the highest oversight
levels typically have underlying problems that can take longer periods
to resolve. It is important for them to ensure that the corrective
actions taken by the licensee are effective before oversight is
reduced. Therefore, inspectors try to allow a sufficient amount of time
to pass after the licensee has taken a corrective action, to be able to
examine not only the corrective action itself but also whether it is
working as intended, which requires it to have been in place for
awhile.
NRC inspectors at the plants we reviewed also said that a decline in
plant performance is often the result of ineffective licensee
corrective action programs, problems related to human performance, or
complacent management, which often results in deficiencies in one or
more of the cross-cutting areas. In assessing the results of the ROP
data, we found an association between plants that had been subjected to
increased levels of oversight and the presence of substantive cross-
cutting issues. For instance, all plants subjected to NRC's highest
level of oversight also had a human performance and/or problem
identification and resolution substantive cross-cutting issue open
either prior to or during the time that they were subjected to
increased oversight.
NRC Is Addressing Weaknesses in Various Areas of Its Oversight Process,
but More Effort Is Needed:
NRC has taken a proactive approach to constantly improving its
oversight process over its first 6 years of implementation, but
additional improvements are needed. NRC has several mechanisms in place
to incorporate feedback from both external and internal stakeholders,
and it is currently working on improving several areas of its oversight
process by, for example, better focusing inspections on areas most
important to safety, improving the timeliness and quality of
determining the risk significance of its inspection findings, and
modifying some of the performance indicators to improve their quality.
NRC is also assessing whether it needs to modify its oversight,
including developing additional inspection procedures, as a result of
some problems that have surfaced in areas not fully inspected by NRC,
such as the recent discovery of groundwater contamination from
radioactive releases at a number of sites. In addition, NRC is working
to address what we believe has been a significant shortcoming by making
changes to its oversight process to improve its ability to better
identify and address early indications of deteriorating safety at
plants before performance problems develop. Some of its changes have
been controversial, however, and NRC officials acknowledge the need to
carefully assess the effectiveness of the changes.
NRC Is Taking Action to Improve Various Areas of Its Oversight Process:
According to NRC, the ROP was implemented with the understanding that
it would be an evolving process and improvements would be made as
lessons were learned. Each year NRC conducts a self-assessment of its
oversight process to compile feedback from various internal and
external sources and to outline the changes it intends to make. As a
part of its self-assessment, NRC developed numerous performance metrics
for its various oversight components, including its inspections and
performance indicator program, to provide quantitative insights into
the timeliness, efficiency, and overall effectiveness of the ROP. The
metrics are based on program data, such as the number and color of
inspection findings, and feedback received from external and internal
stakeholders. Each fall, NRC solicits feedback from external
stakeholders through a survey published in the Federal Register. In
2005, NRC received 21 responses from the industry, industry
organizations, public interest groups, state or local agencies, and
members of the public. NRC also biannually surveys NRC management,
program staff, and regional and site inspectors on the effectiveness of
the ROP. In the most recent survey, which was conducted in 2004, NRC
received responses from about 50 percent of the surveyed staff. In
addition, NRC has a formal feedback mechanism whereby NRC staff can
submit recommendations for improving various oversight components, and
NRC staff meet with industry officials on a monthly basis--in addition
to holding various meetings, workshops, and conferences--to discuss the
ROP. Through NRC's self-assessment process, its staff also incorporates
direction provided by the NRC commissioners and recommendations from
independent evaluations, such as from the ACRS, GAO, and the NRC Office
of the Inspector General.
According to NRC program officials, the changes made to the ROP since
its inception in 2000--including those made in response to the Davis-
Besse incident--have generally refined the existing oversight process,
rather than significantly changing it. In the case of Davis-Besse, NRC
formed a task force to review the agency's regulatory processes. The
task force's report, issued in September 2002, contained more than 50
recommendations, many associated with its oversight process. Among the
more significant ROP-related recommendations were those to (1) enhance
the performance indicator that monitors unidentified leakage; (2)
develop specific guidance to inspect licensee boric acid control
programs and vessel head penetration nozzles; (3) modify the inspection
program, including modifying an inspection procedure to better follow
up on long-standing plant performance issues; and (4) enhance the
guidance for managing plants that are shut down as a result of
significant performance problems. NRC program officials told us that
the task force's most significant recommendations were in areas outside
of the ROP, such as improving the agency's operating experience
program. According to NRC, it has implemented almost all of the task
force's recommendations.
Other modifications NRC has recently made or is in the process of
making include the following:
* NRC recently revised 7 of its baseline inspection procedures to
better focus the level and scope of its inspection efforts on those
areas most important to safety. These revisions resulted from a
detailed analysis in 2005 of its more than 30 baseline inspection
procedures. For example, NRC staff analyzed the number of findings
resulting from each of its inspection procedures to better understand
the areas where performance deficiencies were occurring, and compared
the time that inspectors were spending directly observing plant
activities as opposed to reviewing licensee paperwork to achieve a
balance between the two. For this effort, NRC held constant the level
of resources devoted to its baseline inspection effort and did not
assess whether more or fewer inspection resources overall should be
applied. NRC is now formalizing this analysis and making it a regular
part of its yearly assessment so that it can continually refine its
inspections to direct resources to the most critical performance areas.
* NRC has efforts under way to improve its SDP. An audit by the NRC
Office of the Inspector General, a review by a special task group
formed by NRC, and feedback from other stakeholders such as NEI and UCS
have pointed to several significant weaknesses with the SDP. Also,
other internal and external stakeholders, including NRC inspectors and
plant managers, have raised concerns about the amount of time, level of
effort, and knowledge and resources required to determine the risk
significance of some inspection findings. Industry officials commented
that because most inspection findings are green, one white finding at a
plant can place it in the "bottom quartile" of plants from a
performance perspective. Therefore, industry officials explained,
licensees try to avoid this placement and will expend a great deal of
effort and resources to provide additional data to NRC to ensure that
the risk level issued for the finding is appropriate. This can add
significant time to the process because licensees may use their own
technical tools, including models, data, and assumptions, to analyze
the issue. NRC then considers this information in its own analysis. At
the plants we reviewed, the time it took NRC to determine the final
significance of risk-significant inspection findings ranged from 24
days to over 200 days. The delay in assigning a color to a finding
while the new information is being considered could affect a plant's
placement on NRC's action matrix, essentially delaying the increased
oversight called for if the finding is determined to be greater-than-
green. NRC program officials said that even though there may be a delay
in determining the final risk significance of the finding, the licensee
takes immediate action to fix the identified problem. However,
supplemental inspections are designed to uncover additional associated
problems, if they exist, and delaying these inspections could delay
NRC's ability to discover additional performance problems, potentially
allowing performance to worsen.
NRC developed a plan in 2002 to improve the timeliness of its decision-
making process, enhance the quality of its various SDP tools, and track
its progress in implementing key changes. For example, NRC introduced a
new process aimed at improving timeliness by engaging decision makers
earlier to more quickly identify the scope of the evaluation to be used
to determine the inspection finding's risk significance, the resources
needed, and the schedule to complete the evaluation.
As a part of the SDP, NRC uses probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)
methods, which overall has improved its ability to assess the
performance and safety of nuclear power plants. PRA is an analytical
tool for estimating the probability that a potential accident might
occur by examining how physical structures, systems, and components,
along with employees, work together to ensure plant safety. Using PRA
tools, NRC and the plant licensees can estimate the likelihood that
different accident scenarios at plants will result in reactor core
damage and a release of radioactive materials. NRC often uses PRA tools
to help it determine the risk significance of its inspection findings.
However, we and others have found weaknesses with NRC's use of
PRA.[Footnote 13] For instance, in our May 2004 report on the Davis-
Besse reactor vessel head incident, we found that NRC used some
incomplete and faulty PRA analyses in deciding whether to allow the
licensee to delay shutdown of the reactor for inspection.[Footnote 14]
While NRC program officials acknowledge they can improve their current
PRA tools, they said the tools are adequate for factoring risk into the
oversight process and do achieve their intended purpose. NRC has
several initiatives under way to improve its use of PRA in its decision
making, many of which it plans to complete by June 2007. For example,
NRC recently revised its models to assess events that occur at plants
during at-power situations to better capture individual plant
characteristics, and it is in the process of developing new models to
assess events that occur at plants during low-power or shutdown
conditions. NRC is also developing guidance to address broader PRA
issues, including establishing overall quality requirements for risk
information; providing specific instructions for documenting the
decision process and conclusions; and developing improved methods for
calculating risk, such as its practices for implementing human
reliability analysis.
* NRC is working with the nuclear power industry to improve several of
its performance indicators, including making the definitions of some
indicators more concise to improve their quality and to reduce the
number of discrepancies between licensees and NRC inspectors. Because
NRC inspectors verify indicator data only once a year, a potential
disagreement with a licensee over these data might not surface for up
to 1 year after it is reported, and it may take even longer to resolve
the disagreement. Similar to delays with the SDP, a delay in assigning
a color while the disagreement is being resolved could affect a plant's
placement on NRC's action matrix, and delay the increased oversight
called for if the indicator is determined to be greater-than-green. To
date, NRC's efforts to improve the performance indicator program have
largely centered on developing a key indicator to address known
problems with the indicators that measure the unavailability of safety
systems. NRC has been working jointly with the nuclear industry since
2001 to develop the indicator, which is now risk-informed and intended
to provide a more accurate indication of the risks associated with
changes in the availability and unreliability of important safety
systems. This indicator, referred to as the mitigating systems
performance index, was implemented in April 2006, and the first plant
reports were submitted in July 2006. NRC is also in the process of
changing the definition for several other indicators, in addition to
considering the feasibility of new indicators.
In addition, NRC program officials said they are taking a broad look at
the performance indicator program to assess how they might increase its
overall value to the ROP. The effort is intended, in part, to address
concerns that performance indicators have not contributed to the early
identification of poorly performing plants to the degree originally
envisioned, since all of the indicators are almost always within
acceptable performance levels (green). When the program was developed,
thresholds were set using industry performance data such that about 5
percent of the plants were expected to exceed the green-white
threshold--that is, be designated either white, yellow, or red--for
each of the performance indicators. However, from 2000 through 2005,
less than 1 percent exceeded it. Furthermore, there have been several
cases where plants reported an acceptable performance indicator and
performance problems in the area were subsequently identified. For
example, NRC inspectors at one plant noted that while performance
indicator data related to its alert and notification system for
emergency preparedness had always been reported green, the system did
not always function properly. On the other hand, industry officials
believe that the high percentage of green indicators is indicative of
plants' good performance. Several plant managers told us that they
closely monitor and manage to the acceptable performance thresholds
established for each indicator, and that they will often take action to
address performance issues well before the indicator crosses the
acceptable threshold. To assess issues within the performance indicator
program, NRC developed a standing working group, with representatives
from both the industry and NRC, that meets on a monthly basis. This
group, along with senior NRC and industry management, plans to explore
overall program improvements to better identify declining plant
performance.
In addition to the previously mentioned efforts, NRC is assessing
whether it needs to modify its oversight, including developing
additional inspection procedures, as a result of some problems that
have surfaced in areas not fully inspected by NRC. For example, NRC has
reported that there have been inadvertent, unmonitored releases of
radioactive liquids containing tritium at a number of nuclear power
sites in the past few years.[Footnote 15] To date, NRC reports show
that the measured levels of tritium discovered were low enough that
they do not appear to pose a public health hazard. According to NRC,
the releases were due to equipment failures or structural degradation
at the plants. At one of the plants we reviewed, for example, elevated
levels of tritium in the on-site groundwater were discovered during the
licensee's testing of its monitoring wells. NRC reports suggest that
this radioactive release was most likely due to leakage from the spent
fuel pool's support structures. Shortly after the licensee reported the
contamination, NRC initiated a special inspection to further
investigate the source and cause of the leakage and the licensee's
actions for mitigation. On the basis of this and other discoveries of
contaminated groundwater, in March 2006, NRC formed a lessons-learned
task force to evaluate NRC's regulatory processes related to the
radioactive releases and to recommend areas for improvement. For
example, NRC is reviewing related regulations and guidance, inspection
program requirements, and its communications with external stakeholders
and the public. In addition, the nuclear industry recently undertook an
initiative to improve its groundwater protection, and intends to
develop site-specific action plans at all plants and improve the
industry's data collection, reporting, and protocols for sharing
lessons learned.
NRC is also taking action to improve its requirements for licensees to
control and account for their spent nuclear fuel, that is, the used
fuel periodically removed from reactors in nuclear power plants. NRC
requires licensees to control and account for all of their spent fuel
materials because of the hazardous nature of spent nuclear
fuel.[Footnote 16] However, reviews by both GAO and the NRC Office of
the Inspector General found weaknesses with NRC's oversight of
licensees' spent fuel control and tracking programs.[Footnote 17]
Between 2000 and 2004, several plants experienced instances of missing
or unaccounted-for spent fuel, and NRC reported weaknesses in the
material control and accounting programs at various other plants. In
investigating these issues, we and the NRC Office of the Inspector
General determined that NRC's inspections did not adequately ensure
that all licensees properly controlled and accounted for their spent
nuclear fuel. From the late-1980s through implementation of the ROP,
NRC did not conduct routine material control and accounting
inspections; instead it looked at these activities indirectly through
other inspections, such as those of licensee operations during
refueling of the reactor. We also found that while NRC requires plants
to maintain an accurate record of all their spent fuel and its
location, NRC regulations did not specify how licensees are to conduct
physical inventories or how they are to control and account for loose
spent fuel rods and fragments. NRC is currently in the process of
revising several of its guidance documents and developing inspection
procedures to better assess the effectiveness of licensee material
control and accounting programs. NRC reports that most of these efforts
will be completed by the end of 2007.
NRC Is Taking Its First Major Step to Address a Significant ROP
Weakness in the Area of Safety Culture:
One significant shortcoming in the ROP that we and others have found is
that it has not been as effective as it could be in identifying and
addressing early indications of deteriorating safety performance at
nuclear power plants before problems develop. NRC and others have long
recognized that a safety culture--the organizational characteristics
that ensure that issues affecting nuclear plant safety receive the
attention their significance warrants--can have a significant impact on
a plant's safety performance. The identification of a weak safety
culture--or weaknesses in the attributes that make up a safety culture,
such as attention to detail, adherence to procedures, and effective
corrective and preventative actions--can point to early signs of
deteriorating safety performance before conditions become so serious
that a safety accident occurs. As early as 1989, NRC recognized the
importance of developing a safety culture at each nuclear power plant
that ensures safe plant operations, but NRC's policy stated that it was
the licensee's duty and obligation to monitor and maintain a strong
safety culture.
Despite the recognition of the importance of a safety culture and
several external groups' recommendations to better incorporate safety
culture aspects into NRC's oversight process, NRC did not include
specific measures to comprehensively assess plant safety culture when
it implemented the ROP in 2000. As its new oversight process was being
developed, external stakeholders, including the ACRS, concluded that
additional oversight measures were needed to characterize licensees'
human performance and safety culture. The 2002 Davis-Besse reactor
vessel head incident highlighted that this was a significant weakness
in the ROP. Our May 2004 report concluded that the event occurred, in
part, because NRC did not have an effective means to identify and
address early indications of deteriorating safety at plants before
performance problems develop.
NRC did not take immediate action, however, contending that direct
safety culture evaluations would cross the line from a regulatory
function to a licensee management function. In August 2004, the NRC
Commission directed the staff to improve the ROP by more fully
addressing safety culture. In response, NRC staff formed a safety
culture working group in early 2005 to lead the agency's efforts to
make changes to the ROP to better incorporate safety culture into its
oversight process. As a part of this initiative, the working group
obtained the input of external stakeholders through a series of public
meetings held in late 2005 and early 2006. The group also incorporated
lessons learned from events that occurred at the Salem and Hope Creek
site during this same period. In 2004, NRC confirmed there were
problems with aspects of the site's safety culture. In addressing the
problem, NRC concluded that the ROP did not provide adequate tools to
monitor the situation or the sufficiency of the licensee's corrective
actions. As a result, NRC deviated from the ROP to increase its
oversight at the site, which included conducting special inspections
and forming a team with expertise in the area to review the licensee's
corrective actions. (See app. I for additional information on the
events at Salem and Hope Creek.)
In February 2006, NRC issued proposed changes to some of its inspection
procedures and guidance documents to incorporate safety culture into
the ROP, and implemented the changes in July 2006. NRC used the
following two overall approaches: first, it developed additional
guidance for identifying and addressing cross-cutting aspects, and,
second, it developed a structured way to determine the need to evaluate
plants' safety culture. Several inspection procedures were also
modified to direct inspectors to be sensitive to and take into
consideration safety culture components when planning and conducting
their inspections. Although the three cross-cutting aspects (problem
identification and resolution, human performance, and a safety
conscious work environment) did not change, NRC developed new
definitions for them to more fully encompass safety culture aspects.
Also, NRC developed additional guidance on the treatment of cross-
cutting aspects once they have been identified. For example, the
problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area now has
several components--a corrective action program, operating experience,
and self and independent assessments. The human performance cross-
cutting area is composed of decision making, resources, work control,
and work practices. NRC inspectors are required to assess every
inspection finding to determine if it is associated with one or more of
the components that make up each of the cross-cutting areas. While the
process for assessing inspection findings for the existence of cross-
cutting aspects and substantive cross-cutting issues remains largely
unchanged, now the definitions for the cross-cutting areas are more
detailed and track more closely with those elements that comprise
safety culture.[Footnote 18] In addition, under NRC's new guidance, if
the same substantive cross-cutting issue is identified in three
consecutive assessment periods, NRC may request that the licensee
evaluate its safety culture. The intent is to provide an opportunity to
diagnose a potentially declining safety culture before significant
safety performance problems occur. NRC program officials said they
consider the identification and treatment of substantive cross-cutting
issues the most proactive element of the ROP, because all other
oversight actions are taken only when more significant performance
problems have been identified.
NRC's changes to the ROP now also include a structured way for NRC to
determine the need for a safety culture evaluation. NRC's new guidance
calls for the licensees of plants with more than one white finding in
the same cornerstone or one yellow finding to evaluate whether the
performance issues were caused by any safety culture components, and
NRC may request the licensee to independently evaluate its safety
culture, if the licensee does not identify a safety culture component.
Any safety culture deficiencies are expected to be entered into the
licensee's corrective action program. Regional officials would discuss
the licensee's proposed corrective actions with the licensee, and NRC
may hold a public meeting to discuss the issues. For plants where more
significant or multiple findings have been identified, NRC will not
only independently assess the adequacy of the licensee's independent
evaluation of safety culture, but may also conduct its own evaluation.
Following the completion of any evaluations, regional and headquarters
officials together determine whether additional agency actions are
warranted, and, at a minimum, the licensee will be required to document
its plan to make improvements and a public meeting will be held to
discuss the licensee's performance. According to an NRC official
familiar with the Salem and Hope Creek situation, had these
requirements been in place at the time, they would have been adequate
to address the concerns at Salem and Hope Creek without the need to
deviate from the ROP.
NRC's approach to incorporating safety culture into the ROP has been
controversial, and some stakeholders disagree with certain changes. For
example, some in the nuclear power industry have expressed concern that
the changes could introduce undue subjectivity to NRC's oversight,
given the difficulty in measuring these often intangible and complex
concepts. Several of the nuclear power plant managers at the sites we
reviewed said that it is not always clear why a cross-cutting aspect is
associated with a finding, or what it will take to clear themselves
once they have been identified as having a substantive cross-cutting
issue. Some industry officials worry that the changes will further
increase the number of findings that have cross-cutting aspects
associated with them, and, if all of the findings have these aspects,
whether the process will lose its value. Industry officials also warn
that if the changes are not implemented carefully, resources could be
diverted away from other important safety issues. Other external
stakeholders, such as an official from UCS, on the other hand, suggest
that this effort is an important step toward improving NRC's ability to
identify performance issues at plants before they result in safety
problems. Importantly, there are now additional tools in place for NRC
to use when it identifies potential safety culture concerns. In
reviewing NRC's proposed approach in April 2006, the ACRS concluded
that the approach was appropriate and will enhance the agency's ability
to address safety culture issues; although after gaining some
experience with the process, it stated that NRC should reassess the
adequacy of some procedures.
NRC program officials acknowledged that they will need to assess the
changes they made to the ROP to determine if they better allow
inspectors to detect deteriorating safety conditions at plants before
significant safety events occur. Some at NRC view these changes as the
beginning step toward an incremental approach. For its current efforts,
NRC also acknowledged that additional training for its inspectors on
safety culture is needed. NRC provided computer-based and regional
training to its inspectors as the changes were being finalized, and it
is currently working to incorporate aspects of its safety culture
changes into its more permanent training programs. NRC plans to
evaluate stakeholder feedback--both through its normal processes, such
as its monthly meetings, and potentially through specific industry-
sponsored workshops dedicated to the issue--and make additional changes
on the basis of the lessons learned as part of its annual self-
assessment process for 2007.
Conclusions:
NRC is devoting considerable effort to overseeing the safe operation of
the nation's commercial nuclear power plants, and its process for doing
so appears logical and well-structured. NRC's oversight process is
finding safety problems and is getting the industry to constantly
improve. However, weaknesses with its inspection and performance
indicator programs have been identified--in particular, the timeliness
of the process used to determine the risk significance of inspection
findings, and the ability of performance indicators to contribute to
the early identification of poorly performing plants. Importantly, NRC
is demonstrating that it is aware of these weaknesses and is actively
making changes to improve its oversight. NRC's proactive approach is
demonstrated by the important progress it is making in several key
areas, including making efforts to improve the timeliness and quality
of its significance determination process, redefining some of its
performance indicators, and assessing the need for additional
inspection procedures based on careful analysis. Its efforts to
continuously consider the need to improve and obtain feedback from both
internal and external stakeholders are critical as nuclear power plants
age and the nation considers building new plants. In this regard, it is
also important that the ROP continue to be a very open process in which
NRC provides the public and its other stakeholders with considerable
information on its oversight activities and findings related to plant
safety performance.
Although NRC has been working to improve its oversight in several key
areas, its efforts to incorporate safety culture into the ROP may be
its most critical future change. More than 4 years have passed since
Davis-Besse highlighted that a significant weakness in NRC's oversight
was its inability to identify deteriorating safety conditions at plants
before they resulted in performance problems. NRC has been reluctant to
regulate in the area of safety culture because it did not want to be
directly involved in managing the licensees' plants. However, NRC is
now taking concrete actions to begin incorporating safety culture into
the ROP, although it acknowledges that regulating the often complex and
intangible aspects of safety culture is challenging, and that its
recent changes are simply a first step. As a result, it will be
important to closely monitor this effort to ensure that it is achieving
the goal of objectively assessing safety culture, while providing an
early indication of declining safety performance. An additional
challenge for NRC will be how to provide information to the public and
other stakeholders on this important but complex area of plant
performance. Given that it may take some time for NRC to develop
performance metrics for safety culture, data on substantive cross-
cutting issues, which provide insight into aspects of plants' safety
culture, could be useful to the public and other stakeholders as they
look for assurances that plants are operated safely. Summary-level
information on plants with substantive cross-cutting issues is not
currently available to the public through NRC's Web site.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Given its importance to improving NRC's ability to identify declining
safety performance at nuclear power plants before significant safety
problems develop, we recommend that the NRC commissioners take the
following two actions:
* Aggressively monitor; evaluate; and, if needed, implement additional
methods or processes to increase the effectiveness of its efforts under
the ROP to assess safety culture at plants.
* In addition to periodically evaluating the effectiveness of its
safety culture efforts, NRC may also be able, through its performance
indicator program, to develop specific indicators to measure important
aspects of plants' safety culture. Trends in these performance
indicators could be useful feedback to NRC on its safety culture
activities. The indicators could also provide useful information to the
public and other NRC stakeholders on the safety culture at plants.
In addition, in the absence of performance indicators or other
performance metrics for plants' safety culture, we recommend that the
NRC commissioners make publicly available, through the ROP Web site,
consolidated and comprehensive data on the plants that have substantive
cross-cutting issues open. These data would provide a more
comprehensive picture of plant performance and provide insights into
aspects of the plants' safety culture that otherwise are not readily
available on the Web site.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to NRC for its review and comment.
In a letter from NRC's Executive Director for Operations, NRC generally
agreed with the report's findings, conclusions, and recommendations
(see app. IV). NRC also commented that the report is comprehensive,
fair, and balanced. In addition, NRC provided minor, technical
comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate.
We are also sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Chairman of NRC, and other interested parties. We also
will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or wellsj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Jim Wells:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable James M. Inhofe:
Chairman:
Committee on Environment and Public Works:
United States Senate:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Clean Air, Climate Change, and Nuclear Safety:
Committee on Environment and Public Works:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ed Whitfield:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tom Carper:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Michael N. Castle:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Edward J. Markey:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Key Safety-Related Events at the Salem and Hope Creek
Nuclear Power Plants from 2000 to 2006:
This appendix summarizes key safety-related events at the Salem and
Hope Creek nuclear power plants and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
(NRC) and licensee's actions to follow up on and correct them. This
information is presented to enhance the public's understanding of the
events and timing of NRC's actions. We did not conduct an independent
audit or assessment of the events, other than to help illustrate how
NRC is using its oversight process to ensure plant safety.
The Salem and Hope Creek plants are located at one site in Hancocks
Bridge, New Jersey, 18 miles southeast of Wilmington, Delaware, on the
Delaware River. The two Salem plants (Salem 1 and Salem 2) consist of
two pressurized water reactors, and the Hope Creek plant is a boiling
water reactor. The three plants produce a combined 3,237 megawatts of
electricity. Salem 1 began operating in the late-1970s and Salem 2 and
Hope Creek began operating in the 1980s. PSEG Nuclear LLC is licensed
to operate all three plants, with their current licenses expiring
roughly 40 years after the start of their operations. In January 2005,
PSEG entered into a nuclear operating services contract with Exelon,
the first step of a planned merger between the two companies. Under the
terms of this contract, Exelon manages operations at Salem and Hope
Creek.
From 2000 through 2006, there were several safety-related events at the
site that affected the plants' performance. As a result, NRC increased
its oversight to include supplemental and special inspections, and
required the licensee to take specific actions to address its
performance issues. NRC also deviated from its normal oversight process
from August 2004 through 2006 to increase its oversight and address
problems with the licensee's ability to provide an adequate safety-
conscious work environment (SCWE). A SCWE is defined by NRC as an
environment in which employees feel free to raise safety concerns, both
to their management and to NRC, without fear of retaliation. During
this period, NRC and the licensee held several public meetings to
discuss performance issues related to the site's safety work
environment, or the SCWE, and the actions the licensee was taking to
improve it.
The following summary provides details on the key safety-related events
at Salem and Hope Creek, along with NRC's and the licensee's responses
to the events, from the initial implementation of NRC's reactor
oversight process in April 2000 to June 2006.
Summary of Key Safety-Related Events at Salem and Hope Creek, April
2000 to June 2006:
White Performance Indicator for Unplanned Scrams:
During the fourth quarter of 2000, Salem 1 reported a white color for
the unplanned scrams performance indicator, an indicator that monitors
the number of unplanned scrams--reactor shutdowns--that occurred during
the previous four quarters. During 2000, Salem 1 had four scrams, which
is one more than the acceptable performance level. NRC conducted a
supplemental inspection in March 2001 to follow up on why such a high
number of scrams occurred and on the corrective actions the licensee
was taking to address the problem. In conducting its inspection, NRC
determined that the licensee had performed a comprehensive common cause
analysis of the associated performance deficiencies, which identified
human performance, equipment failure, and procedure and preventive
maintenance program issues as root causes of the performance problems.
The licensee documented these issues in its corrective action program
and developed a plan to outline the actions it would take to address
them. NRC concluded this effort was sufficient and did not require the
licensee to take any additional corrective actions beyond what it had
outlined in its plan.
White Performance Indicator for Unplanned Changes in Reactor Power:
During the first quarter of 2002, Salem 1 reported a white color for
the performance indicator that monitors unplanned changes in reactor
power that could have challenged safety functions during the previous
four quarters. Salem reported a total of seven power changes, which
exceeded the acceptable performance threshold by one. NRC conducted a
supplemental inspection in October 2002 and concluded that the
licensee's implementation of several programs to address the underlying
causes of the unplanned power changes, such as the replacement of
certain pieces of equipment, sufficiently addressed the performance
problem. NRC did not require the licensee to take any additional
corrective actions.
Substantive Cross-Cutting Issue in Problem Identification and
Resolution:
In March 2003, NRC opened a substantive cross-cutting issue in the
problem identification and resolution area at all three plants on the
basis of the identification of a number of green inspection findings
that documented ineffective problem evaluations and untimely,
ineffective corrective actions by plant employees, including recurring
equipment failures. Upon opening this substantive cross-cutting issue,
NRC stated that it would closely monitor the licensee's performance in
this area. This substantive cross-cutting issue remained open until
March 2006, when NRC concluded that the licensee's efforts to improve
its ability to identify and resolve performance problems were
sufficient.
White Inspection Finding for Failure of a Part on an Emergency Diesel
Generator:
In May 2003, NRC determined that the failure of a part on an emergency
diesel generator at the Salem 1 plant that occurred in September 2002
would result in a white inspection finding. NRC conducted a
supplemental inspection in October 2003 and concluded that although the
licensee had adequately fixed the emergency diesel generator, it would
need to take additional action to address broader performance problems.
Specifically, NRC had concerns with the licensee's ability to ensure
that the controls and procedural requirements determined to be
necessary on the basis of evaluations of equipment failures, were
reliably tracked and implemented. The licensee implemented procedural
changes to more effectively track its corrective actions to prevent
recurrence. NRC conducted a second, follow-up supplemental inspection
in September 2004 and, on the basis of this inspection, concluded that
the licensee's corrective actions were sufficient.
White Inspection Finding for the Failure of a Rotating Screen That Is
Part of the Station Service Water System at Hope Creek:
In May 2004, NRC determined that the failure in July 2003 of a rotating
screen that is part of the station service water system at Hope Creek
would result in a white inspection finding. NRC determined that the
failure resulted from the licensee's inadequate maintenance procedures
and its failure to adhere to procedural instructions. In September
2004, NRC conducted a supplemental inspection to follow up on the
corrective actions that licensee had taken. It determined that the
licensee's corrective actions, which included revising relevant
maintenance procedures, were sufficient and did not require additional
actions from the licensee.
White Inspection Finding for the Failure of a Drain Line in the
Moisture Separator System at Hope Creek:
In February 2005, NRC determined that the licensee's failure to
properly evaluate and correct a degraded valve, which resulted in the
failure of a drain system at Hope Creek in October 2004, would result
in a white inspection finding. NRC conducted a supplemental inspection
in June 2005 to follow up on the licensee's corrective actions, which
included the development of new guidance; revisions to relevant plant
operating procedures; inspections of pipe hangers, one of which was
determined to be the initiator of the degraded valve; and the
development of a new procedure for additional monitoring of degraded
equipment. NRC determined that these actions were sufficient and did
not require additional actions from the licensee.
Increased Oversight to Address Safety-Conscious Work Environment
Problems:
In late 2003, NRC initiated a special review of the site's SCWE on the
basis of allegations concerning its SCWE, plant events and inspection
findings that indicated problems with its SCWE, insights from NRC
interactions with the licensee, observations made by NRC inspectors,
and the presence of a substantive cross-cutting issue in problem
identification and resolution. NRC's special review consisted of (1) in-
depth interviews by NRC experts of more than 60 current and former
plant employees, (2) an analysis of the site's inspection and
assessment record over the previous several years, and (3) information
from plant employees' allegations related to the SCWE. NRC provided the
interim results of its review to the licensee in January 2004. Although
NRC did not identify any serious safety violations, the information led
to concerns about the site's SCWE, particularly as it related to the
handling of emergent equipment issues and associated operational
decision making. The review accumulated information about a number of
events that, to varying degrees, called into question the openness of
management to concerns and alternative views, strength of
communications, and effectiveness of the licensee's corrective action
and feedback processes. There were several differences of opinion among
operators and senior managers on plant operating decisions,
particularly as they might impact continuing plant operation and outage
schedules. On the basis of these interim results, NRC requested that
the licensee conduct an in-depth assessment of its SCWE.
NRC issued the final results of its special review in July 2004,
confirming many of the concerns it identified through its interim
review. In its final results, NRC concluded that there were weaknesses
in the licensee's leadership and management approaches, leading to a
perception among some staff and mangers that the company emphasized
production over safety. NRC also determined that licensee management
was not consistent in its support of staff identifying concerns and
providing alternate views, and cited examples of unresolved conflicts
and poor communication between management and staff.
In May 2004, the licensee submitted an independent assessment of its
SCWE. The assessment included interviews of employees, and reviews of
the licensee's inspection record and employee concerns program, among
other things. Among the findings of the assessment were that (1) some
plant employees were hesitant to raise issues; (2) management was not
receptive to or effective at addressing some employee concerns, such as
those surrounding long-standing equipment problems; (3) a significant
number of employees did not view the employee concerns program as a
viable means to raise concerns; and (4) management was not effective at
understanding or addressing the potential for a "chilling" effect--that
is, an environment that discourages workers from raising safety
concerns--in response to highly visible employee concerns and actions
associated with operational events.
As a result of the assessment, the licensee submitted to NRC in June
2004 an action plan to improve its overall safety work environment. The
plan addressed the licensee's corrective action program, work
management program, and safety-conscious work environment. For example,
to improve the licensee's corrective action program, the plan
identified actions to improve monitoring, such as developing and
implementing an integrated corrective action training program and
developing performance indicators. The plan also included a number of
actions to improve the licensee's management alignment, prioritization,
support for and awareness of the workweek schedule, and communication
and training strategies to support work management improvements. In
addition, the plan included actions to improve the willingness of plant
employees to raise concerns, improve the effectiveness of policies and
procedures for resolution of issues, enhance key elements of the
employee concerns program, and improve management effectiveness in
detecting and preventing retaliation or a chilled environment. The
licensee's action plan included 17 metrics designed to measure safety
work environment improvements. The licensee provided the results of
these metrics to NRC on a quarterly basis.
In August 2004, NRC regional officials received approval from
headquarters to deviate from the normal oversight process to increase
oversight at the site to monitor the licensee's actions to improve its
safety work environment. NRC's increased oversight consisted of (1)
reviewing the results of the specific actions the licensee took as a
part of its action plan, (2) creating an NRC team with expertise in the
area to assist with coordinating and focusing these review efforts, and
(3) conducting additional special inspections and enhancing existing
inspections by adjusting their focus and scope. NRC determined that it
could reduce its oversight to baseline levels once the licensee
completed a self-assessment of its SCWE that concluded that it had made
substantial, sustainable progress, and NRC confirmed the licensee's
conclusion.
NRC also opened a substantive cross-cutting issue in the SCWE area at
all three plants in August 2004, on the basis of the results of its
special review of the site's SCWE completed that July. Upon opening
this substantive cross-cutting issue, NRC requested that the licensee
discuss its progress in improving its SCWE and the effectiveness of its
corrective action program in a public meeting planned for late 2004.
This substantive cross-cutting issue remained open in the 2005 annual
assessment letter, issued in March 2006. NRC will consider closing this
substantive cross-cutting issue after the licensee provides the results
of an assessment that concludes that it has made substantial,
sustainable progress, and NRC has completed a review that confirms
these results.
In June 2005, NRC issued the results of an inspection of the licensee's
employee concerns program (ECP) conducted as a part of its increased
oversight to monitor the site's safety work environment. NRC inspectors
did not identify any findings of safety significance and concluded that
the ECP provided a framework for investigating concerns, maintaining
the confidentiality of personnel who use the program, and protecting
employees who use the program against retaliation. They also concluded,
however, that it was too early to fully assess the effectiveness of
recent program improvements and initiatives. The inspectors observed
that a statistically significant portion of the personnel interviewed
indicated that they would not use the ECP due to a perception that the
process did not take adequate measures to protect users'
confidentiality. NRC inspectors cited a section of the ECP that
appeared to affirm this perception. The licensee emphasized that it was
making efforts to protect confidentiality, and acknowledged that the
ECP should reflect these efforts.
NRC also provided the preliminary results of its review of the
licensee's executive review board (ERB) process in June 2005. The ERB
was established to improve the site's safety work environment and
management's effectiveness in detecting and preventing retaliation and
a chilled work environment. NRC inspectors determined that lapses in
the licensee's use of the ERB process constituted a green inspection
finding, although it did not represent a violation of regulatory
requirements. NRC requested that the licensee reassess the review of
the ERB in the broader context of the work environment, identify
additional actions planned or taken to address negative worker
perceptions, and provide a written response to NRC within 30 days. The
licensee responded with planned corrective actions, including
developing and implementing continuing training on the SCWE, and
developing and implementing a plan to improve its corrective action
program.
In July 2005, NRC headquarters extended regional officials' permission
to deviate from the normal oversight process and provide increased
oversight at Salem and Hope Creek. The extension was necessary because
the licensee had not yet met the criteria to move back to normal, or
baseline levels of oversight. Increased oversight included (1)
continued management meetings and site visits to review the
implementation of the licensee's corrective actions; (2) increased
efforts, including using more inspectors and samples than what would
typically be used, to conduct a baseline inspection of the site's
effectiveness at identifying and resolving problems; and (3) an
additional inspection to monitor the licensee's progress in resolving
the substantive cross-cutting issue in the SCWE.
In November 2005, NRC issued the results of the special inspection on
the site's SCWE. The inspection included assessing the licensee's
progress and plans for making improvements to its SCWE, its metrics to
monitor the effectiveness of the improvements made, and effectiveness
of the licensee's corrective actions and self assessment initiatives.
NRC inspectors did not identify any findings of safety significance and
determined that the licensee had made progress in improving its SCWE.
For example, NRC inspectors concluded that workers' willingness to
raise safety concerns had increased. In addition, the licensee had
taken a significant number of actions to improve the corrective action
and work management programs and had implemented several corrective
actions for the employee concerns program. They also concluded that the
licensee had made progress in preventing and detecting retaliation.
However, NRC inspectors also observed that some issues required
additional action and focused attention, such as the need for the
licensee to fully evaluate and address negative perceptions about its
work environment in certain work groups. The licensee initiated actions
to address these observations.
In May 2006, the licensee submitted to NRC an independent peer
assessment that concluded that it had made substantial improvements to
its SCWE, and a solid foundation existed to sustain them. The
assessment included interviews with site personnel; observations of
station activities and meetings; and reviews of the licensee's
programs, procedures, policies, and other relevant information. Among
the assessment's conclusions were that personnel throughout the
organization exhibited a willingness to engage in open-and-candid
discussions and raise safety and quality issues, the corrective action
and work management programs had improved, management had been
effective at detecting and preventing retaliation and addressing
chilling effects in response to the raising of safety concerns, and
management provided high-visibility and strong and continuous
reinforcement of good work environment principles. In response, NRC
began a review of the effectiveness of the licensee's actions to
improve its safety work environment. The results of this review will be
a key input into NRC's midcycle assessment of the site's overall safety
performance to be completed in August 2006; through the midcycle
assessment NRC will determine any changes in the level of oversight for
Salem and Hope Creek.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To examine how NRC oversees plants, we reviewed the various tools and
processes that comprise the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). In this
regard, we analyzed NRC's documentation of its oversight process,
conducted interviews with NRC program staff and other officials,
visited one NRC regional office, and visited one nuclear power plant
site that was of specific interest to our requesters. In particular, we
reviewed NRC's policies, inspection manuals, and other guidance
documents outlining its various oversight process components--
including reports discussing the ROP design basis; inspection and
reporting requirements; performance indicator program guidance; and
other requirements, such as those related to its enforcement and
assessment processes. We interviewed NRC headquarters and regional
officials and regional and on-site inspectors responsible for
implementation of the ROP and visited the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear
power plants to observe firsthand how the ROP is implemented by the
resident inspectors located at each power plant. To learn more about
how ROP results are communicated to the public, we attended the annual
public meeting held at the Indian Point nuclear power plant. We also
reviewed the information NRC makes available to the public on a Web
site devoted to ROP topics, which includes both detailed plant-specific
information and general program information and guidance. In addition,
we interviewed external stakeholder individuals and groups about their
experiences with the ROP, including the NRC Commission Chairman from
1995 to 1999, who is largely credited with leading the development of
the ROP; officials from the NRC Office of the Inspector General, the
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the Union of Concerned Scientists
(UCS), and Greenpeace; and nuclear power plant managers at six sites.
To examine the results of the ROP over the past several years, we
reviewed the number and types of inspection findings NRC issued, the
performance indicators reported by the plants, and the level of
oversight NRC provided to the plants. Specifically, we obtained and
analyzed NRC data on its inspection findings for 2001 through 2005, the
years since implementation of the ROP for which the data were available
for the full year, and discussed our analysis with NRC program
officials. We obtained inspection findings data from the NRC Reactor
Program System (RPS) database and assessed the reliability of the RPS
data by (1) performing electronic and manual testing of required data
elements; (2) reviewing existing information about the data and the
system that produced them; (3) reviewing an audit of the RPS database
performed by the NRC Office of the Inspector General in 2005, and
documents related to NRC's implementation of the audit's
recommendations; and (4) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable
about these data. We determined that these data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. Data elements included a
breakout of inspection findings identified at each nuclear power plant,
including information on their risk significance, or color;
cornerstone; date; cross-cutting aspects; a brief description of the
problem identified; and other related information. We also obtained and
analyzed ROP data provided on NRC's Web site, including a list of
performance indicator data broken out by plant and by quarter and a
list of the plants in each column of the action matrix by quarter since
inception of the ROP in 2000. We assessed the reliability of these data
by interviewing the appropriate agency officials about how these data
are reported on the Web site and compared the data with source
information contained in inspection reports and assessment letters for
sample plants. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of this report. In addition, we reviewed every
assessment letter issued to each of the 103 plants since the inception
of the ROP to document the plants that had one or more substantive
cross-cutting issue open and the length of time that the issue was held
open. We discussed the results of our data analysis with NRC
headquarters program officials and compared the results of the ROP with
other industry-collected and reported performance data, including data
collected through NRC's industry trends program, to identify any
inconsistencies in trends or industry safety performance indicators.
To examine the status of NRC's efforts to improve the ROP, we reviewed
specific components of the ROP where weaknesses had been identified and
recent and current staffs' efforts to improve them. We analyzed NRC
documents, including all annual self-assessment reports issued by NRC
since 2001; interviewed officials from NRC headquarters, regional, and
site offices and outside stakeholder groups, including NEI and UCS; and
attended two public meetings covering proposed changes to incorporate
safety culture into its oversight process. In reviewing the annual self-
assessment reports, we analyzed comments submitted by both internal and
external stakeholders that were collected during recent surveys. We
analyzed responses submitted by internal staff, including management,
program staff, and regional and site inspectors, and responses from
external stakeholders, including industry, industry organizations,
public interest groups, state and local agencies, and members of the
public. We examined all proposed and final documents related to NRC's
safety culture changes, including inspection manuals, training
documents, and other guidance documents. We also reviewed public
comments submitted to NRC on its safety culture changes, such as those
submitted by NEI, UCS, and meetings held on the topic by the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). In addition, we assessed
various external reports and evaluations related to the ROP or specific
aspects relevant to NRC's oversight, such as issues surrounding safety
culture, including our prior reports, those of the NRC Office of the
Inspector General and of the ACRS. We met with NRC program officials
responsible for assessing and implementing changes to the ROP to obtain
a clear understanding of the actions they were taking and the status of
their efforts.
Additionally, we selected a nonprobability sample[Footnote 19] of 6
nuclear power sites (totaling 11 of the 103 operating plants)[Footnote
20] that provided coverage of each of NRC's four regional offices and
varying levels of plant performance and NRC oversight since 2000. The
following nuclear power sites were included in our review: Cooper (1
plant) located near Nebraska City, Nebraska; Indian Point 2 (1 plant)
located near New York, New York; Oconee (3 plants) located near
Greenville, South Carolina; Perry (1 plant) located near Painesville,
Ohio; Salem and Hope Creek (3 plants) located near Lower Alloways
Creek, New Jersey; and Surry (2 plants) located near Newport News,
Virginia. Our selection criteria was designed to represent geographic
diversity, a variety of safety problems in which inspection findings or
performance indicators of higher risk significance (white, yellow, and
red) were issued, trends reflecting both improving and declining safety
performance, and plants that have been subjected to at least some level
of increased oversight since the ROP was implemented. The purpose of
our review was to understand how performance problems were identified
by NRC's oversight process, what caused them, actions taken by NRC and
the licensee in response to the problems, and how NRC documented their
resolution. We analyzed all publicly available inspection reports and
assessment documents covering years 2000 through 2005 for each site to
examine how NRC applied the ROP to identify and correct safety
problems.[Footnote 21] We analyzed each green and greater-than-green
inspection finding documented through the inspection reports and
collected data associated with each finding, including how it was
identified, which cornerstone it was assigned to, whether the finding
was associated with a violation of regulatory requirements, and whether
there were any cross-cutting elements associated with the finding. For
the greater-than-green inspection findings, we collected additional
information to determine the length of time it took the licensee to
correct the performance problem, the length of time and level of effort
NRC inspectors took to follow up on the issue, and the actions it
required the licensee to take. Additionally, for each of the sites, we
reviewed NRC reports and documentation showing that all baseline
inspection procedures were completed (for 2004 and 2005), and that
inspectors verified the licensees' reporting of the performance
indicator data (for 2000 through 2005). We also interviewed NRC branch
chiefs and resident inspectors and industry management officials at
each site to learn more about NRC's implementation of the ROP at the
site. We conducted our work from July 2005 through July 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Nuclear Power Plant Performance Data on the Basis of the
Results of NRC's Reactor Oversight Process, 2001 Through 2005:
Table 3: Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Licensed to Operate in the
United States:
Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 1;
City: Russellville;
State: AR;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 2;
City: Russellville;
State: AR;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 1;
City: McCandless;
State: PA;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 2;
City: McCandless;
State: PA;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 1;
City: Joilet;
State: IL;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 2;
City: Joilet;
State: IL;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 1;
City: Decatur;
State: AL;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 2;
City: Decatur;
State: AL;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 3;
City: Decatur;
State: AL;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 1;
City: Southport;
State: NC;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 2;
City: Southport;
State: NC;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Byron 1;
City: Rockford;
State: IL;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Byron 2;
City: Rockford;
State: IL;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Callaway;
City: Fulton;
State: MO;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 1;
City: Annapolis;
State: MD;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 2;
City: Annapolis;
State: MD;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Catawba 1;
City: Rock Hill;
State: SC;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Catawba 2;
City: Rock Hill;
State: SC;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Clinton;
City: Clinton;
State: IL;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Columbia Generating Station;
City: Richland;
State: WA;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 1;
City: Glen Rose;
State: TX;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 2;
City: Glen Rose;
State: TX;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Cooper;
City: Nebraska City;
State: NE;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Crystal River 3;
City: Crystal River;
State: FL;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 1;
City: Benton Harbor;
State: MI;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 2;
City: Benton Harbor;
State: MI;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Davis-Besse;
City: Toledo;
State: OH;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 1;
City: San Luis Obispo;
State: CA;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 2;
City: San Luis Obispo;
State: CA;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Dresden 2;
City: Morris;
State: IL;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Dresden 3;
City: Morris;
State: IL;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Duane Arnold;
City: Cedar Rapids;
State: IA;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Edwin I. Hatch 1;
City: Baxley;
State: GA;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Edwin I. Hatch 2;
City: Baxley;
State: GA;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Fermi 2;
City: Toledo;
State: MI;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Fort Calhoun;
City: Omaha;
State: NE;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Ginna;
City: Rochester;
State: NY;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Grand Gulf 1;
City: Vicksburg;
State: MS;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: H.B. Robinson 2;
City: Florence;
State: SC;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Hope Creek 1;
City: Lower Alloways Creek;
State: NJ;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 2;
City: New York;
State: NY;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 3;
City: New York;
State: NY;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: James A. FitzPatrick;
City: Oswego;
State: NY;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Joseph M. Farley 1;
City: Dothan;
State: AL;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Joseph M. Farley 2;
City: Dothan;
State: AL;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Kewaunee;
City: Green Bay;
State: WI;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: La Salle 1;
City: Ottawa;
State: IL;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: La Salle 2;
City: Ottawa;
State: IL;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Limerick 1;
City: Philadelphia;
State: PA;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Limerick 2;
City: Philadelphia;
State: PA;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: McGuire 1;
City: Charlotte;
State: NC;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: McGuire 2;
City: Charlotte;
State: NC;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Millstone 2;
City: New London;
State: CT;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Millstone 3;
City: New London;
State: CT;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Monticello;
City: Minneapolis;
State: MN;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 1;
City: Oswego;
State: NY;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 2;
City: Oswego;
State: NY;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: North Anna 1;
City: Richmond;
State: VA;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: North Anna 2;
City: Richmond;
State: VA;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Oconee 1;
City: Greenville;
State: SC;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Oconee 2;
City: Greenville;
State: SC;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Oconee 3;
City: Greenville;
State: SC;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Oyster Creek;
City: Toms River;
State: NJ;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Palisades;
City: South Haven;
State: MI;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 1;
City: Phoenix;
State: AZ;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 2;
City: Phoenix;
State: AZ;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 3;
City: Phoenix;
State: AZ;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 2;
City: Lancaster;
State: PA;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 3;
City: Lancaster;
State: PA;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Perry 1;
City: Painesville;
State: OH;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Pilgrim 1;
City: Plymouth;
State: MA;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 1;
City: Manitowoc;
State: WI;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 2;
City: Manitowoc;
State: WI;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Prairie Island 1;
City: Minneapolis;
State: MN;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Prairie Island 2;
City: Minneapolis;
State: MN;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 1;
City: Moline;
State: IL;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 2;
City: Moline;
State: IL;
NRC region: III.
Nuclear power plant: River Bend 1;
City: Baton Rouge;
State: LA;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Salem 1;
City: Lower Alloways Creek;
State: NJ;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Salem 2;
City: Lower Alloways Creek;
State: NJ;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 2;
City: San Clemente;
State: CA;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 3;
City: San Clemente;
State: CA;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Seabrook 1;
City: Portsmouth;
State: NH;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Seqouyah 1;
City: Chattanooga;
State: TN;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Seqouyah 2;
City: Chattanooga;
State: TN;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Shearon Harris 1;
City: Raleigh;
State: NC;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: South Texas Project 1;
City: Bay City;
State: TX;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: South Texas Project 2;
City: Bay City;
State: TX;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: St. Lucie 1;
City: Ft. Pierce;
State: FL;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: St. Lucie 2;
City: Ft. Pierce;
State: FL;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Summer;
City: Columbia;
State: SC;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Surry 1;
City: Newport News;
State: VA;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Surry 2;
City: Newport News;
State: VA;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 1;
City: Berwick;
State: PA;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 2;
City: Berwick;
State: PA;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Three Mile Island 1;
City: Harrisburg;
State: PA;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 3;
City: Miami;
State: FL;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 4;
City: Miami;
State: FL;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Vermont Yankee;
City: Battleboro;
State: VT;
NRC region: I.
Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 1;
City: Augusta;
State: GA;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 2;
City: Augusta;
State: GA;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Waterford 3;
City: New Orleans;
State: LA;
NRC region: IV.
Nuclear power plant: Watts Bar 1;
City: Spring City;
State: TN;
NRC region: II.
Nuclear power plant: Wolf Creek 1;
City: Burlington;
State: KS;
NRC region: IV.
Source: NRC.
[End of table]
Table 4: Total Number of Green Inspection Findings, 2001 Through 2005:
Nuclear power site[A]: Arkansas Nuclear;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 12;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 15;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 23;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 23;
Total: 82.
Nuclear power site[A]: Beaver Valley;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 8;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9;
Total: 51.
Nuclear power site[A]: Braidwood;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 12;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 7;
Total: 40.
Nuclear power site[A]: Browns Ferry;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8;
Total: 32.
Nuclear power site[A]: Brunswick;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 3;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9;
Total: 26.
Nuclear power site[A]: Byron;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 16;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 19;
Total: 71.
Nuclear power site[A]: Callaway;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 17;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 15;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 17;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 17;
Total: 77.
Nuclear power site[A]: Calvert Cliffs;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 18;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 19;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 6;
Total: 53.
Nuclear power site[A]: Catawba;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8;
Total: 36.
Nuclear power site[A]: Clinton;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 8;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 16;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8;
Total: 47.
Nuclear power site[A]: Columbia Generating Station;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 21;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 17;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 10;
Total: 64.
Nuclear power site[A]: Comanche Peak;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 12;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 3;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 11;
Total: 41.
Nuclear power site[A]: Cooper;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 32;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 23;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 29;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 23;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 34;
Total: 141.
Nuclear power site[A]: Crystal River;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 5;
Total: 24.
Nuclear power site[A]: D.C. Cook;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 27;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 24;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 16;
Total: 88.
Nuclear power site[A]: Davis-Besse;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 16;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 24;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 46;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 12;
Total: 102.
Nuclear power site[A]: Diablo Canyon;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 22;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 25;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 23;
Total: 95.
Nuclear power site[A]: Dresden;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 20;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 19;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 22;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 26;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 13;
Total: 100.
Nuclear power site[A]: Duane Arnold;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 1;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 22;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 12;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 19;
Total: 61.
Nuclear power site[A]: Farley;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 8;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 11;
Total: 33.
Nuclear power site[A]: Fermi;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 18;
Total: 55.
Nuclear power site[A]: FitzPatrick;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 12;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 8;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8;
Total: 40.
Nuclear power site[A]: Fort Callhoun;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 18;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 15;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 21;
Total: 72.
Nuclear power site[A]: Ginna;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 10;
Total: 48.
Nuclear power site[A]: Grand Gulf;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 11;
Total: 49.
Nuclear power site[A]: Harris;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 6;
Total: 26.
Nuclear power site[A]: Hatch;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 8;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 2;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 4;
Total: 29.
Nuclear power site[A]: Hope Creek;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 18;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 24;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 19;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 25;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 16;
Total: 102.
Nuclear power site[A]: Indian Point 2;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 44;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 21;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 20;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 25;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 13;
Total: 123.
Nuclear power site[A]: Indian Point 3;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 3;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8;
Total: 44.
Nuclear power site[A]: Kewaunee;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 12;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 24;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 20;
Total: 79.
Nuclear power site[A]: La Salle;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 20;
Total: 60.
Nuclear power site[A]: Limerick;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 15;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 8;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 4;
Total: 51.
Nuclear power site[A]: McGuire;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 8;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9;
Total: 45.
Nuclear power site[A]: Millstone;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 20;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 8;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 12;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 17;
Total: 70.
Nuclear power site[A]: Monticello;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 17;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 8;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 12;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9;
Total: 59.
Nuclear power site[A]: Nine Mile Point;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 16;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 15;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 19;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8;
Total: 67.
Nuclear power site[A]: North Anna;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 12;
Total: 34.
Nuclear power site[A]: Oconee;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 16;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 19;
Total: 70.
Nuclear power site[A]: Oyster Creek;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 12;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 15;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 12;
Total: 57.
Nuclear power site[A]: Palisades;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 23;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8;
Total: 67.
Nuclear power site[A]: Palo Verde;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 16;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 3;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 46;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 29;
Total: 98.
Nuclear power site[A]: Peach Bottom;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 18;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9;
Total: 61.
Nuclear power site[A]: Perry;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 18;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 16;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 59;
Total: 110.
Nuclear power site[A]: Pilgrim;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 8;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 7;
Total: 34.
Nuclear power site[A]: Point Beach;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 15;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 28;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 24;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 23;
Total: 100.
Nuclear power site[A]: Prarie Island;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 16;
Total: 41.
Nuclear power site[A]: Quad Cities;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 21;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 15;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 11;
Total: 67.
Nuclear power site[A]: River Bend;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 19;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 17;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 18;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 7;
Total: 67.
Nuclear power site[A]: Robinson;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 1;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 3;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 3;
Total: 15.
Nuclear power site[A]: Saint Lucie;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9;
Total: 45.
Nuclear power site[A]: Salem;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 17;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 26;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 24;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 25;
Total: 106.
Nuclear power site[A]: San Onofre;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 16;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 13;
Total: 51.
Nuclear power site[A]: Seabrook;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8;
Total: 43.
Nuclear power site[A]: Sequoyah;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 16;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 4;
Total: 47.
Nuclear power site[A]: South Texas;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 15;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 12;
Total: 61.
Nuclear power site[A]: Summer;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9;
Total: 51.
Nuclear power site[A]: Surry;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 3;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 7;
Total: 28.
Nuclear power site[A]: Susquehanna;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 17;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 7;
Total: 59.
Nuclear power site[A]: Three Mile Island;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 19;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 8;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 12;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 12;
Total: 58.
Nuclear power site[A]: Turkey Point;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 2;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 9;
Total: 39.
Nuclear power site[A]: Vermont Yankee;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 3;
Total: 46.
Nuclear power site[A]: Vogtle;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 8;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 6;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 8;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 3;
Total: 29.
Nuclear power site[A]: Waterford;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 14;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 15;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 17;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 15;
Total: 66.
Nuclear power site[A]: Watts Bar;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 4;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 8;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 8;
Total: 43.
Nuclear power site[A]: Wolf Creek;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 5;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 3;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 7;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 9;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 6;
Total: 30.
Nuclear power site[A]: Total;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 751;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 657;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 774;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 889;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 835;
Total: 3,906.
Nuclear power site[A]: Site average;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 11;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 10;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 12;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 13;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 13;
Total: 59.
Nuclear power site[A]: Range (for each column);
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2001: 1-44;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2002: 1-27;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2003: 3-29;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2004: 2-46;
Number of green inspection findings, by year: 2005: 3-59;
Total: 15-141.
Source: GAO analysis of NRC data.
[A] NRC reports these data by nuclear power site as opposed to by
individual plant. Oftentimes, there are 2 or 3 plants located at each
site. Therefore, data for all 103 plants are included here, but at the
site level.
[End of table]
Table 5: Total Number of Greater-Than-Green Inspection Findings Issued,
2001 Through 2005:
Nuclear power site[A]: Arkansas Nuclear;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Beaver Valley;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Braidwood;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Browns Ferry;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Brunswick;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Byron;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Callaway;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 3;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Calvert Cliffs;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 3;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Catawba;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Clinton;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Columbia Generating Station;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Comanche Peak;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Cooper;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 5;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Crystal River;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: D.C. Cook;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 3;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Davis-Besse;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 4;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: 1.
Nuclear power site[A]: Diablo Canyon;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Dresden;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Duane Arnold;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Farley;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Fermi;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: FitzPatrick;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Fort Callhoun;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Ginna;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Grand Gulf;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Harris;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Hatch;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Hope Creek;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Indian Point 2;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: 1.
Nuclear power site[A]: Indian Point 3;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Kewaunee;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 4;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: La Salle;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Limerick;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: McGuire;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Millstone;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Monticello;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Nine Mile Point;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: North Anna;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Oconee;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 7;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Oyster Creek;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 3;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Palisades;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Palo Verde;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Peach Bottom;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 3;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Perry;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 5;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Pilgrim;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Point Beach;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 3;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: 3.
Nuclear power site[A]: Prarie Island;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Quad Cities;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: River Bend;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Robinson;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Saint Lucie;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Salem;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: San Onofre;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Seabrook;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Sequoyah;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: South Texas;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Summer;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Surry;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Susquehanna;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Three Mile Island;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 2;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Turkey Point;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Vermont Yankee;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Vogtle;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Waterford;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Watts Bar;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 1;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Wolf Creek;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: [Empty];
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: [Empty].
Nuclear power site[A]: Total;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: White: 86;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Yellow: 7;
Total number of inspection findings, by color: Red: 5.
Source: GAO analysis of NRC data.
[A] NRC reports these data by nuclear power site as opposed to by
individual plant. Oftentimes, there are 2 or 3 plants located at each
site. Therefore, data for all 103 plants are included here, but at the
site level.
[End of table]
Table 6: Type of Substantive Cross-cutting Issue Open At Least Some
Portion of the Year, 2001 Through 2005:
Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 1;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR.
Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 2;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR.
Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 1;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 2;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 2;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 3;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Byron 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP.
Nuclear power plant: Byron 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP.
Nuclear power plant: Callaway;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP.
Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 1;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 2;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Catawba 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Catawba 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Clinton;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Columbia Generating Station;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR, HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR, HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR, HP.
Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 1;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 2;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Cooper;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR,HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR,HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR,HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR,HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR,HP.
Nuclear power plant: Crystal River 3;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Davis-Besse;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 1;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR,HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR,HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 2;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR,HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR,HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Dresden 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Dresden 3;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Duane Arnold;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP.
Nuclear power plant: Farley 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Farley 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Fermi 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP.
Nuclear power plant: FitzPatrick;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Fort Callhoun;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Ginna;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Grand Gulf 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Harris 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Hatch 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Hatch 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Hope Creek 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR,
SCWE;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR,SCWE.
Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 2;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR,HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR,HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR,HP;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR.
Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 3;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Kewaunee;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR.
Nuclear power plant: La Salle 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP.
Nuclear power plant: La Salle 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP.
Nuclear power plant: Limerick 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Limerick 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: McGuire 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: McGuire 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Millstone 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR,HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Millstone 3;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Monticello;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 1;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 2;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: North Anna 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: North Anna 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Oconee 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Oconee 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Oconee 3;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Oyster Creek;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR.
Nuclear power plant: Palisades;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR, HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR, HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR, HP.
Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR, HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR, HP.
Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 3;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR, HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR, HP.
Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 2;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 3;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Perry 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR,HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR,HP.
Nuclear power plant: Pilgrim 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR, HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR, HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR, HP.
Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR, HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR, HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR, HP.
Nuclear power plant: Prairie Island 1;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Prairie Island 2;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: River Bend 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Robinson 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Saint Lucie 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Saint Lucie 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Salem 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR,SCWE;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR,SCWE.
Nuclear power plant: Salem 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR,SCWE;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: PIR,SCWE.
Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 3;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Seabrook 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Sequoyah 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Sequoyah 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: South Texas 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: South Texas 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Summer;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Surry 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Surry 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR, HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR, HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Three Mile Island 1;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: HP;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 3;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 4;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Vermont Yankee;
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross-cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 2;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Waterford 3;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: PIR;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Watts Bar 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: HP.
Nuclear power plant: Wolf Creek 1;
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2001: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2002: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2003: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2004: [Empty];
Type of substantive cross- cutting issue open, by year: 2005: [Empty].
Legend:
HP = human performance
PIR = problem identification and resolution
SCWE = safety-conscious work environment:
Source: GAO analysis of NRC data.
[End of table]
Table 7: Total Number of Greater-Than-Green Performance Indicators,
2001 Through 2005:
Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 1;
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
1;
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
2;
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
3;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 7.
Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 3;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
1;
Total: 1.
Nuclear power plant: Byron 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Byron 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Callaway;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
2;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 2.
Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
4;
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
3;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 7.
Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Catawba 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Catawba 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Clinton;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Columbia Generating Station;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
5;
Total: 5.
Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Cooper;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 1.
Nuclear power plant: Crystal River 3;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
1;
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 1.
Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
1;
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 1.
Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
4;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
5;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
2;
Total: 11.
Nuclear power plant: Davis-Besse;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
1;
Total: 2.
Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
1;
Total: 1.
Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
1;
Total: 1.
Nuclear power plant: Dresden 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 1.
Nuclear power plant: Dresden 3;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
4;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
2;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 7.
Nuclear power plant: Duane Arnold;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Farley 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Farley 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Fermi 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
4;
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
4;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
1;
Total: 10.
Nuclear power plant: FitzPatrick;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
2;
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 2.
Nuclear power plant: Fort Callhoun;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
2;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
2;
Total: 5.
Nuclear power plant: Ginna;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Grand Gulf 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Harris 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
3;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 5.
Nuclear power plant: Hatch 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Hatch 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Hope Creek 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 3;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
3;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 3.
Nuclear power plant: Kewaunee;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: La Salle 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: La Salle 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
2;
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
1;
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 3.
Nuclear power plant: Limerick 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Limerick 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: McGuire 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: McGuire 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Millstone 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
2;
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
3;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 5.
Nuclear power plant: Millstone 3;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Monticello;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
4;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
2;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 6.
Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 3.
Nuclear power plant: North Anna 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: North Anna 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
1;
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 1.
Nuclear power plant: Oconee 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
2;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 2.
Nuclear power plant: Oconee 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Oconee 3;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Oyster Creek;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Palisades;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 3;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
3;
Total: 5.
Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 3;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Perry 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
3;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 4.
Nuclear power plant: Pilgrim 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
4;
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 5.
Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
2;
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 2.
Nuclear power plant: Prarie Island 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Prarie Island 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: River Bend 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
2;
Total: 2.
Nuclear power plant: Robinson 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 1.
Nuclear power plant: Saint Lucie 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Saint Lucie 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 2.
Nuclear power plant: Salem 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
2;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 2.
Nuclear power plant: Salem 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
3;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
1;
Total: 5.
Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 3;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Seabrook 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 1.
Nuclear power plant: Sequoyah 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Sequoyah 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
2;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 3.
Nuclear power plant: South Texas 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: South Texas 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 2.
Nuclear power plant: Summer;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
3;
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 3.
Nuclear power plant: Surry 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
3;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
6;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
3;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 12.
Nuclear power plant: Surry 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
2;
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
4;
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
4;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
1;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: 11.
Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Three Mile Island 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 3;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
1;
Total: 1.
Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 4;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
2;
Total: 2.
Nuclear power plant: Vermont Yankee;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 2;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Waterford 3;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Watts Bar 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Wolf Creek 1;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
[Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Total;
[Empty];
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2001:
34;
Number of greater-than- green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2002:
25;
Number of greater- than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2003:
41;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2004:
33;
Number of greater-than-green performance indicators, by year[A]: 2005:
23;
Total: 156.
Source: GAO analysis of NRC data.
Note: Plant licensees report their performance indicator data on a
quarterly basis for 15 different indicators (excluding 3 physical
security indicators). Yearly totals include a summary for all 15
indicators and the four quarters. Thus, if the same indicator was white
for two quarters during the year, it would count twice in the yearly
total.
[A] All of the greater-than-green indicators were white during this
period, no yellow or red indicators were reported.
[End of table]
Table 8: Highest NRC Oversight Level Applied during at Least Some
Portion of the Year, 2001 Through 2005:
Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Arkansas Nuclear 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Beaver Valley 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Braidwood 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry 3;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Brunswick 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Byron 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Byron 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Callaway;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Calvert Cliffs 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Catawba 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Catawba 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Clinton;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Columbia Generating Station;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Comanche Peak 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Cooper;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: H;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: H;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: H;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Crystal River 3;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: D.C. Cook 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Davis-Besse;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [B];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [B];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [B];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [B].
Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Diablo Canyon 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Dresden 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Dresden 3;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Duane Arnold;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Farley 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Farley 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Fermi 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: FitzPatrick;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Fort Callhoun;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Ginna;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Grand Gulf 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Harris 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Hatch 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Hatch 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Hope Creek 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: H;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: H;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Indian Point 3;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Kewaunee;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: M.
Nuclear power plant: La Salle 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: La Salle 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Limerick 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Limerick 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: McGuire 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: McGuire 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Millstone 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Millstone 3;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Monticello;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Nine Mile Point 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: North Anna 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: North Anna 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Oconee 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Oconee 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Oconee 3;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Oyster Creek;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Palisades;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: M.
Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: M.
Nuclear power plant: Palo Verde 3;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: M.
Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Peach Bottom 3;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Perry 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: H;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: H.
Nuclear power plant: Pilgrim 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: H;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: H;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: H.
Nuclear power plant: Point Beach 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: H;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: H;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: H.
Nuclear power plant: Prarie Island 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Prarie Island 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Quad Cities 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: River Bend 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Robinson 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Saint Lucie 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Saint Lucie 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Salem 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Salem 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: San Onofre 3;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Seabrook 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Sequoyah 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Sequoyah 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: South Texas 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: South Texas 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Summer;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Surry 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Surry 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Susquehanna 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Three Mile Island 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 3;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Turkey Point 4;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Vermont Yankee;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: M;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Vogtle 2;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Waterford 3;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: L;
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Nuclear power plant: Watts Bar 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: L.
Nuclear power plant: Wolf Creek 1;
[Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2001: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2002: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2003: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2004: [Empty];
Highest level of oversight applied during at least some portion of the
year[A]: 2005: [Empty].
Legend:
L = 1ST or lowest level of increased oversight beyond the baseline
M = 2ND level of increased oversight beyond the baseline
H = 3RD and highest level of oversight that still allows continued
plant operations:
Source: GAO analysis of NRC data.
[A] All plants receive a baseline level of oversight, regardless of
their safety performance. Plants are also placed into performance
categories on NRC's action matrix on a quarterly basis, which
corresponds to the level of oversight NRC will provide based on the
plant's safety performance. The level of oversight reported here
corresponds to the highest oversight level the plant received during
the year, even if it was only for a portion of the year. Thus, if a
plant was placed into a different category each quarter, the highest
category in which it was placed is reported here.
[B] Davis-Besse was under a separate oversight category not considered
part of the ROP due to the reactor vessel head incident that occurred
in 2002.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001:
September 6, 2006:
Mr. James E. Wells, Jr.
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Wells:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and submit comments on the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, "Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Oversight of Nuclear Power Plant Safety has
Improved but Refinements are Needed" (GAO-06-1029). The U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) appreciates the time and effort you and
your staff have invested to review the NRC oversight program for
commercial nuclear power plants. We also appreciate the willingness of
your staff to maintain a continuing dialogue with the NRC to ensure
that your report is accurate.
Overall, the NRC considers the draft report to be comprehensive, fair,
and balanced. The report is well written and provides an accurate
reflection of the review. The NRC generally agrees with the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations. We have no substantive comments on
the draft report.
The enclosure provides some minor comments for your consideration.
Should you have questions about these comments, please contact Ms.
Melinda Malloy at (301) 415-1785 or Mr. James Andersen at (301) 415-
3565.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Luis A. Reyes:
Executive Dire for Operations:
Enclosure:
Minor Comments on Draft Report:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jim Wells, (202) 512-3841 or w [Hyperlink, wellsj@gao.gov]
ellsj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Raymond H. Smith, Jr.
(Assistant Director), Alyssa M. Hundrup, and Dave Stikkers made key
contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were
Cindy Gilbert, Carol Kolarik, Alison O'Neill, Ilene Pollack, Keith A.
Rhodes, and Barbara Timmerman.
(360585):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Physical security, which is also covered by the ROP, is not
included in this review. For information on NRC's physical security,
see GAO, Nuclear Power Plants: Efforts Made to Upgrade Security, but
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Design Basis Threat Process Should
Be Improved, GAO-06-388 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006).
[2] The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards is an independent
committee, mandated by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, which
provides advice on nuclear facility safety-related topics, among other
topics. The ACRS is currently composed of 11 individuals with a wide
variety of engineering and technical expertise, including nuclear
engineering; risk assessment; chemistry; and mechanical, civil, and
electrical engineering, as well as many others. The ACRS is structured
to provide a forum where these experts can provide independent advice
that can then be factored into NRC's decision-making process. Each
year, the ACRS produces several reports, many of them related to the
ROP.
[3] GAO, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Preventing Problem Plants
Requires More Effective Action by NRC, GAO-T-RCED-98-252 (Washington,
D.C.: July 30, 1998);
and Nuclear Regulation: Preventing Problem Plants Requires More
Effective NRC Action, GAO/RCED-97-145 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 1997).
[4] NRC, Office of the Inspector General, US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission: Audit of NRC's Baseline Inspection Program, OIG-05-A-06
(Dec. 22, 2004).
[5] "Minor issues" are defined by NRC as those that have little actual
safety consequences, little or no potential to impact safety, little
impact on the regulatory process, and no willfulness. For example, if a
licensee missed providing an hourly update to a state agency during a
declared unusual event that resulted in no actual safety consequences,
it would be considered minor if it did not detract significantly from
the state agency's ability to function during the emergency. Also, if a
licensee failed to record one section of a surveillance test, but the
test was performed and the last completed surveillance test revealed
that the equipment adequately performed its safety function, the
finding would be considered minor.
[6] The measures used for the characterization of risk are core damage
frequency and large early release frequency. In some situations, risk
calculations cannot be made using these measures, such as in the case
of measuring the risk for emergency preparedness inspection findings.
In these cases, thresholds were determined by panels of experts on the
basis of operating experience and a determination of what the
appropriate response would be.
[7] Spent fuel storage pools are typically 40-foot deep, steel-lined,
concrete vaults filled with water to store spent fuel rods no longer
capable of being used for nuclear power generation. The water is to
provide shielding from radiation that is left in the rods.
[8] There also are 3 performance indicators in the area of physical
security, and, therefore, they are outside the scope of this review.
[9] While NRC formally places plants into performance categories on its
action matrix on a quarterly basis, NRC assesses plant performance on a
continuous basis and takes actions in accordance with the action matrix
as performance issues are identified.
[10] In some cases, a violation of regulatory requirements can occur
that results in an inspection finding, but the finding is not assigned
a color because the issue associated with the violation is not amenable
to a risk calculation. For these types of findings, a severity level is
assigned to reflect the significance of the finding, ranging from I for
the most significant, to IV for the least significant. In assigning a
severity level to the finding, NRC assesses the following: (1) the
actual safety consequences; (2) the potential safety consequences; (3)
the potential for impacting NRC's ability to perform its regulatory
function (e.g., failure to provide complete and accurate information);
and (4) any willful aspects of the violation. Severity levels I and II
violations generally involve actual or high-potential consequences to
public health and safety. Severity level III violations are cause for
significant concern, and severity level IV violations are less serious
but are of more than minor concern.
[11] During this period, NRC also requested and received approval to
deviate from its oversight process at 6 plants, with 1 of the plants
subjected to increased oversight from a deviation on two separate
occasions. At 4 of the plants, the deviation resulted in increased
oversight, while at 2 plants it resulted in decreased oversight.
[12] While it was not placed into NRC's unacceptable performance
category on the action matrix, the Davis-Besse plant was subjected to a
special oversight process due to its significant performance problems
related to the reactor-vessel head degradation that occurred in 2002.
On the basis of this event, NRC placed the plant, which was already in
a shutdown condition, into an oversight process outside of the ROP and
conducted by a special oversight panel consisting of region and
headquarters NRC officials.
[13] Currently, the NRC Office of the Inspector General is also
completing a review, through a contract with technical experts, to
assess NRC's use of PRA in its regulation of licensees given the
current state of the art in the technology.
[14] GAO, Nuclear Regulation: NRC Needs to More Aggressively and
Comprehensively Resolve Issues Related to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
Plant's Shutdown, GAO-04-415 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004).
[15] Tritium is a mildly radioactive type of hydrogen that occurs both
naturally and during the operation of nuclear power plants. Water
containing tritium and other radioactive substances is normally
released from nuclear plants under controlled, monitored conditions
that NRC mandates to protect public health and safety.
[16] While spent nuclear fuel is too inefficient to power a nuclear
reaction, it is still intensely radioactive and continues to generate
heat for thousands of years. Thus, the potential health and safety
implications make the control of spent nuclear fuel of great
importance.
[17] GAO, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: NRC Needs to Do More to Ensure
that Power Plants Are Effectively Controlling Spent Nuclear Fuel, GAO-
05-339 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005); and NRC, Office of the
Inspector General, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Audit of NRC's
Regulatory Oversight of Special Nuclear Materials, OIG-03-A-15 (May 23,
2003).
[18] NRC also defined four additional components--accountability,
continuous learning environment, organizational change management, and
safety policies--that are not associated with the cross-cutting issues,
but when combined with them, comprise all components that make up
safety culture. While these additional components are not considered in
relation to baseline inspection findings, they would be considered
during the conduct of supplemental inspections.
[19] Because these plants represent a nonprobability sample, results
cannot be used to make inferences about the population, or nuclear
power industry as a whole. This is because in a nonprobability sample,
some elements of the population being studied have no chance or an
unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[20] The 6 sites are out of a total possible of 65. Oftentimes, there
are 2 or 3 operating plants located at each nuclear power site, often
operated and licensed by the same company, and therefore combined for
NRC oversight purposes.
[21] Physical security inspection reports were not included in our
analysis because physical security issues were not within the scope of
this review.
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