Nuclear Energy
NRC Has Made Progress in Implementing Its Reactor Oversight and Licensing Processes but Continues to Face Challenges Gao ID: GAO-08-114T October 3, 2007The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for overseeing the nation's 104 commercial nuclear power reactors to ensure they are operated safely. Since 2000, NRC has used a formal Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to oversee safety. NRC is also responsible for licensing the construction and operation of new reactors. Electric power companies have announced plans to submit 20 applications in the next 18 months. This testimony is based on GAO reports that reviewed (1) how NRC implements the ROP, (2) the results of the ROP over several years, (3) the status of NRC's efforts to improve the ROP, (4) NRC's efforts to prepare its workforce and manage its workload for new reactor licensing, and (5) NRC's efforts to develop its regulatory framework and review processes for new reactor activities. In conducting this work, GAO analyzed programwide information and interviewed cognizant NRC managers and industry representatives.
In implementing its ROP, NRC uses various tools and takes a risk-informed and graded approach to ensure the safety of nuclear power facilities. The ROP primarily relies on physical inspections of equipment and operations and quantitative measures or indicators of performance at each facility to assess the status of safety and determine appropriate levels of oversight. Since 2001, NRC has made more than 4,000 inspection findings that reactor unit operators had not fully complied with safety procedures. Almost all of these findings were for actions NRC considered important to correct but of low significance to safe operations. As a result of NRC inspections, more than 75 percent of the nation's reactor units received some level of increased oversight while five units were subjected to NRC's highest level of oversight for long periods because their performance problems were more systemic. In 2006, GAO reported that NRC has generally taken a proactive approach to improving its ROP. However, concerted efforts will be needed to address shortcomings, particularly in identifying and addressing early indications of declining reactor safety performance. For example, NRC is implementing several enhancements to the ROP to better assess a facility's safety culture--organizational characteristics that ensure safety issues receive the attention their significance warrants. GAO made recommendations to further improve this effort, and NRC has taken initial steps to implement them. NRC has taken important steps to prepare its workforce for new licensing reviews, but several key activities are still underway and uncertainties remain about its management of the expected surge of applications. For example, NRC has increased funding, hired hundreds of new employees, and created and partly staffed a new office. However, NRC has not completed its development of some computer-based tools for enhancing the consistency and coordination of application reviews and has not fully developed criteria for setting priorities if the workload exceeds available resources. Also, while NRC's Office of New Reactors established a resource management board for coordinating certain office review activities, it has not clearly defined the extent of the board's responsibilities. NRC agreed with recommendations GAO made to further improve its workload management. NRC has revised most of its primary regulatory framework and review processes, including its rules, guidance, and oversight criteria to provide for early resolution of issues, standardization, and enhanced predictability. However, NRC has not yet completed some associated rules, guidance, and review process components, including revisions to its environmental guidance, its hearing process, and its process for requesting additional information from applicants. Without these components, expected efficiencies and predictability may be limited regarding the total time an applicant needs to obtain a license. NRC agreed with a recommendation GAO made to further improve its application review process.
GAO-08-114T, Nuclear Energy: NRC Has Made Progress in Implementing Its Reactor Oversight and Licensing Processes but Continues to Face Challenges
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United States Government Accountability Office: GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, Committee on
Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, October 3, 2007:
Nuclear Energy:
NRC Has Made Progress in Implementing Its Reactor Oversight and
Licensing Processes but Continues to Face Challenges:
Statement of Mark Gaffigan:
Acting Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-08-114T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-114T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Clean
Air and Nuclear Safety, Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S.
Senate:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for overseeing
the nation‘s 104 commercial nuclear power reactors to ensure they are
operated safely. Since 2000, NRC has used a formal Reactor Oversight
Process (ROP) to oversee safety. NRC is also responsible for licensing
the construction and operation of new reactors. Electric power
companies have announced plans to submit 20 applications in the next 18
months.
This testimony is based on GAO reports that reviewed (1) how NRC
implements the ROP, (2) the results of the ROP over several years, (3)
the status of NRC‘s efforts to improve the ROP, (4) NRC‘s efforts to
prepare its workforce and manage its workload for new reactor
licensing, and (5) NRC‘s efforts to develop its regulatory framework
and review processes for new reactor activities. In conducting this
work, GAO analyzed programwide information and interviewed cognizant
NRC managers and industry representatives.
What GAO Found:
In implementing its ROP, NRC uses various tools and takes a risk-
informed and graded approach to ensure the safety of nuclear power
facilities. The ROP primarily relies on physical inspections of
equipment and operations and quantitative measures or indicators of
performance at each facility to assess the status of safety and
determine appropriate levels of oversight.
Since 2001, NRC has made more than 4,000 inspection findings that
reactor unit operators had not fully complied with safety procedures.
Almost all of these findings were for actions NRC considered important
to correct but of low significance to safe operations. As a result of
NRC inspections, more than 75 percent of the nation‘s reactor units
received some level of increased oversight while five units were
subjected to NRC‘s highest level of oversight for long periods because
their performance problems were more systemic.
In 2006, GAO reported that NRC has generally taken a proactive approach
to improving its ROP. However, concerted efforts will be needed to
address shortcomings, particularly in identifying and addressing early
indications of declining reactor safety performance. For example, NRC
is implementing several enhancements to the ROP to better assess a
facility‘s safety culture”organizational characteristics that ensure
safety issues receive the attention their significance warrants. GAO
made recommendations to further improve this effort, and NRC has taken
initial steps to implement them.
NRC has taken important steps to prepare its workforce for new
licensing reviews, but several key activities are still underway and
uncertainties remain about its management of the expected surge of
applications. For example, NRC has increased funding, hired hundreds of
new employees, and created and partly staffed a new office. However,
NRC has not completed its development of some computer-based tools for
enhancing the consistency and coordination of application reviews and
has not fully developed criteria for setting priorities if the workload
exceeds available resources. Also, while NRC‘s Office of New Reactors
established a resource management board for coordinating certain office
review activities, it has not clearly defined the extent of the board‘s
responsibilities. NRC agreed with recommendations GAO made to further
improve its workload management.
NRC has revised most of its primary regulatory framework and review
processes, including its rules, guidance, and oversight criteria to
provide for early resolution of issues, standardization, and enhanced
predictability. However, NRC has not yet completed some associated
rules, guidance, and review process components, including revisions to
its environmental guidance, its hearing process, and its process for
requesting additional information from applicants. Without these
components, expected efficiencies and predictability may be limited
regarding the total time an applicant needs to obtain a license. NRC
agreed with a recommendation GAO made to further improve its
application review process.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO made recommendations to NRC to improve the effectiveness of (1) the
ROP in identifying declining safety performance at nuclear power
facilities before significant safety problems develop and (2) NRC‘s
workforce and processes in facilitating the review of new reactor
license applications. NRC generally agreed with the recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-114T]. For more information, contact Mark
Gaffigan at (202) 512-3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the adequacy of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to ensure
public health and safety. Through the ROP, NRC oversees the operation
of the nation's 104 commercial nuclear power reactors, which provide
about 20 percent of the nation's electricity. The safety of these
reactors, which are located at 65 facilities in 31 states, has always
been important because an accident could result in the release of
radioactive material with potentially serious adverse effects on public
health and the environment. NRC is responsible for inspecting operating
nuclear power facilities, while facility operators are responsible for
safely operating their facilities. NRC has the authority to take
actions, up to and including shutting down a reactor, if conditions are
not being met and the reactor poses an undue risk to public health and
safety.
NRC is also responsible for licensing the construction and operation of
new reactors. Since 1989, NRC has worked to develop a regulatory
framework and review process for licensing new reactors that allow an
electric power company to obtain a construction permit and an operating
license through a single combined license (COL) based on one of a
number of standard reactor designs. The COL is NRC's response to the
nuclear industry's concerns about the length and complexity of NRC's
former two-step process of issuing a construction permit followed by an
operating license. NRC has been working to complete this process
because electric power companies have announced plans to submit 20
applications in the next 18 months for licenses to build and operate 31
new reactor units--nearly three decades after the last order was placed
for a new civilian nuclear power reactor unit in the United States.
As requested, my remarks today will focus on our September 2006 report,
which examined how NRC implements the ROP to oversee reactor operations
safety, the results of the ROP over the past several years, and the
status of NRC's efforts to improve the ROP from 2001 through
2005.[Footnote 1] In addition, on September 21, 2007, we issued a
report to you on the steps NRC has taken to prepare its workforce and
manage its workload for new reactor licensing and to develop its
regulatory framework and key review processes for new reactor
activities.[Footnote 2]
To examine NRC's oversight of operating reactors through the ROP, we
assessed NRC's policies and guidance documents, examined inspection
manuals and findings reports, and reviewed the level of oversight it
provided as a result of its findings. We analyzed NRC data on nuclear
reactor safety for 2001 through 2005, including an assessment of their
reliability, which we determined were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our report. We also analyzed NRC's annual self-assessment
reports and relevant inspection documents, reviewed external
evaluations of the ROP, and interviewed several NRC managers and
external stakeholders. Physical security, which is also covered by the
ROP, was not included in this review. In addition, to examine NRC's
readiness to evaluate new reactor license applications, we reviewed NRC
documents for new reactor workforce staffing and training, examined
NRC's regulations and guidance, and interviewed managers in NRC's
Office of New Reactors and several other offices with responsibilities
related to new reactor efforts. Furthermore, we interviewed nearly all
of the announced applicants to obtain their views on the efficiency and
usefulness of NRC's application review process and observed several of
NRC's public meetings on the new reactor licensing process. Our ROP
work was conducted from July 2005 through July 2006, and our new
reactor licensing work from January 2007 through September 2007, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Background:
NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation provides overall direction
for the oversight process and the Office of Enforcement is responsible
for ensuring that appropriate enforcement actions are taken when
performance issues are identified. NRC's regional offices are
responsible for implementing the ROP, along with the inspectors who
work directly at each of the nuclear power facilities. NRC relies on on-
site resident inspectors to assess conditions and the licensees'
quality assurance programs, such as those required for maintenance and
problem identification and resolution. With its current resources, NRC
can inspect only a relatively small sample of the numerous activities
going on during complex operations. NRC noted that nuclear power
facilities' improved operating experience over more than 25 years
allows it to focus its inspections more on safety significant
activities.
One key ROP goal is to make safety performance assessments more
objective, predictable, and understandable. The unexpected discovery,
in March 2002, of extensive corrosion and a pineapple-size hole in the
reactor vessel head--a vital barrier preventing a radioactive release-
-at the Davis-Besse nuclear power facility in Ohio led NRC to re-
examine its safety oversight and other regulatory processes to
determine how such corrosion could be missed.[Footnote 3] Based on the
lessons learned from that event, NRC made several changes to the ROP.
NRC continues to annually assess the ROP by obtaining feedback from the
industry and other stakeholders such as public interest groups, and
incorporates this feedback and other information into specific
performance metrics to assess its effectiveness.
In anticipation of licensing new reactors, NRC has accelerated its
efforts to build up its new reactor workforce. NRC's workforce has
grown from about 3,100 employees in 2004 to about 3,500 employees as of
August 2007, and NRC projects that its total workforce size needs will
grow to about 4,000 employees by 2010.
NRC estimates that the first few COL applications will require about
100,000 hours of staff review and identified around 2,500 associated
review activities related to each application's detailed safety,
environmental, operational, security, and financial information, which
may total several thousand pages. NRC anticipates that for each
application, the review process will take 42 months--including 30
months for its staff review, followed by approximately 12 months for a
public hearing.[Footnote 4] In addition to the COL, NRC has established
(1) the design certification, which standardizes the design of a given
reactor for all power companies using it, with modifications limited to
site-specific needs, and (2) an early site permit, which allows a
potential applicant to resolve many preliminary siting issues before
filing a COL application.[Footnote 5] Electric power companies plan to
use five different reactor designs in their COL applications.
NRC Uses Various Tools and Takes a Risk-Informed and Graded Approach to
Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Power Facilities:
In implementing its ROP, NRC oversees the safe operation of nuclear
power facilities through physical inspections of the various complex
plant equipment and operations, reviews of reactor operator records,
and quantitative measures or indicators of each reactor's performance.
(See table 1 for a more expansive treatment of these tools.) These
tools are risk-informed in that they focus on the aspects of operations
considered most important to safety. NRC bases its oversight process on
the principle and requirement that licensees have programs in place to
routinely identify and address performance issues without NRC's direct
involvement. Thus, an important aspect of NRC's inspection process is
ensuring the effectiveness of licensee programs designed to identify
and correct problems. On the basis of the number and risk significance
of inspection findings and performance indicators, NRC places each
reactor unit into one of five performance categories on its action
matrix, which corresponds to graded, or increasing, levels of
oversight. NRC assesses overall facility performance and communicates
the results to licensees and the public on a semiannual basis.
Table 1: The ROP's Multiple Tools and Graded Approach:
ROP Tool: Baseline inspections;
Description: NRC collects information about reactor units' performance
from baseline inspections by NRC inspectors and quantitative measures
reported by the licensees. These physical inspections are the main tool
NRC uses to oversee safety performance of facilities. NRC defined
specific inspection areas by developing a list of those elements most
critical to meeting the overall agency mission of ensuring safety at
nuclear power facilities.
ROP Tool: Significance determination process;
Description: When NRC inspectors identify a finding they consider to be
more than minor,[A] they use a significance determination process to
assign one of four colors--green, white, yellow, or red--to reflect the
finding's risk significance, which is set on the basis of measures that
reflect the potential health effects that could occur from radiological
exposure. The significance determination process assesses how an
identified inspection finding increases the risk that a nuclear
accident could occur, or how the finding affects the ability of the
facility's safety systems or personnel to prevent such an accident. For
some findings, this process is more deterministic in nature rather than
being tied to risk, such as for emergency preparedness or radiation
protection. In these areas, NRC defines a response appropriate for the
given performance problem.
ROP Tool: Supplemental inspections;
Description: When NRC issues one or more greater-than-green inspection
findings for a reactor unit or facility, it conducts supplemental
inspections.[B] There are three levels of supplemental inspections
performed by regional inspectors that expand the scope beyond baseline
inspection procedures and focus on diagnosing the cause of the
performance deficiency;
* the lowest level assesses the licensee's corrective actions to ensure
they were sufficient in both correcting the problem and identifying and
addressing the root and contributing causes to prevent recurrence;
* the second level has an increased scope that includes independently
assessing the extent of the condition for both the specific and any
broader performance problems;
* the highest level is yet more comprehensive and includes determining
whether the reactor unit or facility can continue to operate and
whether additional regulatory actions are needed. This level is usually
conducted by a multidisciplinary team of NRC inspectors and may take
place over several months.
ROP Tool: Cross-cutting aspects or issues;
Description: As part of its inspection process, NRC evaluates all of
its findings to determine if certain elements of reactor facility
performance, referred to as cross-cutting aspects, were a contributing
cause to the performance problem. There are three cross-cutting aspect
areas: (1) problem identification and resolution, (2) human
performance, and (3) a safety-conscious work environment. If more than
three findings have similar causes within the same cross-cutting area
and if NRC is concerned about the licensee's progress in addressing
these issues, it determines that the licensee has a "substantive" cross-
cutting issue. NRC notifies the licensee that it has opened a
substantive cross-cutting issue, and it may ask the licensee to respond
with the corrective actions it plans to take.
ROP Tool: Special inspections;
Description: NRC conducts special inspections of reactors when specific
events occur that are of particular interest to NRC because of their
potential safety significance or potential generic safety concerns
important to all reactor units or facilities. Special inspections
determine the cause of the event and assess the licensee's response to
the event. For special inspections, a team of experts is often formed
and an inspection charter issued that describes the scope of the
inspection efforts.
ROP Tool: Performance indicators;
Description: In addition to its various inspections, NRC also collects
information through its performance indicator program, which it
maintains in cooperation with the nuclear power industry. On a
quarterly basis, each facility voluntarily self-reports data for 16
separate performance indicators--quantitative measures of performance
related to safety in the different aspects of operations.[C] NRC
inspectors review and verify the data submitted for each performance
indicator annually through their baseline inspections. Similar to its
process for conducting supplemental inspections, when colors indicating
the risk level are assigned and when greater-than-green indicators are
identified, NRC conducts supplemental inspections in response. A green
performance indicator reflects performance within the acceptable range,
unlike inspection findings for which green indicates a performance
deficiency.
ROP Tool: Action matrix;
Description: NRC uses its action matrix to categorize reactor unit or
facility performance and apply increased oversight in a graded fashion.
On a quarterly basis, NRC places each nuclear power reactor unit into
one of five performance categories on its action matrix, which
corresponds to graded, or increasing, levels of oversight. The action
matrix is NRC's formal method of determining how much additional
oversight--mostly in the form of supplemental inspections and NRC
senior management attention--is required on the basis of the number and
risk significance of inspection findings and performance indicators.
ROP Tool: Assessment letters and public meetings;
Description: At the end of each 6-month period, NRC issues an
assessment letter to each nuclear power facility. This letter describes
what level of oversight the facility will receive according to its
placement in the action matrix performance categories, what actions NRC
is expecting the licensee to take as a result of the performance issues
identified, the inspection schedule for the next 15 months, and any
documented substantive cross-cutting issues. NRC also holds an annual
public meeting at or near each facility's site to review performance
and address questions about the facility's performance from members of
the public and other interested stakeholders.
ROP Tool: Industry trends;
Description: Annually, NRC assesses the results of its oversight
process on an industry-level basis by analyzing the overall results of
its inspection and performance indicator programs and comparing them
with other industry-collected and reported performance data.
Source: GAO analysis of NRC documents.
Note: NRC conducts an annual self-assessment of the ROP, which includes
soliciting input from internal and external stakeholders on its
effectives.
[A] NRC defines "minor issues" as those that have little actual safety
consequences, little or no potential to impact safety, little impact on
the regulatory process, and no willfulness.
[B] Supplemental inspections are also conducted for greater-than-green
performance indicators.
[C] There also are three physical security performance indicators that
were outside the scope of this review.
[End of table]
The ROP Has Identified Numerous Problems at Nuclear Power Facilities,
but Few Have Been Considered Significant to Their Safe Operation:
From 2001 through 2005, the ROP identified performance deficiencies
through more than 4,000 inspection findings at nuclear power
facilities. Ninety-seven percent of these findings were designated
green--very low risk to safe facility operations, but important to
correct. Two percent (86) were white findings that were considered to
be of low to moderate risk significance. Twelve findings were of the
highest levels of risk significance--7 yellow and 5 red. More recently,
from January 2006 through June 2007, NRC identified an additional 1,174
green findings, 27 white findings, 1 yellow finding, and no red
findings.
NRC also reviews performance indicators data--used to monitor different
aspects of operational safety--that facility operators report to
categorize the level of reactor unit performance for each indicator.
From 2001 through June 2007, NRC reported that less than 1 percent of
over 39,000 indicator reports exceeded acceptable performance
thresholds and nearly half of all reactor units have never had a
performance indicator fall outside of the acceptable level. Through
June 2007, 3 of the 16 performance indicators have always been reported
to be within acceptable performance levels--measuring the amount of
time that the residual heat removal safety system is unavailable,
monitoring the integrity of a radiation barrier, and monitoring
radiological releases. Since 2001, three reactor units have reported a
yellow indicator for one performance indicator. No red indicators have
ever been reported.
For varying periods from 2001 through 2005, on the combined basis of
inspection findings and performance indicators, NRC has subjected more
than 75 percent of the reactor units to oversight beyond the baseline
inspections. While most reactors received the lowest level of increased
oversight through a supplemental inspection, five reactors were
subjected to NRC's highest level of oversight. Reactor units in this
category were generally subjected to this higher oversight for long
periods due to the more systemic nature of their performance problems.
Currently, 1 unit is receiving the highest level of oversight by NRC,
and 10 units at 6 facilities are receiving the second level of
oversight.
NRC inspectors at the facilities we reviewed indicated that when a
reactor unit's performance declines it is often the result of
deficiencies or ineffectiveness in one or more of the three cross-
cutting areas--problem identification and resolution, human
performance, and a safety-conscious work environment. NRC inspectors
cited examples of possible cross-cutting issues: (1) a facility does
not have an effective corrective action program that appropriately
identified and resolved problems early; (2) a facility employee has not
followed correct maintenance procedures, and NRC made a finding
associated with the human performance area; and (3) facility management
is complacent by not paying attention to detail or adhering to
procedures. Our examination of ROP data found that all reactor units
that NRC subjected to its highest level of oversight had findings
related to one or more of these substantive cross-cutting issues. In
addition, recent NRC inspections have found more problems associated
with these cross-cutting issues, in part because of new guidance for
identifying and documenting them.
NRC Continues to Make Improvements to Its ROP in Key Areas:
Our 2006 report found that NRC has generally taken a proactive approach
to continuously improving its oversight process, in response to
recommendations that grew out of the Davis-Besse incident; independent
reviews; and feedback that is usually obtained during NRC's annual self-
assessment of its oversight process from stakeholders, including its
regional and on-site inspectors. Continued efforts will be needed to
address other shortcomings or opportunities for improvement, however,
particularly in improving its ability to identify and address early
indications of declining safety performance at nuclear power
facilities. For the most part, NRC considers these efforts to be
refinements to its oversight process, rather than significant changes.
Specific areas that NRC is addressing include the following:
* To better focus efforts on the areas most important to safety, NRC
has formalized its process for periodically revising its inspection
procedures. In particular, NRC completed substantive changes to its
inspection and assessment program documents--including those currently
guiding the highest level of NRC inspections--to more fully incorporate
safety culture.
* To address concerns about the amount of time, level of effort, and
knowledge and resources required to determine the risk significance of
some inspection findings, NRC has modified its significance
determination process, which, according to NRC's 2006 self-assessment,
has significantly improved timeliness.
* To address concerns that performance indicators did not facilitate
the early identification of poor performance, NRC has modified several
indicators to make them more risk-informed for identifying the risks
associated with changes in the availability and reliability of
important safety systems. In addition, NRC revised an indicator to more
accurately reflect the frequency of events that upset reactor unit
stability and challenge critical safety functions. NRC is considering
options for revising indicators for emergency preparedness and reactor
cooling systems. Both NRC's 2006 self-assessment and internal staff
survey cited the need to further improve the performance indicators and
their associated guidance.
* Although NRC and others have long recognized the effects of a
facility's safety culture on performance, NRC did not undertake efforts
to better incorporate safety culture into the ROP until 2005, when it
formed a working group to lead the agency's efforts. To date, the group
has completed guidance for identifying, addressing, and evaluating
cross-cutting issues specific to safety culture.
Our 2006 report concluded that NRC's efforts to incorporate safety
culture into the ROP may be its most critical future change to the ROP
and recommended that NRC aggressively monitor; evaluate; and, if
needed, implement additional measures to increase the effectiveness of
its initial safety culture changes. We also recommended that NRC
consider developing specific indicators to measure important aspects of
safety culture through its performance indicator program. While NRC has
largely implemented initial safety culture enhancements to the ROP that
primarily address cross-cutting issues, it does not plan to take any
additional actions to further implement either recommendation before it
completes its assessment of an 18-month implementation phase at the end
of this year. This assessment will include lessons learned that NRC
managers have compiled since July 2006, including insights from
internal and external stakeholders about the effectiveness of ROP
enhancements.
In addition, we recommended that NRC, in line with its desire to make
the ROP an open process, make available additional information on the
safety culture at nuclear power facilities to the public and its other
stakeholders to provide a more comprehensive picture of performance.
NRC has implemented this recommendation by modifying its ROP Web site
to fully explain the review process regarding cross-cutting issues and
safety culture, and now provides data and correspondence on the reactor
units or facilities that have substantive open cross-cutting issues.
NRC Has Implemented Many Actions to Prepare Its Workforce for New
Reactor Licensing Reviews and Manage Its Workload, but Several Key
Elements Are Still Under Way:
NRC has prepared its workforce for new reactor licensing reviews by
increasing funding for new reactor activities, reorganizing several
offices, creating and partly staffing the Office of New Reactors (NRO),
and hiring a significant number of entry-level and midlevel
professionals. As of August 2007, NRC had assigned about 350 staff to
NRO, about 10 percent of the total NRC workforce; however, some
critical positions are vacant, and the office plans to grow to about
500 employees in 2008. To assist its staff in reviewing the safety and
environmental portions of the applications, NRC plans to contract out
about $60 million in fiscal year 2008 through support agreements with
several Department of Energy national laboratories and contracts with
commercial companies. NRC also has rolled out several new training
courses, but it is still developing content for in-depth training on
reactor designs.
NRC is using a project management approach to better schedule, manage,
and coordinate COL application and design certification reviews. While
NRC has made progress, several elements of NRC's activities to prepare
its workforce are still under way, as the following illustrates:
* NRC has developed plans for allocating resources for a design
certification application and an early site permit it is currently
reviewing, 20 COL applications, 2 additional design certification
applications, and a design certification amendment application.
However, NRC has not yet developed specific criteria to set priorities
for reviewing these applications if it needs to decide which
applications take precedence. Without criteria, NRC managers are likely
to find it more difficult to decide how to allocate resources across
several high-priority areas. Accordingly, we recommended that NRC fully
develop and implement criteria for setting priorities to allocate
resources across applications by January 2008, which NRC has agreed to
do.
* NRC is developing computer-based project management and reviewer
tools to assist staff in scheduling and reviewing multiple applications
at the same time. For example, Safety Evaluation Report templates are
designed to assist COL reviewers by providing standardized content that
will enable them to leverage work completed during the design
certification review process. However, the implementation of this and
other tools has been delayed. We recommended that NRC provide the
resources for implementing reviewer and management tools needed to
ensure that the most important tools will be available as soon as is
practicable, but no later than March 2008, which NRC has agreed to do.
* NRO established a cross-divisional resource management board early in
2007 for resolving resource allocation issues if major review
milestones are at risk of not being met. However, it has not clearly
defined the board's role, if any, in setting priorities or directing
resource allocation. Because NRO expects to review at least 20 COL
applications and 6 design certification, early site permit, and limited
work authorization applications associated with its new reactor program
over the next 18 months, it may not be able to efficiently manage
thousands of activities simultaneously that are associated with these
reviews. NRC managers we spoke with recognize this problem and plan to
address it. We recommended that NRC clarify the responsibilities of
NRO's Resource Management Board in facilitating the coordination and
communication of resource allocation decisions, which NRC has agreed to
do.
NRC Has Significantly Revised Its Overall Regulatory Framework and
Review Process, but Several Activities Are Still in Progress:
NRC has significantly revised most of its primary regulatory framework
and review process to prepare for licensing new reactors. Specifically,
NRC has revised and augmented its rules, guidance, and oversight
criteria for licensing and constructing new reactors primarily to
provide for early resolution of issues, standardization, and
predictability in the licensing process. In making these changes, NRC
has regularly interacted with nuclear industry stakeholders to
determine which parts of an application's technical and operational
content could be standardized and to clarify guidance on certain
technical matters. In addition, NRC just completed modifications to its
acceptance review process to include an evaluation of the application's
technical sufficiency as well as its completeness and made internal
acceptance review guidance available last week. While NRC has made
progress in these areas, it has not yet completed some ancillary rules
and regulatory guidance, or actions to implement certain review process
components. For example, because NRC only recently solicited public
comments to further update its environmental guidance, applicants may
have more difficulty developing specific COL content for unresolved
issues. In addition, while NRC proposed a rule to update physical
protection requirements in September 2006, officials told us that it
will not be made final until 2008. Furthermore, NRC's limited work
authorization rule, while substantially complete, will not be available
in final form before October 2007. Lastly, NRC is revising its policy
for conducting hearings on both the contested and uncontested portions
of applications.
In addition, NRC is refining its processes to track its requests for
additional information to each applicant. In some instances, applicants
using the same reference reactor design may be asked the same question,
and one applicant may have already provided a satisfactory answer. With
a completed tracking process, the second reviewer could access the
previously submitted information to avoid duplication. We recommended
that NRC enhance the process for requesting additional information by
(1) providing more specific guidance to staff on the development and
resolution of requests for additional information within and across
design centers and (2) explaining forthcoming workflow and electronic
process revisions to COL applicants in a timely manner. NRC has agreed
to do so.
In conclusion, the safe operation of the nation's nuclear power
facilities has always been of fundamental importance and has received
even more emphasis recently as the nation faces an expected resurgence
in the licensing and construction of new nuclear reactors to help meet
our growing electricity needs. Our assessment of the ROP has found that
NRC has made considerable effort to continuously improve its oversight
activities and to prompt industry to make constant management
improvements. However, while the current oversight process appears
logical and well-structured, NRC recognizes the need to make further
improvements in such areas as the timeliness of its significant
determination process and the redefinition of some performance
indicators. Regulating the often complex and intangible aspects of
safety culture is clearly challenging. While NRC had taken some
concrete actions to incorporate safety culture into the ROP and now has
a structured process in place through its inspection program, we
recommended that NRC continue to act to improve its safety culture
efforts. NRC plans to evaluate the effectiveness of its current actions
at the end of this year before considering any further implementation
of our recommendations. We continue to believe that NRC needs to give
this issue attention in further revising the ROP so that it can better
identify and address early indications of declining safety performance
at nuclear power facilities.
NRC has made important strides in revising its regulatory framework and
review process for licensing new nuclear reactors to improve timeliness
and provide more predictability and consistency during reviews.
Nevertheless, NRC's workforce will face a daunting task in completing
certain regulatory actions currently under way and implementing this
new process as it faces a surge in applications over the next 18
months--the first of which has just been submitted. We identified four
actions that NRC could take to better ensure its workforce is prepared
to review new reactor applications and that its review processes more
efficiently and effectively facilitate reviews, and NRC agreed to
implement them.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or the other Members of the Subcommittee
may have at this time.
Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact Mark
Gaffigan, at (202) 512-3841 or by e-mail at gaffiganm@gao.gov. Richard
Cheston, Assistant Director; Sarah J. Lynch; Alyssa M. Hundrup; and
David Stikkers made key contributions to this testimony.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Nuclear Power
Plant Safety Has Improved, but Refinements Are Needed, GAO-06-1029
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2006).
[2] GAO, Nuclear Energy: NRC's Workforce and Processes for New Reactor
Licensing Are Generally in Place, but Uncertainties Remain as Industry
Begins to Submit Applications, GAO-07-1129 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21,
2007).
[3] GAO, Nuclear Regulation: NRC Needs to More Aggressively and
Comprehensively Resolve Issues Related to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
Plant's Shutdown, GAO-04-415 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004).
[4] While the evidentiary hearing occurs after NRC staff complete their
review of an application, such prehearing activities as decisions on
standing, contention admissibility, and procedural motions begin when
the application is docketed.
[5] NRC also plans to issue new regulations providing limited work
authorizations that would address the construction activities companies
can conduct with NRC authorization and oversight. Such activities as
site clearing, excavation, road building, transmission line routing,
and erecting construction-related support buildings or service
facilities do not require NRC authorization.
[End of section]
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