Commercial Nuclear Waste
Effects of a Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Program and Lessons Learned Gao ID: GAO-11-229 April 8, 2011Spent nuclear fuel--considered very hazardous--is accumulating at commercial reactor sites in 33 states. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, directs the Department of Energy (DOE) to dispose of this waste in a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. In June 2008, DOE submitted a license application for the repository, but in March 2010 moved to withdraw it. However, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or the courts--as a result of lawsuits--could compel DOE to resume the licensing process. This report examines (1) the basis for DOE's decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain program, (2) the termination steps DOE has taken and their effects, (3) the major impacts if the repository were terminated, and (4) the principal lessons learned. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed knowledgeable parties.
DOE decided to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program because, according to DOE officials, it is not a workable option and there are better solutions that can achieve a broader national consensus. DOE did not cite technical or safety issues. DOE also did not identify alternatives, but it did create a Blue Ribbon Commission to evaluate and recommend alternatives. Amid uncertainties about the status of the repository license, DOE took an ambitious set of steps to dismantle the Yucca Mountain program by September 30, 2010. DOE has taken steps to preserve scientific and other data, eliminated the jobs of all federal employees working on the program, and terminated program activities by contractors. DOE also disposed of property from its Las Vegas offices by declaring the property abandoned. This procedure saved DOE time and costs, according to officials. However, DOE's documentation for this process was limited, given the variety and volume of property disposed of. In addition, DOE did not finalize a plan for the shutdown, nor did it identify or assess risks of the shutdown, consistent with federal internal control standards and DOE orders. Some of DOE's shutdown steps would likely hinder progress, should NRC or the courts require DOE to resume the license application review process. Terminating the Yucca Mountain repository program could bring benefits, such as allowing DOE to search for a more acceptable alternative, which could help avoid the costly delays experienced by Yucca Mountain. However, there is no guarantee that a more acceptable or less costly alternative will be identified; termination could instead restart a costly and time-consuming process to find and develop an alternative permanent solution. It would also likely prolong the need for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel at reactor sites, which would have financial and other impacts. For example, the federal government bears part of the storage costs as a result of industry lawsuits over DOE's failure to take custody of commercial spent nuclear fuel in 1998, as required. These costs exceed $15.4 billion and could grow by an additional $500 million a year after 2020. Published reports and our interviews--with federal, state, and local government officials and representatives of various national organizations--suggest two broad lessons for developing a future waste management strategy. First, social and political opposition to a permanent repository, not technical issues, is the key obstacle. Important tools for overcoming such opposition include transparency, economic incentives, and education. Second, it is important that a waste management strategy have consistent policy, funding, and leadership, especially since the process will likely take decades. Some federal and other stakeholders suggested that a more predictable funding mechanism and an independent organization may be better suited than DOE to overseeing nuclear waste management. GAO suggests that Congress consider whether a more predictable funding mechanism would enhance future efforts and whether an independent organization would be more effective. GAO also recommends that DOE assess remaining risks of the shutdown; create a plan to resume licensing if necessary; and report on federal property and its disposition. NRC generally concurred with a draft of this report, but DOE strongly disagreed with the draft and the recommendations, questioning the veracity of GAO's information.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Mark E. Gaffigan Team: Government Accountability Office: Natural Resources and Environment Phone: (202) 512-3168GAO-11-229, Commercial Nuclear Waste: Effects of a Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Program and Lessons Learned
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Congressional Requesters:
April 2011:
Commercial Nuclear Waste:
Effects of a Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Program and
Lessons Learned:
[Note: This report was reissued on April 13, 2011, with clarifications
to the Highlights page]
GAO-11-229:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-229, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Spent nuclear fuel-”considered very hazardous-”is accumulating at
commercial reactor sites in 33 states. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982, as amended, directs the Department of Energy (DOE) to study
Yucca Mountain, Nevada as a site for a repository for this spent fuel.
In June 2008, DOE submitted a license application for the repository,
but in March 2010 moved to withdraw it. However, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) or the courts”-as a result of lawsuits”-
could compel DOE to resume the licensing process.
This report examines (1) the basis for DOE‘s decision to terminate the
Yucca Mountain program, (2) the termination steps DOE has taken and
their effects, (3) the major impacts if the repository were terminated,
and (4) the principal lessons learned. GAO reviewed documents and
interviewed knowledgeable parties.
What GAO Found:
DOE decided to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program
because, according to DOE officials, it is not a workable option and
there are better solutions that can achieve a broader national
consensus. DOE did not cite technical or safety issues. DOE also did
not identify alternatives, but it did create a Blue Ribbon Commission
to evaluate and recommend alternatives.
Amid uncertainties about the status of the repository license, DOE
took an ambitious set of steps to dismantle the Yucca Mountain program
by September 30, 2010. DOE has taken steps to preserve scientific and
other data, eliminated the jobs of all federal employees working on
the program, and terminated program activities by contractors. DOE
also disposed of property from its Las Vegas offices by declaring the
property abandoned. This procedure saved DOE time and costs, according
to officials. However, DOE‘s documentation for this process was
limited, given the variety and volume of property disposed of. In
addition, DOE did not finalize a plan for the shutdown, nor did it
identify or assess risks of the shutdown, consistent with federal
internal control standards and DOE orders. Some of DOE‘s shutdown
steps would likely hinder progress, should NRC or the courts require
DOE to resume the license application review process.
Terminating the Yucca Mountain repository program could bring
benefits, such as allowing DOE to search for a more acceptable
alternative, which could help avoid the costly delays experienced by
Yucca Mountain. However, there is no guarantee that a more acceptable
or less costly alternative will be identified; termination could
instead restart a costly and time-consuming process to find and
develop an alternative permanent solution. It would also likely
prolong the need for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel at reactor
sites, which would have financial and other impacts. For example, the
federal government bears part of the storage costs as a result of
industry lawsuits over DOE‘s failure to take custody of commercial
spent nuclear fuel in 1998, as required. These costs exceed $15.4
billion and could grow by an additional $500 million a year after 2020.
Published reports and our interviews”with federal, state, and local
government officials and representatives of various national
organizations”suggest two broad lessons for developing a future waste
management strategy. First, social and political opposition to a
permanent repository, not technical issues, is the key obstacle.
Important tools for overcoming such opposition include transparency,
economic incentives, and education. Second, it is important that a
waste management strategy have consistent policy, funding, and
leadership, especially since the process will likely take decades.
Some federal and other stakeholders suggested that a more predictable
funding mechanism and an independent organization may be better suited
than DOE to overseeing nuclear waste management.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO suggests that Congress consider whether a more predictable funding
mechanism would enhance future efforts and whether an independent
organization would be more effective. GAO also recommends that DOE
assess remaining risks of the shutdown; create a plan to resume
licensing if necessary; and report on federal property and its
disposition. NRC generally concurred with a draft of this report, but
DOE strongly disagreed with the draft and the recommendations,
questioning the veracity of GAO‘s information. GAO continues to believe
its findings and recommendations are sound.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-229] or key
components. For more information, contact Mark Gaffigan at (202) 512-
3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov. [End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Basis for DOE's Decision to Terminate the Yucca Mountain
Repository Program:
Steps DOE Has Taken to Terminate the Yucca Mountain Repository Program
and Their Effects:
Termination of the Repository Program Could Provide Some Benefits, but
Adverse Impacts Are Likely:
Past Experience May Yield Potential Lessons for Future Nuclear Waste
Management Efforts:
Conclusions:
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: A List of Reports Reviewed:
Appendix III: Organizations We Obtained Input From:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix V: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Name, State, NRC Region, and Status of Commercial Nuclear
Reactors Sites We Contacted:
Figures:
Figure 1: Current Storage Sites for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel and
Proposed Yucca Mountain Repository Site:
Figure 2: Spent Nuclear Fuel Stored in Dry Casks at the Trojan
Independent Fuel Storage Installation in Oregon:
Abbreviations:
DOE: Department of Energy:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
GSA: General Services Administration:
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
NWPA: Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982:
OCRWM: Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management:
WIPP: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 8, 2011:
The Honorable Fred Upton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Joe Barton:
Chairman Emeritus:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Cliff Stearns:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Greg Walden:
House of Representatives:
Nuclear energy, which supplied about 20 percent of the nation's
electric power in 2010, offers a domestic source of energy with low
emissions but also presents difficulties--including what to do with
nuclear fuel after it has been used and removed from commercial power
reactors. This material, known as spent nuclear fuel, is highly
radioactive and considered one of the most hazardous substances on
earth.[Footnote 1] The current national inventory of nearly 65,000
metric tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel is stored at 75 sites in
33 states and increases by about 2,000 metric tons each year.
Since the publication of a 1957 report by the National Academy of
Sciences,[Footnote 2] a geologic repository has been considered the
safest and most secure method of isolating spent nuclear fuel and
other types of nuclear waste from humans and the environment. In 1983,
the President signed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA),
which directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to investigate sites for
a federal deep geologic repository to dispose of spent nuclear fuel
and high-level nuclear waste.[Footnote 3] DOE studied six sites in the
West and three sites in the South, and by 1986, DOE recommended three
candidate sites for site characterization: Hanford in Washington
state, Deaf Smith County in Texas, and Yucca Mountain in Nevada. In
1987, however, Congress amended the act to direct DOE to focus its
efforts only on Yucca Mountain--a site about 100 miles northwest of
Las Vegas. Under this amendment, DOE was to perform studies to
determine if the site was suitable for a repository and make a site
recommendation to the President if it met certain requirements. DOE
was also authorized to contract with commercial nuclear reactor
operators to take custody of their spent nuclear fuel for disposal at
the repository beginning in January 1998. Ultimately DOE was unable to
meet this 1998 date because of a series of delays due to, among other
things, state and local opposition to the construction of a permanent
nuclear waste repository in Nevada and technical complexities.
[Footnote 4] DOE issued a viability assessment in 1998 that stated
Yucca Mountain was still a viable alternative and, in 2002,
recommended the site to the President. In turn, the President
recommended the site to Congress, which subsequently approved the
Yucca Mountain site as the location for the nation's geologic
repository.
In June 2008, DOE submitted a license application to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) seeking authorization to construct a high-
level waste repository at Yucca Mountain. NRC has regulatory authority
to authorize construction of the repository, as well as operations and
closure of a repository, which are separate licensing actions. In the
application, DOE planned to open the repository in 2017, but later
delayed the date to 2020. In March 2009, however, the Secretary of
Energy announced plans to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository
program and instead study other options for nuclear waste management.
The President's fiscal year 2011 budget proposal, released in February
2010, proposed eliminating all funding for the Yucca Mountain
repository program and the DOE office responsible for nuclear waste
management--the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
(OCRWM). At about the same time, the administration also directed DOE
to establish a Blue Ribbon Commission of recognized experts to study
nuclear waste management alternatives. The commission is scheduled to
issue a report by January 2012.
On March 3, 2010, DOE submitted a motion to the NRC's Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board to withdraw its license application with
prejudice, a term described by DOE to mean the Yucca Mountain site
would be excluded from further consideration as a repository site. On
June 29, 2010, the licensing board denied DOE's motion, ruling that
DOE was obligated under NWPA to continue with the licensing effort.
The board noted that, even if it approved the license application,
there was no guarantee the Yucca Mountain repository would ever be
constructed for any number of reasons, including congressional action
changing the law or a decision by Congress not to fund the proposed
repository. In the meantime, DOE took steps to dismantle OCRWM and the
Yucca Mountain repository program by the end of September 2010. In
response to DOE's attempt to withdraw the license application, several
states and parties sued DOE and NRC, arguing that DOE had no authority
to terminate the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.[Footnote 5]
In this context, you asked us to review the termination of the
repository. Our objectives were to determine (1) the basis for DOE's
decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program; (2) the
steps DOE has taken to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program
and the effects, if any, of these steps; (3) the likely major impacts
if the Yucca Mountain repository program were to be terminated; and
(4) the principal lessons that can be learned from the various past
nuclear waste management efforts and how these might be applied to
future efforts.
To answer these objectives, we reviewed pertinent DOE documents;
analyzed both our and other agencies' reports on nuclear waste
management; and interviewed federal, state, local, industry and other
knowledgeable officials. For more information on our methodology, see
appendix I. Specifically, to determine the basis for DOE's decision to
terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program, we contacted the
Secretary of Energy by letter requesting his views. To determine the
steps DOE has taken to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program
and the effects, if any, of these steps. We reviewed DOE documents and
spoke with DOE federal and contractor officials from various offices
involved with the termination efforts, including OCRWM, the Office of
Nuclear Energy, the Office of Environmental Management, the Office of
Legacy Management, and the Office of General Counsel. We also reviewed
pertinent DOE Office of Inspector General reports related to Yucca
Mountain and the termination efforts. To evaluate the likely major
impacts of terminating the Yucca Mountain repository program and the
principal lessons that can be learned, we conducted analysis of our
work and that of other agencies within the legislative branch[Footnote
6] on issues related to siting and building a permanent geological
repository for nuclear waste (see app. II). We focused on the likely
impacts of termination on commercial spent nuclear fuel. We are
preparing a separate report on the impacts of termination on waste
that is in the custody of DOE--mostly high-level waste that is a by-
product of nuclear weapons production.[Footnote 7] We also spoke with
a variety of stakeholders including industry representatives, state
and local officials, community leaders, and others (see app. III).
Specifically, we spoke with representatives from key national
associations and organizations whose members were either affected by
the termination of the Yucca Mountain repository program or were in a
position to comment on the impact as a result of studies or analyses.
To gain a local perspective of the possible impacts of a Yucca
Mountain repository program termination and any lessons that could be
learned, we also contacted communities near the proposed Yucca
Mountain site and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New
Mexico--the nation's only federal geologic repository for radioactive
waste.[Footnote 8] We also selected a nongeneralizable sample of
nuclear power reactors--three operational reactors, one reactor that
is no longer operating, and one decommissioned reactor. The reactor
sites were located in Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, and
Tennessee. We interviewed stakeholders including state and local
government officials, industry representatives, and local community
groups.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to March 2011 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Spent nuclear fuel is considered one of the most hazardous substances
on earth. Without protective shielding, its intense radioactivity can
kill a person exposed directly to it within minutes or cause cancer in
those who receive smaller doses. Although some elements of spent
nuclear fuel cool and decay quickly, becoming less radiologically
dangerous, others remain dangerous to human health and the environment
for tens of thousands of years. The nation's inventory of over 65,000
metric tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel--enough to fill a
football field nearly 15 feet deep--consists mostly of spent nuclear
fuel removed from commercial power reactors. The volume of commercial
spent nuclear fuel is expected to more than double by 2055--assuming
currently operating reactors receive license extensions and no new
reactors are built--and is currently accumulating at 75 sites in 33
states (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Current Storage Sites for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel and
Proposed Yucca Mountain Repository Site:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map]
Commercial sites:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Arkansas:
Beaver Valley, Pennsylvania:
Big Rock Point, Michigan:
Braidwood, Illinois:
Browns Ferry, Alabama:
Brunswick, North Carolina:
Byron, Illinois:
Callaway, Missouri:
Calvert Cliffs, Maryland:
Catawba, South Carolina:
Clinton, Illinois:
Columbia Generating Station, Washington:
Comanche Peak: Texas:
Cooper Station, Nebraska:
Crystal River, Florida:
Davis-Besse, Ohio:
D.C. Cook, Michigan:
Diablo Canyon, California:
Dresden & Morris, Illinois:
Duane Arnold, Iowa:
Edwin I. Hatch, Georgia:
Fermi, Michigan:
Fort Calhoun, Nebraska:
Ginna, New York:
Grand Gulf, Mississippi:
Haddem Neck, Connecticut:
H. B. Robinson, South Carolina:
Humboldt Bay, California:
Indian Point, New York:
Joseph M. Farley, Alabama:
Kewaunee, Wisconsin:
LaCrosse, Wisonsin:
La Salle, Illinois:
Limerick, Pennsylvania:
Maine Yankee, Maine:
McGuire, North Carolina:
Millstone, Connecticut:
Monticello, Minnesota:
Nine Mile Point and James A. FitzPatrick, New York:
North Anna, Virginia:
Oconee, South Carolina:
Oyster Creek, New Jersey:
Palo Verde, Arizona:
Palisades, Michigan:
Peach Bottom, Pennsylvania:
Perry, Ohio:
Pilgrim, Massachusetts:
Point Beach, Wisconsin:
Prairie Island, Minnesota:
Quad Cities, Iowa:
Rancho Seco, California:
River Bend, Louisiana:
Salem & Hope Creek, New Jersey:
Seabrook, New Hampshire:
Sequoyah, Tennessee:
Shearon Harris, North Carolina:
South Texas Project, Texas:
St. Lucie, Florida:
Summer, South Carolina:
Surry, Virginia:
Susquehanna, Pennsylvania:
Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania:
Trojan, Oregon:
Turkey Point, Florida:
Vermont Yankee, Vermont:
Vogtle, Georgia:
Waterford, Louisiana:
Watts Bar, Tennessee:
Wolf Creek, Kansas:
Yankee River, Vermont:
Zion, Illinois:
Proposed Repository:
Yucca Mountain, Nevada.
Source: DOE.
Note: Locations are approximate. DOE has reported that it is
responsible for managing nuclear waste at 121 sites in 39 states, but
this includes high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel at 5 sites
managed by DOE--2 of which are licensed by NRC and contain commercial
spent nuclear fuel, at Fort St. Vrain in Colorado and the Idaho
National Laboratory--and several sites that have only research
reactors that generate small amounts of waste that will be
consolidated at the Idaho National Laboratory for packaging prior to
disposal.
[End of figure]
Operators of commercial nuclear power facilities must actively manage
the spent nuclear fuel--consisting of thumbnail size pellets filling
12-to 14-foot rods bound together in assemblies--by isolating and
continually monitoring it to keep humans and the environment safe.
Most spent nuclear fuel is stored at operating reactor sites, immersed
in pools of water designed to cool and isolate it from the
environment. With nowhere to move the spent nuclear fuel, the racks in
the pools holding spent fuel have been rearranged to allow for more
dense storage of assemblies. Even with this re-racking, spent nuclear
fuel pools are reaching their capacities. Some critics have expressed
concern about the remote possibility of an overcrowded spent nuclear
fuel pool releasing large amounts of radiation if an accident or other
event caused the pool to lose water, potentially leading to a fire
that could disperse radioactive material. As reactor operators have
run out of space in their spent nuclear fuel pools, they have turned
in increasing number to dry cask storage systems that generally
consist of stainless steel canisters placed inside larger stainless
steel or concrete casks (see fig. 2). To protect humans and the
environment, NRC--which regulates commercial nuclear power plants--
requires protective shielding, routine inspections and monitoring, and
security systems to isolate the spent nuclear fuel.
Figure 2: Spent Nuclear Fuel Stored in Dry Casks at the Trojan
Independent Fuel Storage Installation in Oregon:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Portland General Electric Co.
[End of figure]
Progress toward developing a geologic repository was slow until NWPA
was enacted. Since the 1950s, prior to operation of the first U.S.
commercially licensed nuclear power plant, the government recognized
the need to manage the back end of the fuel cycle--specifically, what
to do with the spent nuclear fuel. A 1957 National Academy of Sciences
report endorsed deep geological formations to isolate spent nuclear
fuel, but during the 1950s and 1960s waste management received
relatively little attention from policymakers. The early regulators
and developers of nuclear power viewed waste disposal primarily as a
technical problem that could be solved when necessary by application
of existing technology. Attempts were made to reprocess the spent
nuclear fuel, but they were not successful because of economic issues
and concerns that reprocessed nuclear materials raise proliferation
risks. The Atomic Energy Commission attempted to develop high-level
waste repositories in Kansas and New Mexico in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, but neither succeeded because of local community and
state opposition. Citing the potential risks of the accumulating
amounts of spent nuclear fuel, the NWPA's purpose is, among other
things, to establish the federal responsibility, and a definite
federal policy, for the disposal of high-level waste and spent nuclear
fuel.[Footnote 9] The act required DOE to evaluate a permanent
geologic repository to protect public health and safety and the
environment for current and future generations. DOE, its national
laboratories, and contractors have all worked together on this project.
DOE's June 2008 submission seeking a construction authorization for a
repository at Yucca Mountain initiated two concurrent review processes
at NRC. The first process is the technical licensing review by NRC
staff, to assess the merits of the repository design and formulate a
position on whether to issue a construction authorization for the
repository. The second process consists of hearings before one or more
of NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards, to hear challenges by
participants on technical and legal aspects of DOE's application.
Based on the results of the licensing review and the hearings, NRC
will determine whether to authorize construction of the Yucca Mountain
repository. If construction of the Yucca Mountain repository were to
be authorized, DOE would have to update a separate application
requesting authorization to receive and possess high-level waste at
Yucca Mountain, before DOE could begin operations. This application
would also be subject to the technical review and hearing processes.
Since 1983, DOE has spent nearly $15 billion[Footnote 10] to evaluate
potential nuclear waste repository sites, evaluate the Yucca Mountain
site in more depth, and develop and submit the license application for
it. About 65 percent of this expenditure, or about $9.5 billion, came
from the Nuclear Waste Fund, established under NWPA to pay industry's
share of the cost for the Yucca Mountain repository and funded by a
fee of one-tenth of a cent per kilowatt-hour of nuclear-generated
electricity. The federal government collects this fee from electric
power companies, and the fund balance is currently estimated at about
$25 billion.[Footnote 11] The approximately $5 billion in additional
costs for repository development activities came from other
congressional appropriations. This does not include an estimated $956
million already paid by taxpayers from the U.S. Treasury's judgment
fund, resulting from 74 industry lawsuits, in which courts have
ordered the government to compensate utilities for not accepting spent
nuclear fuel starting in 1998, as required under NWPA. In addition to
these liabilities, according to the Department of Justice, it has
incurred costs of about $168 million as of the end of fiscal year
2010, to defend DOE in litigation. Industry officials said that, for
proprietary reasons, they could not provide a total for their
litigation costs, but that they are also incurring expenses.
With the future of a permanent repository unclear, spent nuclear fuel
may remain at commercial nuclear reactor sites for an extended period.
NRC has stated that, as a matter of policy, it will not license
reactors if it does not have reasonable confidence that the wastes can
be disposed of safely. Regulators have stated that the spent nuclear
fuel, if properly stored and monitored, can be kept safe and secure on-
site for decades. In December 2010, NRC published an update to its
Waste Confidence Decision and Rule, first issued in 1984, and updated
in 1990.[Footnote 12] A key premise of the update is that spent
nuclear fuel can be safely stored for at least 60 years--rather than
the 30 years specified in the 1990 update--beyond the licensed life of
a commercial power reactor, including license extensions. This would
give most reactors about 120 years of safe storage.[Footnote 13] NRC
officials consider these storage measures interim, however, and stated
that a deep geologic repository is necessary for the ultimate disposal
of the spent nuclear fuel. Currently, NRC, as well as DOE and
industry, are working to study the safety and security impacts of
prolonged storage of spent nuclear fuel, but the results of their
studies will not be known for several years.
In the meantime, DOE has established the Blue Ribbon Commission on
America's Nuclear Future, which has been tasked to evaluate existing
fuel cycle technologies, options for prolonged storage of spent
nuclear fuel, permanent disposal options, and other options involving
the full nuclear fuel cycle, including reprocessing. The commission
comprises three subcommittees: Disposal, Reactor Fuel Cycle
Technology, and Transportation and Storage, all of which have been
holding hearings with experts around the country. It has not been
charged with choosing or recommending facility sites, including a site
for a potential permanent repository. The commission is scheduled to
issue a report by January 2012.
The Basis for DOE's Decision to Terminate the Yucca Mountain
Repository Program:
DOE's decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program was
made for policy reasons, not technical or safety reasons.[Footnote 14]
In a June 2010 letter to us, the Acting Principal Deputy Director of
OCRWM, responding on behalf of the Secretary, stated that the
Secretary's decision was based on a proposed change of department
policy for managing spent nuclear fuel. He did not, however, cite any
technical concerns or safety issues related to the Yucca Mountain
repository. The Acting Principal Deputy Director explained that the
Secretary believes there are better solutions that can achieve a
broader national consensus to the nation's spent fuel and nuclear
waste storage needs than Yucca Mountain, although he did not cite any.
He went on to say that the Secretary has repeatedly stated his
conclusions that Yucca Mountain has not proven to be a workable option
for a permanent repository for high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel
and that the technical and scientific context is significantly
different today than it was at the time of the 1983 enactment of the
NWPA.
DOE also filed a reply before NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,
which provided additional information about the reasoning for
attempting to withdraw its license application. Specifically, the
reply explained that "the Secretary's judgment is not that Yucca
Mountain is unsafe or that there are flaws in the license application,
but rather that it is not a workable option and that alternatives will
better serve the public interest."
DOE established a Blue Ribbon Commission to conduct a comprehensive
review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel
cycle, including alternatives for the storage, processing, and
disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste, and materials
derived from nuclear activities. The commission, however, is not to
evaluate individual sites for a repository, including Yucca Mountain,
a position made clear by the Secretary of Energy in public statements.
[Footnote 15] Industry representatives we spoke with, however, stated
that even with a change in policy, a geologic repository or some other
disposal pathway will eventually be needed for the permanent disposal
of spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste. For example, even if
the nation decides to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, the high-level
waste residues from the process will still need to be disposed of.
[Footnote 16] Furthermore, DOE stated that public acceptance is a key
component of a workable effort to build a permanent repository and
that acceptance is lacking from the people of Nevada. Over the past
several decades, however, no states have expressed an interest in
hosting a permanent repository for this spent nuclear fuel and other
types of nuclear waste, including the states with sites currently
storing the waste.
NRC officials stated that no new technical or safety issues related to
the Yucca Mountain repository had been reported to them since DOE
submitted its license application in 2008. In its June 29, 2010,
ruling on DOE's motion to withdraw its license application, NRC's
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board stated that the NWPA provided the
Secretary of Energy with an opportunity to report any reasons that the
Yucca Mountain site was not suitable prior to submitting its license
application, but DOE reported no such issues. According to the board,
the NWPA required DOE to submit a license application and NRC to rule
on its merits by approving or disapproving the issuance of a
construction authorization, the first authorization required in the
license application process.[Footnote 17] Many DOE and NRC officials,
scientists, and industry representatives we spoke with told us that
completing the license review process and obtaining NRC findings on
the technical merits of the license application would provide valuable
information that could be applied to future efforts, even if Yucca
Mountain was not pursued as a repository. Additionally, the board
stated that, even if approved, such approval did not ensure that a
repository would be built or become operational for any number of
reasons, including separate congressional action changing the law or a
decision by Congress not to fund the proposed repository.
As of February 2011, the status of the Yucca Mountain license
application and associated review process is uncertain. On June 30,
2010, the day after the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board denied DOE's
motion to withdraw its license application with prejudice, the NRC
commissioners issued an order inviting parties--including the state of
Nevada, local counties, and industry--to file briefs addressing
whether the commissioners should review the board's decision and, if
so, whether they should uphold or reverse it. As of March 4, 2011,
however, the commissioners have yet to announce whether they plan to
review the board's decision. In a separate action, the United States
District Court of the District of Columbia that is hearing the
lawsuits against DOE decided to stay its proceedings until the NRC
commissioners ruled on the board's decision. Absent any action from
the NRC commissioners, however, the plaintiffs in the lawsuits have
asked the federal court to expedite the hearings to prevent DOE from
shutting down the Yucca Mountain repository program. The court granted
the request on December 10, 2010, and later scheduled oral arguments
to begin on March 22, 2011. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,
with no further input from the NRC commissioners or federal courts,
announced its intention to continue with its consideration of the
challenges to the license application. In these proceedings, the Board
will consider approximately 300 contentions submitted by stakeholders
questioning certain aspects of DOE's license application and related
participant filings and evidence. It is not yet clear whether NRC or
the courts will rule that the license application review process
should resume.
Steps DOE Has Taken to Terminate the Yucca Mountain Repository Program
and Their Effects:
DOE undertook an ambitious set of steps to dismantle the Yucca
Mountain repository program. However, concerns have been raised about
DOE's expedited procedures for disposing of property from the program,
and its documentation of these procedures was limited. In addition,
DOE did not consistently follow federal policy and guidance for
planning or assessing risks of the shutdown. Some of these steps to
dismantle the program will likely hinder progress if the license
application review process resumes--should NRC or the courts require
it.
DOE Took Steps to Terminate the Repository Program:
Amid a backdrop of uncertainty concerning the status and future of the
Yucca Mountain repository license review process, DOE undertook an
ambitious schedule to terminate the repository program and dismantle
OCRWM and the Yucca Mountain repository program by September 30, 2010,
when funding would have ended under the President's budget proposal.
Starting in February 2010, DOE redirected the remaining fiscal year
2010 OCRWM budget to fund closeout activities; hired a contractor to
archive project documents, such as those supporting the license
application; eliminated the jobs of all federal employees working on
the project; terminated project activities carried out by contractors,
including national laboratory scientists; terminated leases for office
space; transferred dozens of truckloads of office equipment and
computers to other DOE facilities and local schools; and closed most
of its 500 contracts and subcontracts.[Footnote 18] DOE officials told
us that DOE met its September 30, 2010, deadline for closure and
believed that despite the difficult task, the shutdown was orderly.
However, while OCRWM's Yucca Mountain project activities have ceased,
several termination tasks are still ongoing, such as disposing of
federal property and closing down contracts and subcontracts. These
tasks have been divided among various DOE programs, including the
National Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of Environmental
Management, the Office of Legacy Management, the Office of Nuclear
Energy, and the Office of General Counsel.
DOE has undertaken extensive efforts to preserve data related to its
licensing efforts, as well as other scientific information relevant to
the storage or disposal of high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel.
The Federal Records Act requires the heads of federal agencies to
preserve certain data and gives authority to the National Archives and
Records Administration to determine which types of documents should be
archived. DOE stated that, consistent with the Federal Records Act, it
is preserving millions of documents related to the licensing effort at
Yucca Mountain, as well as scientific information related to the
storage and disposal of high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel.
First, DOE has been maintaining a collection of 3.6 million documents
pertaining to its license application in its Licensing Support Network
Collection, a database of key licensing documents accessible through
NRC's Web site. NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board recently
highlighted the importance of preserving those documents, and DOE
officials stated that they were committed to preserving them. A DOE
official in charge of managing DOE's Licensing Support Network
collection stated that DOE plans on maintaining it through the NRC's
Web site until the courts have resolved the issues surrounding DOE's
motion to withdraw its license application, then for 100 years after
that. It is not clear, however, who will be responsible for preserving
the Licensing Support Network or whether it will continue to be
accessible by scientists and the public, particularly in light of
budget pressures and changing priorities that may occur over the next
century. A February 18, 2011, memo from NRC's Licensing Support
Network Administrator to members of the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board, however, stated that, under the administration's budget
proposal for fiscal year 2012, the NRC's Licensing Support Network
faces a shutdown as of October 1, 2011. The memo went on to say that,
when the Licensing Support Network Web site is shut down, the parties'
document collections will no longer be electronically accessible by
others and suggested alternatives that NRC may consider, which may
limit the public's or scientists' access to the document collections.
DOE officials stated that they are also taking steps to maintain
several other databases for the use of future scientists, the largest
of which is called the Records Information System. These databases
generally consist of relevant scientific information related to the
storage or disposal of high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel.
According to a DOE contractor responsible for archiving the Records
Information System, this database--consisting of 1.8 million
electronic documents and 11,000 boxes of hard-copy documents--will be
usable and preserved in the same quality as it existed under OCRWM and
for 25 years after the termination of the Yucca Mountain program. An
official with DOE's Office of Legacy Management, which assumed
responsibility for archiving the data, stated that DOE is on track to
complete data preservation efforts by April 2011.
In contrast to the data preservation efforts, efforts to retain Yucca
Mountain project staff were minimal. Staff were encouraged to seek
other employment and given no incentive to stay with OCRWM to assist
with the shutdown. Some DOE and contractor officials told us that
retaining key staff during the shutdown process would have been
helpful. Nevertheless, the roughly 180 federal staff at OCRWM were all
told in March 2010 that their positions would be eliminated by
September 30, and they began leaving as soon as they found alternate
employment, placing increasing stress on the remaining staff to
effectively complete an orderly shutdown. In addition, 60 scientists
and engineers who were contractors from Sandia National Laboratories
were assigned to other projects. This raised questions among some
former site officials we spoke with about whether an orderly shut down
had actually been achieved.
DOE also took steps to dispose of large volumes of federal property in
office buildings in Las Vegas and in storage containers and warehouses
at the Yucca Mountain site. Most of the property in Las Vegas
consisted of office furniture and computers, but the property at the
Yucca Mountain site varied, including scientific and construction
equipment, such as water monitoring equipment and tractors.
DOE Used Expedited Procedures to Dispose of Property, but Its
Documentation Was Limited:
DOE used expedited property disposition procedures after the shutdown-
-procedures that officials said were similar to those used to transfer
excess property in 2009. The 2009 transfers were necessary, according
to DOE officials, because OCRWM's budget was cut by nearly $100
million from fiscal year 2008 levels, because OCRWM selected a new
management and operating contractor, and because there was a shift in
focus from preparing the license application to defending the
application and planning for repository design and construction.
According to DOE officials, the change in budget and the contractor
resulted in a downsizing in the staff in Las Vegas from over 1,000
office suites to about 100 office suites, leaving a large volume of
office equipment that had become excess to the program. Upon DOE's
termination of the Yucca Mountain repository program, the remaining
office suites and supporting office and computer equipment were also
considered excess by OCRWM.
The General Services Administration (GSA) generally has responsibility
for regulating the disposition of federal property.[Footnote 19]
According to GSA regulations, federal agencies must follow a screening
process for excess property, unless they declare the property
abandoned. In the standard screening processes, agencies first
determine if other offices within the agency want the property and, if
not, whether other federal agencies would want the property. In either
event, the agency can directly transfer the property internally or
externally as needed, but it generally should notify GSA of transfers
outside the agency. If no other federal agency wants the property,
then GSA offers the property for sale first to state and local
governments and finally to private citizens through a national sales
database. To make the process of property disposition easier, GSA and
DOE have developed a simplified Energy Asset Disposal System that is
designed to support the screening, reporting, and transferring of
property within DOE and subsequently to automatically pass information
on unwanted property to GSA for possible transfer to other agencies or
for sale.
As an alternative, federal regulations also allow for an agency to
declare its excess property abandoned and to dispose of the property
on its own. To do so, the agency must first make a determination that
the property has no commercial value or that the estimated cost of its
continued care and handling would exceed the estimated proceeds from
its sale. This regulation is a common-sense rule, according to a GSA
official, allowing agencies to dispose of property in cases where it
might not make sense to transfer or sell it. In this case, no
screening or reporting to GSA is required.
DOE officials stated that, when the agency had such a large reduction
in staff between fiscal years 2008 and 2009, agency officials--with
advice from DOE's Office of General Counsel--chose the more
expeditious route of declaring the excess property to be abandoned.
DOE officials explained this was the most efficient pathway because
disposing of property quickly would reduce landlord costs by emptying
buildings of their equipment, save on utilities and security, and, in
some cases, reduce lease costs. In addition, they said they found
ready takers for their property within DOE who would be willing to pay
the dismantlement, packing, and transportation costs, saving OCRWM
money. An internal DOE memo reported in March 2010 that DOE
transferred 80 truckloads of office furniture and equipment to DOE's
Hanford Site during the previous year, saving the Hanford Site about
$2.1 million.
A GSA official with authority over property management in the West
noted that DOE's use of the abandonment regulation was unusual for
such a large volume and variety of property. The regulation is usually
used when agencies are considering smaller volumes of property for
disposal. However, the GSA official stated that the determination of
how to apply the regulation is left up to the agency and the fact that
DOE found a way to reuse the equipment addressed the overall intent of
federal property regulations, as long as DOE did not destroy useful
equipment to meet deadlines. According to the abandonment regulation,
DOE had to determine that its property had no commercial value or that
the cost of its continued care and handling exceeded the estimated
proceeds from the sale. DOE documented its decision to abandon the
property in an internal memo. DOE's memo stated that storing the
furniture and equipment cost about $680 per day. The memo further
stated that, in an OCRWM review of a GSA database, officials found
examples of three pallets of miscellaneous computer equipment that
were similar to what OCRWM had, but that GSA had not received any
offer matching its asking price of $10. Thus, OCRWM determined that
the care, storage, and processing of its property "far surpassed the
estimated proceeds from sale." DOE officials stated that their
documentation was sufficient for regulatory purposes and added that
the time frames for transferring the property would have prohibited
additional analysis or documentation. The GSA official said that
agencies determine on their own the level of analysis required to
declare property abandoned, but that DOE's limited analysis did not
seem to address the large volume or variety of property that DOE was
transferring.
When DOE decided to shut down the Yucca Mountain repository, it
reported in June 2010 that an additional 400 federal and contractor
staff would be terminated, again resulting in excess property in the
Las Vegas office. DOE used the abandonment regulation again and
applied the same example of computer equipment that it used to justify
its prior decision. DOE officials explained that a factor in their
decision in this case was the closure date of September 30, 2010,
which was not flexible and not under the control of OCRWM officials.
Several DOE officials told us that they had never seen such a large
program with so much pressure to close down so quickly. DOE
transferred most of its equipment--about 25 truckloads--to the Hanford
Site, as well as to the West Valley site in New York, the National
Nuclear Security Administration in Las Vegas, and Sandia National
Laboratories. In addition, DOE donated computer equipment to area
schools under the Computers for Learning program.
As of February 2011, DOE officials had transferred very little of the
property from the Yucca Mountain site, and it may have lost some of it
to break-ins. DOE officials said that, although they had a good
inventory of the property they transferred from the office buildings
in Las Vegas, they did not have a good inventory of property at Yucca
Mountain. DOE kept most of the property at the Yucca Mountain site in
locked buildings and storage trailers. After storing this property,
DOE officials found the locks broken on at least three occasions. DOE
officials said that some property may have been taken, but without an
inventory they could not be certain what, if anything, was missing.
The Yucca Mountain site is very remote, only accessible by little-
known rugged back roads through lands managed by the Bureau of Land
Management and the Nevada National Security Site, the latter of which
has guarded gates.[Footnote 20] Given the remoteness of the site and
the cost of guarding the excess equipment, a DOE official said that
DOE did not place guards at the buildings or the storage trailers.
OCRWM has passed responsibility for managing this property to DOE's
Office of Nuclear Energy, and a DOE official stated that an inventory
of the property at the site had been completed by February 2011. A DOE
official stated that DOE planned to screen the remaining property at
the Yucca Mountain site through the Energy Asset Disposal System. He
also noted that, due to the proximity to the former Nevada Test Site,
the property will have to be surveyed for radioactivity before it is
released.
According to DOE officials, some of the property meeting certain
thresholds at the Yucca Mountain site cannot be transferred under the
abandonment regulation but, under DOE guidance, must be sold at fair
market value and the proceeds returned to the Nuclear Waste Fund.
[Footnote 21] DOE officials said that they directed the contractor in
several transactions to sell excess property at fair market value and
to return the proceeds to the Nuclear Waste Fund. The DOE officials
provided documentation of one transaction that directed the contractor
to sell property and reimburse OCRWM, but DOE was not able to provide
us with documentation that showed the sale actually took place or that
the fund had been properly reimbursed. DOE officials said that
documentation would become available during the contract close-out
process. DOE officials further told us that the proceeds from the
sales that did take place went back into the Nuclear Waste Fund to
support OCRWM's shutdown efforts.
Finally, DOE, under separate statutory authority, transferred about
$400,000 worth of firefighting equipment to Nye County. DOE officials
stated that they had originally loaned the equipment to Nye County
under a cooperative agreement and that, upon termination of the Yucca
Mountain program, the county requested transfer of the equipment. In
this case, DOE determined that it was not required to follow GSA's
general property disposition provisions or its abandonment regulation.
Instead, DOE's Office of General Counsel authorized the transfer of
the equipment to Nye County, citing the Atomic Energy Act, which DOE
officials said gives them the authority to transfer property in this
situation. DOE officials said they made the transfer to assist the
county in addressing safety concerns.
DOE Did Not Follow Federal Policy and Guidance for Planning and
Assessing Risks of Termination:
Federal internal control standards and DOE orders require that DOE
sufficiently plan for major activities--including shutdowns--and
assess the risks of doing so. According to the Standards for Internal
Control in the Federal Government, a federal agency should adequately
plan to achieve its objectives, such as those in its strategic plans,
and identify and analyze the risks it faces.[Footnote 22] Such risk
assessments form a basis for determining how risks should be managed.
In analyzing such risks, the standards require agency management to
consider all significant interactions between the agency and other
parties as well as internal factors both agencywide and at the
activity level. This would include ensuring an orderly project
termination, as well as considering the possible impacts of a ruling
by the NRC commissioners or the federal courts that could require that
the Yucca Mountain license application review process be resumed.
Furthermore, DOE's own orders direct officials to adequately plan
projects to maintain effective and efficient use of federal resources
and to ensure it has adequate resources to implement its projects,
whether the project is new construction or the termination of an
existing program.[Footnote 23] Under these orders, DOE must also
assess the risks associated with its efforts.
In implementing its ambitious shutdown schedule, however, DOE did not
complete formal approved plans to guide its shutdown activities or
assess risks. Although DOE had drafted a shutdown plan by February
2010, DOE officials told us that it was never approved. DOE thus had
no formal implementation goals or milestones to guide progress, which
our past work has shown to be a key practice in implementing
organizational transformations.[Footnote 24] The department's
Inspector General also expressed concern about the lack of such a
plan, given the scope and complexity of the shutdown and the possible
effects on areas, such as the preservation of intellectual,
scientific, and technological information and the disposition of
property. In written comments to the Inspector General, DOE responded
that it had developed groups organized around functional areas
identified in its draft shutdown plan. The Inspector General noted
that DOE's efforts, while significant, were still no substitute for
having a shutdown plan. According to DOE General Counsel and former
OCRWM leadership, the September 30 deadline did not allow time for
formal planning, although officials stated that they believed that the
necessary planning did occur. For example, at least weekly meetings
were held with key staff to discuss the shutdown, identify and address
any problems, and keep progress on track. DOE officials stated that
they believe that, despite the lack of formal approved plans, the
shutdown was orderly and they accomplished what they set out to do.
However, some DOE and contractor officials stated that more time to
plan for the shutdown would have been helpful, but the
administration's budget proposal only funded the shutdown effort
through the end of fiscal year 2010. Former OCRWM officials said that
they did the best they could to meet the shutdown target, but as they
were carrying out the shutdown, there were concerns that the schedule
was too short. DOE's primary contractor at Yucca Mountain also
expressed concern. The contractor noted in a June 2010 letter that
contracts of this scale generally take 2 years or more to close out.
The contractor agreed in June to meet DOE's September 30 date--less
than 4 months away--by adopting "creative and unusual approaches,"
such as the transfer of residual work to other parties and saving
interim technical work products as-is with no additional effort to
document objectives, plans, status, or path forward.
Risk assessment, a key part of planning, was also not formally carried
out. Specifically, risk assessment requires identifying and analyzing
relevant risks associated with achieving objectives and forming a
basis for determining how risks should be managed. DOE officials told
us, however, that the September 30 shutdown date did not provide
sufficient time for both a formal risk assessment and the actual
shutdown tasks. Officials added that although they did not complete a
formal risk assessment, they did consider the possible risks of
shutting down the program as they were carrying out the work,
including the risk to DOE's ability to resume the licensing review
process, if necessary. As an example, officials noted that DOE did not
cancel its management and operating contract, in part so that it would
be easier to resume licensing activities if it were required to do so,
according to testimony by the former Acting Principal Deputy Director
of OCRWM. Similarly, DOE helped federal employees at OCRWM to remain
at DOE, in part to facilitate efforts to reconstitute the Yucca
Mountain work force, should the need arise, according to the
testimony.[Footnote 25] Although DOE General Counsel and other
officials said they considered planning and risk issues as the program
was being dismantled, they also told us they would not prepare any
formal plans or risk assessments unless DOE was ordered to resume
licensing activities and they were required to do so.
Loss of Staff Expertise Could Slow Progress If License Review Is
Resumed:
The loss of staff with experience at Yucca Mountain could hinder the
license review if the process is resumed because DOE plays an
important role in defending the license application. DOE has taken
extensive efforts to preserve data from the Yucca Mountain project.
However, experienced and trained staff are also necessary if DOE is to
successfully carry out this role. Specifically, DOE would need to:
* Provide technical, scientific, and legal support for court
challenges.
* Maintain and update the license application and supporting documents
as issues resulting from about 300 contentions--legal challenges to
the license application--were resolved and NRC information requests
were responded to.
* Prepare DOE witnesses and testimony for hearings.
Before their positions were eliminated in 2010, about 180 federal
staff at OCRWM and an additional 60 scientists and engineers who were
contractors from Sandia National Laboratories were on staff, in part
to defend the license application. A DOE official stated that,
although the licensing process could be carried out with fewer staff,
it would nevertheless require 25 to 30 highly trained scientists and a
larger number of support personnel.
Reconstituting this expertise and teamwork could be difficult should
the licensing process be resumed. According to DOE and Sandia National
Laboratories officials, it took DOE years to recruit and train the
proper mix of scientists and engineers--from diverse disciplines such
as hydrology, geology, and mathematics--to work on the license
application. The officials stated that a difficult but important part
of this effort was turning a group of independent researchers into a
team that could work together under a nuclear safety and regulatory
framework. One result of their work was the development of models that
simulated Yucca Mountain's safety performance, a key element of the
license application. According to DOE and NRC officials, the team of
scientists that developed the models would have been the most
qualified to explain and defend these models during the hearings of
NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. These officials expressed
doubt that many of these specialists would return to work on Yucca
Mountain if the license review were resumed because most have moved on
to new projects and assignments, many in other parts of the country.
Some stakeholders we spoke with, including former OCRWM employees,
said some of the former staff would likely not return to a program
they felt that the administration did not support. According to DOE
officials, about 25 percent of former OCRWM employees are no longer
with DOE. Nonetheless, DOE General Counsel officials stated that it
would be possible, if the staff were still working at DOE, to
encourage or require them to work on the Yucca Mountain repository
program should it be resumed. The officials stated that they believed
that a team could be reassembled, but that it might take many months
to do so and it might not have some of the staff who performed the
original work.
Other officials with whom we spoke expressed concerns about DOE's
ability to reassemble its team. A former Acting OCRWM director stated--
in an April 2010 declaration filed in federal court[Footnote 26]--that
he had years of experience on the Yucca Mountain program and
overseeing the creation of teams and, based on his experience, "it
will take well more than 2 years to put a team back together, and even
then it may not be successful." In addition, an official at Sandia
National Laboratories with management responsibilities over the Yucca
Mountain program stated that, if DOE were to resume licensing
activities, it would be helpful to reconstitute staff with original
experience in the technical aspects of the license application, but
that the more time that passes, the harder it would be to do so. He
noted that it would be possible to find replacements, but that
training them to become proficient may take time, and the quality of
the license defense could be jeopardized.
DOE officials said they took some measures to mitigate the risk of
losing technical expertise for the license application review process.
For example, although OCRWM managers did not track staff, they said
that DOE's Office of Human Capital did have access to the locations of
the former OCRWM staff that still work for DOE. OCRWM officials stated
they had no access to information on location and availability of
former laboratory or contractor staff, but that they felt the
laboratories or the contractor could provide that information, if
needed. Also, in May 2010, OCRWM asked its prime contractor for a plan
to shut down Yucca Mountain. OCRWM initially gave the contractor 6
days to produce a plan but granted the contractor's request for an
extension to 14 days. The contractor produced a $2.8 million proposal
to prepare, among other things, a plan for "knowledge retention
packages" that included an effort to mitigate the threat of the
irrecoverable loss of expert knowledge as staff members depart the
Yucca Mountain repository program. The contractor said these packages
would give DOE the ability to more easily resume the license
application review proceedings, if required. According to the
contractor, these packages would have included a strategy for
addressing contentions and preparation for officials who might serve
as witnesses during hearings. The proposal stated that the aim was to
capture the knowledge of current witnesses in a manner that would be
readily available and understandable should the proceeding be
restarted with a different individual as the witness. In a written
response to this proposal, however, DOE stated that the knowledge
retention packages were "both costly and unnecessary." DOE officials
further stated that this proposal extended beyond the September 30,
2010, closure date and would require a large expenditure of government
funds that DOE managers found wasteful, such as videotaping
scientists. As a result, the knowledge retention packages were not
approved by DOE and were not prepared by the contractor.
In addition to DOE, NRC has also taken some actions that could also
hinder the resumption of the license review process for Yucca
Mountain. NRC effectively suspended the technical review of the
license application on October 4, 2010, after Congress, on September
30, 2010, passed a continuing resolution that continued fiscal year
2010 funding levels for fiscal year 2011 appropriations from October 1
through December 3, 2010. NRC then issued guidance that it would apply
fiscal year 2010 funding levels for all programs except the Yucca
Mountain license review process. For that program, NRC announced it
would fund at the President's fiscal year 2011 budget proposal, which
included a close-out of the license review activities at the end of
the fiscal year. Although no NRC staff have been eliminated, an NRC
official said that they are being reassigned to other programs. The
NRC staff had originally planned to issue a key safety evaluation
report in November 2010 as part of NRC's technical review, but NRC
announced it no longer plans to issue that report. Also, even though
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board announced plans to continue with
the licensing proceeding in consideration of challenges to the license
application in late 2010, pursuant to the October 4, 2010, budget
guidance the board is now closing out its activities. According to
NRC's Chief Financial Officer, both the NRC staff and the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board are to submit plans to the NRC
commissioners for an orderly shutdown of activities in 2011. The NRC
Inspector General is investigating whether NRC had the authority to
adopt the fiscal year 2011 budget proposal. In a separate action, the
parties that are currently suing DOE and NRC asked the court to lift
its stay and expedite proceedings, in part, because of NRC's actions.
In response, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit announced that oral arguments would be held on March
22, 2011.
Termination of the Repository Program Could Provide Some Benefits, but
Adverse Impacts Are Likely:
Terminating the Yucca Mountain repository program could bring
benefits, primarily the opportunity for DOE to seek new approaches to
nuclear waste management that could be more widely accepted by the
public, particularly since Yucca Mountain had little support from the
state of Nevada. However, termination would also restart the costly
and time-consuming process of finding a permanent disposal repository
or some other solution for spent nuclear fuel and could take decades
and billions of additional dollars. Furthermore, termination would
likely prolong the need for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel at
reactor sites, which would have financial and other impacts.
Termination Would Provide a Key Benefit:
A key benefit of terminating the Yucca Mountain repository program,
cited by the Secretary when explaining the termination decision, is
the opportunity to seek other approaches that might achieve broader
acceptance than Yucca Mountain. The proposal to build a permanent
repository at Yucca Mountain has faced significant opposition from
some politicians and members of the public, particularly in Nevada.
Past proposals for repositories at other sites, such as the Hanford
Site, faced similar opposition. If a more widely accepted alternative
is identified, it carries the potential for avoiding costly delays
experienced by the Yucca Mountain repository program. However, there
is no guarantee that a more acceptable alternative will be identified.
The Secretary stated that advances in technology have provided the
nation with time to develop an alternative approach to permanent
disposal that might be more widely accepted. DOE, in a statement to
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, stated that recent advances in
methods for storing spent nuclear fuel in dry casks, rather than pools
of water, will allow the spent fuel to be stored on site for a much
longer period of time--perhaps as long as 300 years. During this time,
scientists could research and develop other alternatives for a
permanent solution. Furthermore, DOE stated that reprocessing of spent
nuclear fuel has the potential to reduce the amount of nuclear waste
and improve waste forms for disposal, although DOE noted that the
technology is still in its early stages. DOE has not yet identified
other alternatives and has tasked the Blue Ribbon Commission with
doing so.
The full significance of this benefit is not yet clear because there
is not yet an effective, affordable alternative to a permanent
geologic repository. Although alternatives for managing spent nuclear
fuel might be identified in the future, the National Research Council
of the National Academies reported that, for the foreseeable future,
the only alternatives capable of ensuring the safety and security of
spent nuclear fuel are continued storage and geologic disposal.
[Footnote 27] For example, alternatives--such as disposal in narrow
shafts bored deep into the ground--could be feasible but face cost or
technical constraints. We reached the same conclusion in our November
2009 report, for which we consulted 147 national experts about
alternatives to the Yucca Mountain repository.[Footnote 28]
Technologies to reduce the radioactivity or volume of spent nuclear
fuel, such as reprocessing or the use of advanced reactors, still face
technical and economic challenges and do not eliminate the need for a
permanent disposal alternative.[Footnote 29] In addition, the Chief
Executive Officer of the Nuclear Energy Institute told the Blue Ribbon
Commission that, even with reprocessing, the nation will still need a
geologic disposal facility.[Footnote 30]
Termination Would Restart a Costly, Time-Consuming Process:
The termination of Yucca Mountain essentially restarts a time-
consuming and costly process. In the case of Yucca Mountain, this
process has already cost nearly $15 billion through 2009 and, if work
on Yucca Mountain had continued, it could have cost an additional $41
billion to $67 billion more to complete, as we reported in
2009.[Footnote 31] DOE officials told us that many factors, including
some outside DOE's control, could have affected when the Yucca
Mountain repository would have opened, or whether it would have opened
at all. If work on licensing and constructing Yucca Mountain had
continued, DOE would have had to obtain NRC license approval, certain
crucial permits from the state of Nevada, funding from Congress, and
other key congressional actions, such as permanently withdrawing
public land for the repository. Despite these challenges, DOE's 2008
estimate for opening the Yucca Mountain repository--before DOE took
steps to terminate it--was 2020. While we recognize this 2020 date was
not certain, we know of no better assumption to meaningfully assess
the impact of a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository program.
In written comments to us, DOE officials stated it is speculation to
say a new strategy will take longer to implement than continuing with
the Yucca Mountain program because there was no guarantee of when, if
ever, the many significant steps for opening the Yucca Mountain
repository would have been completed. Since the comment provides only
a hypothetical bounding possibility--the Yucca Mountain repository
might have never opened, even without DOE's current steps to terminate
it--rather than a new estimate for when the repository might have
opened, we note the DOE officials' position but, with the exception of
noting prior work, we do not analyze it further.
DOE officials told us that it is conceivable that an alternative to
Yucca Mountain could be developed and implemented before Yucca
Mountain might ever have opened, such as opening a centralized interim
storage facility. Although DOE suggested that the Blue Ribbon
Commission may come up with alternatives that could be implemented
sooner than Yucca Mountain might have opened--particularly if the
alternative has more public acceptance and avoids costly delays due to
local opposition--we reported in 2009 that there were no other
permanent alternatives to the Yucca Mountain repository that could be
implemented sooner than the 2020 projected date of opening Yucca
Mountain. Although any permanent disposal alternatives would come with
uncertainties as to their cost and schedule--as well as to their
public acceptance--it is likely to take decades to develop. We
reported in 2009 that, according to a manager of an industry effort to
establish a centralized interim storage facility, even a federal
centralized interim storage facility is likely to take 17 to 33 years
to plan and implement.[Footnote 32] An interim storage facility would
include, among other things, siting, licensing, and constructing the
facility and accompanying transportation infrastructure, as well as
coordinating transportation routes with states. If such a facility
were initiated in 2011, this makes the most likely initial opening
date somewhere from 2029 to 2045.[Footnote 33] It is possible that
industry might develop and implement its own interim storage
facilities sooner, but, as we reported in 2009, an interim storage
facility is not a permanent alternative to a repository.
Nevertheless, by terminating work on Yucca Mountain, DOE likely would
have to restart the process for any alternative repository site, since
every site is unique, according to NRC officials. Some of the
officials we spoke with estimated that the termination of Yucca
Mountain could set back the opening of a new geologic repository by at
least 20 years and cost billions of dollars. Some stakeholders
referred to the termination as "kicking the can down the road."
Moreover, several DOE and NRC officials and industry representatives
stated that ending the license review process before allowing NRC to
review the merits of the application was a loss of potentially
valuable information, particularly NRC's assessment regarding
acceptability of the license application.
As a result of the termination of the Yucca Mountain repository
program, DOE may also need to seek additional funding for an
alternative repository. About 60 percent of the cost of developing a
repository has thus far been paid for by the nuclear waste fund, but
utilities only pay into the fund for as long as their reactors are
operating. Most of the reactors in this country are working to obtain
a license extension or have already obtained one for an additional 20
years of operation, and it is not clear how much longer reactor
operators will be paying into the nuclear waste fund. As reactors
retire, they will need to be replaced by new reactors paying into the
fund, or, according to DOE officials, the fund will be drawn down
faster than it can be replenished. According to DOE officials, the
nuclear waste fund was designed to build a large surplus that could be
relied upon for when the very high construction costs exceed annual
contributions; then, the generally high, but decades-long costs for
operations, during which the nuclear waste fund is likely to be drawn
down. For example, our analysis of DOE's cost projections for Yucca
Mountain shows that construction of a repository would have averaged
over $1.7 billion annually, but with some years exceeding $2 billion.
Although the costs of siting, licensing, constructing, and operating
an alternate repository site are uncertain, or even if a repository
will be the path followed by DOE in the near future, DOE has already
spent about $9 billion from the nuclear waste fund. If DOE were to
pursue an alternate repository--assuming an alternate repository would
have costs similar to the Yucca Mountain repository--it is not certain
that the fund will have built up a sufficient surplus to site,
license, construct, and operate it. DOE makes an annual assessment of
the adequacy of the nuclear waste fund to ensure that full costs of a
disposal program will be fully recovered. In November 2010, the
Secretary determined that the fund was adequate, even though an
attachment stated that DOE had no alternative to the Yucca Mountain
repository, and that the Yucca Mountain repository provided the
closest "proxy"--in terms of cost--to an alternative. If the nuclear
waste fund does not have a sufficient surplus for an alternate
repository, additional funding would have to be found. One option,
according to DOE officials, is for the Secretary to propose an
adjustment of the fee in accordance with the NWPA, but they said the
agency must do so while nuclear reactors are still operating.
Moreover, since the taxpayers have paid a proportion of the costs to
establish a repository for DOE-managed high-level waste and spent
nuclear fuel, the taxpayers may also end up paying more for an
alternate repository. In addition, the proposed termination has
prompted calls from industry for DOE to suspend collection of payments
into the Nuclear Waste Fund. Industry has argued that their customers
should not pay for a repository effort that has been shut down, with
no work being done on an alternative. Suspending payments into the
Nuclear Waste Fund could reduce the funds set aside for a repository.
Termination Would Prolong On-site Storage and Increase Costs:
The proposed termination of Yucca Mountain, which had been planned to
be opened in 2020, will likely prolong storage at reactor sites, which
would increase on-site storage costs. Because of delays in opening the
Yucca Mountain repository, on-site storage at commercial nuclear
facilities has been the de facto near-term strategy for managing spent
nuclear fuel. Most spent nuclear fuel is stored at reactor sites,
immersed in pools of water designed to cool it and isolate it from the
environment. With the extension of on-site storage because of the
delays in opening Yucca Mountain, some reactors are running out of
space in their pools and have turned to dry-cask storage systems. In
2009, we reported that such systems for reactor operators cost from
about $30 million to $60 million per reactor, with costs increasing as
more spent nuclear fuel is added to dry storage.[Footnote 34] We also
reported that the spent nuclear fuel would likely have to be
repackaged about every 100 years, although experts said this is
uncertain and research is under way to better understand the longevity
of dry-cask systems. This repackaging could add from about $180
million to nearly $500 million, assuming initial repackaging
operations, with costs dependent on the number of casks to be
repackaged and whether a site has a transfer facility, such as a
storage pool.
Prolonging on-site storage would add to the taxpayer burden by
increasing the substantial liabilities that DOE has already incurred
due to on-site storage at commercial nuclear reactors. Were DOE to
open Yucca Mountain in 2020, as it had planned, and begun taking
custody of spent nuclear fuel, it would still have taken decades to
take custody of the entire inventory of spent nuclear fuel. Assuming a
2020 opening of Yucca Mountain, DOE estimated that the total taxpayer
liabilities for the backlog as of 2020 would be about $15.4 billion
and would increase by $500 million for each year of delay thereafter.
[Footnote 35] It is important to recognize that these liabilities are
outside of the nearly $15 billion already spent on developing a
repository and the estimated $41 to $67 billion still to be spent if
the Yucca Mountain repository were to be constructed and become
operational, most of the cost of which is borne by the Nuclear Waste
Fund. Instead, these liabilities are borne by taxpayers because of the
government's failure to meet its commitment to take custody of the
waste has resulted in lawsuits brought by industry.[Footnote 36]
Furthermore, not all of the lawsuits have been resolved and industry
has claimed that the lawsuits still pending could result in
liabilities of at least $50 billion. Some former DOE officials and
industry and community representatives stated that the termination of
the Yucca Mountain program could result in an additional delay in the
opening of a repository by at least 20 years, which would lead to
additional DOE liabilities in the billions of dollars. Until a final
disposition pathway is determined, there will continue to be
uncertainties regarding the federal government's total liabilities.
At decommissioned reactor sites, prolonged on-site storage could
further increase costs or limit opportunities for industry and local
communities, according to industry and community representatives.
[Footnote 37] As long as the spent nuclear fuel remains, the sites
would not be available for other purposes, and the former operators
may have to stay in business for the sole purpose of monitoring,
storing, and providing costly security for the fuel. Local communities
could lose the potential use of the site for alternative purposes,
potentially impacting economic growth and tax revenue. For example,
according to an industry representative, a local government in
Illinois would like to encourage development of property fronting Lake
Michigan near a shutdown nuclear reactor planned for decommissioning.
A local government official stated in an interview with the media,
however, that it may be difficult to develop and sell the property
because prospective buyers may feel uneasy about living next to a site
storing spent nuclear fuel. Similarly, a local government official
from Minnesota expressed concern about having to provide security and
emergency response for the Prairie Island reactor site and its spent
nuclear fuel because tax revenues from the facility will decrease
substantially after it is decommissioned. However, these issues may
not affect all reactor sites. For example, officials in Oregon told us
they did not feel dry-cask storage at Trojan, a decommissioned
reactor, adversely affected economic growth or tax revenue. This site
is about 42 miles north of Portland, Oregon, and is not in a major
metropolitan area.
Prolonging on-site storage could also increase opposition to expansion
of the nuclear industry, according to state and industry officials.
Without progress on a centralized storage facility or repository, some
experts have stated that some state and local opposition to reactor
storage site recertification will likely increase and so will
challenges to nuclear power companies' applications for reactor
license extensions and for new reactor licenses.[Footnote 38] For
example, Minnesota officials noted that negative public reaction to a
proposal to increase dry-cask storage at a nuclear plant led the state
legislature to impose a moratorium on new nuclear plants. At least 12
other states have similar prohibitions on new construction, 9 of which
can be lifted when a means of disposing of spent nuclear fuel can be
demonstrated. Representatives from some tribal and environmental
organizations said they were concerned with the long-term on-site
storage of spent nuclear fuel. They said nuclear plants should take
additional measures to ensure the safety and security of dry-cask
storage sites, and they have raised these concerns in objecting to the
relicensing of commercial reactors in Minnesota and New Jersey. For
instance, tribal officials from the Prairie Island Indian Community in
Minnesota told us they opposed relicensing the Prairie Island Nuclear
Generating Plant because of environmental and safety concerns they
have about living just 600 hundred yards from spent nuclear fuel.
Termination Could Further Damage DOE's Credibility:
A final impact of terminating Yucca Mountain is that communities may
be even less willing to host spent nuclear fuel repositories or other
storage sites in the future due to further erosion of DOE's
credibility. Credibility has long been a problem for DOE. For
instance, in 1984, a DOE expert panel found that DOE's credibility was
already low in the early 1980s because of its past "ill-handled"
repository siting experiences in Kansas, Michigan, and New Mexico.
According to the panel's report, DOE's credibility was further
strained at that time during initial site selection efforts because
its site selection guidelines were criticized as being "superficial
and vague." DOE continued to face credibility issues over the next 2
decades because of delays in the Yucca Mountain project. Several
stakeholders--including former DOE officials and officials from state
government, and representatives from industry and community groups--
said that DOE's decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository
program has further damaged DOE's credibility.
Past Experience May Yield Potential Lessons for Future Nuclear Waste
Management Efforts:
Our review of reports and interviews with DOE and NRC officials and
representatives of various national associations, local and state
governments, and community organizations suggest two broad lessons for
future repository efforts or other nuclear waste management efforts.
First, overcoming social and political opposition is crucial, and
transparency, economic incentives, and education are important tools
in doing so. Second, in developing a waste management alternative, it
is important to have consistent policy, funding, and leadership, since
any such effort will take decades.
Transparency, Incentives, and Education Are Important in Overcoming
Opposition:
Reports spanning several decades cite societal and political
opposition as key obstacles to siting and building a permanent
repository. In 1982, the Office of Technology Assessment, an office of
Congress from 1972 to 1995 that provided congressional members and
committees with analysis of scientific and technical issues, reported
that after 3 decades of study, there are "no insurmountable technical
obstacles" and that the "greatest single obstacle" to building a
repository is an erosion of public confidence in the federal
government.[Footnote 39] The National Research Council of the National
Academies reiterated this conclusion in a 2001 report, stating that
the most significant challenge to siting and putting into service a
repository is societal.[Footnote 40] This lesson has also been borne
out by previous U.S. attempts to build repositories. At Yucca
Mountain, lack of public support in Nevada was a key reason DOE
decided to terminate the effort, according to DOE. In contrast, local
community support was a key element in the success of the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) repository in New Mexico. WIPP is
currently the world's only operating permanent geologic repository for
nuclear waste, although it only accepts defense-related transuranic
waste and, according to a New Mexico state official, did not win
support from the state to accept high-level waste.
No nation has built a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel or
high-level radioactive waste. Therefore, as industry and community
representatives pointed out, there is no model or set of lessons that
will guarantee success in this complex, decades-long endeavor. Various
reports and stakeholders noted that transparency, incentives, and
education were important features that could improve the likelihood of
success. However, some social and political opposition may be
extremely difficult to overcome, regardless of any of these features.
For example, in 1992, DOE sought to develop a temporary spent nuclear
fuel storage facility in Wyoming, but the Wyoming governor stopped
that effort. In a letter to the county seeking to host the facility,
the governor wrote that, despite the assurances of federal officials,
even those with personal integrity and sincerity, he could not be sure
that the federal government's attitudes or policies would remain the
same over the next 50 years. He wrote that, once the federal
government gains a foothold to a nuclear program in the state, the
state may be powerless to have any further say in the program.
Transparency and Cooperation:
Several reports, DOE and state government officials, and industry and
community representatives noted that transparency in dealing with
local and state governments and affected parties may help overcome
local and state opposition to a repository. Transparency demonstrates
a willingness to address concerns openly and fosters the dialogue
necessary to resolve differences and enhance cooperation, according to
reports and interviews. DOE and state and local government officials
said that transparency was an important factor in the successful
opening of WIPP. For example, DOE evaluated key technical issues in
the design of WIPP in part by using panels of independent experts,
whose internal discussions and results were open to the public.
Furthermore, according to a DOE report, stakeholders and the public
were invited to actively participate in many WIPP technical meetings,
and the public was allowed access to technical documents on
characterizing the WIPP site. A report by scientists and managers at
Sandia National Laboratories found that these efforts built confidence
in the acceptability and integrity of the science program and built
public trust.
Conversely, state government officials told us that, if local
communities or states feel that the federal government is not willing
to address their concerns in a transparent way, they will be less
inclined to work cooperatively with the federal government. For
example, during the 1960s, the Atomic Energy Commission attempted to
develop a high-level waste repository in a salt formation near Lyons,
Kansas. Critics charged that the commission was not transparent in its
efforts, instead rushing to its decision and refusing to address the
concerns of local and state officials. The commission abandoned its
plans for the Lyons site in 1972, after opposition intensified and
additional technical questions arose, such as whether it was possible
to plug exploratory gas and oil shafts at the site. Similarly,
according to a former DOE official and state and local government
officials, DOE lacked transparency in developing its plans for the
Yucca Mountain repository. For example, during studies of the mountain
over the past 20 years, DOE found that water moved through the area
faster than previously realized. As DOE site characterization and
design activities continued, DOE's engineering designs changed, such
as improved alloys for waste canisters to delay corrosion and titanium-
based drip shields to keep the canisters dry. According to a former
DOE official and representatives from state and local governments and
a community group, DOE did not consult with the local or state
governments or other affected parties in developing these new
solutions; it also did not establish independent scientific panels or
any form of state oversight that might have given affected parties
more confidence in the solutions. DOE included these technologies in
its license application, but they have now become the focal point of
several of the challenges raised in the licensing proceeding.
Another way to gain support is to promote state involvement in key
decisions and oversight, according to a state government official and
DOE contractors. This is important because, although many communities
might be found willing to host a repository, most states would not be
willing to do so because of broader constituencies and issues related
to federal-state relations. For example, despite the growing
willingness of the community of Carlsbad and of communities along the
transportation routes to host the repository, the state of New Mexico
continued to oppose WIPP, as did many activist groups. The project
might have ended due to state opposition, but DOE conceded some of its
authority to the state, agreeing to fund the Environmental Evaluation
Group in 1978, a technical oversight group made up of independent
technical experts and funded through a DOE contract. The state did not
consider this enough to address its key concerns, however.
Specifically, the state was concerned that DOE had already made a
decision to site a repository in New Mexico before technical
assessments had been completed and that the state had no enforceable
legal mechanism for asserting its rights. As a result, the state sued
DOE and, in exchange for the state's dropping the lawsuit, DOE made
further concessions when DOE and the state signed the Consultation and
Cooperation Agreement in 1981, giving the state greater input and
oversight on WIPP. The agreement, according to a state government
official, set the stage for both sides to work cooperatively together
to resolve future differences. Without these concessions and
agreements, WIPP might have been further delayed in opening or might
never have opened at all, according to a WIPP project leader for the
state of New Mexico. In contrast, although the NWPA established an
independent oversight group and DOE held public meetings, DOE and the
state of Nevada never established an agreement similar to the
Consultation and Cooperation Agreement DOE signed with New Mexico,
which would have given Nevada an oversight role over the Yucca
Mountain repository.[Footnote 41]
Long-term Incentives:
Many stakeholders we talked to, including officials from DOE and state
government, a former DOE official, and representatives from community
groups, said substantial, long-term investments in the host community
and state can help win support. Long-term investments keep key parties
committed to a repository effort after it has begun, which is
important in an effort that will take several decades. Several of the
stakeholders said that significant investments in infrastructure or
local economic development are preferable to cash payments, which can
end at any time. State government and DOE officials said that the
benefits package for Yucca Mountain in the NWPA--including $20 million
per year in cash after receipt of the first spent fuel until closure
of the facility--was not enough to be considered an incentive for
Nevada, particularly since Nevada was expected to make a concession
for other states without any commensurate contribution from those
states. Although Nevada currently purchases electricity from utilities
that generate electricity from nuclear power, this may not have been
the case when Yucca Mountain was first selected. In the case of WIPP,
a New Mexico state official stated that one agreement DOE negotiated
with New Mexico guaranteed funding for highway improvements along
WIPP's transportation routes for 15 years, totaling $300 million. In
addition to a benefits package, comments reflecting views from DOE,
local government, and the National Academy of Sciences, suggested that
the federal government should consider penalties designed to
discourage local and state governments from taking advantage of
benefits without upholding long-term commitments. According to
reports, many other countries are also offering benefits for
communities willing to host a geologic repository. The amount and type
of benefit varies. For example, Sweden provided a cash payment of $60
million to the community selected to host a repository in that
country. Although France is still in the planning stages for its
repository, it is planning long-term economic development for the host
community.
Education:
Some stakeholders told us that education may be needed to overcome
misperceptions about nuclear waste and its storage to gain public
acceptance. Members of community and academic groups, including the
National Academy of Sciences, told us that some members of the public
incorrectly equate spent nuclear fuel with nuclear weapons. They
associate spent fuel with images of mushroom clouds from the
detonation of a nuclear warhead, when in fact spent nuclear fuel
cannot explode. Education has proved useful. For example, DOE's
contractor at WIPP involved local communities situated along the
transportation routes throughout the state, providing education and
training programs and equipment related to the safe transportation of
radioactive waste. These efforts resulted in increased acceptance of
the project, according to local government officials and community
representatives. Other countries are also pursuing education. For
example, Canada's initial efforts at developing a geologic repository
were tabled due to a lack of public support, and the country's newly
created Nuclear Waste Management Organization has made education one
of several key issues related to long-term management of spent nuclear
fuel. This is a key effort to gain public acceptance for its new
repository project, according to a report recently issued by the
organization.
Consistent Policy, Funding, and Leadership Are Important in Any Waste
Management Effort:
Based on reports and interviews with DOE and NRC officials,
representatives of various national associations and community
organizations, and local and state government officials, we identified
a second broad lesson--emphasizing consistent policy, funding, and
leadership--that may help address societal and public opposition to a
repository or other waste management alternative over the decades it
will take to complete the effort.
Consistent Policies:
Our previous reports about programs at DOE and other agencies have
highlighted the importance for policies to be credible and consistent
to be effectively implemented.[Footnote 42] Several stakeholders we
interviewed and the reports we reviewed reaffirmed this.
According to reports and interviews, the nation's nuclear waste
management policies over the past several decades have not been
consistent, which has contributed to public opposition. In particular,
an independent report issued in 1984 on alternative methods for
financing and managing the nuclear waste program stated that there was
a serious and inherent lack of stability and continuity in the
nation's nuclear waste management program that adversely impacted
DOE's credibility.[Footnote 43] More recently, stakeholders we spoke
with from states, industry, and community groups pointed out changes
in nuclear waste management policy that they considered inconsistent.
For example, some stakeholders said that the NWPA originally
contemplated several sites in the West and several in the East to be
evaluated for a potential nuclear waste repository, with the final
result being one repository in the West and one in the East. However,
a 1987 amendment to the NWPA eliminated this approach and directed DOE
to focus its site characterization efforts only on Yucca Mountain.
In addition, federal agencies have at times been inconsistent in their
policies on safety standards for a repository, considered one of the
more critical issues for public acceptance. For example, the federal
government did not have post-closure safety standards in place for
either WIPP or Yucca Mountain when it began work assessing the likely
performance of each repository's design, making it difficult for the
federal government to determine how well the repository needs to
perform to protect public health or what reliance to place on natural
or engineered systems. Although work began at WIPP in 1974, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was not given authority to issue
safety standards for offsite releases from radioactive material in
repositories until NWPA, in 1983. EPA issued generic safety standards
in 1985 and standards specific to WIPP in 1996. EPA did not issue
safety standards specific to Yucca Mountain until 2001, even though
DOE had begun to focus its work there in 1987. EPA's standards
directed that the repository's safety must be demonstrated over a
10,000-year period. However, after several groups filed suit, alleging
that certain standards were not sufficient, EPA revised some standards
in 2008 to use a 1-million-year period during which safety must be
demonstrated. A former DOE official and a community group
representative said the initial lack of standards galvanized
opposition in both New Mexico and Nevada, and the 1-million-year
standard, which many stakeholders we interviewed, including
scientists, described as an unreasonably long time period for accurate
projections, brought the credibility of Yucca Mountain standards into
question.
For example, some reports we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed
from state and community groups, stated that to achieve consistency, a
nuclear waste management program should be insulated from the
political influences and changes in policy that have plagued the
process for decades. They stated that policies are inherently likely
to change over the time it will take to implement a program. Although
there was general agreement that affected parties needed to be part of
the process, there were different viewpoints on how best to insulate
the program. The 1985 independent report on alternative methods for
financing and managing the nuclear waste program recommended that a
federally chartered, government-owned corporation should be
responsible for the siting and construction of the repository in an
environment largely free from political influence. The report noted
that the organization model would effectively involve key affected
parties in siting decisions, which the report called probably the most
essential element in ensuring the long-term success of the program.
The 1982 report from the Office of Technology Assessment concluded
that an independent agency may be the best, if not the only, way to
maintain credibility. Some stakeholders agreed with these assessments,
noting that DOE was subject to political influences and had lost a lot
of its credibility as a result of changes in policy. They stated that
an independent organization could bring the credibility necessary to
draw key affected parties to an open and transparent discussion on
siting. In addition, they stated that an independent organization
could be structured to have more financial independence, free of some
of the conditions that limited OCRWM in DOE, but they noted that such
an organization would still require oversight. Some quasi-governmental
organizations have been developed and implemented with varying degrees
of success. We have reported on quasi-governmental organizations and
issues related to risky behaviors because of their federal sponsorship
and the need for adequate oversight.[Footnote 44] Still other
stakeholders we talked with had different viewpoints, stating that DOE
remains an adequate entity for the process, noting that it had
successfully sited and built WIPP.
Conversely, some DOE officials and a community representative said
that the site selection process is inherently political. They stated
that the selection of a site--assuming the candidate sites are
technically satisfactory--should be addressed through a political
process involving all stakeholders. Some stakeholders suggested that a
final decision should be made by Congress if it is to have any lasting
authority.
Consistent funding:
DOE and state officials and community representatives told us that
OCRWM's annual budget was not predictable. OCRWM's annual
appropriations varied by as much as 20 percent from year to year, and
its average annual shortfall of appropriations from its budget request
was about $90 million each year. Stakeholders, including former DOE
officials, said that this makes long-term planning difficult.
According to DOE, the original intent of NWPA was to provide
consistent funding for a repository and, until this is addressed, the
uncertainty of funding may impact the long-term plans for a repository.
According to current and former DOE officials, unless changes are
made, the Nuclear Waste Fund might not be sufficient to license,
construct, operate, and close a new repository. This is in part
because as time goes on, reactors will likely retire and, unless more
reactors come on line to replace the retiring reactors, payments to
the fund will dwindle. According to DOE, The fund was originally
designed to build up an initial surplus to allow it to be self-
sustaining as reactors retire.
Continuity of Leadership:
People we spoke with, including former DOE officials and industry
representatives, told us that continuity of leadership is important
for demonstrating commitment to local and state governments and other
affected parties and for providing quality management for a long-term
program. They said OCRWM operated with a revolving-door style of
management that hurt its relationships with local and state government
officials. For example, from 1983 through 2010, OCRWM had 17
directors, more than half of them acting directors. Some former DOE
officials and industry representatives commented that, as part of DOE,
OCRWM was not always a high priority and the quality of managers
running the program varied. Some stakeholders said this illustrates a
lack of commitment for the program and undermined public trust in the
nuclear waste management program. Former OCRWM officials stated that
OCRWM had not been consistent in developing positive relationships
with the local communities and the state. One former OCRWM director
noted the lack of regular meetings with local community groups when he
arrived.
Former DOE officials also told us that scientific leadership needs to
ensure a consistent focus on complying with the regulations or
standards. At WIPP, Sandia National Laboratories was named the lead
laboratory in 1975, and its director for science remained in a key
leadership position for most of the time DOE worked to open the
facility. Former DOE officials said that this helped DOE keep its
focus and prioritize its research over the many years of study. In
contrast, some stakeholders said the science at Yucca Mountain was not
as focused, primarily due to a lack of scientific leadership. For
example, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board noted that some of
the site's early studies were not focused on the performance
assessment modeling needed to develop a license application. DOE named
Sandia National Laboratories as the lead laboratory for Yucca Mountain
in 2007, and former DOE officials and industry representatives
credited its leadership with contributing to the completion of the
license application, submitted in 2008.
Conclusions:
After decades of effort and nearly $15 billion in spending, DOE
succeeded in submitting a license application for a nuclear waste
repository. However, since then, DOE has dismantled its repository
effort at Yucca Mountain and has taken steps that make the shutdown
difficult to reverse. DOE focused on a rapid dismantlement because the
administration ended funding on September 30, 2010. Amid uncertainty
over whether it had the authority to terminate the Yucca Mountain
repository program, DOE terminated the program without formally
assessing the risks stemming from the shutdown, including the
possibility that it might have to resume the repository effort.
Without a formal risk assessment, DOE cannot be assured that it is
aware of any risks it is still facing from the shutdown, such as from
missed opportunities to preserve institutional knowledge that may be
needed in future efforts. Furthermore, as more time passes without a
plan for resuming the licensing process at Yucca Mountain, DOE may
find it increasingly difficult to resume the process if it reconsiders
its decision or is compelled to do so. For example, DOE may find it
increasingly hard to gather staff with previous experience at Yucca
Mountain, since over time more will retire, relocate, or change
careers. Without an adequate closeout plan that included a risk
assessment, DOE has left itself vulnerable to losses in both
experienced staff and physical property. When DOE eliminated
experienced staff, it did not tap them for lessons learned that could
be helpful for future efforts. Furthermore, DOE did not complete an
inventory of OCRWM property before it closed out the Yucca Mountain
site and does not know if equipment was stolen, even though some of
its storage sites were breached. Nor did DOE demonstrate that it fully
documented the return of any proceeds from sales of OCRWM to the
Nuclear Waste Fund. Until these issues are resolved, DOE remains
vulnerable to losses and may not be able to ensure it has
appropriately managed federal property and funds.
The potential termination of Yucca Mountain also has consequences
beyond DOE. On the one hand, it could offer a chance for the nation to
reconsider its approach to nuclear waste management, assess emerging
technologies, and possibly develop new technologies. On the other
hand, termination would once again defer the permanent disposal of
some of the nation's most hazardous materials. In doing so, it would
essentially restart the search for a permanent solution. DOE has begun
this process by charging the Blue Ribbon Commission with evaluating
nuclear waste management and disposal alternatives. The commission has
not been charged with siting a new repository, the process around
which so much opposition has been focused. It is not clear what the
nature of the commission's recommendations will be and whether they
will endorse a particular final disposal pathway. What is clear,
however, is that developing and implementing any alternative to Yucca
Mountain will likely involve considerable time and cost.
Although much time and cost was involved in efforts to develop a
repository, similar mistakes have been repeated at different sites
over the decades--from Lyons, Kansas, to Yucca Mountain, Nevada.
Specifically, efforts have needed the transparency and other features
that helped win public support at WIPP, the nation's only federal
geologic repository. They have also needed consistent policies,
consistent funding, and a sustainable funding mechanism, and
continuity of leadership, which could have kept the efforts focused
and improved public acceptance of a repository. The nation's next
investment of significant time and resources may be more successful if
these lessons are understood and implemented. Specifically, improved
policies, funding, program leadership, and departmental priorities may
help to ensure that costly past mistakes are not repeated. Nuclear
waste disposal is extremely controversial, and no strategy can
guarantee success. However, given the past and the consequences of
failure, many knowledgeable sources suggested that the task may
require a more predictable funding mechanism and more independence
than DOE is able to provide.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Because successfully resolving the issue of what to do with spent
commercial nuclear fuel will likely be a decades-long, costly, and
complex endeavor, which can be disrupted by changing views and
unpredictable funding, Congress may wish to consider whether:
* a more predictable funding mechanism would enhance the federal
government's future efforts to develop and implement a disposal
solution for the nation's spent nuclear fuel, and:
* an independent organization, outside DOE, could be more effective in
siting and developing a permanent repository for the nation's nuclear
waste.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help minimize the impact of the rapid shutdown, improve
accountability for assets related to Yucca Mountain, and improve the
likelihood of success of future nuclear waste management efforts, we
recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the appropriate
officials to take the following two actions:
* Assess the risks stemming from the rapid shutdown of Yucca Mountain
and develop a preliminary plan to restart the project, in case DOE is
required to do so.
* Provide Congress with an inventory of property from the Yucca
Mountain repository program, including its value, and an accounting of
the property disposed of, the funds received from property
transactions, and the disposition of these funds.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided DOE and NRC with a draft of this report for their review
and comment. DOE provided written comments on March 30, 2011, which
are summarized below and reproduced in appendix IV. DOE stated that it
strongly disagreed with many of the findings in our draft report and
both of our recommendations. NRC provided written comments on March
17, 2011, which are reproduced in appendix V. NRC stated it had no
significant comments on our report and thanked us for the time and
effort taken to review this important topic. DOE and NRC also provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.
In its written comments, DOE stated that it strongly disagreed with
many of the findings in the report.
First, DOE questioned the veracity of information supplied by some
parties we interviewed. Specifically, DOE stated that some parties we
interviewed were "either ill-informed or had self-interested (for
example, financial) reason to disagree with DOE's considered
judgments." In order to address the objectives of our report, we
developed a methodology to ensure we obtained a complete, accurate,
and balanced view of the Yucca Mountain situation. As part of this
approach, it was important to include not only DOE's viewpoint but
that of other knowledgeable officials and individuals. Collectively,
we conducted more than 100 interviews with officials from NRC and the
Department of Justice as well as representatives from industry,
independent organizations, national associations and organizations,
academia, and community groups. It is important to note that many of
these knowledgeable individuals represent the views of national
organizations, are considered experts in their fields, or have
appeared as witnesses before the Blue Ribbon Commission. We spoke with
five former DOE OCRWM directors and other former and current DOE
officials and staff, some of whom worked on or managed various aspects
of DOE's shutdown efforts. Several of these officials and staff
provided views that conflicted with those of senior DOE managers. For
example, several of these former and current DOE officials expressed
concerns or reservations about aspects of DOE's steps to terminate the
Yucca Mountain repository project, such as how property was
dispositioned. In addition to the officials interviewed, we reviewed
thousands of pages of documents and reports. We used information from
all of these sources to develop our findings, conclusions, and
recommendations.
Second, DOE's comments questioned our assumption that the Yucca
Mountain repository would have opened in 2020. We believe that using a
2020 opening date is reasonable for analyzing the effects of a
possible termination of the program. As we made clear in our draft
report, 2020 was the target opening date that DOE itself established
in 2008. In developing this date, as we noted in the draft report, DOE
considered the many steps, including legislative and regulatory
actions, needed in order to open the repository. At any point in time,
DOE could have changed its target date or related assumptions, but it
did not. We recognized in our draft report that the opening date for
the Yucca Mountain repository was not certain, but DOE did not suggest
an alternative date for us to use in our analysis. Furthermore, DOE
used its Yucca Mountain repository plans, in which DOE assumes a 2020
opening date, in its annual 2010 assessment of the adequacy of the fee
that utilities pay into the Nuclear Waste Fund. More specifically, in
its 2010 assessment, DOE stated that the Yucca Mountain repository
scenario is the closest "proxy" to an as yet undefined alternative. We
have therefore retained this assumption while making clear its
limitations.
DOE also questioned our assumption that alternatives to Yucca Mountain
would likely take longer to implement and would lead to longer on-site
storage and increased costs. DOE stated that the Blue Ribbon
Commission will provide advice and make recommendations including
alternatives for the storage, processing, and disposal of spent
nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste, implying that such
alternatives could be implemented sooner than the Yucca Mountain
repository, but provided no additional information necessary for a
meaningful analysis of such alternatives. Moreover, the Blue Ribbon
Commission itself, in a March 2011 summary of data it has compiled so
far, stated that a mined, geologic disposal facility still seems to be
the most widely accepted approach and that most challenges to nuclear
waste disposal are political and social, not technical.[Footnote 45]
It is not clear whether the Blue Ribbon Commission's recommendations
can or will address these challenges, whether DOE will choose to
implement any of the Blue Ribbon Commission's recommendations, or how
quickly they can be implemented. In contrast, key interim or permanent
alternatives to the Yucca Mountain repository that we reviewed--
centralized storage, reprocessing, or even a different repository--
could take decades to implement. Although DOE stated in its comments
that it could begin operations of a centralized storage facility in as
little as 6 years, the evidence does not support this. The only effort
to open a centralized facility for storing dry casks of commercial
spent nuclear fuel--a private industry venture--began about 16 years
ago, but continues to face legal and political challenges and at least
3 years of construction before it can begin operations. DOE itself
acknowledged that it might only succeed in opening a centralized
storage facility in 6 years if various complex statutory, regulatory,
siting, construction, and financial issues were expeditiously
resolved. As we note in our report, the termination of the Yucca
Mountain repository essentially restarts a time consuming and costly
process that has already cost nearly $15 billion through fiscal year
2010. The significant opposition to the Yucca Mountain repository,
particularly from Nevada, is not a new development and DOE's pursuit
of the repository in the face of this opposition, followed by its
citing of this opposition in its decision to terminate the project
after more than 20 years, raises great uncertainty and questions about
DOE's credibility on this issue.
Third, DOE stated that it acted responsibly in carrying out the Yucca
Mountain repository shutdown, including assessing risks and ensuring
an orderly project termination. We included in our report DOE
officials' descriptions of steps taken to plan the shutdown of the
program, such as weekly meetings, but that does not constitute an
endorsement of those steps as being complete and comprehensive. As we
and DOE's Inspector General noted, DOE's efforts, while significant,
were still no substitute for having an approved shutdown plan that
includes a risk assessment. Such a plan can establish a shared
understanding of goals and the methods to be used to reach them.
Furthermore, a comprehensive risk assessment would identify not just
the immediate risks of shutting down the program, but the longer-term
risks that could impact future waste management efforts. Such a risk
assessment would help the department ensure that it has considered all
of the likely risks and taken appropriate actions to mitigate possible
impacts. Given the significant time and funds invested in the Yucca
Mountain effort, and the time and funds likely to be invested in a
future effort, it is reasonable to expect that a formal shutdown plan,
including a risk assessment, be completed.
Fourth, DOE stated that it complied with governing legal principles
for disposal of property related to the Yucca Mountain repository
program. However, DOE's property management decisions and its
ambitious property disposition schedule raised questions that we
sought to highlight in our draft report. For example, the
justification that DOE used in selecting the method it used to dispose
of its large volume of property, while complying with federal property
regulations, seemed "unusual," according to a GSA official with
authority over property management in the West. Specifically, DOE used
only a small sample of property that could not be sold--three pallets
of miscellaneous computer equipment--to document the decision to
transfer as abandoned property over 100 truckloads of office furniture
and equipment. Also, DOE's statement in its comments to us that our
draft report "inappropriately suggests that DOE should have conducted
an inventory of the property remaining at the Yucca Mountain site
prior to the shutdown of OCRWM," raises another question. A DOE order
concerning personal property management directs managers to perform
regular physical inventories of personal property that they are
responsible for, and the fact that DOE officials could not ascertain
whether any property was taken when storage units were broken into
seems to illustrate that this was not done.[Footnote 46] Finally, DOE
provided us with little documentation on certain property that was to
be sold at fair market value, with the proceeds returned to the
Nuclear Waste Fund. Although we acknowledge that DOE still has to
reconcile its contracts, the lack of available documentation--
including for one transaction that occurred in October 2009--raises
questions about whether DOE documentation is sufficient to support
timely oversight of such sales.
Fifth, DOE stated that it took steps during the shutdown that gave DOE
the ability to resume an active licensing proceeding, if so required.
Our concern is not that DOE would be unable to resume the process but
that it may be significantly slowed, and possibly less successful,
with the loss of knowledgeable and experienced staff. It is unclear
whether any of these staff would return to work if the licensing
should resume. For example, although DOE stated that it took steps to
retain federal DOE employees within other DOE units, many left DOE
employment. As stated in the report, according to DOE, its Office of
Human Capital had information on the location of the federal employees
who found other employment within DOE, but DOE officials stated that
they were not certain all those former employees would be interested
in returning to a licensing effort. DOE officials stated that they
could also use staff without Yucca Mountain experience, but the
substitution of these staff could jeopardize the quality of the
license defense, according to a key Sandia National Laboratories
official with management responsibilities over the Yucca Mountain
repository. Additionally, under normal attrition rates, as DOE stated
in its comments, DOE might be expected to successfully hire and train
a few individual employees and successfully integrate them into an
existing team, but recruiting an entire new team would, by DOE's own
admission, require years of training in technical and regulatory roles.
Lastly, DOE disagreed with our two recommendations, but, based on the
discussion above, we continue to believe they are appropriate. First,
DOE disagreed with our recommendation that it assess the risks
stemming from the rapid shutdown of Yucca Mountain and develop a
preliminary plan to restart the project. DOE stated that it had
already assessed and taken steps to mitigate the key risks associated
with the shutdown and cast doubt on any useful purpose being served by
conducting an after-the-fact risk assessment. However, as we have
stated, DOE management did not approve a formal shutdown plan or a
risk assessment, and DOE relied instead on focus groups of DOE staff
and meetings between DOE staff and management. As a result, DOE may be
unaware of all the risks it faces, particularly long-term impacts on
future waste management efforts. In addition, the future of the Yucca
Mountain project remains uncertain, and more comprehensive planning
and risk assessment could help DOE more efficiently respond with a
quality defense of its license application if it is required to resume
the license review proceedings.
DOE also disagreed with our recommendation that it provide Congress
with an inventory of property from the Yucca Mountain repository
program. It stated that an inventory of the property at Yucca Mountain
has already been completed, that reconciliation of property
transactions and inventory will take place as part of contract close-
outs, and that the applicable property disposition procedures were
followed. However, the actions DOE took would appear to be
insufficient in light of the facts. Specifically, DOE officials could
not ascertain whether any property was taken when storage units at the
Yucca Mountain site were broken into, and the department had little
documentation on certain property that was to be sold so that the
proceeds could be returned to the Nuclear Waste Fund. If DOE had an
inventory of its property and an accounting of the property disposed
of and funds received, as it should have, compiling this information
to provide Congress with a more complete understanding should not be
particularly difficult or time-consuming.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
appropriate congressional committees, Secretary of Energy, Chairman of
NRC, and other interested parties. In addition, the report also will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at 202-512-3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Mark E. Gaffigan:
Managing Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the basis for the Department of Energy's (DOE) decision
to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program, we wrote the
Secretary of Energy in May 2010 and requested that he provide his
input. We also reviewed key actions--and related documents--taken by
DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and affected parties,
including the June 29, 2010, ruling by NRC's Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board that denied DOE's motion to withdraw its license
application and court filings related to DOE's termination of the
Yucca Mountain repository program. Finally, we interviewed NRC
officials about DOE's decision.
To identify the steps DOE has taken to terminate the Yucca Mountain
repository program, and their effects, if any, we reviewed DOE budget
documents, memoranda, and correspondence. We visited the Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) offices in Las Vegas and
the Yucca Mountain site. We also spoke with DOE federal and contractor
officials from various offices involved with the termination efforts,
including OCRWM, the Office of Nuclear Energy, the Office of
Environmental Management, the Office of Legacy Management, the Office
of General Counsel, and Sandia National Laboratories. We also reviewed
pertinent DOE Office of Inspector General reports and interviewed
Inspector General officials. We used our Standards for Internal
Control in the Federal Government[Footnote 47] to assess DOE's plans
to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository and OCRWM.
To identify the likely major impacts of terminating the Yucca Mountain
repository program, we reviewed our prior reports and those of other
agencies within the legislative branch issued during the period from
1998 to 2010 (see appendix II). We limited the analysis to this period
because under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982(NWPA), 1998 was the
year that DOE was to begin taking custody of spent nuclear fuel from
commercial reactors. We felt that the issues raised in these reports
would adequately capture a range of impacts associated with a
potential closure of Yucca Mountain repository program. We limited the
scope of our review to identifying primary impacts, such as increased
storage costs. We also spoke with representatives from key national
associations and organizations whose members were either affected by
the termination of the Yucca Mountain repository program or were in a
position to comment on the impact as a result of studies or analyses.
These organizations are all national in scope or are part of a
national organization. They presented views that reflected those of
industry, government, academia, and concerned groups. See appendix III
for a list of these organizations. To gain a local perspective on the
possible impacts of a Yucca Mountain termination, we contacted state
and local government officials and community groups near the proposed
Yucca Mountain site and near the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)
site. We also selected a nongeneralizable sample of nuclear power
reactors--three operational reactors, one reactor that is no longer
operating but has not yet been decommissioned, and one decommissioned
reactor. We interviewed officials from state and local governments,
and representatives from industry and local community groups at these
sites. We conducted a site visit to the decommissioned reactor, in
Oregon. We considered several factors when selecting the reactors. For
example, we wanted to include both the oldest and most recently
licensed nuclear power reactors because we assumed they would reflect
different viewpoints on the impacts of terminating the Yucca Mountain
repository program. Table 1 gives details of the reactors we selected.
Table 1: Name, State, NRC Region, and Status of Commercial Nuclear
Reactors Sites We Contacted:
Reactor site: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station;
State: New Jersey;
NRC region: Region I;
Status: Oldest operating reactor, commercial operations began in 1969.
Reactor site: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant;
State: Minnesota;
NRC region: Region III;
Status: Operating reactor.
Reactor site: Trojan Nuclear Plant;
State: Oregon;
NRC region: Region IV;
Status: Decommissioned reactor.
Reactor site: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant;
State: Tennessee;
NRC region: Region II;
Status: Newest operating reactor, licensed in 1996.
Reactor site: Zion Nuclear Power Station;
State: Illinois;
NRC region: Region III;
Status: Reactor shut down but not yet decommissioned.
Source: GAO analysis of NRC data.
[End of table]
In assessing potential impacts, we used DOE's estimate of a 2020
opening date for the Yucca Mountain repository in our analysis. DOE's
2008 estimate for opening the Yucca Mountain repository was 2020,
before it took steps to terminate the program. While we recognize this
2020 date was not certain, we know of no better assumption to
meaningfully assess the impact of a termination of the Yucca Mountain
repository program.
To identify the principal lessons learned from the various past
nuclear waste management efforts and how these might be applied to
future efforts, we reviewed our reports and those of other agencies
within the legislative branch issued during the period from 1982 to
2010 (see appendix II). We limited the analysis to this period because
Congress passed the NWPA in 1982. We felt that issues raised in these
reports would address a range of key lessons learned from the past
nearly 30 years of U.S. nuclear waste management. In addition to this
analysis, we reviewed selected reports from the federal government,
academia, and industry relevant to lessons learned. We interviewed
DOE, NRC, and Sandia National Laboratories officials who had worked on
the Yucca Mountain project for their views on principal lessons
learned. We also talked to former DOE employees, including five past
directors of OCRWM. To obtain stakeholder perspectives on lessons
learned, we interviewed representatives from key national associations
and organizations, local and state governments, and community
organizations. To identify possible lessons learned from the nation's
only federal radioactive waste geologic repository at WIPP located in
New Mexico, we conducted a site visit at the repository and
interviewed officials from DOE, Sandia National Laboratories, and
state and local governments. To identify possible lessons learned from
the repository experiences at other countries, we reviewed documents
from organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development and the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, and we
interviewed officials from DOE, Sandia National Laboratories, and the
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to March 2011 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: A List of Reports Reviewed:
Congressional Budget Office:
CBO. Budget Options, Volume 2. Publication No. 3191. Washington, D.C.:
August 2009.
CBO. The Federal Government's Responsibilities and Liabilities Under
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Testimony statement of Kim Cawley, Chief
Natural and Physical Resources, Cost Estimation Unit, before the
Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington,
D.C.: July 16, 2009.
CBO. Costs of Reprocessing Versus Directly Disposing of Spent Nuclear
Fuel. Testimony Statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, before the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate.
Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2007.
CBO. The Federal Government's Liabilities Under the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act. Testimony Statement of Kim Cawley, Chief, Natural and
Physical Resources, Cost Estimates Unit before the Committee on the
Budget, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, D.C.: October 4,
2007.
CBO. Budget Options. Publication No. 2921. Washington, D.C.: February
2007.
CBO. Budget Options. Publication. Washington, D.C.: February 2005.
CBO. Homeland Security and the Private Sector. Washington, D.C.:
December 2004.
CBO. Cost Estimate: Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1999.
Washington, D.C.: June 24, 1999.
CBO. Cost Estimate: H.R. 45, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1999.
Washington, D.C.: May 17, 1999.
CBO. Cost Estimate: H.R. 1270, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997.
Washington, D.C.: September 25, 1997.
CBO. Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options. Washington,
D.C.: August 1996.
Congressional Research Service:
CRS. Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal. RL33461. Washington, D.C.: April
9, 2010.
CRS. Energy and Water Development: FY2011 Appropriations. R41150.
Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2010.
CRS. The Yucca Mountain Litigation: Liability under the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982. R40996. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2010.
CRS. Energy and Water Development: FY2010 Appropriations. R40669.
Washington, D.C.: January 5, 2010.
CRS. Nuclear Energy Policy. RL33558. Washington, D.C.: December 10,
2009.
CRS. Nuclear Waste Disposal: Alternatives To Yucca Mountain. R40202.
Washington, D.C.: February 6, 2009.
CRS. EPA's Final Health and Safety Standard for Yucca Mountain.
RL34698. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2008.
CRS. Radioactive Waste Streams: Waste Classification for Disposal.
RL32163. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2006.
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
GAO. Nuclear Waste Management: Key Attributes, Challenges, and Costs
for the Yucca Mountain Repository and Two Potential Alternatives.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48]. Washington, D.C.:
November 4, 2009.
GAO. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: DOE Should Reassess Its
Approach to Designing and Building Spent Nuclear Fuel Recycling
Facilities. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-483].
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2008.
GAO. Yucca Mountain: DOE Has Improved Its Quality Assurance Program,
but Whether Its Application for a NRC License Will Be High Quality Is
Unclear. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1010].
Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2007.
GAO. Yucca Mountain: Quality Assurance at DOE's Planned Nuclear Waste
Repository Needs Increased Management Attention. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-313]. Washington, D.C.: March 17,
2006.
GAO. Yucca Mountain: Persistent Quality Assurance Problems Could Delay
Repository Licensing and Operation. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-460]. Washington, D.C.: April 30,
2004.
GAO. Spent Nuclear Fuel: Options Exist to Further Enhance Security.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-426]. Washington, D.C.:
July 15, 2003.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Technical, Schedule, and Cost Uncertainties of the
Yucca Mountain Repository Project. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-191]. Washington, D.C.: December
21, 2001.
GAO. Radiation Standards: Scientific Basis Inconclusive, and EPA and
NRC Disagreement Continues. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-00-152]. Washington, D.C.: June
30, 2000.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Impediments to Completing the Yucca Mountain
Repository Project. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-97-30]. Washington, D.C.: January
17, 1997.
GAO. Department of Energy: Observations on the Future of the
Department. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-96-224]. Washington, D.C.:
September 4, 1996.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: DOE's Management and Organization of the Nevada
Repository Project. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-95-27]. Washington, D.C.:
December 23, 1994.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Comprehensive Review of the Disposal Program Is
Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-94-299].
Washington, D.C.: September 27, 1994.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Foreign Countries Approaches to High-Level Waste
Storage and Disposal. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-94-172]. Washington, D.C.: August
4, 1994.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Funds Spent to Identify a Monitored Retrievable
Storage Facility Site. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-93-199]. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 1993.
GAO. Radioactive Waste: EPA Standards Delayed by Low Priority and
Coordination Problems. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-93-126]. Washington, D.C.: June
3, 1993.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Yucca Mountain Project Behind Schedule and Facing
Major Scientific Uncertainties. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-93-124]. Washington, D.C.: May
21, 1993.
GAO. Transition Series: Energy Issues. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/OCG-93-13TR]. Washington, D.C.:
December 1992.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Status of Actions to Improve DOE User-Fee
Assessments. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-92-165].
Washington, D.C.: June 10, 1992.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: DOE's Repository Site Investigations, a Long and
Difficult Task. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-92-73]. Washington, D.C.: May 27,
1992.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Operation of Monitored Retrievable Storage
Facility Is Unlikely by 1998. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-91-194]. Washington, D.C.:
September 24, 1991.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Quarterly Report as of March 31, 1990. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-91-55]. Washington, D.C.:
February l5, 1991.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Changes Needed in DOE User-Fee Assessments to
Avoid Funding Shortfall. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-90-65]. Washington, D.C.: June 7,
1990.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Quarterly Report as of December 31, 1989.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-90-130]. Washington,
D.C.: April 30, l990.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Quarterly Report as of September 30, 1989.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-90-103]. Washington,
D.C.: March 2, 1990.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Quarterly Report on DOE's Nuclear Waste Program as
of June 30, 1989. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-90-59]. Washington, D.C.:
December 12, 1989.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: DOE's Budgeting Process for Grants to Nevada Needs
Revision. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-90-20].
Washington, D.C.: October 20, 1989.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Quarterly Report as of March 31, 1989. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-89-178]. Washington, D.C.: August
14, 1989.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Termination of Activities at Two Sites Proceeding
in an Orderly Manner. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-89-66]. Washington, D.C.:
February 6, 1989.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Repository Work Should Not Proceed until Quality
Assurance Is Adequate. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-88-159]. Washington, D.C.:
September 29, 1988.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Fourth Annual Report on DOE's Nuclear Waste
Program. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-88-131].
Washington, D.C.: September 28, 1988.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: DOE Should Provide More Information on Monitored
Retrievable Storage. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-87-92]. Washington, D.C.: June 1,
1987.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Status of DOE's Implementation of the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-87-17]. Washington, D.C.: April
15, 1987.
GAO. Nuclear Waste: Institutional Relations under the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-87-14]. Washington, D.C.:
February 9, 1987.
Office of Technology Assessment:
OTA. Managing the Nation's Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste.
OTA-O-171. Washington, D.C.: March 1985.
OTA. Managing the Nation's Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste
(summary). Washington, D.C.: April 1982.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Organizations We Obtained Input From:
AREVA Inc.
Association of American Railroads:
Carlsbad Department of Development (New Mexico):
Carlsbad Mayor's Office (New Mexico):
City of Red Wing, Office of the Mayor (Minnesota):
Clark County Department of Comprehensive Planning (Nevada):
Columbia County Board of Commissioners (Oregon):
Columbia Riverkeeper:
Council of State Governments, Midwestern Office:
Eastern Environmental Law Center:
Energy Communities Alliance:
EnergySolutions:
Exelon Nuclear:
Grandmothers, Mothers and More for Energy Safety (New Jersey):
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research:
International Nuclear Associates:
Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce:
Minnesota Department of Commerce:
National Academy of Sciences:
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners:
National Conference of State Legislatures:
Natural Resources Defense Council:
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection:
New Jersey Environmental Federation:
New Mexico Environment Department:
North American Water Office:
Nuclear Energy Information Service:
Nuclear Energy Institute:
Nuclear Information and Resource Service:
Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition:
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board:
Nye County (Nevada):
Ocean County Sheriff's Department (New Jersey):
Oregon Conservancy Foundation:
Oregon Public Power Coalition:
PECOS Management Services, Inc.
Portland General Electric:
Prairie Island Indian Community:
PSEG Nuclear:
Public Utility Commission of Oregon:
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control:
Southern Nuclear:
Southern States Energy Board:
Southwest Research and Information Center:
State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects:
Tennessee Environmental Council:
Tennessee Valley Authority:
URS Corporation:
U.S. Chamber of Commerce:
Western Interstate Energy Board:
Xcel Energy:
Note: We also obtained input from other organizations not listed here.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
Washington, DC 20585:
March 30, 2011:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Subject: DOE's Response to GAO's Conclusions and Technical
Misstatements (GAO-11-229):
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The Department of Energy strongly disagrees with many of the
conclusions drawn in GAO's Draft Report. In some areas, those
conclusions are based upon misapprehensions of fact. In others, the
Draft Report appears to accept on faith assertions by parties who are
either ill-informed or have self-interested (for example, financial)
reason to disagree with DOE's considered judgments.
More generally, the Draft Report appears premised on two mistaken
assumptions: first, that the Yucca Mountain repository would have
opened, on a date certain (notwithstanding the many hurdles still
remaining before it); and, second, that any alternative to the Yucca
Mountain repository will take longer to implement and therefore lead
to longer storage times at reactor sites and increased costs. To the
contrary, there was considerable uncertainty whether the Yucca
Mountain repository would ever have opened ” let alone when. Among
other things, the project would have required new legislation, an NRC
license, and many additional permits. And it suffered over many years
from persistent community opposition. In shutting down the Yucca
Mountain Project, DOE is committed to pursuing better, more workable
alternatives. To that end, the Secretary has established a Blue Ribbon
Commission on America's Nuclear Future to conduct a comprehensive
review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel
cycle. The Commission will provide advice and make recommendations on
issues including alternatives for the storage, processing, and
disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. Its interim report
is due in July of this year and its final report is due by January
2012.
The Department has acted responsibly in carrying out the Yucca
Mountain Project shutdown and will continue to do so in pursuing new
options with the guidance of the Blue Ribbon Commission. Accordingly,
it is unwarranted to assume, as the Draft Report appears to do
throughout, that the shutdown of Yucca Mountain will impair the
Government's ability to meet responsibly its waste management
obligations.
That said, the Department welcomes GAO's efforts to glean lessons from
the Yucca Mountain experience to guide future waste management
efforts. And it appreciates the opportunity to comment on GAO's Draft
Report, while nevertheless feeling it necessary to register
substantial disagreement with many of the conclusions drawn therein.
A. Shutdown Planning:
From senior management on down, the Department was committed to
closing down the Yucca Mountain Project in a responsible manner, and
it successfully did so. DOE's senior management worked closely with
the Department's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
(OCRWM) and other relevant offices to plan for and implement the
shutdown. This included ensuring that scientific information and other
records were preserved, that DOE's Licensing Support Network
collection of more than 30 million pages was maintained and remained
online via the NRC portal, that all Project property was properly
disposed of, that contracts requirements were met, and that federal
employees were given priority placement within the Department or
provided other assistance in finding new employment. All these
activities were based on a master plan developed by management and
overseen and supported on an ongoing basis by appropriate personnel
within OCWRM and other relevant offices within the Department.
Nevertheless, the Draft Report concludes that DOE lacked an "adequate
closeout plan." Draft Report at 43. This "finding" rests on GAO's
apparent belief that "DOE did not consistently follow federal policy
and guidance for planning ... the shutdown." Id at 14. That is
simply inaccurate.
1. Risk Assessment:
The Draft Report asserts that "DOE terminated the program without
assessing the risks stemming from the shutdown, including the
possibility that it might have to resume the repository effort."
[Footnote 1] Id. at 43. That assertion ignores the substantial
attention DOE gave to risk assessment and the steps it took in
response. Indeed, elsewhere the Draft Report itself specifically notes
that DOE considered and addressed these risks. For example, the Draft
Report acknowledges statements by DOE officials that "although they
did not complete a formal risk assessment, they did consider the
possible risks of shutting down the program ... including the risk to
DOE's ability to resume the license review process, if necessary." Id.
at 22-23 (emphasis added). Even more to the point, as the Draft Report
specifically acknowledges, such consideration led to numerous steps by
DOE to mitigate those risks. Id at 23. Those steps included: (1) "not
canceling its management and operating contract, in part so it would
be easier to resume licensing activities if it were required to do
so;" (2) "helping federal employees at OCRWM to remain at DOE, in part
to facilitate efforts to reconstitute the Yucca Mountain work force,
should the need arise;" and (3) consideration by DOE's Office of the
General Counsel of "planning and risk issues as the program was being
dismantled." It is therefore clear ” and apparently was to GAO ” that
DOE did carefully consider the risks inherent in shutting down the
Yucca Mountain Project and took prudent action to abate such risks as
it identified.
2. Ensuring an Orderly Project Termination:
a. Existence of a Shutdown Plan:
The Department acted to ensure that the Yucca Mountain Project closed
down in a responsible manner. These efforts have largely been
successful, and included significant work to plan for and implement
the shutdown.
For example, in the Draft Report's own words, the Department undertook
"extensive efforts" to "preserve data related to its licensing
efforts, as well as other scientific information relevant to the
storage or disposal of high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel." Id.
at 15. Likewise, the shutdown ensured all Project property was
properly disposed of, that contracts requirements were met, and that
federal employees were given priority placement within the Department
or provided other assistance in finding new employment. All these
activities were based on a draft master plan developed by DOE
management and overseen and supported on an ongoing basis by
appropriate personnel within OCWRM and other relevant offices.
To ensure that the Department closed down the Yucca Mountain Project
in a responsible manner that minimized harm to federal employees ” and
did so within the timeframe necessary to account responsibly for the
likelihood of no funding in Fiscal Year 2011 ” the then-Under
Secretary of Energy, Dr. Kristina Johnson, held weekly meetings with
the senior management of OCRWM and other DOE units. Those units
included the Office of Environmental Management, the Office of Legacy
Management, the Office of Nuclear Energy, the Office of the Chief
Financial Officer, the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, the
National Nuclear Security Administration and the Office of the General
Counsel. The Draft Report acknowledges these meetings, see id at 22,
but fails to appreciate the extent to which this process ensured that
shutdown efforts were reviewed and coordinated by the Department's
senior leaders. As part of this process, for example, the Under
Secretary and affected Departmental offices executed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) clearly delineating each office's roles and
responsibilities for functions continuing after the closure of OCRWM.
[Footnote 2]
The Draft Report recognizes the view of DOE officials involved "that
DOE met its September 30, 2010 deadline for closure and believed that
despite the difficult task, the shutdown was orderly." Id. at 15. As
if to contradict this, however, the Draft Report observes that, "while
OCRWM's Yucca Mountain Project activities have ceased, several
termination tasks are still ongoing, such as disposing of federal
property and closing down contracts and subcontracts." Id.
To the extent this is meant to imply that the shutdown has been less
than successfully executed, that implication is misguided. Rather, as
any responsible organization would, DOE appropriately prioritized its
shutdown activities. By September 30, 2010, all activities that needed
to be completed by the close of the Fiscal Year had in fact been
completed. It was entirely appropriate to defer until after September
30, 2010 activities that did not need to be completed by the end of
the Fiscal Year. Moreover, it is significant that the Draft Report
does not, because it cannot, identify a single unrealized benefit that
would have resulted from DOE adopting "formal" plans instead of the
working plans that it actually implemented.
b. Adequacy of Shutdown Staffing:
The Draft Report questions whether the shutdown effort was
appropriately staffed. Specifically, it asserts that "in contrast to
the data preservation efforts, efforts to retain Yucca Mountain
project staff were minimal." Id. at 16. "Staff were encouraged to seek
other employment and given no incentive to stay with OCRWM to assist
with the shutdown. Some DOE and contractor officials told us that
retaining key staff during the shutdown process would have been
helpful." Id at 16-17.
This misunderstands an important part of DOE's shutdown planning and
execution. Requiring additional staff to remain in their previous
posts throughout the shutdown process would have been inconsistent
with the important goal of assisting OCRWM employees to find new
positions in the Department by September 30, 2010. Moreover, GAO fails
to identify any specific aspect of the shutdown process that might
have been improved had OCRWM retained a larger staff than it did in
the months leading up to September 30, 2010. Further, OCRWM worked
with management of other DOE offices to delay the departure of
essential OCRWM personnel to their new positions where circumstances
permitted.
B. Property Disposition:
Contrary to the impression created by the Draft Report, DOE's
decisions regarding property disposition were made with great care and
with a clear understanding of ” and in compliance with ” the governing
legal principles.
The Draft Report asserts that DOE is "vulnerable to losses in ...
physical property" and "may not be able to ensure it has appropriately
managed federal property and funds." Id. at 43. However, the Draft
Report itself demonstrates that DOE successfully disposed of unneeded
property in a financially sound, common-sense manner that complied
with applicable federal property regulations. See id. at 18-21.
Likewise, the Draft Report criticizes DOE for "not completing an
inventory of OCRWM property before it closed out the Yucca Mountain
site," adding that DOE "does not know if equipment was stolen, even
though some of its storage sites were breached." Id. at 43. But the
facts contained in the Draft Report show that an inventory of property
at the Yucca Mountain site was completed when necessary and the
equipment allegedly at-risk was actually protected by multiple layers
of security. See id. at 20. The Draft Report also asserts that DOE
failed to "demonstrate that it fully documented the return of any
proceeds from sales of OCRWM [property] to the Nuclear Waste Fund." Id
at 43. However, the Draft Report shows that DOE did document the
initial stage of this reimbursement process and acknowledges that full
documentation would be available once certain contracts are closed
out. See id. at 20. Finally, the Draft Report criticizes DOE's
property disposition documentation as "limited." Id. at 17. Yet it
fails to identify any actual flaws or insufficiencies in that
documentation.
The apparent basis for all these misconceptions is provided under the
misleading heading "DOE Used Expedited Procedures to Dispose of
Property, but Its Documentation Was Limited." Id. This heading implies
that the process employed by the Department for the disposal of
property was inadequately documented and somehow flawed. That is
simply not the case. Indeed, virtually all of the facts discussed in
this section of the Draft Report demonstrate that DOE followed both
the letter and intent of the federal property regulations by disposing
of property in a financially sound, common-sense manner.
To facilitate an accurate understanding of DOE's property disposition
procedures, DOE has organized its response around four issues: (1)
Property Disposition Prior to the Shutdown of OCRWM; (2) Property
Disposition During the Shutdown of OCRWM; (3) Property at the Yucca
Mountain Site; and (4) Return of Certain Proceeds to Nuclear Waste
Fund.
1. Property Disposition Prior to the Shutdown of OCRWM:
The Draft Report acknowledges that the property disposition procedures
DOE used during the shutdown, which began in 2010, were consistent
with procedures followed in other circumstances. See id. Specifically,
the Draft Report acknowledges that they were "similar to those used to
transfer excess property in 2009." Id. The 2009 transfers primarily
involved office furniture that was excess to OCRWM's needs after the
transition of OCRWM's management and operation (M&O) contractor in
April of that year. During this transition, the Project vacated the
majority of its leased offices and downsized from over 1,000 office
suites to approximately 100 office suites. As a result of this
downsizing, OCRWM had a significant quantity of excess furniture that
was ultimately transferred to other DOE sites. The Draft Report
contains no finding that this process was in any way flawed.
2. Property Disposition During the Shutdown of OCRWM:
The Draft Report describes the typical screening process that an
agency must follow, as dictated by the General Services Administration
(GSA), unless the agency declares that the property is "abandoned."
See id. at 17-18. The Draft Report then explains that federal
regulations allow an agency to employ an alternative property
disposition process in "common-sense" situations where it "might not
make sense to transfer or sell" the property. Id. at 18. As the Draft
Report explains:
Federal regulations also allow for an agency to declare its property
abandoned and to dispose of the property on its own. To do so, the
agency must first make a determination that the property has no
commercial value or that the estimated cost of its continued care and
storage could exceed the estimated proceeds from its sale.
Id.
Subsequently, the Draft Report acknowledges DOE officials' explanation
that declaring the unneeded property as abandoned and transferring it
within the Department "was the most efficient pathway" because this
allowed the Department to "reduce landlord costs by emptying buildings
of their equipment, save on utilities and security, and in some cases,
reduce lease costs." Id at 18. As the Draft Report recognizes, through
this process, approximately 80 truckloads of office furniture and
equipment were transferred to DOE's Hanford Site, which saved that
site about $2.1 million. Furthermore, the Draft Report cites a GSA
official who correctly stated that "the determination of how to apply
the regulation is left up to the agency and the fact that DOE found a
way to reuse the equipment addressed the overall intent of the federal
property regulations." Id. at 19. The same GSA official also explained
that, "according to the abandonment regulation, DOE had to determine
that its property had no commercial value or that the cost of its
continued care and handling exceeded the estimated proceeds from the
sale." Id.
DOE did in fact determine that the property it planned to abandon had
no commercial value. The Draft Report itself demonstrates that this
determination by DOE was carefully reasoned and appropriately
documented. The Draft Report summarizes the analysis used by the
Department in reaching this determination. See id. Namely, storing the
furniture and equipment costs the Department about $680 per day. OCRWM
had reviewed the GSA database and found examples of three pallets of
equipment that were similar to the material that OCRWM had, but GSA
had not received any offers for the asking price of only $10. In light
of this, OCRWM determined that the care, storage, and processing of
its property "far surpassed the estimated proceeds from sale." Id.
According to the Draft Report, "DOE officials stated that their
documentation was sufficient for regulatory purposes." Id.
In support of its contrary assertion, the Draft Report contains a
single statement by a GSA official who opined that, "agencies
determine on their own the level of analysis required to declare
property abandoned, but ... DOE's limited analysis did not seem to
address the large volume or variety of property that DOE was
transferring." Id. As the first part of that statement indicates,
under the abandonment regulations, the level of analysis required to
declare property abandoned is left to the discretion of the agency.
Those regulations specifically provide that a federal agency does not
need to report abandonment or destruction of excess personal property to
GSA.[Footnote 3] DOE had discretion regarding the abandonment of
property and the implementation of the property regulations. It
exercised that discretion responsibly, and GSA does not have
supervisory, oversight, or enforcement responsibilities over abandoned
property.
3. Property at the Yucca Mountain Site:
The Draft Report states that although very little of the property from
the Yucca Mountain site had been transferred, DOE "may have lost some
of it to break-ins." Id. Further, the Draft Report asserts that the
Department did not have a good inventory of the property at Yucca
Mountain. For support, the Draft Report quotes a DOE official as
saying broken locks had been found on at least three occasions and
that, "some property may have been taken, but without an inventory
they could not be certain what, if anything, was missing." Id. at 20.
In short, the Draft Report inappropriately suggests that DOE should
have conducted an inventory of the property remaining at the Yucca
Mountain site prior to the shutdown of OCRWM, and that if such an
inventory had been conducted DOE would know whether any property was
in fact missing.
It is important to understand that, unlike the property at OCRWM's Las
Vegas offices, the majority of the property located at the Yucca
Mountain site was not slated for disposal and in fact remains in DOE
custody. As such, the Department determined that it was not necessary
to conduct a complete inventory of the property located at the site
because the property did not need to be moved from the site prior to
shutdown and would remain in DOE's control at a secure site.[Footnote
4] Appropriately, during the shutdown of OCRWM, the primary focus was
placed on disposing of the property in the Las Vegas offices, because
the Project had physically to vacate those offices. In addition, the
Department took numerous steps to transfer responsibility and
oversight of the Yucca Mountain site including the property and its
ultimate disposition to other DOE organizations ensuring continuity of
stewardship. The surface facilities at the site are part of DOE's
Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and remain under DOE control
after the shutdown of OCRWM. As such, DOE determined that the
inventory and disposal of property at the site could be deferred until
after the shutdown of OCRWM. As the Draft Report acknowledges, an
inventory of the property at the site has now been completed and the
property will be screened through the Energy Asset Disposal System.
See id. at 20.
Furthermore, the Department did in fact take reasonable steps to
protect the property remaining at the Yucca Mountain site by placing
it either in locked storage buildings or trailers or in the tunnel,
which was shut down and secured behind a fence and locked gate. In
addition, it strictly limited the distribution of keys to specified
responsible officials. Finally, the storage buildings, trailers, and
the tunnel are all located on a remote corner of the NNSS, which is
itself a heavily guarded facility with restricted access. In light of
these multiple layers of security, DOE determined that placing
additional guards outside of the storage buildings, trailers and
tunnel entrance at the site would not be a prudent use of resources.
This determination was entirely appropriate.
4. Return of Certain Proceeds to Nuclear Waste Fund:
The Draft Report notes that DOE guidance prohibits the transfer of
certain property under the abandonment regulation and instead requires
that it be sold at fair market value, with the proceeds to be
deposited into the Nuclear Waste Fund. See id. However, the Draft
Report's assertion that DOE failed to demonstrate appropriate
reimbursement of the Nuclear Waste Fund for property sold for fair
market value is premature at best. As the Draft Report acknowledges,
DOE did provide documentation showing that it "directed [its]
contractor to sell property and reimburse OCRWM." Id. As it further
acknowledges, documentation showing that such sales did in fact occur
and tracking the flow of proceeds is not yet available, but "would
become available during the contract close-out process." Id. Given
that the contract has not yet been closed out, any implication that
the Nuclear Waste Fund has not been appropriately reimbursed is
premature.
C. Ability to Resume the Licensing Proceeding:
As DOE has made clear in public filings,[Footnote 5] it could and
would resume an active licensing proceeding if required to do so. DOE
has taken numerous steps to ensure that it can support an active
licensing proceeding, provided Congress appropriates it funds with
which to do so. Nonetheless, the Draft Report draws the unwarranted
conclusion that "DOE may find it increasingly difficult to resume the
[licensing] process if it ... is compelled to do so." Id at 43.
In support of this conclusion, the Draft Report makes several
assertions, each of which is addressed below.
1. Preservation of Scientific Knowledge:
First, the Draft Report asserts that DOE "missed opportunities to
preserve institutional knowledge that may be needed in future
efforts." Id. That is simply not the case. Indeed, the
Draft Report recognizes that "DOE has taken extensive efforts to
preserve data related to its licensing efforts, as well as other
scientific information relevant to the storage or disposal of high-
level waste and spent nuclear fuel." Id. at 15. As the Draft Report
further recognizes, those efforts included "maintaining a collection
of 3.6 million documents pertaining to its license application" and
"taking steps to maintain several other databases for the use of
future scientists, the largest of which is called the Records
Information System." Id. at 16. As the Draft Report recognizes, the
databases DOE is preserving "generally consist of relevant scientific
information related to the storage of high-level waste and spent
nuclear fuel" and the Records Information System "will be usable and
preserved in the same quality as it existed under OCRWM and for 25
years after the termination of the Yucca Mountain program." Id.
Additionally, DOE preserved core federal capabilities in the areas of
science and program management by retaining key OCRWM personnel within
other Departmental units. Specifically, DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy
(NE) expanded its Office of Used Nuclear Fuel Disposition Research and
Development to ensure that the expertise that had been developed
within OCRWM could be maintained within the Department to conduct the
scientific research required to implement recommendations from the
Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. These actions
would also facilitate a resumption of the licensing process, if DOE
were ordered to do so.
2. Maintenance of the Licensing Support Network (LSN):
Second, the Draft Report asserts that "it is not clear ... who will be
responsible for preserving the [LSN] or whether it will continue to be
accessible by scientists and the public, particularly in light of
budget pressures and changing priorities over a long period of time."
Id.
To the contrary, DOE has made it clear that its Office of Legacy
Management will be responsible for preserving DOE's LSN collection.
[Footnote 6] Furthermore, DOE has stated that it will continue to make
its LSN collection electronically accessible through the NRC's LSN
portal until all appeals related to the Yucca Mountain proceeding have
been exhausted. DOE has further committed that after the Yucca
Mountain proceeding has been terminated, or if the NRC website portal
is shut down prior to such termination, DOE will preserve the LSN in
accordance with the determinations rendered by the National Archives
and Records Administration (NARA) which is the agency vested with
authority to determine whether records should be archived on a
temporary or permanent basis. DOE has recommended that a 100-year
retention period would be appropriate for the LSN, although, again,
NARA will make the final determination.
Thus, while DOE cannot control whether the NRC eliminates
accessibility to the LSN via the NRC portal, the Department is
committed to taking numerous steps to ensure that its LSN collection
will be preserved. As a result, DOE will retain the capability to
search the DOE LSN collection and provide responsive documents.
3. Contractor's "Knowledge Retention" Proposal:
Third, the Draft Report implies that DOE missed an opportunity to
preserve institutional knowledge when it refused to accept a $2.8
million contractor proposal to prepare "knowledge retention packages."
Id. at 25. The Draft Report characterizes that proposal as "an effort
to mitigate the threat of the irrecoverable loss of expert knowledge
as staff members depart the Yucca Mountain repository program." Id.
Yet the Draft Report fails to cite a single example of such
"irrecoverable" knowledge and ” significantly ” skips over the fact
that DOE required that all scientific and technical materials be
sufficiently documented in writing to allow use by other scientific
and technical experts without the need for recourse to the originator.
As DOE explained to GAO, the Department requires that scientific
knowledge be documented in writing because it has long been aware that
the original authors of scientific and technical materials might not
be available for the duration of the proceeding.
Indeed, the Draft Report itself appropriately recognizes that DOE
management reviewed the contractor proposal and determined that the
suggested tasks were far too expensive and wholly unnecessary for DOE
to comply with its obligations to preserve existing records and
scientific information that would be needed were the proceeding ever
to resume.[Footnote 7] The Draft Report should also acknowledge, but
does not, the contractor's inherent self-interest in suggesting the
work at issue. Simply put, the proposed "knowledge retention" plan
was, in the eyes of the experienced DOE managers who reviewed it, a
multi-million dollar boondoggle, entirely unnecessary at this stage of
the application proceeding.[Footnote 8]
4. Ability to Reconstitute Staff:
Fourth, the Draft Report asserts that during the shutdown process, DOE
"eliminated experienced staff' without "tapping them for lessons
learned that could be helpful for future efforts," id. at 43, and that
this "loss of staff with experience at Yucca Mountain could hinder the
license review if the process is resumed," id. at 23. This assertion
ignores the fact that the Department took significant steps to assist
OCRWM employees to find alternate employment with the Department. The
Department tailored these steps in order to maintain core federal
capabilities in the science and program management areas that would be
required (and, as a result of DOE's efforts, available), in the event
DOE were ordered to resume the license application process.
Additionally, in terms of non-federal employees, the vast majority of
contractor personnel who worked on the Yucca Mountain Project did so
under contracts with either Sandia National Laboratories or USA RS.
Those contracts have not been terminated, and through them the
Department could access substantial contractor expertise in the event
the licensing proceeding was to resume.
The Draft Report further asserts that "DOE may find it increasingly
hard to gather staff with previous experience at Yucca Mountain, since
over time more will retire, relocate, or change careers." Id. at 43.
Clearly, the possibility of staff "retiring, relocating, or changing
careers" would exist even had the Project not been terminated.
Likewise, the Draft Report questions DOE's ability to reassemble its
licensing team based on concerns raised by some DOE, NRC, and Sandia
National Laboratories officials. See id at 24. As documented above,
however, DOE has taken steps to mitigate such concerns, for example by
retaining key OCRWM employees at DOE and maintaining its contracts
with Sandia National Laboratories and USA RS. These concerns should
also be balanced against the reality, as noted above, that the license
application was developed under institutional controls requiring
extensive and transparent documentation. In sum, DOE has taken steps
to ensure that, while there would be some delay, it could resume the
licensing proceeding if so ordered, provided Congress appropriates it
money with which to do so.
D. Timing and Cost of Alternatives to Yucca Mountain:
The Draft Report asserts that "any alternative to Yucca Mountain will
likely involve considerable time and cost," and catalogues a variety
of negative impacts that may allegedly arise because DOE's decision
will supposedly cause "delay" in removing materials from existing
locations. Id. at 43. This is an assumption running through the Draft
Report. GAO appears to presume that any alternative to Yucca Mountain
will take longer to implement, resulting in longer storage times at
reactor sites, and will cost more than Yucca Mountain. This
presumption, however, is speculative and unfounded.
1. Prolonged Storage at Reactor Sites:
The Draft Report asserts that DOE's decision to terminate the Project
"will likely prolong storage at reactor sites," which could lead to a
chain of negative impacts including "increased on-site storage costs,"
increased "taxpayer burden by increasing the substantial liabilities
that DOE has already incurred due to on-site storage at commercial
nuclear reactors," "[reduced] opportunities for industry and local
communities" to use existing storage sites for alternative uses, and
"increase[d] opposition to expansion of the nuclear industry." Id. at
30-32. These assertions are premised on the assumption that the Yucca
Mountain Project would have resulted in an operating repository by
2020. In fact, the opening of Yucca Mountain was always subject to
numerous contingencies, including legislative and regulatory actions,
that might well have prevented it from opening by 2020 or any other
date.[Footnote 9] Moreover, these assertions ignore the possibility
that alternatives to Yucca Mountain, such as interim storage, could
well result in waste being transferred from sites more quickly than it
would have had DOE continued to pursue a repository at Yucca Mountain.
[Footnote 10]
The Draft Report's speculation regarding the likelihood of prolonged
storage is also premised upon a significant factual error ” one that
misrepresents not only DOE's position but also a prior GAO Report.
Specifically, the Draft Report cites a 2009 GAO Report (GAO-10-48) for
the mistaken proposition that, "according to dozens of experts, even a
federal centralized interim storage facility is likely to take 17 to
33 years to plan and implement.... If such a facility were initiated
in 2011, this makes the most likely initial opening date somewhere
from 2029 to 2045." Draft Report at 29. In fact, the 2009 Report
attributes this estimate to a single unnamed centralized storage
expert, not dozens of experts.[Footnote 11] The Draft Report then
states that "DOE generally agreed with our findings in [the 2009]
Report." Id. at 29 n.33. This statement is misleading. Specifically,
the single expert estimate in the 2009 Report immediately followed a
statement by DOE "that if various complex statutory, regulatory,
siting, construction, and financial issues were expeditiously
resolved, a centralized facility nuclear waste could begin operations
as early as 6 years after its development began."[Footnote 12] DOE did
not address the estimate attributed to the unnamed expert in its
comments on the 2009 Report since its disagreement had already been
acknowledged in that Report itself.
The current Draft Report further speculates that storage at utility
sites will be prolonged because "communities may be even less willing
to host spent nuclear fuel repositories or other storage sites in the
future" due to the termination of the Project. Id at 33. Here the
Draft Report fails to recognize the significance of DOE's experience
with the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), where there has been
significant community support for the construction and operation of a
waste repository. DOE's pursuit of improved alternatives to Yucca
Mountain will be informed by its successful experience with WIPP. It
will likewise be aided by the expertise and imprimatur of the
distinguished Blue Ribbon Commission the Department has convened to
recommend alternative approaches. For these reasons among others, the
Draft Report's assertion that community acceptance will prove elusive
in the future is speculative at best.
DOE is confident that pursuing improved alternatives to Yucca Mountain
will result in a better approach to waste disposal. Moreover, it is
entirely possible that the DOE may actually be able to accelerate the
schedule by which it is able to remove spent fuel from utility sites.
The Draft Report's speculation to the contrary is thus premature and
unfounded.
2. Costs of Alternatives to Yucca Mountain:
The Draft Report asserts that, "as a result of the termination of the
Yucca Mountain repository program, DOE may also need to seek
additional funding for an alternative repository." Id. at 30. This
statement appears to imply that an increase in the waste fee will be
necessary. This is pure speculation, and it is contrary to the
Secretary's recent determination that the waste fee need not be
altered at this time.
It also ignores the very real possibility that Yucca Mountain might
never have been operational and that an alternative might ultimately
cost less and not require an increase in the fee. As noted, the
opening of Yucca Mountain was always subject to numerous contingencies
that might well have prevented it from opening by 2020 (or any other
date). The effect of such contingencies on the amount of funding
necessary to open Yucca Mountain is unknown. Moreover, speculation
that an alternative disposal solution would cost more than Yucca
Mountain is premature at least until the Blue Ribbon Commission issues
its recommendations and actions have been taken in light of those
recommendations.
The Draft Report further asserts that "if DOE were to pursue an
alternative repository, it is not certain that the [Nuclear Waste
Fund] will have built up a sufficient surplus to site, license,
construct, and operate it." Id. at 30. This is not only speculative;
it evinces a fundamental misunderstanding of the law. DOE is required
by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (NWPA), to conduct
a review every year precisely to determine whether more (or fewer)
funds are necessary. Thus, if more funds ultimately are required,
there is an adequate statutory mechanism to address that issue. The
Draft Report expresses concern that DOE can collect funds pursuant to
that statutory mechanism only "while nuclear reactors are still
operating," apparently suggesting that the Fund may experience a
shortfall when nuclear reactors stop operating. Id. This, too, is
speculative. In short, nothing in the Draft Report suggests, or would
support the suggestion, that the existing statutory mechanism is
inadequate.
E. DOE's Response to GAO's Recommendations for Executive Action:
In light of the foregoing, the Department respectfully submits that
neither of the Draft Report's two recommendations for executive action
is warranted.
First, the Draft Report recommends that DOE "assess the risks stemming
from the rapid shutdown of Yucca Mountain and develop a preliminary
plan to restart the project, in case DOE is required to do so." Id. at
45. As more fully set forth above, DOE has already assessed (and taken
steps to mitigate) the key risks associated with the Project shutdown
process. DOE therefore doubts whether any useful purpose would be
served by expending additional funds to engage in a formalistic, after-
the-fact "risk assessment."
Second, the Draft Report recommends that the Department "provide
Congress with an inventory of property from the Yucca Mountain
repository program, including its value, and an accounting of the
property disposed of, the funds received from property transactions,
and the disposition of these funds." Id. at 45. The Department
believes no useful purpose would be served by engaging in such an
exercise at this time and further believes this would be a waste of
scarce funds. Moreover, the Department does not believe it has an
obligation to provide a separate accounting, especially since an
inventory of the property at the Yucca Mountain site has already been
completed and reconciliation of property transactions and inventory
will take place as part of contract close-outs. Finally, as discussed
more fully above, the Department notes that the applicable property
disposition procedures were followed. Accordingly, the Draft Report's
recommended inventory and accounting would add little if anything of
value to the public record.
F. Technical Misstatements:
Footnote 1 of the Draft Report incorrectly states that "spent nuclear
fuel ... when it is accepted for disposal, is considered to be high-
level waste." Id. at 3 n.1. The NWPA draws a clear distinction between
spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste and this
distinction does not disappear simply because DOE accepts spent
nuclear fuel for disposa1.[Footnote 13]
The Draft Report misuses the statutory-defined term "surplus" several
times. Id. at 17-20. "Surplus" property has a specific meaning in the
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949. That statute
defines "surplus" as "excess property that the [GSA] Administrator
determines is not required to meet the needs or responsibilities of
all federal agencies."[Footnote 14] The term "excess," which is also a
term of art, is defined as "property under the control of a federal
agency that the head of the agency determines is not required to meet
the agency's needs or responsibilities."[Footnote 15] In this case,
the GSA Administrator had not made a determination regarding the DOE
property in question. At the end of page 17 of the Draft Report, and
the beginning of page 18, the use of the term "surplus" is
appropriate, since that discussion addresses GSA's responsibilities.
However, the term "unneeded" should be substituted for the following
references to "surplus": (1) page 17, two references in the third
paragraph; (2) page 18, third paragraph; (3) page 19, second
paragraph, and (4) page 20, first and second paragraph.
The Draft Report states that DOE "did not establish independent
scientific panels ... that might have given affected parties more
confidence" in certain technologies included in the license
application. Id at 36. In fact, the NWPA established the Nuclear Waste
Technical Review Board (NWTRB) for the sole purpose of providing
independent scientific and technical oversight of DOE's disposal
program,[Footnote 16] but the Draft Report gives this important
oversight mechanism only passing notice that underplays its importance
in maintaining transparency. The NWTRB is an independent federal
agency consisting of a panel of 11 experts in science and engineering
nominated by the National Academy of Sciences and appointed by the
President.[Footnote 17] Between NWTRB's inception and the shutdown of
the Project, the NWTRB received approximately $45 million of
Congressional appropriations,[Footnote 18] published dozens of studies
and reports on a wide range of scientific and technical aspects of the
Project,[Footnote 19] and corresponded regularly with DOE regarding
the Project.[Footnote 20] In addition, DOE itself convened independent
scientific and technical panels through the use of expert elicitations
and independent experts. For example, two of the most extensive
elicitations conducted by DOE were the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard
Analysis (PSHA) and the Probabilistic Volcanic Hazard Analysis (PVHA).
Both the PSHA and the PVHA were formal expert elicitations with panels
of independent technical experts. The PSHA was convened to analyze the
potential effects of seismicity on the region surrounding Yucca
Mountain. and the PVHA was convened to analyze the potential effects
of volcanic activity in that region. The results of both of these
expert elicitations are included in the Yucca Mountain License
Application.[Footnote 21]
The Draft Report also states that DOE "did not consult" with the local
community in developing technological solutions for the Project. Id at
36. This is wrong. For example, a local Nye County technical
representative was collocated with DOE technical staff in DOE
facilities. In addition, DOE held numerous public workshops and public
meetings on a broad range of topics.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Peter B. Lyons:
Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy:
Appendix IV Footnotes:
[1] The Draft Report further asserts that, "although uncertainty [sic]
over whether it had the authority to terminate the Yucca Mountain
repository program, DOE terminated the program." Draft Report at 43.
To the contrary, DOE conducted a thorough legal review prior to
terminating the program and proceeded only when confident it had the
legal authority to do so.
[2] DOE, Memorandum of Understanding: Closure of RW and Maintenance of
the Yucca Mountain Site (September 16, 2010).
[3] 41 C.F.R. § 102-36.305.
[4] See Memo to File from James. W. Hollrith, Former Director Office
of Construction and Site Management, OCRWM, (January 31, 2011).
[5] See DOE Response in Opp. to Petitioners' Motion for P.I., In re
Aiken County, D.C. Cir., No. 10-1050, at 16-17, 19-20 & nn. 10, 11,
and Exhibit 1 thereto (April 23, 2010).
[6] See DOE, Memorandum of Understanding: Closure of RW and
Maintenance of the Yucca Mountain Site (September 16, 2010).
[7] See DOE, "Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM)
Contracting Officer Direction to Stop Contract License Application
Contract Tasks to USA Repository Services LLC (USA RS), Contract
Number DE-RW0000005" (June 7, 2010).
[8] Examples of the wasteful and unnecessary tasks suggested by the
M&O contractor included developing recordings, orientation materials,
and sketches that may have provided no benefit if the licensing
proceeding were restarted. See USA RS, "Contract No. DE-RW0000005 ”
USA Repository Services LLC (USA RS) Response to U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) Request for Information," Attachment C (May 24, 2010).
[9] See Brief for Respondents, In re Aiken County, D.C. Cir., No. 10-
1050, at 65-67 (January 3, 2011).
[10] See DOE Response in Opp. to Petitioners' Motion for P.1., In re
Aiken County, D.C. Cir., No. 10-1050, at 16 (April 23, 2010).
[11] GAO-10-48, November 2009, page 30.
[12] GAO-10-48, November 2009, page 30.
[13] Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (hereinafter "NWPA"), sec.
2(12), 42 U.S.C. § 10101(12); see also Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(hereinafter "AEA"), sec. I ldd, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(dd).
[14] 40 U.S.C. § 102(10).
[15] 40 U.S.C. § 102(3).
[16] NWPA, sec. 503, 42 U.S.C. § 10263.
[17] NWPA, sec. 502, 42 U.S.C. § 10262.
[18] OCRWM, Office of Business Management, Summary of Program
Financial & Budget Information, at slide 9 (January 31, 2010),
available at: [hyperlink,
http://www.energv.gov/media/ocrwm-budget-summarv.pdf].
[19] NWTRB Reports, available at [hyperlink,
http://www.nwtrb.tto,reports:reports.html].
[20] NWTRB Correspondence, available at [hyperlink,
http://www.nwirb.vvicorr/corr/html].
[21] See References cited by U.S. Department of Energy for Yucca
Mountain License Application, available at: [hyperlink,
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/hlw-disposal/yucca-lic-app/references.html].
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
March 17, 2011:
Ms. Janet Frisch, Assistant Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office:
701 5th Avenue, Suite 2700:
Seattle, WA 98104:
Dear Ms. Frisch:
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on
the March 2011 draft of the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report, "Commercial Nuclear Waste: Effects of a Termination of
the Yucca Mountain Repository Program and Lessons Learned," (GA0-11-
229). The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has reviewed the draft
report and has no significant comments. We appreciate the time and
effort that you and your staff have taken to review this important
topic.
Should you have any questions about our response, please contact Mr.
Jesse Arildsen of my staff at (301) 415-1785 or at
Jesse.Arildsen@nrc.qov.
Sincerely,
/RA/R. W. Borchardt:
R. W. Borchardt:
Executive Director for Operations:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Mark E. Gaffigan, (202) 512-3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Janet Frisch, Assistant
Director; Arkelga Braxton; Kevin Bray; Penney Harwell-Caramia; Robert
S. Fletcher; Anne Rhodes-Kline; Steve Lipscomb; Mehrzad Nadji; Risa
Pavia; Robert Sánchez; Benjamin Shouse; Vasiliki Theodoropoulos; Mary
Welch; and Arvin Wu made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Spent (or used) nuclear fuel is no longer efficient in generating
power in a nuclear reactor. It is potentially a resource, since parts
of it can be reprocessed to separate out uranium and plutonium so that
they can be used as fuel again in a reactor. Reprocessing, however,
still results in nuclear waste residues that require disposal. The
United States does not reprocess its spent nuclear fuel, and this
fuel, when it is accepted for disposal, is considered to be high-level
waste as defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the regulating
agency.
[2] National Academy of Sciences, The Disposal of Radioactive Waste on
Land (Washington, D.C.: September 1957). This report suggested several
potential alternatives for disposal of nuclear waste, including spent
nuclear fuel, stressing that there are many potential sites for
geologic disposal of waste at various depths and in various geologic
formations. Subsequent reports by the National Academy of Sciences and
others have continued to endorse geologic isolation of nuclear waste
and have suggested that engineered barriers, such as corrosion-
resistant containers, can provide additional layers of protection to
such sites. International consensus also supports geologic disposal.
[3] DOE manages about 13,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel as well
as other high-level waste--primarily generated by the nation's nuclear
weapons program. We issued a separate report on the impacts of
terminating Yucca Mountain on the spent nuclear fuel and high-level
waste managed by DOE. See DOE Nuclear Waste: Better Information Needed
on Waste Storage at DOE Sites as a Result of the Yucca Mountain
Shutdown, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-230]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2011).
[4] Some technical complexities, such as DOE's assessment of how heat
from the spent nuclear fuel might impact the performance of the
repository, became the focus of years of scientific inquiry.
[5] The parties include the states of Washington and South Carolina;
Aiken County, South Carolina; and individuals from the state of
Washington. DOE's Hanford Site and one commercial nuclear power
reactor are located in Washington, DOE's Savannah River Site and four
commercial nuclear power reactors are located in South Carolina, and
the Savannah River Site is located in Aiken County.
[6] These reports were written by GAO, the Congressional Budget
Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the Office of
Technology Assessment, which is no longer in existence.
[7] NRC considers high-level radioactive wastes to be the highly
radioactive materials produced as a byproduct of the reactions that
occur inside nuclear reactors. High-level wastes take one of two
forms: (1) spent nuclear fuel when it is accepted for disposal and (2)
waste materials remaining after spent fuel is reprocessed.
[8] WIPP was designed to accept transuranic waste, not spent nuclear
fuel. Generally, transuranic waste consists of clothing, tools, rags,
residues, debris, soil, and other items contaminated with radioactive
elements heavier than uranium, mostly plutonium, as a result of work
related to the defense industry.
[9] In addition to spent nuclear fuel and defense-generated high-level
waste, the nation also generates so-called greater than class C waste
from the maintenance and decommissioning of nuclear power plants; from
radioactive materials that were once used for food irradiation or for
medical purposes; and from miscellaneous radioactive waste, such as
contaminated equipment from industrial research and development. Under
section 3(b)(1)(D) of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, DOE
is responsible for disposing of greater than class C waste. DOE had
considered Yucca Mountain as a disposal option at one time, but is now
evaluating its disposal options. Greater than class C waste is
currently stored at commercial reactor sites throughout the country--
including at decommissioned reactors--along with spent nuclear fuel.
[10] All amounts are in constant fiscal year 2010 dollars, unless
otherwise noted.
[11] Nominal dollars.
[12] 75 Fed. Reg. 81,037 (Dec. 23, 2010).
[13] The states of Connecticut, New York, and Vermont have sued the
NRC in federal court regarding this waste confidence rule, arguing
that NRC should have performed an environmental review of the impact
of extending on-site storage before making a decision. Several
environmental groups have filed similar lawsuits.
[14] DOE characterized its motion to withdraw its license application
as an interim step toward a final decision, not a decision that might
be considered a final agency action for the purposes of the
Administrative Procedures Act.
[15] Secretary Chu reiterated this position in a February 11, 2011,
letter to the Blue Ribbon Commission.
[16] Reprocessing is the chemical treatment of used nuclear fuel to
separate out plutonium and uranium that can be used again as fuel, but
which leaves a highly radioactive liquid that is referred to as high-
level waste.
[17] The license application process involves three phases. In the
second phase, NRC must review DOE's submission to update its license
application to receive and possess high-level radioactive waste. If
authorized, DOE would be able to begin operations. The third phase
occurs upon conclusion of operations when DOE must request an
amendment to the license application to permanently close the
repository. At each phase, NRC is to ensure that DOE meets certain
regulatory requirements.
[18] DOE stated that, as of December 2010, it had closed over 400 of
the contracts and subcontracts, but that the DOE Inspector General has
identified at least $175 million in prior-year costs that still need
to be resolved and stated that DOE needs to ensure that the closeout
process is managed effectively and that all disallowed costs are
settled and funds recouped. (See: Office of the Inspector General for
DOE, Special Report: Resolution of Questioned, Unresolved, and
Potentially Unallowable Costs Incurred in Support of the Yucca
Mountain Project (Washington, D.C.: July 2010)). In addition, DOE
identified at least $9.4 million in costs for close-out activities
since September 30, 2010, which includes $8.6 million in employee
benefits. Although activities for key contracts were terminated, the
contracts themselves are still in place, in part, to ensure that
certain benefits--such as pensions--are continued.
[19] See 41 C.F.R. pts. 102-36, 102-37.
[20] As of October 1, 2010, responsibility for security of the site
has been transferred to the National Nuclear Security Administration.
[21] DOE Accounting Handbook, chapter 19.
[22] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[23] For example, see DOE Order 413.1B, Internal Control Program and
DOE Order 413.3B, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition
of Capital Assets.
[24] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).
[25] This testimony was given in a deposition from DOE's Acting
Principal Deputy Director of OCRWM filed with DOE's response to a
motion filed in federal court by the state of Washington seeking a
preliminary injunction to prevent DOE from taking any further actions
to terminate or dismantle the Yucca Mountain program.
[26] This declaration was filed on April 2, 2010, as part of a federal
lawsuit brought by Robert L. Ferguson, Gary Petersen, and William
Lampson asking the federal court to review the final determination of
the President and the Secretary of Energy to terminate Yucca Mountain.
[27] National Research Council of the National Academies, Disposition
of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Continuing Societal
and Technical Challenges (Washington, D.C.: 2001).
[28] GAO, Nuclear Waste Management: Key Attributes, Challenges, and
Costs for the Yucca Mountain Repository and Two Potential
Alternatives, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2009).
[29] We previously reported that construction of a reprocessing plant
could cost as much as $44 billion. The Congressional Budget Office
estimated that annual costs for operating a reprocessing facility
could cost between $2 billion and $4 billion. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48].
[30] Statement of Marvin Fertel, Chief Executive Officer of the
Nuclear Energy Institute, before the Blue Ribbon Commission on May 25,
2010. Note also that the Nuclear Energy Institute favors consolidated
storage of spent nuclear fuel, rather than leaving it on site. See
http://brc.gov/may2010_meeting.html.
[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48]. Amounts are
in 2009 present value.
[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48]. Dozens of
experts reviewed our assumption for centralized interim storage, which
we assumed would take 19 years to begin operations. The experts did
not recommend changing that assumption. Some of the experts
represented DOE, NRC, the National Academy of Sciences, the Nuclear
Waste Technical Review Board, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, the Nuclear Energy Institute, the National Association of
Nuclear Regulatory Utility Commissioners, the National Council of
State Legislators, and the State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear
Projects, and a variety of other academic, industry, and independent
groups.
[33] DOE generally agreed with our findings in this report.
[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48].
[35] These amounts do not include $956 million already paid by
taxpayers through the Department of Treasury's judgment fund. These
amounts are in constant fiscal year 2010 dollars.
[36] In addition, the Department of Justice has already incurred costs
of over $168 million through fiscal year 2010 to defend DOE in
litigation. With ongoing litigation, these costs will continue. There
are no estimates of the future liability of these costs.
[37] Decommissioning is the safe removal of a facility from service
and the reduction of residual radioactivity to a level that permits
release of the property and termination of the license. In the case of
decommissioned nuclear power plants, the spent nuclear fuel may remain
on site, so that the NRC would continue to license the site as an
independent spent fuel storage installation.
[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48].
[39] Office of Technology Assessment, Managing Commercial High-level
Waste (Washington, D.C.: 1982).
[40] National Research Council of the National Academies, Disposition
of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Continuing Societal
and Technical Challenges (Washington, D.C.: 2001).
[41] The NWPA created the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, an
independent federal agency to provide scientific and technical
oversight for Yucca Mountain. The board's mission and reports can be
found at [hyperlink, http://www.nwtrb.gov/].
[42] See, for example, GAO, Department of Energy: Actions Needed to
Develop High-Quality Cost Estimates for Construction and Environmental
Cleanup Projects, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-199]
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2010); and Environmental Health: High-
level Strategy and Leadership Needed to Continue Progress toward
Protecting Children from Environmental Threats, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-205] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28,
2010).
[43] Advisory Panel on Alternative Means of Financing and Managing
Radioactive Waste Facilities, Managing Nuclear Waste - A Better Idea
(Washington, D.C.: 1984). This report was authorized by the Secretary
of Energy in 1983 in response to Sec. 303 of the NWPA, which required
the Secretary of Energy to study alternative approaches to managing
the construction and operation of all civilian nuclear waste
management facilities.
[44] See, for example, GAO, The Cooperative Model as a Potential
Component of Structural Reform Options for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-33R] (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 15, 2010).
[45] Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Future, What We've Heard: A
Staff Summary of Major Themes in Testimony and Comments Received by
the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future To Date
(Washington, D.C.: March 2011).
[46] DOE, Department of Energy Personal Property Management Program,
DOE O 580.1, Chg. 1 (May 8, 2008).
[47] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[End of section]
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