DOD Personnel Clearances
DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size Gao ID: GAO-04-344 February 9, 2004Terrorist attacks and espionage cases have heightened national security concerns and highlighted the need for a timely, high-quality personnel security clearance process. However, GAO's past work found that the Department of Defense (DOD) had a clearance backlog and other problems with its process. GAO was asked to address: (1) What is the size of DOD's security clearance backlog, and how accurately is DOD able to estimate its size? (2) What factors impede DOD's ability to eliminate the backlog and accurately determine its size? (3) What are the potential adverse effects of those impediments to eliminating DOD's backlog and accurately estimating the backlog's size? GAO was also asked to determine the status of the congressionally authorized transfer of Defense Security Service (DSS) investigative functions and personnel to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
DOD did not know the size of its security clearance backlog at the end of September 2003 and has not estimated the size of the backlog since January 2000. DOD cannot estimate the size of its backlog of overdue reinvestigations that have not been submitted for renewal, but prior estimates of this portion of the backlog suggest it was sizeable. Using September 2003 data from DSS, OPM, and nine adjudication facilities, GAO calculated the size of investigative and adjudicative portions of the backlog at roughly 270,000 and 90,000 cases, respectively. Because these estimates were made using time-based goals that varied from agency to agency, the actual backlog size is uncertain. Several impediments hinder DOD's ability to eliminate--and accurately estimate the size of--its clearance backlog. Four major impediments slowing the elimination of the backlog are (1) the large numbers of new clearance requests; (2) the insufficient investigator and adjudicator workforces; (3) the size of the existing backlog; and (4) the lack of a strategic plan for overcoming problems in gaining access to state, local, and overseas information needed to complete investigations. Two other factors have hampered DOD's ability to develop accurate estimates of the backlog size. DOD has failed to provide adequate oversight of its clearance program, including developing DOD-wide backlog definitions and measures and using the measures to assess the backlog regularly. In addition, delays in implementing its Joint Personnel Adjudication System have limited DOD's ability to monitor backlog size and track when periodic reinvestigations are due. DOD's failure to eliminate and accurately assess the size of the backlog may have adverse effects. Delays in updating overdue clearances for command, agency, and industry personnel who are doing classified work may increase risks to national security. Slowness in issuing new clearances can increase the costs of doing classified government work. Finally, DOD's inability to accurately define and measure the backlog and project future clearance requests that it expects to receive can adversely affect its ability to develop accurate budgetary and staffing plans. In December 2003, advisors to OPM's Director recommended that the authorized transfer of DOD's investigative functions and personnel to OPM should not occur for at least the rest of fiscal year 2004. That recommendation was based on uncertainties over financial risks that OPM might incur. An alternative plan being discussed by DOD and OPM calls for leaving investigative staff in DSS and giving them training for, and access to, OPM's case management system. A DOD official estimated that using the OPM system, instead of DOD's current system, would avoid about $100 million in update and maintenance costs during the next 5 years. Also, as of December 16, 2003, the Secretary of Defense had not provided Congress with certifications required prior to any transfer.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-344, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size
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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
February 2004:
DOD Personnel Clearances:
DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and
Determining Its Size:
GAO-04-344:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-344, a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Terrorist attacks and espionage cases have heightened national
security concerns and highlighted the need for a timely, high-quality
personnel security clearance process. However, GAO‘s past work found
that the Department of Defense (DOD) had a clearance backlog and other
problems with its process. Congress recently authorized the transfer
of DOD‘s investigative functions to the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM). GAO was asked to address: (1) What is the size of DOD‘s
security clearance backlog, and how accurately is DOD able to estimate
its size? (2) What factors impede DOD‘s ability to eliminate the
backlog and accurately determine its size? and (3) What are the
potential adverse effects of those impediments to eliminating DOD‘s
backlog and accurately estimating its sizethe backlog‘s size? GAO was
also asked to determine the status of the congressionally authorized
transfer of Defense Security Service (DSS) investigative functions and
personnel to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
What GAO Found:
DOD did not know the total size of its security clearance backlog at
the end of September 2003 and has not developed estimated the size of
the backlog estimates since January 2000. DOD cannot estimate the size
of its backlog of overdue reinvestigations that have not been
submitted for renewal, but prior estimates of this portion of the
backlog suggest it is was sizeable. Using September 2003 data from
DSS, OPM, and nine adjudication facilities, GAO calculated the size of
investigative and adjudicative portions of the backlog at roughly
270,000 and 90,000 cases, respectively. Because these estimates were
made using time-based goals that varied from agency to agency, the
actual backlog size is uncertain.
Several impediments hinder DOD‘s ability to eliminate”and accurately
estimate the size of”its clearance backlog. Four major impediments
slowing the elimination of the backlog are (1) the large numbers of
new clearance requests; (2) the insufficient investigator and
adjudicator workforces; (3) the size of the existing backlog; and (4)
the lack of a strategic plan for overcoming problems in gaining access
to state, local, and overseas information needed to complete
investigations. Two other factors have hampered DOD‘s ability to
develop accurate estimates of the backlog size. DOD has failed to
provide adequate oversight of its clearance program, including
developing DOD-wide backlog definitions and measures, and using the
measures to assess the backlog regularly. In addition, 2 years of
delays in implementing its Joint Personnel Adjudication System have
limited DOD‘s ability to monitor backlog size and track when periodic
reinvestigations are due.
DOD‘s failure to eliminate, and accurately assess the size of the
backlog, may have adverse effects. Delays in updating overdue
clearances for command, agency, and industry personnel who are doing
classified work may increase risks to national security. Slowness in
issuing new clearances can increase the costs of doing classified
government work. Finally, DOD‘s inability to accurately define and
measure the backlog and project future clearance requests that it
expects to receive can adversely affect its ability to develop
accurate budgetary and staffing plans.
In December 2003, advisors to OPM‘s Director recommended that the the
authorized transfer of DOD‘s investigative functions and personnel to
OPM should not occur for at least the rest of fiscal year 2004. That
recommendation was based on uncertainties over financial risks that
OPM might incur. An alternative plan being discussed by DOD and OPM
calls for leaving investigative staff in DSS and giving them training
for, and access to, OPM‘s case management system. A DOD official
estimated that using the OPM system, instead of DOD‘s current system,
would avoid about $100 million in update and maintenance costs during
the next five 5 years. Also, as of December 16, 2003, the Secretary of
Defense had not provided Congress with certifications required prior
to any transfer.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD improve its personnel security clearance
program‘s management and oversight by matching workforces sizes to
workloads; developing developing a strategic plan to getto overcome
access to information problems; developing DOD-wide backlog
definitions, measures, and reports; and completing workimplementing on
the Joint Personnel Adjudication System. DOD concurred with three
recommendations and partially concurred with one.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-344.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Derek Stewart, (202)
512-5559, stewartd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Unable to Estimate the Size of Its Clearance Backlog:
Multiple Impediments Slow DOD's Progress in Eliminating Its Backlog and
Generating Accurate Backlog Estimates:
Backlogs and Poor Estimates May Lead to Increased National Security
Risks, Higher Costs, and Workload Uncertainties:
Status Update on the Authorized Transfer of DSS Investigative Functions
and Personnel to OPM:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Recent Recommendations Related to DOD's Personnel Security
Clearance Process:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Adjudicative Backlog Present at Each Central Adjudication
Facility, as of September 30, 2003:
Table 2: Targeted and Actual Numbers of Requests Submitted to DSS and
OPM during Fiscal Years 2001-2003:
Figures:
Figure 1: DOD's Personnel Security Clearance Process:
Figure 2: Estimated Backlog Size at Each Stage in the Personnel
Security Clearance Process, as of September 2003:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DSS: Defense Security Service:
JPAS: Joint Personnel Adjudication System:
OPM: Office of Personnel Management:
OASD (C3I): Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence:
OUSD (I): Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
February 9, 2004:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Skelton:
Recent events, such as the terrorist attacks on the United States on
September 11, 2001, and several high-profile espionage cases have
heightened national security concerns and underscored the need for a
timely, high-quality personnel security clearance process. Each year,
the Department of Defense (DOD) processes hundreds of thousands of
security clearance requests for service members, government employees,
and industry personnel who are conducting classified work for the
department and other government agencies. These requests include
(1) periodic reinvestigations for individuals who already hold security
clearances or initial investigations for individuals who have not held
security clearances in the past and (2) adjudications to determine
whether or not individuals are eligible for clearances, based on
information collected during the investigations and reinvestigations.
Historically, DOD's Defense Security Service (DSS) had conducted almost
all of the department's security clearance investigations. In 1999,
however, DOD contracted with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM),
and later with private-sector investigative firms, to process large
numbers of new investigations and reinvestigations. Using information
from the investigations, DOD's 10 central adjudication facilities
provide the eligibility-for-clearance determinations.
Since at least the late 1990s, the timeliness of DOD's personnel
security clearance process has been at issue. In our October 1999
report,[Footnote 1] for example, we identified serious problems with
the adequacy of DOD's investigations; this work prompted the department
to declare its investigative function a systemic weakness[Footnote 2]
under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982.[Footnote
3] In our August 2000 report, we noted that DOD estimated it had a
backlog of more than 500,000 overdue reinvestigations that had not yet
been submitted for renewal and found that DOD had no established method
for monitoring or estimating the total number of periodic
reinvestigations that were overdue but not submitted.[Footnote 4]
Moreover, in our 2001 report, we found that DOD's adjudicators did not
consistently document adverse security conditions, and we identified
other factors that hindered the effectiveness of the adjudication
process.[Footnote 5] Along with our reviews, several reports issued in
2000 and 2001 by the DOD Office of the Inspector General have also
documented problems with various aspects of the security clearance
process.[Footnote 6] In agency comments to GAO and DOD Office of
Inspector General recommendations (see app. I for recommendations), DOD
identified many actions it had taken or planned to take to address
problems in its investigative and adjudicative processes. For example,
in response to a recommendation in our August 2000 report, DOD noted
that the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) would be
implemented in fiscal year 2001 and would provide an automated means of
tracking and counting overdue but-not-submitted requests for
reinvestigation.
More recently, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004 authorized the transfer of DOD's personnel security investigative
functions and 1,855 investigative employees to OPM.[Footnote 7] Under
the Act, a transfer of functions can only be made after the Secretary
of Defense certifies that certain conditions can be met and that the
Director of OPM concurs with the authorized transfer. Among the
conditions requiring Secretary of Defense certification are "[t]hat the
Office of Personnel Management is fully capable of carrying out high-
priority investigations required by the Secretary of Defense within a
timeframe set by the Secretary of Defense" and "[t]hat the Office of
Personnel Management has undertaken necessary and satisfactory steps to
ensure that investigations performed on Department of Defense contract
personnel will be conducted in an expeditious manner sufficient to
ensure that those contract personnel are available to the Department of
Defense within the timeframe set by the Secretary of Defense.":
You asked us to conduct a follow-up review of DOD's personnel security
process. As agreed with your office, this report addresses three
questions: (1) What is the size of DOD's security clearance backlog,
and how accurately is DOD able to estimate its size? (2) What factors
impede DOD's ability to eliminate the backlog and accurately determine
its size? (3) What are the potential adverse effects of those
impediments to eliminating DOD's backlog and accurately estimating the
backlog's size? In addition to answering these three questions, you
asked us to determine the status of the congressionally authorized
transfer of DSS investigative functions and personnel to OPM.
To conduct our work, we reviewed DOD and OPM regulations, instructions,
policy guidance, and available empirical data and procedural
information on the personnel security clearance process. In addition,
we obtained information during meetings with DOD, OPM, and other
officials who are responsible for the oversight, investigative, and
adjudicative functions of the personnel security clearance process. We
also referred to prior GAO, DOD Office of Inspector General, and
congressional reports. We conducted our work from February through
December 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Additional information on our scope and methodology is
presented in appendix II.
Results in Brief:
DOD did not know the size of its security clearance backlog at the end
of September 2003 and has not estimated the size of the backlog since
January 2000. DOD cannot estimate the size of its backlog of overdue
reinvestigations that have not yet been submitted for renewal, but
prior estimates of this portion of the backlog have been sizeable. For
example, we noted in our 2000 report that DOD estimated its number of
overdue-but-not-submitted reinvestigations at 300,000 cases in 1986 and
at 500,000 cases in 2000. Based on September 2003 data that we obtained
from DSS, OPM, and adjudication facilities, we estimated the potential
size of DOD's investigative and adjudicative backlogs to be roughly
270,000 and 90,000 cases, respectively. Because these estimates were
developed using time limits for completing investigations or
adjudications that varied from agency to agency, uncertainty is present
regarding the actual size of the backlog.
A number of impediments hinder DOD's ability to eliminate its security
clearance backlog and accurately estimate the size of the backlog. Four
major impediments have slowed DOD's progress in eliminating the
backlog. (1) The large number of new requests for clearances has
hampered DOD's efforts to draw down the number of cases already in
DOD's current backlog. (2) The sizes of the investigator and
adjudicator workforces have not been sufficient to eliminate the
backlog, even though DOD has taken steps to increase the number of
requests that can be processed. For example, according to an OPM
official, roughly 8,000 full-time-equivalent investigative personnel
are needed to eliminate the backlog, but our calculations showed that
DOD and OPM have around 4,200 full-time-equivalent government and
contract investigative staff as of December 2003. (3) The mere size of
the existing backlog has prevented the timely processing and completion
of new requests for clearances. (4) The lack of a strategic plan for
overcoming problems in gaining access to state, local, and overseas
information has slowed the completion of investigations and thereby has
impeded the reduction of the backlog. In addition, two other factors
have hampered DOD's ability to develop accurate estimates of the
backlog. DOD has failed to provide adequate oversight for the security
clearance program, including developing DOD-wide definitions and
measures of the backlog and using the measures to assess the backlog
regularly. In addition, delays in implementing JPAS have limited DOD's
ability to, among other things, monitor backlog size and track when
periodic reinvestigations are due.
DOD's failure to eliminate its large security clearance backlog and to
accurately estimate the size of the backlog may have adverse effects.
For example, delays in updating overdue clearances for command, agency,
and industry personnel performing classified government work may
increase risks to national security. Similarly, delays in issuing
initial clearances caused by the backlog and other impediments can
increase the costs of doing classified government work. In addition,
DOD's inability to accurately define and measure the backlog and
project the number of future clearance requests it expects to receive
can adversely affect DOD's ability to develop accurate budgetary and
staffing plans. For example, DOD's difficulty in estimating its
workload was evidenced in fiscal year 2002 when DOD expected 720,000
requests for investigations and actually received more than 850,000
requests--or 18 percent more.
In December 2003, advisors to the Director of OPM recommended that the
congressionally authorized transfer of DOD's investigative functions to
OPM should not take place for at least the rest of fiscal year 2004.
That recommendation was based on uncertainty about the financial risks
that OPM might incur from the transfer. The advisors recommended an
alternative plan that is currently being discussed by DOD and OPM
officials. The alternative plan would keep DSS's investigative staff in
DOD; provide DSS with access to OPM's case management system, which,
according to a DOD official, would save about $100 million in costs
associated with continuing to update and maintain DOD's current case
management system; and train DSS staff to use that system. Also, as of
December 16, 2003, the Secretary of Defense had not provided Congress
with the certifications that are required before the transfer could
take place.
In order to eliminate the personnel security clearance backlog and
increase the accuracy of DOD's security clearance backlog estimates, we
are recommending that DOD take steps to improve the management and
oversight of the personnel security clearance program: match both
investigative and adjudicative workforce sizes to workloads; develop a
strategic plan to overcome access to information problems; develop
DOD-wide backlog definitions and measures and monitor the backlog; and
complete the implementation of JPAS.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD fully concurred with three
of our four recommendations and partially concurred with our
recommendation to match workforce sizes to workloads.
Background:
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD
(I)) was created in 2002 with the passage of the Bob Stump National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.[Footnote 8] Among the
responsibilities of OUSD (I) are the coordination and implementation of
DOD policy for access to classified information. At the time of our
earlier review on the clearance process, these responsibilities
belonged to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (OASD (C3I)).
Classified information is categorized into three levels--top secret,
secret, and confidential--to denote the degree of protection required
for information according to the amount of damage that unauthorized
disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to national defense or
foreign relations.[Footnote 9] The degree of expected damage that
unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause is
"exceptionally grave damage" for top secret information, "serious
damage" for secret information, and "damage" for confidential
information. To retain access to classified information, individuals
must periodically go through the security clearance process. The time
frames for reinvestigation are every 5 years for top secret, 10 years
for secret, and 15 years for confidential.[Footnote 10]
DOD's personnel security clearance process has three stages:
preinvestigation, which includes determining if a requirement for
access exists and submitting an investigation request; the actual
personnel security investigation; and adjudication, a determination of
eligibility for access to classified information (see fig. 1). Since
1997, all federal agencies:
have been subject to a common set of personnel security investigative
standards and adjudicative guidelines for determining whether service
members, government employees, industry personnel, and others are
eligible to receive a security clearance.[Footnote 11] In 1998, DOD
formally incorporated these standards and guidelines into its
regulations governing access to classified information.[Footnote 12]
Figure 1: DOD's Personnel Security Clearance Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The security officer begins the preinvestigation stage of the clearance
process by determining whether a position requires access to classified
information. If so, the current or future job incumbent completes a
personnel security questionnaire that asks for detailed information
about a wide range of issues. The impetus for an investigation request
could be a need to (1) appoint, enlist, or induct an individual into
the military; (2) staff a new program or contract with an individual
who has a clearance; (3) replace a cleared job incumbent with someone
else; (4) raise an existing clearance to a higher level; or (5)
reinvestigate a previously cleared job incumbent whose clearance is due
for reinvestigation.
In the investigation stage, investigative staff members seek
information pertaining to the subject's loyalty, character,
reliability, trustworthiness, honesty, and financial responsibility.
The level of clearance is the primary determinant of the types and
sources of information gathered. For example, an investigation for a
top secret clearance requires much more information than does the type
of investigation required to determine eligibility for either a secret
or confidential clearance. The types or sources of information might
include an interview with the subject of the investigation, national
agency checks (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigations and immigration
records), local agency checks (e.g., municipal police and court
records), financial checks, birth date and place, citizenship,
education, employment, public records for information such as
bankruptcy or divorce, and interviews with references.
In the adjudication stage of the security clearance process, government
employees in 10 DOD central adjudication facilities[Footnote 13] use
the information gathered at the investigation stage to approve, deny,
or revoke eligibility to access classified information. Once
adjudicated, the security clearance is then issued up to the
appropriate eligibility level, or alternative actions are taken if
eligibility is denied or revoked.
DOD Unable to Estimate the Size of Its Clearance Backlog:
DOD did not know the size of its personnel security clearance backlog
and has not estimated the size of the backlog since January 2000. DOD
was unable to estimate the size of its backlog for overdue
reinvestigations that have not yet been submitted, but our estimates
for overdue submitted investigation requests and overdue adjudications
were roughly 270,000 and 90,000 cases, respectively, at the end of
September 2003. These estimates are not based on a consistent set of
DOD-wide definitions and measures; instead, the time limits for
defining and measuring the backlog varied from agency to agency.
DOD Unable to Estimate the Number of Overdue Reinvestigations Not Yet
Submitted:
DOD could not estimate the number of personnel who had not requested
a reinvestigation, even though their clearances exceeded the
governmentwide time frames for reinvestigation (see fig. 2). As we
mentioned earlier, the governmentwide time frames for renewing
clearances are 5, 10, or 15 years depending on an individual's
clearance level. We, therefore, defined this portion of the backlog as
any request for reinvestigation that had not been submitted within
those time frames.
Figure 2: Estimated Backlog Size at Each Stage in the Personnel
Security Clearance Process, as of September 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In our 2000 report, we indicated that DOD estimated its overdue but-
not-submitted reinvestigation backlog at 300,000 cases in 1986 and
500,000 cases in 2000.[Footnote 14] Our 2000 report also noted that the
500,000-case backlog estimate was of questionable reliability because
of the ad hoc methods used to derive it. Between 2000 and 2002, DOD
took a number of steps to reduce this backlog, including mandating the
submission of requests and requiring senior service officials to
provide monthly submission progress reports. On February 22, 2002, DOD
concluded this backlog reduction effort by issuing an OASD (C3I)
memorandum directing that "[b]y September 30, 2002, if a clearance is
not based upon a current or pending investigation, or if the position
does not support a requirement for a clearance, the clearance must be
administratively terminated or downgraded without prejudice to the
individual." DOD is unable to show that the overdue but-not-submitted
reinvestigations backlog was eliminated by these actions.
Roughly 270,000 Submitted Requests for Investigations Overdue for
Completion:
At the end of September 2003, the investigative portion of the backlog
consisted of roughly 270,000 submitted requests for either
reinvestigation or initial investigation that had not been completed
within a prescribed amount of time. We calculated this estimate from
information provided in response to the data requests that we made to
DSS and OPM. This number represents an estimated 163,000 cases at DSS
and 107,000 cases contracted to OPM that had not been completed within
the time limits. In our August 2000 report, DOD stated that a vast
majority of 94,000 submitted requests for reinvestigation were overdue
for completion, and those cases were not part of DOD's estimate of
500,000 overdue but-not-submitted reinvestigations discussed in the
prior section. At that time, DOD had not included either submitted
reinvestigations or initial investigations that exceeded specified time
limits as part of the DOD-wide backlog. An estimate of the initial
investigations exceeding the time limit was not a focus of that work.
The existence of varying sets of time limits for completing
investigations makes it difficult to develop accurate estimates of the
size of DOD's investigative backlog.
* DSS's performance goals are 120 days for a periodic reinvestigation
for a top secret clearance, 90 days for an initial top secret
clearance, and 75 days for either a secret or confidential clearance
being issued initially.[Footnote 15] In addition, some requests for
investigations receive priorities over other requests.
* OPM has timeliness categories that DOD and other agencies use to
request various types of investigations. The timeliness categories are
35 days for priority investigations, 75 days for accelerated
investigations, 120 days for standard investigations, and 180 days for
extended service agreements.[Footnote 16]
The lack of a standard set of time limits is a long-standing problem.
In 1994, the Joint Security Commission reported on this issue, and
among other things (1) found there was no performance standard for
timeliness in completing investigations and adjudications, (2) stated
it repeatedly heard from the customer community that 90 days is an
appropriate standard for completing an average investigation and
adjudication, and (3) recommended "[s]tandard measurable objectives be
established to assess the timeliness and quality of investigations,
adjudications, and administrative processes and appeals performed by
all such organizations within DOD and the Intelligence
Community."[Footnote 17]
OPM's issuance of closed pending cases--investigations sent to
adjudication facilities without one or more types of source data--
presents another ambiguity in defining and accurately estimating the
backlog. In our October 1999 report, we found that DSS had similarly
delivered incomplete investigations to DOD adjudicators.[Footnote 18]
After we recommended that DOD adjudication facility officials grant
clearances only when all essential investigative work has been done,
DSS monitored the cases returned from the adjudication facilities and
identified reasons for the returns. Overall, about 10 percent of the
283,480 DOD cases fully closed by OPM in fiscal year 2002 were
initially delivered to central adjudication facilities as closed
pending cases. When measuring the timeliness of its contractors'
performance, OPM defines completed investigations as cases that (1)
have the complete information required for the type of investigation,
(2) are closed pending, or (3) have been discontinued. If the
investigations have not been fully completed within OPM-contracted time
limits, we believe that closed pending cases should be included in the
investigative portion of the backlog.
DOD-Wide Estimate of Adjudicative Backlog Exceeds Roughly 90,000 Cases:
Central adjudication facilities' responses to our request for
adjudicative backlog estimates as of September 30, 2003, indicated that
roughly 90,000 completed investigations had not been adjudicated within
prescribed time limits (see table 1). Differences in the sizes of the
backlog at the various central adjudication facilities are due to a
combination of factors. For example, the military service departments
generally perform more adjudications than do DOD agencies; some
facilities have increased their staffing of government employees to
decrease the backlog; and some facilities have contracted for support
services to decrease the backlog. We later discuss the large number of
requests that have resulted over the last few years. DOD officials
attributed this extra adjudicative workload to, among other things,
increased operations related to the war on terrorism.
Table 1: Adjudicative Backlog Present at Each Central Adjudication
Facility, as of September 30, 2003:
Central Adjudication Facility: Army; Size of Adjudicative Backlog:
35,226.
Central Adjudication Facility: Air Force; Size of Adjudicative Backlog:
25,493.
Central Adjudication Facility: Defense Industrial Security Clearance
Office; Size of Adjudicative Backlog: 12,793.
Central Adjudication Facility: Navy; Size of Adjudicative Backlog:
12,606.
Central Adjudication Facility: Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals;
Size of Adjudicative Backlog: 4,487.
Central Adjudication Facility: Washington Headquarters Services; Size
of Adjudicative Backlog: 1,296.
Central Adjudication Facility: Defense Intelligence Agency; Size of
Adjudicative Backlog: 1,046.
Central Adjudication Facility: National Security Agency; Size of
Adjudicative Backlog: 0.
Central Adjudication Facility: Joint Staff; Size of Adjudicative
Backlog: does not track.
Total; Size of Adjudicative Backlog:
92,947.
Source: DOD.
Note: We did not attempt to gather information from the National
Reconnaissance Office because of the sensitive nature of its mission.
[End of table]
An ambiguous picture of the adjudicative backlog size is present
because the central adjudication facilities use different time limits
to define when cases become part of the backlog. Applying the backlog
criteria of one central adjudication facility to the completed
investigations waiting adjudication at another facility could increase
or decrease the estimated size of the DOD-wide adjudicative backlog.
For instance, the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office's goals
for completing adjudications are 3 days for initial investigations and
30 days for periodic reinvestigations, and any cases exceeding these
amounts are considered a backlog. In contrast, the Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals' goal is to maintain a steady workload of
adjudicating 2,150 cases per month within 30 days of receipt, and it
considers a backlog to exist when the number of cases on hand exceeds
its normal workload. Thus, if the Defense Industrial Security Clearance
Office's stricter time limit were applied to the initial investigations
awaiting adjudication at the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals,
the latter office's backlog would be larger than that currently
reported.
Multiple Impediments Slow DOD's Progress in Eliminating Its Backlog and
Generating Accurate Backlog Estimates:
We have identified four major impediments that have slowed DOD's
progress in eliminating its clearance backlog and two impediments that
have hindered its ability to produce accurate backlog estimates.
Large Number of Clearance Requests, Limited Staffing, Existing Backlog,
and No Strategic Plan for Information-Access Problems Slow DOD's
Efforts to Eliminate the Backlog:
In our review of documents and discussions with officials from DOD,
OPM, industry associations, and investigator contractors, we identified
four major impediments that have hampered DOD's ability to eliminate
its current security clearance backlog. These are: (1) the large number
of new requests for clearances, (2) inadequate investigator and
adjudicator workforces, (3) the mere size of the existing backlog, and
(4) the lack of a strategic plan for overcoming problems by government
and contractor investigators in gaining access to information from
state, local, and overseas sources.
Large Number of Requests for Clearances:
The large number of requests for security clearances hinders DOD's
efforts to draw down the number of cases in its current clearance
backlog. In fiscal year 2003, the Secretary of Defense annual report to
the President and Congress noted that defense organizations annually
request more than 1 million security checks. These checks include
investigations that are part of the personnel security clearance
process as well as other investigations such as those used to screen
some new recruits entering the military. Other federal agencies are
also requesting a growing number of background investigations according
to OPM. In our November 2003 report on aviation security,[Footnote 19]
we noted that OPM had stated that (1) it received an unprecedented
number of requests for background investigations governmentwide since
September 2001 and (2) the large number of requests was the primary
reason for delayed clearance processing.
Historically, almost all of DOD's requests for investigations were
submitted to DSS. Starting in 1999, DOD contracted with OPM to complete
a large number of requests for investigations as part of DOD's effort
to expand its investigative capacity and decrease its investigative
backlog. OUSD (I) estimated that DOD spent over $450 million for the
investigations submitted to DSS and OPM in fiscal year 2003. As table 2
shows, OUSD (I) reported that the actual number of requests submitted
for investigations were approximately 700,000 in fiscal year 2001, more
than 850,000 in fiscal year 2002, and more than 775,000 in fiscal year
2003.[Footnote 20] In fiscal year 2003, DSS had responsibility for a
larger percentage of the total DOD investigations workload than it had
in the prior 2 fiscal years. DSS supplemented its federal workforce
with contracts to three private-sector investigations firms. As table 2
also indicates, the number of targeted submissions versus the actual
number of submissions that DOD received varied considerably from year
to year. In fiscal year 2001, DOD received fewer requests than it had
expected (82 percent), and in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, it received
more requests than projected (119 and 113 percent, respectively).
Table 2: Targeted and Actual Numbers of Requests Submitted to DSS and
OPM during Fiscal Years 2001-2003:
Requests submitted to: DSS;
FY 2001: Target: 435,734;
FY 2001: Actual: 416,233;
FY 2002: Target: 408,539;
FY 2002: Actual: 438,093;
FY 2003: Target: 530,271;
FY 2003: Actual: 603,460.
Requests submitted to: OPM;
FY 2001: Target: 413,033;
FY 2001: Actual: 283,963;
FY 2002: Target: 312,248;
FY 2002: Actual: 418,181;
FY 2003: Target: 157,004;
FY 2003: Actual: 173,984.
Requests submitted to: Total;
FY 2001: Target: 848,767;
FY 2001: Actual: 700,196;
FY 2002: Target: 720,787;
FY 2002: Actual: 856,274;
FY 2003: Target: 687,275;
FY 2003: Actual: 777,444.
Percent of actual at DSS;
FY 2001: Actual: 59 %;
FY 2002: Actual: 51 %;
FY 2003: Actual: 78 %.
Percent of target;
FY 2001: Target: 82 %;
FY 2002: Target: 119 %;
FY 2003: Target: 113 %.
Source: OUSD (I).
Note: Table 2 shows when investigations began, but the investigations
may not be completed in the same fiscal year.
[End of table]
DOD personnel, investigations contractors, and industry officials told
us that the large number of requests for investigations could be
attributed to many factors. For example, they ascribed the large number
of requests to heightened security concerns that resulted from the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. They also attributed the large
number of investigations to an increase in the operations and
deployments of military personnel and to the increasingly sensitive
technology that military personnel, government employees, and
contractors come in contact with as a part of their job. While having a
large number of cleared personnel can give the military services,
agencies, and industry a large amount of flexibility when assigning
personnel, the investigative and adjudicative workloads that
are required to provide the clearances further tax DOD's already
overburdened personnel security clearance program.
A change in the level of clearance being requested also increases the
investigative and adjudicative workloads. A growing percentage of all
DOD requests for clearances is at the top secret level. For example, in
fiscal years 1995 and 2003, 17 percent and 27 percent, respectively, of
the clearance requests for industry personnel were at the top secret
level. This increase of 10 percentage points in the proportion of
investigations at the top secret level is important because top secret
clearances must be renewed twice as often as secret clearances (i.e.,
every 5 years versus every 10 years). According to OUSD (I), top secret
clearances take eight times the investigative effort needed to complete
a secret clearance and three times the adjudicative effort to review.
The doubling of frequency along with the increased effort to
investigate and adjudicate each top secret reinvestigation adds costs
and workload for DOD.
* Cost. In fiscal year 2003, the costs of investigations that DOD
obtained through DSS were $2,640 for an initial investigation for a top
secret clearance, $1,591 for a periodic reinvestigation of a top secret
clearance, and $328 for the most commonly used investigation for a
secret clearance. The cost of getting and maintaining a top secret
clearance for 10 years is approximately 13 times greater than the cost
for a secret clearance. For example, an individual getting a top secret
clearance for the first time and keeping the clearance for 10 years
would cost DOD a total of $4,231 in current year dollars ($2,640 for
the initial investigation and $1,591 for the reinvestigation after the
first 5 years). In contrast, an individual receiving a secret clearance
and maintaining it for 10 years would cost a total of $328 ($328 for
the initial clearance that is good for 10 years).
* Time/Workload. The workload is also affected by the scope of coverage
in the various types of investigations. Much of the information for a
secret clearance is gathered through electronic files. The
investigation for a top secret clearance, on the other hand, requires
the information needed for the secret clearance as well as data
gathered through time-consuming tasks such as interviews with the
subject of the investigation request, references in the workplace, and
neighbors.
Inadequate Investigative and Adjudicative Workforces Hinder Efforts to
Eliminate Backlog:
Another impediment to eliminating the large security clearance backlog
is the inadequate size of the federal and private-sector investigative
workforces relative to the large workloads that they face. The Deputy
Associate Director of OPM's Center for Investigations Services
estimated that roughly 8,000 full-time-equivalent investigative
personnel would be needed by OPM and DOD (together) to eliminate
backlogs and deliver investigations in a timely fashion to their
customers. The rough estimate includes investigators and investigative
technicians. However, changes in the numbers or types of clearance
requests, different levels of productivity by investigators, and other
factors could greatly affect this estimated workforce requirement.
As of December 2003, we calculated that DOD and OPM have around
4,200 full-time-equivalent investigators available as federal
employees or currently under contract. Of this number, DSS indicated
that it has about 1,200 investigators and 100 investigative
technicians. In addition, DSS has the equivalent of 625 full-time
investigative staff, based on 2,500 mostly part-time investigators,
from its three contractors. DSS equates four of the part-time
investigators to one full-time investigator. Finally, although OPM has
almost no investigative staff currently, its primary contractor has
approximately 2,300 full-time investigators. OPM reported that its
primary contractor is adding about 100 investigators per month, but
turnover is about 70 employees per month.
We believe that DSS's estimate of the number of full-time-equivalent
investigators working for its contractors is imprecise because (1) an
investigator may work part-time for more than one contractor and
(2) the amount of time devoted to conducting investigations can vary
substantially. These part-time investigators work different amounts of
time each month, according to both their own preference and the number
of assignments they receive from investigation contractor(s). Sometimes
they are unavailable to work for one contractor because they are
conducting investigations for another contractor. Officials from DSS's
investigations contractors told us that they intend to continue relying
largely on staff employed on an as-needed basis. Some of the private-
sector officials stated that they would incur additional financial
risks if they were to use full-time investigators.
Inadequate adjudicator staffing also causes delays in issuing
eligibility-for-clearance decisions. Since we issued our report on DOD
adjudications in 2001, the number of eligibility-for-clearance
decisions has risen for reasons such as an increase in the number of
completed investigations stemming from DOD's contract with OPM and the
improved operation of DSS's Case Control Management System.
Central adjudication facilities with adjudicative backlogs have taken
various actions to eliminate their backlog. The Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals hired 46 additional adjudicators on 2-year term
appointments, contracted for administrative functions associated with
adjudication, and is seeking permission from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to hire some of its term adjudicators permanently.
The Navy's central adjudication facility contracted with three
companies to provide support and hired an additional 27 full-time-
equivalent civilian and military adjudicators, which helped the Navy
eliminate much of its adjudicative backlog that had grown to
approximately 60,000 cases by December 2002. Because the DOD Office of
Inspector General is examining whether the Navy adjudicative contracts
led the contractor's staff to perform an inherently governmental
function--adjudication--it is unclear whether the Army and Air Force
central adjudication facilities will be able to use similar contracting
to eliminate their backlogs.
The 10 DOD central adjudication facilities are funded by different
agencies and operate independently of one another. As a result, OUSD
(I) cannot transfer backlogged cases from one facility to eliminate an
adjudicative backlog at another facility. In our April 2001 report on
DOD adjudications,[Footnote 21] we noted that studies issued by the
Defense Personnel Security Research Center, the Joint Security
Commission, and the DOD Office of the Inspector General between 1991
and 1998 had concluded that the decentralized structure of DOD's
adjudication facilities had drawbacks. Two of the studies had
recommended that DOD consolidate its adjudication facilities (with the
exception of the National Security Agency because of the sensitive
nature of its work) into a single entity. Currently, OUSD (I) is
exploring the possibility of assigning all industry adjudications to
the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office instead of having it
share this responsibility with the Defense Office of Hearing and
Appeals.
Size of Existing Backlog Impedes Prompt Opening of New Requests for
Investigation:
The current size of the investigative backlog impedes DOD's ability to
process new security clearance requests within the prescribed time
limits. A new request might remain largely dormant for months in the
investigations queue until other requests that were received earlier
have been completed. This point can be illustrated by examining the
results of miscommunications between OASD (C3I) and DSS regarding
assigning priorities to investigations between March 2002 and March
2003. During that period, DSS placed a higher priority on completing
new--versus old--requests. From March through September 2002, DSS
averaged 97 days to open and complete initial investigation requests
for top secret clearances; 100 days, for top secret reinvestigation; 43
days, for secret; and 44 days, for confidential. For three of the four
types of investigations, DSS's average completion times were faster
than its time-based goals (120 days for a periodic reinvestigation for
a top secret clearance, 90 days for an initial top secret clearance;
and 75 days for either a secret or confidential clearance being issued
initially). Starting in March 2003, DSS again assigned a higher
priority to older requests. However, during those 12 months, from March
2002 to February 2003, the average age of the older cases increased,
and it is impossible to say how much of the increase was due to the
miscommunication regarding priorities, a change in the number of
requests that DSS received, or some other factor.
DSS staff told us that the delays in starting investigations could lead
to additional delays in processing the case, particularly for military
personnel who were being deployed or were moving. Therefore, DSS
instituted a procedure to attempt to meet with individuals requesting
an investigation before they deploy or go on extended training. Delays
in starting investigations can result in extra investigative work to
find the individuals at their new addresses or additional delays if
investigators wait for the individuals to return from deployment or
training. In some cases, however, DOD commands, agencies, and
contractors have been able to obtain some investigations quickly by
assigning higher priorities to certain individual investigations or
types of investigations.
No Strategic Plan for Overcoming Information-Access Problems Slows
Investigative Process:
The absence of a strategic plan for overcoming problems in gaining
access to information from state and local agencies also slows the
speed of personnel security clearance investigations and, thereby,
impedes reducing the size of the backlog. Investigators face delays in
conducting background checks because of the lack of automated records
in many localities, state and local budget shortfalls that limit how
much time agency staff have to help investigators, and privacy concerns
(e.g., access to conviction records from the courts instead of the
preferred arrest records from law enforcement). This problem of
accessibility to state and local information was identified in an
October 2002 House Committee on Government Reform report.[Footnote 22]
The report recommended that the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney
General jointly develop a system that allows DSS and OPM investigators
access to state and local criminal history information records. In
addition, representatives from one investigations contractor noted that
the Security Clearance Information Act[Footnote 23] gives only certain
federal agencies access to state and local criminal records, and
therefore private-sector investigators are put at a disadvantage
relative to federal investigators.
Another barrier to the timely closure of an investigation is a limited
investigative capacity overseas, which causes delays in obtaining
information from overseas investigative sources. DSS, OPM, and private-
sector investigations contractors do not maintain staffs overseas to
investigate individuals who are currently or were formerly stationed
overseas, who have traveled or lived overseas, or who have relatives
living in foreign countries. Officials at DSS and the central
adjudication facilities told us that they typically ask overseas-based
DOD criminal investigations personnel or State Department and Central
Intelligence Agency employees to supply this type of investigative
information as a collateral duty.
DOD has no strategic plan for overcoming access to information problems
and the delays that result, but DOD has made efforts to address
selective aspects of the access problem. For example, DOD supplied us
with draft legislation proposing to provide access to a central
repository for driver licensing records. DOD proposed that this
information be used in personnel security investigations and
determinations as well as personnel investigations with regard to
federal employment security checks. Also, an OUSD (I) official noted
that DOD proposed a legislative change for the fiscal year 2001
authorization bill to allow easier access to records of criminal
history information.
Oversight Problems and Automation Delays Hinder Accurate Monitoring of
Backlog Size:
OUSD (I) and its predecessor OASD (C3I) have not provided the oversight
needed to monitor and accurately estimate the various parts of the
backlog that are present throughout DOD. Also, as we documented
earlier, backlog estimates are not based on a consistent set of DOD-
wide definitions and measures. Knowing the accurate size of the backlog
is an important step towards effectively managing and eventually
eliminating the backlog. When we asked for all investigative backlog
reports produced since 2000, OUSD (I) supplied January 2000 estimates
as its most recent report, and the report included only
reinvestigations. This finding regarding the infrequency of reporting
contradicts DOD's concurrence with our October 1999 recommendation for
OASD (C3I) to improve its oversight of the investigations program and
our August 2000 recommendation to design routine reports to show the
full extent of overdue reinvestigations. Our April 2001 report
similarly concluded that OASD (C3I) needed to provide stronger
oversight and better direction to DOD's adjudication facility
officials. After a review of DOD's personnel security investigations
program, an October 2002 report by the House Government Reform
Committee recommended, "The Secretary of Defense should continue to
report the personnel security investigations program including the
adjudicative process as a material [sic] weakness[Footnote 24] under
the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act to ensure needed
oversight is provided to effectively manage and monitor the personnel
security process from start to finish."[Footnote 25] DOD concurred with
our October 1999 recommendation to declare its investigations program
as a material weakness to ensure that needed oversight is provided and
that actions are taken. For fiscal years 2000 through 2003, DOD listed
the personnel security program as a systemic weakness, which is a
weakness that affects more than one DOD component and may jeopardize
the department's operations.[Footnote 26]
Delays in implementing the joint adjudication system, JPAS, have
greatly inhibited OUSD (I)'s ability to monitor overdue
reinvestigations and generate accurate estimates for that portion of
the backlog. Among JPAS's intended purposes are to consolidate DOD's
security clearance data systems and provide various levels of near
real-time input and retrieval of clearance-related information to OUSD
(I), investigators, adjudicators, and security officers at commands,
agencies, and industrial facilities. The DOD Chief Information Officer
identified JPAS as a critical mission system. When we reported on the
reinvestigations backlog in August 2000, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence stated
that JPAS would be fully implemented in fiscal year 2001 and would be
capable of providing recurring reports showing the accurate number of
cleared personnel requiring a periodic reinvestigation by component and
type of investigation. In early December 2003, an OUSD (I) official
said current plans are to have JPAS fully operational by January 2004.
The delays are caused by problems such as loading adjudicative data
from each central adjudication facility's internally developed database
and historical data from the Defense Clearance and Investigation Index.
Backlogs and Poor Estimates May Lead to Increased National Security
Risks, Higher Costs, and Workload Uncertainties:
DOD's failure to eliminate its backlog of overdue reinvestigations may
heighten the risk of national security breaches. Also, backlog-related
delays in issuing initial security clearances may raise the cost of
doing classified work for the U.S. government. In addition, DOD's
inability to accurately determine the actual size of its clearance
backlog and project the number of clearances needed results in
inaccurate budget requests and staffing plans.
Continued Failure to Eliminate Backlog May Lead to Increased National
Security Risks and Unnecessary Costs:
Delays in completing reinvestigations caused by the backlog and other
impediments may lead to a heightened risk of national security
breaches. Such breaches involve the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information, which can have effects that range from
exceptionally grave damage to national security for top secret
information to damage for confidential information.[Footnote 27] In
1999, the Joint Security Commission reported that delays in initiating
reinvestigations create risks to national security because the longer
individuals hold clearances the more likely they are to be working with
critical information systems.[Footnote 28]
Delays in completing initial security clearances may have an economic
impact on the cost of performing classified work within or for the
U.S. government. Although estimates of the total economic costs of
delays in granting clearances are dated, they reflect the extent of an
ongoing problem. In a 1981 report, we estimated that the DOD
investigative backlog could cost nearly $1 billion per year in lost
productivity.[Footnote 29] More than a decade later, the Joint Security
Commission report noted that the costs directly attributable to
investigative delays in fiscal year 1994 could be as high as several
billion dollars because workers were unable to perform their jobs while
awaiting a clearance.[Footnote 30] While newer overall cost estimates
are not available, the underlying reasons--the backlog and clearance
delays that prevent the employment--for the costs still exist within
DOD. For instance, DSS reported that the average time required to
complete an initial investigation for a top secret clearance was 454
days for fiscal year 2002 and 257 days for October 2002 through
February 2003.
The impact of delays in completing initial clearances affects
industry,[Footnote 31] which relies on DOD to provide clearances for
their employees. Representatives from one company with $1 billion per
year in sales stated that their company offers a $10,000 bonus to its
employees for each person recruited who already has a security
clearance. Such operating costs are then passed on to government
customers in the form of higher bids for contracts. In turn, the
recruit's former company may need to back-fill a position, as well as
possibly settle for a lower level of contract performance while a new
employee is found, obtains a clearance, and learns the former
employee's job. Also, industry representatives discussed instances
where their companies gave hiring preference to personnel who could do
the job but were less qualified than others who did not possess a
clearance. The chair of the interagency Personnel Security Working
Group noted that a company might hire an employee and begin paying that
individual, but not assign any work to the individual until a clearance
is obtained. Also, the head of the interagency group noted that
commands, agencies, and industry might incur lost-opportunity costs if
the individual chooses to work somewhere else rather than wait to get
the clearance before beginning work.
Poor Estimates Can Result in Inadequate Budget and Staffing:
DOD's inability to accurately project its personnel security clearance
workload requirements have created budgeting and staffing difficulties
for DOD units involved in the clearance process. For example, in fiscal
year 2000, the services and defense agencies had to limit the number of
overdue reinvestigations that they submitted for investigation because
they had not budgeted the additional funds needed to cover the costs of
the increased workload. Differences between the targeted and actual
number of investigations for fiscal years 2001 to 2003 (see table 2)
also document problems with the current procedures used to project
clearance requirements. Inaccurate projections of personnel security
clearance workloads may have also caused the backlog to be bigger than
it might otherwise be because DSS and the central adjudication
facilities did not adequately plan for increases in workloads.
Status Update on the Authorized Transfer of DSS Investigative Functions
and Personnel to OPM:
In December 2003, advisors to the Director of OPM recommended that the
congressionally authorized transfer of DSS investigative functions and
personnel to OPM not occur--at least for the rest of fiscal year 2004-
-due primarily to concerns about the financial risks associated with
the transfer. The advisors recommended an alternative plan that is
currently being discussed by DOD and OPM officials. The alternative
plan proposes that DSS investigative functions and employees stay in
DOD; use the OPM case management system, which according to a DOD
official would save about $100 million in costs associated with
continuing to update and maintain DOD's current case management system;
and receive training to use that system from OPM. As of December 16,
2003, the Secretary of Defense had not provided Congress with the
certifications required before the transfer can take place.
Background of the Authorized Transfer:
On February 3, 2003, a DOD news release announced that the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and the Director of the OPM had signed an
agreement that would allow DOD to divest its personnel security
investigative functions and OPM to offer positions to DSS investigative
personnel. The proposal for the transfer of functions and personnel was
included in DOD's The Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act
when that legislative proposal was submitted to Congress on April 10,
2003. Also, the Secretary of Defense's annual report to the President
and to Congress for 2003 cited the transfer as an effort to
"[r]eengineer the personnel security program by seeking statutory
authority to transfer the personnel security investigation function
currently performed by the Defense Security Service to the Office of
Personnel Management, thus streamlining activities and eliminate
redundancy."[Footnote 32] The projected savings were estimated to be
approximately $160 million over the fiscal year 2004 to 2009 time
frame.
On November 24, 2003, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2004 authorized the transfer of DSS's personnel security
investigative functions and its 1,855 investigative employees to
OPM.[Footnote 33] Before the transfer can occur, the Secretary of
Defense must certify in writing to the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees that the following five conditions have been met:
* OPM is fully capable of carrying out high-priority investigations
required by the Secretary of Defense within a time frame set by the
Secretary of Defense;
* OPM has undertaken necessary and satisfactory steps to ensure that
investigations performed on DOD contract personnel will be conducted in
an expeditious manner sufficient to ensure that those contract
personnel are available to DOD within a time frame set by the Secretary
of Defense;
* DOD will retain capabilities in the form of federal employees to
monitor and investigate DOD and contractor personnel as necessary to
perform counterintelligence functions and polygraph activities of the
department;
* The authority to adjudicate background investigations will remain
with DOD, and the transfer of DSS personnel to OPM will improve the
speed and efficiency of the adjudicative process; and:
* DOD will retain within DSS sufficient personnel and capabilities to
improve DOD industrial security programs and practices.
The Director of OPM may accept the transfer, but such a transfer may be
made only after a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date on which
the defense committees receive the certification.
Current Status of the Authorized Transfer:
Senior OPM officials recommended that the Director of OPM should not
accept the transfer of DSS's investigative functions and personnel, at
least for the rest of fiscal year 2004. The OPM officials reported that
OPM is not currently prepared to accept DSS's investigative functions
and staff because of concerns about financial risks associated with the
authorized transfer. OPM stated that under its current system of
contracting out all investigations, the contractor assumes all
financial risk for completing investigations at agreed-upon prices. OPM
does not believe that current productivity data for DSS staff is
sufficient to indicate whether DSS staff could provide the services at
the price that OPM charges its customers. Also, OPM believes that the
documentation for the financial costs of automobile leases, office
space, and so forth are not currently adequate to provide OPM with the
assurance that it needs to accept 1,855 personnel into an agency that
currently has about 3,000 employees--more than a 60 percent growth in
the number of OPM employees.
In a memorandum of understanding that is being finalized at OPM and
DOD, OPM is offering an alternative plan for DSS's investigative
functions and staff. While we were not provided a copy of the document,
OPM officials described its contents to us orally. Among other things,
the plan--if approved--would include the following:
* DSS's investigative functions and staff would remain part of DOD;
* DSS's investigative staff would receive training from OPM on the use
of OPM's investigative procedures and OPM's investigations management
system; and:
* OPM would allow DOD to use OPM's investigations management system and
thereby negate the need for DSS's investigations management system,
which an OUSD (I) official indicated could cost about $100 million to
update and maintain over the next 5 years.
A senior OPM official with whom we spoke was optimistic that the
alternative plan will go to DOD for review and signature before the end
of December 2003. If DOD proposes changes, the plan will need to
undergo re-staffing at OPM and possibly DOD. OPM's position described
above was verified with the same OPM official on December 16, 2003.
After learning of the alternative plan and the draft memorandum of
understanding, we discussed both with an OUSD (I) official who has been
a key negotiator with OPM. The official verified that OPM had voiced
the concerns regarding risk and was preparing an alternative plan. That
DOD official is optimistic that DOD will be able to provide the
assurances that are needed for the authorized transfer to occur before
the end of fiscal year 2004. DOD's position was verified with the same
OUSD (I) official on December 16, 2003.
Conclusions:
DOD continues to have a personnel security clearance backlog that
probably exceeds roughly 360,000 cases by some unknown number.
This situation may increase risks to national security and monetary
costs associated with delays in granting clearances. DOD faces many
impediments as it attempts to eliminate its backlog, and these
weaknesses are material to the prompt completion of clearance requests
at all stages of the personnel security process. The large number of
clearance requests being submitted may be the impediment that is least
amenable to change. As we mentioned earlier, worldwide deployments,
contact with sensitive equipment, and other security requirements
underpin the need for personnel to be cleared for access to classified
information. Other impediments to eliminating the backlog are
formidable, but more tractable. Shortages of investigative and
adjudicative staff prevent DOD from quickly completing cases in the
existing backlog as well as the hundreds of thousands of new clearance
requests that have been submitted during each of the last 3 years.
Using the rough estimates provided by an OPM official, the shortage of
over 3,500 full-time-equivalent investigative staff illustrates one
area in the clearance process where supply of personnel is inadequate
to meet the demand for services. DOD has not developed a strategic plan
for overcoming problems in accessing information locally, at the state
level, and overseas during investigations; and this lack of a strategy
hinders DOD efforts to quickly complete cases and efficiently eliminate
the clearance backlog.
Basic to designing an efficient means for overcoming the impediments is
obtaining and using accurate information regarding the backlog. Clear
pictures of the backlog size will continue to be elusive if components
continue to use varying backlog definitions and measures. The presence
of a backlog of an imprecise size and impediments throughout the
clearance process suggest systemic weaknesses in DOD's personnel
security clearance program. Key to generating those reports is the
implementation of the overdue JPAS with its ability to track when
reinvestigations are due.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Because of continuing concerns about the size of the backlog and its
accurate measurement and the personnel security clearance program's
importance to national security, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence take the
following four actions:
* Identify and implement steps to match the sizes of the investigative
and adjudicative workforces to the clearance request workload;
* Develop a strategic plan for overcoming problems accessing data
locally, at the state level, and overseas;
* Develop DOD-wide backlog definitions and measures, and monitor the
backlog at each of the three clearance-process stages using the
DOD-wide measures; and:
* Complete the implementation of the Joint Personnel Adjudication
System.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, OUSD (I) concurred with
three of our four recommendations and partially agreed with our
recommendation to match workforces with workload. OUSD (I) noted that
(1) DOD is developing tools to predict and validate investigative
requirements; (2) staffing, budgeting, and management of the
investigative and adjudicative resources are the purview of the
affected DOD component and investigative providers; and (3) growing a
capable workforce takes time. We agree with these points, but they do
not change the fact that DOD has historically had a backlog and that
these issues must be dealt with timely and effectively to eliminate the
backlog. As our report points out, implementation delays--such as that
with JPAS--hamper efforts to accurately estimate the backlog and
eliminate it. While it is true that the resources provided by DOD
components play an important role in eliminating the backlog, OUSD (I)
also has a critical leadership role because of its responsibility for
the coordination and implementation of DOD policy for accessing
classified information. Finally, the historical and continuing void
between workload demand and capacity suggests that OUSD (I) needs to
take supplemental steps to grow capable investigative and adjudicative
workforces as we have recommended.
DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided
technical comments that we incorporated in the final draft as
appropriate.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 15 days
from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Management and Budget, and
the Office of Personnel Management. We will also make copies available
to appropriate congressional committees and to other interested parties
on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge at
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Key staff members
contributing to this report were Jack E. Edwards, Robert R. Poetta,
Frank Bowen, and Nancy L. Benco.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Derek B. Stewart:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Recent Recommendations Related to DOD's Personnel Security
Clearance Process:
This appendix lists the personnel clearance process recommendations
found in recent reports from GAO, the DOD Office of Inspector General,
and the House Committee on Government Reform. These verbatim
recommendations are arranged according to the issuance dates of the
reports. At the end of each set of recommendations, we provide comments
on whether DOD concurred with the recommendations and the rationale for
nonconcurrences.
Recommendations from U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel:
Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security
Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-12, Washington, D.C., October 27, 1999.
Because of the significant weaknesses in the DOD personnel security
investigation program and the program's importance to national
security, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence) to:
* report the personnel security investigation program as a material
weakness under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act to ensure
that the needed oversight is provided and that actions are taken to
correct the systemic problems in the Defense Security Service personnel
security investigation program;
* improve its oversight of the Defense Security Service personnel
security investigation program, including approving a Defense Security
Service strategic plan; and:
* identify and prioritize overdue reinvestigations, in coordination
with other DOD components, and fund and implement initiatives to
conduct these reinvestigations in a timely manner.
In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct the
Defense Security Service Director, with oversight by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence) to:
* develop a corrective action plan as required under the Federal
Managers' Financial Integrity Act that incorporates corrective actions
and milestones for addressing material weaknesses in the Defense
Security Service personnel security investigative program and
performance measures for monitoring the progress of corrective actions;
* establish a strategic plan that includes agency goals, performance
measures, and procedures for tracking progress in meeting goals in
accordance with sound management practices and the Government
Performance and Results Act;
* conduct analyses needed to (1) determine an appropriate workload that
investigators and case analysts can manage while meeting federal
standards and (2) develop an overall strategy and resource plan to
improve the quality and timeliness of investigations and reduce the
number of overdue reinvestigations;
* review and clarify all investigative policy guidance to ensure that
investigations comply with federal standards;
* establish a process for identifying and forwarding to the Security
Policy Board suggested changes to policy guidance concerning the
implementation of the federal standards and other investigative policy
issues;
* establish formal quality control mechanisms to ensure that Defense
Security Service or contracted investigators perform high-quality
investigations, including periodic reviews of samples of completed
investigations and feedback on problems to senior managers,
investigators, and trainers;
* establish a training infrastructure for basic and continuing
investigator and case analyst training that includes formal feedback
mechanisms to assess training needs and measure effectiveness, and as a
high priority, provide training on complying with federal investigative
standards for investigators and case analysts; and:
* take steps to correct the case management automation problems to gain
short-term capability and develop long-term, cost-effective automation
alternatives.
Further, we recommend that the Secretary direct all DOD adjudication
facility officials to (1) grant clearances only when all essential
investigative work has been done and (2) regularly communicate with the
Defense Security Service about continuing investigative weaknesses and
needed corrective actions.
DOD concurred with all of the recommendations and described many
actions already planned or underway to implement the recommendations.
Recommendations from U.S. General Accounting Office, More Actions
Needed to Address Backlog of Security Clearance Reinvestigations, GAO/
NSIAD-00-215, Washington, D.C., August 24, 2000.
To improve the management of DOD's personnel security reinvestigation
program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence) to:
* design routine reports with key data from the Joint Personnel
Adjudication System database to show the full extent of overdue
reinvestigations, including those overdue but not yet submitted for
update and those in process and:
* develop appropriate incentives to encourage agency security managers
to keep information in the database current and to submit
reinvestigation requests on time. Changes in existing regulations,
policies, and procedures may be necessary to provide such incentives.
DOD concurred with all of the recommendations. In their comments, DOD
stated that those personnel who have not had a request for their
periodic reinvestigation submitted to the Office of Personnel
Management or the Defense Security Service by September 30, 2002, would
have their security clearances downgraded or canceled.
Recommendations from Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General
Audit Report, Security Clearance Investigative Priorities, Report No.
D-2000-111, Arlington, Va., April 5, 2000.
* We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence) establish an Integrated
Process Team to:
* Develop criteria for determining the highest priority mission-
critical and high-risk positions based on their impact on mission-
critical programs. The criteria must also include a review of the
special projects at the Defense Security Service.
* Develop a process for relating specific clearance requests to
mission-critical and high-risk positions. This process must identify
specific individuals as they are submitted for initial investigations
and periodic reinvestigations. The process should continually adjust
the highest priority mission-critical and high-risk positions to
actions that may impact them.
* We recommend that the Director, Defense Security Service, establish
the process and metrics to ensure expeditious processing of personnel
security clearance investigations in accordance with established
priorities.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications,
and Intelligence) non-concurred with the first recommendation, stating
that the recommendations are beyond the scope and ability of his Office
to implement, especially in the near future. However, the Defense
Security Service concurred with the intent of the recommendation.
DOD and DSS concurred with the second recommendation.
Recommendations from U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel:
More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for Top Secret
Security Clearances, GAO/NSIAD-01-465, Washington, D.C., April 18,
2001.[Footnote 34]
To provide better direction to DOD's adjudication facility officials,
improve DOD's oversight, and enhance the effectiveness of the
adjudicative process, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence) to:
* establish detailed documentation requirements to support adjudication
decisions, including all significant adverse security conditions and
the mitigating factors relevant to each condition;
* require that all DOD adjudicators use common explanatory guidance,
such as that contained in the Adjudicative Desk Reference;
* establish common adjudicator training requirements and work with the
Defense Security Service Academy to develop appropriate continuing
education opportunities for all DOD adjudicators; and:
* establish a common quality assurance program to be implemented by
officials in all DOD adjudication facilities and monitor compliance
through annual reporting.
DOD concurred with all of the recommendations and described the actions
it planned to take to improve its guidance, training, and quality
assurance program.
Recommendations from Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General
Audit Report, Tracking Security Clearance Requests, Report No. D-2000-
134, Arlington, Va., May 30, 2000.
* We recommend that the Director, Defense Security Service, track all
security clearance requests from the time they are received until the
investigative cases are opened. Security clearance requests that are
not opened to investigative cases, and those investigative cases that
are opened without electronic requests should be included in the
tracking process.
* Post, weekly, the names and social security numbers of all cases in
process on the Extranet for Security Professionals. This entry for each
name should include, at a minimum, the date that the request was loaded
into the Case Control Management System, the date that the
investigative case was opened, and the date that the case was closed.
DOD and DSS concurred on these recommendations.
Recommendation from Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General
Audit Report, Program Management of the Defense Security Service Case
Control Management System, Report No. D-2001-019, Arlington, Va.,
December 15, 2000.
We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence) and the Director, Defense Security
Service, prior to making further decisions on the future system
architecture, analyze whether the investment for the Case Control
Management System and the Enterprise System provides the best business
solution when compared to alternative solutions for opening, tracking
and closing personnel investigation cases.
DOD and DSS concurred with this recommendation.
Recommendations from U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
Government Reform, Defense Security Service: The Personnel Security
Investigations [PSI] Backlog Poses a Threat to National Security,
Report 107-767, Washington, D.C., October 24, 2002.
* The Secretary of Defense should continue to report the personnel
security investigations program including the adjudicative process as a
material weakness under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act
to ensure needed oversight is provided to effectively manage and
monitor the personnel security process from start to finish.
* The Secretary of Defense should set priorities and control the flow
of personnel security investigation requests for all DOD components.
* The Secretary of Defense should closely monitor the interface between
JPAS and CCMS to ensure effective management of investigative and
adjudicative cases and avoid further backlogs.
* The National Security Council should promulgate Federal standards for
investigating and adjudicating personnel security clearances in a
timely manner.
* The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General jointly should
develop a system, which allows DSS and OPM investigators access to
state and local criminal history information records.
DOD indicated that it does not plan to respond to these
recommendations.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To estimate the size and accuracy of the Department of Defense-wide
(DOD) personnel security clearance backlog, we obtained separate
estimates of the investigative and adjudicative backlogs from the
Defense Security Service (DSS), the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM), and DOD's central adjudication facilities. Also, we obtained
some DOD-wide information from the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence (OUSD (I)). As part of the estimation process,
we observed the steps used to capture and process investigative
information at DSS and OPM. We obtained additional information
regarding issues such as number of days required to complete an
investigation or adjudication, time limits (i.e., criteria) for
completing investigations and adjudications, and data reliability from
DSS, OPM, and the central adjudication facilities during site visits,
through questionnaires, and by interviews. We conducted this work at
OUSD (I), Washington, D.C.; DSS, Fort Meade, Maryland; OPM, Washington,
D.C., and Boyers, Pennsylvania; Army, Navy, Air Force, National
Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Staff, and
Washington Headquarters Services central adjudication facilities
located in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area; the Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office, Columbus, Ohio; and the Defense
Office of Hearings and Appeals, Arlington, Virginia, and Columbus,
Ohio. We did not request data from the National Reconnaissance Office
central adjudication facility because of the sensitive nature of its
operations. Reviews of GAO, House Government Reform Committee, and
Joint Security Commission reports provided a historical perspective for
the report. Additional context for understanding DOD's personnel
security program was obtained through a review of DOD regulations
(e.g., DOD 5200.2-R), federal investigative standards, and federal
adjudicative guidelines.
To identify the factors that impede DOD's ability to eliminate its
backlog and accurately estimate the backlog size, we reviewed prior
GAO, DOD Office of Inspector General, House Government Reform
Committee, Defense Personnel Security Research Center, and Joint
Security Commission reports. DSS and OPM provided procedural manuals
and discussed impediments while demonstrating their automated case
management systems and provided other information such as workload data
in responses to written questions and in interviews. Interviews
regarding impediments were also held with officials from OUSD (I); nine
central adjudication facilities; the Defense Personnel Security
Research Center; the Chair of the Personnel Security Working Group of
the National Security Council, Washington, D.C.; investigations
contractors at their headquarters: US Investigations Services, Inc.;
ManTech; and DynCorp; and associations representing industry:[Footnote
35] Aerospace Industries Association, Information Technology
Association of America, National Defense Industrial Association, and
Northern Virginia Technology Council. Our General Counsel's office
supplied additional context for evaluating potential impediments
through its review of items such as the Security Clearance Information
Act and Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information.
To identify the potential adverse effects of the impediments to
eliminating the backlog and accurately estimating its size, we reviewed
prior GAO and Joint Security Commission reports. We supplemented this
information with recent data from DSS and OPM regarding the number of
days that it took to complete various types of investigations. Also, an
interview with the Chair of the Personnel Security Working Group of the
National Security Council provided a governmentwide perspective on the
effects of delays and backlogs. Industry representatives cited above
provided other perspectives on the economic costs of delays in
obtaining eligibility-for-clearance determinations.
For our update on the status of the authorized transfer of DSS's
investigative functions and staff to OPM, we reviewed the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 and GAO reports on DSS
and OPM operations. In addition, we reviewed planning documents such as
those describing the various transfer-related action teams that OPM and
DOD created; these teams included one that sought to reconcile
differences in the procedures used to conduct personnel security
investigations. We also conducted interviews in December with DOD and
OPM to determine up-to-date perspectives regarding the authorized
transfer from officials representing both agencies.
We conducted our review from February 2003 through December 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this
report.
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000:
INTELLIGENCE:
JAN 26 2004:
Mr. Derek Stewart:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Stewart:
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the General Accounting
Office (GAO) draft report, "DoD PERSONNEL CLEARANCES: DoD Needs to
Overcome Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size,"
dated December 22, 2003 (GAO Code 350324/GAO-04-344).
Your recommendations reaffirm the direction the DoD has begun
implementing. Unfortunately, the report does not adequately reflect the
recent dedicated and positive efforts by the DoD --its employees and
partners --to correct deficiencies previously identified by the GAO and
others.
We are in the midst of an unprecedented transformation of the personnel
and industrial security programs administered by the Defense Security
Service. The business process reengineering and improvements as well as
policy changes currently underway
will allow us to better understand our front-end clearance requirements
and conduct capacity analyses; automate the end-to-end clearance
process reducing the amount of "touch labor"; provide security officers
visibility into the status of a particular investigation(s); promote
collaboration and standardization among adjudicators; improve the
timeliness of investigations and adjudications; and utilize a risk
model to determine time and scope of reinvestigations.
The Executive Branch and the Congress have repeatedly stated their
commitment to the transformation of Government in order to better meet
the needs of our citizens while providing fiscal stewardship. However
as necessary as one might deem these kinds of reports to be, they are
demoralizing to a workforce that is valiantly attempting to achieve the
good Government all of us strive for.
Detailed comments to the recommendations are enclosed. Technical
comments were forwarded directly to the GAO staff for consideration.
Sincerely:
Signed by:
Carol A. Haave:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Counterintelligence and Security):
Enclosure:
GAO CODE 350324/GAO-04-344:
"DOD PERSONNEL CLEARANCES: DoD Needs to Overcome Impediments to
Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to identify and
implement steps to match the size of the investigative and adjudicative
workforces to the clearance request workload. (p. 31/ Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The Department has struggled to
accurately predict its investigative workload, which in turn impacts
appropriate sizing of the investigative and adjudicative workforces. To
address this issue, DoD is developing a verification and validation
module to predict and validate investigative requirements as well as
looking into interfacing with other databases (e.g. acquisition) to be
able to better predict future and continuing investigative needs. These
initiatives coupled with data from the Joint Personnel Adjudication
System (JPAS) will lay the framework to help the Department address
this issue.
The Department's efforts in the mid-to-late 90's to align workload with
resources yielded unintended consequences and headlines. The Department
turned to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and private vendors
for investigative assistance. The concept was to establish a baseline
workload volume for the federal sector and utilize private vendors to
address the peaks and valleys. Good concept, but the private sector has
not been able to fill the capacity void as rapidly as needed and views
the financial picture as too risky for any long term investment without
a solid guarantee for success.
OUSD(I) will provide the necessary tools to be able match the workload
to available resources, but staffing, budgeting, and management of
those resources are the purview of the affected DoD Component and
investigative provider. This office has directed the DoD Components to
adequately budget for their investigative requirements and for those
with adjudication responsibilities to adequately staff and resource the
central adjudication facility in order to meet its mission
requirements. However, "throwing resources at the problem" is not going
to fully resolve the capacity constraint. Both the investigative and
adjudicative workforce must be "grown" as the number of experienced
personnel is declining. "Growing" a capable workforce takes time.
Enclosure:
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to develop a
strategic plan for overcoming problems accessing data locally, at the
state level, and overseas.
(p. 31 /Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Department is addressing this issue, but a
more formal approach will be developed.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to develop DoD-
wide backlog definitions and measures, and monitor the backlog at each
of the three clearance-process stages using the DoD-wide measures. (p.
32/Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. DoD will develop backlog definitions and measures
and "dashboard-like" tools to more effectively monitor the personnel
security clearance process.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to complete the
full implementation of the Joint Personnel Adjudication System. (p. 32/
Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. Full implementation of the Joint Personnel
Adjudication System (JPAS) is the goal and efforts are underway to
achieve it.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Related GAO Products:
DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for
Top Secret Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2001.
DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance
Reinvestigation Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2000.
DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security
Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215. Washington, D.C.: August
24, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are Being
Addressed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose
National Security Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.:
February 16, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations
Pose National Security Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.:
October 27, 1999.
Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History
Screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999.
Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to
Relinquish Its Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 1999.
Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access
to and Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245.
Washington, D.C.: September 1998.
Privatization of OPM's Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R.
Washington, D.C.: August 22, 1996.
Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R.
Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1996.
Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the
Executive Office of the President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.:
October 19, 1995.
Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM's Role in
Background Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185. Washington, D.C.:
June 14, 1995.
Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating Investigations
and Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101. Washington, D.C.: March
24, 1995.
Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the
Clearance Process. GAO/NSIAD-95-21. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.
Personnel Security Investigations: GAO/NSIAD-94-135R.
Washington, D.C.: March 4, 1994.
Nuclear Security: DOE's Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance
Work Load. GAO/RCED-93-183. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 12, 1993.
DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not Provided
When Access is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162. Washington, D.C.:
May 5, 1993.
Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate
Duplicative Background Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23.
Washington, D.C.: May 10, 1993.
Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security
Clearances and Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14.
Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993.
Security Clearances: Due Process for Denials and Revocations by
Defense, Energy, and State. GAO/NSIAD-92-99. Washington, D.C.:
May 6, 1992.
Due Process: Procedures for Unfavorable Suitability and Security
Clearance Actions. GAO/NSIAD-90-97FS. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1990.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel
Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-12
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999).
[2] In DOD's Annual Statement of Assurance, FY 1999 Volume I, DOD
stated that "[i]n the upcoming annual assurance statement, Defense
Security Service (DSS) will identify the Personnel Security
Investigations Program as being a material weakness and will provide an
action plan that addresses corrective actions needed to bring the
program back into compliance with performance expectations and with
existing security policies." However, in both the fiscal year 2000 and
2001 Annual Statement of Assurance, the personnel security
investigations program was listed as a systemic weakness. According to
the fiscal year 2001 Statement of Assurance, "Material weaknesses are
management control problems that affect only one Component and do not
significantly impact mission accomplishment. Systemic weaknesses are
management control problems that affect more that one DOD Component and
may jeopardize the Department's operations." Department of Defense,
Annual Statement of Assurance, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: 1999).
[3] Pub. L. 97-255 (Sept. 8, 1982).
[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed
to Address Backlog of Security Clearance Reinvestigations, GAO/NSIAD-
00-215 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 24, 2000).
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel: More Consistency
Needed in Determining Eligibility for Top Secret Security Clearances,
GAO-01-465 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 2001).
[6] Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General Audit Report,
Program Management of the Defense Security Service Case Control
Management System, Report No. D-2001-019 (Arlington, Va.: Dec. 15,
2000); Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General Audit Report,
Acquisition Management of the Joint Personnel Adjudication System,
Report No. D-2001-112 (Arlington, Va.: May 5, 2001); and Department of
Defense, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Security Clearance
Investigative Priorities, Report No. D-2000-111 (Arlington, Va.: Apr.
5, 2000).
[7] Pub. L. 108-136 § 906 (Nov. 24, 2003).
[8] Pub. L. 107-314 § 901 (Dec. 2, 2002).
[9] Classification of National Security Information, 5 C.F.R. §1312.4
(2003).
[10] Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Information, 32 C.F.R. Part 147, Subpart B, Attach. A and
Attach. C (2003).
[11] The White House, "Implementation of Executive Order 12968,"
Memorandum, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 1997). This memorandum approves
the adjudicative guidelines, temporary eligibility standards, and
investigative standards required by Executive Order 12968, Access to
Classified Information, Aug. 2, 1995.
[12] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence, "Personnel Security Investigations
and Adjudications," Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 1998).
[13] A Defense Personnel Security Research Center report provided the
following distinctions in the roles of the 10 DOD central adjudication
facilities. The Army, Navy, and Air Force facilities adjudicate all
military and civilian clearances for their respective services, and the
sensitive compartmented information clearances for industry employees
working on the department's contracts. The Washington Headquarters
Service facility adjudicates all clearances, except for sensitive
compartmented information, for civilians assigned to Defense agencies.
The National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, and
Defense Intelligence Agency facilities adjudicate all sensitive
compartmented information clearances for their own employees, and the
Defense Intelligence Agency also does the same for other Defense agency
civilians. The Joint Chiefs of Staff facility adjudicates clearances
for its own personnel. The Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office
adjudicates investigations that contain favorable or minor derogatory
information for issuance of top secret, secret, and confidential
clearances for industry personnel. Industry investigations that contain
major derogatory information are transferred to the Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals for adjudication. Ralph M. Carney et al., Quality
Assurance in Defense Adjudication: An Adjudicator Workshop for Defining
and Assessing Quality, (Monterey, Calif.: Defense Personnel Security
Research Center, Mar. 2003).
[14] GAO/NSIAD-00-215.
[15] DSS's performance goal is to complete at least 75 percent of each
type of investigation within the specified time limits, but monitoring
of the backlog requires a determination of whether each investigation
was completed by the time limit--not whether an aggregate performance
goal was met for a particular type of investigation.
[16] OPM's performance goals for its contractor are to complete 90
percent of the 35-day service requests by the agency date, 92 percent
of the 75-day service requests by the agency date, 95 percent of the
120-day service requests by the agency date, and 95 percent of the
extended service agreements by the agency date.
[17] Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security: A Report to the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 1994).
[18] GAO/NSIAD-00-12.
[19] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Federal Air
Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and
Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed, GAO-04-242 (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 19, 2003).
[20] In our October 1999 report on investigations, table 9 showed that
during fiscal years 1991-1998, DSS opened a low of 126,000 cases in
fiscal year 1996 and a high of 271,000 cases in fiscal year 1992. We
believe that differences in investigative procedures and other
conditions at DSS then versus now make findings from any such
comparison of prior and current investigative workloads tenuous. GAO/
NSIAD-00-12.
[21] GAO-01-465.
[22] Committee on Government Reform, Defense Security Service: The
Personnel Security Investigations (PSI) Backlog Poses a Threat to
National Security, H.R. 107-767 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2002).
[23] Security Clearance Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 9101 (2003).
[24] While the October 2002 House Committee on Government Reform report
does indeed make this recommendation, the DOD's annual statements of
assurance for fiscal year 2000 and for fiscal year 2001 and its annual
performance and accountability reports for fiscal year 2002 and for
fiscal year 2003 report the personnel security investigations program
as a "systemic weakness." Committee on Government Reform report, Oct.
24, 2002.
[25] Committee on Government Reform report, Oct. 24, 2002, p. 36.
[26] Department of Defense Annual Statement of Assurance, Fiscal Year
2000 and Fiscal Year 2001; Department of Defense Performance and
Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2002 (Jan. 31, 2003) and Fiscal Year
2003 (Dec. 23, 2003).
[27] Classification of National Security Information, 5 C.F.R. §1312.4
(2003).
[28] Joint Security Commission II, Report of the Joint Security
Commission II, (Aug. 24, 1999), p. 5-6.
[29] U.S. General Accounting Office, Faster Processing of DOD Personnel
Security Clearances Could Avoid Millions in Losses, GAO/GGD-81-105
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 1981).
[30] Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security: A Report to the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, Chapter
4, Personnel Security--The First and Best Defense (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 28, 1994).
[31] We have an ongoing effort for the House Government Reform
Committee that is examining the backlog of industry requests for
clearances, the timeliness of clearance determinations, and the steps
that DOD might take to make its process more efficient.
[32] Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the
President and to Congress 2003, p. 64.
[33] Pub. L. 108-136 § 906 (Nov. 24, 2003).
[34] The recommendations from this report on DOD adjudication were
included because (1) the adjudications rely heavily on high-quality,
complete personnel security investigations and (2) the 2002 House
Committee on Government Reform report recommended including the
adjudicative portion of the clearance process as a material weakness.
[35] Information from industry associations was obtained as part of an
ongoing GAO engagement examining DOD's personnel security clearance
process as it applies to industry personnel. More specifically, the
engagement examined the size of the backlog, timeliness of eligibility-
for-clearance decisions, and steps that DOD is taking to decrease the
time required for those decisions.
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