DOD Personnel Clearances
Funding Challenges and Other Impediments Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel Gao ID: GAO-06-747T May 17, 2006The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for about 2 million active personnel security clearances. About one-third of the clearances are for industry personnel working on contracts for DOD and more than 20 other executive agencies. Delays in determining eligibility for a clearance can heighten the risk that classified information will be disclosed to unauthorized sources and increase contract costs and problems attracting and retaining qualified personnel. On April 28, 2006, DOD announced it had stopped processing security clearance applications for industry personnel because of an overwhelming volume of requests and funding constraints. GAO has reported problems with DOD's security clearance processes since 1981. In January 2005, GAO designated DOD's program a high-risk area because of longstanding delays in completing clearance requests and an inability to accurately estimate and eliminate its clearance backlog. For this statement GAO addresses: (1) key points in the billing dispute between DOD and OPM and (2) some of the major impediments affecting clearances for industry personnel.
The costs underlying a billing dispute between DOD and OPM are contributing to further delays in the processing of new security clearance requests for industry personnel. The dispute stems from the February 2005 transfer of DOD's personnel security investigations function to OPM and associated costs for which DOD agreed to reimburse OPM. Among other things, the two agencies' memorandum of agreement for the transfer allows OPM to charge DOD annual price adjustments plus a 25 percent premium, in addition to the rates OPM charges to other federal government agencies. A January 20, 2006, memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) questioned the continued need for the premiums and requested mediation from OMB. According to DOD and OPM, OMB has directed the two agencies to continue to work together to resolve the matter. The inspectors general for both DOD and OPM are expected to report on the results of their investigations into the dispute this summer. Other impediments, if not effectively addressed, could negatively affect the timeliness of clearance-eligibility determinations for one or more of the following employee groups: industry personnel, servicemembers, and civilian government employees. All three groups are affected by DOD's longstanding inability to accurately estimate the size of its security clearance workload. Inaccurate estimates of the volume of clearances needed make it difficult to determine clearance-related budgets and staffing requirements. Similarly, the July 1, 2006, expiration of Executive Order 13381, which delegated responsibility for improving the clearance process to OMB, could potentially slow improvements in personnel security clearance processes DOD-wide as well as governmentwide. GAO has been encouraged by OMB's high level of commitment to activities such as the development of a government plan to improve personnel security clearance processes governmentwide but is concerned about whether such progress will continue after the executive order expires. In contrast, demand for top secret clearances for industry personnel and the lack of reciprocity (the acceptance of a clearance and access granted by another department, agency, or military service) are impediments that mainly affect industry personnel. A previously identified increase in the demand for top secret clearances for industry personnel has workload and budgetary implications for DOD and OPM if such requests continue to occur. Finally, the lack of reciprocity has a negative effect on employees and employers, and increases the workload for already overburdened investigative and adjudicative staff. Reciprocity problems have occurred despite the issuance of governmentwide investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines in 1997.
GAO-06-747T, DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Statement for the Record to the Committee on Government Reform, House
of Representatives:
DOD Personnel Clearances:
Funding Challenges and Other Impediments Slow Clearances for Industry
Personnel:
Statement for the Record by Derek B. Stewart:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-06-747T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-747T, a statement for the record to the Committee
on Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for about 2 million
active personnel security clearances. About one-third of the clearances
are for industry personnel working on contracts for DOD and more than
20 other executive agencies. Delays in determining eligibility for a
clearance can heighten the risk that classified information will be
disclosed to unauthorized sources and increase contract costs and
problems attracting and retaining qualified personnel. On April 28,
2006, DOD announced it had stopped processing security clearance
applications for industry personnel because of an overwhelming volume
of requests and funding constraints. GAO has reported problems with
DOD‘s security clearance processes since 1981. In January 2005, GAO
designated DOD‘s program a high-risk area because of longstanding
delays in completing clearance requests and an inability to accurately
estimate and eliminate its clearance backlog.
For this statement GAO addresses: (1) key points in the billing dispute
between DOD and OPM and (2) some of the major impediments affecting
clearances for industry personnel.
What GAO Found:
The costs underlying a billing dispute between DOD and OPM are
contributing to further delays in the processing of new security
clearance requests for industry personnel. The dispute stems from the
February 2005 transfer of DOD‘s personnel security investigations
function to OPM and associated costs for which DOD agreed to reimburse
OPM. Among other things, the two agencies‘ memorandum of agreement for
the transfer allows OPM to charge DOD annual price adjustments plus a
25 percent premium, in addition to the rates OPM charges to other
federal government agencies. A January 20, 2006, memorandum from the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) questioned the continued need for the premiums and
requested mediation from OMB. According to DOD and OPM, OMB has
directed the two agencies to continue to work together to resolve the
matter. The inspectors general for both DOD and OPM are expected to
report on the results of their investigations into the dispute this
summer.
Other impediments, if not effectively addressed, could negatively
affect the timeliness of clearance-eligibility determinations for one
or more of the following employee groups: industry personnel,
servicemembers, and civilian government employees. All three groups are
affected by DOD‘s longstanding inability to accurately estimate the
size of its security clearance workload. Inaccurate estimates of the
volume of clearances needed make it difficult to determine clearance-
related budgets and staffing requirements. Similarly, the July 1, 2006,
expiration of Executive Order 13381, which delegated responsibility for
improving the clearance process to OMB, could potentially slow
improvements in personnel security clearance processes DOD-wide as well
as governmentwide. GAO has been encouraged by OMB‘s high level of
commitment to activities such as the development of a government plan
to improve personnel security clearance processes governmentwide but is
concerned about whether such progress will continue after the executive
order expires. In contrast, demand for top secret clearances for
industry personnel and the lack of reciprocity (the acceptance of a
clearance and access granted by another department, agency, or military
service) are impediments that mainly affect industry personnel. A
previously identified increase in the demand for top secret clearances
for industry personnel has workload and budgetary implications for DOD
and OPM if such requests continue to occur. Finally, the lack of
reciprocity has a negative effect on employees and employers, and
increases the workload for already overburdened investigative and
adjudicative staff. Reciprocity problems have occurred despite the
issuance of governmentwide investigative standards and adjudicative
guidelines in 1997.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-747T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Derek B. Stewart at
(202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairman Davis and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this statement for your
hearing on the challenges facing the Department of Defense (DOD) and
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in processing requests for
personnel security clearances in a timely manner. Two years ago, we
testified before this committee on similar challenges.[Footnote 1]
Before providing our observations about the challenges, I would like to
provide some background to (1) give a general context for understanding
clearances and describe the importance of industry personnel to our
national security, (2) discuss how clearance problems can negatively
affect national security, and (3) provide information about several
recent events affecting the overall status of DOD's personnel security
clearance program.
Background:
As you know, Mr. Chairman, for over two decades, we have reported on
problems with DOD's personnel security clearance program as well as the
financial costs and risks to national security resulting from these
problems (see Related GAO Reports at the end of this statement). For
example, at the turn of the century, we documented problems such as
incomplete investigations, inconsistency in determining eligibility for
clearances, and a backlog of overdue clearance reinvestigations that
exceeded 500,000 cases.[Footnote 2] More recently in 2004, we
identified continuing and new impediments hampering DOD's clearance
program and made recommendations for increasing the effectiveness and
efficiency of the program.[Footnote 3] Also in 2004, we testified
before this committee on clearance-related problems faced by industry
personnel.[Footnote 4]
A critical step in the federal government's efforts to protect national
security is to determine whether an individual is eligible for a
personnel security clearance. Specifically, an individual whose job
requires access to classified information must undergo a background
investigation and adjudication (determination of eligibility) in order
to obtain a clearance. As with federal government workers, the demand
for personnel security clearances for industry personnel has increased
during recent years. Additional awareness of threats to our national
security since September 11, 2001, and efforts to privatize federal
jobs during the last decade are but two of the reasons for the greater
number of industry personnel needing clearances today. As of September
30, 2003, industry personnel held about one-third of the approximately
2 million DOD-issued clearances. DOD's Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence has overall responsibility for DOD clearances,
and its responsibilities also extend beyond DOD. Specifically, that
office's responsibilities include obtaining background investigations
and adjudicating clearance eligibility for industry personnel in more
than 20 other federal agencies,[Footnote 5] as well as the clearances
of staff in the federal government's legislative branch.
Problems in the clearance program can negatively affect national
security. For example, delays reviewing security clearances for
personnel who are already doing classified work can lead to a
heightened risk of disclosure of classified information. In contrast,
delays in providing initial security clearances for previously
noncleared personnel can result in other negative consequences, such as
additional costs and delays in completing national security-related
contracts, lost-opportunity costs, and problems retaining the best
qualified personnel.
Longstanding delays in completing hundreds of thousands of clearance
requests for servicemembers, federal employees, and industry personnel
as well as numerous impediments that hinder DOD's ability to accurately
estimate and eliminate its clearance backlog led us to declare the
program a high-risk area in January 2005. The 25 areas on our high-risk
list at that time received their designation because they are major
programs and operations that need urgent attention and transformation
in order to ensure that our national government functions in the most
economical, efficient, and effective manner possible.[Footnote 6]
Shortly after we placed DOD's clearance program on our high-risk list,
a major change in DOD's program occurred. In February 2005, DOD
transferred its personnel security investigations functions and about
1,800 investigative positions to OPM. Now DOD obtains nearly all of its
clearance investigations from OPM[Footnote 7], which is currently
responsible for 90 percent of the personnel security clearance
investigations in the federal government.[Footnote 8] DOD retained
responsibility for adjudication of military personnel, DOD civilians,
and industry personnel.
Other recent significant events affecting DOD's clearance program have
been the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 and the issuance of the June 2005 Executive Order No.
13381, Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for
Access to Classified National Security Information. The act included
milestones for reducing the time to complete clearances, general
specifications for a database on security clearances, and requirements
for greater reciprocity of clearances (the acceptance of a clearance
and access granted by another department, agency, or military service).
Among other things, the executive order resulted in the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) taking a lead role in preparing a strategic
plan to improve personnel security clearance processes governmentwide.
Using this context for understanding the interplay between DOD and OPM
in DOD's personnel security clearance processes, my statement addresses
two objectives in this statement: (1) key points of a billing dispute
between DOD and OPM and (2) some of the major impediments affecting
clearances for industry personnel.
As requested by this committee, we have an ongoing examination of the
timeliness and completeness of the processes used to determine the
eligibility of industry personnel to receive top secret clearances. We
expect to present the results of this work in the fall. My statement
today, however, is based primarily on our completed work and our
institutional knowledge from our prior reviews of the steps in the
clearance processes used by DOD and, to a lesser extent, other
agencies. In addition, we used information from the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; executive orders; and other
documents, such as a memorandum of agreement between DOD and OPM. We
conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards in May 2006.
Summary:
The additional costs DOD has incurred for its investigations are
contributing to further delays in the processing of new security
clearances for industry personnel. Despite an already sizable backlog
of security clearance applications, DOD stopped processing applications
for industry personnel on April 28, 2006. DOD attributed the stoppage
to a large volume of industry clearance requests and funding
constraints. The funding constraints may be the result of a broader
billing dispute that has been taking place between DOD and OPM. As part
of the agreement that transferred DOD's clearance investigations
function to OPM, OPM may charge DOD for annual price adjustments plus a
25 percent premium, in addition to the rates it normally charges other
federal agencies for investigations. DOD disputes the continued need
for the premium and has asked OMB to mediate; however, information from
the two agencies indicates that OMB has directed DOD and OPM to
continue to work together to resolve the matter. The inspectors general
for both DOD and OPM are investigating the billing dispute and are
expected to report on the results of their investigations this summer.
Some impediments, if not effectively addressed, can hinder the timely
determination of clearance eligibility for servicemembers, civilian
government employees, and industry personnel; whereas other impediments
mainly affect industry personnel. One impediment that could affect all
three employee groups is DOD's longstanding inability to accurately
estimate its future clearance requests. In fiscal years 2001 through
2003, the department incorrectly estimated the number of requests by
90,000 to 150,000 cases per year. This impediment makes it difficult to
determine clearance-related budgets and staffing requirements. Another
impediment for all three employee groups pertains to the July 1, 2006,
expiration of Executive Order 13381, which delegated responsibility for
improving the clearance process to OMB. We have been encouraged by
OMB's high level of commitment during the development of a plan to
improve clearance processes governmentwide. Because there has been no
indication that the executive order will be extended, we are concerned
about whether such progress will continue. In contrast, greater demand
for top secret clearances for industry personnel and the lack of
reciprocity would primarily affect industry personnel. Between fiscal
years 1995 and 2003, the proportion of security clearance requests for
industry personnel who required top secret investigations and
adjudications increased from 17 to 27 percent of the workload. A rise
in the demand for top secret clearances has negative side effects that
include the need to renew clearances more often (than secret or
confidential clearances), requirements for more information about
applicants, and much higher costs. A second impediment that might
affect industry personnel more than other employee groups is the
absence of reciprocity. In addition to slowing how quickly contractors
can use newly hired employees, this impediment increases the workload
for already overburdened investigative and adjudicative staff.
Reciprocity problems have occurred despite the issuance of
governmentwide investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines in
1997.
Unexpected Volume of Clearance Requests and Funding Constraints Delay
Security Clearances for Industry Personnel Further:
DOD stopped processing applications for clearance investigations for
industry personnel on April 28, 2006, despite an already sizeable
backlog. DOD attributed its actions to an overwhelming volume of
requests for industry personnel security investigations and funding
constraints. We will address the issue of workload projections later
when we discuss impediments that affect industry personnel as well as
servicemembers and federal employees, but first we would like to talk
about the issue of funding.
An important consideration in understanding the funding constraints
that contributed to the stoppage is a DOD-OPM billing dispute, which
has resulted in the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
requesting OMB mediation. The dispute stems from the February 2005
transfer of DOD's personnel security investigations function to OPM.
The memorandum of agreement signed by the OPM Director and the DOD
Deputy Secretary prior to the transfer lists many types of costs that
DOD may incur for up to 3 years after the transfer of the
investigations function to OPM. One cost, an adjustment to the rates
charged to agencies for clearance investigations, provides that "OPM
may charge DOD for investigations at DOD's current rates plus annual
price adjustments plus a 25 percent premium to offset potential
operating losses. OPM will be able to adjust, at any point of time
during the first three year period after the start of transfer, the
premium as necessary to cover estimated future costs or operating
losses, if any, or offset gains, if any."
The Under Secretary's memorandum says that OPM has collected
approximately $50 million in premiums in addition to approximately $144
million for other costs associated with the transfer. The OPM Associate
Director subsequently listed costs that OPM has incurred. To help
resolve this billing matter, DOD requested mediation from OMB, in
accordance with the memorandum of agreement between DOD and OPM.
Information from the two agencies indicates that in response to DOD's
request, OMB has directed them to continue to work together to resolve
the matter. The DOD and OPM offices of inspector general are currently
investigating all of the issues raised in the Under Secretary's and
Associate Director's correspondences and have indicated that they
intend to issue reports on their reviews this summer.
If Not Effectively Addressed, Impediments Could Continue to Hinder
Efforts to Provide Timely Clearances:
Some impediments, if not effectively addressed, could hinder the timely
determination of clearance eligibility for servicemembers, civilian
government employees, and industry personnel; whereas other impediments
would mainly affect industry personnel. The inability to accurately
estimate the number of future clearance requests and the expiration of
the previously mentioned executive order that resulted in high-level
involvement by OMB could adversely affect the timeliness of eligibility
determinations for all types of employee groups. In contrast, an
increased demand for top secret clearances for industry personnel and
the lack of reciprocity would primarily affect industry personnel.
An Existing and a Potential New Impediment Could Lead to Continuing
Problems for All Types of Employees Seeking Clearances:
A major impediment to providing timely clearances is the inaccurate
projections of the number of requests for security clearances DOD-wide
and for industry personnel specifically. As we noted in our May 2004
testimony before this committee, DOD's longstanding inability to
accurately project its security clearance workload makes it difficult
to determine clearance-related budgets and staffing requirements. In
fiscal year 2001, DOD received 18 percent (about 150,000) fewer
requests than it expected, and in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, it
received 19 and 13 percent (about 135,000 and 90,000) more requests
than projected, respectively. In 2005, DOD was again uncertain about
the number and level of clearances that it required, but the department
reported plans and efforts to identify clearance requirements for
servicemembers, civilian employees, and contractors. For example, in
response to our May 2004 recommendation to improve the projection of
clearance requests for industry personnel, DOD indicated that it was
developing a plan and computer software that would enable the
government's contracting officers to (1) authorize a certain number of
industry personnel clearance investigations for any given contract,
depending on the number of clearances required to perform the
classified work on that contract, and (2) link the clearance
investigations to the contract number.
Another potential impediment that could slow improvements in personnel
security clearance processes in DOD--as well as governmentwide--is the
July 1, 2006, expiration of Executive Order No. 13381. Among other
things, this executive order delegated responsibility for improving the
clearance process to the Director of OMB for about 1 year. We have been
encouraged by the high level of commitment that OMB has demonstrated in
the development of a governmentwide plan to address clearance-related
problems. Also, the OMB Deputy Director met with GAO officials to
discuss OMB's general strategy for addressing the problems that led to
our high-risk designation for DOD's clearance program. Demonstrating
strong management commitment and top leadership support to address a
known risk is one of the requirements for removing DOD's clearance
program from GAO's high-risk list. Because there has been no indication
that the executive order will be extended, we are concerned about
whether such progress will continue without OMB's high-level management
involvement. While OPM has provided some leadership in assisting OMB
with the development of the governmentwide plan, OPM may not be in a
position to assume additional high-level commitment for a variety of
reasons. These reasons include (1) the governmentwide plan lists many
management challenges facing OPM and the Associate Director of its
investigations unit, such as establishing a presence to conduct
overseas investigations and adjusting its investigative workforce to
the increasing demand for clearances; (2) adjudication of personnel
security clearances and determination of which organizational positions
require such clearances are outside the current emphases for OPM; and
(3) agencies' disputes with OPM--such as the current one regarding
billing--may require a high-level third party to mediate a resolution
that is perceived to be impartial.
Increased Demand for High-level Clearances and the Lack of Reciprocity
Are Previously Identified Problems for Industry Personnel:
As we have previously identified, an increase in the demand for top
secret clearances could have workload and budgetary implications for
DOD and OPM if such requests continue to occur. In our 2004 report, we
noted that the proportion of requests for top secret clearances for
industry personnel increased from 17 to 27 percent from fiscal years
1995 through 2003. This increase has workload implications because top
secret clearances (1) must be renewed every 5 years, compared to every
10 years for secret clearances, and (2) require more information about
the applicant than secret clearances do. Our 2004 analyses further
showed that the 10-year cost to the government was 13 times higher for
a person with a top secret clearance ($4,231) relative to a person with
a secret clearance ($328). Thus, if clearance requirements for
organizational positions are set higher than needed, the government's
capacity to decrease the clearance backlog is reduced while the cost of
the clearance program is increased.
When the reciprocity of clearances or access is not fully utilized,
industry personnel are prevented from working. In addition to having a
negative effect on the employee and the employer, the lack of
reciprocity has adverse effects for the government, including an
increased workload for the already overburdened staff who investigate
and adjudicate security clearances. Problems with reciprocity of
clearances or access, particularly for industry personnel, have
continued to occur despite the establishment in 1997 of governmentwide
investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines.[Footnote 9] The
Reciprocity Working Group, which helped to prepare information for the
governmentwide plan to improve the security clearance process, noted
that "a lack of reciprocity often arises due to reluctance of the
gaining activity to inherit accountability for what may be an
unacceptable risk due to poor quality investigations and/or
adjudications." Congress enacted reciprocity requirements in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of December
2004,[Footnote 10] and OMB promulgated criteria in December 2005 for
federal agencies to follow in determining whether to accept security
clearances from other government agencies. Because of how recently
these changes were made, their impact is unknown.
Concluding Observations:
We will continue to assess and monitor DOD's personnel security
clearance program at your request. We are conducting work on the
timeliness and completeness of investigations and adjudications for top
secret clearances for industry personnel and we will report that
information to this committee this fall. Also, our standard steps of
monitoring programs on our high-risk list require that we evaluate the
progress that agencies make toward being removed from the
list.[Footnote 11] Lastly, we monitor our recommendations to agencies
to determine whether steps are being taken to overcome program
deficiencies.
Staff Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at
(202)512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions
to this testimony include Jack E. Edwards, Assistant Director; Jerome
Brown; Kurt A. Burgeson; Susan C. Ditto; David Epstein; Sara Hackley;
James Klein; and Kenneth E. Patton.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Managing Sensitive Information: Departments of Energy and Defense
Policies and Oversight Could Be Improved. GAO-06-369. Washington, D.C.:
March 7, 2006.
Managing Sensitive Information: DOE and DOD Could Improve Their
Policies and Oversight. GAO-06-531T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006.
GAO's High-Risk Program. GAO-06-497T. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security Clearance
Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process.
GAO-06-323R. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing
Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO-06-233T.
Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
Defense Management: Better Review Needed of Program Protection Issues
Associated with Manufacturing Presidential Helicopters. GAO-06-71SU.
Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2005.
DOD's High-Risk Areas: High-Level Commitment and Oversight Needed for
DOD Supply Chain Plan to Succeed. GAO-06-113T. Washington, D.C.:
October 6, 2005.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security Clearance
Program. GAO-05-988R. Washington, D.C.: August 19, 2005.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of Contractors
under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient. GAO-05-681. Washington, D.C.:
July 15, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles
Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk
Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DOD
Business Operations. GAO-05-629T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-
394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
DOD's High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires
Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T.
Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005.
GAO's 2005 High-Risk Update. GAO-05-350T. Washington, D.C.: February
17, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 2005.
Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11
Commission's Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.:
September 14, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce
Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for
Industry Personnel. GAO-04-632. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs
and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry
Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.
Security Clearances: FBI Has Enhanced Its Process for State and Local
Law Enforcement Officials. GAO-04-596. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2004.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its
Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332.
Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to
Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344. Washington,
D.C.: February 9, 2004.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges
of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed.
GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
Results-Oriented Cultures: Creating a Clear Linkage between Individual
Performance and Organizational Success. GAO-03-488. Washington, D.C.:
March 14, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed to Ensure Interoperability of
Systems That Process Intelligence Data. GAO-03-329. Washington D.C.:
March 31, 2003.
Managing for Results: Agency Progress in Linking Performance Plans With
Budgets and Financial Statements. GAO-02-236. Washington D.C.: January
4, 2002.
Central Intelligence Agency: Observations on GAO Access to Information
on CIA Programs and Activities. GAO-01-975T. Washington, D.C.: July 18,
2001.
Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks.
GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000.
DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for
Top Secret Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2001.
DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance
Reinvestigations Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2000.
DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security
Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215. Washington, D.C.: August
24, 2000.
Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of
Executive Branch Officials. GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177. Washington, D.C.:
July 27, 2000.
Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of
Executive Branch Officials. GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139. Washington, D.C.: July
11, 2000.
Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, But Further
Action Is Required. GAO/AIMD-00-169. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are Being
Addressed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose
National Security Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.: February
16, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose
National Security Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.: October 27,
1999.
Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to
Relinquish Its Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 1999.
Department of Energy: Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE
Facilities. GAO/T-RCED-99-159. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 1999.
Performance Budgeting: Initial Experiences Under the Results Act in
Linking Plans With Budgets. GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-67. Washington, D.C.: April
12, 1999.
Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History
Screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999.
Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access to
and Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245.
Washington, D.C.: September 30, 1998.
Inspectors General: Joint Investigation of Personnel Actions Regarding
a Former Defense Employee. GAO/AIMD/OSI-97-81R. Washington, D.C.: July
10, 1997.
Privatization of OPM's Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R.
Washington, D.C.: August 22, 1996.
Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R.
Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1996.
Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the Executive
Office of the President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.: October 19,
1995.
Privatizing OPM Investigations: Implementation Issues. GAO/T-GGD-95-
186. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 1995.
Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM's Role in
Background Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185. Washington, D.C.: June 14,
1995.
Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the
Clearance Process. GAO/NSIAD-95-21. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.
Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating Investigations
and Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101. Washington, D.C.: March
24, 1995.
Managing DOE: Further Review Needed of Suspensions of Security
Clearances for Minority Employees. GAO/RCED-95-15. Washington, D.C.:
December 8, 1994.
Personnel Security Investigations. GAO/NSIAD-94-135R. Washington, D.C.:
March 4, 1994.
Classified Information: Costs of Protection Are Integrated With Other
Security Costs. GAO/NSIAD-94-55. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 1993.
Nuclear Security: DOE's Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance
Work Load. GAO/RCED-93-183. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 1993.
Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate Duplicative
Background Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23. Washington, D.C.: May 10,
1993.
Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security
Clearances and Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14.
Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993.
DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not Provided
When Access Is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162. Washington, D.C.:
May 5, 1993.
Security Clearances: Due Process for Denials and Revocations by
Defense, Energy, and State. GAO/NSIAD-92-99. Washington, D.C.: May 6,
1992.
Due Process: Procedures for Unfavorable Suitability and Security
Clearance Actions. GAO/NSIAD-90-97FS. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1990.
Weaknesses in NRC's Security Clearance Program. GAO/T-RCED-89-14.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 1989.
Nuclear Regulation: NRC's Security Clearance Program Can Be
Strengthened. GAO/RCED-89-41. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 1988.
Nuclear Security: DOE Actions to Improve the Personnel Clearance
Program. GAO/RCED-89-34. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 1988.
Nuclear Security: DOE Needs a More Accurate and Efficient Security
Clearance Program. GAO/RCED-88-28. Washington, D.C.: December 29, 1987.
National Security: DOD Clearance Reduction and Related Issues. GAO/
NSIAD-87-170BR. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 1987.
Oil Reserves: Proposed DOE Legislation for Firearm and Arrest Authority
Has Merit. GAO/RCED-87-178. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 1987.
Embassy Blueprints: Controlling Blueprints and Selecting Contractors
for Construction Abroad. GAO/NSIAD-87-83. Washington, D.C.: April 14,
1987.
Security Clearance Reinvestigations of Employees Has Not Been Timely at
the Department of Energy. GAO/T-RCED-87-14. Washington, D.C.: April 9,
1987.
Improvements Needed in the Government's Personnel Security Clearance
Program. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 1985.
Need for Central Adjudication Facility for Security Clearances for Navy
Personnel. GAO/GGD-83-66. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 1983.
Effect of National Security Decision Directive 84, Safeguarding
National Security Information. GAO/NSIAD-84-26. Washington, D.C.:
October 18, 1983.
Faster Processing of DOD Personnel Security Clearances Could Avoid
Millions in Losses. GAO/GGD-81-105. Washington, D.C.: September 15,
1981.
(350865):
[End of section]
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We identified 22 other agencies in GAO-04-632. Exec. Order No. 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, February 20, 1960,
which was amended by Exec. Order No. 12829, National Industrial
Security Program, January 6, 1993, authorizes DOD to reach agreement
with other federal departments and agencies to extend its regulations
concerning authorizations for access to classified information by
industry. The agencies that have entered into agreements with DOD for
security services under the National Industrial Security Program are
the (1) National Aeronautics and Space Administration, (2) Department
of Commerce, (3) General Services Administration, (4) Department of
State, (5) Small Business Administration, (6) National Science
Foundation, (7) Department of the Treasury, (8) Department of
Transportation, (9) Department of the Interior, (10) Department of
Agriculture, (11) Department of Labor, (12) Environmental Protection
Agency, (13) Department of Justice, (14) Federal Reserve System, (15)
U.S. Government Accountability Office (formerly U.S. General Accounting
Office), (16) U.S. Trade Representative, (17) U.S. International Trade
Commission, (18) U.S. Agency for International Development, (19)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (20) Department of Health and Human
Services, (21) Department of Homeland Security, and (22) Department of
Education. The Department of Energy and the Central Intelligence Agency
are signatories of the National Industrial Security Program Operating
Manual and thus have reciprocity with DOD under provisions of the
manual. Three federal agencies (the Department of Energy, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) also may
grant security clearances to industry personnel who work on national
security-related programs.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to
Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for
Industry Personnel, GAO-04-202T (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004).
[2] GAO, DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining
Eligibility for Top Secret Security Clearances, GAO-01-465 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 18, 2001); DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address
Backlog of Security Clearance Reinvestigations, GAO/NSIAD-00-215
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 24, 2000); and DOD Personnel: Inadequate
Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks, GAO/
NSIAD-00-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999).
[3] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to
Reduce Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance
Eligibility for Industry Personnel, GAO-04-632 (Washington, D.C.: May
26, 2004); and GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome
Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size, GAO-04-344
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004).
[4] GAO-04-202T.
[5] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).
[6] Currently, the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and National Reconnaissance Office each have a waiver that
allows them to contract for their own personnel security clearance
investigations.
[7] In GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but
Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk
Designation, GAO-05-842T (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005), we listed
the departments/agencies having statutory or delegated authority to
conduct background investigations, as identified by the then Deputy
Associate Director of OPM's Center for Investigations Services. Those
departments/agencies are the Central Intelligence Agency; Department of
State; Department of the Treasury; Internal Revenue Service; Bureau of
Engraving and Printing; Federal Bureau of Investigation; National
Security Agency; U.S. Agency for International Development; Department
of Homeland Security; Bureau of Customs and Border Protection; U.S.
Secret Service; Small Business Administration; Broadcasting Board of
Governors; Department of Justice--Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives; U.S. Postal Service; Tennessee Valley Authority;
National Reconnaissance Office; and Peace Corps. Even though these
agencies have authority to conduct their own investigations, some of
them request that OPM conduct all or part of their investigations.
[8] Reciprocity, as is required by Executive Order No. 12968, is a
policy that requires background investigations and eligibility
determinations conducted under the order be mutually and reciprocally
accepted by all agencies, expect when an agency has substantial
information indicating that an employee may not satisfy the standards
under this order. Reciprocity also involves the ability to transfer (1)
an individual's existing, valid security clearance and (2) access from
one department, agency, or military service to another or from the
federal government to the private sector (and vice versa) when the
individual changes jobs without having to grant another clearance or
access.
[9] Pub. L. No. 108-548, § 3001 (d), Reciprocity of Security Clearance
and Access Determinations.
[10] The general steps required to remove DOD's personal security
clearance program from the high-risk list are summarized in GAO, DOD
Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Longstanding
Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain, GAO-06-233T
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2005).
[11]
