The Federal Workforce
Additional Steps Needed to Take Advantage of Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to Emergency Operations Gao ID: GAO-07-515 May 4, 2007The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which provides direction to the federal executive boards (FEBs), is now emphasizing that in the post-9/11 environment, the boards have a transformed emergency support role. The report discusses the boards' emergency preparedness roles and responsibilities and their potential role in preparing for and responding to pandemic influenza. GAO selected 14 of the 28 FEBs for review because they coordinate the greatest number of federal employees or had recent emergency management experience.
Located outside Washington, D.C., in 28 cities with a large federal presence, the federal executive boards (FEB) are interagency coordinating groups designed to strengthen federal management practices, improve intergovernmental relations, and participate as a unified federal force in local civic affairs. Created by a Presidential Directive in 1961, the boards are composed of the federal field office agency heads and military commanders in their cities. Although membership by agency heads on the boards is required, active participation is voluntary in practice. The boards generally have staff of one or two full-time personnel, including an executive director. The FEBs have no congressional charter and receive no congressional appropriation but rather rely on voluntary contributions from their member agencies. Although the boards are not intended to be first responders, the regulations that guide the FEBs state that emergency operations is one of their functions. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the FEBs have designated emergency preparedness, security, and employee safety as a core function of the boards and are continuing to work on a strategic plan that will include a common set of performance standards for their emergency support activities. All of the selected FEBs were performing emergency activities, such as organizing preparedness training, and FEB representatives and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials reported that these activities mutually advanced their missions. The FEBs, however, face key challenges in carrying out their emergency support role. First, their role is not defined in national emergency plans. According to several FEMA officials, FEBs could carry out their emergency support role more effectively if it was included in national emergency management plans. The framework within which the FEBs operate with member agencies and OPM also poses challenges in holding the boards accountable for their emergency support function. In addition, the funding sources for the boards are uncertain, affecting their ability to plan for and commit to providing emergency support services. Despite these challenges, the nature of pandemic influenza, which presents different concerns than localized natural disasters, makes the FEBs a particularly valuable asset in pandemic preparedness and response. Many of the selected boards had already hosted pandemic preparedness events, which included their member agencies and local community organizations. With the greatest burden of pandemic response resting on the local communities, the FEBs' outreach and their ability to coordinate across organizations suggest that they may be an important resource in preparing for and responding to a pandemic.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-515, The Federal Workforce: Additional Steps Needed to Take Advantage of Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to Emergency Operations
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entitled 'The Federal Workforce: Additional Steps Needed to Take
Advantage of Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to
Emergency Operations' which was released on June 4,
2007.
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Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate:
United States Government Accountability
Office:
GAO:
May 2007:
The Federal Workforce:
Additional Steps Needed to Take Advantage of Federal Executive Boards'
Ability to Contribute to Emergency
Operations:
GAO-07-515:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-515, a report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of
Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
OPM, which provides direction to the FEBs, is now emphasizing that in
the post-9/11 environment, the boards have a transformed emergency
support role. The report discusses the boards‘ emergency preparedness
roles and responsibilities and their potential role in preparing for
and responding to pandemic influenza. GAO selected 14 of the 28 FEBs
for review because they coordinate the greatest number of federal
employees or had recent emergency management
experience.
What GAO Found:
Located outside Washington, D.C., in 28 cities with a large federal
presence, the federal executive boards (FEB) are interagency
coordinating groups designed to strengthen federal management
practices, improve intergovernmental relations, and participate as a
unified federal force in local civic affairs. Created by a Presidential
Directive in 1961, the boards are composed of the federal field office
agency heads and military commanders in their cities. Although
membership by agency heads on the boards is required, active
participation is voluntary in practice. The boards generally have staff
of one or two full-time personnel, including an executive director. The
FEBs have no congressional charter and receive no congressional
appropriation but rather rely on voluntary contributions from their
member agencies. Although the boards are not intended to be first
responders, the regulations that guide the FEBs state that emergency
operations is one of their functions.
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the FEBs have designated
emergency preparedness, security, and employee safety as a core
function of the boards and are continuing to work on a strategic plan
that will include a common set of performance standards for their
emergency support activities. All of the selected FEBs were performing
emergency activities, such as organizing preparedness training, and FEB
representatives and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
officials reported that these activities mutually advanced their
missions.
The FEBs, however, face key challenges in carrying out their emergency
support role. First, their role is not defined in national emergency
plans. According to several FEMA officials, FEBs could carry out their
emergency support role more effectively if it was included in national
emergency management plans. The framework within which the FEBs operate
with member agencies and OPM also poses challenges in holding the
boards accountable for their emergency support function. In addition,
the funding sources for the boards are uncertain, affecting their
ability to plan for and commit to providing emergency support
services.
Despite these challenges, the nature of pandemic influenza, which
presents different concerns than localized natural disasters, makes the
FEBs a particularly valuable asset in pandemic preparedness and
response. Many of the selected boards had already hosted pandemic
preparedness events, which included their member agencies and local
community organizations. With the greatest burden of pandemic response
resting on the local communities, the FEBs‘ outreach and their ability
to coordinate across organizations suggest that they may be an
important resource in preparing for and responding to a
pandemic.
What GAO Recommends:
Particularly given the threat of pandemic influenza, GAO recommends
that the Director of OPM discuss with FEMA and other stakeholders the
feasibility of integrating FEBs in national emergency plans. In
completing the FEB strategic plan, OPM should also establish
accountability for the boards‘ emergency support activities and develop
a proposal to address the uncertainty of funding sources for the
boards. While not commenting specifically on the recommendations, OPM
said it is building a business case through which to address the
resources FEBs need to continue operations and that institutionalized
relationships with partners such as FEMA can help address funding
issues. FEMA said that it welcomed the opportunity to work with OPM to
formally define the FEB role in emergency planning and
response.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
515].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Bernice Steinhardt at
(202) 512-6806 or steinhardtb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
FEB Emergency Preparedness and Response Roles and Responsibilities Are
Being Developed as a Core Function of the
Boards:
The FEBs Face Key Challenges in Providing Emergency Support
Services:
The Nature of Pandemic Influenza May Make the FEBs a Particularly
Valuable Asset in Pandemic Preparedness and
Response:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology:
Appendix II: Office of Personnel Management Document Describing the FEB
Role and Responsibilities in Emergency
Situations:
Appendix III: FEBs' Host Agencies:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of Personnel
Management:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Number of Federal Employees and Agencies Served by Each FEB in
Descending Order of Employees Served:
Figures:
Figure 1: Location of the 28 FEBs:
Figure 2: Jurisdictional Boundaries of the 28
FEBs:
Figure 3: Participants in Two Minnesota FEB Pandemic Tabletop
Exercises:
Abbreviations:
AMEM: Association of Minnesota Emergency
Managers:
APC: Advanced Pharmaceutical Cache:
COOP: continuity of operations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
FEB: federal executive board:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management
Agency:
GETS: Government Emergency Telecommunications
Service:
GSA: General Services Administration:
HCLMSA: Human Capital Leadership and Merit System
Accountability:
JFO: joint field office:
JPDO: Joint Planning and Development
Office:
NARA: National Archives and Records
Administration:
ONSC: Office of National Security
Coordination:
OPM: Office of Personnel Management:
United States Government Accountability
Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 4, 2007:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
In an April 2004 report on opportunities to improve federal continuity
planning, we concluded that federal executive boards (FEB) are uniquely
positioned to improve coordination of emergency preparedness efforts in
areas outside of Washington, D.C.[Footnote 1] Located in 28 cities with
a large federal presence, the FEBs are interagency coordinating groups
designed to strengthen federal management practices, improve
intergovernmental relations, and participate as a unified federal force
in local civic affairs. The membership of each board is made up of the
highest ranking federal agency officials in the FEB service area. The
regulations that guide FEB operations state that the boards shall be
responsible for emergency operations, such as those under hazardous
weather conditions; responding to blood donation needs; and
communicating related leave policies.[Footnote 2] Much of the FEB
emergency operations responsibility in the past has been providing
advisories regarding hazardous weather conditions to member agency
leaders and providing a forum in which agency leaders could make
informed decisions about office closings affecting their employees. The
Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which provides direction to the
boards, is now emphasizing that in the post-9/11 environment the FEBs
have a transformed role that encompasses elements of emergency
preparedness, employee security, and continuity of operations. Although
the boards are not intended to be first responders, we recommended in
the 2004 report that OPM should determine the desired role for the FEBs
in improving coordination of emergency preparedness efforts and
identify and address FEB capacity issues to meet that
role.
Determining the FEB role in emergency operations is particularly
challenging given that the boards operate with no independent authority
and with resources voluntarily provided by member agencies. The boards
depend on a host agency, generally the agency with the greatest number
of employees in the area, to provide staff of usually one or two full-
time personnel, including an executive director. The FEBs also rely on
their hosts and other member agencies for operating expenses. Important
to emergency preparedness, one of the FEB functions includes building
relationships with state and local organizations to promote federal
involvement within their communities.
Emergency preparedness efforts involve dealing with the full range of
emergencies, including natural and man-made disasters. Attention has
focused on pandemic influenza, a real and significant threat facing the
United States and the rest of the world. Influenza pandemics occur when
a novel influenza virus emerges that can be effectively transmitted
between humans who have little immunity to it. The last three pandemics
in the 20th century occurred in 1918, 1957, and 1968, and killed
approximately 40 million, 2 million, and 1 million people worldwide,
respectively. Although the timing of the next pandemic is
unpredictable, there is widespread agreement that an influenza pandemic
will occur at some point. A pandemic is not a singular event, but is
likely to come in waves, each lasting months, and pass through
communities of all sizes across the nation and the world
simultaneously. A pandemic could threaten society and the economy by
removing essential personnel, including federal government employees,
from the workplace for weeks or months.
To obtain a better understanding of the roles, responsibilities, and
capacities of selected FEBs for emergency operations, particularly in
the event of pandemic influenza, you asked us to (1) identify the
actions FEBs have taken to fulfill their emergency preparedness and
response roles and responsibilities, (2) describe the key challenges
facing the FEBs in fulfilling these roles and responsibilities, and (3)
evaluate the extent to which the FEBs can contribute to emergency
preparedness and response to pandemic
influenza.
To address our objectives, we selected 14 FEBs for our study. The
selected FEBs are Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Fort
Worth, Denver, Los Angeles, Minnesota, New Orleans, New York City,
Oklahoma, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Seattle. These FEBs were
selected because they coordinate the greatest number of federal
employees or have recent experience with specific emergency management
events. We obtained and reviewed FEB documents, such as annual reports,
monthly activity reports, minutes, and correspondence, and interviewed
at least two key FEB representatives from each selected board,
including the chair or vice chair and executive director. We also had
discussions with and obtained pertinent documentation from officials at
OPM and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at their
headquarters in Washington, D.C. Because the FEBs and FEMA collaborate
closely on continuity of operations (COOP) activities in the field, we
also interviewed the FEMA regional directors in regions V and VI based
in Chicago, Illinois, and Denton, Texas, respectively.[Footnote 3] In
addition, we reviewed academic literature and prior GAO reports about
leveraging collaborative networks.
We conducted our review in the 14 case study FEB cities and Washington,
D.C., from March 2006 through February 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Detailed information
on our scope and methodology appears in appendix
I.
Results in Brief:
OPM and the FEBs are developing a strategic plan for the boards that
will establish emergency preparedness, security, and employee safety as
a core FEB function with a common set of expectations for the boards'
emergency activities. This strategic plan should more fully ensure that
the federal employees located in the FEB service areas receive the
needed level of emergency support. OPM officials recognize that the
FEBs can add value to regional preparedness efforts as vehicles for
communication, coordination, and capacity building but acknowledge that
the emergency support activities provided by the FEBs vary. However,
all of the selected boards were involved in emergency activities such
as disseminating emergency preparedness information, serving as federal
liaisons for state and local emergency management officials, and
organizing preparedness training. Officials from FEMA, which provides
guidance and assistance for COOP planning across the executive branch,
and almost all of the executive directors or chairs from the selected
boards cited a positive and beneficial working relationship. In
addition, although not all of the FEB representatives felt this was a
responsibility the boards should assume, some of the selected boards
have played a role in responding to emergencies in the past. For
example, the Oklahoma FEB staff played a role in helping first
responders locate building occupants after the April 19, 1995, bombing
of the federal building in Oklahoma City.
The FEBs face several key challenges in providing support for the
nation's emergency preparedness and response efforts. First, the FEB
role in supporting the nation's emergency response structure is not
developed or identified in federal emergency guidance and plans.
According to several FEMA officials, including the FEBs in a formal
role within federal emergency structures would help the boards carry
out their emergency support role more effectively by identifying and
communicating the value the boards can add to emergency support. In
addition, the framework under which the boards operate poses
accountability challenges. Although OPM is responsible for providing
program direction and oversight to the boards, many of the FEB
representatives said OPM cannot provide sufficient leadership and
feedback to 28 boards with its one-person FEB program office. Also,
aligning performance expectations for the FEB executive directors
consistent with OPM direction was hampered by the fact that the
executive directors report to a host agency and are usually subject to
that agency's rating and performance management system. Finally, the
differing sizes of the FEB service areas and their funding and resource
levels, coupled with the voluntary nature of their funding structure,
affect the capacities of the boards to support emergency preparedness.
The Los Angeles FEB, for example, primarily serves a six-county area in
the immediate vicinity of Los Angeles with approximately 120,000
federal employees, yet the executive director noted that its staffing
is similar to FEBs covering much smaller areas and numbers of employees
and agencies. With FEB resources dependent on the continued willingness
of the host agency and other member agencies to contribute, several of
the executive directors from the selected boards said it was difficult
to plan and commit to providing emergency support services. Many of the
FEB representatives from the selected boards expressed concern that
their activities will be further affected by reduced agency funding and
resource support as agency budgets grow more
constrained.
Despite these FEB challenges, the nature of an influenza pandemic makes
the boards a particularly valuable asset in planning for and responding
to a national disaster of this nature. Unlike a localized disaster,
such as a hurricane or earthquake, for which national resources can be
mobilized and deployed to assist in the disaster response, pandemic
influenza will be largely addressed by the resources available to each
community it affects. In the current pandemic planning stages, many of
the selected FEBs were already using their community relationships to
facilitate communication and coordination with local federal agency
leaders and state and local governments. These FEBs were also building
capacity for pandemic influenza response within their member agencies
and community organizations through hosting pandemic influenza training
and exercises. For example, 13 of the 14 selected FEBs were involved in
pandemic-related activities that ranged from sponsoring informational
briefings to coordinating pandemic exercises. The Minnesota FEB hosted
a pandemic influenza exercise in October 2006 that included
approximately 180 participants from 100 organizations within federal
agencies, state and local government, and the private sector. Given
their knowledge of the federal agencies within their jurisdictions,
during pandemic influenza FEBs have the potential to provide a forum to
inform the decisions of member agency leaders and emergency
coordinators, similar to what the boards provide for other hazards.
Additionally, several of the selected FEBs were considering how they
could support the federal workforce during pandemic influenza and
provide assistance in coordinating resources to federal agencies
responding to the pandemic.
This report contains four recommendations to the Director of OPM to
work with the FEBs and FEMA to improve the capacity of the boards to
enhance their emergency support services. OPM and FEMA should formalize
the FEBs' contribution to FEMA's emergency preparedness efforts, and
OPM should initiate discussion with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and other responsible stakeholders to determine the feasibility
of integrating the FEB emergency support responsibilities into the
established emergency response framework. In addition, OPM should also
continue to work on a common set of performance standards for emergency
support responsibilities across the FEB system, for which the boards
will be held accountable. As part of the FEB strategic planning
process, OPM should also develop a proposal for alternative funding
mechanisms to help ensure that the FEBs can provide the appropriate
level of emergency support for the federal
workforce.
We provided a draft of the report to the Director of OPM and to the
Secretary of Homeland Security. We received written comments from OPM,
which are included in appendix IV. While not commenting specifically on
the recommendations, OPM stated that it understands the importance of
the issues raised in the report. By documenting results and creating a
consistent accountability mechanism, and through institutionalized
relationships with strategic partners like FEMA, OPM believes that it
is building a strong business case through which it can address the
resources FEBs need to continue operations. In comments received from
FEMA by e-mail, FEMA concurred with the findings of the report and
welcomed the opportunity to work with OPM to develop a memorandum of
understanding that more formally defines the FEB role in emergency
planning and response.
Background:
FEBs were established by a Presidential Directive in 1961 to improve
coordination among federal activities and programs outside Washington,
D.C. The boards' overall mission includes supporting and promoting
national initiatives and responding to the local needs of federal
agencies and their communities. They provide a point of coordination
for the development and operation of federal programs having common
characteristics. Approximately 85 percent of all federal employees work
outside the greater Washington, D.C., area, and the number of FEBs has
grown from 10 to 28 over the past 46 years. When President Kennedy
established the FEBs, they were located in the major cities in each of
the 10 Civil Service Commission administrative regions. He later added
2 more boards, while President Johnson authorized 3 more, President
Nixon added 10, and President Ford added 1. Two more boards were added
by OPM in the 1990s bringing the total number of boards to 28. Figure 1
shows the metropolitan areas where the 28 boards are located.[Footnote
4]
Figure 1: Location of the 28 FEBs:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: GAO analysis based on OPM data and Map Resources
(map).
[End of figure]
According to the regulations that guide the FEBs, the Director of OPM
is responsible for overseeing and directing the operations of all of
the FEBs consistent with the law and with the directives of the
President. The boards are composed of the federal field office agency
heads and military commanders in their cities, and the regulations
state that each FEB should have a chair elected by the FEB members to
serve a term not to exceed a year. The regulations also state that the
boards should be governed by bylaws or other rules for their internal
governance that are developed for each board. Although through
Presidential Directive FEB membership is mandatory for the senior
agency officials within the FEB's geographic boundaries, the boards
have no independent authority and they rely on the voluntary
cooperation of their members to accomplish their
goals.
The FEB funding structure is unusual within the federal government. The
boards have no legislative charter and receive no congressional
appropriation. Rather, each FEB is supported by a host agency, usually
the agency with the greatest number of employees in the region. These
host agencies provide varying levels of staffing, usually one or two
full-time positions--an executive director and an executive assistant.
Some agencies also temporarily detail employees to the FEB staff to
assist their local boards and to provide developmental opportunities
for their employees. Additionally, the FEBs are supported by member
agencies through contribution of funds as well as in-kind support, such
as office space, personal computers, telephone lines, and Internet
access.[Footnote 5] In 2006, OPM estimated the cost of FEB operations
at approximately $6 million.
FEB Emergency Preparedness and Response Roles and Responsibilities Are
Being Developed as a Core Function of the
Boards:
To assist in standardizing emergency activities across the FEB system,
OPM and the FEBs are establishing an emergency preparedness, security,
and employee safety set of activities with performance measures that
will be common to all of the boards. Although this effort is not
completed, all of the selected FEBs were doing some emergency
activities, such as hosting emergency preparedness training and
exercises. For example, FEMA officials and the FEB representatives
reported working together, often with the General Services
Administration (GSA), on COOP training and exercises. In the past, some
of the selected FEBs also played a role in responding to emergencies,
although not all of the FEB representatives felt this was an
appropriate activity for the boards.
OPM and the FEBs Continue to Work on a Common Set of Performance
Standards for FEB Emergency Support
Activities:
OPM and the FEBs are developing a multiyear strategic plan that will
include a core function for the FEBs called emergency preparedness,
security, and employee safety. The plan will include expectations and
measures to assess how well each FEB is performing the activities. OPM
has reported working with the boards on emergency planning issues since
2001, and in March 2004, a document summarizing the FEB role in
emergency situations was finalized. The boards' emergency support
responsibilities include elements such as serving as a federal liaison
between state and local emergency officials, establishing notification
networks and interagency emergency preparedness councils, and hosting
emergency preparedness exercises for agencies. A complete list of the
FEB emergency support responsibilities detailed in the 2004 document
can be found in appendix II. According to an OPM official, designating
emergency support as a core function of the FEBs will further enhance
the FEB role in emergency situations. OPM officials recognize that the
FEBs can add value to regional preparedness efforts as vehicles for
communication, coordination, and capacity building but acknowledge that
the emergency activities of the FEBs have varied from board to board.
The emergency support function is intended to provide consistent
delivery of FEB emergency preparedness and response programs and
activities for the federal workforce across the system of 28
boards.
Not all of the representatives from the selected FEBs were convinced
that the boards should have an expanded emergency service support role.
Although all of the selected boards had some type of emergency
communication network and emergency preparedness council in place,
there was disagreement among the FEB representatives on the role the
FEBs should play in emergency service support, particularly during an
emergency. Without adequate staff and resources, some of the executive
directors expressed concern that they will not be able to meet
expectations. One executive director, for example, noted that because
her local board lacked 24/7 communication and coordination abilities,
it could not be held accountable for emergency service roles and
responsibilities. Another executive director commented that there was a
general expectation within the board's metropolitan federal community
that the FEB will assume a significant leadership role during a
possible future emergency. However, he observed that limited and
declining funding does not provide for an effective communication
system. As a consequence, he felt this expectation was unrealistic and
may contribute to major misunderstandings in the event of a significant
emergency.
On the other hand, several of the executive directors felt that the
FEBs would be able to accomplish much more in this area with additional
resources. For example, one executive director, with an emergency
operations background, emphasized that if the boards were given
dependable funding and increased stature within the federal government
by formal recognition of their emergency support role, their return on
investment in terms of emergency support functions would be
substantial. In general, the consensus among those who viewed the FEBs
as having an increased role in emergency operations was that with
dependable funding and resources, all the boards in the FEB system
could and should provide a similar level of emergency operations
support. Several FEB representatives also stated that OPM leadership
and direction in clearly outlining emergency operations expectations
and OPM's oversight of these activities would diminish uncertainty
about the boards' role in emergency support, both among the boards and
federal agencies in general. They were encouraged by the designation of
emergency services as a core FEB
function.
All of the Selected FEBs Were Performing Some Emergency
Activities:
The FEBs are charged with providing timely and relevant information to
support emergency preparedness and response coordination, and OPM
expects the boards to establish notification networks and
communications plans to be used in emergency and nonemergency
situations. The boards are also expected to disseminate relevant
information received from OPM and other agencies regarding emergency
preparedness information and to relay local emergency situation
information to parties such as OPM, FEB members, media, and state and
local government authorities. FEB representatives generally viewed the
boards as an important communications link between Washington and the
field and among field agencies. For example, the Atlanta FEB's
executive director described the boards as a conduit for both emergency
and nonemergency information to member agencies through e-mail,
telephone, and Web sites. While many of the items needing dissemination
are also passed through normal agency channels, several FEB
representatives noted that it usually takes longer for communication to
be received through their agency headquarters than through the FEB
channel. The Oklahoma FEB chair described the FEBs as central
depositories that receive information from headquarters and quickly
disseminate that information to the field, reducing the information gap
between Washington, D.C., and the rest of the
country.
Previously, much of the emergency support responsibility of FEBs was in
providing communication regarding hazardous and inclement weather
conditions. Almost all of the selected FEBs reported this as an
emergency activity for which they continue to have responsibility. For
example, the Atlanta FEB executive director said that during potential
weather emergencies, she and members of the Policy and Steering
Committee from GSA and the National Weather Service gather information
about the forecast and road conditions. The executive director, FEB
chair, and members of the Policy and Steering Committee then conduct a
4:00 a.m. conference call to make a decision about suggested agency
closings or delayed reporting. Following the conference call, the FEB
executive director posts a message on the board's emergency hazard line
that designated agency employees can check. This message is also posted
to the FEB general telephone line and the FEB Web site. Several of the
executive directors emphasized that they can only make recommendations
to the federal agencies in their areas of service, but they cannot
mandate that federal agencies close for weather or other
emergencies.
Although each of the selected boards we reviewed reported conducting
communications activities as a key part of its emergency support
service, they used a number of different types of communication
systems. The Boston FEB, for example, operates two electronic
communications mechanisms to be in contact with senior federal agency
officials during local and national emergencies, both during and after
hours. The first is an Internet portal, developed and maintained by the
DHS Federal Protective Service, which is designed to provide senior
agency officials access to up-to-date information, such as threat
assessments and emergency weather. The second communications system is
called EDIAL, housed and maintained by the First U.S. Coast Guard
District's 24-hour command system. EDIAL, funded for the FEB by GSA New
England, enables the board to communicate with agency officials
simultaneously via an electronic telephone message in times of
emergency. Several of the executive directors mentioned the importance
of having access to the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
(GETS) cards, a White House-directed emergency phone service. GETS
provides emergency preparedness personnel a high probability of
completion for their phone calls when the probability of completing a
call through normal channels is significantly decreased. The majority
of the selected boards reported keeping an emergency contact list for
officials in their member agencies.
Several of the executive directors emphasized the importance of
standardizing the communications systems of the boards so that every
FEB is communicating in the same way. The communication abilities among
the selected FEBs did vary, often dependent on the communication system
provided by a supporting agency. For example, the Atlanta FEB reported
previously using an emergency call-down system supplied by the Atlanta
U.S. District Court, but the system was too slow. The executive
director there said she was exploring the possibility of transferring
to the Southwestern Emergency Response Network, which would give her
greater capacity to notify area agencies in emergency situations. A
complaint about many of the FEB communication systems was that they
were slow or needed to be manually updated. The Dallas-Fort Worth FEB
executive director noted that with the boards becoming more of a
national network and serving as backups to one another, the importance
of a fully supported national communication network for the FEBs is
becoming even more evident.
According to OPM, the FEB role in emergency service support also
includes coordination activities. For example, OPM reported that it
expects the boards to serve as federal liaisons for state and local
emergency officials and to assess local emergency situations in
cooperation with federal, state, and local officials. Although all of
the boards reported some involvement of state and local officials in
their emergency activities, the degree of board connections with state
and local officials varied. The Minnesota FEB and the Oklahoma FEB, for
example, reported strong relationships with state and local government
officials, state and local emergency management leaders, and private
sector businesses. The Dallas-Fort Worth FEB executive director
reported that the board partners with state and local government
representatives, the private sector, law enforcement, and first
responders, all of which are key players in assessing local emergency
situations. On the other hand, the Chicago FEB executive director said
that because Chicago is so large, the board has few established
relationships with state and local officials. The chair of the Boston
FEB said its board had 24-hour contact numbers for some state officials
but not city officials.
In terms of coordination, the FEBs are also charged with identifying a
core group of federal leaders in each community to discuss planned
courses of action, such as delayed arrival and shelter in place, in the
event of an emergency. All of the selected boards had some type of
emergency preparedness council. In the case of the Los Angeles FEB,
however, the emergency preparedness committee had to disband because of
significant transportation challenges in the Los Angeles area. The
board's executive director said they now have an emergency preparedness
e-mail group. In addition, OPM expects the boards to provide problem
resolution assistance as appropriate, to include identifying federal
resources that may be available to assist the community in responding
to, or recovering from, an emergency. Examples of some of the selected
boards' past responses during emergencies are detailed in a section
below.
OPM expects the FEBs in their capacity-building role to facilitate
training for member agencies regarding their responsibilities related
to occupant emergency plans, COOP planning, and other emergency
preparedness topics. All of the selected FEBs reported hosting at least
one emergency preparedness briefing, training, or exercise during the
past year. The Minnesota FEB, for example, hosted homeland security
briefings by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Transportation
Security Administration, the Minnesota Department of Health, the Secret
Service, FEMA, the Federal Protective Service, state and county
emergency management directors, and the Department of Defense. The
Denver FEB conducts a yearly scenario-based COOP exercise usually in
conjunction with FEMA, the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA), and GSA. In addition to other preparedness exercises, the
Chicago FEB hosted an exercise dealing with emergency preparedness and
people with disabilities. Several FEB representatives made the point
that these emergency preparedness exercises and activities are
particularly valuable for the smaller federal agencies. While military,
law enforcement, and public safety federal agencies may have a solid
grasp of emergency preparedness, some of the smaller administrative
agencies need help defining what their responsibilities are in this
area. In addition, an FEB executive director and a chair said that the
interagency exercises help to ensure that federal workers are receiving
consistent treatment across the agencies.
FEB Representatives Reported Working with FEMA on COOP
Planning:
One of the FEB emergency support responsibilities is facilitating COOP
training for federal agencies, and the FEB representatives reported
working with FEMA and, in many cases, GSA to accomplish this. As
mentioned previously, COOP planning is an effort conducted by agencies
to ensure that the capability exists to continue essential agency
functions across a wide range of potential emergencies. FEMA, GSA, and
OPM are the three agencies that have the most direct impact on
individual agency efforts to develop viable COOP capabilities. FEMA, as
the lead agency for executive branch COOP planning, has responsibility
for formulating guidance, facilitating interagency coordination, and
assessing the status of executive branch COOP capabilities. GSA is
responsible for working with FEMA in providing COOP training for
federal agencies and assisting agencies in acquiring alternate
facilities in the event of an emergency, while OPM is responsible for
maintaining and revising human capital management guidance for
emergency situations and assisting the heads of other departments and
agencies with personnel management and staffing during national
security emergencies.
FEB representatives said they work with FEMA and GSA to develop and
strengthen agency COOP and other emergency plans. For example, most of
the boards have COOP working groups or emergency committees, often lead
by FEMA and GSA, which help conduct various emergency exercises. The
exercises are designed to provide insight and guidance that can be used
to develop specific action plans that address interruptions in services
provided by their agencies, and FEB representatives said that COOP
plans are tested through these exercises. A FEMA official testified in
May 2006 that the COOP working groups established with the FEBs in New
Orleans, Houston, and Miami prior to the hurricanes of 2005 and the
many COOP training and exercise activities conducted by these
organizations were instrumental in facilitating federal agency recovery
and reconstitution efforts following hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and
Wilma.[Footnote 6] During the past year, FEMA Region III nominated the
Philadelphia FEB COOP working group for a 2006 Excellence in Government
Award because the group had improved the federal image of preparedness
among the Philadelphia community through training, exercises, and
interagency coordination projects. The group received a Silver Medal
Award as a result of the nomination. As another example of joint
activities, through a campaign that is a collaboration between FEMA,
the Red Cross, and other emergency response groups, the Boston FEB
hosted a series of seminars aimed at educating employees about home
preparedness.
Almost all of the FEB executive directors or chairs from the selected
boards cited a positive and beneficial working relationship with FEMA.
Some of the executive directors also said that a strong relationship
exists between their boards and the FEMA regional directors in their
areas. In addition, the regional FEMA officials we interviewed all said
the FEBs assist FEMA with its mission. Another FEMA official noted that
reaching out to the field can be difficult, but the FEBs provide
communications and access to the majority of federal agencies, which
makes FEMA's job much easier. Although FEMA does not have a formal
agreement with the FEBs, FEMA and the FEBs have common interests in
making sure the federal workforce is protected, and the relationship
proves mutually beneficial. According to a FEMA official, many of the
agencies in the field have COOP policies, procedures, and planning in
place in part because the FEBs have assisted FEMA in getting this
program out to them. He noted that the FEBs carry the COOP activities
forward and, although the boards operate under tenuous conditions,
their outreach is invaluable. Similar to most of the opinions expressed
regarding FEMA's work with the FEBs, the Seattle FEB chair said that
FEMA has displayed active leadership and has proven to be a good
connection for sharing information.
FEBs Have Played a Role in Responding to Past
Emergencies:
The Oklahoma FEB response to the bombing of the Oklahoma City Murrah
Federal Building on April 19, 1995, illustrates the role of some of the
boards in aiding emergency response. The board staff knew all of the
agencies in the Murrah Building; the home telephone numbers of critical
staff; the city, county, and state principals in Oklahoma City; and
which federal agencies were available to provide immediate relief and
support. According to the Oklahoma executive director, with the
information the FEB was able to provide and a blueprint of the Murrah
Building, the first responders were able to determine where they might
find more people after the bombing. The FEB staff also played a role in
providing support to the victims and families of those who died in the
bombing through activities such as arranging counseling. In addition,
shortly after the disaster the Oklahoma FEB hosted a meeting with the
Vice President in which local agency leaders discussed what worked well
and what needed attention in recovering from the
disaster.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita represented huge disasters in the history
of our nation, and according to a FEMA official, through these
catastrophes the New Orleans FEB's executive director established and
maintained an essential communication link between FEMA's Office of
National Security Coordination (ONSC) and OPM. A FEMA official noted
that many federal agencies, specifically smaller agencies or agencies
with limited resources, were better prepared because of the
coordination, collaboration, training, and resource sharing the New
Orleans FEB was able to provide. The New Orleans FEB executive director
also became part of the nation's first federal agency COOP and
Reconstitution Team, made up of representatives from the New Orleans
and Dallas-Fort Worth FEBs, GSA, NARA, OPM, and FEMA. Additionally,
following the interruption of communications and loss of contact with
federal leaders, the executive director was able to work through ONSC
to locate and reestablish contact with all members of the FEB Policy
Committee at their alternate sites, beginning the reconstitution of the
New Orleans FEB. The FEB served as a conduit for information between
Washington and the representative local agencies, and the Policy
Committee was able to provide status updates to identify common needs
or problems that agency leaders were facing that required expedited
assistance to resolve. According to a FEMA official, the lessons
learned during the conference calls with the New Orleans FEB Policy
Committee following Hurricane Katrina allowed for better national
response and coordination during Hurricane Rita. The New Orleans FEB
executive director reported that part of her role during Hurricane
Katrina was to raise awareness that many of the essential personnel of
the federal workforce in New Orleans had no housing and, therefore,
were not able to return to work. Eventually, essential federal and
local workers and members of the New Orleans police and fire
departments and their families were housed aboard
ships.
As another example of FEB support following hurricanes Katrina, Rita,
and Wilma, FEMA Region V put into place a temporary Chicago call center
that was scheduled to open in early September 2005. The call center was
created in response to the projected volume of calls from victims of
the disasters to enable FEMA to more effectively and rapidly
communicate with them. Because of the requirement that call center
staff must be fingerprinted and have security clearances, federal
employees were the only ones who could immediately meet FEMA's need to
staff the center. The Chicago FEB executive director coordinated with
agency officials in soliciting nearly 300 federal employees who were
detailed to the center while negotiations were being conducted with a
contractor who would then backfill these positions. According to FEMA
and the Chicago FEB, the effort in sharing federal personnel was highly
successful.
During nonemergency but disruptive events, such as political
conventions or rallies, the FEBs in the affected areas have helped to
contain the potential disturbance for federal agencies' operations. For
example, the FEB representatives from Boston and New York City said
their boards played a role during the national political conventions
held there in the summer of 2004. In preparation for the events, OPM
conducted a series of emergency preparedness seminars for local agency
representatives through the FEBs in both cities. The sessions provided
information on emergency planning and human resource flexibilities
available to agencies for use in emergency situations and during major
public events and were designed to prepare all federal agencies for
emergencies, both natural and man-made. In addition, OPM gave the
Boston FEB vice chair and the New York City chair onetime authority
during the event to make decisions regarding the nonemergency workforce
should that become necessary. As another example, during the
immigration rallies in the summer of 2006 in Chicago, the Chicago FEB
reported that it was communicating with the Federal Protective Service,
which shared security information with the board. The Chicago FEB was
able to pass this information on to the local agencies so employees
could prepare and make alternative travel arrangements since some
streets were closed.
The FEBs Face Key Challenges in Providing Emergency Support
Services:
The distinctive characteristics of the FEBs within the federal
government help to explain the key challenges the boards face in
providing emergency support services. Factors including the boards'
lack of a defined role in national emergency support structures, their
accountability framework, and the differences in their capacities
present challenges in providing a needed level of emergency support
across the FEB service areas.
A Defined FEB Role in National Emergency Plans Would Better Ensure That
the Boards Can Effectively Carry Out Their Emergency Support
Role:
According to several FEMA officials we interviewed, the FEBs could
carry out their emergency support role more effectively if their role
was included in national emergency management plans. FEMA officials
from two different regions with responsibility for emergency activities
in 11 states said they felt the boards could be used more effectively
and that they add value to the nation's emergency operations. They
agreed with several of the FEB executive directors we interviewed who
felt the boards lacked recognition within the federal government's
emergency response structure and that their value in emergency support
was often overlooked by federal agency officials unfamiliar with their
capabilities. A FEMA regional director noted that it is very important
that the FEB emergency support role is understood, and he believed
including the boards in emergency management plans was an opportunity
to communicate the role of the FEBs and how they could contribute in
emergencies involving the federal
workforce.
The FEMA officials provided examples of areas where the FEBs could
support the existing emergency response structure and where the boards'
role could be defined in emergency management plans. For example, while
FEBs are not first responders, the National Response Plan's[Footnote 7]
emphasis on local emergency response suggests using the existing local
connections and relationships established by the FEBs. The National
Response Plan is also intended to provide a framework for how federal
departments and agencies will work together and coordinate with state,
local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations during
incidents through the establishment of several multiagency coordination
structures. Among other activities, these coordination structures are
responsible for maintaining situational awareness,[Footnote 8]
information sharing, and communications; coordinating internal
operations; and coordinating among the different entities. The FEMA
officials agreed that the FEBs could provide support to the existing
emergency response structure via these multiagency coordination
centers, given the FEBs' connections and knowledge of their local
communities. The boards could provide real-time information to the
centers and have access to status reports that they could share with
high-level federal officials within their service areas during an
emergency affecting the federal
workforce.
FEMA officials had specific suggestions for where formal inclusion of
the FEBs should be considered in multiagency coordination centers. One
official noted that when a disaster threatens the federal community, it
would be advantageous for the FEB to have a seat in the joint field
office (JFO). A JFO is a temporary federal facility established locally
to coordinate operational federal assistance activities to the affected
areas during incidents of national significance. Within the JFO, senior
federal representatives form a multiagency coordination entity and
direct their staff in the JFO to share information, aid in establishing
priorities among incidents and associated resource allocation, and
provide strategic coordination of various federal incident management
activities. The reasoning behind the suggestion to include the FEBs was
that the boards have knowledge of the departments and agencies in their
cities, making them able to assess the status of the local federal
community affected by the disaster. According to the same official,
another place for the FEBs to contribute that merits consideration is
the regional response coordination center, which coordinates regional
response efforts, establishes federal priorities, and implements local
federal program support until a JFO is
established.
FEMA officials also suggested that the FEBs could maintain the vital
records related to COOP, such as alternative COOP sites, phone numbers,
and emergency contacts. FEMA officials proposed that FEMA could provide
technical assistance to the FEBs to develop a COOP directory format
containing the specific information for their member agencies, while
the FEBs would be responsible for maintaining, updating, protecting,
and distributing the directory. FEMA officials also suggested that it
may be helpful for the FEBs and FEMA to draft a memorandum of
understanding that formalizes the role and responsibilities of the FEBs
in assisting FEMA with COOP and other emergency
activities.
The need for formal agreements on emergency roles and responsibilities
has been highlighted in our previous work.[Footnote 9] For example, in
assessing the response to Hurricane Katrina, we recommended that it was
important for FEMA and the Red Cross to clarify their respective roles
and responsibilities. In May 2006, the two organizations entered into a
memorandum of understanding that outlines their areas of mutual support
and cooperation in disaster response and recovery operations and in
performance of their respective roles under the National Response
Plan.
The Operational Framework for the Boards Poses Accountability
Challenges:
According to OPM, leadership and oversight of the FEBs is conducted
from OPM Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Although the FEB regulations
state that the chairs of the FEBs should report to OPM through regional
representatives, who were charged with overseeing the activities of
their FEBs, an OPM official explained that the regional oversight these
regulations refer to is now done from headquarters. Within OPM, the
Associate Director for Human Capital Leadership and Merit System
Accountability (HCLMSA) supervises the Director for FEB Operations.
Within the HCLMSA division, the field services group managers are
intended to serve in a liaison and support role with the FEBs in their
geographic areas. An OPM official said there are five field service
managers who interact with the FEBs in their jurisdictions. While the
official said the managers are not expected to provide oversight of FEB
activities, they are expected to regularly attend FEB executive board
meetings and help coordinate OPM-provided training. Some FEB
representatives reported that their OPM field service managers were
active in their FEBs, while others said their managers were
not.
In light of the recent emphasis on systemwide expectations and
accountability measures for the boards, many of the FEB representatives
we interviewed believed OPM needs to provide additional leadership and
feedback to them. The relationship between OPM and the FEBs is
complicated, in part because the boards need a certain level of
autonomy to address regionally identified issues through projects and
programs specific to their localities. More recently, however,
particularly with the emergency support expectations for the boards
that cut across the FEB system, many of the FEB representatives felt
more assistance and feedback from OPM on FEB activities are warranted.
Many were frustrated with what they perceived as a lack of priority
given to the boards by OPM. For example, some noted that the Director
of FEB Operations is a one-person office, which they felt was
inadequate to meet the needs of and provide oversight for the 28
boards. Several of the FEB representatives also pointed to a recent
incident where the FEB system's host Web site server, contracted out by
OPM, was defaced. Service was not restored to some of the FEB Web sites
until several weeks later.
The accountability structure for the FEB executive directors poses
additional challenges. An OPM official reported that the executive
directors are rated by their supervisors of record in their host
agencies. In 2004, OPM worked with the FEB executive directors to
develop critical performance standards to be used by the FEB chairs to
provide input to the host agency supervisors on the performance of the
FEB executive directors. Executive directors were asked by OPM to use
the standards to solicit input from their FEB chairs for their
performance evaluations, although there is no provision to ensure the
performance standards are consistently applied among the individual
director ratings. Of the 14 selected boards, 5 boards had an
arrangement where the performance appraisal was done by the host agency
supervisor who received performance appraisal input from the FEB chair.
Four executive directors reported they were rated by their host
agencies with no input from the FEB chairs, while for four of the
executive directors, the chair provided the executive director's rating
to the host agency. One executive director did not receive a
performance appraisal because she was still considered an employee of
one agency even though her salary was paid by another
agency.
Some of the executive directors we interviewed said that under their
current accountability structure, they answer to OPM, the chair or
policy committee of the FEB, and the board's host agency, which
generally pays their salaries. When asked about accountability, some of
the executive directors said they would follow the host agency's
guidance given that their salaries were paid by them. Others said they
would answer primarily to their chairs or policy committees. One of the
FEB representatives noted that he believes the current performance
system does not reward high-performing
FEBs.
Varying FEB Capacities Test the Boards' Ability to Provide Consistent
Levels of Emergency Support Services across the
Country:
As we reported in 2004, the context in which the FEBs operate,
including varying capacities among the boards for emergency
preparedness efforts, could lead to inconsistent levels of preparedness
across the nation.[Footnote 10] Figure 2 illustrates that the service
areas of the FEBs differ substantially in the size of their formal
jurisdictions, and table 1 shows how the number of federal
employees[Footnote 11] and agencies served by each board varies. These
factors may affect a board's capacity to provide emergency support. For
example, FEB representatives from Chicago and Los Angeles said their
locations in large cities made providing FEB emergency support services
for their service areas more difficult. The Los Angeles executive
director, for example, noted that the Los Angeles FEB primarily serves
a six-county area in the immediate vicinity of Los Angeles with notable
transportation problems. This makes in-person meetings a challenge. The
service area includes approximately 120,000 federal employees from 230
different agencies. Yet the executive director noted that the FEB's
staffing is similar to that of FEBs covering much smaller areas and
numbers of employees and agencies. The Cincinnati FEB, in contrast,
covers approximately 15,000 federal employees from 90 different
agencies. Appendix III lists the 28 FEBs along with their host
agencies.
Figure 2: Jurisdictional Boundaries of the 28
FEBs:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO presentation of OPM
information.
[A] Includes civilian agencies in Guam.
[End of figure]
Table 1: Number of Federal Employees and Agencies Served by Each FEB in
Descending Order of Employees Served:
FEB: Los Angeles;
Federal employees served: 118,250;
Number of federal agencies: 230.
FEB: San Antonio;
Federal employees served: 91,130;
Number of federal agencies: 68.
FEB: Oklahoma;
Federal employees served: 78,681;
Number of federal agencies: 252.
FEB: Honolulu-Pacific;
Federal employees served: 72,155;
Number of federal agencies: 96.
FEB: San Francisco;
Federal employees served: 70,000;
Number of federal agencies: 150.
FEB: Baltimore;
Federal employees served: 69,488;
Number of federal agencies: 140.
FEB: Chicago;
Federal employees served: 64,803;
Number of federal agencies: 180.
FEB: St. Louis;
Federal employees served: 62,155;
Number of federal agencies: 82.
FEB: New York City;
Federal employees served: 61,578;
Number of federal agencies: 152.
FEB: Atlanta;
Federal employees served: 58,020;
Number of federal agencies: 120.
FEB: Dallas-Fort Worth;
Federal employees served: 49,855;
Number of federal agencies: 144.
FEB: Philadelphia;
Federal employees served: 48,238;
Number of federal agencies: 154.
FEB: Seattle;
Federal employees served: 47,233;
Number of federal agencies: 147.
FEB: Boston;
Federal employees served: 45,479;
Number of federal agencies: 150.
FEB: Denver;
Federal employees served: 39,161;
Number of federal agencies: 160.
FEB: Kansas City;
Federal employees served: 38,906;
Number of federal agencies: 134.
FEB: Newark;
Federal employees served: 38,270;
Number of federal agencies: 79.
FEB: Minnesota;
Federal employees served: 35,806;
Number of federal agencies: 120.
FEB: South Florida;
Federal employees served: 35,672;
Number of federal agencies: 129.
FEB: Detroit;
Federal employees served: 32,733;
Number of federal agencies: 85.
FEB: New Mexico;
Federal employees served: 32,102;
Number of federal agencies: 94.
FEB: Oregon;
Federal employees served: 31,000;
Number of federal agencies: 225.
FEB: Houston;
Federal employees served: 29,419;
Number of federal agencies: 115.
FEB: Cleveland;
Federal employees served: 25,842;
Number of federal agencies: 91.
FEB: Pittsburgh;
Federal employees served: 24,898;
Number of federal agencies: 107.
FEB: New Orleans;
Federal employees served: 20,141[A];
Number of federal agencies: 71[A].
FEB: Buffalo;
Federal employees served: 15,935;
Number of federal agencies: 100.
FEB: Cincinnati;
Federal employees served: 14,727;
Number of federal agencies:
90.
Source: OPM.
[A] Numbers are under review because of Hurricane Katrina.
[End of table]
There is no consistency for funding the FEBs nationwide, and the levels
of support provided to the boards in terms of operating expenses,
personnel, and equipment vary considerably. For example, some of the
executive directors reported they received an operating budget
allocation for travel and supplies, while others said they received
nothing or very little in this regard. Without adequate and consistent
levels of funding and resources across the FEB system, some FEB
representatives we interviewed were skeptical as to whether any
standardization of emergency activities could be
implemented.
The FEBs' dependence on host agencies and other member agencies for
their resources also creates uncertainty for the boards in planning and
committing to provide emergency support services. The lack of funding
in a particular year may curtail the amount of emergency support an
individual board could provide. Many of the FEB representatives
characterized the board funding structure as dysfunctional, and some
expressed concern that their activities will be further affected by
reduced agency funding and resource support as agency budgets grow more
constrained. When boards' funding is precarious, the executive
directors spend the majority of their time soliciting resources from
member agencies, without adequate time or resources to focus on
mission- related activities. Federal agencies that have voluntarily
funded FEB positions in the past have begun to withdraw their funding
support. Of our 14 case study boards, representatives from 3 of the
boards said they had recently had their host agencies withdraw funding
for their boards' executive assistant positions. Several FEB
representatives felt the uncertainty about the funding of the FEBs
raises questions as to the survivability of the system and its ability
to fulfill its emergency support
function.
Recognizing that the capacities of FEBs vary across the nation, OPM
established an internal working group in August 2003 to study the
strengths and weaknesses of the boards. According to OPM, the working
group reviewed funding and staffing levels for possible recommendations
of funding enhancements in challenged areas and developed several
products to assist OPM in communicating the value of the FEBs to
agencies. In 2006, OPM proposed a three-part plan, including
restructuring the network of 28 boards to try to address the resource
issues of some of the boards by combining them with other boards.
Federal population numbers and geographic proximity of existing FEBs
were used to develop the proposed structure, which reduced the 28
boards into a system of 21 boards. The majority of the FEBs did not
support the restructuring component of the plan, asserting that the
proposal was not well developed and stressing the importance of
maintaining local presence for FEB operations and activities in the
current locations. OPM decided not to pursue the approach. However, OPM
officials said they will revisit restructuring the FEB network if
resource issues remain a problem.
There have been different options considered for FEB funding in the
past. For example, in 1988, OPM developed a budget proposal to include
in its fiscal year 1990 budget submission base dollars and full-time
equivalents to fully fund the FEBs. Ultimately, OPM reported only
receiving a fraction of the money requested, and OPM did not request
additional funding for the next fiscal year. OPM has not requested
funding of this type for the FEBs since that time. The current funding
arrangements continue to emphasize local agency responsibility whereby
usually one major department or agency in each city provides funding
for an executive director and an assistant, although other federal
agencies can contribute. OPM officials said they continue to support
local agency commitment to the FEBs. From OPM's vantage point, the
boards that have developed strong relationships with their partner
agencies have more success securing the necessary resources within
existing funding arrangements. Although OPM officials stated they play
an integral role in facilitating discussions to resolve FEB funding
issues, some of the FEB representatives reported that OPM told them
that if any of the FEBs encountered funding difficulties, the boards
were on their own to solve the problems since the FEBs were unwilling
to accept OPM's restructuring proposal.
The problem of unstable resources is one that could affect any
networked organization similar to the FEBs that relies, more or less,
on voluntary contributions from members. Agencies may be reluctant to
contribute resources to an initiative that is not perceived as central
to their responsibilities, especially during periods of budgetary
constraints. This reluctance may, however, limit the long-term
investment of the federal government in working more collaboratively.
For example, we recently reported on the Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO), a congressionally created entity designed to plan for
and coordinate a transformation from the current air traffic control
system to the next generation air transportation system by
2025.[Footnote 12] Housed within the Federal Aviation Administration,
JPDO has seven federal partner agencies. One of the greatest challenges
that JPDO officials cited was creating mechanisms to leverage partner
agency resources. Although leveraging efforts have worked well so far,
we noted that JPDO could face difficulties in securing needed agency
resources if the priorities of the partner agencies change over time.
This has been a long-standing problem for the FEBs as well. In a 1984
report, we concluded that although the FEBs have contributed to
improved field management, the future of the boards was uncertain
because funding for staff and board participation had
declined.[Footnote 13] Similar to the boards' current situation, in
1983, five FEBs lost all or part of their staff support as agency
budgets grew more constrained.
In Canada, the federal government has adopted a mix of both central
funding and departmental contributions for its regional coordinating
entities. Regional federal councils, the Canadian equivalent of the
FEBs, are sustained by a balance between central funding and
departmental contributions at the local level. The role of the councils
was the subject of in-depth consideration by Canadian government
officials in 1996, and at that time, the Treasury Board increased the
level of support it provided to the councils, including central funding
to support staff positions and some operating expenses. A 2000 report
on the councils concluded that a balance between central funding and
departmental contributions at the local level may well be the model
best suited to financially sustain the councils.[Footnote
14]
Although OPM and the FEBs are now involved in a strategic planning
effort, OPM has not to date considered the resource requirements to
support an expanded emergency support role for the FEBs. Yet, as we
have pointed out in our previous reports, a strategic plan should
include a description of the resources--both sources and types--that
will be needed for the strategies intended to achieve the plan's goals
and objectives.
The Nature of Pandemic Influenza May Make the FEBs a Particularly
Valuable Asset in Pandemic Preparedness and
Response:
Despite the challenges the FEBs face in providing emergency support,
their potential to add value to the nation's emergency preparedness and
response is particularly evident given an event like pandemic
influenza. The distributed nature of a pandemic and the burden of
disease across the nation dictate that the response will be largely
addressed by each community it affects. Using their established and
developing community relationships to facilitate communication and
coordination with local federal agency leaders and state and local
governments, FEBs are well positioned to assist in pandemic
preparedness and response. In the current pandemic planning stages,
many of the selected FEBs were already acting as conveners, hosting
pandemic influenza preparedness events, such as briefings and training
and exercises, and were considering how federal agencies could share
resources during a pandemic.
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Present Different Concerns
Than Localized Natural Disasters:
According to the Homeland Security Council, the distributed nature of a
pandemic, as well as the sheer burden of disease across the nation,
means that the physical and material support states, localities, and
tribal entities can expect from the federal government will be limited
in comparison to the aid it mobilizes for geographically and
temporarily bounded disasters like earthquakes and hurricanes. Unlike
those incidents that are discretely bounded in space or time, an
influenza pandemic could spread across the globe over the course of
months or over a year, possibly in waves, and would affect communities
of all sizes and compositions. While a pandemic will not directly
damage physical infrastructure, such as power lines or computer
systems, it threatens the operation of critical systems by potentially
removing the essential personnel needed to operate them from the
workplace for weeks or months.
The Homeland Security Council issued two documents to help address the
unique aspects of pandemic influenza. The November 2005 National
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza is intended to guide the overall effort
to address the threat and provide a planning framework consistent with
the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Homeland
Security. This planning framework is also intended to be linked with
the National Response Plan. In May 2006, the Homeland Security Council
also issued the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza. This plan lays out broad implementation
requirements and responsibilities among the appropriate federal
agencies and also describes expectations for nonfederal stakeholders,
including state and local governments, the private sector,
international partners, and individuals. Further, all federal agencies
are expected to develop their own pandemic plans that along with other
requirements, describe how each agency will provide for the health and
safety of its employees and support the federal government's efforts to
prepare for, respond to, and recover from a
pandemic.
The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic
Influenza states that the greatest burden of the pandemic response will
be in the local communities. Local communities will have to address the
medical and nonmedical effects of pandemic influenza with available
resources. The implementation plan maintains that it is essential for
communities, tribes, states, and regions to have plans in place to
support the full spectrum of their needs over the course of weeks or
months, and for the federal government to provide clear guidance on the
manner in which these needs may be met. As pandemic influenza presents
unique challenges to the coordination of the federal effort, joint and
integrated planning across all levels of government and the private
sector is essential to ensure that available national capabilities and
authorities produce detailed plans and response actions that are
complementary, compatible, and
coordinated.
FEBs' Unique Role in the Local Federal Community Can Aid in Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness and Response:
Research has shown that systems like the FEBs have proven to be
valuable public management tools because they can operate horizontally,
across agencies in this case, and integrate the strengths and resources
of a variety of organizations in the public, private, and nonprofit
sectors to effectively address critical public problems, such as
pandemic influenza.[Footnote 15] Government leaders are increasingly
finding that using traditional hierarchical organizations does not
allow them to successfully address complex problems. As a result, they
are beginning to explore the use of collaborative networks that reach
across agencies and programs.
The boards bring together the federal agency leaders in their service
areas and have a long history of establishing and maintaining
communication links, coordinating intergovernmental activities,
identifying common ground, and building cooperative relationships.
Documents supporting the establishment of the FEBs noted that it is
important that field executives have a broader picture of government
and a general understanding of the interrelationships of government
activity. The boards also partner with community organizations and
participate as a unified federal force in local civic affairs. This
connection to the local community could play a role in pandemic
influenza preparedness and response as predisaster relationship
building and planning are often the cornerstones to incident
management.
Many of the selected FEBs cultivated relationships within their
federal, state, and local governments and their metropolitan area
community organizations as a natural outgrowth of their general
activities. For example, FEB activities, such as the Combined Federal
Campaign and scholarship programs, brought the boards into contact with
local charities and school boards. In addition, through activities such
as hosting emergency preparedness training or through participation in
certain committees, some of the selected FEBs reported a connection
with emergency management officials, first responders, and health
officials in their communities. Through their facilitation of COOP
exercises and training, the FEBs bring together government leaders,
health officials, and first responders in a venue where the parties can
share ideas, discuss plans, and coordinate approaches. The San
Francisco FEB executive director and chair said they attend FEMA's
Regional Interaction Steering Committee meetings, which brought them in
contact with federal, state, and local government emergency management
partners. The Minnesota FEB plays an active role in both the
Association of Minnesota Emergency Managers (AMEM) and the Metropolitan
(Twin Cities) Emergency Managers Association. The Minnesota FEB
executive director, for example, serves on the AMEM board of directors
as federal agency liaison, a newly created partnership with the
organization. As another example, the Oklahoma FEB partnered with the
fire departments in Oklahoma City and Tulsa to provide site visits to
the federal agencies there to help strengthen emergency preparedness
plans and update evacuation and shelter-in-place plans. The executive
director said the site visits also provided agency leaders with the
opportunity to interact with the most likely first responders in the
event of an emergency and to obtain valuable information to include in
emergency preparedness plans.
As with the boards' emergency support role in general, some of the FEB
representatives envisioned their boards taking a more active role in
pandemic influenza preparedness and response than others did. While
some FEB representatives stressed the unique characteristics of the
boards that position them to help prepare and respond to pandemic
influenza, others noted the boards' limited staffing and resources. One
FEB executive director remarked that although the boards have no real
authority, they are valuable because of the community relationships
they have forged and their unique ability to coordinate resources and
communicate. As previously discussed, several representatives were
concerned, however, about the role the FEBs could play in the event of
a large-scale emergency, such as an influenza
pandemic.
FEBs Are Acting as Conveners to Deliver Planning and Training Needed
for Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Have a Potential Role in
Pandemic Response:
In terms of current pandemic planning, many of the selected FEBs were
building capacity for pandemic influenza response within their member
agencies and community organizations by hosting pandemic influenza
training and exercises. The Implementation Plan for the National
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza highlights training and exercises as an
important element of pandemic planning. For example, 13 of the 14
selected FEBs were involved in pandemic influenza-related activities
that ranged from informational briefings to coordinating pandemic
exercises, some that included nonprofit organizations, the private
sector, and government. The one exception was the New Orleans FEB,
where the executive director said the board is still too heavily
involved with Hurricane Katrina recovery to focus on helping agencies
to collaborate on pandemic influenza
preparedness.
A number of the selected FEBs have held pandemic influenza tabletop
exercises. A pandemic influenza tabletop exercise would be based on a
fictitious account of a plausible outbreak of pandemic influenza with
scenarios constructed to facilitate problem solving and to provoke
thinking about gaps and vulnerabilities. The Boston FEB, together with
the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency and FEMA, held a pandemic
influenza tabletop exercise in November 2006. The exercise objectives
included goals such as helping to increase the awareness of federal,
state, local, and tribal government agencies of the requirement to
incorporate pandemic influenza procedures into COOP planning and
identifying special considerations for protecting the health and safety
of employees and maintaining essential government functions and
services during a pandemic outbreak. In addition, the Baltimore FEB
hosted a pandemic influenza exercise on November 1, 2006, facilitated
by FEMA Region III and the Maryland Emergency Management Agency. The
Seattle FEB, with the assistance of FEMA and the City of Seattle,
sponsored an all-day conference in October 2006 called Pandemic Flu:
Get Smart, Get Ready! Conversation Tools and
Tips.
The Minnesota FEB has been a leader among the boards in pandemic
influenza planning. Using a tabletop exercise it created, the board
hosted its first pandemic influenza exercise in February 2006, with a
follow-up exercise in October 2006. The October exercise included
approximately 180 participants from 100 organizations within federal
agencies, state and local government, and the private sector. Figure 3
illustrates the breadth of participation in the exercises, including
key infrastructure businesses such as power and telecommunications. The
Minnesota FEB executive director noted that Minnesota has excellent
state and local government relationships, which help to facilitate
planning of this nature. Examples of partnerships the board has with
state and local entities include those with the State of Minnesota
Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, the Minnesota
Department of Health, the St. Paul Chamber of Commerce, and the
American Red Cross.
Figure 3: Participants in Two Minnesota FEB Pandemic Tabletop
Exercises:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO presentation of MN FEB information.
[End of figure]
The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic
Influenza emphasizes that government and public health officials must
communicate clearly and continuously with the public throughout a
pandemic. The plan recognized that timely, accurate, credible, and
coordinated messages will be necessary. According to many of the FEB
representatives we interviewed, the communications function of the
boards is a key part of their activities and could be an important
asset for pandemic response. For example, when asked about the role
they envision the FEBs playing in the response to a pandemic, the
Dallas-Fort Worth FEB representatives said that because the board is
viewed by its member agencies as a credible source of information, the
board's role should be to coordinate communications among member
agencies. They gave the example of the Department of Health and Human
Services working through the board to disseminate medical information
to their local community.
In addition to their communications role, during pandemic influenza the
FEBs have the potential to broaden the situational awareness of member
agency leaders and emergency coordinators and provide a forum to inform
their decisions, similar to what the FEBs provide for other hazards,
such as inclement weather conditions. A FEMA official noted that FEBs
have vital knowledge of the federal agencies in their jurisdictions,
which can provide valuable situational awareness to community emergency
responders.
Some of the FEBs were also considering the role they can play in
assisting member agencies by supporting human capital functions, such
as supporting the federal workforce and coordinating the deployment of
personnel among member agencies as may be appropriate. Several FEB
representatives said, for example, that they were considering how they
could provide assistance in coordinating support to federal agencies
responding to pandemic influenza, such as addressing personnel
shortages by locating available resources among member agencies. Other
FEB representatives we interviewed reiterated a theme that even the
critical federal employees in the field can be left to fend for
themselves when disasters strike their communities. Consequently, they
are not able to handle the emergency issues of the federal government.
For example, according to the New Orleans executive director, in New
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina the oil and gas workers had their
companies as powerful advocates in securing housing for them so they
could resume working. She reported that in sharp contrast, there was no
entity nationally that was an advocate for the local federal workforce
to ensure the speedy reconstitution of essential services. In the
majority of cases, she said that essential federal employees queued up
for temporary housing in long lines. She intervened to bring attention
to the need for expedited temporary housing for federal employees, who
were responsible for providing essential functions, but who were also
victims of the disaster.
To avoid a similar situation during pandemic influenza, the Minnesota
and Oklahoma FEBs are trying to negotiate with their states to create
memorandums of agreement between the states and the federal agencies,
represented by the FEBs. Their objectives are to identify how medical
supplies and vaccines from the Advanced Pharmaceutical Cache (APC) or
the Strategic National Stockpile, which will be distributed by the
states, will be dispersed to essential federal government employees in
the event of a pandemic or bioterrorist attack. To accomplish this, the
FEBs are working with their federal members to apply the states'
guidelines for vaccine priorities to the federal workforce in their
areas of service so that essential federal employees, such as air
traffic controllers, federal law enforcement officers, and correctional
facilities staff, are appropriately integrated in the state vaccine
distribution plans. They also want to identify federal agencies and
their resources that can augment the states' operation of the mass
vaccine dispensing sites. The Minnesota FEB has inventoried all of the
federal agencies within its jurisdiction and feels it has a good idea
of the resources that will be needed. According to the Minnesota FEB
executive director, however, Minnesota currently does not have enough
medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and vaccines in its APC to cover the
emergency personnel of the federal government in Minnesota nor does it
have the resources for purchasing these
supplies.
Conclusions:
Achieving results for the nation increasingly requires that federal
agencies work with each other and with the communities in which they
serve. The federal executive boards are uniquely able to bring together
federal agency and community leaders in major metropolitan areas
outside Washington, D.C., to meet and discuss issues of common
interest, such as preparing for and responding to pandemic influenza.
As we reported in 2004, such a role is a natural outgrowth of general
FEB activities and can add value in coordinating emergency operations
efforts.
Several interrelated issues limit the capacity of FEBs to provide a
consistent and sustained contribution to emergency preparedness and
response. These issues may present limitations to other areas of FEB
activities, not solely to emergency preparedness. Among them are the
following:
* The role of the FEBs in emergency support is not defined in national
emergency guidance and plans.
* Performance standards, for which the boards will be held accountable,
with accompanying measures, are not fully developed for FEB emergency
support activities.
* The availability of continuing resource support for the FEBs is
uncertain and the continued willingness of host and member agencies to
commit resources beyond their core missions may decrease, especially in
times of increasing budgetary
constraints.
While the FEBs and FEMA have established important working
relationships in a number of locations, these have, to date, been
largely informal. As FEMA officials have noted, including the FEBs in
federal emergency guidance and plans provides an opportunity for the
FEBs to leverage the network of community relationships they have
already established. OPM and FEMA could formalize the FEBs'
contribution to FEMA's emergency preparedness and response efforts
through a memorandum of understanding, or some similar mechanism,
between FEMA and the FEBs, and a formal designation of the FEB role in
FEMA guidance. Likewise, recognition of the FEB emergency support role
in the national emergency structure could help the boards carry out
their emergency support role more effectively by underscoring the value
they add, which may be overlooked by federal agency officials
unfamiliar with their capabilities.
The ability of FEBs and organizations like them to fulfill important
collaborative national missions is hampered if they are dependent on
the willingness of host agencies to provide support. OPM has determined
that the FEBs should have an important and prominent role in emergency
support and envisions a set of emergency support activities across the
FEB system. The current structure of host agencies and in-kind
contributions puts at risk the achievement of that
goal.
OPM's work on a strategic plan with the FEBs affords the opportunity to
complete the development of clear expectations for the FEBs in
emergency operations and to develop appropriate performance measures
for these expectations. OPM also has an opportunity, as part of this
planning process, to consider alternative funding arrangements that
would better match the roles envisioned for the FEBs. As noted earlier,
a strategic plan should describe how goals and objectives are to be
achieved, including how different levels of resources lead to different
levels of achievement and the sources of those
resources.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Consistent with OPM's ongoing efforts in this regard, we recommend that
the Director of OPM take the following four actions to help improve the
ability of the FEBs to contribute to the nation's emergency
preparedness efforts, particularly given the threat of pandemic
influenza:
* Once OPM completes defining emergency support expectations for the
FEBs, OPM should work with FEMA to develop a memorandum of
understanding, or some similar mechanism, that formally defines the FEB
role in emergency planning and response.
* OPM should initiate discussion with DHS and other responsible
stakeholders to consider the feasibility of integrating the FEB
emergency support responsibilities into the established emergency
response framework, such as the National Response
Plan.
* OPM should continue its efforts to establish performance measures and
accountability for the emergency support responsibilities of the FEBs
before, during, and after an emergency event that affects the federal
workforce outside Washington, D.C.
* As an outgrowth of the above efforts and to help ensure that the FEBs
can provide protection of the federal workforce in the field, OPM, as
part of its strategic planning process for the FEBs, should develop a
proposal for an alternative to the current voluntary contribution
mechanism that would address the uncertainty of funding sources for the
boards.
Agency Comments:
We provided the Director of OPM and the Secretary of Homeland Security
a draft of this report for review and comment. We received written
comments from OPM, which are reprinted in appendix IV. While not
commenting specifically on the recommendations, OPM stated that it
understands the importance of the issues raised in the report, noting
that it is building the boards' capacity by developing a national FEB
strategic and operational plan that will ensure consistent delivery of
services across the FEB network. By documenting results and creating a
consistent accountability mechanism, OPM said it is building a strong
business case through which it can address the resources FEBs need to
continue operations. OPM also stated that it believed institutionalized
relationships with strategic partners like FEMA can demonstrate FEBs'
business value and help address ongoing funding issues. In comments
received from FEMA by e-mail, FEMA concurred with the findings of the
report and welcomed the opportunity to work with OPM to develop a
memorandum of understanding that more formally defines the FEB role in
emergency planning and response. FEMA also recognized the current
personnel and budget limitations of the FEBs in supporting emergency
planning and response activities and said that a proposal for an
alternative to the current FEB voluntary contribution mechanism should
assist with providing an improved capability for the
boards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Director of OPM and the
Secretary of Homeland Security and appropriate congressional
committees. We will also provide copies to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-6806 or steinhardtb@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Bernice Steinhardt:
Director, Strategic Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology:
The objectives of our review were to:
* identify the actions the federal executive boards (FEB) have taken to
fulfill their emergency preparedness and response roles and
responsibilities,
* describe the key challenges facing the FEBs in fulfilling these roles
and responsibilities, and:
* evaluate the extent to which the FEBs can contribute to emergency
preparedness and response to pandemic
influenza.
To address these objectives, we reviewed FEB annual reports and
academic literature as well as prior GAO reports about leveraging
collaborative networks. Additionally, we reviewed the National Response
Plan, Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic
Influenza, and the Joint Field Office Activation and Operations
Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure to assess the
feasibility of FEB involvement in those plans. We interviewed Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) officials, and we consulted with three GAO
field office managers who are members of their local FEBs to gain a
greater understanding of FEB activities. We selected 14 of the 28 FEBs
for more detailed review. Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Dallas-
Fort Worth, Denver, Los Angeles, New York City, Oklahoma, Philadelphia,
San Francisco, and Seattle were selected because they are 12 of the 15
largest FEBs in terms of number of federal employees served. Minnesota
was selected because it is considered a leader in pandemic influenza
planning, and New Orleans was selected because of its recent emergency
management experience with Hurricane Katrina. GAO headquarters and
field office teams interviewed at least two key FEB representatives,
including the chair or vice chair and the executive director from the
14 selected boards. Additionally, we obtained and reviewed FEB
documents, such as annual reports, monthly activity reports, minutes,
and correspondence, at the selected sites. Because our selection of
FEBs was nonprobabilistic, the results of our review of these selected
FEBs are not generalizable to all other FEBs. However, the challenges
and issues that were identified in our coverage of half of all FEBs
along with our review of materials concerning the FEBs as a group
suggests that these matters are not limited to just the selected
FEBs.
OPM provided data on the counties of jurisdiction for all of the boards
as well as their host agencies and the number of federal and military
employees and agencies in each service area. We determined these data
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report.
We also interviewed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
officials at their headquarters in Washington, D.C. FEMA serves as the
Department of Homeland Security's designated lead agent for continuity
of operations (COOP) plans for the FEBs' executive branch members.
Because the FEBs and FEMA collaborate on COOP activities in the field,
we interviewed the FEMA regional directors in regions V and VI based in
Chicago, Illinois, and Denton, Texas, respectively, to obtain an
outside perspective of the boards and their role in emergency
operations. Our analysis of the capacity of FEBs to support emergency
preparedness is drawn from our collective review and assessment of
information and documents provided to us by officials from OPM and FEMA
and the FEB representatives at the selected FEBs as well as our
examination of the relevant literature described
above.
Our review was conducted from March 2006 through February 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Office of Personnel Management Document Describing the FEB
Role and Responsibilities in Emergency
Situations:
Role: Provide Emergency Liaison And Communications - FEBs stand ready
to provide timely and relevant information to support emergency
preparedness and response coordination.
Emergency Preparedness;
- FEBs will serve as a Federal liaison for State and Local emergency
officials;
-FEBs will establish notification networks and develop a protocol
(Communications Plan) to be used in nonemergency and emergency
situations;
-FEBs will disseminate relevant information received from OPM/DC
regarding emergency preparedness information (memorandums from OPM
officials, emergency guides, training opportunities, information from
other departments/agencies, etc.);
- FEBs will identify a core group of Federal leaders in each community
who will meet regularly to discuss planned courses of action (delayed
arrival, early dismissal, shelter in place, emergency personnel only,
etc.) in the event of an emergency;
-FEBs will survey and/or facilitate training for member agencies
regarding their roles and responsibilities related to occupant
emergency plans;
-FEBs will facilitate training on Continuity of Operations (COOP), and
other emergency preparedness topics, i.e., shelter in place, triage,
onsite responder, etc. for Federal
agencies.
Response Coordination;
-FEBs will assess local emergency situations in cooperation with
Federal, State and Local officials;
-FEBs will activate established notification system for transmission of
local emergency information, as prescribed by the FEB's protocol
(Communications Plan);
-FEBs will provide problem resolution assistance as appropriate, to
include identifying Federal resources which may be available to assist
the community in responding to, or recovering from, an emergency;
-FEBs relay local emergency situation information, by way of periodic
reports to the appropriate authorities, to include, but not limited to:
OPM/DC, FEB members, media, State and Local government authorities;
-FEBs will disseminate information received from OPM/DC regarding
emergency information at the national level
- decision on employee work status, information from other
departments/agencies, etc.
Communications Plan;
-FEBs alert those responsible for implementing the Occupant and Agency
Emergency Plans and serve as a redundant (back-up) communication
vehicle to ensure
notification.
Source: OPM.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: FEBs' Host Agencies:
FEB: Atlanta;
Host agency: Social Security Administration-Regional
Office.
FEB: Baltimore;
Host agency: Department of Defense-U.S. Army/Fort
Meade.
FEB: Boston;
Host agency: Environmental Protection Agency-Regional
Office.
FEB: Buffalo;
Host agency: Department of Homeland Security-Immigration and Customs
Enforcement U.S. Coast Guard.
FEB: Chicago;
Host agency: General Services Administration-Regional
Office.
FEB: Cincinnati;
Host agency: Department of Veterans Affairs-Regional Medical
Center.
FEB: Cleveland;
Host agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration-Glenn
Research Center.
FEB: Dallas-Fort Worth;
Host agency: Health and Human Services-Regional
Office.
FEB: Denver;
Host agency: Department of Defense-Defense Finance and Accounting
Service.
FEB: Detroit;
Host agency: Department of Defense-U.S. Tank Automotive
Command.
FEB: Honolulu-Pacific;
Host agency: Department of Defense-Pearl Harbor Naval
Shipyard.
FEB: Houston;
Host agency: Department of Homeland Security-Customs and Border
Protection.
FEB: Kansas City;
Host agency: Department of Transportation Federal Highway
Administration/Federal Aviation
Administration.
FEB: Los Angeles;
Host agency: Department of Homeland Security-Customs and Border
Protection/Los Angeles Field
Office.
FEB: Minnesota;
Host agency: Department of the Interior-Headquarters National Business
Center.
FEB: New Mexico;
Host agency: Department of the Interior-Bureau of Land
Management.
FEB: New Orleans;
Host agency: Department of Agriculture-National Finance
Center.
FEB: New York City;
Host agency: Department of Transportation-Federal Aviation
Administration.
FEB: Newark;
Host agency: Department of Homeland Security-Customs and Border
Protection.
FEB: Oklahoma;
Host agency: Department of Defense-Tinker Air Force
Base.
FEB: Oregon;
Host agency: Department of Veterans Affairs-Portland Veterans Affairs
Medical Center.
FEB: Philadelphia;
Host agency: Department of Defense-Defense Logistics
Agency.
FEB: Pittsburgh;
Host agency: Office of Personnel
Management.
FEB: San Antonio;
Host agency: Department of Veterans Affairs-Regional Medical
Center.
FEB: San Francisco;
Host agency: Department of Labor-Office of Assistant Secretary for
Administration and Management.
FEB: Seattle;
Host agency: Department of Housing and Urban Development- Regional
Office Social Security Administration-Regional Office of Personnel
Management.
FEB: South Florida;
Host agency: Department of Commerce-
Headquarters.
FEB: St. Louis;
Host agency: Department of Defense-National Geospatial- Intelligence
Agency.
Source: OPM.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of Personnel
Management:
The Director:
United States Office Of Personnel Management:
Washington, DC 20415:
Apr 12 20D7:
The Honorable David Walker Comptroller
General:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Walker:
Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments in response to the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) draft report entitled The
Federal Workforce: Additional Steps Needed to Take Advantage of Federal
Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to Emergency Operations (GAO-
07-515).
I appreciate GAO's recognition of the Federal Executive Boards' (FEB)
contributions to the Federal Government's effectiveness in the field.
The report's focus on FEBs' work in emergency preparedness is
particularly useful for understanding the critical role FEBs play in
Federal planning for natural and man-made disasters. While the Report's
design did not include the broader scope of FEBs' work, the Boards'
combined focus on human capital management, emergency preparedness and
community relations make them an effective part of Federal emergency
planning efforts.
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) understands the importance of
the issues raised in the GAO Report. Because they reflect areas of
concern to us as well, OPM has addressed these issues in the past, and
continues to do so today. For example, to address FEB funding issues,
OPM successfully obtained Congressional approval for cross-agency
funding authority by FEB member agencies. Currently, we are building
the network's capacity to deliver by developing a National FEB
Strategic and Operational Plan. This Plan - currently in draft --
identifies core activities under two lines of business: Emergency
Preparedness, Security & Employee Safety and Human Capital Readiness.
Each line of business defines measurable outcomes and deliverables to
assure consistent delivery of services across the FEB network. By
documenting results and creating a consistent accountability mechanism,
OPM is building a strong business case through which we can address the
resources FEBs need to continue
operations.
Through this process, we are continuing to build collaboration
mechanisms with our strategic partners such as the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). As the GAO report points out, the FEBs'
emergency support activities are critical for FEMA's ability to
accomplish its mission. We believe that institutionalized relationships
with strategic partners like FEMA can demonstrate FEBs' business value
and help address ongoing funding issues.
I am providing specific technical corrections to the draft report and
would ask for your consideration of these
changes.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Linda M. Springer:
Director:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Bernice Steinhardt (202) 512-6808 or
steinhardtb@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report
were William Doherty, Assistant Director; Dominic Barranca; Scott
Behen; Kathleen Boggs; Deirdre Brown; Beverly Burke; Jimmy Champion;
Betty Clark; Derrick Collins; Daniel Concepcion; Amber Edwards; Richard
Guthrie; Bonnie Hall; Charles Hodge; Aaron Kaminsky; Judith Kordahl;
Susan Mak; Signora May; Samuel Scrutchins; Gabriele Tonsil; George
Warnock; and Daniel Zeno. In addition, William Bates, Thomas Beall,
David Dornisch, and Donna Miller provided key
assistance.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Human Capital: Opportunities to Improve Federal Continuity
Planning Guidance, GAO-04-384 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20,
2004).
[2] 5 C.F.R. § 960.107 (c) (6).
[3] COOP planning is an effort conducted by agencies to ensure that the
capability exists to continue essential agency functions across a wide
range of potential emergencies.
[4] Federal executive associations or federal executive councils may be
located in places where FEBs do not exist. They have purposes and
objectives similar to those of the FEBs, although they do not function
within the same formal set of parameters as FEBs (e.g., they are not
officially established by Presidential Memorandum nor do they receive
policy direction and guidance from OPM).
[5] For a time, under a governmentwide restriction against interagency
financing of boards, commissions, or other groups, interagency
financing of FEBs was prohibited, including both cash and in-kind
financial support. See, 67 Comp. Gen. 27 (1987). However, beginning in
1996, Congress exempted FEBs from this restriction. Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 613, 110 Stat.
3009, 3009-356 (1996).
[6] Statement of Robert Shea, Acting Director of Operations Federal
Emergency Management Agency, House Committee on Government Reform, May
24, 2006.
[7] The National Response Plan is designed to provide the structure for
the coordination of federal support for disaster response with a basic
premise that incidents are generally handled at the lowest
jurisdictional level possible. State and local resources provide the
first line of emergency response and incident management
support.
[8] See GAO, Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance
Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS
Agencies, GAO-07-89 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 2006). This report
described situational awareness as a continual process of collecting,
analyzing, and disseminating intelligence, information, and knowledge
to allow organizations and individuals to anticipate requirements,
react effectively, and establish a common operational picture.
Additionally, situational assessment includes the evaluation and
interpretation of information gathered from a variety of sources that
when communicated to emergency managers and decision makers, can
provide a basis for incident management decision
making.
[9] See, for example, GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That
Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-
06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005), and Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross Should Be Improved
for the 2006 Hurricane Season, GAO-06-712 (Washington, D.C.: June 8,
2006).
[10] GAO-04-384.
[11] The figures include military
employees.
[12] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and
Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace
System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13,
2006).
[13] GAO, Federal Executive Boards Contribute To Improved Field
Management But Future Is Uncertain, GAO/GGD-84-31 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 6, 1984).
[14] Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Regional Federal Councils,
January 2000.
[15] See, for example, GAO-06-15, and Donald P. Moynihan, Leveraging
Collaborative Networks in Infrequent Emergency Situations (Washington,
D.C.: IBM Center for the Business of Government, June
2005).
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