Social Security Numbers
Government Benefits from SSN Use but Could Provide Better Safeguards Gao ID: GAO-02-352 May 31, 2002The Social Security number (SSN) was created in 1936 to track workers' earnings and eligibility for Social Security benefits. Because SSNs are unique identifiers and do not change, the numbers provide a convenient and efficient way to manage records. Government agencies are taking some steps to safeguard the number, but some protections are not uniformly in place at any level of government. Many of the state and county agencies responding to GAO's survey maintain records that contain SSNs; federal agencies maintain public records less frequently. At the state and county levels, some offices, such as state professional licensing agencies and county recorders' offices, have traditionally been repositories for public records that may contain SSNs. Some government agencies are trying to better safeguard the SSN by trying innovative approaches to protect them from public display. For example, some agencies and courts are modifying their processes or their forms so that they can collect SSNs but prevent the number from becoming part of the publicly available record. The most far-reaching efforts took place in states with a statewide initiative that established a policy and procedures designed to protect individuals' personal information, including SSNs, in all circumstances where they collect, store, and use it.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
May 2002:
Social Security Numbers:
Government Benefits from SSN Use but Could Provide Better Safeguards:
GAO-02-352:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
All Levels of Governments Use SSNs Extensively for a Wide Range of
Purposes:
Governments Are Taking Some Steps to Safeguard SSNs but Important
Measures Not Universally Employed:
Open Nature of Certain Government Records Results in Wide Access to
SSNs:
Some Governments and Agencies Are Taking Innovative Actions to Limit
Use and Display of SSNS in Public Records:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Matter For Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Federal Laws That Restrict SSN Disclosure:
Appendix III: Federal, State, and County Departments That Reported
Maintaining Public Records With SSNs:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Examples of Federal Statutes That Authorize or Mandate the
Collection and Use of Social Security Numbers:
Table 2: Comparison of Key Provisions Concerning Disclosure of SSNs:
Table 3: Of Program Agencies That Share SSNs, Percentage That Share
Them with Specific NonGovernment Entities:
Table 4: Percentage of Government Entities That Provide Individuals
with Required Information When Collecting SSNs:
Table 5: Percentage of Program Agencies That Report Imposing Selected
Requirements on Outside Entities When Sharing SSNs:
Table 6: Of Courts, County Recorders, and State Licensing Agencies;
and of Program Agencies That Maintain Public Records, Percentage That
Maintain Public Records That Contain SSNs:
Table 7: Number of Programs within Federal Agencies That Responded to
Our Survey and Maintain Public Records, Identify SSNs on Those Public
Records, and Permit Access to Those Records on Their Web Sites:
Table 8: Number and Type of State Departments and Agencies That
Maintain Public Records, Identify SSNs on Those Public Records, and
Permit Access to Those Records on Their Web Sites:
Table 9: Number and Type of County Departments and Agencies that
Maintain Public Records, Identify SSNs on Those Records, and Permit
Access to Those records on Their Web Sites:
Figures:
Figure 1: Percentage of Program Agencies Using SSNs for Each Reason
Listed:
Figure 2: Percentage of Government Personnel Departments That Display
SSNs on Different Types of Documents:
Figure 3: Percentage of State and County Entities that Display SSNs on
Each of the Types of Public Records Listed:
Figure 4: Percentage of State and County Entities that Display SSNs on
Each of the Types of Public Records Listed:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FOIA: Freedom of Information Act:
FTC: Federal Trade Commission:
IRS: Internal Revenue Service:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
SSA: Social Security Administration:
SSI: Supplemental Security Insurance:
SSN: social security number:
TANF: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families:
[End of section]
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 31, 2002:
The Honorable E. Clay Shaw, Jr.
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Social Security:
Committee on House Ways and Means:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein:
Chair:
The Honorable Jon Kyl:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information:
Committee on the Judiciary:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Charles Grassley:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs:
Committee on the Judiciary:
United States Senate:
The Social Security number (SSN) was created in 1936 as a means to
track workers' earnings and eligibility for Social Security benefits.
Since that time, the number has been used for myriad non-Social
Security purposes. Private sector use of the SSN has grown
exponentially. For example, businesses may ask individuals to provide
their SSNs when they apply for credit, seek medical or other insurance
coverage, rent an apartment, or place an order for merchandise. In
addition, many federal, state, and local government agencies also use
the SSN. In some cases, these government agencies use SSNs as they
administer their programs to deliver services or benefits to the
public. Individuals who provide SSNs to receive these services and
benefits may expect the SSNs to be considered confidential and thus
protected from public disclosure. In other cases, government agencies
serve as the repository for records or documents that are routinely
made available to the public for inspection. These public records may
contain SSNs.[Footnote 1] This use of SSNs by the private sector and
government agencies has raised public concern over how this personal
information is being used and protected. Further, the growth in
electronic record keeping and the explosion of the availability of
information over the Internet, combined with an apparent rise in
identity theft, have heightened this concern.
We have previously reported that certain public and private sector
officials told us that SSNs play an important role in their ability to
deliver services or conduct business.[Footnote 2] In this report, you
asked us to delve deeper into the government uses of SSNs.
Specifically, we studied (1) the extent and nature of federal, state,
and county government agencies' use of SSNs as they administer
programs to provide benefits and services; (2) the actions government
agencies take to safeguard these SSNs from improper disclosure and use
when they are used to administer programs; (3) the extent and nature
of federal, state, and county governments' use of SSNs when they are
contained in public records; and (4) the options available to better
safeguard SSNs that are found in these public records.
To address these issues we interviewed knowledgeable federal, state,
and county officials to identify government programs or activities
that frequently use SSNs. To develop information on the nature and
extent of governments' use of SSNs and their actions to protect
individuals' privacy when using SSNs, we mailed surveys to 18 federal
agencies and those departments that typically use SSNs in all 50
states, the District of Columbia, and the 90 most populous counties.
[Footnote 3] We also conducted site visits and in-depth interviews at
six selected federal programs, three states, and three counties. We
met with officials responsible for programs, agencies, or departments
(hereinafter referred to generically as agencies) and courts that make
frequent use of SSNs. We report on only those government entities that
obtain, receive, or use SSNs. The information they provided was self-
reported, and we did not verify it. We conducted our work between
February 2001 and March 2002 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. For additional information on our
approach, please see appendix 1.
Results in Brief:
When federal, state, and county government agencies administer
programs that deliver services and benefits to the public, they rely
extensively on the SSNs of those receiving the benefits and services.
Because SSNs are unique identifiers and do not change, the numbers
provide a convenient and efficient means of managing records. They are
also particularly useful for data sharing and data matching because
agencies can use them to check or compare their information quickly
and accurately with that from other agencies. In so doing, these
agencies can better ensure that they pay benefits or provide services
only to eligible individuals and can more readily recover delinquent
debts individuals may owe. Using SSNs for these purposes can save the
government and taxpayer hundreds of millions of dollars each year and
help make sure programs are achieving their goals. In addition to
using SSNs to deliver services or benefits, agencies also use or share
SSNs to conduct statistical programs, research, and program
evaluations. Moreover, all government departments or agencies use
their employees' SSNs to varying extents to perform some of their
responsibilities as employers, such as paying their employees and
providing health and other insurance benefits. In the course of using
SSNs to administer their programs and as employers, agencies sometimes
display these SSNs on documents, such as program eligibility cards or
employee badges, that can be seen by others who may have no need for
the SSN.
While government agencies are making wide use of SSNs, they are also
taking some steps to safeguard the numbers; however, certain measures
that could help protect SSNs are not uniformly in place at any level
of government. First, when requesting SSNs, government agencies are
not consistently providing individuals with information required by
federal law. This information, such as how the SSNs will be used and
whether individuals are required to provide their SSNs, is the first
line of defense against improper disclosure because it allows SSN
holders to make informed decisions about whether to provide their SSN
to obtain the services in question. Second, although agencies that use
SSNs to provide benefits and services are taking steps to safeguard
the numbers from improper disclosure, our survey identified potential
weaknesses in the security of information systems at all levels of
government. Similarly, regarding the display of SSNs by these
agencies, we found numerous examples of actions taken to limit the
presence of SSNs on documents that are not intended to be public but
are nonetheless seen by others; however, these changes are not
systematic and many government agencies continue to display SSNs on a
variety of documents.
Regarding public records, many of the state and county agencies
responding to our survey reported maintaining records that contain
SSNs; however, federal program agencies maintain public records less
frequently. At the state and county levels, certain offices, such as
state professional licensing agencies and county recorders' offices,
have traditionally been repositories for public records that may
contain SSNs. These records chronicle the various life events and
other activities of individuals as they interact with the government,
such as birth certificates, professional licenses, and property title
transfers. Officials who maintain these records told us their primary
responsibility is to preserve the integrity of the record rather than
protect the privacy of the individual SSN holder. In addition, courts
at all three levels of government maintain public records that may
contain SSNs, such as divorce decrees and child support orders. In
some cases, government agencies and the courts create these documents
containing SSNs themselves. In other cases, the documents are
submitted by others, such as when title companies submit documents to
support property title transfers and when attorneys submit evidence
for the record. Traditionally, the general public has gained access to
public records by visiting the office that maintains the records,
which offers at least some practical limitations on the volume of SSNs
any one person can collect. However, the growth of electronic record
keeping has made it easier for a few agencies to provide or even sell
their data in bulk. Moreover, although few entities report making SSNs
available on the Internet, several officials told us they are
considering expanding the volume and type of public records available
on their Web site.
When SSNs have been found in public records, some government agencies
are trying to better safeguard the SSN by trying innovative approaches
to protect the SSNs from public display. For example, some agencies
and courts are modifying their processes or their forms so that they
can collect SSNs but prevent the number from becoming part of the
publicly available record. This is most effective when the agency or
court prepares the document. When others submit the document to become
part of the public record, it is more difficult to limit the
appearance of the SSN unless the individual or business submitting the
document takes the initiative to omit the SSN or include it only when
absolutely necessary. Regarding placing public records containing SSNs
on Web sites, some agencies and courts have decided to limit this
practice as well; however, some have not. Overall, the most far-
reaching efforts we identified took place in states where there was a
statewide initiative that established a policy and procedures designed
to protect individuals' personal information, including SSNs, in all
of the different circumstances that governments collect, store, and
use it.
We are making recommendations in this report that the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) direct federal agencies to review their
practices for securing SSNs and providing SSN holders with information
required by federal law and that OMB take steps to better inform state
and local government agencies that they are required to provide this
information when they request an individual's SSN. We are also
presenting a matter for congressional consideration, suggesting that
the Congress, in consultation with the president, convene a
representative group of federal, state, and local officials to develop
a unified approach to safeguarding SSNs used in government and
particularly those displayed in public records. The Social Security
Administration (SSA) and OMB generally agreed with our recommendations.
Background:
Since the creation of the SSN, the number of federal agencies and
others that rely on it has grown beyond the original intended purpose,
in part because a number of federal laws authorize or require SSN use.
Additionally, the advent of computerized records further increased
reliance on SSNs. This growth in use and availability of SSNs is
important because SSNs are often the "identifier" of choice among
thieves who steal another individual's identity. Although no single
federal law regulates overall use and disclosure of SSNs by
governments, when federal government agencies use SSNs, several
federal laws limit the use and disclosure of the number in certain
circumstances.[Footnote 4] Also, state laws may vary in terms of the
restrictions imposed on SSN use and disclosure. Moreover, some records
that contain SSNs are considered part of the public record and, as
such, are routinely made available to the public for review.
Use of SSN Has Grown, in Part, Because of Federal Requirements SSA is
the federal agency responsible for issuing SSNs, which are used to
track workers' earnings and eligibility for Social Security benefits.
Legislation enacted in 1935 created the SSA and made the agency
responsible for implementing a social insurance program designed to pay
benefits to retired workers to ensure a continuing portion of income
after retirement.[Footnote 5] The amount of these benefits was based,
in part, on the amount of the workers' earnings. As a result, SSA
needed a system to keep track of earnings by individual worker and for
employers to report these earnings. In 1936, SSA created a numbering
system designed to provide a unique identifier, the SSN, to each
individual. Workers are now required by law to provide SSA their
number when they apply for benefits from SSA. As of December 1998, SSA
had issued 391 million SSNs.
Since the creation of the SSN, other entities in both the private and
public sectors have begun using SSNs, in part because of federal
requirements. Widespread SSN use in government began with a 1943
Executive Order issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt requiring
that all federal agencies use the SSN exclusively when agencies need
to use identification systems for individuals, rather than set up a
new identification system. In later years, the number of federal
agencies and others relying on the SSN as a primary identifier
escalated dramatically, in part, because a number of federal laws were
passed that authorized or required its use for specific activities as
shown in table 1. In many instances, the laws required that SSNs be
used to determine individuals' eligibility for certain federally
funded program services or benefits, or they served as a unique
identifier for such government-related activities as paying taxes or
reporting wages earned. In some cases these statutes require that
state and local governmental entities collect SSNs.
Table 1: Examples of Federal Statutes That Authorize or Mandate the
Collection and Use of Social Security Numbers:
Federal statute: Tax Reform Act of 1976; 42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(c)(i);
General purpose for collecting or using SSN: General public assistance
programs, tax administration, driver's license, motor vehicle
registration;
Government entity and authorized or required use: Authorizes states to
collect and use SSNs in administering any tax, general public
assistance, driver's license, or motor vehicle registration law.
Federal statute: Food Stamp Act of 1977; 7 U.S.C. 2025(e)(1);
General purpose for collecting or using SSN: Food Stamp Program;
Government entity and authorized or required use: Mandates the
secretary of agriculture and state agencies to require SSNs for
program participation.
Federal statute: Deficit Reduction Act of 1984; 42 U.S.C. 1320b-7(1);
General purpose for collecting or using SSN: Eligibility benefits
under the Medicaid program;
Government entity and authorized or required use: Requires that, as a
condition of eligibility for Medicaid benefits, applicants for and
recipients of these benefits furnish their SSNs to the state
administering program.
Federal statute: Housing and Community Development Act of 1987; 42
U.S.C. 3543(a);
General purpose for collecting or using SSN: Eligibility for the
Department of Housing and Urban Development programs;
Government entity and authorized or required use: Authorizes the
secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
require program applicants and participants to submit their SSNs as a
condition of eligibility.
Federal statute: Family Support Act of 1988; 42 U.S.C.
405(c)(2)(C)(ii);
General purpose for collecting or using SSN: Issuance of birth
certificates;
Government entity and authorized or required use: Requires states to
obtain parents' SSNs before issuing a birth certificate unless there
is good cause for not requiring the number.
Federal statute: Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988; 42
U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(D)(i);
General purpose for collecting or using SSN: Blood donation;
Government entity and authorized or required use: Authorizes states
and political subdivisions to require that blood donors provide their
SSNs.
Federal statute: Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of
1990; 42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(C);
General purpose for collecting or using SSN: Retail and wholesale
businesses participation in food stamp program;
Government entity and authorized or required use: Authorizes the
secretary of agriculture to require the SSNs of officers or owners of
retail and wholesale food concerns that accept and redeem food stamps.
Federal statute: Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990; 38 U.S.C.
510(c);
General purpose for collecting or using SSN: Eligibility for Veterans
Affairs compensation or pension benefits programs;
Government entity and authorized or required use: Requires individuals
to provide their SSNs to be eligible for Department of Veterans
Affairs' compensation or pension benefits programs.
Federal statute: Social Security Independence and Program Improvements
Act of 1994; 42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(E);
General purpose for collecting or using SSN: Eligibility of potential
jurors;
Government entity and authorized or required use: Authorizes states
and political subdivisions of states to use SSNs to determine
eligibility of potential jurors.
Federal statute: Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996; 42 U.S.C. 666(a)(13);
General purpose for collecting or using SSN: Various license
applications, divorce and child support documents, death certificates;
Government entity and authorized or required use: Mandates that states
have laws in effect that require collection of SSNs on applications
for driver's licenses and other licenses; requires placement in the
pertinent records of the SSN of the person subject to a divorce
decree, child support order, paternity determination; requires SSNs on
death certificates; creates national database for child support
enforcement purposes.
Federal statute: Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996; 31 U.S.C.
7701(c);
General purpose for collecting or using SSN: Persons doing business
with a federal agency;
Government entity and authorized or required use: Requires those doing
business with a federal agency (i.e., lenders in a federal guaranteed
loan program; applicants for federal licenses, permits, right-of-ways,
grants, or benefit payments; contractors of an agency and others) to
furnish SSNs to the agency.
Federal statute: Higher Education Act Amendments of 1998; 20 U.S.C.
1090(a)(7);
General purpose for collecting or using SSN: Financial assistance;
Government entity and authorized or required use: Authorizes the
secretary of education to include the SSNs of parents of dependent
students on certain financial assistance forms.
Federal statute: Internal Revenue Code (various amendments); 26 U.S.C.
6109;
General purpose for collecting or using SSN: Tax returns;
Government entity and authorized or required use: Authorizes the
commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service to require that taxpayers
include their SSNs on tax returns.
Source: GAO review of applicable federal laws.
[End of table]
Private businesses, such as financial institutions and health care
service providers, also frequently ask individuals for their SSNs. In
some cases, they require the SSN to comply with federal laws but at
other times, these businesses routinely choose to use the SSNs to
conduct business. SSNs are a key piece of identification in building
credit bureau databases, extracting or retrieving data from consumers'
credit histories, and preventing fraud. Businesses routinely report
consumers' financial transactions, such as charges, loans, and credit
repayments to credit bureaus. A representative for the credit bureaus
estimated that 80 percent of these transactions include SSNs. Although
the representative reported that credit bureaus use other identifiers,
such as names and addresses, to build and maintain individuals' credit
histories, credit bureaus view the SSN as one of the most important
identifiers for ensuring that correct information is associated with
the right individual because the SSN does not change as would a name
or address. The credit bureaus' representative told us that without
the SSN, or a similar stable identifier, such as a biometric
identifier,[Footnote 6] credit bureaus could still conduct business
but the level of accuracy of individuals' credit records would be
greatly reduced. The fundamental goal of credit bureaus is ensuring
that the credit information provided to those who grant consumers
credit is accurate. The less accurate the information, the less value
that information is to those who grant credit. The credit bureaus'
representative told us that until other stable identifiers like
biometrics gain widespread use, credit bureaus view the SSN as the key
tool for ensuring the accuracy of consumer credit histories.
The advent of computerized record keeping has implications for the
availability of SSNs and other sensitive data. Government entities are
beginning to make their records electronically available over the
Internet. Moreover, the Government Paperwork Elimination Act of 1998
requires that, where practicable, federal agencies provide by 2003 for
the option of the electronic maintenance, submission, or disclosure of
information. State government agencies have also initiated Web sites
to address electronic government initiatives. Moreover, continuing
advances in computer technology and the ready availability of
computerized data have spurred the growth of new business activities
that involve the compilation of vast amounts of personal information
about members of the public, including SSNs, that businesses sell.
Identity Thieves Often Use Others‘ SSNs:
This growth in the use of SSNs is important to individual SSN holders
because these numbers, along with names and birth certificates, are
among the three personal identifiers most often sought by identity
thieves.[Footnote 7] Identity theft is a crime that can affect all
Americans. It occurs when an individual steals another individual's
personal identifying information and uses it fraudulently. For
example, SSNs and other personal information are used to fraudulently
obtain credit cards, open utility accounts, access existing financial
accounts, commit bank fraud, file false tax returns, and falsely
obtain employment and government benefits. SSNs play an important role
in identity theft because they are used as breeder information to
create additional false identification documents, such as drivers'
licenses.
Most often, identity thieves use SSNs belonging to real people rather
than making one up; however, on the basis of a review of identity
theft reports, victims usually (75 percent of the time) did not know
where or how the thieves got their personal information.[Footnote 8]
In the 25 percent of the time when the source was known, the personal
information, including SSNs, usually was obtained illegally. In these
cases, identity thieves most often gained access to this personal
information by taking advantage of an existing relationship with the
victim. The next most common means of gaining access were by stealing
information from purses, wallets, or the mail. In addition,
individuals can also obtain SSNs from their workplace and use them or
sell them to others. Finally, SSNs and other identifying information
can be obtained legally through Internet sites maintained by both the
public and private sectors and from records routinely made available
to the public by government entities and courts. Because the sources
of identity theft cannot be more accurately pinpointed, it is not
possible at this time to determine whether SSNs that are used
improperly are obtained most frequently from the private sector or the
government.
Recent statistics collected by federal and consumer reporting agencies
indicate that the incidence of identity theft appears to be growing.
[Footnote 9] The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the agency
responsible for tracking identity theft, reports that complaint calls
from possible victims of identity theft grew from about 445 calls per
week in November 1999, when it began collecting this information, to
about 3,000 calls per week by December 2001. However, FTC noted that
this increase in calls might also, in part, reflect enhanced consumer
awareness. In addition, SSA's Office of the Inspector General, which
operates a fraud hotline, reports that allegations of SSN misuse
increased from about 11,000 in fiscal year 1998 to more than 65,200 in
fiscal year 2001. Additionally, SSA reported that almost 39,000 other
allegations of program fraud also include an element of SSN misuse
during fiscal year 2001. Most of these allegations relate to identity
theft. However, some of the reported increase may be a result of a
growth in the number of staff SSA assigned to field calls to the Fraud
Hotline during this period. SSA staff increased from 11 to over 50
during this period, which allowed personnel to answer more calls.
Also, officials from two of the three national consumer reporting
agencies report an increase in the number of 7 year fraud alerts
placed on consumer credit files, which they consider to be reliable
indicators of the incidence of identity theft.[Footnote 10] Finally,
it is difficult to determine how many individuals are prosecuted for
identity theft because law enforcement entities report that identity
theft is almost always a component of other crimes, such as bank fraud
or credit card fraud, and may be prosecuted under the statutes
covering those crimes.
In Some Instances SSNs are to Be Protected from Public Disclosure:
No single federal law regulates the overall use or restricts the
disclosure of SSNs by governments; however, a number of laws limit SSN
use in specific circumstances. Generally, the federal government's
overall use and disclosure of SSNs are restricted under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act. Broadly speaking, the
purpose of the Privacy Act is to balance the government's need to
maintain information about individuals with the rights of individuals
to be protected against unwarranted invasions of their privacy by
federal agencies. Also, the Social Security Act Amendments of 1990
also provide some limits on disclosure, and these limits apply to
state and local governments as well. In addition, a number of federal
statutes impose certain restrictions on SSN use and disclosure for
specific programs or activities.[Footnote 11] At the state and county
level, each state may have its own statutes addressing the public's
access to government records and privacy matters; therefore, states
may vary in terms of the restrictions they impose on SSN use and
disclosure. Table 2 shows key laws that may affect SSN disclosure at
the federal, state, and county level. For more information on the
specific provisions in the federal laws, including a summary of the
privacy principles that underlie the Privacy Act, see appendix II.
Table 2: Comparison of Key Provisions Concerning Disclosure of SSNs:
Federal: The Freedom of Information Act of 1966: presumes government
records are available upon formal request, but exempts certain
personal information, such as SSNs;
State: Open records laws or "sunshine" laws”vary by state but all 50
states and the District of Columbia have such statutes;
County: Governed by state and/or local laws.
Federal: The Privacy Act of 1974: regulates certain types of federal
recordkeeping; generally prohibits disclosure of personal information,
such as SSNs, with exceptions;
State: A number of states have enacted their own privacy laws or they
rely on other guidance; at least 17 states have statutes that
specifically address SSN use or disclosure;
County: Governed by state and/or local laws.
Federal: The Social Security Act Amendments of 1990: bars disclosure
of SSNs collected because of laws enacted on or after October 1, 1990;
State: The Social Security Act Amendments of 1990;
County: The Social Security Act Amendments of 1990.
Source: GAO review of federal laws, and The Privacy Journal,
Compilation of State and Federal Laws, 1997 edition with updates in a
1999 Supplement and a 2000 Supplement.
[End of table]
In addition, a number of laws provide protection for sensitive
information, such as SSNs, when maintained in computer systems and
other government records. Most recently, the Government Information
Security Reform provisions of the Fiscal Year 2001 Defense
Authorization Act require that federal agencies take specific measures
to safeguard computer systems that may contain SSNs.[Footnote 12] For
example, federal agencies must develop agency-wide information
security management programs, establish security plans for computer
systems, and conduct information security awareness training for
employees. These laws do not apply to state and local governments;
however, in some cases state and local governments have developed
their own statutes or put requirements in place to similarly safeguard
sensitive information, including SSNs, kept in their computer systems.
SSNs Are Found in Some Public Records:
In some cases, government entities, particularly at the state and
county levels, maintain public records that are routinely made
available to the public for inspection. For state and county executive
branch agencies, state law generally governs whether and under what
circumstances these records are made available to the public, and they
vary from state-to-state. Records may be made available for a number
of reasons. These include the presumption that citizens need
government information to assist in oversight and ensure that
government is accountable to the people. In addition, some government
agencies, such as county clerks or recorders, exist primarily to
create or maintain records to assist the public and private sector in
the conduct of business, legal, or personal affairs. These records may
contain SSNs.
Certain records maintained by the federal, state, and county courts
are also made available to the public. In principle, these records are
open to aid in preserving the integrity of the judicial process and to
enhance the public trust and confidence in the judicial process.
Courts are generally not subject to FOIA or other open record laws. At
the federal level, access to court documents generally has its
grounding in common law and constitutional principles. In some cases,
public access is also required by statute, as is the case for papers
filed in a bankruptcy proceeding. As with federal courts, requirements
regarding access to state and local court records may have a state
common law or constitutional basis or may be based on state laws.
Although states' laws may vary, generally, custodians of court records
must identify a statute, court rule, or a case law or common law basis
to preclude public access to a particular record; otherwise the record
is presumed to be accessible to the public and must be disclosed to
the public upon request.
All Levels of Governments Use SSNs Extensively for a Wide Range of
Purposes:
SSNs are widely used by federal, state, and county government agencies
when they provide services and benefits to the public. These agencies
use SSNs both to manage their records and to facilitate data sharing
with others. They share SSNs and other personal information to verify
eligibility for benefits, collect debts owed the government, and
conduct or support research and evaluation. In addition to using SSNs
for program purposes, many of these agencies also reported using their
employees' SSNs for activities such as payroll, wage reporting, and
providing employee benefits. As a result of this widespread SSN usage,
these agencies occasionally display SSNs on documents that may be
viewed by others who do not have a need for this personal information.
Agencies Use SSNs to Administer Programs That Provide Benefits or
Services to Individuals:
Most of the agencies we surveyed at all levels of government reported
using SSNs extensively to administer their programs. As shown in
figure 1, more agencies reported using SSNs for internal
administrative purposes, that is, they use them to identify, retrieve,
and update their records, than for any other purpose. SSNs are so
widely used for this purpose, in part, because each number is unique
to an individual and does not change, unlike some other personal
identifying information, such as names and addresses. For this reason,
SSNs can provide a convenient and efficient means to manage records,
particularly electronic records, that catalog services or benefits
government agencies provide individuals or families.
Figure 1: Percentage of Program Agencies Using SSNs for Each Reason
Listed:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Internal administrative purposes:
Federal (N = 55): 82%;
State (N = 44): 90%;
County (N = 197): 89%.
Verify applicants' eligibility; monitor accuracy of information
individuals provide:
Federal (N = 55): 73%;
State (N = 44): 83%;
County (N = 197): 82%.
Collect debts individuals owe agency/government:
Federal (N = 55): 40%;
State (N = 44): 34%;
County (N = 197): 25%.
Conduct internal research or program evaluation:
Federal (N = 55): 53%;
State (N = 44): 44%;
County (N = 197): 26%.
Provide data to outside researchers:
Federal (N = 55): 4%;
State (N = 44): 18%;
County (N = 197): 7%.
Legend: N is the number of respondents upon which the percentage is
based.
Source: GAO surveys of federal, state, and county departments and
agencies. Figure includes departments and agencies that administer
programs and excludes courts, county clerks and recorders, and state
licensing agencies.
[End of figure]
Many agencies also use SSNs to share information with other entities
to bolster the integrity of the programs they administer. For example,
individuals are often asked to report their income, citizenship
status, and household composition to determine their eligibility for
government benefits or services. To avoid paying benefits or providing
services or loans to individuals who are not really eligible for them,
agencies use applicants' SSNs to match the information they provide
with information in other data bases, such as other federal benefit
paying agencies, state unemployment agencies, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), or employers. As unique identifiers, SSNs help ensure
that the agency is obtaining or matching information on the correct
person.
As shown in figure 1, the majority of agencies at all three levels of
government reported sharing information containing SSNs for the
purpose of verifying an applicant's eligibility for services or
benefits. These data-sharing activities can help save the government
and taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars. In some cases, the
Congress has recognized the benefits of this data sharing for
federally funded programs and has either explicitly permitted or
required agencies to share data for these purposes. Examples of SSN
use for verifying and monitoring eligibility include the following:
* Individuals confined to a correctional facility for at least 1 full
month are ineligible to continue receiving federal Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program benefits.[Footnote 13] SSA, the federal
agency that administers this program, uses SSNs to match records with
state and local correctional facilities to identify individuals for
whom the agency should terminate benefit payments. We reported that
between January and August 1996, the sharing of prisoner data between
SSA and state and local correctional facilities helped SSA identify
about $151 million overpayments already made and prevented about $173
million in additional overpayments to ineligible prisoners.[Footnote
14]
* When individuals apply for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF), a program designed to help low-income families, the law
requires them to provide program administrators their SSNs and
information about their income and resources.[Footnote 15] Some
agencies that administer this program use SSNs to share data to
determine the applicants' and current recipients' eligibility and to
verify self-reported information. The state of New York alone
estimated that by checking state wage data records, it saved about $72
million in unpaid benefits between January and September 1999.
[Footnote 16]
SSNs Are Used to Collect Debt:
SSNs can also help ensure program integrity when they are used to
collect delinquent debts, and some agencies at each level of
government reported sharing data containing SSNs for this purpose.
Individuals may owe such debts to government agencies when they fall
behind in loan repayments, have underpaid taxes, or are found to have
fraudulently received benefits. For example:
* The Department of Education uses SSNs to match data on defaulted
education loans with the National Directory of New Hires. This
database, which was implemented in October 1997, contains the names
and SSNs, among other information, of individuals that employers
reported hiring after implementation.[Footnote 17] As a result of this
matching, which was implemented in fiscal year 2001, the department
reported collecting $130 million from defaulted student loans
borrowers in 2001.
* The Department of the Treasury, as the federal government's lead
agency for debt collection, also uses the SSN. For example, when an
individual falls behind in payments owed the federal government, the
agency owed the debt provides Treasury with the debtors' SSN and debt
information. Treasury then uses the SSN to determine whether
individuals owe the federal government money before making certain
payments, such as tax refunds. If Treasury finds the individual is
delinquent in paying a debt to the government, the agency will offset
certain payments due the individual to satisfy the debt. Using this
approach, Treasury used tax refund offsets to collect over $1 billion
in federal nontax debt in 2001.
SSNs Are Used for Statistics, Research, and Evaluation:
Certain statistical agencies, which are responsible for collecting and
maintaining data for statistical programs that are required by
statute, make use of SSNs. In some cases, these data are compiled
using information provided for another purpose. For example, the
Bureau of the Census prepares annual population estimates for states
and counties using individual income tax return data linked over time
by SSN to determine migration rates between localities.[Footnote 18]
For its Survey of Income and Population Participation, the bureau asks
survey participants for various demographic characteristics and types
of incomes received. The bureau also asks participants to provide
their SSNs, informing them that the SSNs will be used to obtain
information from other government agencies to avoid asking for
information already reported to the government. As is the case for all
government information collections, OMB must approve the collection of
data for such statistical and research purposes.
In addition, SSNs along with other program data, are sometimes used
for research and evaluation. SSNs provide government agencies and
others with an effective mechanism for linking data on program
participation with data from other sources to help evaluate the
outcomes or effectiveness of government programs.[Footnote 19] This
information can prove invaluable to program administrators as well as
policymakers. As shown in table 3, more than one-third of federal,
state, and county agencies combined reported using SSNs to conduct
internal research or program evaluation, and almost one-fifth of state
agencies provide data containing SSNs to outside researchers. Examples
of SSN use for evaluation and research include the following:
* As one of its many uses, Census may match the Survey of Income and
Population Participation responses with data contained in records for
programs such as TANF, Supplemental Security Income, and food stamp
programs. Linking various data by SSN helps policymakers assess the
extent to which these federal programs together assist low-income
individuals.
* Health departments may provide SSN information to outside
researchers, including universities or foundations, or provide SSN
information to other organizations such as the National Center for
Health Statistics, which compile national data on subjects such as
infant birth and mortality data.
Other Program Uses:
In addition to the above reasons for sharing data that focus primarily
on program integrity and research, some agencies use SSNs as a means
of sharing data to improve services. For example, in light of major
changes to the nation's welfare program in 1996, welfare agencies are
focusing on moving needy families toward economic independence and are
drawing on numerous federal and state programs to provide a wide array
of services, such as child care, food stamps, and employment and
training. Sharing data can help them identify what services
beneficiaries have received and what additional services are available
or needed.
Agencies Are Most Likely to Share SSNs with Other Government Agencies
and Contractors:
All government agencies that administer programs and share records
containing individuals' SSNs with other entities reported sharing SSNs
with at least one other government agency.[Footnote 20] Aside from
sharing with other government agencies, the largest percentage of
federal and state program agencies report sharing SSNs with
contractors, and a relatively large percentage of county program
agencies report sharing with contractors as well, as shown in table 3.
Agencies across all levels of government use contractors to help them
fulfill their program responsibilities. Contractors most frequently
determine eligibility for services, provide services, conduct data
processing activities, and perform research and evaluation. In
addition to sharing SSNs with contractors, government agencies also
share SSNs with private businesses, such as credit bureaus and
insurance companies, as well as debt collection agencies, researchers,
and, to a lesser extent, with private investigators.
Table 3: Of Program Agencies That Share SSNs, Percentage That Share
Them with Specific NonGovernment Entities:
Entities That Receive SSNs from Government agencies: Contractors;
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, Federal: 54%; (39);
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, State: 39%; (149);
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, County: 28%; (138).
Entities That Receive SSNs from Government agencies: Credit bureaus;
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, Federal: 31%; (32);
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, State: 17%; (145);
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, County: 10%; (138).
Entities That Receive SSNs from Government agencies: Insurance
companies;
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, Federal: 24% (33);
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, State: 28% (147);
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, County: 31%; (139).
Entities That Receive SSNs from Government agencies: Debt collection
agencies;
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, Federal: 29%; (31);
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, State: 16%; (140);
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, County: 10%; (136).
Entities That Receive SSNs from Government agencies: Researchers;
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, Federal: 12%; (34);
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, State: 33%; (147);
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, County: 14%; (135).
Entities That Receive SSNs from Government agencies: Private
investigators;
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, Federal: 0%; (0);
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, State: 7%; (141);
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, County: 7%; (138).
Entities That Receive SSNs from Government agencies: Marketing
companies
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, Federal: 0%; (0);
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, State: 2%; (139);
Government Agencies Reporting Sharing SSNs, County: 1%; (137).
Legend: The number in parentheses is the number of respondents upon
which the percentage is based.
Source: GAO survey of federal, state, and county agencies, using
responses from those that reported sharing SSNs. Table includes
departments and agencies that administer programs for the public and
excludes courts, county clerks and recorders, and state licensing
agencies.
[End of table]
Governments Use Employees' SSNs for Employer-Related Activities:
All government personnel departments we surveyed reported using their
employees' SSNs to fulfill at least some of their responsibilities as
employers. As with many of the program-related SSN uses described
earlier, these employer uses involve data sharing among governments
and other agencies. Personnel departments responding to our
questionnaire said they use SSNs to help them maintain internal
records and provide employee benefits. To provide these benefits,
employers often share data on employees with other entities, such as
health care providers or pension plan administrators. As an example,
employers submit employees' SSNs along with certain information about
employees to health insurers and retirement plan administrators.
Health insurers may use the SSNs to identify enrollment in health
plans and verify eligibility for payments for health services.
Retirement plan administrators use the SSN to record the contribution
in the correct employee account, and when they make payments to
individuals, they are required to report the payments using the
individuals' SSNs to the IRS.
In addition, employers are required by law to use employees' SSNs when
reporting wages. Wages are reported to SSA, and the agency uses this
information to update earnings records it maintains for each
individual. These earnings ultimately determine eligibility for and
the amount of Social Security benefits. After processing these
reported wages, SSA provides the information to the IRS, which uses it
to monitor individuals' compliance with the federal personal income
tax rules. The IRS uses SSNs to match these employer wage reports with
amounts individuals report on personal income tax returns. Finally,
federal law requires that states maintain employers' reports of newly
hired employees, identified by SSNs. States must forward this
information to a national database that is used by state child support
agencies to locate parents who are delinquent in child support
payments.
Government Agencies Occasionally Display SSNs on Documents That May Be
Viewed by Others:
In the course of delivering their services or benefits, many
government agencies occasionally display SSNs on documents that may be
viewed by others, some of whom may not have a need for this personal
information. Figure 2 shows a variety of ways SSNs are displayed, as
reported in our survey by federal, state, and county personnel
departments. When SSNs appear on payroll checks, rather than on the
more easily safeguarded pay stub, any number of individuals can view
the employee's SSN depending on where the check is cashed. To receive
services at government rates, government employees may be required to
provide hotel employees and others documents such as travel orders or
tax exemption forms that display their SSNs.
Figure 2: Percentage of Government Personnel Departments That Display
SSNs on Different Types of Documents:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Document type: Payroll or other reimbursement checks;
Federal (N = 55): 67%;
State (N = 44): 59%;
County (N = 197): 57%.
Document type: Vouchers/authorizations for dependent childcare credits;
Federal (N = 55): 33%;
State (N = 44): 27%;
County (N = 197): 20%.
Document type: Vouchers/authorizations for public transportation
subsidies;
Federal (N = 55): 53%;
State (N = 44): 5%;
County (N = 197): 9%.
Document type: Promotion lists;
Federal (N = 55): 13%;
State (N = 44): 32%;
County (N = 197): 24%.
Document type: Travel orders/authorizations;
Federal (N = 55): 100%;
State (N = 44): 41%;
County (N = 197): 9%.
Document type: Authorizations for training outside of the agency;
Federal (N = 55): 73%;
State (N = 44): 27%;
County (N = 197): 2%.
Document type: Employees' badges/identification cards;
Federal (N = 55): 27%;
State (N = 44): 5%;
County (N = 197): 9%.
Legend: N is the number of respondents upon which the percentage is
based.
Source: GAO surveys of federal, state, and county personnel
administrators.
[End of figure]
Some federal agencies and a few state and county personnel departments
reported displaying employees' SSNs on their employee badges. Notably,
the Department of Defense (DOD), which has over 2.7 million active and
reserve military personnel, displays SSNs on its identification cards
for these personnel. According to DOD officials, the Geneva Convention
suggests that military personnel have an identification number
displayed on their identification card, and DOD has chosen to use the
SSN for this purpose. On the state level, the Department of Criminal
Justice in one state, which has about 40,000 employees, displays SSNs
on all employee identification cards. According to that state's
Department of Criminal Justice officials, some of their employees have
taken actions such as taping over their SSNs so that prison inmates
and others cannot view this personal information.
SSNs are also displayed on documents that are not employee-related.
For example, some benefit programs display the SSN on the benefit
checks and eligibility cards, and over one-third of federal
respondents reported including the SSN on official letters mailed to
participants. Further, some state institutions of higher education
display students' SSNs on identification cards. Finally, SSNs are
sometimes displayed on business permits that must be posted in public
view at an individual's place of business.
Governments Are Taking Some Steps to Safeguard SSNs but Important
Measures Not Universally Employed:
When agencies that deliver services and benefits use SSNs to
administer programs, they are taking some steps to safeguard SSNs, but
certain measures that could provide more assurances that these SSNs
are secure are not universally in place at any level of government.
First, when federal, state, and county agencies request SSNs, they are
not consistently informing the SSN holders of whether they must
provide the SSN to receive benefits or services and how the SSN will
be used. In addition, although some agencies are using identifiers
other than the SSNs in their records, most report it would be
difficult to stop using SSNs. When agencies do use the SSN, we found
weaknesses in their information systems security at all levels of
government, which indicate SSNs may be at risk of improper disclosure.
Finally, although some agencies are taking action to limit the display
of SSNs on documents that are not intended to be public but may be
viewed by others, these actions are sometimes taking place in a
piecemeal manner rather than as a result of a systematic effort.
Many Government Entities Collect SSNs without Providing Required
Information:
When a government agency requests an individual's SSN, the individual
needs certain information to make an informed decision about whether
to provide their SSN to the government agency or not. Accordingly,
section 7 of the Privacy Act requires that any federal, state, or
local government agency, when requesting an SSN from an individual,
provide that individual with three key pieces of information.
[Footnote 21] Government entities must:
* tell individuals whether disclosing their SSNs is mandatory or
voluntary,
* cite the statutory or other authority under which the request is
being made, and,
* state what uses government will make of the individual's SSN.
This information, which helps the individual make an informed
decision, is the first line of defense against improper use.
Although nearly all government entities we surveyed collect and use
SSNs for a variety of reasons, many of these entities reported they do
not provide individuals the information required under section 7 of
the Privacy Act when requesting their SSNs. As shown in table 4,
federal agencies were more likely to report that they provided the
required information to individuals when requesting their SSNs than
were states or local government agencies. Even so, federal agencies
did not consistently provide this required information; 32 percent
reported that they did not inform individuals of the statutory
authority for requesting the SSN and 21 percent of federal agencies
reported that they did not inform individuals of how their SSNs would
be used.
Table 4: Percentage of Government Entities That Provide Individuals
with Required Information When Collecting SSNs:
Informs Individuals: That providing SSN is voluntary;
Federal: 90%; (10);
State: 38%; (78);
County: 42%; (74).
Informs Individuals: Of legal authority to request SSNs;
Federal: 68%; (37);
State: 51%; (147);
County: 39%; (161).
Informs Individuals: How SSNs will be used;
Federal: 79%; (57);
State: 51% (270);
County: 36%; (294).
Legend: The number in parentheses is the number of respondents upon
which the percentage is based.
Source: Data from GAO surveys of federal, state, and county
departments, using responses from all government entities.
[End of table]
For federal agencies, OMB is responsible for assisting with and
overseeing the implementation of the Privacy Act. Although OMB has
issued guidance for federal agencies to follow in implementing the act
overall, OMB's guidance does not address section 7.[Footnote 22]
However, there is another provision of the act that contains
requirements similar to those of section 7, and OMB guidance does
address this provision.[Footnote 23] This provision requires agencies
to inform individuals from whom they request information (1) the legal
authority that authorizes the collection and whether disclosure is
voluntary or mandatory, (2) the purposes for which the information is
intended to be used, (3) the routine uses to be made of the
information, and (4) the effects on the individual of not providing
all or any part of the information. Agencies must provide this
information on the forms they use to collect the information or on a
separate form that can be retained by the individual. However, this
provision differs from section 7 in important ways. It applies only to
federal agencies that maintain a system of records, as defined under
the act, whereas section 7 applies to all agencies at the federal,
state, and local level and contains no provision limiting its coverage
to agencies maintaining a system of records.[Footnote 24]
Regarding how OMB oversees implementation of the Privacy Act, OMB
officials told us that they review certain federal agency actions
related to the Privacy Act, such as notices placed in the federal
register to inform the public of changes to agency systems of records;
however it is not their role to monitor day-to-day federal agency
compliance with the many provisions of the act.[Footnote 25] For this
ongoing compliance monitoring, OMB officials said that they rely on
agency privacy officers, general counsels, and inspector generals.
[Footnote 26] In addition, under the Act, individuals can bring a
civil action against a federal agency requesting the SSN if they
believe that the agency has not complied with the section 7
requirements and if this failure to comply results in an adverse
effect on the individual.
At the state and county levels of government, it is not clear who has
responsibility for overseeing the section 7 requirements placed on
state and local governments. In fact, some state and local officials
we spoke with were unaware of the requirements. Moreover, OMB
officials told us that they have not issued any implementing
regulations or guidance for section 7 for state and county government
agencies, and no federal agency has assumed overall responsibility for
monitoring these agencies and informing them of their obligations
under section 7 of the Privacy Act.[Footnote 27] According to OMB
officials, their role with respect to state and local governments is
limited to advising state and county officials who raise questions
about the act. In addition, OMB officials also work with the National
Association of State Chief Information Officers and other
organizations to discuss and share ideas on information management
issues.
Further, unlike the federal government, courts have disagreed on
whether individuals have a right of civil action against state and
county governments when these individuals believe state or county
agencies are not complying with section 7 of the Privacy Act. For
example, a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision held that
individuals do not have a right of action against state and local
governments for violating the Privacy Act.[Footnote 28] Conversely,
other courts have recognized implied remedies against state
governments for violations of the act. For example, in Louisiana, a
district court ordered that the state stop asking for SSNs as a
prerequisite to voter registration, based partially on the court's
determination that the Louisiana commissioner of elections was
violating section 7 of the act.[Footnote 29] Similarly, a district
court found that Virginia violated the act when collecting SSNs for
voter registration because it did not provide required notice when
requesting individuals' SSNs.[Footnote 30]
More Can Be Done to Protect SSNs from Improper Public Disclosure:
When government agencies collect SSNs that are not part of public
records, they have a number of options available to them to limit the
risk of improper disclosure. These agencies can:
* use numbers other than SSNs for some program activities;
* implement a number of controls to ensure that when they use SSNs,
they are properly safeguarded; and;
* limit the use of SSNs on documents that may be viewed by others who
do not have a need to access this personal information.
Some Agencies Use Alternate Numbers, but Most Report it Would Be
Difficult to Stop Using SSNs:
Despite the widespread use of SSNs at all levels of government, not
all agencies use the SSN. Some respondents (19 from state departments
and 33 from county departments) reported that they do not obtain,
receive, or use the SSNs of program participants, service recipients,
or individual members of the public. Moreover, of those who do use the
SSN, not all use it as their primary identification number for record-
keeping purposes. Of federal respondents, 65 percent use SSN as their
primary identifier, while 50 percent of state and 38 percent of county
agencies reported doing so. In addition, when agencies do use the SSN
as their primary identification number, some agencies also maintain an
alternative number that is used in addition to or in lieu of SSNs for
certain activities. In fact, at least one-fourth of the respondents
across all levels of government said they used SSNs as the primary
identifier and also assigned alternative identifiers (38 federal, 30
state, and 25 percent county). There are a number of reasons why
agencies use identification numbers other than SSNs. Officials from
two county health departments told us that they do not require
applicants for the Women, Infant, and Children Program to provide
their SSNs because eligibility is determined based on client-provided
information.[Footnote 31] Under these circumstances, program
administrators do not need to use SSNs to match data to verify program
eligibility. Two officials said that their county health departments
use numbers the departments assign as the primary identifier. In such
cases, however, health care providers may use SSNs to track patients'
medical care across multiple providers or to coordinate benefit
payments. Finally, law enforcement agencies we met with are less
likely to consider SSNs as their primary identification number because
criminals often have multiple or stolen identities and SSNs.
We asked those agencies that used SSNs as their primary identifier and
did not use alternate identification numbers how difficult it would be
to change their procedures to permit using different identification
numbers in place of SSNs. More than 85 percent of agencies in this
category at all levels of government reported that it would be
somewhat or very difficult to make this change (93 percent of federal
agencies, 93 percent of state agencies, and 87 percent of county
agencies). The top four reported reasons why programs might have
difficulty making these changes, were (1) that it would prevent
interfacing with the computer systems of other departments or programs
that use SSNs, (2) it would be too costly, (3) the program's current
software would not support the change, and (4) it would require a
change in law.
Many Agencies Using SSNs to Administer Programs Do Not Have in Place
Uniform Information Security Controls:
When government agencies collect and use SSNs as an essential
component of their operations, they need to take steps to mitigate the
risk of individuals gaining unauthorized access to SSNs or making
improper disclosure or use of SSNs. As discussed earlier in this
report, agencies at all levels of government use SSNs extensively for
a wide range of purposes. Further, they store and use SSNs in varied
formats. Over 90 percent of our survey respondents reported using both
hard copy and electronic records containing SSNs when conducting their
program activities. When using electronic media, many employ personal
computers linked to computer networks to store and process the
information they collect. This extensive use of SSNs, as well as the
various ways in which SSNs are stored and accessed or shared, increase
the risks to individuals' privacy and make it both important and
challenging for agencies to take steps to safeguard these SSNs.
Uniform guidelines that cut across all levels of government do not
exist to specify what actions governments should take to safeguard
personal information that includes SSNs. However, certain federal laws
lay out a framework for federal agencies to follow when establishing
information security programs to protect sensitive personal
information, such as SSNs.[Footnote 32] The federal framework is
consistent with strategies used by those private and public
organizations that we previously reported have strong information
security programs.[Footnote 33] The federal framework includes four
principles that are important to an overall information security
program. These are to periodically assess risk, implement policies and
controls to mitigate risks, promote awareness of risks for information
security, and continually monitor and evaluate information security
practices. To gain a better understanding of whether agencies had in
place measures to safeguard SSNs that are consistent with the federal
framework, we selected eight commonly used practices found in
information security programs”two for each principle. Use of these
eight practices could give an indication that an agency has an
information security program that follows the federal framework.
[Footnote 34] We surveyed the federal, state, and county programs and
agencies on their use of the following eight practices:
Periodically assess risk:
* Conduct risk assessments for computer systems that contain SSNs;
* Develop written security plan for computer systems that contain SSNs.
Implement policies and controls to mitigate risks:
* Develop written policies for handling records with SSNs;
* Control access to computerized records that contain SSNs, such as
assigning different levels of access and using methods to identify
employees (e.g., use ID cards, PINS, or passwords).
Promote awareness of risks for information security:
* Provide employees training or written materials on responsibilities
for safeguarding records;
* Take disciplinary actions against employees for noncompliance with
policies, such as placing employees on probation, terminating
employment, or referring to law enforcement.
Continually monitor and evaluate information security practices:
* Monitor employees' access to computerized records with SSNs, such as
tracking browsing and unusual transactions;
* Have computer systems independently audited.
Responses to our survey indicate that agencies that administer
programs at all levels of government are taking some steps to
safeguard SSNs; however, potential weaknesses exist at all levels.
Many survey respondents reported adopting some of the practices;
however, none of the eight practices were uniformly adopted at any
level of government. Of the eight practices, the largest percentage of
agencies at all three levels of government combined reported
controlling access to computerized records that contain SSNs and
taking disciplinary actions against employees for noncompliance with
policies. The smallest percentage of agencies at all three levels of
government combined reported developing written policies for handling
records with SSNs and having their information systems security
independently audited. Overall, opportunities exist at all levels of
government to increase protections against improper access,
disclosure, or use of personal information, including SSNs. In
general, when compared to state and county government agencies, a
higher percentage of federal agencies reported using most of the eight
practices.
It is important to note that since 1996 we have consistently
identified significant information security weaknesses across the
federal government. In early 2002, based on a review of 24 of the
largest federal agencies, we reported that federal agencies had not
established information security programs consistent with legislative
requirements.[Footnote 35] We found that significant information
security weaknesses continued to exist in all major areas for
information security programs. For example, (1) risk assessments had
not been conducted for all computer systems, (2) polices may have been
inadequate or excessive because risks had not been adequately
assessed, (3) employees may have been unaware of their security
responsibilities because agencies provided little or no training, and
(4) effectiveness of security practices was unknown because of
inadequate testing and evaluation of security controls. Further, in
its February 2001 report to the Congress, OMB noted that many federal
agencies have significant deficiencies in every important area of
security.[Footnote 36] Although information security weaknesses may
have been reported for certain states and counties, we are not aware
of a comparable, comprehensive assessment of information security for
either state or county government.
Further, when SSNs are passed from a government agency to another
entity, agencies need to take additional steps to continue protections
for sensitive personal information that includes SSNs, such as
imposing restrictions on the entities to help ensure that the SSNs are
safeguarded. OMB guidance specifies a number of requirements federal
agencies must follow for certain sharing of personal information.
[Footnote 37] For example, the guidance specifies that federal
agencies should prohibit recipient agencies from redisclosing data,
except as allowed by law; employ effective security controls; and
include mechanisms to hold recipients of data accountable for
compliance. The guidance does not prescribe specific steps agencies
should take when sharing information containing SSNs and other
personal information. Moreover, although state and county governments
may establish their own requirements, these would apply only to their
respective jurisdiction. In the absence of uniform prescribed steps
agencies should take when sharing data, we surveyed agencies on
whether they implemented selected requirements when sharing information
containing SSNs with outside entities.
As shown in table 5, agency responses indicate that, although most
include security requirements in contracts or data sharing agreements,
many did not have a process in place to ensure compliance. Most
agencies reported requiring those receiving personal data to restrict
access to and disclosure of records containing SSNs to authorized
persons and to keep records in secured locations. However, fewer
agencies reported having provisions in place to oversee or enforce
compliance. For example, only about half of the agencies at all levels
of government combined reported using audits to monitor receivers'
compliance with requirements. As a result, there is little assurance
that entities receiving SSNs from government agencies have upheld
their obligation to protect the confidentiality and security of SSNs.
Table 5: Percentage of Program Agencies That Report Imposing Selected
Requirements on Outside Entities When Sharing SSNs:
Requirement imposed on receivers: SSNs must be safeguarded;
Access to SSNs must be restricted to authorized persons:
Government agencies sharing SSNs, Federal: 100% (33);
Government agencies sharing SSNs, State: 90%; (134);
Government agencies sharing SSNs, County: 84%; (76).
Disclosure of SSNs must be restricted to authorized persons:
Government agencies sharing SSNs, Federal: 88%; (33);
Government agencies sharing SSNs, State: 92%; (135);
Government agencies sharing SSNs, County: 81%; (78).
Records with SSNs must be kept in secure location:
Government agencies sharing SSNs, Federal: 97%; (33);
Government agencies sharing SSNs, State: 88%; (135);
Government agencies sharing SSNs, County: 78%; (78).
Requirement imposed on receivers: Oversight provisions;
Entity must self-report compliance;
Government agencies sharing SSNs, Federal: 34%; (32);
Government agencies sharing SSNs, State: 32%; (120);
Government agencies sharing SSNs, County: 29%; (76).
Entity must be independently audited for compliance:
Government agencies sharing SSNs, Federal: 59%; (32);
Government agencies sharing SSNs, State: 55%; (124);
Government agencies sharing SSNs, County: 50%; (76).
Agency imposes penalties for noncompliance;
Government agencies sharing SSNs, Federal: 67%; (30);
Government agencies sharing SSNs, State: 69%; (124);
Government agencies sharing SSNs, County: 50%; (76).
Legend: The number in parentheses is the number of respondents upon
which the percentage is based.
Source: GAO survey of federal, state, and county departments and
agencies, using responses from those that reported sharing SSNs. Table
includes departments and agencies that administer programs for the
public and excludes courts, county recorders, and state licensing
agencies.
[End of table]
Efforts are underway at the federal level to more closely review
individual federal agencies' security practices. At the direction of
the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, officials from 15
federal agencies' offices of the inspector general are reviewing their
respective agency practices in using and safeguarding SSNs. At the
state and county levels, opportunities exist for associations that
represent these jurisdictions nationwide to conduct educational
programs to highlight the importance of safeguarding SSNs, encourage
agencies to strengthen how they safeguard SSNs, and develop
recommended policies and practices for safeguarding SSNs.[Footnote 38]
Some Agencies Are Beginning to Take Steps to Limit SSN Display on
Documents That May Be Viewed by Others:
We identified a number of instances where the Congress or governmental
entities have taken or are considering action to reduce the presence
of SSNs on documents that may be viewed by others who may not have a
need to view this personal information. Examples of recent efforts to
reduce display follow.
* Treasury relocated the placement of SSNs on Treasury checks to a
location that cannot be viewed through the envelope window.
* The Defense Commissary Agency stopped requiring SSNs on checks
written by members because of concerns about improper use of the SSNs
and identity theft.[Footnote 39]
* SSA has truncated individuals' SSNs that appear on the approximately
120 million benefits statements it mails each year. At the top of this
statement, SSA has included a notice warning individuals to protect
their SSNs.
* A state comptroller's office changed its procedures so that it now
offers vendors the option of not displaying SSNs on their business
permits.
* One state has a statute that prohibits display of SSNs on licenses
issued by the state's health department.
* Some states have passed laws prohibiting the use of SSNs as a
student identification number.
* Almost all states have modified their policies on placing SSNs on
state drivers' licenses. Although it was common practice to find SSNs
on licenses only a few years ago, today only ten states routinely
display SSNs as a recognizable nine-digit number.[Footnote 40]
It is important to note that these steps to limit the display of SSNs
do not mean the agency has stopped collecting SSNs. In fact, in some
cases, the agency may be required by law to collect the SSN but the
number need not always be placed on a document or record that is seen
by the public.
Agencies are taking these actions even though it is not clear that the
SSN displays we identified are, in fact, prohibited. Limitations on
disclosing the SSN vary from use to use and among governmental
entities. For example, on the federal level, the Privacy Act permits
the disclosure of information in a record covered by the act if the
agency can show that the use is compatible with the purpose for which
it was collected. At the state level, depending on the state and
applicable state laws, information about public employees may be
considered public information and available upon request. Nonetheless,
the efforts to reduce display suggest a growing awareness that SSNs
are private information, and the risk to the individual of placing an
SSN on a document that others can see may be greater than the benefit
to the agency of using the SSN in this manner. However, despite this
growing awareness and the actions cited above, many government
agencies continue to display SSNs on a variety of documents that can
be seen by others.
In addition to the above actions taken by agencies at different levels
of government, several bills have been introduced in the Congress that
propose to more broadly limit or restrict the display of SSNs by all
government entities. For example, some specifically prohibit SSN
display on benefit checks or employee identity badges.
Open Nature of Certain Government Records Results in Wide Access to
SSNs:
Many of the respondents to our survey reported maintaining public
records that contain SSNs. Many of these records are maintained by
county clerks or recorders and certain state agencies. In addition,
courts at all three levels of government maintain records that contain
SSNs and are available to the public. Some of the documents in these
records that contain SSNs are created by the governmental entity
itself, while others are submitted by members of the public,
attorneys, or financial institutions. The public has traditionally
gained access to these public records by visiting the offices where
they are maintained and requesting certain documents or by browsing
among hard copies or microfilm to find the desired information. This
has served, at least in part, as a practical deterrent to the
widespread collection and use of others' SSNs from public records.
However, the growth of electronic record keeping has enabled a few
agencies to provide or even sell their data in bulk. Moreover,
although few entities report making SSNs available on the Internet,
several officials told us they are considering expanding the volume
and type of public records available on their Web site.
Many State and County Public Records Contain SSNs:
As shown in table 6, all of the federal courts and over two-thirds of
the state and county courts, county recorders, and state licensing
agencies that reported maintaining public records indicated that these
records contained SSNs. In addition, some program agencies also
reported maintaining public records that contain SSNs. (For more
information on the types of federal programs and state and county
agencies that reported maintaining public records, see appendix III).
Table 6: Of Courts, County Recorders, and State Licensing Agencies;
and of Program Agencies That Maintain Public Records, Percentage That
Maintain Public Records That Contain SSNs:
Courts, recorders, and licensing agencies that maintain public records
with SSNs:
Federal: 100%; (3)[A];
State: 68% (31);
County: 77%; (95).
Program agencies that maintain public records with SSNs:
Federal: 23%; (22);
State: 29%; (189);
County: 33%; (140).
[A] All three respondents were from federal courts.
Legend: The number in parentheses is the number of respondents upon
which the percentage is based.
Source: Data from GAO survey of federal, state, and county departments
and agencies.
[End of table]
County clerks or recorders (hereinafter referred to as recorders) and
certain state agencies often maintain records that contain SSNs
because these offices have traditionally been the repository for key
information that, among other things, chronicles various life events
and other activities of individuals as they interface with
government.[Footnote 41] For example, they often maintain records on
an individual's birth, marriage, and death. They maintain
documentation that an individual has been licensed to work in certain
professions, such as medical, legal, and public accounting. In
addition, they may maintain documentation on certain transactions,
such as property ownership and title transfer. This is done, according
to recorders we met with, to make ownership known and detect any liens
on a parcel of land before making a purchase.
SSNs appear in these public records for a number of reasons. They may
already be a part of a document that is submitted to a recorder for
official preservation. For example, military veterans are encouraged
to file their discharge papers with their local recorder's office to
establish a readily available record of their military service, and
these documents contain the SSN because that number is the
individual's military identification number.[Footnote 42] Also,
documents that record financial transactions, such as tax liens and
property settlements, contain SSNs to help identify the correct
individual. In other cases, government officials are required by law
to collect SSNs. For example, to aid in locating noncustodial parents
who are delinquent in their child support payments, the federal
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 requires that states have laws in effect to collect SSNs on
applications for marriage, professional, and occupational licenses.
Moreover, some state laws allow government entities to collect SSNs on
voter registries to help avoid duplicate registrations. Again,
although the law requires public entities to collect the SSN as part
of these activities, this does not necessarily mean that the SSNs
always must be placed on the document that becomes part of the public
record. Figure 3 shows the percentage of state and county entities
that display SSNs on each of the types of public records listed.
Figure 3: Percentage of State and County Entities that Display SSNs on
Each of the Types of Public Records Listed:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Record: Death certificates;
State (N = 49): 41%;
County (N = 92): 54%.
Record: Property settlement documents;
State (N = 49): 27%;
County (N = 92): 42%.
Record: Land ownership records;
State (N = 49): 16%;
County (N = 92): 41%.
Record: Birth certificates;
State (N = 49): 24%;
County (N = 92): 33%.
Record: Marriage permits/licenses;
State (N = 49): 27%;
County (N = 92): 30%.
Record: Professional/occupational licenses;
State (N = 49): 59%;
County (N = 92): 26%.
Record: Taxpayer records;
State (N = 49): 18%;
County (N = 92): 17%.
Record: Jury lists;
State (N = 49): 18%;
County (N = 92): 17%.
Record: Voter registries;
State (N = 49): 2%;
County (N = 92): 9%.
Legend: N is the number of respondents upon which the percentage is
based.
Source: GAO surveys of state and county government agencies, using
responses from those that reported maintaining at least one of the
above listed public records containing SSNs.
[End of figure]
Courts at all three levels of government also collect and maintain
records that are routinely made available to the public. Court records
overall are presumed to be public; however, each court may have its
own rules or practices governing the release of information.[Footnote
43] The rationale for making these records public is that keeping
court activities open helps ensure that justice is administered
fairly. In addition, the legal requirement that bankruptcy court
documents remain open for public inspection is to ensure that
bankruptcy proceedings take place in a public forum to best serve the
rights of both creditors and debtors.
As with recorders, SSNs appear in court documents for a variety of
reasons. In many cases, SSNs are already a part of documents that are
submitted by attorneys or individuals. These documents could be
submitted as part of the evidence for a proceeding or could be
included as part of a petition for an action, such as a judgment or a
divorce. In other cases, courts include SSNs on documents they and
other government officials create, such as criminal summonses, arrest
warrants, and judgments, to increase the likelihood that the correct
individual is affected (i.e., to avoid arresting the wrong John
Smith). In some cases federal law requires that SSNs be placed in
certain records that courts maintain. For example, the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
requires that SSNs be placed in records that pertain to child support
orders, divorce decrees, and paternity determinations. Again, this
assists child support enforcement agencies in efforts to help parents
collect money that is owed to them. These documents may also be
maintained at county clerk or recorders' offices. Figure 4 shows
percentage of state and county entities that display SSNs on each of
the types of public records listed.
Figure 4: Percentage of State and County Entities that Display SSNs on
Each of the Types of Public Records Listed:
Record: Judgments;
State (N = 45): 58%;
County (N = 86): 65%.
Record: Child support orders;
State (N = 45): 60%;
County (N = 86): 50%.
Record: Divorce petitions/decrees;
State (N = 45): 53%;
County (N = 86): 45%.
Record: Child custody documents;
State (N = 45): 47%;
County (N = 86): 40%.
Record: Paternity determinations;
State (N = 45): 44%;
County (N = 86): 31%.
Legend: N is the number of respondents upon which the percentage is
based.
Source: GAO survey of state and county government agencies, using
responses from state county courts and county recorders that report
maintaining at least one of the above listed records containing SSNs.
[End of figure]
When federal, state, or county entities, including courts, maintain
public records, they are generally prohibited from altering the formal
documents. Officials told us that their primary responsibility is to
preserve the integrity of the record rather than protecting the
privacy of the individual named in the record. Officials told us they
believe they have no choice but to accept the documents with the SSNs
and fulfill the responsibility of their office by making them
available to the general public.
Traditional Access to Public Records Has Practical Limitations That
Would Not Exist on the Internet:
Traditionally, the public has been able to gain access to SSNs
contained in public records by visiting the recorder's office, state
office, or court house; however, the requirement to visit a physical
location and request or search for information on a case-by-case basis
offers some measure of protection against the widespread collection
and use of others' SSNs from public records.[Footnote 44] Depending on
the local practice, a member of the public may request specific
documents from a clerk or may be able to browse through thousands of
hard copies of documents, often dating back many decades or more. In
addition, some counties make available documents that have been
microfilmed or microfiched. Under these circumstances, it may be
somewhat easier to find information on individuals; however, the
information available would be limited to the type of record that is
microfilmed (e.g., property settlement documents). In other words, the
effort involved in obtaining documents by visiting local offices in
effect helps insulate individuals from possible harm that could result
from SSN misuse because of the time and effort required. A county
recorder told us that the individuals willing to expend the time and
effort to visit local offices to review public records generally have
a business need to do so.
However, this limited access to information in public records is not
always the case. We found examples where members of the public can
obtain easy access to larger volumes of documents containing SSNs.
Some offices that maintain public records offer computer terminals set
up where individuals can look up electronic files from a site-specific
database. In one of the offices we visited, documents containing SSNs
that are otherwise accessible to the public are also made available in
bulk to certain groups. In one county we visited, title companies have
an arrangement to scan court documents to add to their own databases
before the documents are filed in the county recorder's office.
When comparing the sharing practices of courts, state licensing
agencies, and county recorders to program agencies that collect and
use SSNs, a higher percentage of county recorders reported sharing
information containing SSNs with credit bureaus, researchers, debt
collection agencies, private investigators, and marketing companies.
When courts, state licensing agencies, or county recorders share
public records containing SSNs, they do not restrict receivers' use or
disclosure of the data.
Government offices may charge fees when providing copies of records in
various formats that may contain SSNs and other personal information.
More than 20 percent of county agencies and 25 percent of state
agencies reported charging fees when providing SSNs to a contractor,
researcher, individual, or other entity during the last 12 months.
[Footnote 45] In most cases, the fees only covered costs for
providing the information. However, 13 percent of the state
respondents and 44 percent of the county respondents that charged fees
reported making a profit from charging a fee. At the state level, the
smallest profit reported from this sale of records over the last 12
months was $5,000, and the largest was $2,068,400. On the county
level, the smallest profit reported over the same period was $200, and
the largest was more than $2 million. The range in revenue may be
partially explained by the fact that officials from these agencies may
sell these records to individuals requesting one or a small number of
documents, or they may sell these records in bulk. For example, one
state sells its unclaimed property database, which often contains SSNs.
Finally, few agencies reported that they place SSNs on their Internet
sites; however, this practice may be growing. Of those agencies that
reported having public records containing SSNs, only 3 percent of the
state respondents and 9 percent of the county respondents reported
that the public can access these documents on their Web site. In some
cases, such as the federal courts, documents containing SSNs are
available on the Internet only to paid subscribers. In other cases,
large numbers of SSNs may be available to the general public. For
example, one state's Office of the Comptroller of Public Accounts
displays SSNs of business owners on their public web site embedded in
Vendor/Taxpayer Identification Numbers. Moreover, increasing numbers
of departments are moving toward placing more information on the
Internet. We spoke with several officials that described their goals
for having records available electronically within the next few years.
Providing this easy access of records potentially could increase the
opportunity to obtain records that contain SSNs that otherwise would
not have been obtained by visiting the government agency.
Some Governments and Agencies Are Taking Innovative Actions to Limit
Use and Display of SSNS in Public Records:
When SSNs are found in public records, some government entities are
trying to strike a new balance between their responsibility to allow
the general public access to documents that have traditionally been
made available for public review and an increased interest in
protecting the privacy of individuals. This is possible primarily for
those records the agency or court creates. In these cases, the
government entity may still collect SSNs, which may be required by law
or important for record-keeping purposes, but the number itself need
not be displayed. For those records and documents submitted by others,
it is more difficult to exclude the SSN unless the individual or
business preparing the document omits it before submission.
Alternatives to Displaying SSNs in Public Records Exist:
When government agencies create public documents or records, such as
marriage licenses, some are trying new innovative approaches that
protect SSNs from public display. Some agencies have developed
alternative types of forms to keep SSNs and other personal information
separate from the portion of a document that is accessible to the
general public. In these cases, even if the government agency is
required by law to record the SSN, the number does not always need to
be displayed on the copy of the document that is made available to the
public.[Footnote 46] Changing how the information is captured on the
form can help solve the dilemma of many county recorders who, because
they are the official record keepers of the county, are usually not
allowed to alter an original document after it is officially filed in
their office. For example, a county recorder told us that Virginia
recently changed its three part marriage application and license form.
Currently, only one copy of the form is routinely made available to
the general public and that copy does not contain the SSN while the
other two copies do contain the SSN. However, a county recorder told
us that even this seemingly simple change in the format of a document
can be challenging because, in some cases, the forms used for certain
transactions are prescribed by the state.
In addition to these efforts at recorders offices, courts at all three
levels of government have made efforts to protect SSNs in documents
that the general public can access through court clerk offices. For
example, one state court offers the option of filing a separate form
containing the SSN that is then kept separate from the part of the
record that is available for public inspection.
These solutions, however, are most effective when the recorder's
office, state agencies, and courts prepare the documents themselves.
In those many instances where others file the documents, such as
individuals, attorneys, or financial institutions, the receiving
agency has less control over what is contained in the document and, in
many cases, must accept it as submitted. Officials told us that, in
these cases, educating the individuals who submit the documents for
the record may be the most effective way to reduce the appearance of
SSNs. Such educational efforts could begin with informing individuals
who submit documents to these offices that, once submitted, anything
in that document is open to the public for review.[Footnote 47] For
example, one individual who submitted his military discharge papers to
his county recorder's office expressed concern about having done so
after he found out that his document was available for anyone to
review. Several officials suggested placing signs in offices where
public records are maintained. Others suggested finding additional
ways to notify the public of the nature of public records and the
consequences of submitting documents with SSNs on them.[Footnote 48]
In addition, financial institutions, title companies, and attorneys
submit a large portion of the documents that become part of the public
record in recorder's offices and the courts. These entities could
begin to consider whether SSNs are required on the documents they
submit. It may be possible to limit the display of SSNs on some of
these documents or, where SSNs are deemed necessary to help identify
the subject of the documents, it may be possible to truncate the SSN
to the last four digits.
While the above options are available for public records created after
an office institutes changes, fewer options exist to limit the
availability of SSNs in records that have already been officially
filed or created. One option is redacting or removing SSNs from
documents before they are made available to the general public. In our
fieldwork, we found instances where departments redact SSNs from
copies of documents that are made available to the general public, but
these tended to be situations where the volume of records and number
of requests were minimal, such as in a small county. Most other
officials told us redaction was not a practical alternative for public
records their offices maintain. Although redaction would reduce the
likelihood of SSNs being released to the general public, we were told
it is time-consuming, labor intensive, difficult, and in some cases
would require change in law. In documents filed by others outside of
the office, SSNs do not appear in a uniform place and could appear
many times throughout a document. In these cases, it is particularly
labor-intensive and a lengthy process to find and redact SSNs.
In addition, especially in large offices that receive hundreds of
requests for general public documents per day, we were told redacting
SSNs from each document before giving it to a member of the general
public would require significant staff resources. In one large urban
county, the district clerk's office sells about 930,000 certified
pages a year from family law cases. The district clerk estimates that
it would cost his office an additional $1 million per year in staff
time and related expenses to redact SSNs from all of those documents
before they are made available to the general public.
Moreover, redaction would be less effective in those offices where
members of the general public can inspect and copy large numbers of
documents without supervision from office staff. In these situations,
officials told us that they could change their procedures for
documents that they collect in the future, but it would be extremely
difficult and expensive to redact SSNs on documents that have already
been collected and filed. In several of these offices we visited,
documents are available in hard copy, on microfilm, on microfiche, or
in electronic format. Copies of thousands of documents, often dating
back many decades or more, are kept in large rooms where anyone can
browse through them. In addition, some counties have computer
terminals set up where individuals can look up electronic files on
their own. In these cases, the only way to prevent disclosure of SSNs
would be to redact them from all of the past records, which officials
told us would be extraordinarily costly and in some cases (e.g., on
microfiche and electronically scanned documents) would be extremely
difficult.
Some of the bills currently before the Congress call for redacting
SSNs from public records or otherwise ensuring that the public does
not have access to the numbers. In some cases, the proposals would
apply to all SSN displays originally occurring after 3 years from the
date of their enactment. In other cases, the proposal calls for
redacting all SSNs that are routinely placed in a consistent and
predictable manner on a public record by the government entity, but it
would not require redacting SSNs that are found in varying places
throughout the record.
Agencies Are Considering Limiting Information Placed on the Internet:
To protect SSNs that the general public can access on the Internet,
some courts and government agencies are examining their policies to
decide whether SSNs should be made available on documents on their Web
sites. In our fieldwork, we heard many discussions of this issue,
which is particularly problematic for courts and recorders, who have a
responsibility to make large volumes of documents accessible to the
general public. On the one hand, officials told us placing their
records on the Internet would simply facilitate the general public's
ability to access the information. Furthermore, officials expressed
concern that placing documents on the Internet would remove the
natural deterrent of having to travel to the courthouse or recorder's
office to obtain personal information on individuals.
Again, we found examples where government entities are searching for
ways to strike a balance. For example, the Judicial Conference of the
United States recently released a statement on electronic case file
availability and Internet use in federal courts. They recommended that
documents in civil cases and bankruptcy cases should be made available
electronically, but SSNs contained in the documents should be
truncated to the last four digits. Also, we spoke to one county
recorder's office that had recently put many of its documents on their
web site, but had decided not to include categories of documents that
were known to contain SSNs. In addition, some states are taking action
to limit the display of SSNs on the Internet. Laws in Arizona and
Rhode Island prohibit the display of students' SSNs on the Internet.
Even though the incidence of SSNs on government Web sites is minimal
right now, some officials told us they were considering or were in the
process of making more documents available on the Internet. Without
some kind of forethought about the inherent risk posed by making SSNs
and other personal information available on the Internet, it is
possible that SSNs will become increasingly available to the general
public via the Internet.
Statewide Efforts Have Had Far-Reaching Effects:
The examples of efforts to limit the disclosure of SSNs cited above
stem from initiatives taken by certain offices within states or from
state laws that restrict specific types of SSN uses. By their nature,
these efforts are limited only to the specific offices or types of
use. However, efforts to protect individuals' privacy can be more far-
reaching when the initiatives are statewide. For example, in April
2000, the governor of Washington signed an executive order intended to
strengthen privacy protections for personal information held by state
agencies on the citizens, as well as ensure that state agencies comply
fully with state public disclosure and open government laws. Under
Washington's executive order, state agencies are required to protect
personal information to the maximum extent possible by (1) minimizing
the collection, retention, and release of personal information by the
state,(2) prohibiting the unauthorized sale of citizens' personal
information by state government, and (3) making certain that
businesses that contract with the state use personal information only
for the contract purposes and cannot keep or sell the information for
other purposes.
A number of actions to limit SSN use and display resulted from this
order. In response to the executive order, state agencies across
Washington reviewed their forms and documents on which SSNs appeared
and identified displays that were deemed unnecessary, that is,
displays where the appearance of the SSN on the document was not
deemed vital to the business of the agency. In these cases, agency
officials removed the SSNs from the forms or documents. For example,
the state Department of Natural Resources removed SSNs from employee
performance evaluation notices and worklists, individual employee
training profiles, and employee exit questionnaire forms. Officials
told us that they have also discontinued requiring SSNs on leave
requests, travel reimbursements, and training forms. The Washington
Office of the Attorney General deleted SSNs from training and
attendance forms, personnel questionnaires, employee separation forms,
flexiplace work schedule forms, and others. In addition, the
Washington Department of Labor and Industries separated information in
personnel files that may be reviewed by supervisors from payroll
documents. In addition, private information, such as SSNs, is being
redacted from employee documents that can be viewed by others, and
applicants for jobs in a county we visited are not required to provide
their SSN until they are offered a job.
Washington agencies also changed the format of certain public records
to limit the disclosure of SSNs. For example, the SSN and other
personal information are only included on the back of the marriage
certificate form, which is not supposed to be copied or given to the
general public. In certain Washington courts, SSNs and other personal
information required in family law cases must be written on a separate
form from the rest of the court document, and this form is then kept
in a restricted access file. This means that the public does not have
access to the information, and internal access is limited to judges,
commissioners, other court personnel, and certain state administrative
agencies that administer family law programs. Anyone else requesting
access to these case records must petition the court and make a
showing of good cause as to why access should be granted.
Agencies for Washington state also reviewed and certified all
contracts involving data sharing as having appropriate requirements to
prevent and detect contractors' unauthorized SSN use. In fact, we were
told of one case where the Washington state Department of Licensing
monitored a contractor's compliance with maintaining the privacy of
personal information by, in part, providing the contractor with
certain easily identifiable information that other entities did not
have. By tracing the flow if this information, officials discovered
that the contractor had improperly disclosed personal information and
terminated the contract.
Minnesota is another example of a state where action on the state
level, in this case in the form of a law, has made a difference in how
SSNs are treated in public records. The Minnesota Government Data
Practices Act, which predates the federal Privacy Act, regulates the
handling of all government data that are created, collected, received,
or released by a state entity, political subdivision, or statewide
system, no matter what form the data are in, or how they are stored or
used. Referred to as the nation's first privacy act, Minnesota's
statute regulates what information can be collected, who can see or
have copies of the information, and civil penalties for violation of
the act. Minnesota uses a detailed approach to classifying data as not
public. One statutory provision specifically classifies SSNs collected
by state and local government agencies as not public. As a result of
this law, individuals must be informed either orally or in writing of
their privacy rights whenever the state collects sensitive information
about them. In addition, individuals filing a civil court document can
either put their personal information on a separate form or submit two
copies of the document, only one of which contains SSNs. The
information containing SSNs is then filed separately from the rest of
the court document and is not open to the general public.
Neither state tracked costs for making changes to better protect
personal information, such as SSNs. Generally, state officials
reported that the costs for implementing the initiative in Washington
and carrying out the state statute in Minnesota are absorbed in the
cost of the states' overall operations.
Conclusions:
SSNs are widely used in all levels of government and play a central
role in how government entities conduct their business. As unique
identifiers, SSNs are used to help make record keeping more efficient
and are most useful when government entities share information about
individuals with others outside their organization. The various
benefits from sharing data help ensure that government agencies
fulfill their mission and meet their obligation to the taxpayer by,
for example, making sure that the programs serve only those eligible
for services.
However, as governments enjoy the benefits from using SSNs, they are
not consistently safeguarding this personal information. They are not
consistently providing individuals with required information about how
their numbers will be used, thus depriving SSN holders of the basis to
make a fully informed decision about whether to provide their SSN. Nor
do governments have in place uniform information systems security
measures. This suggests that these numbers and other sensitive
information are at risk for improper disclosure and that more can be
done to implement practices to help protect them. Further, when
government agencies display the SSN on documents, such as employee
identification badges and benefit eligibility cards, that are viewed
by others who may not have a need for this personal information, the
agency displaying the SSN increases the risk that the number may be
improperly obtained and misused. In some cases, the risk for misuse
may outweigh any benefit of its display.
Safeguarding SSNs in public records offers an even greater challenge
because of the inherent tension between the nature of public records,
that is, the need for transparency in government activities, and the
need to protect individuals' privacy. Plans to bring public records on-
line and make them available over the Internet add urgency to this
issue. Although the on-line access to such records will greatly
increase convenience for those members of the public who use them,
personal information like SSNs that is contained in some of these
records will also be made readily available to the public. Addressing
the issues of whether the traditional rules of public access should
apply to electronic records, particularly those found on the Internet,
is both urgent and vital. Without policies specifying ways to
safeguard SSNs on the Internet, the potential for compromising
individuals' privacy and the potential for SSN misuse will increase
significantly.
Further, although improving safeguards for government use of SSNs and
other personal information is important, even the most successful
efforts by government agencies cannot eliminate the risk to
individuals that their SSNs will be misused because SSNs are so widely
used in the private sector as well. Any effort to significantly reduce
the risk of improper disclosure and misuse of SSNs would require added
safeguards and limits on private sector use and display of the SSN as
well. Nonetheless, measures to protect privacy by public sector
entities could at least help minimize the risk of misuse.
Under current law, weaknesses in the safeguards applied to SSNs can be
more readily addressed in the federal government than in the state and
local governments. Federal laws lay out a framework for information
systems security programs to help protect sensitive information
overall. More specific to the SSN, the Privacy Act places broad
restrictions on federal government use and disclosure of personal
information such as the SSN. Improved federal implementation of these
requirements can be accomplished within current law.
On the state and local level, the Privacy Act does have a provision
that applies to state and local governments albeit more limited than
the requirements on the federal government. This requirement”that all
levels of government provide certain information to SSN holders, such
as how their SSNs will be used”is not consistently applied. However,
strengthening enforcement of this provision of the act, while
important, will not address the more basic protection issues related
to information security and public display. Doing so by mandating
stronger state and local government safeguards for such personal
information as the SSN, however, confronts questions of jurisdiction
and policy that are beyond the scope of this report. Nonetheless, such
questions should be addressed quickly, before public sector
information is compromised and before public records become fully
electronic. Accordingly, we are making recommendations to OMB to help
strengthen safeguards in federal agencies, and we are presenting a
matter for congressional consideration to facilitate intergovernmental
collaboration in strengthening safeguards at the state and local
levels.
Recommendations:
The Privacy Act and other federal laws prescribe actions federal
departments and agencies must take to assure the security of SSNs and
other personal information. Because these requirements may not be
uniformly observed, we recommend that the administrator, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB, direct federal agencies to
review their practices for securing SSNs and providing required
information. As part of this effort, agencies should also review their
practices for displaying SSNs.
To better inform state and local governments of their responsibilities
under section 7 of the Privacy Act, we recommend that the
administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB,
direct his staff to augment the Privacy Act guidance by specifically
noting that section 7 applies to all federal, state and local
government agencies that request SSNs, or take other appropriate steps.
To address SSN security and display issues in state and local
government and in public records, including those maintained by the
judicial branch of government at all levels, the Congress may wish to
convene, in consultation with the president, a representative group of
federal, state and local officials including, for example, state
attorneys general, county recorders, and state and local chief
information officers, selected members of the Congress, and state or
local elected officials, to develop a unified approach to safeguarding
SSNs used in all levels of government and particularly those displayed
in public records. This approach could include recommendations for
congressional consideration. GAO could assist in identifying
representative participants and in convening the group.
Agency Comments:
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the director of
OMB and the commissioner of SSA or their designees. We also requested
that other officials review the technical accuracy of their respective
agency or entity activities discussed in the draft, and we
incorporated their changes where appropriate.
SSA officials informed us that they would not provide written comments
on the draft because the report does not make recommendations to the
agency and comments were not required. However, we were told that the
deputy commissioner shares the concerns expressed in the report and
agrees with the conclusions.
We did not receive written comments from the OMB director; however,
other OMB officials provided us oral comments on the draft. They
generally agreed with our recommendation that OMB direct federal
agencies to review their practices for securing SSNs and providing the
required information. In regard to our recommendation that OMB augment
Privacy Act guidance or take other appropriate steps to better inform
state and local governments of their responsibilities under section 7
of the Act, OMB officials told us that they are unsure of the need for
additional OMB guidance in this area. They indicated that guidance on
section 7 already exists in a publicly-available format on the Justice
Department's Web site. In addition, they believe the section 7
provision is quite short and appears to be fairly self-explanatory. As
the guidance in the Justice Web site indicates, some interpretive
issues have arisen in litigation; however, OMB officials said the
Justice guidance readily explains those issues. In addition, they
said, the report does not indicate substantive areas where additional
interpretive guidance is needed. However, they noted that the report
does suggest that state and local officials may not be aware of
section 7 provisions. In that case, they said increasing awareness of
these legal requirements may warrant further consideration.
Accordingly, OMB plans to consider, in consultation with other federal
agencies, options for increasing state and local officials' awareness
on this subject.
Although OMB correctly points out that the overview of the Privacy Act
on the Department of Justice Web site refers to the requirements of
section 7, we believe our finding that a significant percentage of
state and local agencies reported they do not routinely provide
individuals with the information required under section 7 supports the
need for additional action. We agree that state and local officials
may not be aware of section 7 requirements, and we believe there is a
need to increase the awareness both of state and local officials
administering the programs and of those monitoring compliance at the
state and local levels. Because OMB is the federal agency responsible
for assisting with and overseeing the implementation of the Privacy
Act, we believe it should take the lead on increasing state and local
awareness of section 7. However, we recognize that OMB's role with
respect to state and local governments is limited and support the
agency's idea to act in consultation with other federal agencies to
take other steps it deems appropriate to accomplish this increased
awareness.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Jo Anne B.
Barnhart, commissioner of SSA, Mr. Mitchell E. Daniels Jr., the
director of OMB, and others who are interested. Copies will also be
made available to others upon request.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
call me on (202) 512-7215. The major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Barbara D. Bovbjerg:
Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To complete the objectives for this assignment, we used a combination
of in-depth interviews, site visits, and mail surveys. To gain a
preliminary understanding of how governments use and protect SSNs and
to help design our survey and site-visit questions, we met with a
number of government agencies, associations, and privacy experts. At
the federal level, we interviewed officials from OMB, the Office of
Personnel Management, SSA, and the FTC. At the state level, we
interviewed officials from the National Governors Association, the
National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers, and Treasurers,
the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, the National
Conference of State Legislatures, and the National Association of
State Chief Information Officers, which represents state chief
information officers, and the state of Maryland. At the county level,
we interviewed officials from the National Association of County
Election Officials, Clerks, and Recorders, the National Association of
Counties, and Fairfax and Fauquier Counties, Virginia. We also met
with or contacted officials/organizations regarded as experts in the
privacy area, which included a privacy consultant and an official from
the Privacy Journal. In addition, we reviewed published reports and
studies on SSN use and privacy issues.
To gain an understanding of the requirements for both using and
protecting SSNs, we reviewed pertinent federal legislation, federal
guidance and directives regarding the use and handling of SSNs and
other personal information, GAO reports, and various studies of state
SSN use and privacy laws. To develop our criteria for assessing the
actions government agencies take to protect SSNs, we drew from
applicable federal laws, primarily the Government Information Security
Reform provisions of the Fiscal Year 2001 Defense Authorization Act,
OMB Circular A-130 and other guidance, and the Federal Information
System Controls Audit Manual that specifies guidelines for federal
agencies to safeguard sensitive information stored in computer
systems. We also drew from our work on best practices used by private
companies and public sector organizations identified in our Executive
Guide: Information Security Management, Learning From Leading
Organizations.[Footnote 49] Finally, we held a 1-day seminar on
innovative practices used by the private sector to protect sensitive
information. Attendees included officials from the Private Sector
Council and member firms, including Kaiser Permanente, a health care
provider; State Street Bank, a large commercial bank; and Allstate, an
insurance company.
Our surveys, site visits, and in depth interviews with officials of
targeted federal, state, and county programs focused on the following
areas: how SSNs are used (for both programmatic and personnel-related
purposes), how and why SSNs are shared with other entities (including
contractors), what information programs provide individuals when
agencies collect and use their SSNs, how agencies maintain and
safeguard SSNs and other personal data, and the cost for minimizing
use or implementing alternatives to using SSNs.
At the federal level, we surveyed all 14 cabinet-level agencies plus
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Small Business
Administration, SSA, and the federal court system. The latter three
agencies and the federal court system were added for breadth of
coverage to ensure that we covered regulatory agencies, independent
agencies, and courts.[Footnote 50] We asked that each agency identify
the five programs that maintain documents containing the SSNs of the
largest number of individuals and then asked representatives of those
programs to complete a questionnaire. To the extent that an agency had
a program whose primary purpose was to conduct research that used
records with individuals' SSNs as part of that research, we asked that
it be substituted for one of the five programs. Finally, we
distributed a different survey to agency personnel offices to
determine how agencies used and protected the SSNs of their employees.
The federal agency and the federal personnel questionnaires were each
pretested at least twice. Because we don't know how many programs
within the federal agencies we surveyed maintain records containing
individuals' SSNs, we cannot calculate a response rate for the federal
agency questionnaire. In total, 58 federal programs, agencies, or
courts returned a completed questionnaire. Of the 18 federal agencies
to which we sent a questionnaire, 15 returned a completed
questionnaire for at least one program. We now know that one of the 18
agencies that received a questionnaire did not have any programs that
maintained records containing SSNs. In addition, 18 federal personnel
offices received our personnel questionnaire, and of those 15 returned
completed questionnaires, for a response rate of 83 percent.
At the state level, our work covered all 50 states and the District of
Columbia. In each state, we distributed the surveys to seven
preselected programs or functions that were identified by others as
likely to be ones that maintained documents containing the SSNs of the
largest number of individuals. These included the departments of (1)
human services, (2) health services and vital statistics, (3)
education, (4) labor and licensing, (5) judiciary, (6) public safety
and corrections, and (7) law enforcement.[Footnote 51] Finally, we
also surveyed each state's personnel office. The state department and
personnel questionnaires were each pretested twice. In total, 424
state programs or functions were mailed a questionnaire, and of those
307 returned completed questionnaires, for a response rate of 72
percent. In addition, of the 51 state personnel offices that were
mailed our state personnel questionnaire, 42 completed and returned
it, for a response rate of 82 percent.
At the local level, we selected 90 counties with the largest
populations in the nation as our focus. Our goal was to choose areas
with large numbers of persons that would be affected by the way local
government agencies handled SSNs. We again focused on those
preselected programs or functions that county officials reported as
ones that maintained documents containing the SSNs of the largest
number of individuals. These are, in general, the same programs or
functions that we focused on in the states; we also surveyed the
county clerk or recorder, which was identified as a place that
maintained a large number of records containing individuals' SSNs.
Finally, we surveyed each county's personnel office. The county
department and personnel questionnaires were each pretested twice. In
total, 488 county programs or functions were mailed a questionnaire,
and of those 344 returned completed questionnaires, for a response
rate of 70 percent. In addition, 90 county personnel offices were
mailed our county personnel questionnaire, and of those 64 completed
and returned it, for a response rate of 71 percent.
In-depth interviews and site visits to federal agencies, states, and
counties were used to supplement the survey data by providing more
detailed information on the uses of SSNs, reasons for their use, and
challenges encountered in protecting them. Interviews and site visits
for federal programs were selected based on breadth of coverage, novel
or innovative steps to protect SSNs, and special interest by the
requestors. We conducted in-depth interviews with officials from the
(1) Federal Court System - Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts;
(2) Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; (3) Department of
Education's Student Financial Assistance; (4) Department of Housing
and Urban Development's Low Income Housing Programs; (5) DOD
Commissaries; and (6) the U.S. Marshals Service. At the state level,
we conducted site visits to the states of Texas, Washington, and
Minnesota. We selected these states because their legal framework and
practices regarding the openness of government records and the privacy
of individuals varied. Texas has a strong open records tradition;
Washington state has an executive order in place that has serves to
limit the availability of certain personal information; and Minnesota
has a privacy law that also serves to limit the availability of
certain types of information. At the county level, we conducted site
visits to Harris County, Texas; King County, Washington; and Aitkin
County in Minnesota.[Footnote 52] We visited counties located in
states we selected for site visits to help us understand how state
policy affects local practices. Also, we selected Aitkin County,
Minnesota to gain the perspectives of a smaller rural county. During
our site visits, we met with officials from the departments or
agencies that were considered heavy users of SSNs. We also met on two
occasions with a group of county clerks and recorders
from urban and smaller rural counties.
To provide information on the role of government use of SSNs in
identity theft, we incorporated information provided by GAO's Tax
Administration and Justice group, which was obtained as part of a
broader effort to describe the prevalence and cost of identity
theft.[Footnote 53] The information we used from that effort is based
on interviews with and documentation provided by the FTC, SSA's Office
of Inspector General, IRS, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Secret Service, and credit bureaus among others.
We performed our work at SSA headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland; at
Maryland state offices in Annapolis, Maryland; Washington D.C.; and at
selected locations including Austin, Texas; Harris County, Texas;
Olympia, Washington; King County, Washington; St. Paul Minnesota; and
Aitkin County Minnesota. We conducted our work between February 2001
and March 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Federal Laws That Restrict SSN Disclosure:
The following federal laws establish a framework for restricting SSN
disclosure:
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552) - This act
establishes a presumption that records in the possession of agencies
and departments of the executive branch of the federal government are
accessible to the people. FOIA, as amended, provides that the public
has a right of access to federal agency records, except for those
records that are protected from disclosure by nine stated exemptions.
One of these exemptions allows the federal government to withhold
information about individuals in personnel and medical files and
similar files when the disclosure would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. According to Department of
Justice guidance, agencies should withhold SSNs under this FOIA
exemption. This statute does not apply to state and local governments.
The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a) - The act regulates federal
government agencies' collection, maintenance, use and disclosure of
personal information maintained by agencies in a system of records.
[Footnote 54] The act prohibits the disclosure of any record contained
in a system of records unless the disclosure is made on the basis of a
written request or prior written consent of the person to whom the
records pertains, or is otherwise authorized by law. The act
authorizes 12 exceptions under which an agency may disclose
information in its records. However, these provisions do not apply to
state and local governments, and state law varies widely regarding
disclosure of personal information in state government agencies'
control. There is one section of the Privacy Act, section 7, that does
apply to state and local governments. Section 7 makes it unlawful for
federal, state, and local agencies to deny an individual a right or
benefit provided by law because of the individual's refusal to
disclose his SSN. This provision does not apply (1) where federal law
mandates disclosure of individuals' SSNs or (2) where a law existed
prior to January 1, 1975 requiring disclosure of SSNs, for purposes of
verifying the identity of individuals, to federal, state or local
agencies maintaining a system of records existing and operating before
that date. Section 7 also requires federal, state and local agencies,
when requesting SSNs, to inform the individual (1) whether disclosure
is voluntary or mandatory, (2) by what legal authority the SSN is
solicited, and (3) what uses will be made of the SSN. The act contains
a number of additional provisions that restrict federal agencies' use
of personal information. For example, an agency must maintain in its
records only such information about an individual as is relevant and
necessary to accomplish a purpose required by statute or executive
order of the president, and the agency must collect information to the
greatest extent practicable directly from the individual when the
information may result in an adverse determination about an
individual's rights, benefits and privileges under federal programs.
The Social Security Act Amendments of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
405(c)(2)(C)(viii)) - A provision of the Social Security Act bars
disclosure by federal, state and local governments of SSNs collected
pursuant to laws enacted on or after October 1, 1990. This provision
of the act also contains criminal penalties for "unauthorized willful
disclosures" of SSNs; the Department of Justice would determine
whether to prosecute a willful disclosure violation. Because the act
specifically cites willful disclosures, careless behavior or
inadequate safeguards may not be subject to criminal prosecution.
Moreover, applicability of the provision is further limited in many
instances because it only applies to disclosure of SSNs collected in
accordance with laws enacted on or after October 1, 1990. For SSNs
collected by government entities pursuant to laws enacted before
October 1, 1990, this provision does not apply and therefore, would
not restrict disclosing the SSN. Finally, because the provision
applies to disclosure of SSNs collected pursuant to laws requiring
SSNs, it is not clear if the provision also applies to disclosure of
SSNs collected without a statutory requirement to do so. This
provision applies to federal, state and local governmental agencies;
however, the applicability to courts is not clearly spelled out in the
law.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Federal, State, and County Departments That Reported
Maintaining Public Records With SSNs:
The following tables provide additional information on the types of
departments or agencies that reported maintaining records that are
routinely made available to the public and, of those, the ones that
reported that their public records contained SSNs.
Table 7: Number of Programs within Federal Agencies That Responded to
Our Survey and Maintain Public Records, Identify SSNs on Those Public
Records, and Permit Access to Those Records on Their Web Sites:
All federal programs:
Maintain public records: Yes: 26;
Maintain public records: No: 31;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 7;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 18;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 3;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 4.
Agriculture:
Maintain public records: Yes: 1;
Maintain public records: No: 3;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 0;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 1;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 0.
Commerce:
Maintain public records: Yes: 0;
Maintain public records: No: 1;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 0;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 0.
Defense:
Maintain public records: Yes: 1;
Maintain public records: No: 2;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 0;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 1;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 0.
Education:
Maintain public records: Yes: 2;
Maintain public records: No: 3;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 0;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 2;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 0.
Health Human Services:
Maintain public records: Yes: 0;
Maintain public records: No: 2;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 0;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 0.
Housing Urban Development:
Maintain public records: Yes: 2;
Maintain public records: No: 3;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 0;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 2;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 0.
Interior:
Maintain public records: Yes: 2;
Maintain public records: No: 2;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 1;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 1;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 1;
Justice:
Maintain public records: Yes: 0;
Maintain public records: No: 5;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 0;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 0.
Labor:
Maintain public records: Yes: 4;
Maintain public records: No: 1;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 0;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 4;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 0.
Transportation:
Maintain public records: Yes: 1;
Maintain public records: No: 3;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 0;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 1;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 1.
Treasury:
Maintain public records: Yes: 3;
Maintain public records: No: 1;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 1;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 2;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 1.
Veterans Administration:
Maintain public records: Yes: 2;
Maintain public records: No: 1;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 1;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 1;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 1.
Small Business Administration:
Maintain public records: Yes: 2;
Maintain public records: No: 2;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 0;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 2;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 0.
Social Security Administration:
Maintain public records: Yes: 3;
Maintain public records: No: 2;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 1;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 1;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 1.
Federal Court System:
Maintain public records: Yes: 3;
Maintain public records: No: 0;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 3;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 3;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 0.
Source: GAO survey of federal agencies.
[End of table]
Table 8: Number and Type of State Departments and Agencies That
Maintain Public Records, Identify SSNs on Those Public Records, and
Permit Access to Those Records on Their Web Sites:
All state departments:
Maintain public records: Yes: 241;
Maintain public records: No: 36;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 75;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 145;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 2;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 70[A].
State Courts:
Maintain public records: Yes: 26;
Maintain public records: No: 5;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 19;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 5;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 17[A].
State Law Enforcement:
Maintain public records: Yes: 26;
Maintain public records: No: 3;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 8;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 16;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 8.
State Human Services:
Maintain public records: Yes: 31;
Maintain public records: No: 4;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 8;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 20;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 8.
State Health & Vital Statistics:
Maintain public records: Yes: 28;
Maintain public records: No: 4;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 7;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 17;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 7.
State Labor:
Maintain public records: Yes: 31;
Maintain public records: No: 6;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 7;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 23;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 1;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 6.
State Licensing:
Maintain public records: Yes: 7;
Maintain public records: No: 0;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 2;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 5;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 2.
State Education (K-12):
Maintain public records: Yes: 38;
Maintain public records: No: 4;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 11;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 23;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 1;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 9.
State Education (Higher Education):
Maintain public records: Yes: 14;
Maintain public records: No: 5;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 1;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 12;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 1.
State Public Safety:
Maintain public records: Yes: 25;
Maintain public records: No: 5;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 7;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 15;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 7.
State Corrections:
Maintain public records: Yes: 34;
Maintain public records: No: 4;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 12;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 18;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 12.
[A] One state entity indicated a "not applicable" response because it
did not have a Web site.
Source: GAO survey of state agencies.
[End of table]
Table 9: Number and Type of County Departments and Agencies that
Maintain Public Records, Identify SSNs on Those Records, and Permit
Access to Those records on Their Web Sites:
All county departments:
Maintain public records: Yes: 251;
Maintain public records: No: 46;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 119;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 116;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 11;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 105[A].
Social Services:
Maintain public records: Yes: 35;
Maintain public records: No: 24;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 13;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 19;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 13.
Health Department:
Maintain public records: Yes: 43;
Maintain public records: No: 9;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 10;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 31;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 10.
County Sheriff:
Maintain public records: Yes: 55;
Maintain public records: No: 7;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 21;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 28;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0; ;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 20[A].
Court Clerks:
Maintain public records: Yes: 39;
Maintain public records: No: 3;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 30;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 7;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 2;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 28.
County Recorders:
Maintain public records: Yes: 61;
Maintain public records: No: 2;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 43;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 15;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 9;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 32.
Superintendent of Schools:
Maintain public records: Yes: 18;
Maintain public records: No: 1;
Public records identify SSNs: Yes: 2;
Public records identify SSNs: No: 16;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: Yes: 0;
Public has access to records with SSNs via Web site: No: 2.
[A] Two county departments answered "not applicable" because the
departments did not have a Web site.
Source: GAO survey of county agencies.
[End of table]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Kay Brown (202) 512-3674:
Jacquelyn Stewart (202) 512-7232:
Staff Acknowledgments:
The following team members contributed to all aspects of this report
throughout the review: Lindsay Bach, Jeff Bernstein, Jacqueline Harpp,
Daniel Hoy, Raun Lazier, James Rebbe, Vernette Shaw, and Anne Welch.
In addition, Richard Burkard, Patrick Dibattista, Joel Grossman, Debra
Johnson, Carol Langelier, Minette Richardson, Robert Rivas, Ron Salo,
Rich Stana, and William Thompson also made contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] We found no commonly accepted definition of public records. For
the purposes of this report, when we use the term public record, we
are referring to a record or document that is routinely made available
to the public for inspection either by a federal, state, or local
government agency or a court, such as those readily available at a
public reading room, clerk's office, or on the Internet.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Social Security: Government and
Commercial Use of the Social Security Number is Widespread,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/HEHS-99-28] (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 16, 1999).
[3] We did not survey state Departments of Motor Vehicles or state
agencies that administer state tax programs because we have reported
on these activities separately. Nor did we focus on the requirements
for the use and dissemination of taxpayer information because they are
distinct from many of the requirements covered in this report. See
U.S. General Accounting Office, Child Support Enforcement: Most States
Collect Drivers' SSNs and Use Them to Enforce Child Support,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-239] (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 15, 2002) and Taxpayer Confidentiality: Federal, State, and Local
Agencies Receiving Taxpayer Information, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-GGD-99-164] (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
30, 1999).
[4] In this review, we do not include criminal provisions that might
apply to the improper use of SSNs.
[5] The Social Security Act of 1935 created the Social Security Board,
which was renamed the Social Security Administration in 1946.
[6] Biometric identification uses automated methods of recognizing a
person based on a physiological or behavioral characteristic including
fingerprints, speech, face, retina, iris, handwritten signature, hand
geometry, and wrist veins.
[7] United States Sentencing Commission, Identity Theft Final Alert
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 1999).
[8] This information is based on a review of 39 cases involving SSN
theft drawn from the Federal Trade Commission's fiscal year 1998 data
files.
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Identity Theft: Prevalence and
Cost Appear to be Growing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-363] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1,
2002).
[10] A fraud alert is a warning that someone may be using the
consumer's personal information to fraudulently obtain credit. When a
fraud alert is placed on a consumer's credit card file, it advises
credit grantors to conduct additional identity verification before
granting credit. The third consumer reporting agency offers fraud
alerts that can vary from 2 to 7 years at the discretion of the
individual.
[11] For example, the Internal Revenue Code, which requires the use of
SSNs for certain purposes, declares tax return information, including
SSNs, to be confidential, limits access to specific organizations, and
prescribes both civil and criminal penalties for unauthorized
disclosure. For more information, see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-GGD-99-164]. Also, the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 explicitly restricts
the use of SSNs to purposes set out in the Act, such as locating
absentee parents to collect child support payments.
[12] These provisions supplement information security requirements
established in the federal Computer Security Act of 1987, the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, and
Office of Management and Budget guidance.
[13] SSI provides cash assistance to needy individuals who are aged,
blind, or disabled.
[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, Supplemental Security Income:
Incentive Payments Have Reduced Benefit Overpayments to Prisoners,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/HEHS-00-2] (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 22, 1999).
[15] TANF was created by the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. The program has been
implemented in the form of block grants to states and is designed to
help low-income families with children reduce their reliance on
welfare and move toward economic independence.
[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, Benefit and Loan Programs:
Improved Data Sharing Could Enhance Program Integrity, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/HEHS-00-119] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
13, 2000).
[17] The Department of Health and Human Services' National Directory
of New Hires is a national database containing new hire and wage data
from every state and federal agency and unemployment insurance data
from state unemployment security agencies. This directory was mandated
by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 to help enforce child support obligations. At a minimum, the
database includes the individual's name, address, and SSN, as well as
the employer's name, address, and identification number. This data is
also used for various program enforcement purposes by a limited number
of state and federal agencies.
[18] Census is authorized by statute to collect a variety of
information, and the Bureau is also prohibited from making it
available, except in certain circumstances.
[19] In some cases, records containing SSNs are sometimes matched
across multiple agency or program databases. The statistical and
research communities refer to the process of matching records
containing SSNs for statistical or research purposes as "record
linkage." See U.S. General Accounting Office, Record Linkage and
Privacy: Issues in Creating New Federal Research and Statistical
Information, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-126SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2001).
[20] On the federal level, data sharing often involves computerized
record matching. The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of
1988, which amended the Privacy Act, specifies procedural safeguards
affecting agencies' use of Privacy Act records in performing certain
types of computerized matching program, including due process rights
for individuals whose records are being matched. These due process
rights were further clarified in the Computer Matching and Privacy
Protection Amendments of 1990.
[21] Section 7 of the Privacy Act is not codified with the rest of the
act, but rather is found in the note section to 5 U.S.C. 552a.
[22] The Department of Justice has on its Web site an overview of the
Privacy Act that references section 7. This information was prepared
in coordination with OMB.
[23] 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3).
[24] Of the 58 federal programs that responded to our survey, 39
reported that some portion of their records were covered by the
Privacy Act, 3 reported that no portion of their records were covered
by the act, and the remaining 16 agencies did not know if their
records were covered by the Privacy Act.
[25] Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, OMB is, however, responsible
for reviewing and approving all collections of information including
forms, surveys, telephonic requests, or various other formats used by
federal agencies when requesting SSNs and other information from an
SSN holder, state or local governments, and others. Thus the agency
also has this opportunity to influence the collection of SSNs.
[26] According to OMB officials, all federal agencies have an officer
responsible for implementing the Privacy Act.
[27] When federal agencies provide states with funding for specific
programs, they could include requirements that the entities
implementing the program comply with section 7 of the Privacy Act.
[28] Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Unt
v. Aerospace Corp, 765 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1981)). The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals covers California, Oregon, Washington, Arizona,
Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana
Islands.
[29] McKay v. Altobello, No. 96-3458, 1997 WL 266717 (E.D. La. May 16,
1997).
[30] Griedinger v. Davis, 782 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Va. 1992), reversed
and remanded on other grounds, 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir.1993).
[31] However, state auditors in one state told us that when programs
do not require an SSN, such as the Women, Infants, and Children
Program, it is more difficult to audit the program for compliance
because they have to rely on matching data on individuals using name,
address, and wage records to ensure that the appropriate people are
receiving services. They said this process is time consuming and is
not 100 percent accurate. They believe that the use of SSNs for the
program would speed up and improve the accuracy of data matches.
[32] See federal Government Information Security Reform provisions of
the fiscal year 2001 Defense Authorization Act, the federal Computer
Security Act of 1987, the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the Clinger-
Cohen Act of 1996, and OMB guidance.
[33] U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Information
Security Management, Learning From Leading Organizations, GAO/AIMD-98-
68 (Washington, D.C.: May 1998) reported on strategies used by private
and public organizations”a financial services corporation, a regional
utility, a state university, a retailer, a state agency, a nonbank
financial institution, a computer vendor, and an equipment
manufacturer”that were recognized as having strong information
security programs. The information security strategies discussed in
the report were only a part of the organizations' broader information
management strategies.
[34] States may also require any number of the eight practices, but
the requirements would vary from state to state.
[35] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security: Additional
Actions Needed to Fully Implement Reform Legislation, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-470T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6,
2002).
[36] Office of Management and Budget, FY 2001 Report to Congress on
Federal Government Information Security Reform (Washington, D.C.:
February 2002).
[37] OMB Memorandum 01-05 applies to federal data sharing activities
covered by the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act, as
amended. The covered activities are computer-matching for purposes
such as verifying program eligibility for federal benefits or
recovering delinquent debt. The memorandum states that federal
agencies should consider applying the concepts to other data sharing
arrangements.
[38] In some cases, where federal agencies administer programs that
provide federal funds to states and counties, the federal agency has
spelled out program-specific requirements for information security
that state and county government agencies are expected to follow when
they use federal funds to operate these programs.
[39] As of March 2002, the Navy Exchange System still requires SSNs on
checks. Officials told us they hope to implement a system similar to
the DOD Commissary by the end of 2002.
[40] SSNs are displayed on all licenses in one state, on all licenses
except where the driver has asked that they be omitted in nine states,
and only on licenses requested by the driver in 14 states.
[41] It varies from state to state as to whether certain records, such
as marriage licenses and birth certificates, are maintained in county
or state offices. Certain documents, however, such as land and title
transfers, are almost always maintained at the local, or county, level.
[42] Veterans are advised that these are important documents, which
can be registered/recorded in most states or localities for a nominal
fee making retrieval easy. In October 2001, DOD added a cautionary
statement that recording these documents could subject them to public
access in some states or localities.
[43] In some states, for example, adoption records, grand jury
records, and juvenile court records are not part of the public record.
In addition, some court documents pertinent to the cases may or may
not be in the public record, depending on local court practice.
Finally, the judge can choose to explicitly seal a record to protect
the information it contains from public review.
[44] Some jurisdictions also permit citizens to request public records
through the mail.
[45] Our surveys were mailed first in August 2001, and the last
surveys analyzed were received in March 2002.
[46] In other cases, the law requires that the SSN appear on the
document itself, as on death certificates.
[47] In these cases when the governmental office is not requesting
that the individual disclose his or her SSN, the receiving office is
not required to provide the individual with the information required
under section 7 of the Privacy Act.
[48] There are few appropriate vehicles available to notify large
segments of the public of this type of information. SSA has a public
education campaign and also sends a statement of earnings and
projected benefits to about 123 million people each year.
[49] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-98-68].
[50] Although the IRS uses and shares SSNs with a number of
governmental entities, we did not focus on the requirements for the
use and dissemination of taxpayer information because they are
distinct from many of the requirements covered in this report. See GGD-
99-164.
[51] We did not target state Departments of Motor Vehicles; instead we
incorporated information gathered by another GAO team studying SSN use
in these state agencies for child support enforcement efforts. See
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-239]. In addition, we
did not focus on state tax agencies because the requirements for
sharing taxpayer information are distinct from the other requirements
in this report.
[52] We also visited court officials at Anoka County, Minnesota.
[53] U.S. General Accounting Office, Identity Theft: Prevalence and
Cost Appear to be Growing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-363] (Washington D.C.: Mar. 1,
2002).
[54] The Privacy Act defines a system of records as a group of records
under the control of the agency from which information is retrieved by
the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or
other identifier assigned to the individual, such as an SSN.
[End of section]
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