Election Reform
Nine States' Experiences Implementing Federal Requirements for Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists Gao ID: GAO-06-247 February 7, 2006The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted in part to help ensure that only eligible persons are registered to vote. Under HAVA, as of January 1, 2004, states were to create computerized statewide voter registration lists to serve as official rosters of legally registered voters for elections for federal office. States, however, were given the option to seek a waiver to postpone implementation of HAVA provisions until 2006. All but nine states did so. This report discusses the experiences of the nine states that were subject to the original HAVA deadline--Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia. The report describes actions election officials in these states reported taking to meet specific HAVA requirements--as applicable to their states--for (1) establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists and (2) verifying the accuracy of information on voter registration applications and maintaining accurate computerized voter lists. GAO is also reporting what states said about challenges they faced and lessons learned implementing the requirements. Draft sections of this report were reviewed by the nine states; the Election Assistance Commission, which was responsible for coordinating HAVA waivers; and the Department of Justice. GAO incorporated technical comments, as appropriate.
To establish the HAVA-required registration lists, five states modified existing computerized statewide voter registration systems; one state replaced an older system with a new one; and two states created statewide voter registration systems for the first time, according to election officials. Officials from the ninth state reported no actions were taken because the state had such a registration list in place prior to HAVA. State election officials reported they took steps to verify information provided on voter registration applications and maintain their voter lists as required by HAVA. States either completed or were in the process of completing the required matches of voter registration information with state motor vehicle agency (MVA) or Social Security Administration (SSA) records. Officials from all nine states reported conducting the list maintenance activities required by HAVA: eliminating duplicate registrations and coordinating the voter list with state agency records on felons and the deceased to identify and remove the names of ineligible registrants. According to officials from four states, implementing HAVA improved the accuracy of the voter lists, for example, by correcting errors in voter information before they were entered into the statewide list. Officials from the other five states reported little to no improvements to the accuracy of their lists in part, some said, because they had established systems similar to those required by HAVA prior to the enactment of the law. State election officials reported they faced challenges and learned lessons while implementing the HAVA requirements. For example, officials from seven states reported their experiences taught them that collaborating with local officials to develop the computerized statewide systems later helped them successfully implement the systems.
GAO-06-247, Election Reform: Nine States' Experiences Implementing Federal Requirements for Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
February 2006:
Election Reform:
Nine States' Experiences Implementing Federal Requirements for
Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists:
GAO-06-247:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-247, a report to the Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted in part to help
ensure that only eligible persons are registered to vote. Under HAVA,
as of January 1, 2004, states were to create computerized statewide
voter registration lists to serve as official rosters of legally
registered voters for elections for federal office. States, however,
were given the option to seek a waiver to postpone implementation of
HAVA provisions until 2006. All but nine states did so.
This report discusses the experiences of the nine states that were
subject to the original HAVA deadline”Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia.
The report describes actions election officials in these states
reported taking to meet specific HAVA requirements”as applicable to
their states”for (1) establishing computerized statewide voter
registration lists and (2) verifying the accuracy of information on
voter registration applications and maintaining accurate computerized
voter lists. GAO is also reporting what states said about challenges
they faced and lessons learned implementing the requirements.
Draft sections of this report were reviewed by the nine states; the
Election Assistance Commission, which was responsible for coordinating
HAVA waivers; and the Department of Justice. GAO incorporated technical
comments, as appropriate.
What GAO Found:
To establish the HAVA-required registration lists, five states modified
existing computerized statewide voter registration systems; one state
replaced an older system with a new one; and two states created
statewide voter registration systems for the first time, according to
election officials (see below). Officials from the ninth state reported
no actions were taken because the state had such a registration list in
place prior to HAVA.
State election officials reported they took steps to verify information
provided on voter registration applications and maintain their voter
lists as required by HAVA. States either completed or were in the
process of completing the required matches of voter registration
information with state motor vehicle agency or Social Security
Administration records. Officials from all nine states reported
conducting the list maintenance activities required by HAVA:
eliminating duplicate registrations and coordinating the voter list
with state agency records on felons and the deceased to identify and
remove the names of ineligible registrants. According to officials from
four states, implementing HAVA improved the accuracy of the voter
lists, for example, by correcting errors in voter information before
they were entered into the statewide list. Officials from the other
five states reported little to no improvements to the accuracy of their
lists in part, some said, because they had established systems similar
to those required by HAVA prior to the enactment of the law.
State election officials reported they faced challenges and learned
lessons while implementing the HAVA requirements. For example,
officials from seven states reported their experiences taught them that
collaborating with local officials to develop the computerized
statewide systems later helped them successfully implement the systems.
States GAO Contacted Regarding Implementation of Required Registration
Lists:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-247.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr.,
at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Eight States Reported Taking Actions to Establish Computerized
Statewide Voter Registration Lists, and the Ninth Reported Having Such
a List Prior to HAVA:
States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Information on Registration
Applications and Maintain Lists, Improving the Accuracy of Some Lists:
State Election Officials Reported Numerous Challenges and Lessons
Learned while Implementing HAVA Requirements for Their Statewide Voter
Registration Lists:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: EAC and DOJ Roles in Implementing HAVA Statewide Voter
Registration List Provisions:
Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Alaska Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of Arizona Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
Appendix V: Reported Experiences of Georgia Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Hawaii Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Kentucky Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Minnesota Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
Appendix IX: Reported Experiences of South Carolina Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
Appendix X: Reported Experiences of South Dakota Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
Appendix XI: Reported Experiences of West Virginia Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Reported Type of Unique Identifying Number Collected or
Assigned by States to Implement HAVA Requirements:
Table 2: Reported Actions Taken by States to Implement HAVA-Required
Verification of Information on Voter Registration Applications by
Matching with MVA Records:
Table 3: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify
Duplicate Registration:
Table 4: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify Names
of Deceased Registrants:
Table 5: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify
Ineligible Felons:
Figures:
Figure 1: Overview of Verification and Maintenance Processes That Could
Be Implemented Using a Computerized Statewide Voter Registration
System:
Figure 2: Actions Nine States Reported Taking to Establish Computerized
Statewide Voter Registration Lists:
Abbreviations:
AAMVA: American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
EAC: Election Assistance Commission:
HAVA: Help America Vote Act:
HAVV: Help America Vote Verification:
MCD: minor civil decision:
MVA: motor vehicle agency:
NASED: National Association of State Election Directors:
NASS: National Association of Secretaries of State:
SSA: Social Security Administration:
VRAZ: Voter Registration Arizona:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
February 7, 2006:
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.:
Chairman:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Confidence in the electoral process to produce free and fair elections
is of the utmost importance to a legitimate democratic political
system. The basic goal of an election system is simple to state but not
simple to achieve--enable all eligible voters to register to vote, cast
their votes, and have those votes counted accurately. The Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted, in part, to help ensure that only
eligible persons are registered to vote.[Footnote 1] This law provides
that, among other things, as of January 1, 2004, states are to create
computerized statewide voter registration lists that serve as official
rosters of legally registered voters for elections for federal
office.[Footnote 2] Under this provision, most states are also to
verify the accuracy of information provided on voter registration
applications by matching it with information contained in the state
motor vehicle agency's (MVA) database or the Social Security
Administration's (SSA) records, as appropriate.[Footnote 3] In
addition, states are to perform list maintenance on statewide voter
lists by coordinating them on a regular basis with state records on
felony status and deaths, in order to identify and remove names of
ineligible voters.
Under HAVA, states could apply to the Election Assistance Commission
(EAC) by January 1, 2004, for a waiver, postponing the effective
implementation date of the statewide voter registration list
requirement for 2 years until January 1, 2006.[Footnote 4] All but nine
states exercised the waiver option. The nine states that were to
implement the HAVA requirements described above, by the original 2004
deadline were Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota,
South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia. This report discusses
the experiences of these nine states as they implemented these HAVA
requirements, in particular, the actions that state election officials
reported taking to (1) establish computerized statewide voter
registration lists and (2) verify the accuracy of information on voter
registration applications and maintain accurate computerized voter
lists. In addition, we report what states told us regarding (3) the
challenges they faced and lessons they learned while implementing these
requirements.
In addition to this report, we have issued or plan to issue reports
this year on other specific election issues. These reports, as did our
earlier work issued in 2001,[Footnote 5] in general focus on the
people, processes, and technology associated with the preparation for
and administration of elections. Specifically, in June 2005, we issued
a report on the efforts of selected state and local election officials
in seven states to ensure that voter registration lists are
accurate.[Footnote 6] In September 2005, we issued two reports, one on
the efforts of selected local election officials in these same seven
states on managing voter registration and ensuring eligible citizens
can vote[Footnote 7] and the other on significant security and
reliability concerns that have been identified for electronic voting
systems.[Footnote 8] Later this year, we plan to issue a report on the
Department of Defense's implementation of the Federal Voting Assistance
Program to facilitate absentee voting by military personnel during the
November 2004 election. These reports respond to congressional requests
made prior to the November 2004 election. In addition, we are
undertaking a broader, more comprehensive review of election
administration processes related to the November 2004 general election.
This comprehensive study, which we plan to issue in 2006, will address
activities and challenges--people, processes, and technology--
associated with each major stage of election administration to include
registration, absentee and early voting, election day preparation and
activities, and vote counting and certification.
To meet our objectives for this report, we conducted structured
telephone interviews with state election officials in each of the nine
states. We also interviewed officials with and obtained documents from
the EAC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division,
which is responsible for enforcing parts of HAVA. In addition, we
reviewed relevant state and federal laws.
We did not independently verify the responses to questions posed to
state officials during our telephone interviews. However, state
election officials were provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy
of their responses for this report. We also provided relevant sections
of the report to EAC and DOJ officials to verify the accuracy of the
information they provided. Appendix I provides a more detailed
description of our scope and methodology.
We conducted our work from January 2005 through December 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Officials from eight of the nine states reported taking a variety of
actions in order to establish the HAVA-required computerized voter
registration lists; an official from one state, Kentucky, reported no
actions were taken because, according to the official, prior to HAVA,
the state had a system in place that met the HAVA requirements. With
regard to the other states, officials from Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii,
South Carolina, and South Dakota reported they had computerized
statewide voter registration systems in place prior to January 2004
that they modified in order to implement the HAVA requirements;
officials from Minnesota said their state replaced rather than modified
the computerized voter registration system it had in place prior to
HAVA. Officials from Arizona and West Virginia said their states did
not have computerized statewide voter registration lists in place prior
to HAVA and created them for the first time to implement the law.
Additionally, election officials from all states except Alaska, where
state officials are responsible for maintaining the statewide voter
registration list, told us that their states provided some form of
support to local election officials to ensure that they could operate
the computerized statewide voter registration system to enter and
update voter registration information.
State election officials reported taking the steps required by HAVA to
verify information provided on voter registration applications and
maintain their voter lists, and some officials reported the accuracy of
the voter lists improved as a result. The steps states took depended on
what HAVA provisions applied to them. Of the states we reviewed,
Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and West Virginia were
subject to the HAVA provision for verifying information provided on
voter registration applications by matching it with SSA and MVA
records. These states were in various stages of implementing the
requirement, officials told us. At the time of our review, four of
these five states were matching information with MVA databases, and two
states--Arizona and South Dakota--were matching information with SSA
records, according to officials. Alaska, Minnesota, and West Virginia
officials said they were in the process of making arrangements with SSA
to conduct matches. The requirement to verify information on voter
registration applications by matching it with MVA and SSA records, in
general, is optional for states that collect voters' full Social
Security numbers on these applications.[Footnote 9] Of the states we
reviewed, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina fall into this
category; officials from Hawaii reported their state voluntarily
matched information on registration applications with MVA records.
Officials from all nine states also reported conducting the list
maintenance activities required by HAVA; all of the state officials
said their states eliminate duplicate registrations and coordinate the
voter list with other state records to identify and remove names of
deceased voters and persons ineligible under state law to register to
vote because of their felony status. Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota,
and West Virginia officials said that implementing the HAVA
requirements led to some or great improvement in the accuracy of their
voter lists by reducing duplicate registrations or improving the
quality of voter information before it was entered into the statewide
voter list. Officials from the remaining states--Alaska, Georgia,
Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina--reported that HAVA had little or
no effect on the accuracy of their voter lists. This result likely
occurred, some of these officials said, because their states had
operated computerized statewide lists for many years prior to HAVA.
While HAVA contains requirements directed at maintaining accurate voter
registration lists, even after such requirements are implemented,
maintaining accurate computerized lists will likely remain a
challenging task for state and local officials. In part this is because
of the inherent risks of managing a dynamic body of information that is
constantly changing as voters move, change names, come of age to vote,
or become ineligible to vote.
Creating statewide registration lists required by HAVA presented a
number of challenges and lessons learned, officials told us, as they
developed their computerized statewide voter registration systems, made
them operational, and later managed them. Election officials from
Minnesota and West Virginia said that, for example, they adopted
project timelines as they developed their systems that they later found
were too compressed. Officials from Arizona, Minnesota, and West
Virginia observed that completing the time-consuming task of converting
existing voter registration data, which often were inaccurate and
needed to be corrected, from old voter registration systems to the new
statewide systems was a challenge. Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky,
South Dakota, and West Virginia officials also told us that as they
developed their computerized systems, they learned that collaborating
with local officials to design and develop the systems was important to
the states' ultimate successful implementation of the systems.
Officials also shared challenges and lessons learned related to making
their systems operational. For example, some officials also told us
they learned that prior to putting their systems into service, it is
important to train staff to use the new system, and officials from
Minnesota suggested providing the training manual online to make the
most recent information available to staff. State officials also shared
challenges and learned lessons from managing the computerized systems.
For example, Hawaii officials said one challenge they faced was
updating voter information and using their computerized system at the
same time. Hawaii and Kentucky officials suggested officials keep in
mind that selecting future upgrades to the system will likely involve
negotiations with local jurisdictions that may have competing needs or
administrative and technical constraints.
Background:
As election officials manage voter registration processes and voter
lists, they must balance two competing goals. On the one hand,
officials seek to minimize the burden on eligible people registering to
vote. On the other hand, they also seek to ensure that the voter lists
are accurate, a task that involves including the name of each eligible
voter on the voter list, removing names of ineligible voters, and
having safeguards in place so that names of voters are not removed in
error from the list.
Congress has passed legislation relating to the administration of both
federal and state elections, pursuant to its various constitutional
powers, including processes related to maintaining voter lists. The
constitutional framework for elections contemplates both state and
federal roles. States are responsible for the administration of both
their own elections and federal elections. States regulate various
aspects of the election process, including, for example, ballot access,
registration procedures, absentee voting requirements, establishment of
polling places, provision of election day workers, and counting and
certifying the vote. The states in turn incur the costs associated with
these activities. Although the states are responsible for running
elections, Congress has authority to affect the administration of
elections. Congress' authority to regulate elections depends upon the
type of election. With regard to federal elections, Congress has
constitutional authority over both congressional and presidential
elections. In addition, with respect to federal, state, and local
elections, a number of constitutional amendments authorize Congress to
enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory acts.
Most recently, HAVA was enacted in 2002, and among other things,
mandated that each state establish a computerized statewide voter
registration list to serve as the official voter registration list for
conducting elections for federal office in each state.[Footnote 10] The
voter registration list is to serve as a secure, centralized, and
interactive database that is coordinated with other state agency
databases and grants state and local election officials immediate
electronic access to enter and update voter information. States and
territories were to implement a computerized statewide voter
registration database by January 1, 2004. States could apply to EAC by
January 1, 2004, for a waiver of the effective date until January 1,
2006. Nine states and one territory--Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia, and
Guam--did not apply for a waiver.
States subject to HAVA must also take steps to ensure that the
statewide voter registration lists are accurate. Under HAVA, states are
to perform list maintenance on a regular basis by removing ineligible
voters from the statewide voter list. States are to coordinate the
computerized list with their state agencies' records on felony status
and death to verify voters' eligibility. For example, states must cross-
reference the voter registration list with their state's records on
felons to remove the names of ineligible voters and records on death to
remove deceased registrants. States are also required to remove
duplicate registrants, that is, names of voters that appear more than
once on the statewide voter list. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the
states' discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to
implement this list maintenance requirement.
In addition to undertaking list maintenance, states are required under
HAVA to verify voter registration application information. For federal
elections, a voter registration application may not be processed or
accepted by a state unless it contains the applicant's driver's license
number or the last four digits of the Social Security number.[Footnote
11] If the voter has neither of these numbers, the state must assign
the voter a voter identification number. Voter registration information
is to be matched with motor vehicle agency (MVA) records or Social
Security Administration (SSA) records, depending on the information
provided by the applicant. Certain state laws require applicants to
provide their full Social Security number on voter registration
applications. HAVA provides that for those states requiring full Social
Security numbers on such applications, in accordance with Section 7 of
the Privacy Act of 1974, the HAVA voter registration verification
requirements are optional. Of the nine states that did not receive
waivers, four--Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina--collect
the full Social Security number and, therefore, are not subject to this
HAVA requirement, according to state officials.
Under HAVA, the state MVA must enter into an agreement with SSA to
verify the applicant information when applicants provide the last four
digits of their Social Security number rather than a driver's license
number on voter registration applications. HAVA additionally requires
SSA to develop methods to verify the accuracy of information on the
voter registration applications by matching the name, date of birth,
and the last four digits of the Social Security number provided on the
voter registration application with SSA records. SSA is to determine
whether SSA records indicate the individual is deceased.
Figure 1 provides an example of how a computerized statewide voter
registration list could verify voter eligibility through matching
registration applications with MVA and SSA, matching the statewide list
with state records on felons and death notices from the state courts
and the state vital statistics agency, and identifying duplicate
registrants in the statewide list.[Footnote 12]
Figure 1: Overview of Verification and Maintenance Processes That Could
Be Implemented Using a Computerized Statewide Voter Registration
System:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
To assist states with implementing these federal mandates, HAVA
authorizes funding to states for the creation and maintenance of the
computerized statewide voter lists. In turn, HAVA requires states to
provide such support as may be required to local jurisdictions to
enable them to use the computerized voter list. HAVA also established
EAC and charged it with, among other things, providing voluntary
technical guidance on the administration of federal elections, serving
as a national clearinghouse for information on election administration,
and providing federal funding to the states to implement the HAVA
provisions. Also, DOJ has enforcement authority with respect to the
uniform and nondiscriminatory implementation of certain HAVA
requirements such as those relating to the statewide voter registration
list and verifying information on voter registration applications.
According to DOJ officials, following the passage of HAVA, it was
unnecessary to take enforcement actions against any of the nine
nonwaiver states. DOJ officials also reported working with the states
to address initial challenges and provide informal guidance while EAC
awaited staff and resources. Appendix II discusses EAC's and DOJ's
roles regarding computerized statewide voter registration lists in
greater detail.
Eight States Reported Taking Actions to Establish Computerized
Statewide Voter Registration Lists, and the Ninth Reported Having Such
a List Prior to HAVA:
Officials from eight of the nine states reported taking a variety of
actions in order to implement the HAVA computerized voter registration
list requirement; an official from one state, Kentucky, reported no
actions were taken because the state had such a system in place prior
to the enactment of HAVA. Officials from Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, South
Carolina, and South Dakota reported modifying their existing
computerized statewide voter registration systems; officials from
Minnesota said the existing computerized voter registration system was
replaced; and officials from Arizona and West Virginia said their
states created computerized statewide voter registration systems for
the first time. Although these eight states reported taking different
steps to establish computerized statewide voter registration systems,
election officials reported that all of these systems met the HAVA
provisions that called for computerized statewide voter registration
lists. According to officials, these computerized lists served as
centralized and interactive databases containing the names of all
legally registered voters in the state and granted election officials
immediate electronic access to query, update, and enter voter
information. They also said these computerized lists were capable of
generating official voter registration lists. Figure 2 summarizes the
actions that eight of the nine states reported taking to establish
computerized voter registration lists.
Figure 2: Actions Nine States Reported Taking to Establish Computerized
Statewide Voter Registration Lists:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Election officials from six states, Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky,
South Carolina, and South Dakota, said their states' existing
computerized statewide voter registration systems, in place in some
cases for many years prior to HAVA, allowed state and local election
officials to share and maintain an interactive database of registered
voters and generate official voter registration lists. As a result,
officials from Kentucky reported they were required to make no change
to their existing system to implement the HAVA requirements. Officials
from these other states reported that they were required to only modify
their existing systems, in some cases making only minor changes, in
order to implement HAVA. For example, in Hawaii, election officials
reported their state has operated a computerized statewide voter
registration system since 1982 and only made minor technical changes as
a result of HAVA, such as adding the ability to flag inactive voters.
In addition, since Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina
collect voters' full Social Security numbers on voter registration
applications, they are not subject to the HAVA provisions for verifying
information on voter registration applications by matching it with MVA
and SSA records, officials reported. Accordingly, officials said they
did not have to modify their existing systems to provide this matching
capability. Alaska and South Dakota are subject to HAVA's data matching
provisions. These states also had computerized statewide voter lists in
place prior to HAVA, and their election officials said they modified
them as a result of HAVA. Alaska election officials reported that they
added new data fields to the computerized statewide voter registration
system to capture the last four digits of the voters' Social Security
numbers and to identify first-time voters who registered by mail, which
required little or no effort.[Footnote 13] South Dakota election
officials reported making similar changes as well as adding the
capability to match voter registration applications with MVA and SSA
records, actions that required a moderate level of effort, they said.
In the three remaining states, officials reported creating new systems
in order to implement HAVA. Officials from Minnesota said their state
operated a computerized statewide voter registration system prior to
HAVA. Their state replaced rather than modified this system. Arizona
and West Virginia election officials reported that their states did not
have computerized statewide voter lists in place prior to HAVA and that
they expended a significant level of effort to create such systems.
Prior to HAVA, some counties and local jurisdictions in these states
had computerized voter registration systems in place. However, the
systems were not interconnected to create statewide databases of
legally registered voters. Election officials in Arizona said that
creating the computerized list was also complicated because state and
county election officials lacked the legal authority to access state
records they were to match with the statewide voter list. The state had
to pass new statutes and amend others so that election officials could
receive information from state agencies, such as felony records,
according to a senior election official.
Some officials told us that in addition to the capabilities required by
HAVA their states' computerized voter registration systems provide
election management tools that help them prepare for and conduct
elections. For example, West Virginia election officials told us their
computerized voter registration list is also able to identify voters
who wished to serve as poll workers and produce reports on absentee
ballots, early voters, poll workers, and election data statistics.
Minnesota state election officials said that their computerized voter
registration list includes a module that centrally tracks absentee
ballots provided to military personnel or other citizens residing
overseas.
Some state officials are planning to enhance their systems' election
management features. For example, Arizona plans to award a contract to
implement an updated version of its current system, which is to include
the ability to track out-of-state moves by voters and manage issues
such as petitions, provisional ballots, poll workers, and poll
locations. Kentucky election officials told us that they wish to
upgrade their system to provide more election management tools to
counties, including a new function to identify poll workers and
complete absentee ballot forms. See appendixes III through XI for more
information on each state's current computerized statewide voter
registration system and future plans.
Federal funds are available to states to assist them as they implement
the HAVA provisions.[Footnote 14] In turn, HAVA requires states to
provide such support as may be required to local jurisdictions to help
them use the computerized voter lists. Officials from six states we
interviewed--Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and West Virginia--reported receiving federal funds to establish
computerized voter lists; these states said they spent a combination of
federal and state funds totaling about $8.4 million to establish their
computerized lists. As required by HAVA, each of the nine states,
except Alaska, where the state is solely responsible for entering and
maintaining voter registration information, provided some type of
support to local jurisdictions to help them operate the computerized
statewide voter registration systems, according to officials. For
example, South Carolina election officials told us that they provided
personal computers and software to local jurisdictions, as well as
training for staff.
States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Information on Registration
Applications and Maintain Lists, Improving the Accuracy of Some Lists:
State election officials reported taking required steps to verify
information provided on voter registration applications and to maintain
accurate computerized voter lists. Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, South
Dakota, and West Virginia--the states subject to the HAVA provisions to
verify information provided on voter registration applications--took
steps to do so by collecting the required unique identifying
information from voters, officials told us. As of November 2005,
Arizona and South Dakota were matching information on the applications
with state MVA or SSA records, according to election officials. The
remaining states were in various stages of implementing the matching
requirement. All nine states conducted regular voter list maintenance
activities to purge duplicates and remove names of persons ineligible
to vote, such as deceased registrants, as required by HAVA, officials
also reported. Officials from four of the nine states we reviewed said
that implementing the HAVA requirements led to some or great
improvement in the accuracy of their voter lists. While HAVA contains
requirements that should help states maintain accurate voter
registration lists, maintaining accurate voter lists will likely remain
a challenge for election officials, in part because lists are dynamic
and constantly changing as voters move, change names, or become
ineligible to vote.
States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Voter Registration Applications
with MVAs and SSA:
Under HAVA, most states are to verify the accuracy of information on
voter registration applications by matching information, such as the
name and date of birth, with MVA or SSA records, depending on the
information provided by the applicant. As noted earlier, HAVA also
requires that voter registration applicants for federal elections
provide or be assigned one of several types of unique identifying
information that can be matched with other records for verification.
For matching purposes, applicants are to be asked for their state
driver's license number or, if an applicant has not been issued a
driver's license, the last four digits of the voter's Social Security
number. An eligible applicant who has not been issued a state driver's
license or a Social Security number can still register to vote. In
those cases, election officials are required to assign the registrant
an identification number.
Not all states are subject to the HAVA requirement to verify voter
registration application information by comparing or matching the
information with MVA or SSA records. In general, under HAVA, states
requiring full Social Security numbers on voter registration
applications prior to 1975 in order to verify the identity of a
registrant are not subject to the HAVA requirement that application
information be matched with MVA or SSA records. HAVA provides that for
those states the voter registration verification requirement is
optional. Four of the nine states we reviewed--Georgia, Hawaii,
Kentucky, and South Carolina--collect the full Social Security number
on voter registration applications and, therefore, according to state
officials, are not subject to this provision. Five of the nine states
we reviewed--Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and West
Virginia--are subject to this HAVA provision to collect or assign a
unique identifying numbers and then verify voter information by
matching it with MVA or SSA information.
Officials from all five of these states subject to this HAVA provision
reported their systems collected or assigned the required unique
identifying numbers for registered voters, as indicated in table 1.
Table 1: Reported Type of Unique Identifying Number Collected or
Assigned by States to Implement HAVA Requirements:
State: Alaska[B];
Driver's license number: Yes;
Last four digits of Social Security number: Yes;
Voter registration number[A]: Yes.
State: Arizona;
Driver's license number: Yes;
Last four digits of Social Security number: Yes;
Voter registration number[A]: Yes.
State: Minnesota;
Driver's license number: Yes;
Last four digits of Social Security number: Yes;
Voter registration number[A]: Yes.
State: South Dakota;
Driver's license number: Yes;
Last four digits of Social Security number: Yes;
Voter registration number[A]: Yes.
State: West Virginia;
Driver's license number: Yes;
Last four digits of Social Security number: Yes;
Voter registration number[A]: Yes.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.
[A] HAVA requires that for those applicants who have not been issued a
driver's license or a Social Security number, states shall assign them
a voter registration number.
[B] In addition to this information, Alaska's voter registration
application allows voters to provide their full Social Security number
or an Alaska state identification card number.
[End of table]
Officials from four of the five states also reported taking steps to
match information on voter registration applications with state MVA
records and provided the date by which MVA matching became available,
as indicated in table 2.
Table 2: Reported Actions Taken by States to Implement HAVA-Required
Verification of Information on Voter Registration Applications by
Matching with MVA Records:
State: Alaska;
Match applications with MVA records: Yes;
Date matching capability became operational: January 2004.
State: Arizona;
Match applications with MVA records: Yes;
Date matching capability became operational: January 2004.
State: Minnesota;
Match applications with MVA records: Yes;
Date matching capability became operational: January 2004.
State: South Dakota;
Match applications with MVA records: Yes;
Date matching capability became operational: January 2004.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.
[End of table]
In West Virginia, officials said that their state was not yet
conducting these required matches because they were still in the
process of developing an agreement with the MVA to verify information
on applications. They also reported difficulty conducting data matches
because the MVA lacked the ability to interface with the statewide
voter list. They expected this issue to be resolved by 2006. Although
not required to do so, Hawaii voluntarily implemented this HAVA
requirement, election officials said.
In addition, officials from all five of these states subject to this
HAVA provision reported taking steps to match information on voter
registration applications with SSA records. As noted earlier, if voter
registration applicants provide the last four digits of their Social
Security number on the registration applications rather than their
driver's license numbers, states are to verify information on the
application by matching it with SSA records. Officials from two states-
-Arizona and South Dakota--reported that their states were currently
conducting the required matches. They were not able to conduct these
matches by the January 1, 2004, deadline because SSA's computer program
to process these matches was not operational until 8 months after the
deadline had passed, in August 2004.[Footnote 15] Election officials
from three states--Alaska, Minnesota, and West Virginia--said their
states were not yet conducting these required matches because they were
still in the process of developing an agreement with SSA to verify
information on applications. Minnesota officials also said they
encountered technical difficulties electronically sharing data with SSA
but anticipated the agreement and the technological issues would be
resolved so that they could conduct matches by 2006. Alaska and West
Virginia officials could not provide an estimated date by which the
agreement would be completed and the required matches conducted.
All States Reported Taking Steps to Perform Required List Maintenance
on a Regular Basis:
In addition to requiring most states to verify information on voter
registration applications, HAVA provides that all states, including the
nine states discussed in this report, are to perform list maintenance
on the HAVA-required statewide voter registration lists on a regular
basis.[Footnote 16] In general, list maintenance activities include
adding new voters to the voter list; updating voter information if a
voter moves within the state; and removing the names of ineligible
voters from the voter list, such as persons who are deceased or
convicted of a felony that, under state law, makes them ineligible to
be registered to vote. HAVA requires that the computerized list be
coordinated with state agency records on felony status and death to
remove the names of ineligible voters. Duplicate registrations, that
is, names of voters that appear more than once on the statewide voter
list, are also to be eliminated.
Election officials in all nine states reported taking the required
actions to perform list maintenance on a regular basis to identify and
remove duplicates and names of registrants ineligible to vote. The
sections below identify the type and frequency of actions states
reported taking to implement the HAVA-required list maintenance
activities in accordance with state and local procedures. These
procedures for maintaining the statewide voter list varied from state
to state, as detailed in appendixes III-XI.
Identifying duplicate voter registrations. HAVA requires that states
are to remove duplicate registrations, that is, names of voters that
appear more than once, from the statewide voter list. Duplicate
registrations may occur in the statewide lists when, for example,
voters move within a state, reregister, and then fail to notify the
county in which they were previously registered to vote. HAVA, in
general, leaves it to the states' discretion to determine the type and
frequency of actions to implement this list maintenance requirement.
Officials from all nine states reported that their systems check for
duplicate registrants to ensure that voters are not listed in the
statewide voter list more than once. When applications are entered into
the statewide database of registered voters, some states' systems
automatically screen the applications on a real-time basis, that is, as
the data are entered, to ensure that they do not duplicate an existing
registration; other states screen the entire list on a regular basis.
Table 3 shows the variation by state in the reported type and frequency
of actions taken to identify duplicate registrations.
Table 3: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify
Duplicate Registration:
State: Alaska;
Applications screened to identify duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Real time;
Voter registration list checked for duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Annual.
State: Arizona;
Applications screened to identify duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Daily;
Voter registration list checked for duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Periodic.
State: Georgia;
Applications screened to identify duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Real time;
Voter registration list checked for duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Monthly.
State: Hawaii;
Applications screened to identify duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Real time;
Voter registration list checked for duplicate registrations: N/A[A];
Frequency of list checks: N/A[A].
State: Kentucky;
Applications screened to identify duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Real time;
Voter registration list checked for duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Periodic.
State: Minnesota;
Applications screened to identify duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Daily;
Voter registration list checked for duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Annual.
State: South Carolina;
Applications screened to identify duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Real time;
Voter registration list checked for duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Quarterly.
State: South Dakota;
Applications screened to identify duplicate registrations: N/A[B];
Frequency of application screening: N/A[B];
Voter registration list checked for duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Annual.
State: West Virginia;
Applications screened to identify duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Real time;
Voter registration list checked for duplicate registrations: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Periodic.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.
[A] Not applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, voter registration
applications, not the entire database of registered voters, are checked
on a real-time basis. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states'
discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to implement
this list maintenance requirement.
[B] Not applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, the entire list, not
voter registration applications, is checked annually. HAVA, in general,
leaves it to the states' discretion to determine the type and frequency
of actions to implement this list maintenance requirement.
[End of table]
Identifying names of deceased voters. HAVA requires that states are to
coordinate the voter list with their state agencies' death records to
verify voters' eligibility. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states'
discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to implement
this list maintenance requirement. Officials from all nine states
reported that they or local officials regularly matched state agency
death records with the statewide voter lists to ensure that names of
deceased registrants do not remain on the rolls. Most of these matches
were based on electronic or paper records. Table 4 shows the variation
by state in the reported type and frequency of actions taken to
identify deceased registrations.
Table 4: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify Names
of Deceased Registrants:
State: Alaska;
Applications screened to identify names of deceased registrants: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Real time;
Voter registration list checked for names of deceased registrants: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Monthly.
State: Arizona;
Applications screened to identify names of deceased registrants:
N/A[A];
Frequency of application screening: N/A[A];
Voter registration list checked for names of deceased registrants: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Monthly.
State: Georgia;
Applications screened to identify names of deceased registrants: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Real time;
Voter registration list checked for names of deceased registrants: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Monthly.
State: Hawaii;
Applications screened to identify names of deceased registrants:
N/A[A];
Frequency of application screening: N/A[A];
Voter registration list checked for names of deceased registrants: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Biweekly.
State: Kentucky;
Applications screened to identify names of deceased registrants:
N/A[A];
Frequency of application screening: N/A[A];
Voter registration list checked for names of deceased registrants: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Monthly.
State: Minnesota;
Applications screened to identify names of deceased registrants:
N/A[A];
Frequency of application screening: N/A[A];
Voter registration list checked for names of deceased registrants: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Monthly.
State: South Carolina;
Applications screened to identify names of deceased registrants: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: N/A[A];
Voter registration list checked for names of deceased registrants: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Monthly.
State: South Dakota;
Applications screened to identify names of deceased registrants: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Daily;
Voter registration list checked for names of deceased registrants: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Weekly.
State: West Virginia;
Applications screened to identify names of deceased registrants:
N/A[A];
Frequency of application screening: N/A[A];
Voter registration list checked for names of deceased registrants: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Monthly.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.
[A] Not applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, the entire list, not
voter registration applications, is checked. HAVA, in general, leaves
it to the states' discretion to determine the type and frequency of
actions to implement this list maintenance requirement.
[End of table]
Identifying persons convicted of a disqualifying felony. HAVA requires
states to coordinate the voter list with their state agencies' records
on felony status to verify voters' eligibility. HAVA, in general,
leaves it to the states' discretion to determine the type and frequency
of actions to implement this list maintenance requirement. Officials
from all nine states reported that their states matched state court
records with the statewide lists to identify persons ineligible under
state law to vote because of a disqualifying felony conviction. These
matches were based on electronic or paper records. Table 5 shows the
variation by state in the reported type and frequency of actions taken
to identify voters ineligible to register because of a felony
conviction.
Table 5: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify
Ineligible Felons:
State: Alaska;
Applications screened to identify names of ineligible felons: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Real time;
Voter registration list checked for names of ineligible felons: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Monthly.
State: Arizona;
Applications screened to identify names of ineligible felons: N/A[A];
Frequency of application screening: N/A[A];
Voter registration list checked for names of ineligible felons: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Periodic.
State: Georgia;
Applications screened to identify names of ineligible felons: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Real time;
Voter registration list checked for names of ineligible felons: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Monthly.
State: Hawaii;
Applications screened to identify names of ineligible felons: N/A[A];
Frequency of application screening: N/A[A];
Voter registration list checked for names of ineligible felons: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Biweekly.
State: Kentucky;
Applications screened to identify names of ineligible felons: N/A[A];
Frequency of application screening: N/A[A];
Voter registration list checked for names of ineligible felons: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Monthly.
State: Minnesota;
Applications screened to identify names of ineligible felons: N/A[A];
Frequency of application screening: N/A[A];
Voter registration list checked for names of ineligible felons: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Monthly.
State: South Carolina;
Applications screened to identify names of ineligible felons: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Monthly;
Voter registration list checked for names of ineligible felons: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Monthly.
State: South Dakota;
Applications screened to identify names of ineligible felons: Yes;
Frequency of application screening: Daily;
Voter registration list checked for names of ineligible felons: N/A[B];
Frequency of list checks: N/A[B].
State: West Virginia;
Applications screened to identify names of ineligible felons: N/A[A];
Frequency of application screening: N/A[A];
Voter registration list checked for names of ineligible felons: Yes;
Frequency of list checks: Periodic.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states.
[A] Not applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, the entire list, not
voter registration applications, is checked. HAVA, in general, leaves
it to the states' discretion to determine the type and frequency of
actions to implement this list maintenance requirement.
[B] Not applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, voter registration
applications, not the entire database of registered voters, are checked
a daily basis. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states' discretion to
determine the type and frequency of actions to implement this list
maintenance requirement.
[End of table]
Identifying individuals ineligible to vote because of mental
incompetence. The voter eligibility requirements in the nine states we
reviewed provided that applicants declared mentally incompetent to vote
are not eligible to register to vote. Officials in eight states
reported they have procedures in place to identify registrants
ineligible to vote because of court orders of mental incompetence. All
reported that removing registrants for this reason was a rare
occurrence. The ninth state, West Virginia, did not report such
procedures are in place.[Footnote 17]
Four States Reported That Voter List Accuracy Improved as a Result of
HAVA, but Managing Inherent Risks to Voter List Accuracy Remains a
Challenge:
Officials from four states--Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and West
Virginia--reported that implementing the HAVA requirements improved the
accuracy of their voter lists somewhat or to a great extent. South
Dakota officials reported that verifying applications has helped
identify inaccurate information on applications and that matching
applications with the MVA helped reduce the number of duplicate
registrations. Officials from Minnesota, which replaced its existing
computerized voter registration with a new one in order to implement
HAVA, also reported that implementing the HAVA requirements reduced the
incidence of duplicate registrations. And officials in the states of
Arizona and West Virginia, which built entirely new systems to comply
with HAVA, reported a great improvement in the accuracy of their voter
rolls.
Officials from the remaining states--Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky,
and South Carolina--reported that HAVA had little or no effect on the
accuracy of their voter lists. This result likely occurred, some of
these officials said, because their states have had well-established
computerized statewide lists, similar to those required by HAVA, in
place for many years prior to HAVA. Officials from Georgia, Hawaii, and
Kentucky also attributed this result to their states' ability to
require the full Social Security number on voter registration
applications. Having this unique identifier provided a means to
identify and remove duplicate registrants from voter lists, they
stated.
While HAVA contains requirements directed at maintaining accurate voter
registration lists, even after such requirements are implemented,
maintaining accurate computerized lists will likely remain a
challenging task for state and local officials. In part this is because
of the inherent risks of managing a dynamic body of information that is
constantly changing as voters move, change names, come of age to vote,
or become ineligible to vote. Managing these risks has challenged
election officials across the country for some time, as we have
documented in a series of past reports. In October 2001 we issued a
report that described the operations and challenges associated with
each stage of the election process, including list maintenance. We
reported that, judging from our national survey of local election
officials, officials were challenged by continually updating and
deleting information from voter registration lists and had concerns
related to obtaining accurate and timely information to keep voter
lists accurate.[Footnote 18] In June 2005 we reported on the processes
14 local voting jurisdictions from seven states used to verify voter
registration eligibility and the challenges officials faced in
maintaining accurate voter lists.[Footnote 19] We reported that while
some of these challenges, such as reducing duplicate registrations
among jurisdictions within the state, may be resolved when HAVA is
fully implemented, others may continue to be issues. Problems
identifying voters who are registered concurrently in more than one
state and problems using incomplete, untimely, or hard-to-decipher
felony, death, and other information could also continue to hinder
efforts to maintain accurate voter lists. In September 2005 we issued a
report that described the experiences of selected local election
officials in the same seven states as they processed voter registration
applications.[Footnote 20] We reported that officials in these
jurisdictions face a number of challenges, such as processing
incomplete or inaccurate applications received from voter registration
drives sponsored by nongovernmental organizations.
Some of the concerns highlighted in our October 2001, June 2005, and
September 2005 reports remain issues in states we discussed in this
report, even after these nine states implemented the HAVA-required
computerized lists. For example:
Duplicate voter registrants. Echoing concerns reported in our previous
work, the majority of state election officials interviewed for this
report said that their states might not receive information about
residents who leave the state and reregister to vote in another
state.[Footnote 21] As a result, voters could be registered and vote in
two states concurrently. One senior election official described this
type of duplicate registration as a "universal" problem affecting all
states. States are not required to share information that would allow
them to identify persons registered in more than one state,[Footnote
22] although some states voluntarily notify other states when a voter
relocates and reregisters in that state, officials said. Officials from
Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Minnesota, South Carolina, South
Dakota, and West Virginia told us they notify other states of voters
who relocate and then reregister. However, such notifications are
possible only if voters disclose on their voter registration
application they have relocated from another state, officials also told
us. This issue, caused in part by a lack of consistently available
information, poses an inherent risk to the accuracy of voter lists and
may not be resolved solely by implementing the HAVA-required
computerized list requirement.
Deceased registrants. We previously reported that concerns regarding
timeliness and completeness of vital statistics data on deceased
persons used to match against voter lists may continue to be an issue,
even after the HAVA requirements for a computerized list are
implemented.[Footnote 23] However, the election officials we
interviewed in most of the states did not share concerns about the
timeliness of information their offices receive on deceased persons
from the vital statistics office. One official observed that the vital
statistics office may not receive timely information from coroners or
funeral home directors. Officials in a majority of the states we
reviewed observed that data on deceased persons may not be complete
because states are not able consistently to identify and remove names
of deceased registrants if the deaths occur out of state. According to
an official in South Dakota, some states are prohibited by state laws
from sharing information on deaths, a fact that has, in part, prevented
this issue from being resolved. Even in states that share such
information, unless officials are aware that the deceased was
registered to vote in a certain state, officials are not able to pass
the information to the appropriate election office. This issue, related
in part to the unavailability of information, poses an inherent risk to
the accuracy of voter lists and is not resolved by implementing the
HAVA-required computerized list requirement.
Felons. While HAVA requires coordinating the voter list with state
information on persons convicted of a felony, election officials we
interviewed in several of the states expressed concerns similar to
those reported in our previous work that the criminal information they
receive is incomplete, not timely, or difficult to decipher.[Footnote
24] This issue, similar to concerns related to the availability,
timeliness, and quality of other types of voter registration
information, poses an inherent risk to the accuracy of lists because it
could limit the ability of officials to identify and remove names of
felons ineligible to register to vote from the computerized voter
lists.
U.S. citizenship. In addition to having concerns regarding felony
status, election officials from two states also expressed concerns
regarding the willingness of registrants to self-attest that they were
U.S. citizens and therefore eligible to vote under state eligibility
requirements, concerns that are consistent with those documented in our
previous work.[Footnote 25] The HAVA-required unique identifying
numbers, such as driver's license numbers or Social Security numbers,
are not useful for this purpose because neither is generally accepted
as evidence of U.S. citizenship. This lack of information poses an
inherent risk to the accuracy of lists, as illustrated by an example
from Minnesota.[Footnote 26] Officials told us that they discovered 30
noncitizens on the Minnesota voter list during the November 2004
general election despite having the HAVA-required computerized
statewide voter list in place. Minnesota's MVA has since added visa
expiration dates to the driver's licenses of noncitizens to indicate
their citizenship status. South Dakota officials reported their MVA
provides similar information on driver's licenses. To address this
concern, Arizona officials told us that their state no longer accepts
the registration applicants' self-attestation of citizenship; all voter
registration applicants are now required to provide proof of
citizenship. As we reported in our June 2005 report, federal jury
administrators could identify possible noncitizens on the basis of
information that potential jurors provide when identifying themselves
as noncitizens on their jury service questionnaire.[Footnote 27] We
recommended that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts determine
the feasibility and steps necessary for U.S. district court jury
administrators to provide notice to state election officials of
potential jurors who identify themselves as noncitizens. Officials from
Hawaii reported that their state periodically checks the voter list
with this type of information and other citizenship indexes.
Receiving voter registration applications. Officials from Georgia,
South Carolina, and South Dakota said that their state received voter
registration applications from registration drives that contained
inaccuracies such as fictitious names, a problem that we had identified
in past reports.[Footnote 28] South Carolina officials also said that
only a small number of such applications are generally received.
Officials from a majority of the nine states we reviewed reported that
they received a small number of complaints from voters who said that
they had registered through a registration drive but that their names
did not appear on the voter list on Election Day.
State Election Officials Reported Numerous Challenges and Lessons
Learned while Implementing HAVA Requirements for Their Statewide Voter
Registration Lists:
Creating statewide computerized lists required by HAVA presented a
number of challenges and resulted in lessons learned, officials told
us, as they developed their computerized statewide voter registration
systems, made them operational, and later managed them. The challenges
and lessons learned they shared are consistent with those that our past
research has shown to be important to effectively acquiring,
developing, and implementing information systems in public and private
sector organizations.[Footnote 29] Officials shared their experiences
as they developed their systems, for example:
* Election officials from Minnesota and West Virginia reported that
meeting the time frames they established for developing their
computerized lists was challenging, in part because of limited staff
available to complete the work.
* Designing a system with the appropriate scope was an issue raised by
Arizona, Hawaii, Kentucky, and Minnesota officials. This challenge
involved determining the functional requirements of the system, for
instance, the number of election management features the system should
provide, if any, in addition to the capabilities required by HAVA. A
senior Minnesota official reported Minnesota reduced the scope of its
new system from what it had initially planned because of resource and
time constraints, keeping the necessary elements but eliminating some
election administration functions. Officials said this experience
taught them that the functional requirements of the system should be
prioritized as early as possible to differentiate features that are
necessary from those that would be nice to have. Arizona officials
addressed this design challenge by initially implementing a system that
performed only the basic tasks required under the HAVA provisions, they
reported. In the near term, they told us, local officials used the
computerized statewide system to manage voter registration information
while continuing to use their local computerized systems to manage
elections. This decision minimized changes to the way counties
historically managed elections, officials said. The state plans to
expand the scope of its new statewide system in the future, providing
counties with additional election management capabilities, an official
told us. Their plan, officials said, is to draw upon local and state
officials' experiences with the statewide system to identify and
prioritize what additional features to add to their system. The
Kentucky official offered a lesson learned as well, suggesting that
election officials, as they define the capabilities the system is to
offer, should be mindful of selecting a system that the state can
afford now and in the future.
* Converting data on registered voters from the old system to the new
system was time-consuming and required processes to ensure that data
were accurately entered into the new system, election officials from
Arizona, Minnesota, and West Virginia observed. This work was
complicated, in part, because of inaccurate information in existing
records such as misspelled street addresses or duplicate registrations
that needed to be resolved before inputting the corrected data into the
new systems' databases. Minnesota officials said that to help local
officials with this work, they developed a tool that allowed them to
compare old records of voter information with the new ones on a case-
by-case basis.
* Officials from Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, South Carolina,
South Dakota, and West Virginia also said that as states develop their
computerized systems, they should adopt a collaborative approach,
working with local officials to design, develop, or implement the
systems in order to obtain local officials' cooperation. The state
officials provided various reasons for emphasizing the importance of
maintaining cooperative relationships with local officials. For
example, West Virginia officials told us local officials resisted
moving from their county-based systems to the statewide system, which
made implementing the system more difficult. Local officials resisted
in part because many of them viewed the new statewide system as an
intrusion into a domain of election administration that had been a
local--not a state--responsibility, state officials told us. Involving
county officials in designing and implementing the system, the state
officials said, might have addressed this issue and simplified
implementation of the new system. Arizona and South Carolina officials
said they involved local officials by convening a working group
composed of both local and state officials that was responsible for
developing the system. Hawaii state officials told us that frequent,
regular communication helped their state maintain a cooperative
relationship with local officials; for instance, this state holds
quarterly meetings with county officials in order to coordinate
activities such as completing list maintenance and data entry before
poll books and voter lists are printed. Kentucky officials said the key
to their success was the cooperative working relationship they
cultivated with local officials by keeping them involved.
Officials also shared challenges and lessons learned while making their
systems operational. For example, West Virginia officials said that
their system became operational in every county on the same day.
However, it may have been beneficial for their state, they stated, to
introduce the system incrementally county by county rather than
bringing every election jurisdiction online the same day. They reasoned
that such a staggered rollout schedule might have been easier on the
state election officials, given their staffing constraints. Officials
from some states also told us that prior to putting systems into
service, it is important to train staff to use the new system. In order
to provide local officials access to the most current information,
Minnesota officials said they provide the user's manual online.
State election officials also shared their lessons learned from their
experience managing computerized voter registration systems once they
were operational. Officials from Hawaii and Kentucky, two states that
have managed computerized voter registrations systems for some years,
observed that as technology develops, officials may decide to enhance
their systems, as both of their states have done over the years. These
officials offered lessons to keep in mind as states contemplate system
upgrades: be mindful that selecting upgrades to the system may require
compromises among local jurisdictions that may have competing needs or
different administrative or technical constraints and that changes to
the system affect all local jurisdictions equally. Hawaii officials
shared another issue they encountered while managing their system; they
could not use the computerized system while updating voter information.
To address this issue, officials from Hawaii said their staff created a
shadow system so that the system could be updated and available at the
same time. Hawaii officials also recommended that states establish
uniform processing procedures among their jurisdictions so that all
jurisdictions function as one.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
after the report date. At that time we will make copies available to
others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in
appendix XII.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This report describes the experiences of election officials in Alaska,
Arizona, Hawaii, Georgia, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South
Dakota, and West Virginia implementing the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (HAVA) requirements pertaining to the establishment of
computerized statewide voter registration lists and steps to verify and
maintain the accuracy of those lists. Specifically, our objectives were
to describe the actions election officials from nine states reported
taking to (1) establish computerized statewide voter registration lists
and (2) verify information provided on voter registration applications
and maintain the statewide voter lists. In addition, we describe what
these state officials told us regarding (3) the challenges they faced
and lessons they learned while implementing these requirements. Most
states obtained a waiver from the Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
to postpone implementation of this HAVA requirement until January 1,
2006. However, these nine states did not obtain a waiver and,
therefore, were to implement these HAVA requirements by the original
deadline, January 1, 2004.
To meet our objectives, we reviewed HAVA provisions related to the
establishment of statewide computerized voter registration list
requirements. We then identified the proper points of contact within
each state and conducted telephone interviews using a structured
interview format. Among other things, we asked election officials in
the nine states to describe when their computerized systems had been
developed; the capabilities of their systems; what actions, if any,
their states took to implement the HAVA requirements for a computerized
list; what level of effort was required to make any HAVA-related
modifications; what effect implementing these changes, if any, might
have had on the accuracy of their statewide voter lists; and what
challenges they faced and lessons they learned while implementing these
HAVA requirements. We did not independently verify the accuracy of
state election officials' responses. However, state election officials
were provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their responses
for this report, and on the basis of the comments we received, we made
technical changes where appropriate. As part of our interviews, we also
asked state officials how much federal and state money was spent on
their computerized statewide systems in order to implement the HAVA
requirements. We did not independently verify the amounts they reported
to us. However, we attempted to compare the amounts of money the states
reported that they spent with data reported by them to EAC on the
implementation of all HAVA requirements. Because of variations in the
way these amounts were reported by the states, we could not identify
the amounts spent solely on implementation of the computerized list
requirement.
Our work focused primarily on the states, since most of the
responsibilities for implementing HAVA statewide computerized list
provisions took place at the state level. We did, however, communicate
with officials from the EAC and Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil
Rights Division to obtain information about and documentation on their
roles and responsibilities related to the HAVA statewide computerized
list provisions. We also provided sections of the report discussing EAC
and DOJ to officials with those organizations to verify the accuracy of
the information they provided and, on the basis of their comments, made
technical changes where appropriate. In addition, we reviewed prior GAO
reports on elections, including voter registration issues.
We conducted our work from January 2005 through December 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: EAC and DOJ Roles in Implementing HAVA Statewide Voter
Registration List Provisions:
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) provides that the Election Assistance
Commission (EAC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are to have
specific roles in states' efforts to implement the Help America Vote
Act's statewide voter registration list provisions. HAVA established
EAC to, among other things, serve as a national clearinghouse for
information on election administration and provide information and
guidance with respect to laws, procedures, and technologies affecting
the administration of federal elections.
On August 4, 2005, EAC released its final version of the Voluntary
Guidance on Implementation of Statewide Voter Registration Lists. The
purpose of the voluntary guidance was to assist states in their efforts
to develop and maintain a statewide voter registration list pursuant to
HAVA Section 303(a). The guidance describes a set of specifications and
requirements states may use to implement the HAVA provisions, such as
establishing real-time access to all registration data, securing the
registration list, synchronizing the statewide list with local
databases at least every 24 hours, and coordinating with other
databases for the purpose of performing voter registration verification
and list maintenance. EAC's guidance also contains recommendations on
dealing with outcomes that may result from the verification process,
the type of voting history information states should track, and the
type of system that is most closely aligned with HAVA requirements. In
addition to the voluntary guidance, EAC has also created and posted on
its Web site two best practices documents--"Best Practices in
Administration, Management, and Security in Voting Systems and
Provisional Voting" and "Best Practices for Facilitating Voting by U.S.
Citizens Covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting
Act"--and other information on election administration. According to
EAC officials, EAC expects that the clearinghouse will be fully
operational during 2006.
HAVA also provides enforcement authority to DOJ with respect to the
uniform and nondiscriminatory implementation of certain HAVA
requirements such as those relating to the statewide voter registration
list and voter eligibility verification provisions. Officials with
DOJ's Civil Rights Division told us that in addition to monitoring
states' compliance with HAVA, DOJ has promoted pre-enforcement
compliance, which includes working with states to identify what actions
are reasonable to expect them to take, educating state and local
officials, and responding to states' inquiries. According to DOJ
officials, at the time of our review, DOJ had not taken enforcement
actions against any of the nine nonwaiver states. DOJ officials also
said that they worked with the states following the passage of HAVA to
address initial challenges and provide informal guidance while EAC
began operations and hired staff.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Alaska Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
This appendix describes steps Alaska election officials reported taking
to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002
(HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing
computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy
of information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate
statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges
and lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect
the responses to our telephone interviews with Alaska election
officials and were not independently verified by us.
Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration
Lists:
Alaska had in place a computerized statewide voter registration system
prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created a mainframe-based
system in 1985. To implement the provisions of HAVA, minor
modifications were made to the system to allow election officials to
record driver's license numbers and the last four digits of the voter's
Social Security number. These modifications cost approximately $5,000
in state and federal funds to implement. Alaska state officials awarded
a contract to upgrade its statewide voter registration system, in order
to include additional election management capabilities, such as poll
worker management and Internet voter registration, at a cost of $2.6
million.
Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Applications:
To implement the HAVA voter application verification requirements, the
state's four regional election supervisors, who function as state
employees,[Footnote 30] verified application information by comparing
voter eligibility information (full name; date of birth; and either a
driver's license number, full Social Security number, the last four
digits of the Social Security number, or a unique identifier assigned
by the state if the individual lacks a Social Security number and a
driver's license) with state motor vehicle agency records to verify
identity, age, and duplicate registrations. At the time of our review,
Alaska was not comparing information with the Social Security
Administration (SSA) because the state did not have a signed memorandum
of understanding with SSA.
Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists:
To implement HAVA, Alaska has taken steps to maintain the accuracy of
its voter registration list by coordinating the list with other state
agency records, as described below.
* Duplicate registrants. State officials perform an electronic check on
the entire statewide voter registration list for duplicates once a year
and on an as-needed basis.
* Deceased registrants. State officials conduct monthly electronic
updates of vital statistics death records by checking name, date of
birth and either the full Social Security number or the last four
digits.
* Disqualified felons. State officials update court system records on a
monthly basis. Specifically, court system records from the Department
of Corrections and Bureau of Vital Statistics are checked against the
voter registration list, comparing name, date of birth, and full Social
Security number.
* Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the event
of a court declaration of mental incompetence, the court would notify
state officials of the judgment and the Division of Elections would
inactivate the voter's registration. Officials reported that
disqualification because of mental incompetence does not occur often.
To ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed from the
state voter registration list, election officials send letters
notifying individuals of their pending removal from the statewide voter
registration list. These letters are sent to those who have not voted
in the most recent two federal elections and those who have
disqualifying felony convictions, as allowed under state law. Alaska
officials reported that they removed the names of ineligible voters in
2004.
Challenges and Lessons Learned:
Election officials did not report any challenges or lessons learned
while implementing these HAVA requirements.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of Arizona Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
This appendix describes steps Arizona election officials reported
taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing
computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy
of information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate
statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges
and lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect
the responses to our telephone interviews with Arizona election
officials and were not independently verified by us.
Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration
Lists:
Prior to HAVA, Arizona did not have a computerized statewide voter
registration system in place, although several counties operated
computerized voter registration systems. Arizona created an
interconnected, statewide Web-based voter registration system called
Voter Registration Arizona (VRAZ) to implement the requirements of
HAVA. VRAZ became operational by the HAVA deadline of January 1, 2004.
VRAZ had an initial development cost of $1 million and was jointly
funded by state and federal sources. The system took approximately 6
months to develop. The state had to pass new statutes and amend others
so that election officials could receive information from state
agencies, such as felony records. In addition to carrying out the
required functions of the voter registration system, election officials
can query all state voter registration records on Election Day if their
polling place has an Internet connection.
A new version of VRAZ is under development and is expected to replace
voter registration systems in 13 of 15 counties. The new version of
VRAZ, called VRAZ II, is expected to reflect reciprocity agreements
with other states whereby officials will be alerted when a voter moves
from state to state and registers to vote in those states covered by
the agreement. In addition, the new system is expected to contain
additional election management capabilities beyond those required by
HAVA, including the ability to retrieve data on election administration
issues such as voter petitions, provisional ballots, training of poll
workers, and polling locations. The estimated cost for VRAZ II is $10
million. At the time of our review, Arizona officials were anticipating
that VRAZ II would go online in 2007.
Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration
Applications:
To implement the HAVA voter application verification requirements,
Arizona compared the applicant's name, date of birth, driver's license
number, or the last four digits of the Social Security number with
motor vehicle agency (MVA) records to identify potentially inaccurate
applications. In addition, Arizona's Web-based voter registration
software, EZ Voter--which allows Arizona citizens to register to vote
via the Internet--electronically verified the accuracy of the voter
registration applications filed online by matching the applicant's
name, date of birth, driver's license number, or last four digits of
the Social Security number with MVA records. EZ Voter registrations
were then entered at the county level daily and submitted to the
statewide voter registration list.
At the time of our review, Arizona had completed a memorandum of
understanding with the Social Security Administration (SSA) and was
verifying information on voter registration applications by matching it
with SSA records as required by HAVA.
Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists:
As state officials developed the VRAZ system, they identified and
corrected inaccurate voter registration data prior to entering the data
into the new system; through this process they were also able to
eliminate duplicate registrants from the statewide list. Election
officials also took steps to maintain the accuracy of the voter
registration list by coordinating the list with other state agency
records, as described below.
* Duplicate registrants. State officials electronically identify
duplicate matches by checking name, address, driver's license number,
and the last four digits of the Social Security number on voter
registration applications on a daily basis. The entire list is screened
once a month to identify duplicate registrants.
* Deceased registrants. The Secretary of State's office receives an
electronic file of recent deaths from the Department of Health Services
once a month. Officials identify any matches by checking name, date of
birth, and the last four digits of the Social Security number.
* Disqualifying felons. State officials receive information on felony
convictions from Arizona courts on a varying basis--weekly or monthly
in the case of the state's superior courts and on an ongoing basis from
U.S. district courts. Once a felon's sentence has been completed,
voting rights are reinstated and the individual may register to vote by
submitting a new voter registration application. Officials identify any
matches by checking name, date of birth, and the last four digits of
the Social Security number. This is a paper-based process in smaller
courts and an electronic process in larger courts.
* Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. As with
information on felons, courts submit information in an electronic or
paper format to state officials on individuals declared mentally
incompetent at different times for comparison with the statewide voter
registration list.
To ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed from voter
registration lists, local officials send a letter to voters to notify
them of their impending removal from the statewide voter registration
list. For example, letters are sent to individuals with a disqualifying
felony conviction.
Challenges and Lessons Learned:
One challenge Arizona election officials faced was designing a system
with the appropriate scope. Election officials said they addressed this
design challenge by initially implementing a system that performed only
the basic tasks required under the HAVA provisions. To minimize changes
to the way counties historically managed elections, local officials
used the computerized statewide system to manage voter registration
information while continuing to use their local computerized systems to
manage elections. The state plans to expand the scope of its new
statewide system in the future, providing counties with additional
election management capabilities. Another challenge reported by Arizona
election officials was the conversion of data on registered voters from
the old system to the new system. Officials said it was time-consuming
and required processes to ensure that data were accurately entered into
the new system.
Election officials also reported on the importance of collaboration
among state and local officials. The state convened a working group
composed of both local and state officials that was responsible for
developing its statewide computerized system. Arizona officials stated
that a communications plan that allows information about the voter list
management process to be shared among state and county officials can
help lessen political resistance and facilitate buy-in by state and
county officials. The implementation of VRAZ in stages was another way
state officials gained the trust of the counties.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Reported Experiences of Georgia Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
This appendix describes steps Georgia election officials reported
taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing
computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy
of information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate
statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges
and lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect
the responses to our telephone interviews with Georgia election
officials and were not independently verified by us.
Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration
Lists:
Georgia had in place a computerized statewide voter registration system
prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this mainframe-based
system in 1995. To implement HAVA, state officials made one minor
modification to their voter registration system--adding the capability
to identify whether a voter had registered for the first time by mail.
Officials have plans to enhance the current system in order to provide
election administration management capabilities, such as identifying
potential poll workers and giving election officials on Election Day
immediate electronic access to the voter list so they can verify where
voters are registered to vote. At the time of our review, officials
were planning to conduct a pilot program to test the enhanced system.
Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration
Applications:
In Georgia, voter registration applicants were required to provide
their full Social Security number on voter registration applications as
a unique identifier. Since Georgia collected the full Social Security
number, the state was not subject to the HAVA requirements to collect a
unique identifying number or to verify information on voter
registration applications with motor vehicle agency or Social Security
Administration records. Georgia elected not to verify information with
these agencies, as HAVA allows. However, the state had processes in
place to conduct real-time checks of voter registration applications to
ensure they did not duplicate an existing registration and that the
application information did not match the records of deceased persons.
The state procedures also provide for verifying voter eligibility by
comparing voter registration applications with state court records on
felony lists to identify persons ineligible to vote because of a
disqualifying felony conviction.
Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists:
Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, Georgia has maintained the
accuracy of its voter registration list by coordinating the list with
other state agency records, as described below.
* Duplicate registrants. On a monthly basis, state officials check the
statewide voter list to identify duplicate registrants and transmit the
list of duplicates to the counties for updating.
* Deceased registrants. Every month, county officials receive
electronic files on deceased persons from the Department of Vital
Statistics. Officials identify any matches with the statewide voter
registration list by checking name, date of birth, full Social Security
number, and address. On a quarterly basis, the state receives an
electronic report from the Department of Vital Statistics and verifies
that the counties have made the changes and checks for errors. The
information is compiled into a quarterly report that verifies that the
counties have made the necessary changes and that an error report is
generated showing the records that did not match.
* Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, the state receives a paper
list of felony convictions from state courts. The felony list is then
sent to counties for updating. County officials identify any matches
with the statewide voter registration list by checking name, date of
birth, full Social Security number, and address.
* Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the case
of mental incompetence, a court order must specify that a person is
barred from voting; otherwise, the person may continue to vote. As with
information on felons, on a monthly basis, the state receives from
state courts a paper list of individuals declared mentally incompetent.
The list is then sent to counties for updating. County officials
identify any matches with the statewide voter registration list by
checking name, date of birth, full Social Security number, and address.
To ensure that eligible voters' names are not inadvertently removed
from the statewide voter registration list, county officials send a
letter to voters to notify them of their impending removal from the
voter registration rolls. These letters are sent to individuals who
have requested to be removed, those with a disqualifying felony
conviction, and those who have been declared mentally incompetent.
Georgia officials reported that they removed the names of ineligible
voters in 2004.
Challenges and Lessons Learned:
Although Georgia has had a statewide computerized voter list in place
for 10 years, officials reported that a challenge they continue to face
is training employees on how to use the system. Officials said that one
lesson learned is that states need to get buy-in from county officials
early on in the process of developing a statewide voter registration
system. They suggested that one way to accomplish this may be to form a
task force, composed of state and local officials, to review system
development issues and design.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Hawaii Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
This appendix describes steps Hawaii election officials reported taking
to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002
(HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing
computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy
of information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate
statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges
and lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect
the responses to our telephone interviews by Hawaii election officials
and were not independently verified by us.
Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration
Lists:
Hawaii has had a computerized voter registration system since the 1970s
and developed a statewide interactive system in 1982. Hawaii's system
provides election officials with immediate access to the computerized
statewide voter list whereby they can enter new or update existing
voter registration information and query all state voter registration
records. To implement HAVA, election officials made minor technical
changes to the statewide voter registration system, such as adding the
ability to flag inactive voters. At the time of our review, Hawaii was
making additional arrangements to enhance its current computerized
voter registration system by modifying the absentee voting component of
the system.
Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration
Applications:
In Hawaii, voter registration applicants were required to provide their
full Social Security number on voter registration applications as a
unique identifier. Since Hawaii collected the full Social Security
number, the state was not subject to the HAVA requirements to collect a
unique identifying number or to verify information on voter
registration applications with motor vehicle agency (MVA) or Social
Security Administration records. Hawaii voluntarily matched information
on voter registration forms with MVA records, comparing information
such as the individual's name, driver's license number, and full Social
Security number. The computerized voter registration system conducted
real-time checks for duplicate registrations and age requirements prior
to accepting the new application into the statewide voter registration
system.
Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists:
Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, Hawaii officials have
maintained the accuracy of Hawaii's statewide voter registration list
by coordinating the list with other state agency records, as described
below.
* Duplicate registrants. The computerized statewide voter registration
system automatically checks for duplicate registrations as soon as an
application is processed.
* Deceased registrants. Twice a month, county officials check paper
death records from the Department of Vital Statistics to identify
deceased registrants by checking the name, date of birth, and the full
Social Security number.
* Disqualified felons. Twice a month, county clerks receive paper
records from circuit court officials. These records are then checked
against the information in the statewide voter registration list by
comparing name, date of birth, and the full Social Security number.
* Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. Officials
reported that disqualification because of mental incompetence does not
occur often in Hawaii. The courts are the only entity that can make a
judgment regarding mental incompetence that would disqualify a person
from being registered to vote.
To ensure that eligible voters' names are not inadvertently removed
from the statewide voter registration list, local officials send a
letter to every voter prior to the general election before removing
voters' names from the list, in accordance with the National Voter
Registration Act provisions for removing voters' names from lists.
Challenges and Lessons Learned:
Although Hawaii had a statewide voter registration system in place
prior to HAVA, officials shared their general perspectives on
implementing voter registration systems. Hawaii election officials said
that one of the biggest challenges can be coordinating with counties
and developing a rapport with county officials. To assist in
coordination efforts, the state holds quarterly meetings with county
officials. In these meetings, state and local officials coordinate
activities such as completing list maintenance and data entry prior to
the printing of poll books and voter lists. Another issue raised by
Hawaii officials was designing a system with the appropriate scope.
These officials also shared lessons learned about managing a
computerized voter registration system. They stated that technological
developments will require compromise among local jurisdictions that
have different administrative and technological constraints. Officials
also recommended that states establish uniform processing procedures
among their jurisdictions so that all jurisdictions function as one.
Finally, Hawaii created a shadow system so that the system could be
both updated and available for use at the same time.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Kentucky Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
This appendix describes steps Kentucky election officials reported
taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing
computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy
of information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate
statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges
and lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect
the responses to our telephone interviews by Kentucky election
officials and were not independently verified by us.
Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration
Lists:
Kentucky had in place a computerized statewide voter registration
system prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this mainframe-
based system in 1973. Kentucky's current system allows all local
election officials immediate access to enter new or update existing
voter registration information in their jurisdiction, and immediate
access to query all state voter registration records. In addition,
election officials provided a toll-free number for precinct officers to
access an interactive voice response phone system to check voter
eligibility. As a result, Kentucky did not have to take any additional
steps to implement HAVA statewide computerized list requirements.
Election officials planned to upgrade their computerized statewide
voter registration system in the future to provide more election
management tools to counties, such as including a function to track
poll workers and complete absentee ballot forms. The state has
developed the absentee ballot application and expects it to be used by
its counties in the 2006 elections.
Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration
Applications:
In Kentucky, voter registration applicants were required to provide
their full Social Security number on voter registration applications as
a unique identifier. Since Kentucky collected the full Social Security
number, the state was not subject to the HAVA requirements to collect a
unique identifying number or to verify information on voter
registration applications with motor vehicle agency or Social Security
Administration records. Kentucky elected not to verify information with
these agencies, as HAVA allows. To verify information on voter
registration applications, Kentucky's computerized statewide voter
registration automatically checked for duplicate registrations before
new registrants were added to the statewide list.
Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Registration Lists:
Kentucky currently has processes in place to maintain the accuracy of
the statewide voter registration list by comparing the statewide voter
registration list with state agency records, as described below.
* Duplicate registrants. The computerized statewide voter registration
system automatically checks for duplicate registrations as soon as a
new application is entered into the system.
* Deceased registrants. On a monthly basis, election officials check
the computerized statewide voter registration list against the records
from the Department of Vital Statistics to identify deceased
registrants by comparing name, date of birth, and full Social Security
number.
* Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, court records are
electronically checked against the computerized statewide voter
registration list to identify persons convicted of a disqualifying
felony by comparing name, date of birth, and full Social Security
number.
* Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. Officials
use court records to identify voters ineligible because of mental
incompetence by comparing applicant's name, date of birth, and full
Social Security number with the computerized statewide voter
registration list.
To ensure that the names of eligible voters are not inadvertently
removed from the statewide voter registration list, state officials
match voters' identifying information with U.S. Postal Service, felony,
mental competency, and death records. State officials also send letters
to voters to notify them of pending removal based on a disqualifying
felony conviction.
Challenges and Lessons Learned:
Since Kentucky had a computerized statewide voter registration system
in place prior to HAVA, election officials did not report any
challenges. However, Kentucky election officials provided examples of
lessons learned while maintaining their current computerized statewide
voter registration system. They said it is important to develop a
computerized statewide voter registration system that will be
sustainable now and in the future. Officials suggested that as states
contemplate system upgrades, they be mindful that changes to the system
affect all jurisdictions, despite their differing needs and
constraints. A key to their success has been the cooperative working
relationship they cultivated with local officials by keeping them
involved. Election officials also recommended that states "think
outside the box" when designing ways to use the voter registration
database. For example, they utilized their statewide computerized
system to established voter information centers on Kentucky's state Web
site to assist applicants and staff in the voter registration process.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Minnesota Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
This appendix describes steps Minnesota election officials reported
taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing
computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy
of information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate
statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges
and lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect
the responses to our telephone interviews by Minnesota election
officials and were not independently verified by us.
Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration
Lists:
Minnesota is unique in the way election administration functions are
structured and can vary by jurisdiction. In this state, the county
auditor has certain election responsibilities and can choose to
delegate other election responsibilities to minor civil division-level
(MCD) government--townships and cities. For example, while counties
manage voter registration, county auditors may delegate other
functions, such as absentee voting to MCDs. There are some functions
that MCDs are responsible for handling, such as polling place matters.
Minnesota had a computerized statewide voter registration system in
place prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this mainframe-
based system in 1988. To comply with the provisions of HAVA, the state
amended its election laws and replaced its existing computerized
statewide voter registration system in 2004. The system included new
election management capabilities, such as providing election officials
with immediate access to enter and update applicant information and
creating electronic matching capabilities with state agencies to verify
voter eligibility. The system also centrally tracked absentee ballots
provided to military personnel or other citizens residing overseas. The
project was completed in 11 months at a reported cost of about $5.3
million.
Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration
Applications:
To implement HAVA, Minnesota verifies voter registration application
information by comparing name, date of birth, driver's license number,
or the last four digits of the voter's Social Security number with
motor vehicle agency records to identify potentially ineligible
applications. Since Minnesota is a same-day registration state, checks
for duplicates are automatically run on voter applications on a daily
basis. In addition, the Department of Public Service tracks visas
issued to ensure that noncitizens are unable to vote.
At the time of our review, Minnesota was in the process of completing a
memorandum of understanding with the Social Security Administration
(SSA) to allow verification of information on voter registration
applications by comparing it with SSA records. Officials anticipated
that they would begin conducting matches by 2006.
Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists:
To implement HAVA, Minnesota election officials took steps to maintain
the accuracy of the voter registration list by coordinating with other
state agency records, as described below.
* Duplicate registrants. The statewide voter registration system
produces maintenance reports to identify potential duplicates. In
addition, checks for duplicates are run on an annual basis.
* Deceased registrants. On a monthly basis, county officials conduct
manual checks of oral and paper death records from the Department of
Vital Statistics by checking the name, date of birth, and the full
Social Security number.
* Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, officials receive paper
records from the courts to check for those persons convicted of a
disqualifying felony. Once the court computer system is in place, this
process will have the capability to provide electronic matching by
comparing the applicant's name, date of birth, driver's license,
identification card, full Social Security number, and last four digits
of the Social Security number.
* Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. On a monthly
basis, officials receive paper records from the courts to check for
those declared mentally incompetent.
To ensure that the names of eligible voters are not inadvertently
removed from the statewide voter registration list, state officials
send notices to voters prior to removing their names from the list.
Challenges and Lessons Learned:
Minnesota election officials reported that one of the major challenges
they faced was replacing the existing voter registration system in an
11-month time frame. Also, officials told us that conducting elections
while updating their voter registration system further complicated
their efforts. Another challenge that election officials reported was
converting data on registered voters from the old system database to
the new system. Minnesota officials said that to help local officials
with this work they developed a tool that allowed them to compare old
records of voter information with the new ones on a case-by-case basis.
In addition, Minnesota election officials discussed various lessons
learned while implementing the HAVA requirements. The first lesson
learned was the importance of identifying and prioritizing the
functional requirements for the computerized statewide voter
registration system. In order to manage the scope of replacing a
computerized statewide voter registration system, election officials
told us they had to separate the "nice to have" features from the
features required by HAVA. This step assisted election officials in
managing the scope and cost of their project.
Second, Minnesota election officials reported using in-house resources
to replace the existing computerized statewide voter registration
system. According to election officials, it is best to use in-house
resources to establish a computerized statewide voter registration
system when there are sufficient in-house resources and staff
expertise.
Third, Minnesota election officials said that it was useful to create
an online user's manual for the computerized statewide voter
registration system. Election officials reported that by having the
user's manual online, staff at all levels had immediate access to
information on how to operate the computerized statewide voter
registration system.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: Reported Experiences of South Carolina Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
This appendix describes steps South Carolina election officials
reported taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to
establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying
the accuracy of information provided on voter applications, and
maintaining accurate statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix
summarizes challenges and lessons learned election officials reported
with respect to implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this
appendix reflect the responses to our telephone interviews by South
Carolina election officials and were not independently verified by us.
Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration
Lists:
South Carolina had an interactive computerized statewide voter
registration system in place prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state
created this mainframe-based system in the late 1960s and modified it
in 1992. Election officials made minor modifications to its system by
adding additional data fields in order to implement the provisions of
HAVA. The system also has election management capabilities beyond HAVA,
including the ability to track absentee voters and poll managers. The
state reportedly spent about $67,000 in federal funds for the most
current system modifications.
Election officials began work on a new Web-based, menu-driven system in
2000. The system is expected to be more flexible and is to allow
election officials to perform election administration tasks such as
signature verification. The new system is also expected to have the
capability to run checks with the motor vehicle agency database.
Officials reported that the implementation of the new system will not
take place until after the 2006 elections.
Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Applications:
South Carolina required voter registration applicants to provide their
full Social Security number on voter registration applications as a
unique identifier. Since South Carolina collects the full Social
Security number, the state is not subject to the HAVA requirements to
collect a unique identifying number or to verify information on voter
registration applications with the motor vehicle agency or Social
Security Administration. South Carolina elected not to verify
information with these agencies, as HAVA allows. Prior to entering
applicants into the statewide list, county officials check to ensure
the application does not duplicate an existing registration. State
officials compare voter registration applications with records on
deceased persons and persons ineligible to register to vote because of
a disqualifying felony conviction, as allowed under state law.
Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists:
Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, South Carolina officials
maintain the accuracy of the state's voter registration list by
coordinating the list with other state agency records, as described
below.
* Duplicate registrants. South Carolina produces a report on duplicates
quarterly. The voter registration system identifies duplicate
registrants using the full Social Security number and date of birth.
County officials make the necessary changes.
* Deceased registrants. State officials conduct monthly electronic
comparisons with state agency death records. Officials identify any
matches by checking name, date of birth, and full Social Security
number and remove names of ineligible registrants.
* Disqualified felons. State officials conduct monthly electronic
comparisons with state agency felony records. Officials identify any
matches based on name, address, date of birth, and full Social Security
number and remove names of ineligible registrants.
* Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. The counties
maintain paper records on the mentally incompetent. Upon receipt of a
written court order, county officials identify and remove ineligible
voters.
In order to ensure that eligible voters' names are not inadvertently
removed, state officials send a letter to voters to notify them of
their impending removal from the statewide voter registration list.
Letters are sent to individuals who have filed a change-of-address with
the U.S. Postal Service, failed to appear in the most recent two
federal elections, or have a disqualifying felony conviction. South
Carolina officials reported that they removed the names of ineligible
voters in 2004.
Challenges and Lessons Learned:
Although South Carolina had a statewide voter registration system in
place prior to HAVA, officials shared their general perspectives on
implementing voter registration systems. Officials stated that forming
a working group composed of state and local officials helped to ensure
stakeholder buy-in. State officials also reported that the updated
system that they are in the process of creating is proving challenging
because they are developing it in-house instead of purchasing the
system from a vendor. Officials reported that states should assess
their available resources and skills before deciding to develop a
system on their own.
[End of section]
Appendix X: Reported Experiences of South Dakota Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
This appendix describes steps South Dakota election officials reported
taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing
computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy
of information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate
statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges
and lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect
the responses to our telephone interviews by South Dakota election
officials and were not independently verified by us.
Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration
Lists:
South Dakota had a computerized statewide voter registration system in
place prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created the system in
2002. Election officials added new data fields and data matching
capability to the existing computerized list in order to implement the
provisions of HAVA. The modifications cost $302,004, of which $103,598
came from federal funds and $198,406 from state funds.
Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration
Applications:
To implement HAVA, county election officials verified voter
registration application information by comparing name, date of birth,
and driver's license number, or the last four digits of the voter's
Social Security number, with state motor vehicle agency records to
identify potentially inaccurate applications. These officials also
compared applications with records on the deceased and persons
convicted of a disqualifying felony prior to adding them to the
statewide voter list. South Dakota local election officials verified
voter registration information by comparing it with the Social Security
Administration's records beginning in August 2005.
Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists:
As required to implement HAVA, election officials have taken steps to
maintain the accuracy of South Dakota's voter registration list by
coordinating the list with other state agency records, as described
below.
* Duplicate registrants. State officials check the statewide list for
duplicates at least annually and more often during an election cycle.
State officials identify duplicate registrants by checking for voters
with the same name, driver's license number, and the last four digits
of the Social Security number and forward the names of ineligible
registrants to county officials for processing.
* Deceased registrants. Local officials match name, date of birth, and
the last four digits of the Social Security number on voter
registration applications with the state vital statistics agency's
death records through weekly electronic batch comparisons.
* Disqualified felons. Local officials electronically compare voter
registration applications with records of persons convicted of a
disqualifying felony that makes them ineligible to register to vote.
Officials identify persons ineligible to register to vote based on
name, date of birth, driver's license number, and last four digits of
the Social Security number.
* Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the event
that a court issues a declaration of mental incompetence, the court
provides the written declaration to the county election official who
removes the ineligible registrant from the voter list.
In South Dakota, local officials are responsible for updating voter
information and removing names from the voter registration list. To
ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed from the
state voter registration list, local election officials send letters
notifying individuals of their pending removal from the statewide voter
registration list.
Challenges and Lessons Learned:
State officials reported that working as a team and maintaining a
positive working relationship with the counties enabled South Dakota to
implement HAVA by the deadline.
[End of section]
Appendix XI: Reported Experiences of West Virginia Election Officials
Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions:
This appendix describes steps West Virginia election officials reported
taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing
computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy
of information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate
statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges
and lessons learned election officials reported with respect to
implementing HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect
the responses to our telephone interviews by West Virginia election
officials and were not independently verified by us.
Steps Taken to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration
Lists:
With regard to the HAVA statewide computerized list provisions, West
Virginia created an interactive, computerized statewide voter
registration system. According to state election officials, some
counties had computerized voter registration systems prior to the
enactment of HAVA, but they were not interconnected through a statewide
computer system. Election officials hired a vendor to create the new
statewide system, which went into service in January 2004 at a reported
cost of approximately $1.9 million in federal funds. The new system
also has election management capabilities beyond the requirements of
HAVA, including the ability to produce reports on absentee ballots,
early voters, poll workers, and election data statistics. It also
provides a separate database to track poll workers.
Verifying Accuracy of Information Provided on Voter Registration
Applications:
To implement HAVA, West Virginia developed the capability to verify
voter registration application information by comparing name, date of
birth, and driver's license number or the last four digits of the
voter's Social Security number with motor vehicle agency (MVA) records.
However, officials reported that the state had difficulty conducting
data matches with MVA because MVA lacked the ability to interface with
the statewide voter list. Officials said that they expected this
problem to be resolved by 2006. Since the enactment of HAVA, the state
system checks new applications for duplicates, automatically flags
duplicates, and notifies county officials to eliminate them.
West Virginia is in the process of finalizing the agreement with the
Social Security Administration (SSA) to allow a comparison between
voter eligibility information and SSA data as required by HAVA. This
agreement will enable state officials to compare the last four digits
of a voter's Social Security number with SSA records. Officials
reported that they expected the agreement to be completed by December
2005.
Maintenance of Accurate Statewide Voter Lists:
Prior to HAVA, county voter registration systems could only check for
duplicates within the county, and local officials could only check
felony and death lists using paper records. Since the enactment of
HAVA, election officials have taken steps to maintain the accuracy of
the statewide voter registration list by coordinating the list with
other state agency records, as described below.
* Duplicate registrants. West Virginia checked the entire database for
duplicates during the implementation of its new statewide system. The
county clerks also periodically check the system for duplicate
registrants.
* Deceased registrants. County officials maintain the voter
registration list through a monthly comparison of the list with state
death records. At the time of this report, officials rely on oral and
paper records to identify any matches by checking name, address, date
of birth, and the last four digits of the Social Security number.
Officials said they expected in the future to conduct these comparisons
electronically.
* Disqualified felons. County officials receive paper records from
federal and state courts on disqualifying felony convictions.
* Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. The state
does not conduct list maintenance based on this information.
Local officials are responsible for updating voter information and for
removing voter records; state officials said that they follow the
National Voter Registration Act provisions for removing names from the
list. In general, section 8 of NVRA provides that, in the
administration of voter registration for federal elections, states may
not remove names of registrants for non-voting and that names of
registrants may be removed only for certain specified reasons.
Challenges and Lessons Learned:
[End of section]
West Virginia officials also said that meeting the time frames they
established for developing their computerized lists was challenging, in
part because of limited staff available to complete the work. The
officials stated that it might have been better to introduce the system
incrementally. West Virginia officials also reported that the counties
resisted moving from county-based systems to the statewide system in
part because many of them viewed the new statewide system as an
intrusion into a domain of election administration that had been a
local--not a state--responsibility. Involving county officials in
designing and implementing the system, the state officials said, might
have simplified implementation of the new system. Other challenges
reported by West Virginia officials included data conversion, obtaining
timely approvals for purchases, changing necessary provisions of state
law, and overcoming technology problems.
[End of section]
Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William O. Jenkins, Jr., (202) 512-8777, or jenkinswo@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact person named above, John Mortin, Assistant
Director; David Alexander; Leo Barbour; Amy Bernstein; Michelle Fejfar;
Geoff Hamilton; E. Anne Laffoon; Jean Orland; Dan Rodriguez; Miquel
Salas: Stephanie Sand; and Ashanta Williams made key contributions to
this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).
[2] HAVA in general applies to elections for federal office in the 55
U.S. states and territories, including the District of Columbia, but
for the purposes of this report, we refer only to the states. North
Dakota does not require voters to register to vote and is, therefore,
not subject to the HAVA requirements to create and maintain a
computerized statewide voter registration list.
[3] Not all states are subject to the HAVA requirement to verify voter
registration application information by comparing or matching it with
MVA or SSA records. In general, under HAVA, states requiring full
Social Security numbers on voter registration applications prior to
1975 in order to verify the identity of a registrant are not subject to
this HAVA requirement.
[4] HAVA established the EAC to provide guidance and manage payments to
the states for the implementation of HAVA's requirements.
[5] GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across
the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).
[6] GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local
Elections Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-
478 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).
[7] GAO, Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on
Managing Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote,
GAO-05-997 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2005).
[8] GAO, Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability
of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to
Be Completed, GAO-05-956 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2005).
[9] HAVA provides that for those states using full Social Security
numbers on voter registration applications in accordance with Section 7
of the Privacy Act of 1974, HAVA's voter registration verification
requirements are optional. Of the states we reviewed, Georgia, Hawaii,
Kentucky, and South Carolina collect the full Social Security number
and, therefore, have not been treated as subject to the HAVA
registration information verification requirement. Georgia's right to
this Privacy Act exemption, however, was in litigation at the time of
our review. A district court order (Schwier v. Cox, Civil No. 1:00-CV-
2820, (N.D. Ga. January 31, 2005)) that Georgia does not qualify for
this exemption was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.
[10] In addition to states, the District of Columbia, Guam, American
Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico are generally subject
to HAVA requirements.
[11] With respect to driver's license related information, the REAL ID
Act of 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005)) establishes
certain minimum standards, effective in May 2008, for state issuance of
driver's licenses in order for such licenses to be recognized for any
official purpose by federal agencies. For a state driver's license to
be recognized by a federal agency, the REAL ID Act provides, for
example, that states require applicants to present certain types of
information, such as documentation of a person's name, address of
principal residence, and evidence of a person's U.S. citizenship or
lawful immigration status prior to issuance. Federal recognition of
state-issued driver's licenses will also be conditioned upon, among
other things, a requirement that documents presented by an applicant be
verified by the state, that states enter into a memorandum of
understanding with the Secretary of Homeland Security to verify the
legal presence of noncitizen applicants, and that states provide all
other states electronic access to state motor vehicle database
information.
[12] Under federal law, U.S. Attorneys are required to give written
notice of felony convictions in federal district courts to the chief
state election official of the offender's state of residence upon
conviction of the offender. The law also requires the state election
officials to notify the election officials of the local jurisdiction in
which an offender resides of federal felony convictions. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973gg- 6(g). This provision was enacted into law in 1993 in section
8 of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), Pub. L. No.
103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993).
[13] Individuals who register by mail and have not previously voted in
an election for federal office in the state are, in general, required
to provide identification at the polls the first time they cast a
ballot.
[14] To be eligible to receive federal payments to implement this and
other HAVA provisions, states must comply with certain requirements
such as appropriating state funds equal to 5 percent of the total
funding to be spent on implementing HAVA.
[15] GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local
Elections Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-
478 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).
[16] HAVA is not the first federal legislation affecting the
administration of elections. The National Voter Registration Act, for
example, was enacted, in part to establish registration procedures
designed to "increase the number of eligible citizens who register to
vote in elections for Federal office," "protect the integrity of the
electoral process," and "ensure that accurate and current voter
registration lists are maintained."
[17] West Virginia election officials told us that while state law
provides that a person found mentally incompetent is ineligible to
register to vote, they have not received such information from courts.
[18] GAO-02-3.
[19] GAO-05-478.
[20] GAO-05-997.
[21] GAO-05-478.
[22] As discussed earlier, under the REAL ID Act of 2005 federal
recognition of state-issued driver's licenses will be conditioned upon,
among other things, a requirement that states provide all other states
electronic access to state motor vehicle database information.
[23] GAO-05-478.
[24] GAO-05-478.
[25] GAO-05-478.
[26] As discussed earlier, under the REAL ID Act of 2005, federal
recognition of state-issued driver's licenses will be conditioned upon,
among other things, a state requirement that applicants provide certain
information relating to their U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration
status prior to issuance. Federal recognition is also to be conditioned
upon, among other things, a requirement that states enter into a
memorandum of understanding with the Secretary of Homeland Security to
verify the legal presence of noncitizen applicants.
[27] GAO-05-478.
[28] We reported in the past that state election officials we
interviewed expressed concerns regarding (1) the receipt of inaccurate
voter registration applications from voter registration drives
sponsored by nongovernmental organizations and (2) failure of these
organizations to submit completed applications to election officials.
See GAO-05-997.
[29] For additional information on best practices associated with
acquiring and implementing vote systems, see GAO-05-956.
[30] Alaska does not have counties; instead, there are four election
regions responsible for administering elections. The state director of
elections appoints the regional election supervisors.
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