Weapons Acquisition

The United States today wields unprecedented military strength, boasting an impressive arsenal of battleforce ships, combat planes, tanks, and munitions. The acquisition of many of these weapons, however, has been fraught with major problems. Commitments have been made to programs like the B-2 bomber without first demonstrating that they meet critical performance requirements. Unit costs for weapon systems like the DDG-51 destroyer and the C-17 transport continue to spiral upward. Meanwhile, weapons such as the Advanced Cruise Missile and Apache helicopter have been encountering costly production and support problems. This report explores what can be done to reverse past trends and improve the acquisition process. Today's acquisition problems are the consequences of a procurement process that has become deeply rooted over the years. Yet GAO believes that the prospects for lasting change, given the diminished Soviet threat and declining defense budgets, have never been more encouraging. This report draws on 15 years of GAO work on acquisition issues, examining the cultural side of acquisition problems to suggest ways to improve the process in the future.

GAO found that: (1) despite attempts to improve the acquisition process, weapons still cost more, take longer to field, often encounter performance problems, and are difficult to produce or support; (2) cost growth, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls can befall weapons acquisition programs that are not well conceived, planned, managed, funded, and supported; (3) many analyses for justifying major acquisitions are narrowly focused and do not fully consider alternative solutions; (4) many acquisition programs take longer and cost more to develop and produce weapons than the estimates on which the programs were initially approved; (5) weapons take too long to develop and field; (6) weapons begin production too quickly and are fielded with major unknowns or unresolved problems and many weapons encounter significant problems on the production line and in the field; (7) program sponsors frequently make optimistic cost assumptions and reduce quantities or program scope or prolong the schedule to make a program affordable and thereby avoid cancellation; (8) program survival is a more powerful incentive than program affordability; (9) successful programs have tended to pursue reasonable performance objectives and avoid the effects of design instability and the equation of program success with technical success; and (10) reforms in management practices include realistic estimating, thorough testing, and accurate reporting.