Navy Mine Warfare

Operation Desert Storm revealed major weaknesses in the Navy's ability to detect and disarm enemy mines. The Navy possessed only limited capability at the time to conduct mine countermeasures at various water depths. In addition, two Navy warships struck Iraqi mines in open waters in the Persian Gulf, causing $21.6 million worth of damage. By contrast, one of the mines was believed to cost $10,000 and the other $1,500. This report examines the steps the Navy is taking to ensure a viable, effective naval force that will be ready to conduct countermeasures in two nearly simultaneous regional wars. GAO evaluates the (1) status of the Navy's research and development projects, (2) readiness of the Navy's on-hand mine countermeasure assets, and (3) match between the Navy's planned and on-hand mine countermeasures assets and its mine countermeasures requirements.

GAO found that: (1) the Navy must develop different systems to cover deep- and shallow-water mine clearing operations, and its shallow-water MCM capability is limited; (2) the Navy has about 18 different projects to address its MCM weaknesses, but has not set clear priorities among its mine warfare programs; (3) a long-range plan could help the Navy maximize its limited financial resources and ensure ongoing funding of its priority systems; (4) the Navy has experienced delays in new systems' deployment and has identified shortfalls of at least $99.5 million in its shallow-water projects' development; (5) the Navy's 14 oceangoing MCM ships have long-standing equipment reliability problems and parts shortages, which hinders mission performance; (6) the Navy is resolving the ships' problems, but that will take several more years; (7) the Navy is spending about $1.5 billion for 12 coastal, non-oceangoing mine hunting ships that are no longer needed, and will spend an average of $3.6 million annually to operate and maintain each of them; (8) the Navy plans to acquire a new MCM command, control, and support ship early in the next century and, in the interim, convert an older helicopter carrier at a cost of $118 million, but other existing ships and onshore locations could fulfill mission requirements at a lower cost; and (9) the Navy could save millions of dollars by deactivating some of the coastal ships and the command support ship.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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