Military Prepositioning

The U.S. military stores, or prepositions, reserves of military equipment near possible war zones to help ensure that the items will be quickly available to U.S. troops in the event of a crisis. The Army and the Air Force have poorly defined, outdated, or otherwise questionable requirements in the major programs that GAO reviewed. The precise readiness of the prepositioned stocks--and the impact of any shortfalls--are hard to determine because of the questionable requirements that underpin the programs and the poor information that the services use to manage the programs. Although the services are trying to address these problems, it may be years before they are resolved and readiness can be reliably assessed. The Army's positioning of brigade sets in Kuwait, Qatar, Korea, and afloat reflects DOD's current two-war strategy. However, the requirements for the three brigade sets in Europe are questionable. GAO found wide variations in the readiness of the individual brigade sets. The Kuwait set is at a high level of readiness, and the sets afloat in Korea and Qatar are improving as additional equipment is added to them. The readiness of the European sets is declining, however, and the Army has no immediate plans to fill equipment shortages caused by the transfer of equipment to units in, or returning from, Bosnia. Until the Army establishes valid requirements for these programs and improves inventory reporting, their readiness cannot be reliably and comprehensively reported. Similarly, the Air Force has not determined precise requirements for its bare base and vehicle programs. For example, the Air Force is storing more than 900 vehicles in Europe but has no current requirements for the vehicles to be stored there. The Air Force reported significant shortfalls in its prepositioning programs, and GAO found equipment in poor condition. The most significant shortfall reported by the Air Force is in the Persian Gulf bare base program; the program has less than one-third of the sets that the Air Force projects it would need for a major war there. At one location GAO visited, GAO found that more than 40 percent of the Air Force's aging vehicles were in poor condition and would need to be repaired before being used.

GAO noted that: (1) the Army and Air Force have poorly defined, outdated, or otherwise questionable requirements in the major programs that GAO reviewed; (2) the Army and Air Force have reported significant shortages and poor maintenance conditions in their prepositioning programs; (3) reliable data to assess inventory fill and maintenance condition was unavailable; (4) while the services are taking steps to address the requirements and reporting problems, it may be several years before these problems are resolved and readiness can be reliably assessed; (5) the positioning of the Army's brigade sets in Kuwait, Qatar, Korea, and afloat supports the current two-war strategy; (6) the three brigade sets in Europe are in a state of flux, and the Army recognizes the need to revisit and evaluate the requirements for those sets; (7) the Kuwait set is at a high level of readiness, and the sets afloat, in Korea, and in Qatar are improving as additional equipment is added to these sets; (8) the readiness of the European sets is declining and the Army has no immediate plans to fill equipment shortages caused by the transfer of equipment to units in, or returning from, Bosnia; (9) the Army has not determined valid requirements for its operational projects and sustainment programs; (10) the Army is reviewing these programs to establish requirements; (11) until the Army establishes valid requirements and improves inventory reporting, their readiness cannot be reliably and comprehensively assessed; (12) the Air Force has not determined precise requirements for its bare base and vehicle programs; (13) in the Persian Gulf, the Air Force has not completed the detailed planning at each of its planned operating locations to determine what infrastructure and vehicles would be available to deploying forces; (14) current requirements are based on a worst-case scenario that assumes the Air Force must provide virtually all the facilities and vehicles it would need should a major war occur; (15) in Europe, the Air Force is storing over 900 vehicles but has no current requirements for the vehicles to be stored there; (16) in the vehicle program, the Air Force does not have reliable, comprehensive reports of inventories on hand or their maintenance condition; (17) at one location visited, GAO found that over 40 percent of Air Force's aging vehicles were in poor condition and would require repair before being used; and (18) until the Air Force determines requirements for these programs and improves reporting, the impact of shortfalls and poor maintenance conditions will be difficult to discern.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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