Military Readiness

The Army spends about $1 billion annually to operate three combat training centers in California, Louisiana, and Germany. The Army established the centers to increase unit readiness for deployment and warfighting; to produce bold, innovative leaders through stressful tactical and operational exercises; to embed doctrine throughout the Army; to provide feedback to Army and joint combined participants; and to provide a data source for lessons learned to improve doctrine training, leader development, organizations, and material to help soldiers win in combat. GAO found that although most units that trained at the training centers in 1998 favorably assessed their training, neither the Army nor individual units were realizing the full benefits of this training. This is because (1) many units were arriving ill prepared for the exercises, (2) training was not as realistic as it could be, (3) the condition and age of pre-positioned equipment had harmed training at two centers, and (4) neither individual units nor the Army itself was able to effectively capitalize on lessons learned from the centers' exercises.

GAO noted that: (1) although the majority of units that trained at the Army's combat training centers in 1998 favorably assessed their training, neither the Army nor individual units are achieving the full benefits of this training; (2) this is because: (a) many units are arriving ill prepared for the exercises; (b) training is not as realistic as it could be; (c) the condition and age of pre-positioned equipment has adversely affected training at two centers; and (d) neither individual units nor the Army itself is able to effectively capitalize on lessons learned from the centers' exercises; (3) personnel shortages, turnover, and high operating tempo have adversely affected units' ability to prepare for their rotations to the centers, and as a result, units are arriving ill prepared to engage in the exercises; (4) in February 1999, Army Forces Command issued new guidance that requires unit commanders to establish training "gates" at their home stations to gauge whether their units are prepared to move to more complex training levels, including training center exercises; (5) since the guidance does not address the causes of insufficient preparation, strict adherence to the guidance may simply serve to exclude some units from valuable training center experiences; (6) because units lack proficiency at the battalion level, the centers routinely modify conditions in ways that provide less challenging and thereby less realistic scenarios than might be encountered on a real battlefield; (7) by limiting conditions and not accurately portraying current and future threats, the training centers undermine realism and limit the value of training exercises; (8) the poor condition and age of some pre-positioned equipment at NTC and JRTC further degrade training; (9) as of July 1999, the Army was considering various alternatives to improve pre-positioned equipment at NTC; (10) commanders cannot take full advantage of the lessons learned at the centers due to ineffective take-home materials, a lack of training opportunities once they return home, and personnel turnover that prevents them from attending to the identified weaknesses; (11) although the centers have collected large amounts of data, the Army has never standardized data collection and therefore cannot combine information to assess trends; and (12) consequently, the Army cannot take full advantage of its lessons learned and does not know the extent to which center exercises are improving unit and leader proficiency.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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