Environmental Contamination
Corps Needs to Reassess Its Determinations That Many Former Defense Sites Do Not Need Cleanup Gao ID: GAO-02-658 August 23, 2002The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that cleaning up contamination and hazards at thousands of properties that it formerly owned or controlled will take more than 70 years and cost as much as $20 billion. These formerly used defense sites (FUDS), which can range in size from less than an acre to many thousands of acres, are now used for parks, farms, schools, and homes. Hazards at these properties include unsafe buildings, toxic and radioactive wastes, containerized hazardous wastes, and ordnance and explosive wastes. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for identifying, investigating, and cleaning up hazards resulting from military use. GAO found that the Corps lacks a sound basis for its conclusion that 38 percent of 3,840 FUDS need no further study or cleanup action. The Corps' determinations are questionable because there is no evidence that it reviewed or obtained information that would allow it to identify all the potential hazards at the properties, or that it took sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards. GAO also found that the Corps often did not notify owners of its determinations that the properties did not need further action, as called for in its guidance, or tell the owners to contact the Corps if evidence of DOD-caused hazards was found later.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-02-658, Environmental Contamination: Corps Needs to Reassess Its Determinations That Many Former Defense Sites Do Not Need Cleanup
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
August 2002:
Environmental Contamination:
Corps Needs to Reassess Its Determinations That Many Former Defense
Sites Do Not Need Cleanup:
GAO-02-658:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
About 38 Percent of the Corps‘ Determinations That No DOD Action Is
Indicated Are Questionable:
Corps Did Not Consistently Notify Owners and Regulatory Agencies about
NDAI Determinations and Non-DOD Contamination:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Additional Details on Our Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Results of Our Analysis of 603 Randomly Selected NDAI
Properties:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
Tables:
Table 1: Corps Districts in Our Sample:
Table 2: Results of GAO‘s Analysis of 603 Randomly Selected NDAI
Properties (Shown by Corps District):
Figures:
Figure 1: Examples of Hazards That Might Be Present at FUDS Properties:
Figure 2: Geographic Distribution of 4,030 FUDS Properties That the
Corps Has Determined Require No Further DOD Study or Cleanup Action:
Figure 3: Photo of Locked Gate and Corps Staff Notes from a Site Visit
to a 255-Acre Former Nike Missile Site:
Figure 4: Photo of Large Log Home and Corps Staff Notes from a Site
Visit to a 255-Acre Former Nike Missile Site:
Figure 5: Photo from a Site Visit to a Former Gap Filler Annex:
BD/DR: building demolition and debris removal:
CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980:
CON/HTRW: containerized hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste:
DCI: data collection instrument:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
FUDS: formerly used defense sites:
GAO: General Accounting Office:
HTRW: hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste:
NDAI: no DOD action indicated:
OEW: ordnance and explosive waste:
SARA: Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986:
Letter August 23, 2002:
The Honorable John D. Dingell
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Sawyer
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that cleaning up
contamination and hazards at thousands of properties that it formerly
owned or controlled will take more than 70 years and cost from $15
billion to $20 billion. These formerly used defense sites (FUDS), now
owned by states, local governments, and individuals, are used for
parks, farms, schools, and homes. Many of these properties, which can
range in size from less than an acre to many thousands of acres, were
acquired or used by DOD more than 30 to 40 years ago and in some cases
more than 100 years ago. Hazards at these properties can include unsafe
buildings; hazardous, toxic, and radioactive wastes; containerized
hazardous wastes; and ordnance and explosive wastes. The U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) is responsible for identifying,
investigating, and cleaning up such hazards if DOD caused them.
Since 1984, the Corps has determined that more than 4,000 of the 9,181
properties potentially eligible for its FUDS cleanup program do not
have hazards that require further Corps study or cleanup action. The
Corps made these determinations following a preliminary assessment of
eligibility in which the Corps first established whether the properties
were ever under DOD control and thus eligible for the FUDS program. If
a property met this criterion, the Corps then determined if any hazards
caused by DOD might be present. To make this determination, Corps
guidance calls for (1) obtaining available information on the present
and prior uses of the site from records, owners, and federal, state,
and local agencies; (2) requesting from the current owner both
information on any hazards caused by DOD that might be present and
permission to physically inspect the property; and (3) visiting the
site to examine it for obvious signs of hazards. If the Corps does not
find evidence that hazards caused by DOD might be present, the Corps
designates the properties as ’No DOD action indicated, Category I“
(NDAI).
[Footnote 1] Corps guidance also calls for the owner to be notified of
the NDAI determination. The Corps will reconsider an NDAI
determination,
and, if necessary, take appropriate action if evidence of DOD-caused
hazards is found later. However, the Corps does not generally initiate
further review, but relies on owners and federal and state regulatory
agencies for new information about potential hazards caused by DOD.
Depending on the types of hazards, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) or state environmental regulatory agencies may be responsible for
ensuring that the Corps meets applicable cleanup requirements and
standards. EPA and some states have questioned the adequacy of the
Corps‘ process for assessing the presence of potential hazards and the
validity of some of its determinations that no DOD action is indicated.
In this context, you asked us to determine the extent to which the
Corps (1) has a sound basis for its NDAI determinations and (2) has
communicated its NDAI determinations to owners and to the regulatory
agencies that may have responsibility and notified the owners that it
will reconsider an NDAI determination if evidence of DOD-caused hazards
is found later.
To determine if the Corps has a sound basis for its NDAI
determinations, we reviewed a statistical sample of 635 of 4,023 NDAI
files at nine Corps districts selected from 21 of the 22 Corps
districts that execute the FUDS program.[Footnote 2] These 21 districts
accounted for 99.8 percent of the NDAIs at the time of our review. We
excluded 32 of the 635 properties from our analysis because the files
contained evidence that the property either was not eligible for the
FUDS program or that a cleanup project was proposed. Based on our
sample, we estimate that 3,840 of the 4,023 determinations in our study
population met the definition of an NDAI--the property was eligible for
the FUDS program and the Corps determined that no further study or
cleanup action was needed. We reviewed each file to determine
if it contained evidence that the Corps (1) had reviewed or obtained
information on the prior uses of the site that would allow it to
identify the types of hazards potentially resulting from DOD‘s use and
(2) had taken sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential
hazards. We did not question the soundness of an NDAI determination
based on the absence of a single piece of information, such as a site
map or a record of contact with an owner. Rather, we based our
assessment of the Corps‘ efforts on the totality of the evidence in the
file. Our questioning of an NDAI determination does not mean that the
property is contaminated; rather, it indicates that the Corps‘ file did
not contain evidence that the Corps took steps to identify and assess
potential hazards at the property that would support the NDAI
determination. To determine whether the Corps communicated its NDAI
determinations to owners and the regulatory agencies and notified
owners of its willingness to reconsider an NDAI decision, we examined
the NDAI files for evidence that the Corps had done so. The results of
our analysis can be projected to the NDAI population in the 21
districts. The percentages and numbers of questionable NDAIs and those
related to the universe of NDAIs presented in this report are
statistical estimates based on our analysis of 603 NDAI files. We
express the precision of the results of our analysis (that is, the
sampling errors associated with these estimates) as 95 percent
confidence intervals.[Footnote 3] All percentage estimates have
sampling errors of plus or minus 10 percentage points or less, unless
otherwise stated. All other numeric estimates have sampling errors of
plus or minus 10 percent of the value of those estimates or less,
unless otherwise stated.
Results in Brief:
Our analysis of Corps files indicates that the Corps does not have a
sound basis for determining that about 38 percent, or 1,468, of 3,840
formerly used defense sites do not need further study or cleanup
action.[Footnote 4] The Corps‘ determinations are questionable because
there is no evidence that the Corps reviewed or obtained information
that would allow it to identify all the potential hazards at these
properties or that it took sufficient steps to assess the presence of
potential hazards. For example, we estimate that for about 74 percent
of all NDAI properties, the files do not indicate that the Corps
reviewed or obtained information such as site maps or photos that would
show facilities, such as ammunition storage facilities, that could
indicate the presence of hazards (e.g., unexploded ordnance). We also
estimate that the files for about 60 percent of all NDAI properties do
not indicate that the Corps contacted all the current owners to obtain
information about potential hazards.[Footnote 5] In addition, the Corps
appeared to have overlooked or dismissed information in its possession
that indicated hazards might be present. For example, at a nearly
1,900-acre site previously used as an airfield by both the Army and the
Navy, the file included a map showing bomb and fuse storage units on
the site that would suggest the possible presence of ordnance-related
hazards. However, despite the map, we found no evidence that the Corps
searched for such hazards. In other cases, the files contained no
evidence that the Corps took sufficient steps to assess the presence of
potential hazards. For example, although Corps guidance calls for a
site visit to look for signs of potential hazards, we estimate that the
files do not show that Corps conducted the required site visits for
686,[Footnote 6] or about 18 percent, of all NDAI properties.
The problems with the Corps‘ assessments occurred, in part, because
Corps guidance does not specify (1) what documents or level of detail
the Corps should obtain when looking for information on the prior uses
of and the facilities located at FUDS properties to identify potential
hazards or (2) how to assess the presence of potential hazards. For
example, some Corps district staff stated that there was no guidance
showing the types of hazards normally found at certain types of
facilities. Since many properties may have not been properly assessed,
the Corps does not know the number of additional properties that may
require cleanup, the hazards that are present at those properties, the
risk associated with these hazards, the length of time needed for
cleanup, or the cost to clean up the properties.
Our analysis also indicates that the Corps frequently did not notify
owners of its determinations that the properties did not need further
action, as called for in its guidance, or instruct the owners to
contact the Corps if evidence of DOD-caused hazards was found later.
Based on our review of Corps files, we estimate that the Corps did not
notify all the current owners of its determinations for about 72
percent of the properties that the Corps determined do not need further
study or cleanup action. Even when the Corps notified the owners of its
determinations, we estimate that at about 91 percent of these
properties it did not instruct the owners to contact the Corps if
evidence of potential hazards was found later.[Footnote 7] In some
cases, several years elapsed before the Corps notified owners of its
determinations. This lack of communication with the owners hinders the
Corps‘ ability to reconsider, when appropriate, its determinations that
no further study or cleanup action is necessary. The Corps also did not
notify EPA or state environmental agencies of its determinations or of
potential hazards it identified that were not the result of DOD use,
even though these agencies may have regulatory responsibilities to
ensure that cleanup occurs. Although there is no specific requirement
for the Corps to notify regulatory agencies of non-DOD contamination,
its failure to do so results in missed opportunities to assist the
agencies‘ efforts to carry out their statutory responsibilities to
protect human health and the environment.
We are including recommendations in this report that address the need
for the Corps to (1) develop more specific guidelines and procedures
for identifying and assessing potential hazards at FUDS and (2) use the
revised guidelines and procedures to review its NDAI files and
determine which properties should be reassessed. We are also
recommending that the Corps consistently implement procedures to ensure
that owners and regulatory agencies are notified of NDAI determinations
and its policy of reconsidering its determinations if evidence of DOD-
caused hazards is found later.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it did not
agree that the Corps did not (1) consistently obtain information
necessary to identify potential hazards at FUDS or (2) take sufficient
steps to assess the presence of potential hazards. Although DOD
included a number of statements that described the Corps‘ procedures
and process for evaluating FUDS in its comments, it did not provide any
evidence to support its position. Further, DOD partially agreed with
our recommendations and indicated that efforts are underway to evaluate
current Corps guidance and determine if revisions or additional
guidance are needed. DOD also indicated that it has plans to reevaluate
two to five NDAIs per year at each state‘s request. In addition, DOD
provided a number of technical comments and clarifications, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
Background:
Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, DOD is authorized
to identify, investigate, and clean up environmental contamination and
other hazards at FUDS. The environmental restoration program was
established by section 211 of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), which amended the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA).[Footnote 8] Under the environmental restoration program,
DOD‘s activities addressing hazardous substances, pollutants, or
contaminants are required to be carried out consistent with section 120
of CERCLA.
DOD delegated its authority for administering the FUDS program to the
U.S. Army; in turn, the U.S. Army delegated execution of the program to
the Corps. To be eligible for cleanup under the FUDS program, a
property must have been owned by, leased to, possessed by, or otherwise
controlled by DOD during the activities that caused hazards. These
hazards consist of:
* unsafe buildings, structures, or debris,[Footnote 9] such as leaning
or weakened load-bearing walls or supports; open-sided platforms or
floors more than 6 feet above the next lower level; and any pit,
depression, or tank that can collect or contain standing water, such as
underground missile silos, septic tanks, and sewers;
* hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste, which includes contaminants
such as arsenic, certain paints, some solvents, petroleum and some
related products, and toxic pollutants from landfills;
* containerized hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste, such as
transformers and underground and aboveground storage tanks that contain
petroleum, solvents, or other chemicals; and:
* ordnance and explosive waste such as military munitions and chemical
warfare agents.
Figure 1 shows examples of the types of hazards that might be found at
FUDS properties.
Figure 1: Examples of Hazards That Might Be Present at FUDS Properties:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Department of Defense and www.uxoinfo.com.
[End of figure]
According to DOD‘s fiscal year 2001 report on the status of its various
environmental cleanup programs, there were 9,181 properties identified
by the Corps, the states, or other parties as potentially eligible for
cleanup under the FUDS program.[Footnote 10] To determine if an
identified property is eligible for the FUDS program, the Corps
conducts a preliminary assessment of eligibility to establish whether
the property was ever owned or controlled by DOD and if hazards from
DOD‘s use are potentially present. Corps officials point out that the
preliminary assessment of eligibility is not intended to be a
comprehensive evaluation of the FUDS property; instead, it is a
screening effort intended to determine if potential hazards caused by
DOD exist and, if so, whether additional study or cleanup actions are
required to address such hazards. Corps guidance generally calls for
staff to use the following procedures when conducting a preliminary
assessment of eligibility:
* obtain available information on the present and prior uses of the
site from real estate and archival records; present and former owners;
and other federal, state, and local agencies;
* identify any relevant conditions, such as a release of liability or a
requirement to restore the property, in real estate deeds that would
affect the federal government‘s liability;
* contact the current owner to obtain permission for an initial survey
of the property to determine if DOD-caused hazards are potentially
present; and:
* visit the property to examine it for obvious signs of hazards and
identify any areas that may require further study or testing.
At the end of the preliminary assessment of eligibility, the Corps
determines if any further study or cleanup action is needed. If the
Corps determines that no further action is needed, the property is
designated as NDAI.[Footnote 11] According to Corps guidance, the
districts must notify current owners of the result of the preliminary
assessment of eligibility within 30 to 60 days after the final NDAI
determination.
Because FUDS properties may have changed significantly since DOD owned
or controlled them, the facilities once present and any potential
hazards that may still exist may not be obvious. For example, former
DOD facilities at a FUDS property may have been renovated, destroyed,
or removed, and areas no longer used may be overgrown with vegetation,
making potential hazards more difficult to detect. As a result, key
components of the Corps‘ preliminary assessment of eligibility are
(1) obtaining historical documents, such as maps and photos that can
aid Corps staff in identifying and locating the facilities at the
property and indicate how the property was used (prior uses and the
activities that took place), and (2) conducting an inspection of the
property (site visit) to check for existing hazards caused by DOD.
Although DOD guidance states that CERCLA is the statutory framework for
the environmental restoration program, in recent years EPA has
questioned whether the Corps‘ process is consistent with CERCLA, and
both EPA and some state regulatory officials have questioned its
adequacy. While the Corps is required to carry out the program in
consultation with EPA, the Corps is not required to consult with state
regulatory agencies until hazards are discovered. Corps guidance now
instructs staff to keep EPA and state regulatory agencies informed of
the status and disposition of each NDAI determination, but the Corps
does not consult with EPA or the states when making its determination
because it considers the preliminary assessment of eligibility an
internal management process. Figure 2 shows the location of the 4,030
FUDS properties that the Corps has designated as NDAI.
Figure 2: Geographic Distribution of 4,030 FUDS Properties That the
Corps Has Determined Require No Further DOD Study or Cleanup Action:
[See PDF for image]
Note: When we selected our random sample in June 2001, there were 4,030
NDAIs.
[End of figure]
Source: GAO‘s analysis of data provided by the Corps of Engineers.
About 38 Percent of the Corps‘ Determinations That No DOD Action Is
Indicated Are Questionable:
Based on our review of NDAI files, we estimate that the Corps does not
have a sound basis for about 38 percent or 1,468,[Footnote 12] of the
estimated 3,840 NDAI determinations in our study population because the
property files did not contain evidence showing that the Corps
consistently reviewed or obtained information that would have allowed
it to identify all of the potential hazards at the properties or that
it took sufficient steps to assess their presence. In many cases, when
attempting to identify potential hazards resulting from DOD activities,
the Corps apparently did not obtain relevant information about former
DOD activities and facilities at the properties, such as buildings and
underground storage tanks constructed and used by DOD. For example,
based on our review of Corps files, we estimate that for about 74
percent, or 2,828,[Footnote 13] of all NDAI determinations, the Corps
did not review or obtain site maps, aerial photos, or ground photos
that could provide information about potential hazards (e.g., a site
map showing an ammunition storage facility could suggest the presence
of unexploded ordnance). Furthermore, in a number of cases, it appeared
that the Corps overlooked or dismissed information in its possession
when it looked for evidence of potential hazards. In addition, we
estimate that the Corps did not conduct a site visit at 686,[Footnote
14] or about 18 percent, of all NDAI properties despite Corps guidance
that requires site visits to determine if potential hazards are
present. The problems we noted occurred, in part, because Corps
guidance is not specific about what documents the Corps should obtain,
the level of detail required when seeking information on the prior uses
of the FUDS properties and the facilities located at them, or how to
assess the presence of potential hazards.
Corps Did Not Consistently Obtain Information Needed to Identify
Potential Hazards at FUDS:
The files for the NDAI properties that we reviewed did not always
indicate that the Corps reviewed or obtained information that would
have aided in identifying potential hazards at the properties.
Information on what DOD activities occurred, what DOD facilities
existed, and where those activities and facilities were located at FUDS
can provide leads about potential hazards and where they might be. Such
information could be obtained from site maps showing buildings or
facilities at the property; aerial and ground photos; current
landowners; or federal, state, and local agencies. However, although
Corps guidance instructs staff to obtain available information on the
present and prior uses of the site, the FUDS manual offers no specific
guidelines on what documents or level of detail to obtain.[Footnote 15]
While our review indicates that at some sites Corps staff obtained site
maps, aerial or ground photos, or information from owners or other
agencies, it appeared that the Corps did not do so consistently; as a
result, potential hazards may have been overlooked.
The random sample of NDAI files that we reviewed contained little
evidence that Corps staff reviewed or obtained site maps to identify
potential hazards. Maps can provide detailed information on the
facilities that were present when DOD owned or used the site and could
aid the Corps in identifying potential hazards resulting from military
activities at the site. For example, although there were no DOD
structures remaining at an anti-aircraft artillery site whose file we
reviewed, a detailed map showed the exact location of a gun
emplacement, an ammunition magazine, a motor pool area, a mess hall,
seven barracks, two administrative buildings, a communications
building, a drainage area, a septic tank, a grease rack, a 5,000-gallon
storage tank, an oil storage facility, a pump house, a grease trap, two
generators, a paint shed, a latrine, and a refueling area.
Obtaining such maps for sites could provide knowledge of site
facilities and could lead Corps staff to identify potential locations
of hazardous substances, ordnance, or unsafe buildings. Without the
site map, many of these facilities might not have been identified as
features that were likely to be located at an anti-aircraft artillery
site. Further, without the map, it might have been difficult to
establish the former locations of these facilities because of the size
of the property and the length of time that has elapsed between DOD‘s
use and the Corps‘ assessment. However, despite the usefulness of site
maps, based on our review, we estimate that for about 77 percent, or
2,972,[Footnote 16] of all NDAI properties, the files do not contain
site maps or references to a map review.
There was also little evidence that the Corps obtained aerial or ground
photos of the FUDS to identify potential hazards. Photos, like maps,
can provide information that may be useful in identifying potential
hazards. In addition to providing information on what facilities
existed and where they were located when the military owned or used the
site, photos can also provide information on the condition of the
facilities when the military was present. This information is
particularly important because if a facility was in good condition when
the military disposed of the property, but has since been allowed to
deteriorate, the Corps is not responsible for cleanup. Photos can also
help the Corps identify areas that were used as landfills or other
disposal sites. However, based on the information contained in the
Corps‘ files, we estimate that for about 92 percent, or 3,522, of all
NDAI determinations, the files do not contain aerial or ground photos
or indicate that photos were reviewed as part of the Corps‘ process.
In addition, there was little evidence that the Corps used the current
owner (or owners) as a source of information for the majority of the
sites that we reviewed. The current owner has the potential to provide
information about a FUDS property. If the current owner is the person
who first obtained the property from DOD, then the owner might be able
to describe the facilities that were present at acquisition and explain
what has become of those facilities. Even if the current owner is not
familiar with the DOD activities conducted at the site, the owner might
be able to describe the current condition of the property and note any
hazards present. Based on our review of NDAI files, we estimate that
the
Corps did not contact all the current owners for about 60 percent, or
2,319, of all NDAI properties in our study population.[Footnote 17]
Information on FUDS may also be available from various local, state,
and federal agencies. For example, during a preliminary assessment for
one property in the New York district, the Corps obtained information
on:
* the potential presence of ammunition or explosive wastes from the
city police department;
* facilities that may have been at the site during military use from a
city environmental office, the port authority transportation
department, the city police department, and the national archives;
* site maps from the city library; and:
* permits issued for underground storage tanks from the city building
department.
However, it appears that the Corps seldom asked these kinds of agencies
for information. For example, a New Jersey state official told us that
his department has 15,000 files on sites within the state, but the
Corps has never gone through the department‘s files. We estimate that
the Corps contacted a local, state, or federal agency to obtain
information that could indicate potential hazards for only about 10
percent, or 375, of the 3,840 NDAI properties in our study
population.[Footnote 18]
Camp O‘Reilly, a FUDS in Puerto Rico, exemplifies how obtaining
historical information on how a site was used or current information on
the condition of the property could have helped the Corps identify
potential hazards. Camp O‘Reilly was a 907-acre military post that
included 591 buildings and other facilities and housed about 8,000
troops from August 1942 to June 1945. In September 1992, the Corps
determined that there were no hazards at Camp O‘Reilly that were
eligible for FUDS cleanup and designated the site as NDAI. Yet, there
is no evidence in the Corps‘ files that the Corps obtained or reviewed
maps, archival photos, or studies, or that it contacted the current
owners to identify potential hazards during its preliminary assessment
of eligibility for Camp O‘Reilly. Had the Corps obtained and made use
of historical information, it could have identified a number of
potential hazards. In July 1997, the University of Puerto Rico, the
current owner, contacted the Corps and indicated that several locations
on the property contained hazards caused by DOD use. In a second
assessment--with the aid of the owner‘s information, site maps, and
records--the Corps identified three 15,000-gallon underground storage
tanks, an area adjacent to a drinking water source that is ’highly“
contaminated with oil by-products, a 12,000-square-foot landfill, and a
concrete structure (15 feet wide, 70 feet long, and 60 feet deep)
filled with water that presents a drowning hazard. These hazards have
all been determined to result from DOD use of the property and are
eligible for cleanup under the FUDS program.
Information on potential hazards found at certain types of FUDS
properties may also be useful in identifying potential hazards at other
similar properties. For example, in August 1994, the Corps issued
’Procedures for Conducting Preliminary Assessments at Potential
Ordnance and Explosive Waste Sites.“ This document notes that certain
types of former sites are highly likely to contain unexploded ordnance
and that such sites ’must not be determined as [NDAI] unless strong
evidence or extenuating circumstances can be presented as to why no
[ordnance] contamination is expected.“ The sites specified in the
document included Army airfields, auxiliary airfields, practice bombing
ranges, rifle ranges, and prisoner of war camps. Although these
procedures are not referenced in the FUDS Manual, and we cannot show a
cause-and-effect relationship between the issuance of the procedures
and the more frequent identification of unexploded ordnance as a
potential hazard, we found that that Corps staff identified unexploded
ordnance as a possible hazard at these types of sites more often after
the issuance of these procedures. For example, in our sample, which
included 48 auxiliary airfields, unexploded ordnance was identified as
a possible hazard at only 8 of 36 sites that the Corps reviewed before
the procedures were issued. In contrast, for the 12 auxiliary airfields
in our sample that the Corps reviewed after the procedures were issued,
the Corps identified unexploded ordnance as a potential hazard at 10 of
the airfields. Our sample also included 15 prisoner of war camps.
Before the procedures were issued, unexploded ordnance was not
identified as a possible hazard at any of the seven sites the Corps
reviewed. After the procedures were issued, five of the eight prisoner
of war camps in our sample were identified as having potential
unexploded ordnance hazards.
The Corps also developed a formal guide for assessing Nike missile
sites. In addition we found that a FUDS project manager in the Corps‘
Fort Worth district developed an informal guide for assessing 14
different types of FUDS properties that listed the hazards most likely
to be found at each. For example, if a property contained a laundry
facility, this informal guide indicates that staff should look for dry
cleaning solvents and tanks. Similarly, for a property containing an
unmanned radar station, staff should look for underground storage
tanks. The Fort Worth project manager told us that he developed the
guide because he did not know what to look for when he began working in
the FUDS program. However, while the use of such procedures or guides
appears to be useful in identifying potential hazards at certain types
of sites, we were able to identify or obtain only the three guides
discussed previously.
Corps Did Not Take Sufficient Steps to Assess the Presence of Potential
Hazards:
We found that at times Corps officials overlooked or dismissed
information in their possession that indicated potential hazards might
be present. Often, these problems appear to have involved a failure to
act upon information obtained during identification efforts or a
failure to consider information from owners or from federal, state, or
local environmental agencies. In other cases, the information in the
file suggested potential hazards at the site and did not indicate the
basis for the Corps‘ NDAI determination. We also found instances where
it appears that the Corps‘ assessment focused on only one of the four
potential hazards included in the Corps‘ program--unsafe buildings,
structures, or debris; hazardous, toxic, and radioactive wastes;
containerized hazardous wastes; and ordnance and explosive wastes.
According to several headquarters and district officials, the FUDS
program was focused primarily on cleaning up unsafe buildings and
debris in the early years of the program. Of the NDAI determinations
that we believe lack a sound basis, we estimate that the:
Corps either overlooked or failed to adequately assess the potential
for hazardous wastes at about 88 percent of the properties, for
containerized hazards at about 78 percent of the properties, and for
ordnance and explosive wastes at about 40 percent of the
properties.[Footnote 19] The following cases illustrate situations
where the Corps overlooked or dismissed information in its possession
that suggested that hazards might be present:
* The Corps identified a variety of facilities at Fort Casey, an almost
1,050-acre FUDS property in the state of Washington, and developed
information on prior uses; yet, the Corps apparently failed to use this
information in its assessment of the site. Facilities identified by the
Corps included a coal shed, oil and pump houses, a paint shop, a
gasoline station, a grease rack location, and a target shelter--
indicating, among other things, possible hazardous containerized and
ordnance-related wastes. Yet, the file contained no evidence that these
facilities and related potential hazards were considered. The potential
hazards stemming from the use of these facilities were not addressed in
documents or site visit descriptions, and the site was designated as
NDAI. Subsequent to our review, we learned that after the Corps
completed its assessment, the state environmental agency performed
independent reviews in 1999 and 2001, in part to document any threats
or potential threats to human health or the environment posed by this
site. The state reported finding hazardous wastes exceeding state
cleanup levels that were believed to have occurred during DOD ownership
of this site. The state also found what appeared to be fill pipes
normally associated with underground storage tanks--something the Corps
overlooked during its site visit and overall assessment of this site.
* Fort Pickens is an approximately 1,600-acre FUDS property on
the Florida coast that was used to defend against invasion during
World Wars I and II. The Corps identified numerous facilities,
including a power plant building, oil houses, ordnance warehouses, an
ordnance magazine, search light towers, transformers, electric poles,
water and ’miscellaneous“ facilities, and underground storage tanks. A
site visit revealed open manholes, confirmed the presence of
underground storage tanks and vent pipes and old ammunition lifts with
magazines, and identified a septic tank. The Corps also noted
vegetation stress and attributed this to the local drought. The file
contained no evidence that the Corps assessed the property for possible
chemical contamination. Despite noting the potential hazards associated
with these types of facilities and uses during its assessment and site
visit, the Corps designated the site as NDAI.
* The former Othello Air Force Station (Z-40) was a 77-acre aircraft
warning station in the state of Washington. At this site the Corps
initially identified approximately 106 facilities, including a diesel
plant; an auto maintenance shop; a possible 3,000-gallon underground
storage tank and two 25,000-gallon underground storage tanks; a vehicle
fueling station and many other oil, grease, ammunition, and paint
storage sites; a transformer; and ’other structures required for
operation of a radar station“ that existed during DOD ownership. The
presence of these facilities suggests the potential for both
containerized and freestanding hazardous wastes and ordnance hazards at
the property. However, there was no evidence the Corps considered the
former facilities and their characteristics as potential hazards in
reaching their NDAI determination, and, according to the file, the site
visit was ’only a cursory drive-thru inspection.“ An independent study
of this site by the state found hazards (i.e., petroleum compounds such
as gasoline, diesel, lube or hydraulic oil; polychlorinated biphenyls;
and pesticides) and some chemicals exceeding state cleanup levels at
two locations, which are believed linked to military
ownership.[Footnote 20]
* At the Millrock Repair and Storage Depot of New York, the Corps
identified potential aboveground storage tanks, gas pumps, a dynamite
storage building, and a generator shed. The Corps‘ file contained
conflicting trip reports, one indicating potential oil and gas spills
and another indicating that no hazards were found. The initial Corps
proposal for designating the site as NDAI was rejected by the
appropriate Corps district office, and a cleanup project was proposed
to sample for gasoline-related chemicals at the site of former storage
tanks and a gas pump. Subsequently, the proposed project was rejected
on the grounds that there was no evidence that the hazards were related
to DOD‘s use of the site. Despite the presence of potential hazards,
the file contains no evidence that the Corps took additional steps to
determine the source of the hazards or that it reported their presence
to the appropriate regulatory agencies.
* At the Mount Vernon Municipal Airport in the state of Washington, a
nearly 1,900-acre site previously used by both the Army and the Navy,
the Corps overlooked information in its possession indicating possible
ordnance hazards. In the preliminary assessment of eligibility for this
site, the Corps obtained a map showing conditions of the site on
June 30, 1944, which indicated bomb and fuse storage units. Although
the Corps assessed the site for unsafe buildings and debris and
containerized hazards, the file contained no evidence that the Corps
searched for possible unexploded ordnance despite both guidance issued
by the Corps in 1994, which states that Army airfields are likely to
contain unexploded ordnance, and the presence of the bomb and fuse
storage units, which would also indicate the potential presence of
unexploded ordnance.
We also found that in some cases the files did not contain evidence
that Corps staff conducted a site visit, as required by Corps guidance.
A site visit is one of the primary methods used by the Corps to
determine if the potential hazards are in fact present at a site. For
example, if the Corps identifies underground storage tanks as potential
hazards because a site was once used as a motor pool facility, a site
visit can be used to determine if underground storage tanks are still
in place. A typical site visit would include at least a visual check
for signs of filler or vent pipes, which would normally protrude
aboveground if tanks were still present. Without a site visit, the
Corps cannot check for the continued presence of potential hazards.
Based on our review of NDAI files, we estimate that about 18 percent,
or 686, of the estimated 3,840 NDAIs in our study population did not
receive site visits that met Corps requirements: about 428 properties
received no site visits, and about 258 properties received site visits
conducted from the air or from a vehicle, which are not appropriate,
according to Corps program officials.[Footnote 21]
The following case illustrates a situation where the Corps conducted
the site visit from the air:
* At the former Kasiana Island Base Station in Alaska, the site visit
consisted of an over-flight. Although a bunker was noted during the
flyover, the contractor conducting the assessment for the Corps said in
its report that the area was heavily overgrown. In addition, the file
contained no evidence that the Corps tried to identify power sources
(and any associated fuel storage tanks) that were likely present to
operate the searchlight positions and seacoast radar stations located
at the site. Although it was not possible to determine what, if any,
hazards may still exist at the site without being on the ground to
check for the presence of hazards, the file contained no evidence that
the Corps took any further action before designating the site as an
NDAI. Subsequent to designating the site as an NDAI, the Corps
revisited the site and found two underground storage tanks, several 55-
gallon drums, and a storage battery. Tests conducted in the area of the
underground storage tanks showed that diesel products in the
groundwater exceeded acceptable limits.
For some files designated as NDAI, it appeared that Corps staff
remained in their vehicles and took site visit photos from the site‘s
periphery. Figures 3, 4, and 5 are examples of such photos for visits
to a former Nike missile site and a former gap filler annex.
Figure 3: Photo of Locked Gate and Corps Staff Notes from a Site Visit
to a 255-Acre Former Nike Missile Site:
[See PDF for image]
Corps Staff Notes: ’Locked gate and road into the missile site area.
Property is posted. Owners could not be reached. No available telephone
number.“:
Source: Corps of Engineers files.
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Photo of Large Log Home and Corps Staff Notes from a Site
Visit to a 255-Acre Former Nike Missile Site:
[See PDF for image]
Corps Staff Notes: ’Large log home in distance is built on top of a
silo. Neighbor stated no H.T.W. [hazardous and toxic waste] at this
site.“:
Source: Corps of Engineers files.
[End of figure]
According to a 1986 guide developed by the Corps for assessing Nike
missile sites, hazards typically found at Nike sites include petroleum
compounds, paints and solvents, leaking underground storage tanks, and
lead from batteries. The guide also notes that dumping of wastes was
common at Nike sites. On-site dumps were usually located in secluded
areas that ’would evade the attention of inspecting military officers,“
according to the guide.
Figure 5: Photo from a Site Visit to a Former Gap Filler Annex:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The Corps found no evidence of environmental problems at the
site.
Source: Corps of Engineers files.
[End of figure]
Gap filler annexes are typically unmanned radar sites that are remotely
located. According to the guide developed by Corps staff in Fort Worth,
containerized hazards, such as underground or aboveground storage
tanks containing petroleum, are usually found at such sites.
Transformers containing toxic wastes (polychlorinated biphenyls) have
also been found at similar sites.
Because 30 or more years may pass between the closure of a former
defense site and a Corps site visit, it is likely that potential
hazards would go unnoticed from a vehicle because the area may be too
large to see or may be overgrown with vegetation that could hide any
evidence of potential hazards. In fact, one of the many concerns
expressed by state and EPA officials was that Corps ’windshield“ or
’drive-by“ site visits did not involve a thorough assessment of an
entire site. While Corps guidance requires a site visit, the guidance
provides no specifics, only a general framework for assessing potential
hazards. However, Corps officials told us that site visits conducted
from the air or a vehicle are considered inadequate and would not
fulfill the requirement to conduct a site visit.
Other Factors Contributed to Inadequate Preliminary Assessments of
Eligibility:
A number of other factors contributed to inadequate preliminary
assessments of eligibility. Corps officials explained that, during the
early stages of the FUDS cleanup program, they were hampered by limited
knowledge of hazards that might be present. They also explained that
the priorities of the program have changed over time. For example,
several Corps officials told us that during its early stages, the
program‘s focus was on identifying unsafe building hazards. Later, the
focus changed to identifying and removing containerized hazards--
primarily underground storage tanks. As a result of changing
priorities, not all of the potential hazards were identified and
assessed. Moreover, several Corps officials told us that although
hazardous, toxic, and radioactive wastes are one category of hazards
covered by the program, they cannot propose a project to clean up such
hazards without evidence of their existence. However, since 1990,
sampling soil and water has not been allowed during the preliminary
assessment of eligibility to determine the presence and type of any
contamination that might have been caused by DOD activities. According
to these officials, without sampling to indicate the presence of
hazardous wastes, it is difficult to develop the evidence needed to
justify a cleanup project. As a result, NDAI determinations have been
made even when the presence of hazardous waste was suspected. Some
Corps officials agreed that some of the older NDAI determinations might
not be justified and stated that those determinations may need to be
reexamined.
Several district officials indicated that although they would like to
reexamine some of the NDAI determinations, the FUDS program is now
focused on cleaning up hazards already identified, and limited funds
are available for reviewing past NDAI determinations. Although Army
guidance on the FUDS program issued in March 2001 authorized the
districts to reexamine two to five NDAI determinations annually per
state in each of the 22 relevant Corps districts if regulatory agencies
request the reexaminations and if funds are available, funding
shortfalls already hamper the program, according to program officials.
For example, the Corps estimates that at current funding levels--
approximately $220 million in fiscal year 2002--cleaning up the hazards
already identified will take more than 70 years. In its 2001 Funding
Strategies report, the Corps proposed that the Army and DOD increase
the annual FUDS program funding by $155 million to approximately $375
million per year. If the increased funding were approved and sustained,
the Corps could complete cleanup by 2050.
Corps Did Not Consistently Notify Owners and Regulatory Agencies about
NDAI Determinations and Non-DOD Contamination:
In the files we reviewed, we found no evidence that the Corps
consistently notified owners of its NDAI determinations, as required by
Corps guidance. In some cases, the Corps did not notify the owners for
several years after it made the NDAI determinations. In addition, while
Corps policy calls for reconsidering an NDAI determination if evidence
is later discovered, it appeared that the Corps rarely instructed the
owners to contact the Corps with such evidence or told them of the
Corps‘ policy. Furthermore, the Corps did not notify federal and state
regulatory agencies of its NDAI determinations because Corps guidance
at that time did not require it to do so, even though these agencies
might have regulatory responsibilities or could have information that
might cause the Corps to reconsider its NDAI determination. The Corps
also generally did not notify federal or state regulatory agencies of
potential hazards that it identified but determined were not caused by
DOD‘s use. By not routinely notifying the regulatory agencies of
hazards caused by non-DOD users, the Corps lost an opportunity to
assist these agencies‘ efforts to protect human health and the
environment.
Corps Did Not Consistently Notify Owners about NDAI Determinations:
According to Corps guidance, the districts must notify current owners
of the result of the preliminary assessment of eligibility. However,
based on our review of the NDAI files, we estimate that the Corps did
not provide this information to all the current owners at about 72
percent, or 2,779,[Footnote 22] of the NDAI properties included in our
study population. At one district, a Corps official stated that owners
were sent notification of NDAI determinations only if they requested
it. Further, in spite of the requirement that owners be notified within
30 to 60 days after a final NDAI determination, in some cases the Corps
did not notify owners for several years. In one district, notification
letters were not sent to owners until 1994, although NDAI
determinations had been made as many as 8 years before. The late-
arriving letters caused many owners to call the district office with
questions about their NDAI determinations. As a result, the:
district decided to stop sending notification letters to owners. In
addition, while Corps policy calls for reconsidering an NDAI
determination if evidence of potential hazards is discovered later, we
found that the Corps rarely instructed the owners to contact the Corps
with such evidence or told them of the Corps‘ policy. Based on our
review of Corps files, we estimate that even when the Corps notified
the owners of the NDAI determinations, at about 91 percent of these
properties it did not instruct the owners to contact the Corps with
evidence of potential hazards, if found later.[Footnote 23] However,
because the preliminary assessment of eligibility is not a
comprehensive evaluation of these properties, and the Corps does not
routinely review its past NDAI determinations, owners are an essential
outside source of new information about potential hazards at a given
site. By not notifying owners of the NDAI determinations or advising
them to contact the Corps if evidence of potential hazards is
discovered, the Corps may be reducing its ability to gather new
information about potential hazards and reconsider previous NDAI
determinations.
Corps Did Not Consistently Notify EPA and State Regulatory Agencies
about NDAI Determinations and Non-DOD Contamination:
Even though EPA and state regulatory agencies might have relevant
statutory responsibilities or could have information that might cause
the Corps to reconsider its NDAI determination, based on our review of
Corps files, we estimate that the Corps did not notify the regulatory
agencies of the NDAI determinations at the time they were made for
about 99 percent of the properties. Although Corps officials told us
that they have now provided copies of all the NDAI determinations to
the relevant federal and state agencies, some EPA and state officials
indicated that they have not yet received copies of the NDAI
determinations. Even when notification was provided, it was often done
in a way that did not encourage agencies‘ involvement. For example, one
state regulatory agency received a bulk delivery of Corps FUDS summary
documents for past NDAI determinations with no explanation. According
to state officials, sending agencies NDAI determinations made several
years earlier limits the agencies‘ ability to provide timely input
about potential hazards at a given site. Sending bulk deliveries of
documents with no explanation does not encourage the involvement of
state regulators who might be unfamiliar with Corps documentation or
procedures.
Notifying EPA and state regulatory agencies of NDAI determinations in a
timely and appropriate manner could facilitate regulators‘ involvement
and address some of the concerns that these agencies have about the
adequacy of the Corps‘ preliminary assessment of eligibility. State
regulators told us that their concurrence with an NDAI determination
could increase the credibility of the Corps‘ determination and improve
its quality. State regulators indicated that, in some cases, they could
provide the Corps with information about FUDS sites and properties
adjacent to FUDS sites, including sampling data that could assist the
Corps in determining if further study or cleanup actions by DOD were
needed. State regulators also told us that they could provide the Corps
with best practice guidance on conducting site visits and engaging the
public in data-gathering. A state official also pointed out that his
state could assist the Corps in gaining entry to a property if the
owner refused to allow the Corps to conduct a site visit. Typically, if
the owner refuses entry, the Corps designates the property as NDAI.
EPA and some state regulatory agencies believe that the involvement of
their agencies is crucial to the successful implementation and review
of the Corps‘ preliminary assessment of eligibility process. One
example where state involvement has led to the reconsideration of an
NDAI determination is the former Wilkins Air Force Base in Ohio, where
a school is now located. Following increased public interest in school
sites that were once owned by DOD, the state regulatory agency became
concerned about the number of FUDS in the state where schools or school
activities are now located and conducted a file review of all FUDS
sites with school-related activities. Based on new information from the
state agency, and after conducting a joint site visit, the Corps
proposed a new project at the former Wilkins Air Force Base. The Army
is taking steps to improve communication among the Army, regulators,
and other stakeholders. In 2000, the Army created the FUDS Improvement
Working Group to (1) address the concerns of regulators and other
stakeholders about the FUDS program and (2) identify new or modified
policies and procedures that will improve communication.
We also noted during our review of NDAI files that the Corps routinely
did not notify regulatory agencies when it identified potential hazards
that were not the result of DOD use. Although, according to a Corps
official, it is ’common sense“ that the Corps would notify EPA or state
regulatory agencies of non-DOD hazards that it identified during its
preliminary assessment of eligibility, we estimate that at about 246
NDAI properties the Corps did not notify EPA or state regulatory
agencies of non-DOD hazards.[Footnote 24] For example, when conducting
a site visit in Louisiana in 1986, Corps staff identified an
underground diesel oil storage tank of unknown size that held
approximately 12 inches of diesel oil. The Corps concluded that this
hazard was not the result of DOD activities, but was left by the Coast
Guard. However, the file contains no evidence that the Corps
notified EPA or state regulators of the suspected hazard. An EPA
official told us that the Corps never notified EPA of the hazard at
this site, and that EPA became aware of the hazard only in 2000, as the
result of an initiative it undertook to review Corps FUDS files. While
not notifying regulatory agencies of potential hazards that were not
the result of DOD use does not affect the Corps‘ NDAI determination, it
presents a lost opportunity to assist regulators in their efforts to
protect human health and the environment.
Conclusions:
The Corps does not have a sound basis for about a third of its NDAI
determinations for FUDS properties. In making its determinations, the
Corps was handicapped by a lack of information about how these
properties were used and which facilities were present when DOD
controlled the property. In addition, the Corps, at times, apparently
overlooked or dismissed information in its possession that suggested
that hazards might be present. In still other cases, the Corps did not
conduct an adequate site visit to assess the presence of hazards.
Because of inadequacies in the Corps‘ process for assessing the
presence of DOD-caused hazards at these properties, potential hazards
may have gone unnoticed. The Corps also did not consistently notify
owners and regulatory agencies of its findings and determinations. By
not communicating with these parties, the Corps lost opportunities to
obtain information on potential hazards that were not discovered during
their preliminary assessment of eligibility, which is not
comprehensive.
These shortcomings resulted, in part, because Corps guidance does not
specify what documents or level of detail the Corps should obtain when
identifying potential hazards. Also, the guidance does not include
information about typical hazards that might be present at certain
types of properties or specify how to assess the presence of potential
hazards. As a result, the Corps‘ assessment that almost 4,000 FUDS
require no further study or cleanup action may not be accurate. In
essence, the Corps does not know the number of additional properties
that may require further study or cleanup actions, the hazards that may
be present at these properties, or the risk level associated with these
hazards. Given that one of the factors used in establishing the Corps‘
cleanup priorities is the risk that each property poses to the public
or to the environment, unless the Corps improves its guidance and
reviews past NDAI determinations to determine which sites should be
reassessed, the Corps cannot be reasonably certain that it has
identified all hazards that may require further study or cleanup
action. Without knowing the full extent of the hazards at these
properties, the Corps cannot be assured that the properties it is
currently cleaning up or that it plans to clean up in the future are
the sites that pose the greatest risk. The Corps also cannot estimate
how much additional money and time may be needed to clean up properties
that were not properly assessed.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that all potential hazards are adequately identified and
assessed, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Corps
to develop and consistently implement more specific guidelines
and procedures for assessing FUDS properties. These guidelines and
procedures should:
* specify the historical documents such as site maps, aerial and ground
photos, and comprehensive site histories that the Corps should try to
obtain for each property to identify all of the potential hazards that
might have been caused by DOD‘s use;
* include a listing of typical hazards that might be present at certain
types of properties, such as communication facilities or motor pools,
and incorporate the guides already developed for ordnance hazards and
Nike missile sites into Corps procedures;
* require that the Corps contact other interested parties--including
federal, state, and local agencies--as well as owners during the
preliminary assessment of eligibility to discuss potential hazards at
the properties; and:
* provide instructions for conducting site visits to ensure that each
site receives an adequate site visit and that all potential hazards are
properly assessed.
To further ensure that all hazards caused by DOD at FUDS properties are
identified, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, as an initial
step, direct the Corps to use the newly developed guidance and
procedures to review the files of FUDS properties that it has
determined do not need further study or cleanup action to determine if
the files contain adequate evidence to support the NDAI determinations.
If there is an insufficient basis for the determination, those
properties should be reassessed.
To ensure that all parties are notified of the Corps‘ NDAI
determinations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Corps to develop and consistently implement procedures to ensure that
owners and appropriate federal, state, and local environmental agencies
are notified of the results of the Corps‘ preliminary assessments of
eligibility in a timely manner. The Corps should also ensure that
owners are aware that the Corps will reconsider an NDAI determination
if new evidence of DOD hazards is found. In addition, when preliminary
assessments of eligibility identify potential hazards that did not
result from DOD activities, the procedures should direct the Corps to
notify the appropriate regulatory agencies in a timely manner.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a copy of this report to the DOD for review and comment. In
written comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with our
conclusions, but partially agreed with each of the three
recommendations included in this report.
DOD disagreed with our conclusion that the Corps did not consistently
obtain information necessary to identify potential hazards at FUDS
properties. While DOD acknowledged that the Corps did not have
consistent procedures for evaluating FUDS properties during the early
years of the program, the agency stated that it does not believe that
such inconsistencies led to inadequate assessments. Our conclusion that
the Corps did not consistently obtain information necessary to identify
potential hazards at FUDS properties is based on our review of over
600 randomly selected NDAI files at nine Corps district offices. We
found numerous instances where the files did not contain evidence that
potential hazards associated with the property‘s prior uses were
identified or that Corps staff looked for hazards other than unsafe
buildings or debris. Furthermore, during our review, several district
officials told us that they would like to reexamine some of the NDAI
determinations, but that limited funding is available for this purpose.
DOD also stated that the use of tools developed in the later years of
the program, such as checklists for specific types of sites, have
contributed to a more consistent approach. We agree that tools such as
checklists and guides, which provide information on potential hazards
that might be found at certain types of FUDS properties, would be
useful. However, as we point out in our report, we identified only
three such checklists or guides during our review and they were not
referenced in the Corps‘ FUDS manual that provides information and
guidance to staff. For this reason, we recommended that the Corps
develop guidelines and procedures that include a listing of typical
hazards that might be present at certain types of facilities and
incorporate the guides already developed.
DOD also disagreed that the Corps did not take sufficient steps to
assess the presence of potential hazards at FUDS properties. In its
comments, DOD stated that the FUDS eligibility determination was never
intended as a means to characterize all the hazards at a site and
cannot be compared to the CERCLA preliminary assessment/site
inspection. We recognize that the preliminary assessment of eligibility
is not, nor is it intended to be, a comprehensive evaluation of a FUDS
property, and our report does not compare the Corps‘ preliminary
assessment of eligibility to the CERCLA preliminary assessment/site
inspection. DOD also stated that if the Corps determines that a
property is eligible for the program, an investigation process is
undertaken to determine the extent of DOD-caused hazards at the site.
Actually, all eligible FUDS properties do not automatically proceed to
the investigative phase. In fact, NDAIs, which account for over 4,000
of the approximately 6,700 properties the Corps has determined are
eligible for the FUDS cleanup program, do not undergo further
investigation. Only properties eligible for the FUDS program and where
the Corps believes that potential hazards caused by DOD may exist
undergo further investigation. However, as we point out in our report,
we found instances where Corps officials appeared to overlook or
dismiss information in their possession that suggested potential
hazards might be present, and we included specific examples where this
occurred.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to develop and
consistently implement more specific guidelines and procedures for
assessing FUDS properties. DOD pointed out that the Army, through the
FUDS Improvement Initiative, is currently evaluating the need for any
additional guidance or requirements. Our report describes some of the
shortcomings that we found in the Corps‘ guidance, and our
recommendation identifies key areas where we believe that the Corps‘
guidelines and procedures should be made more specific.
DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation to use newly
developed guidance and procedures to determine if NDAI files contained
adequate evidence to support the Corps‘ determinations. DOD noted that
the Corps would reevaluate an NDAI determination if additional
information were discovered and pointed out that the Army has already
agreed to reevaluate two to five NDAIs per year at each state‘s
request. Our report acknowledges both the Corps‘ policy of
reconsidering an NDAI determination if evidence of DOD-caused hazards
is later found and its plans to reevaluate two to five NDAIs per year
at each state‘s request. We do not believe that the Corps should wait
to be asked to reconsider its past NDAI determinations. Under the
Defense Environmental Restoration Program, DOD and the Corps, as the
executive agent for the FUDS program, bear the responsibility of
identifying, investigating, and cleaning up, if necessary, DOD-caused
hazards at FUDS properties. Therefore, we continue to believe that the
Corps should undertake a review of NDAI property files and reassess
those properties where the Corps‘ determinations are not adequately
supported.
In response to our recommendation aimed at improving its notification
procedures, DOD commented that eligibility determination reports are
now routinely provided to the states and, where appropriate, to EPA
regional offices, and that recent efforts have increased coordination
and communication between regulatory agencies and property owners. DOD
also pointed out that the Army plans to include, as part of the FUDS
manual revision, guidance that specifically requires notification of
landowners and regulatory agencies of all NDAI determinations. While
DOD did not specifically comment on our recommendation to develop
procedures to direct the Corps to notify the appropriate regulatory
agencies when its preliminary assessment of eligibility identifies
potential hazards that did not result from DOD activities, DOD
indicated in its technical comments that the Corps will notify the
proper authorities of such hazards.
In addition to its written comments, DOD also provided a number of
technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated as
appropriate. DOD‘s comments appear in appendix III.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Corps (1) has a sound basis for
its determinations that more than 4,000 formerly used defense sites
need no further study or cleanup actions and (2) communicated its NDAI
determinations to owners and regulatory agencies that may have
responsibilities and notified the owners that it will reconsider an
NDAI determination if evidence of DOD-caused hazards is found later, we
reviewed a statistical sample of 635 NDAI files at nine Corps districts
that execute the FUDS program. The districts selected were (1) Alaska,
(2) Fort Worth, (3) Jacksonville, (4) Louisville, (5) New York, (6)
Omaha, (7) Sacramento, (8) Savannah, and (9) Seattle. The Alaska
district was selected with certainty because it had the highest number
of NDAIs when we began our review. The remaining 8 districts were
selected at random from 21 of the 22 Corps districts that execute the
FUDS program, with the probability of selection proportional to the
number of NDAIs in their districts. The Huntington district was
excluded from our study population because it only had seven NDAIs and
was not considered to be a practical choice to examine if selected. The
21 districts from which we selected our random sample accounted for
99.8 percent of the NDAI files. Thirty-two of the properties whose
files we selected for review were excluded from our analysis because
the files contained evidence that either the property was not eligible
for the FUDS program or that a cleanup project was proposed. Each NDAI
selected was subsequently weighted in the analysis to account
statistically for all eligible NDAIs in the 21 districts, including
those that were not selected.
We obtained and reviewed the Corps‘ policies and procedures and program
documents to obtain information about the preliminary assessment of
eligibility. We also interviewed past and present FUDS program
officials from headquarters and district offices to obtain information
about the practices followed by Corps staff in completing this phase.
From the information provided by these officials and a review of a
sample of NDAI files at the Baltimore district, we developed a data
collection instrument (DCI). The DCI was used to document, in a
consistent manner, the evidence that we abstracted from each file
reviewed and our assessment of the soundness of the Corps‘ NDAI
determination.
We also contacted environmental officials from 17 states that interact
with Corps districts on the FUDS program. We judgmentally selected
these states to provide a range of opinion and perception of the Corps‘
preliminary assessment of eligibility. In addition, we contacted
officials from EPA regional offices that interact with the Corps‘
districts included in our review. These offices included Atlanta
(Region 4); Chicago (Region 5); Dallas (Region 6); Denver (Region 8);
Kansas City (Region 7); New York City (Region 2); San Francisco (Region
9); and Seattle (Region 10). Appendix I contains additional details on
our scope and methodology, and appendix II presents the results of our
review of 603 randomly selected NDAI files.
We conducted our review from May 2001 through June 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it
until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to
the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Office of Management and
Budget; the appropriate congressional committees; and other interested
parties. We will also provide copies to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available, at no charge, on the GAO Web
site at http://www.gao.gov/.
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me or Edward
Zadjura at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are listed
in appendix IV.
(Ms.) Gary L. Jones
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
Signed by Gary L. Jones:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Additional Details on Our Scope and Methodology:
The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) (1) has a sound basis for
determining that more than 4,000 formerly used defense sites (FUDS)
need no further study or cleanup and for designating those properties
as ’No Department of Defense (DOD) Action Indicated, Category I“ (NDAI)
and (2) communicated its NDAI determinations to owners and to the
regulatory agencies that may have responsibility and notified the
owners that it will reconsider an NDAI determination if evidence of
DOD-caused hazards is found later. To address these objectives, we
analyzed a statistical sample of 603 NDAI files at nine Corps districts
that execute the FUDS program. The districts selected were (1) Alaska,
(2) Fort Worth, (3) Jacksonville, (4) Louisville, (5) New York, (6)
Omaha, (7) Sacramento, (8) Savannah, and (9) Seattle. The Alaska
district was selected with certainty because it had the highest number
of NDAIs when we began our review. The remaining districts were
randomly selected, with the probability of selection proportional to
the number of NDAIs in the district. Table 1 provides additional
information on the districts selected for our review, including the
states within their boundaries, the number of FUDS properties
designated as NDAI, the NDAI files we selected for review, and the
number of determinations that we questioned.
Table 1: Corps Districts in Our Sample:
Corps district: Alaska; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within the
district‘s boundaries: Alaska; NDAI-designated properties: 371; NDAI-
designated properties analyzed by GAO: 77; NDAI-designated properties
where GAO questioned the Corps‘ determination: 33.
Corps district: Fort Worth; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within
the district‘s boundaries: Louisiana, Texas[A]; NDAI-designated
properties: 238; NDAI-designated properties analyzed by GAO: 68; NDAI-
designated properties where GAO questioned the Corps‘ determination:
28.
Corps district: Jacksonville; States and other U.S. jurisdictions
within the district‘s boundaries: Florida, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin
Islands; NDAI-designated properties: 381; NDAI-designated properties
analyzed by GAO: 77; NDAI-designated properties where GAO questioned
the Corps‘ determination: 27.
Corps district: Louisville; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within
the district‘s boundaries: Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio;
NDAI-designated properties: 178; NDAI-designated properties analyzed
by GAO: 63; NDAI-designated properties where GAO questioned the Corps‘
determination: 25.
Corps district: New York; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within
the district‘s boundaries: New Jersey, New York; NDAI-designated
properties: 232; NDAI-designated properties analyzed by GAO: 68; NDAI-
designated properties where GAO questioned the Corps‘ determination:
22.
Corps district: Omaha; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within the
district‘s boundaries: Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Wyoming; NDAI-designated properties:
157; NDAI-designated properties analyzed by GAO: 60; NDAI-designated
properties where GAO questioned the Corps‘ determination: 23.
Corps district: Sacramento; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within
the district‘s boundaries: California,[A] Nevada, Utah; NDAI-
designated properties: 192; NDAI-designated properties analyzed by GAO:
64; NDAI-designated properties where GAO questioned the Corps‘
determination: 15.
Corps district: Savannah; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within
the district‘s boundaries: Georgia; NDAI-designated properties: 100;
NDAI-designated properties analyzed by GAO: 49; NDAI-designated
properties where GAO questioned the Corps‘ determination: 27.
Corps district: Seattle; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within the
district‘s boundaries: Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington; NDAI-
designated properties: 377; NDAI-designated properties analyzed by GAO:
77; NDAI-designated properties where GAO questioned the Corps‘
determination: 29.
Corps district: Total; States and other U.S. jurisdictions within the
district‘s boundaries: [Empty]; NDAI-designated properties: 2,226;
NDAI-designated properties analyzed by GAO: 603; NDAI-designated
properties where GAO questioned the Corps‘ determination: 229.
[A] Only a portion of this state is included in the geographic
boundaries of the district. The Fort Worth district covers most of
Texas and has oversight responsibility for 183, or about 94 percent, of
the 194 properties in the state designated as NDAI. The Sacramento
district covers the northern portion of California and has oversight
responsibility for 148, or about 36 percent, of the properties in the
state designated as NDAI.
[End of table]
We reviewed each selected file to determine if it contained evidence
that the Corps (1) reviewed or obtained information on the buildings,
structures, and other facilities (such as underground storage tanks)
associated with DOD‘s use of the site that would allow the Corps to
identify the types of hazards potentially resulting from DOD‘s use and
(2) took sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards.
If we did not find evidence in the file that indicated the Corps
reviewed or obtained information on prior DOD uses of the site, we
concluded that the Corps did not identify all of the hazards that might
be present at the site. However, the absence of a single piece of
information, such as a site map or record of contact with an owner, did
not automatically cause us to question the adequacy of the Corps‘
efforts to identify the prior uses and the associated potential
hazards. Rather, we based our assessment of the Corps‘ efforts on the
totality of the evidence in the file. For example, if the file did not
contain a site map, but the file contained evidence that the Corps
staff made use of a site map during its assessment, we concluded that
the Corps reviewed a site map.
If the file contained evidence that the Corps determined that potential
hazards might be present, but did not take certain actions, such as
conducting a site visit, we concluded that the Corps did not take
sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards at the
site. However, if the file contained evidence that a site visit was
conducted, such as the date of a site visit, we concluded that the
Corps conducted a site visit even if the file did not contain photos or
a trip report. If a file contained evidence that the Corps overlooked
or dismissed information in its possession that potential hazards might
be present, we concluded that the Corps did not take sufficient steps
to assess the presence of potential hazards. If we found either or all
of these scenarios when reviewing the files, we determined that the
NDAI determinations were questionable. Our questioning of an NDAI
determination does not mean that the property is contaminated; rather,
it indicates that the Corps‘ file did not contain evidence that the
Corps took steps to identify and assess potential hazards at the
property that would support the NDAI determination.
We also reviewed the NDAI files to determine how often the Corps
notified owners and regulatory agencies of its NDAI determinations and
of its policy of reconsidering the determinations if additional
evidence of DOD-caused hazards was found later.
We used a data collection instrument (DCI) to document, in a consistent
manner, the evidence that we abstracted from each file and our
assessment of the soundness of the Corps‘ NDAI determinations. Each DCI
was independently reviewed and compared to the original file to ensure
that the information documented on the DCI was accurate and that our
assessment of the Corps‘ determination was reasonable, i.e., that
another person looking at the information in the file would come to the
same conclusion about the Corps‘ determination. We copied the contents
of the files to ensure that any further questions or issues could be
researched later and that we had sufficient evidence to support the
information recorded on the DCI. From the DCIs, we created an
electronic database. The members of our team reviewing the files and
the person conducting the supervisory review changed for each district.
While we rotated staff to reduce bias, we also used this rotation to
help increase consistency of judgments. In addition, we conducted an
independent quality check of our database entries created from the
DCIs. For each of the districts visited, we randomly selected 10
percent of the electronically entered DCIs. An independent verifier
checked 100 percent of the data for every question, sub-question, and
comment box on the DCI, comparing the ’hard copy“ of the DCI to the
entries found in the database to ensure that there were no data entry
errors. Our error rate was 0.379 percent--less than ½ of 1 percent. All
errors found were corrected. In addition, we verified 100 percent of
the responses to questions and sub-questions on the DCI that were key
to supporting our findings.
The information presented in this report consists, in part, of
statistical estimates based on our review of randomly selected files.
The results of our analysis are projectable to NDAI determinations
nationwide, excluding the Huntington district. Because we followed a
probability procedure based on random selections, our sample is only
one of a large number of samples that we could have drawn. Each sample
could have provided different estimates. We therefore express our
confidence in the precision of our particular sample‘s results as 95
percent confidence intervals. Each of these intervals contains the
actual (unknown) population value for 95 percent of the samples we
could have drawn. As a result, we are 95 percent confident that each of
the confidence intervals in the report will include the true value in
the study population.
All percentage estimates from the file review have 95 percent
confidence intervals whose width does not exceed plus or minus 10
percentage points, unless otherwise noted. All numerical estimates
other than percentages (such as averages or totals) have 95 percent
confidence intervals whose width does not exceed 10 percent of the
value of those estimates, unless otherwise noted. The widths of the
confidence intervals are shown as footnotes to the text, where
appropriate.
While the results of our analysis are generally projectable nationwide,
we also used our selected samples to develop case examples of the
preliminary assessments of eligibility conducted by the Corps. These
case examples are for illustration only.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Results of Our Analysis of 603 Randomly Selected NDAI
Properties:
To determine the extent to which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) has a sound basis for its determinations that more than 4,000
formerly used defense sites (FUDS) need no further Department of
Defense (DOD) study or cleanup and for designating those properties as
’No DOD Action Indicated“ (NDAI), we reviewed and analyzed a
statistical sample of 603 NDAI files at nine Corps districts. Table 2
shows the property name, the FUDS number, and whether we found, based
on our review of the evidence in the file, that the Corps had a sound
basis for its NDAI determination. In those cases where we do not
believe that the Corps has a sound basis, the table includes an
explanation for our finding. Our questioning of an NDAI determination
does not mean that the property is contaminated; rather, it indicates
that the Corps‘ file did not contain evidence that the Corps took steps
to identify and assess potential hazards at the property that would
support the NDAI determination. In the table, we use abbreviations for
the four types of hazards: building demolition and debris removal (BD/
DR); hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste (HTRW); containerized
hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste (CON/HTRW); and ordnance and
explosive waste (OEW).
Table 2: Results of GAO‘s Analysis of 603 Randomly Selected NDAI
Properties (Shown by Corps District):
[See PDF for image]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
JUL 23 2002:
Ms. Gary L. Jones:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment General Accounting Office:
441 G. Street NW Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Jones:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-02-658, ’ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION: Corps Needs to
Reassess Its Determinations That Many Former Defense Sites Do Not Need
Cleanup“, dated:
June 27, 2002 (GAO Code 360090). In the report, GAO asserted that many
of the Corps‘ No DoD Action Indicated (NDAI) determinations did not
have a sound basis and that the Corps did not consistently notify
stakeholders of their findings.
The Department disagrees with GAO‘s conclusion that the Corps did not
consistently obtain information necessary to identify potential hazards
at Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS). Many of the files surveyed had
eligibility determinations prepared in the 1980s and early 1990s. While
we agree that, especially in the early days of the program, the Corps
may not have had consistent procedures for evaluating FUDS, we do not
agree that inconsistencies in approach necessarily led to inferior
results. In fact, some of the earlier eligibility determinations were
very detailed. As the program has matured, however, the use of tools,
such as checklists for specific types of sites, have contributed to a
more consistent approach in defining hazards.
The Department also disagrees with GAO‘s conclusion that the Corps did
not take sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards
at FUDS. The FUDS eligibility determination is used primarily to
support authorization and appropriation, and is guided solely by DoD‘s
contribution, if any, to contamination at a site. The eligibility
determination was never intended as a means to characterize all hazards
present at the site, and therefore, cannot be compared to the CERCLA
preliminary assessment/site inspection (PA/SI). If the Corps determines
that a property is eligible for the program, an investigation process
is undertaken to characterize the extent of DoD hazards at the site,
which is consistent with the CERCLA PA/SI process. We have confidence
in the Corps‘ ability to assess hazards and do not believe there have
been deliberate failures or efforts to dismiss relevant information in
any of these cases.
Regarding the issue of other factors contributing to inadequate
preliminary assessments of eligibility, the Corps has always maintained
that NDAIs would be reopened on discovery of additional information.
Even in the absence of new information, the Army, through the FUDS
Improvement Work Group, has agreed to reevaluate two to five NDAIs per
year at each state‘s request.
Regarding GAO‘s concern that the Corps did not consistently notify
owners and regulatory agencies about NDAI determinations, eligibility
determination reports are now routinely provided to states, and where
appropriate, to EPA regional offices. In addition, recent efforts by
the Army through the FUDS Improvement Initiative, have increased
coordination and communication between the Corps, regulatory agencies
and property owners. For example, development of state-wide management
actions plans assure that state priorities are given top consideration
in the Corps‘ program execution planning.
Finally, regarding coordination with landowners, the Corps must obtain
right of entry from the landowner to conduct an eligibility
determination. Hence, there is always some level of communication with
the landowner through rights of entry.
While the Department partially agrees with each of GAO‘s
recommendations, especially since they closely mirror efforts currently
underway by the Army to improve the program, the Department is
concerned with the broad nature of the conclusions contained within the
report. Our response to GAO‘s recommendations and specific comments,
are attached.
We welcome the opportunity to revisit this issue at your convenience.
My point of contact is Mr. Kurt Kratz at (703) 697-5372.
Sincerely,
Raymond F. DuBois, Jr. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations
and Environment):
Signed by Raymond F. DuBois, Jr.:
Enclosure:
GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED JUNE 27, 2002:
(GAO CODE 360090):
’ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION:CORPS NEEDS TO REASSESS ITS
DETERMINATIONS THAT MANY FORMER DEFENSE SITES DO NOT NEED CLEANUP“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: Recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Corps
to develop and consistently implement more specific guidelines and
procedures for assessing FUDS properties...
DoD RESPONSE: Partially Agree. The Corps of Engineers has had for a
number of years specific guidelines and procedures for the evaluation
and documentation of NDAIs. The Army, through the FURS Improvement
Initiative, is currently evaluating the need for any additional
guidance or requirements. The Corps of Engineers is also in the process
of revising its FUDS regulations, and plans to standardize existing
procedures, as well as incorporate new guidance recommended by
stakeholders, through the FUDS Improvement Initiative Workgroup. The
Department of Defense will monitor the Army‘s progress in carrying out
these initiatives.
RECOMMENDATION 2: Recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Corps
to use the newly developed guidance and procedures to review the files
of FUDS properties that it has determined do not need further study or
clean up action to determine if the files contain adequate evidence to
support the NDAI determinations. If there is not a sufficient basis for
the determination, those properties should be reassessed.
DoD RESPONSE: Partially Agree. The Corps has always maintained that
NDAIs would be reopened on discovery of additional information. In
addition, even in the absence of new information, the Army, through the
FUDS Improvement Work Group, has agreed to reevaluate two to five NDAIs
per year at each state‘s request. The particular properties to be
reviewed and their sequencing will be coordinated with stakeholders, as
appropriate, through development of FUDS state-wide Management Action
Plans.
The Army is also currently considering a formalized process for closing
out the 6,000 NDAIs currently in the FUDS inventory, which would
include re-notification of property owners and regulatory agencies, and
archiving all site information. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
will monitor Army progress in implementing these initiatives.
RECOMMENDATION 3: Recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Corps
to develop and consistently implement procedures to ensure that owners
and appropriate federal, state, and local environmental agencies are
notified of the results of the Corps‘ preliminary assessments of
eligibility in a timely manner. The Corps should also ensure that
owners are aware that the Corps will reconsider an NDAI determination
if new evidence of DoD hazards is found. In addition, when preliminary
assessments of eligibility identify potential hazards that did not
result from DoD activities, the procedures should direct the Corps to
notify the appropriate regulatory agencies in a timely manner.
DoD RESPONSE: Partially Agree. The Corps has procedures and practices
in place to notify stakeholders of the results of eligibility
determinations. All of the Corps‘ files have been made available to the
states and EPA regions that have asked for copies.The Corps has never
denied access to these files. Outreach and public participation in the
FUDS program have been a primary focus of the Army‘s FUDS Improvement
Initiative, and the Corps is currently implementing recommendations
that would ensure availability of the eligibility determinations and
other information, through enhanced notification procedures. The Army
plans to include, as part of the FUDS Manual revision, guidance that
specifically requires notification of landowners and regulatory
agencies of all NDAI determinations. The Department will continue to
monitor Army progress in its on-going effort to improve the FUDS
program.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Ms. Gary L. Jones, (202) 512-3841
Edward Zadjura, (202) 512-9914:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Ian Ferguson, Ken Lightner, Sherry
McDonald, and Aaron Shiffrin made key contributions to this report.
Also contributing to this report were Doreen S. Feldman, Susan W.
Irwin, Cynthia Norris, and Sidney Schwartz.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Corps previously used the term ’no further action“ (NOFA) to
characterize this determination. Beginning in fiscal year 2001, the
Corps changed the ’no further action“ designation to ’no DOD action
indicated“ (NDAI).
[2] The Corps uses its database of FUDS properties on a daily basis to
plan, schedule, and monitor the FUDS program, so there are constant
changes and updates. In June 2001, when we selected our random sample,
there were 4,030 NDAIs in the 22 districts. We did not include the
Huntington district in our review because it had only seven NDAIs and
was not considered a practical choice to examine if selected.
[3] Each of these intervals contains the actual (unknown) population
value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As a result,
we are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence intervals in
the report will include the true value in the study population.
[4] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval
are 1,201 and 1,750, respectively. We adjusted the number of NDAIs in
our study population to reflect the small portion of properties in our
sample that we excluded from our analysis because the files contained
evidence that the property either was not eligible for the FUDS program
or that a cleanup project was proposed.
[5] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval
are 44 percent and 75 percent, respectively.
[6] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval
are 456 and 974, respectively.
[7] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval
are 70 percent and 99 percent, respectively.
[8] In the early 1980s, congressional concern about abandoned military
buildings and debris in Alaska and releases of hazardous substances
from federal facilities laid the foundation for the DOD environmental
restoration program. The Defense Appropriations Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-
212) provided 1 year of funding for the cleanup of hazardous substances
released from DOD properties and the removal of unsafe or unsightly DOD
buildings and debris. Annual appropriations for these activities have
continued, but since 1986 they have been funded under the Defense
Environmental Restoration Accounts established by Congress as part of
DOD‘s environmental restoration program.
[9] According to the Corps, this type of hazard is a DOD responsibility
only on property that is currently owned by state or local governments
or native corporations.
[10] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Environmental Contamination:
Cleanup Actions at Formerly Used Defense Sites, GAO-01-557 (Washington,
D.C.: July 31, 2001) for information on the number and location of FUDS
properties that are eligible for cleanup, the types of hazards
identified, and status of cleanup projects. The report is available, at
no charge, on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov/.
[11] The Corps can also designate the property as NDAI if (1) the
current owner refuses right of entry, (2) cleanup projects have been
initiated or completed by past or current owners, (3) cleanup would be
limited to removal of asbestos-containing material or lead-based paint,
or (4) past or current owners have used the buildings or facilities,
such as underground storage tanks, present on the property.
[12] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval
are 1,201 and 1,750, respectively.
[13] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval
are 2,520 and 3,105, respectively.
[14] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval
are 456 and 974, respectively.
[15] The FUDS Manual provides general policy guidance on the execution
of the FUDS program and is intended to provide information and guidance
to Corps staff. The manual consolidates previous program guidance but
does not supersede any applicable regulations, contract requirements,
or command authority. The first FUDS manual was issued in 1993. Efforts
are underway to update the existing FUDS manual, which was issued in
1998.
[16] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval
are 2,656 and 3,249, respectively.
[17] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence intervals
for the percentage and total are 44 percent and 75 percent, and 1,688
and 2,909, respectively.
[18] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence intervals
for the percentage and total are 2 percent and 28 percent, and 64 and
1,081, respectively.
[19] Because more than one category of potential hazards may be present
at a property, the sum of these percentages exceeds 100.
[20] Washington State Department of Ecology, Preliminary Assessment
Report for Formerly Used Defense Site Othello Air Force Station (Z-40),
Othello, Washington, prepared for U.S. EPA Region 10, June 2001. The
state of Washington randomly selected 10 NDAI-designated FUDS to check
the quality of the Corps‘ determinations. This often involved soil and
groundwater sampling with the results compared to state cleanup
standards. Eighty percent of the FUDS with NDAI designations were
contaminated above state cleanup standards. The Corps assured the state
that it would re-evaluate these sites provided funding was available.
[21] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval
for the estimate of the number of NDAI properties that did not receive
an appropriate site visit are 456 and 974. The lower and upper bounds
of the 95 percent confidence intervals for the number of properties
that received no site visit or received site visits conducted from a
vehicle or from the air are 212 and 749, and 124 and 465, respectively.
[22] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval
are 2,398 and 3,118, respectively.
[23] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval
are 70 percent and 99 percent, respectively.
[24] The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval
are 176 and 333, respectively.
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