Defense Management
Fully Developed Management Framework Needed to Guide Air Force Future Total Force Efforts Gao ID: GAO-06-232 January 31, 2006The Air Force is in the process of transforming its force to meet today's new and emerging threats. Its "Future Total Force" concept is intended to maximize future capabilities by integrating its active, National Guard, and reserve components to a greater degree. While the Air Force was making force structure decisions and developing its 20-year plan, the Air National Guard embarked on its own "Vanguard" transformation initiative to ensure its role and relevance in the new Air Force. This report discusses (1) the processes and events that surrounded the Air Force's development of its 20-year force structure plan, including the involvement of key stakeholders and the development of the Guard's Vanguard initiative, and (2) the extent to which the Air Force is utilizing key results-oriented management tools to guide its effort to identify new missions for the Air National Guard and integrate active and Guard forces as part of its Future Total Force effort.
The Air Force used an iterative process to develop its 20-year force structure plan with periodic review and oversight by senior-level Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force officials; however, stakeholders have different views on the extent to which the Air Force sought and addressed input from process participants. The plan included a reduction in the legacy fighter fleet--residing largely within the Air National Guard--and the acquisition of new aircraft such as the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. In late 2004, a departmentwide shift in funding priorities reduced the number of F/A-22 aircraft to be acquired and resulted in changes to the Air Force's plan. Perspectives on how well this process worked vary depending on the role and level of involvement of each organization. For example, Air Force Air Staff officials viewed the process as fully participatory and noted that the Air National Guard Bureau and the Air Force's major commands had direct representation on the force structure development team. In contrast, Air National Guard officials expressed concerns about their ability to influence decisions and 7 of the 10 adjutants general whom GAO contacted believed that they did not have sufficient opportunity to influence the decisions. Because documentation of the proceedings of key meetings was limited, GAO was unable to evaluate the extent to which stakeholders influenced the process. During the same period, the Air National Guard began a separate effort--the Vanguard Engagement Strategy--to solicit input from the states on future roles and missions for the Guard and to prepare its units to respond to anticipated force structure reductions. The Air Force has taken steps to identify new missions for the Air National Guard and test ways to integrate the active, Guard, and reserve components as part of its Future Total Force transformation, but it has not fully developed a management framework to guide its efforts or a plan to evaluate its progress. In December 2004, the Air Force announced initiatives for six states to test its transformation concepts. In March 2005, the Air Force established a new directorate to guide implementation of the Future Total Force concept. The new directorate has taken steps to identify new missions and implement new constructs to integrate components. As GAO has previously reported, organizations undergoing transformation increase their likelihood of success if they adopt a results-oriented management framework to guide their efforts. Although the directorate has drafted a strategic plan that directorate officials said includes such tools, as of November 2005, the plan had not been approved and there is no requirement that it be used to guide implementation efforts. Moreover, while the Air Force has some metrics to use in evaluating its test initiatives, it has not developed a comprehensive evaluation plan to measure results. By moving ahead to implement the Future Total Force concept without such a framework and evaluation plan, the Air Force may be unable to successfully transform its culture, evaluate initiatives and program results, determine the most cost effective mix of active and reserve forces, and ensure transparency of the implementation process.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-232, Defense Management: Fully Developed Management Framework Needed to Guide Air Force Future Total Force Efforts
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2006:
Defense Management:
Fully Developed Management Framework Needed to Guide Air Force Future
Total Force Efforts:
GAO-06-232:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-232, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Air Force is in the process of transforming its force to meet
today‘s new and emerging threats. Its ’Future Total Force“ concept is
intended to maximize future capabilities by integrating its active,
National Guard, and reserve components to a greater degree. While the
Air Force was making force structure decisions and developing its 20-
year plan, the Air National Guard embarked on its own ’Vanguard“
transformation initiative to ensure its role and relevance in the new
Air Force.
This report discusses (1) the processes and events that surrounded the
Air Force‘s development of its 20-year force structure plan, including
the involvement of key stakeholders and the development of the Guard‘s
Vanguard initiative, and (2) the extent to which the Air Force is
utilizing key results-oriented management tools to guide its effort to
identify new missions for the Air National Guard and integrate active
and Guard forces as part of its Future Total Force effort.
What GAO Found:
The Air Force used an iterative process to develop its 20-year force
structure plan with periodic review and oversight by senior-level
Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force officials;
However, stakeholders have different views on the extent to which the
Air Force sought and addressed input from process participants. The
plan included a reduction in the legacy fighter fleet”residing largely
within the Air National Guard”and the acquisition of new aircraft such
as the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. In late 2004, a
departmentwide shift in funding priorities reduced the number of F/A-22
aircraft to be acquired and resulted in changes to the Air Force‘s
plan. Perspectives on how well this process worked vary depending on
the role and level of involvement of each organization. For example,
Air Force Air Staff officials viewed the process as fully participatory
and noted that the Air National Guard Bureau and the Air Force‘s major
commands had direct representation on the force structure development
team. In contrast, Air National Guard officials expressed concerns
about their ability to influence decisions and 7 of the 10 adjutants
general whom GAO contacted believed that they did not have sufficient
opportunity to influence the decisions. Because documentation of the
proceedings of key meetings was limited, GAO was unable to evaluate the
extent to which stakeholders influenced the process. During the same
period, the Air National Guard began a separate effort”the Vanguard
Engagement Strategy”to solicit input from the states on future roles
and missions for the Guard and to prepare its units to respond to
anticipated force structure reductions.
The Air Force has taken steps to identify new missions for the Air
National Guard and test ways to integrate the active, Guard, and
reserve components as part of its Future Total Force transformation,
but it has not fully developed a management framework to guide its
efforts or a plan to evaluate its progress. In December 2004, the Air
Force announced initiatives for six states to test its transformation
concepts. In March 2005, the Air Force established a new directorate to
guide implementation of the Future Total Force concept. The new
directorate has taken steps to identify new missions and implement new
constructs to integrate components. As GAO has previously reported,
organizations undergoing transformation increase their likelihood of
success if they adopt a results-oriented management framework to guide
their efforts. Although the directorate has drafted a strategic plan
that directorate officials said includes such tools, as of November
2005, the plan had not been approved and there is no requirement that
it be used to guide implementation efforts. Moreover, while the Air
Force has some metrics to use in evaluating its test initiatives, it
has not developed a comprehensive evaluation plan to measure results.
By moving ahead to implement the Future Total Force concept without
such a framework and evaluation plan, the Air Force may be unable to
successfully transform its culture, evaluate initiatives and program
results, determine the most cost effective mix of active and reserve
forces, and ensure transparency of the implementation process.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Air Force take steps to fully
develop a management framework, accelerate its approval, and establish
an evaluation plan to assess its test initiatives. DOD agreed with the
recommendations in this report and has begun implementing them.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-232.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at 202-
512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Stakeholder Views on Extent of Input and Transparency of Force
Structure Development Process Differ:
Air Force Proceeding with Future Total Force Implementation without a
Fully Developed Management Framework:
Conclusion:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Key Events and Stakeholder Participation in The Force
Structure Development Process:
Table 2: Future Total Force Initiatives Announced by the Air Force in
December 2004:
Table 3: Key Results-Oriented Management Tools:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 31, 2006:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Frank LoBiondo:
House of Representatives:
The Air Force has developed a 20-year force structure plan that will
require billions of dollars to recapitalize, modernize, and upgrade its
inventory of aging aircraft. This force structure plan could
potentially result in a significant reduction in the number of existing
fighter aircraft--replaced by fewer aircraft that are intended to be
more capable and reliable--along with changes in the roles and missions
of the Air National Guard, and further integration of the active,
Guard, and reserve flying units. The Air Force intends to transform its
force to meet new and emerging threats--while supporting military
operations at home and abroad and preparing to implement changes
resulting from the 2005 base closure and realignment process.
Recognizing that future capabilities to meet these challenges will
require a combination of new, more capable aircraft that will cost
billions of dollars, including $63.8 billion currently estimated for
the F/A-22, the Air Force has embarked on developing what it calls the
"Future Total Force" which is intended to integrate the active and
reserve components to a greater degree by using new organizational
constructs and realigning missions.
As the Air Force begins to adjust and reduce its current force
structure, the Air National Guard has also recognized that it must be
proactive in helping the Air Force identify new roles and missions best
suited for the Guard so that it can remain a ready, reliable, and
relevant component of the Future Total Force. To prepare for the
future, the Air National Guard embarked on its own transformational
effort--called the Vanguard Engagement Strategy--to ensure that it
would continue its role as a key participant in the Air Force's
expeditionary force and defense of the homeland, as well as in emerging
mission areas.
Because of the significant impact that the Air Force's transformational
efforts could have on the future force structure and basing of the Air
National Guard, you asked us to examine the processes through which the
Air Force developed its force structure plans, its progress in
identifying new missions and organizational constructs for the Air
Guard, and the level of stakeholder involvement in the force structure
development process. Additionally, you expressed interest in the Air
National Guard's Vanguard transformation initiative. This report
discusses (1) the processes and events that surrounded the Air Force's
development of its 20-year force structure plan, including the
involvement of key stakeholders and the development of the Guard's
Vanguard initiative, and (2) the extent to which the Air Force is using
key results-oriented management tools to guide its effort to identify
new missions for the Air National Guard and integrate active and Guard
forces as part of its Future Total Force effort.
To describe the processes and events surrounding the Air Force's
development of its 20-year force structure plan, we reviewed Air Force
guidance, directives, and instructions and interviewed current and
former officials of the Air Force Strategic Planning Directorate who
led the force structure development. We also interviewed key
stakeholders involved in this process including the Air National Guard
Director and officials of two major Air Force commands. We discussed
the process with 10 adjutants general[Footnote 1] to obtain their
perspectives on the process. To guide our selection of adjutants
general to include in our review, we developed criteria--including a
mix of large and small states, a geographic mix of states, and states
with differing views on the Air Force's force structure plans and the
Guard's Vanguard program--and evaluated each state and territory
against these criteria. We also interviewed Air Force Studies and
Analyses Agency officials to discuss modeling and analyses they
performed to evaluate various force structure options. We reviewed the
Air National Guard's Vanguard Engagement Strategy and held discussions
with senior Air Guard officials, including several adjutants general,
to determine how the strategy was related to the Air Force's force
structure development process. We did not evaluate the Air Force's base
closure and realignment assessment and recommendations process as part
of this report, but did separately report on the overall Department of
Defense (DOD) base closure and realignment process in July
2005.[Footnote 2] To assess the extent to which the Air Force is using
key management tools in developing new missions for the Air National
Guard and integrating the active and reserve component forces, we
reviewed key documents and our prior work on the management tools
consistently found in successful organizations. We also discussed these
tools with senior directorate officials to obtain their perspectives
and discussed their efforts to develop a strategic plan. We did not
evaluate the process the Air Force is using to identify and validate
new missions for the Guard. Although much of the information on the
force structure development process was testimonial from participants
in the process, we assessed this information by comparing it to
supporting documentation, when available, and corroborated it through
additional interviews to determine consistency and reasonableness. On
the basis of these efforts, we believe the information we obtained is
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Additional
information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
We conducted our review from September 2004 through November 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The Air Force used an iterative process to develop its 20-year force
structure plan with periodic review and oversight by senior-level DOD
and Air Force officials, and a complex process of modeling and
analysis; However, stakeholders have different views on the
transparency of the process and the extent to which the Air Force
sought and addressed input from process participants. Moreover, the
adjutants general were not directly involved because the Air Force
relied on the Air National Guard to represent the states' perspectives.
The force structure plan developed by the Air Force included a
reduction in the legacy fighter fleet--which resides largely within the
Air National Guard--and the acquisition of new aircraft such as the F/A-
22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. In late 2004, following completion of
the Air Force's process to develop the 20-year force structure plan, a
departmentwide shift in funding priorities by the Secretary of Defense
reduced the number of F/A-22 aircraft to be acquired. This decision
resulted in changes to the Air Force's 20-year force structure plan as
the Air Force delayed retirement plans for some of its F-16 aircraft to
accommodate F/A-22 reductions. This revised force structure plan was
provided to the Air Force's base closure team and was used to develop
base realignment and closure recommendations. Significant modifications
to those recommendations were subsequently made by the congressionally
chartered Base Closure and Realignment Commission, which issued its own
recommendations to the President on September 8, 2005. However, the
Quadrennial Defense Review, expected to be completed in February 2006,
may require further changes to the Air Force's force structure plan.
Perspectives on how well the Air Force's force structure development
process worked vary depending on the role and level of involvement of
each organization. For example, Air Force officials viewed the process
as participatory and noted that the Air National Guard Bureau and the
Air Force's major commands had direct representation on the force
structure development team. In contrast, Air National Guard officials
and officials from one major Air Force command expressed concerns about
their ability to influence decisions and 7 of the 10 adjutants general
that we contacted believed that they did not have sufficient
opportunity to influence the force structure decisions. Because
documentation of the proceedings and issues discussed at key meetings
attended by the Air Force, the Air National Guard, and the adjutants
general was limited, we were unable to evaluate the extent to which
stakeholders were able to influence the force structure development
process. To prepare Air National Guard units in each state to respond
to anticipated force structure reductions, the Air National Guard began
a separate effort, referred to as the Vanguard Engagement Strategy, to
begin transforming the Guard and solicit input from the states on
future roles and missions for the Guard to keep it relevant and ready
to support future Air Force requirements. The Vanguard Strategy remains
the framework through which the Air Guard develops and refines its
input to the Air Force's transformation efforts.
The Air Force has taken steps to identify some new missions for the Air
National Guard and test new ways of integrating active, Guard, and
reserve units as part of its Future Total Force transformational
effort, but lacks a fully developed management framework to guide the
process and evaluate the results. The Air Force has taken two important
steps in implementing its Future Total Force concept. First, in
December 2004, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force announced test
initiatives in six states to test new Air Guard missions and new ways
to integrate the active and reserve components. The Air Force has
continued to evaluate and prioritize additional initiatives over the
past several months. Second, in March 2005, the Air Force established
the Future Total Force Directorate, with a 2-year term, to guide the
implementation of the Future Total Force concept. Driven by recent
force structure and base closure decisions, this new directorate has
focused largely on identifying new missions and implementing new
constructs to integrate active, Guard, and reserve forces. Our prior
work and the work of others show that organizations undertaking complex
transformations can increase their likelihood of success by adopting a
results-oriented management framework, which includes key management
practices and a strategy that includes results-oriented management
tools, to guide implementation efforts and achieve desired program
outcomes.[Footnote 3] Although the Future Total Force Directorate has
drafted a strategic plan that according to directorate officials would
address many of these results-oriented management tools, the plan is
not yet approved. Consequently, until the strategic plan is approved,
there is no requirement that those involved in implementing the Future
Total Force concept--including the Air Staff, Air Combat Command, and
Air National Guard--use the plan to guide their efforts. The
directorate has also established some steps to evaluate the six test
initiatives, but these steps do not provide a comprehensive,
methodical, and readily evident approach to evaluate the success of the
new organizational constructs being tested so that the Air Force can
determine the most cost effective ways to organize active and reserve
forces to carry out the National Defense Strategy. By moving ahead with
its efforts to implement the Future Total Force concept without a
comprehensive results-oriented management framework, the Air Force may
not be able to efficiently and effectively achieve the transformation
to the Future Total Force, adjust to the many uncertainties surrounding
transformation, or fully evaluate its test initiatives and overall
program results.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Air Force to strengthen the recently established Future Total
Force Directorate's management efforts by completing a strategic plan
that fully reflects results-oriented management principles, setting
specific time frames to accelerate the plan's approval, and developing
an evaluation plan for assessing the success or failure of its
initiatives designed to test new organizational constructs. In written
comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our recommendations
and provided information on the actions it plans to take to address
them. The Air Force completed and approved the Future Total Force
strategic plan and stated that it is aggressively working toward its
goal of having a clear and comprehensive plan for evaluating Future
Total Force alternatives.
Background:
The Air Force's aircraft fleet is currently the oldest in the service's
history. The average age of the service's aircraft is 23 years, and
many tankers and bombers are more than 40 years old. The service has
stated that the biggest challenge it faces over the next two decades is
replacing its aging aircraft. Accordingly, the Air Force plans to
retire some of its older fighters such as the F-16 and has begun
purchasing new aircraft such as the F/A-22, currently being fielded,
and the F-35 Joint Strike fighter, which is currently under
development. At the same time it modernizes and recapitalizes, the Air
Force anticipates facing changing and harder to define adversaries; an
increased demand for support to combat operations; and affordability
challenges.
The Air National Guard is a reserve component of the United States Air
Force. It performs both federal and state missions, consists of about
107,000 members, and makes up about 20 percent of the total Air Force.
The Air National Guard plays a key role in the Air Force's Aerospace
Expeditionary Force,[Footnote 4] including providing 100 percent of the
air sovereignty missions, 49 percent of theater airlifts, and 45
percent of tanker missions. Since September 11, 2001, Air National
Guard pilots and aircraft have played a key role in worldwide Air Force
operations, participating in Operation Noble Eagle defending the skies
over the United States; Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan; and
Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. In their state role, Air National
Guard units report to the governor of their respective state, territory
(Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands), or the commanding general of the
District of Columbia National Guard and participate in emergency relief
support during natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, and
forest fires; search and rescue operations; support to civil
authorities; maintenance of vital public services; and counter-drug
operations. Most recently, the Air National Guard was involved in the
relief effort following Hurricane Katrina in September 2005.
The Air Force, its major commands, and the National Guard Bureau each
have a role in the management of the Air National Guard. The Air Force
and its major commands play a key role in determining the Air National
Guard's force structure, approving new missions, and equipping the
Guard to perform its missions. In addition, the Air National Guard
largely relies on the Air Force to provide its funding through the
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process. The National
Guard Bureau administers the federal functions of the Air National
Guard and works with the Air Force Air Staff to develop and coordinate
programs that directly affect the Guard. The Bureau also formulates and
administers programs for training, development, and maintenance of Air
National Guard units. In accordance with Title 10 of the United States
Code, the National Guard Bureau also acts as the channel of
communication between the Air Force and the 54 states and territories
where National Guard units are located.[Footnote 5]
Additionally, National Guard units in each of the 54 states and
territories are commanded by an Air Force or Army officer known as the
adjutant general. The adjutants general are, for the most part, state
or territory employees and work for the governor. The adjutants general
are responsible for overseeing Guard units' federal and state missions
and may also serve as state emergency management directors. The
adjutants general are advocates for the views of their state and work
closely with the National Guard Bureau, Air Force, and Army to ensure
the National Guard is ready to respond to the nation's needs both
overseas and domestically.
Stakeholder Views on Extent of Input and Transparency of Force
Structure Development Process Differ:
From November 2002 through September 2004, the Air Force developed a 20-
year force structure plan through a multistep, iterative process that
included periodic review and oversight by senior-level Air Force, Air
National Guard, and DOD officials and a complex process of modeling and
analysis; however, stakeholders have different views on the
transparency of the process and the extent to which the Air Force
sought and addressed input from process participants. Moreover, the
adjutants general were not directly involved because the Air Force
relied on the Air National Guard to represent the states' perspectives.
A wide range of perspectives exist on how well this process worked,
depending on the role and level of involvement of each organization.
Limited documentation exists to show the various organizations
represented at planning meetings and briefings, but the documentation
does not indicate what issues were discussed or whether input was
sought from all participants. Therefore, we were unable to evaluate the
extent to which stakeholder interests influenced the Air Force's
proposed force structure, which was referred to as the Beacon Force. To
prepare the Air National Guard units in each state for the anticipated
force structure reductions, the Director, Air National Guard, began a
separate effort known as the Vanguard Engagement Strategy to solicit
input from the states on future roles and missions for the Air National
Guard to support future Air Force requirements within whatever force
structure emerged from the force structure planning process. Although
this effort also met with some resistance from participants, it
continues to be the framework through which the Air National Guard
provides input to the Air Force's Future Total Force initiative.
Force Structure Planning Process Included Iterative Analysis and
Periodic Oversight:
The Air Force used a multistep, iterative process to develop its 20-
year force structure plan--also referred to as the 2025 force structure
plan. The Air Force began to develop its long-term plan in response to
a provision in the Base Closure and Realignment Act, as amended through
2003, which required the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress
a 20-year force structure plan beginning with fiscal year
2005.[Footnote 6] According to current and former Air Force officials,
as the service began projecting its existing force structure plans over
the 20-year period, it believed that the existing plan it had in place
would be unaffordable in the longer term and took several steps to
develop a more affordable plan that would still provide required
capabilities.
The Air Force's Strategic Planning Directorate led this 2-year effort-
-from November 2002 through September 2004--to develop a more
affordable long-term force structure plan with the intention of using
the 2025 force structure plan as the basis for both base realignment
and closure decisions and the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.[Footnote
7] Table 1 provides a chronology of the key events surrounding the
force structure development and summarizes stakeholder participation in
the process.
Table 1: Key Events and Stakeholder Participation in The Force
Structure Development Process:
Time frame: November 2002-April 2003;
Key events:
* Air Force Strategic Planning Directorate began planning for
development of affordable 20- year force structure plan to meet Base
Closure and Realignment Act requirements;
* Initial meetings held to solicit stakeholder input on current and
future force structure plans;
* CORONA[A] and Chief of Staff briefed on the current plan/broad
options;
Stakeholders participating and providing input:
* Chief of Staff of the Air Force;
* Air Force four-star generals;
* Director, Air National Guard;
* Chief, Air Force Reserve;
* Major commands;
* Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency.
Time frame: May 2003;
Key events:
* Stakeholders asked to provide current, future unconstrained, and
future constrained force structure plans;
* Strategic Planning Directorate determined that an integrated long-
term force structure plan does not exist and, projected over the long-
term, current major command plans are unaffordable;
* Chief of Staff briefed on results;
Stakeholders participating and providing input:
* Chief of Staff of the Air Force;
* Major commands;
* Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency;
* Air National Guard;
* Air Force Reserve Command.
Time frame: June 2003;
Key events:
* CORONA members briefed on current, constrained, and "strawman" force
structure based on initial plans from major commands;
* CORONA members approved follow-on briefings to major commands;
Stakeholders participating and providing input:
* Air Force four-star generals;
* Director, Air National Guard;
* Chief, Air Force Reserve.
Time frame: July - August 2003;
Key events:
* "Strawman" force structure briefed to major commands, Air National
Guard, and Air Force Reserve Command to inform and obtain input;
* Developed consolidated long-term force structure plan to balance
competing priorities of all major commands;
Stakeholders participating and providing input:
* Major commands;
* Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency;
* Air National Guard;
* Air Force Reserve Command.
Time frame: September 2003;
Key events:
* Chief of Staff and Air Force Secretary briefed on long-term force
structure plan;
* Four-star generals and Air National Guard Director briefed on force
structure plan; including specific reductions to legacy fleet and need
to consolidate active and reserve components;
* Force structure plan submitted to Joint Staff as initial submission
for base realignment and closure process;
Stakeholders participating and providing input:
* Secretary of the Air Force;
* Chief of Staff of the Air Force;
* Air Force four-star generals;
* Director, Air National Guard.
Time frame: November 2003;
Key events:
* CORONA members briefed on force structure plan; questions arose on
"optimum" force structure option;
Stakeholders participating and providing input:
* Air Force four-star generals;
* Director, Air National Guard;
* Chief, Air Force Reserve.
Time frame: January - February 2004;
Key events:
* Air Force "Tiger Team" formed to address CORONA concerns and validate
long-term force structure plan; efforts focused on the combat air force
(i.e., fighters, bombers) and verifying capabilities provided;
* Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency evaluated options to optimize
combat force capabilities within anticipated funding levels;
* Periodic briefings provided to stakeholders including major commands
and Air National Guard;
* Air Force "optimal" option became known as the Beacon Force;
* Detailed plans developed for fiscal year 2006 budget submission based
on Beacon Force;
Stakeholders participating and providing input:
* Air Staff;
* Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency;
* Major commands;
* Air National Guard.
Time frame: May 2004;
Key events:
* Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff and then CORONA members
briefed on the Beacon Force;
* Beacon Force approved as Air Force 2025 force structure plan;
Stakeholders participating and providing input:
* Secretary of the Air Force;
* Chief of Staff of the Air Force;
* Air Force four-star generals;
* Director, Air National Guard;
* Chief, Air Force Reserve.
Time frame: June 2004;
Key events:
* 2025 force structure plan briefed to Deputy Secretary of Defense;
Stakeholders participating and providing input:
* Deputy Secretary of Defense;
* Secretary of the Air Force;
* Chief of Staff of the Air Force;
* Air Staff.
Time frame: July 2004;
Key events:
* 2025 force structure plan briefed to adjutants general conference;
Stakeholders participating and providing input:
* Secretary of the Air Force;
* Chief of Staff of the Air Force;
* Air Staff;
* Director, Air National Guard;
* Adjutants general.
Time frame: September 2004;
Key events:
* The Secretary of Defense and senior leadership briefed on the 2025
force structure plan;
* Secretary of Defense approved the Air Force's proposed 2025 force
structure plan;
Stakeholders participating and providing input:
* Secretary of Defense;
* Senior Leadership Review Group;
* Air Force Senior Leadership.
Time frame: December 2004;
Key events:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense issued Program Budget Decision 753
which reduced funding for the F/A-22 and ended procurement in 2008
rather than 2011;
* Air Force adjusted its approved force structure plan to slow
retirement of F-16 aircraft to compensate for F/A-22 reduction;
Stakeholders participating and providing input:
* Secretary of Defense;
* Air Staff.
Time frame: March 2005;
Key events:
* In accordance with the Base Closure and Realignment Act, the
Secretary of Defense submitted the Air Force's revised 20-year force
structure plan to the Congress as part of DOD's submission;
Stakeholders participating and providing input:
* Secretary of Defense.
Source: GAO's analysis of Air Force information.
[A] CORONA is a term the Air Force uses for meetings of its four-star
generals and senior leadership held three times a year to discuss
servicewide issues.
[End of table]
As shown in table 1, between November 2002 and April 2003, the
directorate held a series of meetings with subject matter experts from
across the service, including representatives from the Air Staff, major
commands (e.g., Air Combat Command), Air National Guard, Air Force
Reserve Command, and Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency, to identify
the existing long-term force structure plan and solicit input on the
future plan. The directorate determined that while episodic attempts
had been made at establishing a long-term plan in the past, an
integrated, comprehensive, and fiscally realistic plan simply did not
exist.[Footnote 8]
As the directorate developed the 2025 force structure plan, the major
commands, the Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve Command were
asked to provide input to the process, according to Air Force
officials. The directorate provided periodic briefings to the senior
leadership of the Air Force, the major commands, the Air National
Guard, and the Air Force Reserve Command throughout the force structure
development process. According to the former Deputy Director of the
Strategic Planning Directorate who led the development effort, the
directorate adjusted the force structure plan several times based on
input from stakeholders and guidance from senior Air Force leadership,
before reaching agreement on a consolidated long-term force structure
plan that balanced the competing priorities of all of the major
commands across the Air Force. He further noted that when the Air Force
four-star generals and the Air National Guard Director were briefed on
and approved the consolidated force structure plan in September 2003,
the participants recognized that the smaller force structure would
require the Air Force to integrate its active and reserve components to
a greater extent. This consolidated 20-year force structure plan served
as the Air Force's initial submission to the Joint Staff as part of the
base realignment and closure process in late September 2003.
In November 2003, during a subsequent briefing to senior Air Force
leaders--in a meeting known as CORONA--questions arose about whether
the force structure plan submitted to the Joint Staff in September was
the "best possible" force structure option.[Footnote 9] The senior
leadership was particularly concerned about the adequacy of the combat
air force included in the proposed plan. To address these questions,
the Air Staff formed a "Tiger Team" to evaluate the proposed force
structure plan. The team worked with the Air Force Studies and Analyses
Agency[Footnote 10] to evaluate the proposed force structure plan
against other possible options. The Air Force Studies and Analyses
Agency used modeling and analyses to evaluate the September 2003
submission to the Joint Staff against 17 other options to identify the
option that would, in their words, "optimize" capabilities required to
meet the National Defense Strategy[Footnote 11] within anticipated
budget levels.[Footnote 12] According to senior Studies and Analyses
Agency officials, at the direction of the Tiger Team, their analysis
focused on the combat air force--in other words, fighter and bomber
aircraft--and on determining the number of those aircraft required to
provide desired capabilities.[Footnote 13] Studies and Analyses Agency
officials also stated that the analysis did not consider whether the
aircraft would be flown by the active or reserve component force.
Further, they stated that the methodology included first setting aside
the number of aircraft required to meet the U.S. Northern Command's
existing homeland defense requirements[Footnote 14] and then
distributing the remainder of the aircraft to meet the other
requirements of the National Defense Strategy. Upon completion of the
analysis, the Studies and Analyses Agency determined that the force
structure plan submitted to the Joint Staff in September 2003 was, in
fact, the best option.
The Air Staff formally briefed the plan--now known as the Beacon Force-
-to the adjutants general for the first time in July 2004. Prior to
that time, the Air Force had primarily relied on the Air National Guard
to represent the adjutants generals' views in the force structure
development process.[Footnote 15] The plan included the acquisition of
new aircraft, such as the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter, and a
steep reduction in the F-16 fleet, which comprises a significant
portion of the Air National Guard fighter fleet, and it was expected
that some Air National Guard units would lose their aircraft and
associated flying missions as a result. Both Air National Guard and Air
Combat Command officials told us that they had concerns about the
Beacon Force plan and its effect on their ability to perform the
homeland defense mission while meeting Air Expeditionary Force
commitments. To address their respective concerns, Air Combat Command
and Air National Guard officials worked together to develop an
alternative proposal that would allow the Air Force to retain a larger
portion of the F-16 fleet. Representatives of the Air Guard and Air
Combat Command presented their proposal to the Air Staff in October
2004, but according to Command and Guard officials, they were told the
proposal could not be considered because the Beacon Force plan had
already been approved by the Secretary of the Air Force and the
Secretary of Defense.
In December 2004, 3 months after approving the Air Force's Beacon Force
plan, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued Program Budget
Decision 753, which reduced the Air Force budget and shifted funds to
the Army.[Footnote 16] This budget reduction drove the Air Force to
alter its 20-year force structure plan. The budget decision reduced
funding for the F/A-22 by $10.5 billion and cut 96 aircraft from the
planned procurement quantity, leaving a total of 178 aircraft to be
procured.[Footnote 17] To adjust to this reduction in the number of F/A-
22s to be purchased, the Air Force adopted an alternative force
structure plan--1 of the 17 previously evaluated by the Air Force
Studies and Analyses Agency--that slowed the retirement of its F-16
fleet. According to Air National Guard and Air Combat Command
officials, the revised force structure plan alleviated some of their
concerns because it slowed the reduction of the F-16 fleet and allowed
the Guard to retain a greater number of flying units in the near term.
The revised 20-year force structure plan was submitted to the Congress
in March 2005. The plan was also used by the Air Force's base closure
and realignment team to reorganize the fleet by determining where the
planned force structure (i.e., aircraft) would be located and who would
operate it (i.e., the active or reserve components). We did not
evaluate the Air Force's base closure and realignment assessment and
recommendations process for this report. However, we separately
reported on the overall DOD base closure and realignment process in
July 2005.[Footnote 18] The congressionally chartered Base Closure and
Realignment Commission made significant modifications to DOD's
recommendations--particularly with respect to Air National Guard units-
-in its recommendations to the President on September 8, 2005.
The force structure plan may continue to evolve as a result of the 2005
Quadrennial Defense Review. This review is an ongoing, congressionally
mandated study conducted by DOD that is expected to result in new
guidance on strategy, forces, and risks derived from extensive
deliberations and consultation. The purpose of the Quadrennial Defense
Review is to provide a basic strategy for addressing critical issues
such as budget and acquisition priorities, emerging threats, types and
levels of force structure, and capabilities, for the next 20 years.
Results of the review are scheduled for publication in February 2006
and may result in changes to the Air Force's 20-year force structure
plan.
Stakeholder Participation and Perceptions of the Force Structure
Development Process Vary:
As shown in table 1, many key stakeholders participated directly in the
force structure development process, including representatives of the
Air Staff, the major commands, the Air Force Studies and Analyses
Agency, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve Command. The
force structure development team also provided numerous briefings
throughout the process to audiences that included the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary of Defense, senior Air Force leadership, major
commands, Air Force Reserve Command, Air National Guard, and state
adjutants general. Although periodically briefed by the Air Staff and
the Guard Bureau on the Air Force's overall plans to adjust the force
structure, the adjutants general did not participate directly in the
process.
Through our discussions with Air Force Air staff, major command, and
Air National Guard officials, as well as 10 adjutants general, we found
that key stakeholders included in and affected by the force structure
development process have varying, and sometimes disparate, perceptions
of the process depending on their role and involvement. We requested
minutes or other documentation of key meetings, but Air Force and Air
National Guard officials told us that this documentation did not exist.
Therefore, we were unable to assess the exact nature and extent of
stakeholder involvement or evaluate the perceptions and views of key
participants. The following summaries describe the perspectives
provided by the Air Staff, Major Commands, Air National Guard, and
adjutants general officials we interviewed.
Air Staff. The Air Staff officials we spoke with told us that they used
a process based on the Air Force Corporate Structure, which formalizes
review and decision making by bringing together representatives from
across the Air Force to discuss issues and develop recommended courses
of action. Air Staff officials noted that key stakeholders, including
the Air National Guard and major commands, were invited to attend and
were present at many of the meetings and briefings over the 2-year
period during which the force structure was being developed. During
these meetings, it was the Air Staff's expectation that Air National
Guard participants would (1) raise concerns about the force structure
plan and (2) represent the views of the adjutants general in the
discussions in accordance with Title 10 of the United States Code,
which establishes the National Guard Bureau as the channel of
communication between the Air Force and the states. According to the
Director, Future Total Force Directorate, these meetings provided the
opportunity for all involved to raise concerns and have them openly
discussed. However, in the opinion of this official, this opportunity
is dependent upon the representative to make and defend the position of
his or her organization. In the absence of objections, the group as a
whole assumes that all are in agreement. With respect to the adjutants
general, the former Deputy Director of the Air Force Strategic Planning
Directorate told us that in addition to the formal briefings, the
directorate staff provided several briefings to individual adjutants
general throughout the force structure development process. However,
available documentation we obtained did not indicate how many briefings
were given or to whom. Directorate staff viewed these meetings as
opportunities for the adjutants general to share their views, provide
direct input, and influence the force structure development process.
Major Commands. Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command officials
told us that they were consulted about force structure options and that
they had several opportunities to provide input into the process.
However, Air Combat Command officials noted that while they were
included in the process through various briefings and meetings, they
often did not know how their input was used. Further, Air Combat
Command officials noted that when they submitted an alternative
proposal to the force structure plan in October 2004, prepared in
conjunction with the Air National Guard, it was met with resistance
from Air Staff officials because the Air Force's force structure plan
had already been approved by the Secretary of the Air Force and the
Secretary of Defense.
Air National Guard. Air National Guard officials told us that while
they participated in numerous meetings and briefings held by the Air
Staff, they did not believe that their views, opinions, and input were
being sought. Air Guard officials often viewed these meetings as
informational in nature because the Air Staff described overall
anticipated force structure cuts without details on where the cuts
would be made and how the reductions would affect the Air National
Guard. The Air National Guard officials whom we talked with noted that
the Guard representatives were frequently outranked at these meetings
and, as a result, did not feel that the environment was conducive to
raising their concerns and consequently remained silent. Several Guard
officials told us that on the occasions when they raised concerns or
objections, their input was met with negative reactions from the Air
Staff and on at least one occasion they were told that the decision had
already been approved by the Air Force senior leadership and their
input was too late. Overall, as previously discussed, the Air National
Guard believed that the Beacon Force plan would reduce its F-16 fleet
too quickly and that the Guard would absorb a disproportionately high
portion of the cuts. DOD's December 2004 budget decision that limited
the F-A/22 acquisition and slowed the retirement of the F-16 fleet
resolved these concerns to some extent.
Adjutants general. For the most part, the adjutants general we
interviewed (7 of 10) were in agreement in their belief that they did
not have sufficient opportunity to provide input or to influence the
force structure development process. Three of the 10 adjutants general
that we interviewed told us that they viewed the briefings and
information they received on the force structure development process to
be "big picture" options under consideration, with few specific
details. Half of the adjutants general noted that despite their efforts
to engage the Air Force in discussion about specific force structure
issues, in their opinion, the Air Staff was not receptive to their
input. Six of the adjutants general we met with specifically noted
their belief that the Air Force did not adequately consider the Guard's
responsibility for homeland security or the Guard's requirements to
participate in other state missions in making its force structure
decisions. For example, three adjutants general expressed concern that
if some or all of the aircraft in their states were retired, they would
also lose associated personnel whose state role is to perform security
or firefighting missions.
Air National Guard Vanguard Strategy Initiated to Identify Future Roles
and Missions:
During the same period that the force structure plan was being
developed, the Air National Guard developed its Vanguard Engagement
Strategy to establish a forum to ensure that the Guard remains ready,
reliable, and relevant as the Air Force adjusts its current force
structure, by providing input into the Air Force's decision-making
processes. The strategy encouraged the state adjutants general and
units to begin identifying new roles and missions that they could
support in the future. Although under way at the same time as the force
structure was being developed, the Guard's Vanguard strategy was not
formally linked to the force structure development process, according
to Air Force and Air National Guard officials.
As noted previously, the Air National Guard used its Vanguard strategy
as a means of involving the adjutants general in thinking about and
planning for the future. Over the period from December 2002 through
late 2004, Air National Guard officials engaged in a variety of efforts
to encourage state Guard officials to begin thinking about the future
of their units and identifying possible new missions that would be
appropriate for their state. Outreach efforts by senior Air National
Guard leaders included presentations to the Adjutants General
Association of the United States and senior leadership conferences.
During these meetings, Air National Guard and on some occasions senior
Air Force leaders discussed the overall force structure planning
process and expected results. Additionally, one senior Air National
Guard official told us that he made personal contact with the adjutants
general of most of the 54 states and territories to discuss potential
force structure reductions and the Vanguard initiative. During these
individual meetings, the official discussed the overall force structure
plan, specific changes that could affect each state, and possible ideas
for new missions.
According to Air National Guard officials, the Vanguard Strategy was
met with a variety of reactions from the adjutants general. Many state
organizations responded to the Air National Guard's request for new
mission proposals by offering ideas and proposals of their own. As of
November 2005, 46 of the 54 states and territories--about 85 percent--
had submitted proposals through the Vanguard process. Additionally,
according to Air National Guard officials, some states submitted
proposals for new missions directly to the Air Staff, rather than
through the Vanguard process, and some states organizations chose not
to submit any new mission ideas for their state at all.
According to senior Air National Guard officials, the Vanguard
Engagement Strategy remains the framework through which the Air
National Guard develops and refines its input to the Air Force's Future
Total Force transformation effort. In addition, Future Total Force
Directorate officials told us that all proposals from state
organizations must now be funneled through the Air National Guard
process and that they no longer accept proposals directly from state
organizations.
Air Force Proceeding with Future Total Force Implementation without a
Fully Developed Management Framework:
The Air Force is proceeding with implementation of its Future Total
Force transformation concept--which is centered on new ways of using
and organizing the active, Guard, and reserve components--without a
fully developed management framework to guide its efforts and
facilitate evaluation of the new organizational constructs currently
being tested. As the Air Force developed its 20-year force structure
plan and prepared its base closure and realignment recommendations, it
concluded that new ways of operating would be required in the future
and embarked on implementing its Future Total Force concept.
Specifically, the Air Force announced initiatives to begin testing some
new organizational constructs for integrating active, reserve, and
Guard units, and also established a temporary office to initiate and
manage implementation of these efforts. Implementing organizational
changes, such as those the Air Force is attempting, are difficult and
require concentrated effort and a management framework that sets forth
a clear strategy that includes results-oriented management tools--such
as long-term goals, strategies and performance measures--to guide
implementation efforts and evaluate new concepts. However, the
directorate is still in the process of developing a strategic plan to
guide the Future Total Force transformation effort, and specific time
frames have not been set for approving the plan. Without a management
framework that includes a strategic plan and a comprehensive plan for
evaluating its test initiatives, the Air Force's ability to implement
the Future Total Force effort efficiently and effectively may be
limited, and the overall progress and success of its efforts will be
more difficult for DOD managers and the Congress to assess.
Air Force Has Taken Initial Steps to Implement Future Total Force
Concept:
The Air Force is facing significant challenges that could ultimately
affect its combat capabilities: an aging fleet of aircraft that needs
to be replaced or modernized, adversaries that are increasingly hard to
define, and affordability challenges. These challenges combined with
anticipated reductions in its force structure have driven the Air Force
to embark on an effort to transform its force to better integrate
active and reserve forces. The resultant Future Total Force concept, if
fully implemented, could have a substantial impact on the way the Air
Force and its reserve components operate and are organized. The Future
Total Force concept consists of two components: (1) creating a long-
term plan for a smaller, more capable and affordable force structure
that is capable of addressing future threats and (2) using new
organizational arrangements that allow the Air Force to better use the
personnel in all its components by integrating its active and reserve
component forces into mixed units. For example, the Air Force asserts
that its new aircraft, such as the F/A-22 fighter, will be more capable
and more reliable than current aircraft, thus providing an opportunity
to use a higher number of crews per aircraft to take advantage of the
aircraft's capabilities. The Air Force plans to increase the number of
crew members available by combining active and reserve component forces
into co-located active, Guard, and reserve units that share aircraft.
In addition, the service plans to meet increasing demand for certain
new and emerging missions, such as operating unmanned aerial vehicles
and analyzing intelligence, by assigning more of those missions to
Guard and reserve units. According to Air Force officials, these
efforts will also allow the Air Force to respond to changes brought
about by base closure and realignment decisions, including 18 Air
National Guard units that will lose their aircraft and flying missions.
Over the last year, the Air Force has taken two important steps toward
implementing the Future Total Force concept. First, in December 2004,
the Secretary of the Air Force announced six test initiatives--four
focused on integrating active, Guard, and reserve units through the use
of new organizational constructs and two that assigned emerging
missions to Guard and reserve units. The initiatives included the first
Air National Guard units that will operate Predator unmanned aerial
vehicles, the first "community-based" unit where the Air Force will
station active duty personnel at a Guard unit, and the first active
duty and Guard units to fly the F/A-22 fighter aircraft as integrated
"associate" units.[Footnote 19] Table 2 lists the Future Total Force
test initiatives and provides a brief description of each.
Table 2: Future Total Force Initiatives Announced by the Air Force in
December 2004:
Initiative: Richmond to Langley Integration;
Description: The Virginia Air National Guard's Richmond-based 192[ND]
Fighter Wing will join the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base
in an associate unit to operate the F/A-22 fighter aircraft. Guard
pilots and maintenance personnel have begun training for the new
mission.
Initiative: Vermont Community Basing;
Description: The Air Force will station active duty personnel at
Vermont Air National Guard's 158[TH] Fighter Wing in an associate unit
to use experienced Guard personnel to train inexperienced active duty
personnel and to test whether the personnel services normally provided
on an active Air Force base can be obtained from the local community.
The first of 12 active duty personnel reported for duty in Vermont in
June 2005.
Initiative: Arizona and Texas Predator Missions;
Description: Arizona and Texas Air National Guard members will operate
Predator unmanned aerial vehicles in their respective states. Six crews
were in training as of October 2005. Air Force analysis to determine
appropriate unit size and location is under way.
Initiative: New York Distributed Ground Station;
Description: Initially, the Air Force planned for the New York Air
National Guard to process global intelligence information;
However, subsequent increased demand for unmanned aerial vehicles
caused the Air Force, after discussions with state officials, to change
the proposed new mission from the Ground Station to a Predator mission.
Plans for establishing the Predator unit are under development.
Initiative: Nevada Air Warfare Center;
Description: The Air Force plans to integrate Nevada Air National Guard
personnel into Predator operations and Air Force Reserve personnel into
most missions at the Air Warfare Center.
Initiative: Hill Air Force Base, Utah Integration;
Description: The Air Force Reserve's 419[TH] Fighter Wing will
integrate with the active duty's 388th Fighter Wing in an associate
unit, both units currently operate F-16 fighters at Hill Air Force
base. Agreements on how the units will operate were being coordinated
as of October 2005.
Source: GAO, developed from Air Force data.
[End of table]
At the time of our review, the initiatives were in varying stages of
development. For example, some of the initiatives including the
Richmond to Langley integration and the Vermont Community Basing had
been under development prior to the announcement and formalized
implementation plans have been finalized and agreed to by the Air
Combat Command, the Air National Guard, and the state adjutants
general. As shown in table 2, training of those involved in these
integration initiatives has already begun. In other cases, such as the
Texas Predator and New York Distributed Ground Station initiatives,
little planning was done in advance and, in fact, according to state
officials, little notice was provided to the affected states prior to
the public announcement. For several of the initiatives, much planning
remains to be done before implementation can be completed. In addition,
as discussed later, the Air Force has identified several hundred other
potential initiatives, which it has prioritized for future
implementation.
The second step taken by the Air Force to implement the Future Total
Force concept was to establish a new directorate in March 2005 to
provide a focal point for managing the transformational initiatives
that promote the Future Total Force concept; the new directorate also
assumed responsibility for overseeing implementation of the test
initiatives.[Footnote 20] The Air Force established the directorate on
a 2-year temporary basis, with the intention of incorporating the
Future Total Force concept into usual Air Force practices and thus
ultimately eliminating the need for an office dedicated to promoting
and managing these ideas. The directorate is staffed with
representatives from stakeholder organizations including the Air Staff,
Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve Command, and several states. In
addition, the Air Force has established two working groups to provide
support and guidance to the directorate. These working groups also
involve representatives from the Air Staff, major commands, reserve
components, and adjutants general. Several stakeholders we interviewed
told us that their inclusion in the Future Total Force Directorate and
its working groups has improved communication between the Air Force and
the Air Guard and that they have recently had more opportunity to
provide input to key decisions.
Since its inception, the Future Total Force Directorate has continued
to oversee development of the Future Total Force test initiatives, but
has largely focused its efforts on identifying additional new missions
and integration opportunities for Guard and reserve units, particularly
those affected by the base closure and realignment decisions. First,
the directorate evaluated the impact of base closure recommendations
and other planned actions on active, Guard, and reserve units. Second,
the directorate, working with key stakeholder organizations, identified
and prioritized a list of about 300 potential new missions and
integration opportunities into four categories ranging from highest to
lowest priority, at times combining new missions with integration
opportunities--such as an associate Predator unit operated by an
integrated active and Guard unit.[Footnote 21] Third, the directorate
plans to use this list to evaluate and match potential missions with 18
units affected by 2005 base closure decisions. Once missions have been
determined for these units, the directorate plans to begin assigning
the remaining missions to other units. The Air Force indicates that it
plans to complete implementation of about 60 percent of the highest
priority initiatives by fiscal year 2007 and about 87 percent of all
initiatives by fiscal year 2009.
The Air Force Has Not Fully Developed a Management Framework Needed to
Guide Implementation Efforts and Fully Test Initiatives:
Implementing significant transformational changes, such as those the
Air Force is attempting under the Future Total Force concept, are
difficult and require concentrated effort to accomplish established
goals. Our prior work and the work of others show that organizations
undertaking complex transformations can increase their likelihood of
success by adopting a results-oriented management framework, which
includes key management practices and a strategy that includes results-
oriented management tools, to guide implementation efforts and achieve
desired program outcomes.[Footnote 22] Key management practices include
leadership that defines and articulates a compelling reason for change;
sets the direction, pace, and tone for transforming; assigns
accountability for results; and is supported by a dedicated
implementation team, which, in turn, can provide the focused, day-to-
day direction needed for success.[Footnote 23] The Air Force has taken
steps that address several of these key management practices and
provide certain aspects of a framework to guide its overall Future
Total Force effort. For example, the Air Force has developed the Future
Total Force concept over a period of several years and has described
the needs and reasons for change in its policies and guidance to
subordinate organizations. The Air Force, as previously discussed, has
also recently established the Future Total Force Directorate to provide
day-to-day management, accountability, and an increased emphasis on
this transformation effort.
An effective management framework also includes a clear strategy that
articulates a mission and vision and incorporates the use of specific
results-oriented management tools, such as those embodied by the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,[Footnote 24] to provide
organizations with a way to effectively implement and manage
transformation efforts. This framework can shift the focus of
organizations from measuring activities and processes to identifying
and measuring desired results. Table 3 lists and describes the results-
oriented management tools used in our analysis.
Table 3: Key Results-Oriented Management Tools:
Long-term goals; Long-term goals identify overall expected results and
when to expect such results.
Strategies to be used; General methods the agency plans to use to
effectively and efficiently accomplish long-term goals.
Performance goals; Derived from long-term goals, should establish
intended performance and focus on results required.
Performance measures; Specific, objective indicators used to measure
progress toward achieving goals.
Evaluation and corrective action plans; An evaluation plan is an
objective and formal assessment of the results of a major effort; a
corrective action plan describes how evaluation findings will be used
to improve performance or revise unmet goals.
Source: GAO guidelines.
[End of table]
Long-term goals should explain what results are expected, should be
results-oriented, and should be expressed in a way that allows them to
be assessed in terms of achievement. Goals can help an organization
communicate what it intends to accomplish. Performance measures should
be objective and results oriented with specific target levels to meet
performance goals. Measuring performance allows organizations to track
progress toward goals and provides crucial information on which to base
organizational and management decisions. Organizations use evaluation
and corrective action plans to examine the success of a program and to
improve performance by identifying appropriate strategies to meet those
goals that were not met. An evaluation plan is a particularly important
management tool for implementing the Future Total Force concept because
of the new organizational constructs that will be required and the
complex challenges that they present. For example, integrating active
and Guard units may require changes to how those forces are employed,
their organizational structures and cultures, personnel policies and
career progression, how they are trained, and the unit command
structure.
At the time of our review, the Air Force had not yet fully developed
these elements. The Future Total Force Directorate was developing a
strategic plan that directorate officials said would address many of
the results-oriented management tools we described above. In addition,
the officials said that the plan would include the directorate's
organizational vision and mission; lay out its strategic goals and
objectives, and identify specific steps to achieve them; and provide
for an annual review using specific performance measures to gauge
success in achieving each goal. As of November 2005, however, the
strategic plan was still in draft form and had not yet been approved,
nor had specific time frames been set for approving the plan.
Furthermore, directorate officials said that approval of their
strategic plan is dependent upon approval of the Air Force Deputy Chief
of Staff for Plans and Programs' (their parent organization) strategic
plan, which is not expected to be finalized until early 2006.
Also, as of November 2005, the Air Force had developed implementation
plans for two of the Air Force initiatives designed to test new
organizational constructs that will integrate active, Guard and reserve
units, which are the foundation of the Future Total Force concept.
However, these two implementation plans lacked comprehensive methods to
evaluate and assess the results of the initiatives. For example, the
approved implementation plan for the Vermont initiative describes to a
limited extent some metrics that will be used to evaluate both mission
and non-mission-related activities such as the skill progression of
active duty maintenance personnel as a result of training with more
experienced Air National Guard personnel and the satisfaction of active
duty personnel in obtaining support from the local community. The
Virginia initiative implementation plan describes metrics for crew
ratios and utilization rates that the Air Force intends to use to
measure the effectiveness of that initiative, but does not address
other metrics. Also, the Director of the Future Total Force Directorate
told us that other steps will be taken to evaluate the test
initiatives, including (1) the test units will be continuously
monitored so that implementation issues may be addressed as they arise,
(2) implementation obstacles and lessons learned are discussed at
monthly meetings of the Future Total Force working groups, and (3) the
directorate's strategic plan, once approved, will set out several other
indicators that can suggest whether the Future Total Force concept is
producing the desired results. According to directorate officials,
these indicators will include:
* traditional Air Force measurements of unit effectiveness such as
readiness, crew ratios and utilization rates, and sortie generation
rates;
* reserve component volunteerism compared to involuntary mobilization;
* trends in the number of deployable active, Guard, and reserve
personnel for the Air Expeditionary Force; and:
* progress toward implementing the 20-year force structure plan.
Taken as a whole, the compilation of metrics contained in the approved
implementation plans for two of the test initiatives and the other
measures that Future Total Force Directorate officials have described
as being contained in the draft strategic plan are good first steps,
but do not provide a comprehensive, methodical, and readily evident
approach to evaluating the success of the new organizational constructs
being tested. As we have previously reported, such a formal study
process can provide a rigorous framework for data evaluation,
development of lessons learned, and increase the visibility of the
process to outside organizations. For example, best practices by other
governmental organizations and the private sector rely on detailed
study plans, or data collection and analysis plans, to guide the
development of studies and experiments and the collection and analysis
of data, and to provide a feedback loop that links the outcomes of the
study or event and subsequent analysis to the original goals and
objectives of the test.[Footnote 25]
When we discussed the benefits of such an evaluation plan with
directorate officials, they stated their concern that a lengthy
evaluation of the test initiatives could delay implementation of the
new organizational constructs beyond the time frames in which they will
be needed to support Future Total Force goals and objectives. We agree
that the evaluation should not be drawn out to the point that the Air
Force's goals for implementing the Future Total Force are not achieved.
However, the absence of a comprehensive and readily evident plan to
evaluate the initiatives can itself create an environment in which
delays may occur. Further, without a sound evaluation plan, the Air
Force will not have a good basis for determining the extent to which
the new organizational constructs should be applied, a basis for
identifying and applying lessons learned, or a method for gaining
acceptance of the conclusions reached, and increasing the transparency
of the process for decision makers and outside organizations.
Conclusion:
The Air Force has developed a force structure plan for the next 20
years with a vision of a smaller, but more agile and capable force.
This plan calls for billions of dollars to be invested in new aircraft
while some legacy aircraft are retired, new roles and missions, and the
physical and operational integration of more active, Guard, and reserve
units to form the "Future Total Force." The changes that will be
required to achieve these objectives present significant challenges to
the Air Force, such as the need to develop new doctrine, training,
personnel policies, and command structures for the integrated units,
which will require the support of all affected organizations to develop
effective solutions and achieve success. While the Air Force has
recognized these challenges and has taken several steps to address
them, it has not yet completed development of a management framework
that fully reflects results-oriented management principles and no
specific time frame has been established for putting such a framework
in place. Until the framework is completely developed and approved, no
requirement exists for those responsible for implementing the Future
Total Force concept to use the draft strategy and the management tools
it contains to guide the transformation and provide visibility over its
results. Similarly, the Air Force has not fully developed a clear and
comprehensive plan to evaluate the test initiatives announced in
December 2004 and expand these new constructs as appropriate. Without
an approved comprehensive evaluation plan that includes metrics and
milestones for assessing results, the Air Force may be unable to fully
evaluate the new organizational constructs and determine the most cost
effective way to organize active and reserve forces to carry out the
defense strategy. Moreover, without a comprehensive management
framework that includes an approved strategic plan and a clear plan to
evaluate the test initiatives, the Air Force may be limited in its
ability to adjust to the many uncertainties surrounding this
transformation process, measure the success of its efforts, and receive
the full support of all the affected organizations, including the state
adjutants general and the Congress.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To establish a results-oriented management framework that can be used
to guide the implementation of the Future Total Force transformation
process, measure effectiveness and overall results, and clearly
communicate plans for implementing and evaluating the concept to all
key stakeholders and decision makers within the Air Force and DOD, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air
Force to take the following two actions:
* Require the Future Total Force Directorate to fully develop a
comprehensive, results-oriented management framework to guide the
Future Total Force transformation effort and measure overall results.
Specifically, the management framework should include a strategic plan
that contains, but is not limited to:
* long-term goals and objectives,
* strategies to be used to accomplish goals,
* performance goals,
* performance criteria for measuring progress, and:
* evaluation and corrective action plans.
* Set a specific time frame to accelerate the approval of the Future
Total Force Directorate's strategic plan.
Further, to establish a clear understanding of the approach and
mechanisms to be used to evaluate the Future Total Force initiatives to
test new organizational constructs, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to take the following
action:
* Establish a stand-alone, comprehensive, and clearly articulated plan
for evaluating the Future Total Force test initiatives to measure
results, identify and apply lessons learned, and build on current
efforts to increase the transparency of the process for Air Force and
DOD decision makers and outside organizations.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our
recommendations and provided information on the actions it plans to
take to address them. The Air Force completed and approved the Future
Total Force strategic plan and stated that it is aggressively working
toward its goal of having a clear and comprehensive plan for evaluating
Future Total Force alternatives. Although we have not fully evaluated
the recently approved strategic plan, our initial review indicates that
it contains many of the elements that we believe are important to guide
a transformation effort of this magnitude. Specifically, the plan
describes the organizational vision, mission, strategic goals and
objectives, key initiatives, and some general performance measures for
the initial implementation of the Future Total Force concept. However,
as the department noted in its comments, the strategic plan is a
"living document" that should be reviewed and improved over time to
reflect progress toward achieving the goals and objectives it
describes. The department also agreed that a stand-alone,
comprehensive, and clearly articulated plan for evaluating the Future
Total Force test initiatives is needed and noted that it is working to
develop such a plan, including working to identify new metrics
specifically for evaluating its integration initiatives. Once this
evaluation plan is completed and approved, and if it provides a
comprehensive and readily evident plan to evaluate the test
initiatives, we believe that the Air Force actions would be responsive
to our recommendation. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Air Force; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; the
Director, Air National Guard; and the Director, Office of Management
and Budget. We will also provide copies to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the processes and events that surrounded the Air Force's
development of its 20-year force structure plan, we interviewed
officials and obtained briefings and other pertinent documentation from
current and former officials of the Department of the Air Force
Headquarters, Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, Air Force
Studies and Analyses Agency, and Air National Guard. We reviewed the
Office of the Secretary of Defense Program Budget Decision 753 that
reduced the Air Force procurement budget for fiscal year 2006 and
discussed with Air Force officials the subsequent adjustments made to
the force structure. Although much of the information on the force
structure development process was testimonial from participants in the
process, we assessed this information by comparing it to supporting
documentation, when available, and corroborated it through additional
interviews to determine consistency and reasonableness. On the basis of
these efforts, we believe the information we obtained is sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. We also reviewed DOD's draft
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support and discussed the
strategy with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense. We also interviewed officials at the U.S. Northern
Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command to understand
the Air National Guard's role in homeland defense missions. During the
same period in which the Air Force was developing its force structure
plan, the Air National Guard implemented its Vanguard Engagement
Strategy. To describe the Air National Guard's Vanguard Engagement
strategy and its relationship to the Air Force's force structure
development process, we reviewed the strategy and interviewed and
obtained briefings and documentation from Air National Guard and
Department of the Air Force officials.
To determine the level of involvement of key stakeholders in the force
structure development process, we interviewed officials and obtained
documentation from officials of the Department of the Air Force
Headquarters, Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, and the Air
National Guard. Also, to determine the level of stakeholder involvement
in the Guard's Vanguard initiative, we interviewed officials from the
Department of the Air Force Headquarters and the Air National Guard and
obtained documentation from Air National Guard officials. To gauge the
involvement of the 54 adjutants general, we interviewed a non-
probability sample of 10 adjutants general. To guide our selection of
this sample, we developed a list of six criteria and evaluated each
state and territory against these criteria. The state selection
criteria included (1) a mix of large and small states, with states
containing three or more flying units being considered large; (2) a
geographic mix of states; (3) states with differing views on the
proposed force structure plan or Vanguard changes; (4) states with
adjutants general who were active in leadership positions in the
Adjutants General Association of the United States; (5) states with
adjutants generals serving on an Air Force General Officer Steering
Committee; and (6) states with Vanguard or Future Total Force
initiatives. We conducted open-ended interviews with the adjutants
general of Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Nebraska, New York, North
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia to gain their perspectives
on the force structure development process and the Vanguard engagement
strategy and their level of involvement in the development and
implementation of each. In 6 of the 10 states, we also interviewed
members of the adjutants generals' command staff.
To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force is utilizing key
management tools to develop new missions for the Air National Guard and
to integrate active duty and reserve component forces, we identified
key management tools consistently found in successful organizations
through a review of key documents and our prior work. We reviewed and
analyzed key documents related to the Air Force's efforts to implement
its Future Total Force concept and held discussions with the Director
and other officials of the newly formed Air Force Future Total Force
Directorate to obtain their perspectives and discuss their efforts to
develop a strategic plan incorporating the key management tools to
guide implementation of the concept. In addition, we interviewed
directorate and Air Combat Command officials to determine what actions
they had taken to develop a plan to implement and evaluate the six
Chief of Staff test initiatives. We also interviewed the adjutants
general for four of the states slated to participate in the test
initiatives to determine their involvement and discuss their plans for
implementing and measuring the success of these initiatives. We did not
evaluate the process the Air Force is using to identify and validate
new missions for the Guard.
We conducted our review from September 2004 through November 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
RESERVE AFFAIRS:
1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500:
JAN 17 2006:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report,
"DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: Fully Developed Management Framework Needed to
Guide Air Force Future Total Force Efforts," dated December 14, 2005
(Code 350583). The Department partially concurs with Recommendations 1,
3 and concurs with Recommendation 2. Detailed comments on the GAO
recommendations and the Future Total Force Strategic Plan are enclosed.
The Department appreciates the level of effort and applauds the
thoroughness and professionalism of the GAO staff. The Department is
pleased that the report acknowledged our efforts to maintain an open
and transparent process with all stakeholders. In addition, we
recognize that a management framework is required to implement the
Future Total Force initiatives and are in the process of producing an
adaptive system of measurement that can adjust to the unique
characteristics of each initiative. The Department also recognizes that
a number of traditional AF unit metrics are useful in this effort.
There is a need to balance a robust management network while fostering
an environment of immediate success. We are dedicated to continuous
improvement of our metrics and identifying best practices that can be
applied to new initiatives. We are also mindful that the benefits of a
large number of data gathering requirements must be weighed against the
burden those requirements put on our people.
The point of contact for this office is Colonel Cora Jackson-Chandler,
OASD/RA (RT&M), at (703) 695-4126:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Thomas F. Hall:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED DECEMBER 14, 2005:
GAO CODE 350583/GAO-06-232:
"DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: Fully Developed Management Framework Needed to
Guide Air Force Future Total Force Efforts"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to require the Future Total Force
Directorate to continue to fully develop a comprehensive, results
oriented management framework to guide the future total force
transformation effort and measure overall results. Specifically, the
management framework should include a strategic plan that contains, but
is not limited to:
* long-term goals and objectives;
* strategies to be used to accomplish goals;
* performance goals;
* performance criteria for measuring progress; and:
* evaluation and corrective plans:
DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The Air Force currently has a robust
system of working groups (WGs) integrated process teams (IPTs), and a
General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) that brings all stake holders
together to monitor progress, surface problems, craft solutions and
refine the process. Additionally, the Future Total Force Strategic Plan
was in draft form at the time of this audit. Since the audit, the plan
has been completed and approved. This plan contains many of the
specific recommendations requested by GAO. This plan lays out the
organizational vision, mission, strategic goals and objectives, key
initiatives and performance metrics for the next two years and is the
basis for organizational long-term process improvement.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to set a specific timeframe to
accelerate the approval of the Future Total Force Directorate's
strategic plan.
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The FTF Strategic Plan was approved by AF/XP on
December 16, 2005 and is attached. However, it is important to note
that this is a "living document" that will change and grow over time to
reflect advances in the goals, objectives, initiatives, strategies, and
metrics.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to establish a stand-alone,
comprehensive, and clearly articulated plan for evaluating the Future
Total Force test initiatives to measure results, identify and apply
lessons learned, and build on current efforts to increase the
transparency of the process for Air Force and DoD decision makers and
outside organizations.
DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The Air Force's Future Total Force
Directorate is aggressively working toward their goal to have a stand-
alone, comprehensive and clearly articulated plan for evaluating FTF
initiatives. In the interim, they are utilizing well-established AF
processes and measurement standards to evaluate unit health and
progress. In addition, new metrics unique to specific integration
initiatives and an adaptive or tailored approach to defining metrics
are being explored.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Robert Repasky, Assistant
Director; Hugh Brady; John Clary; Alissa Czyz; George Delgado; Nicole
Harms; Penney Harwell; Kenneth Patton; Terry Richardson; and Travis
Thomson also made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] We interviewed the adjutants general of 10 states--Colorado,
Connecticut, Maryland, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, and Virginia.
[2] GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).
[3] GAO, Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and
Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform
Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004).
[4] The Air Force Aerospace Expeditionary Force (also referred to as
the Air and Space Expeditionary Force) combines the active, reserve,
and Guard into one component that trains, deploys, and operates
together. This force is comprised of fighters, bombers, tankers, and
tactical air lifters.
[5] 10 U.S.C. §10501.
[6] Pub. L. No. 107-107, section 2912(a) (1) (A) required DOD to
develop a 20-year force structure plan as the basis for its base
closure and realignment analysis. The plan was to begin with fiscal
year 2005 and be based on an assessment of the (1) probable threats to
U.S. national security during the 20-year period, (2) the probable end-
strength levels and major force units needed to meet the threats, and
(3) the anticipated level of funding available for national defense.
[7] The congressionally mandated 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review,
scheduled for publication in February 2006, is a DOD-wide,
comprehensive review intended to provide a basic strategy for
addressing critical issues such as budget and acquisition priorities,
emerging threats, force modernization, and the force structure required
for the next 20 years.
[8] Previous Air Force efforts had focused primarily on the 6-year
defense plan used in the Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Execution process.
[9] CORONA is a term the Air Force uses for meetings of its four-star
generals and senior leadership held three times a year to discuss
servicewide issues.
[10] The Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency reports directly to the
Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and provides analysis to the Chief
of Staff and Secretary that is intended to enhance the quality of
defense reviews, force structure and resource allocation processes, and
air expeditionary force actions.
[11] As set out in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the National
Defense Strategy provides strategic-level guidance for developing force
structure. The strategy calls for defending the United States while
serving as a deterrent in four critical regions and swiftly defeating
adversaries in two overlapping major conflicts with the capability of
winning decisively in one of them for an enduring result. At the same
time, the capability should exist to conduct a limited number of
smaller-scale contingency operations. This is commonly referred to as
"1-4-2-1."
[12] The Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency used its Combat Force
Assessment Model to compare the Strategic Planning Directorate's 20-
year force structure plan to 17 alternative options to measure the
effect that increases or decreases in the availability of particular
weapon systems would have on both effectiveness and cost.
[13] According to Studies and Analyses Agency officials, for this
analysis the mobility air force--those aircraft that provide airlift
and refueling capability--was only considered in terms of how the
refueling capabilities might affect the capabilities of the combat air
force.
[14] The U.S. Northern Command is responsible for executing homeland
defense activities and supporting civilian authorities when requested.
[15] Air Force officials cited the Title 10 authority (10 U.S.C.
§10501) of the National Guard Bureau to act as the channel of
communication between the Department of the Air Force and the states.
[16] Program Budget Decision 753 was DOD's reaction to an Office of
Management and Budget mandate to cut $55 billion from its Fiscal Years
2006-2011 Future Years Defense Program and, at the same time, add $25
billion to the fiscal years 2007-2011 Army budget to cover the cost of
the ongoing reorganization known as Army Modularity. The net result was
a reduction of $30 billion in DOD's budget over a 6-year period.
[17] Program Budget Decision 753 nominally reduced the procurement
quantity to 179 aircraft. Subsequently, the Air Force transferred one
production aircraft to be dedicated to testing, thus reducing the
procurement quantity to 178.
[18] GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).
[19] Associate units combine active and reserve component units in an
integrated work environment to share aircraft and perform support,
maintenance, instruction, and day-to-day missions. The Air Force has
used the associate unit organizational construct in the past in the
mobility community where active and Air Force Reserve Command units
frequently share mobility aircraft, such as the C-130 and KC-135.
[20] Although the Future Total Force concept has been in development
for several years, previous efforts had been carried out at a lower
organizational level within the Air Force's Strategic Planning
Directorate. The new directorate was established in order to devote the
full-time effort believed necessary to fully implement the concept.
[21] With input from the major commands, Air National Guard, and Air
Force Reserve Command, the directorate prioritized the missions list by
grouping missions into one of four bands: Band 1, the highest priority,
contains those the Air Force "must do" to satisfy congressional
mandates, existing laws, etc; Band 2 missions are considered "mission
critical" to the Air Force achieving its objectives; Band 3 missions
are "mission significant," meaning that failing to perform the tasks
could negatively affect overall effectiveness; and Band 4 missions are
"mission enhancing," meaning that they would be nice to do if resources
are available. In addition, some missions were not included in the
bands because they were added to the list after the prioritization
process was complete.
[22] GAO, Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability,
and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform
Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004).
[23] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[24] Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).
[25] GAO, Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit
from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing, GAO-06-
84 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2005).
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