Military Personnel
Reserve Components Need Guidance to Accurately and Consistently Account for Volunteers on Active Duty for Operational Support Gao ID: GAO-07-93 October 31, 2006The Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress have expressed concern with the frequency and length of time that volunteer reservists serve on active duty. In fiscal year 2006, DOD nearly doubled its fiscal year 2005 estimate for the total maximum levels of reservists volunteering to be on active duty for operational support. Congress required GAO to review the reasons behind the increases and expressed an interest in understanding which reservists were being included or excluded from these numbers. In this report, GAO (1) identified the factors that led to the increase in DOD's requests for the maximum number of volunteer reserve personnel authorized to be on active duty for operational support since DOD's initial request in fiscal year 2005 and (2) assessed the extent to which the reserve components have consistently reported the number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since 2005. In conducting this review, GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed DOD officials.
DOD's requested authorization levels for reserve personnel voluntarily on active duty for operational support grew substantially between fiscal years 2005 and 2006 for two reasons. First, when developing its fiscal year 2005 estimate, DOD used data reported annually that excluded some reservists serving in operational support capacities. Second, the definition of operational support was not included with the legislation and DOD did not distribute an official definition until 6 months after the fiscal year 2005 authorized levels were in place. Based on the published definition and greater outreach to personnel responsible for monitoring the number of volunteers for this type of active duty, most reserve components submitted higher estimates for maximum levels for fiscal year 2006. DOD submitted the same estimates in fiscal year 2007 as fiscal year 2006 because the number of volunteers did not change greatly. The reserve components have not been consistently identifying the number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since this monthly reporting requirement was adopted in fiscal year 2005. The reserve components are inconsistently including certain categories of personnel in their reported numbers. For example, two of the six reserve components do not include personnel serving as voluntarily recalled retired reservists in their reported totals, even though this category is listed in DOD's definition of operational support. In addition, only three of the six components include reservists serving on extended active duty missions in their reported numbers. GAO also found that the Navy Reserve erroneously submitted cumulative amounts instead of the highest amount of volunteer reservists each month for 6 months, so that it appeared to exceed its maximum authorized level three times. DOD is implementing a change to its Defense Manpower and Data Center to systematically generate the highest count of reservists each month, but the effectiveness of this change depends on whether the components update and align their policies and systems to provide these data. DOD is in the process of developing an instruction and only four of the reserve components have updated or have plans to update their guidance to clarify and consistently define what categories to include when accounting for these operational support reservists. Without updating and aligning their guidance, inconsistencies and errors in the reported numbers of operational support reservists may continue.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-93, Military Personnel: Reserve Components Need Guidance to Accurately and Consistently Account for Volunteers on Active Duty for Operational Support
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Operational Support' which was released on November 1, 2006.
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2006:
Military Personnel:
Reserve Components Need Guidance to Accurately and Consistently Account
for Volunteers on Active Duty for Operational Support:
GAO-07-93:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-93, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress have expressed concern
with the frequency and length of time that volunteer reservists serve
on active duty. In fiscal year 2006, DOD nearly doubled its fiscal year
2005 estimate for the total maximum levels of reservists volunteering
to be on active duty for operational support, as shown in the table.
Congress required GAO to review the reasons behind the increases and
expressed an interest in understanding which reservists were being
included or excluded from these numbers. In this report, GAO (1)
identified the factors that led to the increase in DOD‘s requests for
the maximum number of volunteer reserve personnel authorized to be on
active duty for operational support since DOD‘s initial request in
fiscal year 2005 and (2) assessed the extent to which the reserve
components have consistently reported the number of reservists serving
in an operational support capacity since 2005. In conducting this
review, GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found:
DOD‘s requested authorization levels for reserve personnel voluntarily
on active duty for operational support grew substantially between
fiscal years 2005 and 2006 for two reasons. First, when developing its
fiscal year 2005 estimate, DOD used data reported annually that
excluded some reservists serving in operational support capacities.
Second, the definition of operational support was not included with the
legislation and DOD did not distribute an official definition until 6
months after the fiscal year 2005 authorized levels were in place.
Based on the published definition and greater outreach to personnel
responsible for monitoring the number of volunteers for this type of
active duty, most reserve components submitted higher estimates for
maximum levels for fiscal year 2006. DOD submitted the same estimates
in fiscal year 2007 as fiscal year 2006 because the number of
volunteers did not change greatly.
The reserve components have not been consistently identifying the
number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since
this monthly reporting requirement was adopted in fiscal year 2005. The
reserve components are inconsistently including certain categories of
personnel in their reported numbers. For example, two of the six
reserve components do not include personnel serving as voluntarily
recalled retired reservists in their reported totals, even though this
category is listed in DOD‘s definition of operational support. In
addition, only three of the six components include reservists serving
on extended active duty missions in their reported numbers. GAO also
found that the Navy Reserve erroneously submitted cumulative amounts
instead of the highest amount of volunteer reservists each month for 6
months, so that it appeared to exceed its maximum authorized level
three times. DOD is implementing a change to its Defense Manpower and
Data Center to systematically generate the highest count of reservists
each month, but the effectiveness of this change depends on whether the
components update and align their policies and systems to provide these
data. DOD is in the process of developing an instruction and only four
of the reserve components have updated or have plans to update their
guidance to clarify and consistently define what categories to include
when accounting for these operational support reservists. Without
updating and aligning their guidance, inconsistencies and errors in the
reported numbers of operational support reservists may continue.
Table 1: Maximum Authorized Number of Active Duty Reserve Personnel for
Operational Support from Fiscal Years 2005 to 2006:
Maximum number of reservists authorized to be on active duty for
operational support: Army Reserve;
Fiscal year 2005: 5,000;
Fiscal year 2006: 13,000;
Difference from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 8,000;
Percentage change from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 160%.
Maximum number of reservists authorized to be on active duty for
operational support: Army National Guard;
Fiscal year 2005: 10,300;
Fiscal year 2006: 17,000;
Difference from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 6,700;
Percentage change from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 65%.
Maximum number of reservists authorized to be on active duty for
operational support: Navy Reserve;
Fiscal year 2005: 6,200;
Fiscal year 2006: 6,200;
Difference from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 0;
Percentage change from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 0%.
Maximum number of reservists authorized to be on active duty for
operational support: Marine Corps Reserve;
Fiscal year 2005: 2,500;
Fiscal year 2006: 3,000;
Difference from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 500;
Percentage change from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 20%.
Maximum number of reservists authorized to be on active duty for
operational support: Air National Guard;
Fiscal year 2005: 10,100;
Fiscal year 2006: 16,000;
Difference from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 5,900;
Percentage change from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 58%.
Maximum number of reservists authorized to be on active duty for
operational support: Air Force Reserve;
Fiscal year 2005: 3,600;
Fiscal year 2006: 14,000;
Difference from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 10,400;
Percentage change from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 289%.
Maximum number of reservists authorized to be on active duty for
operational support: Total;
Fiscal year 2005: 37,700;
Fiscal year 2006: 69,200;
Difference from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 31,500;
Percentage change from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 84%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD and the reserve components develop guidance to
clarify and consistently define the categories of operational support
that should be included in the reported amounts. In commenting on a
draft of this report, DOD concurred with the recommendation.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-93].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Derek Stewart at (202)
512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Maximum Authorized Number of Active Duty Reserve Personnel for
Operational Support from Fiscal Years 2005 to 2006:
Abbreviations:
DMDC: Defense Manpower and Data Center:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FY: fiscal year:
NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 31, 2006:
The Honorable John C. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin;
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Since the end of the Cold War, the reserve components[Footnote 1] have
become an integral part of military operations. As of May 2006, the
Ready Reserve comprised roughly 44 percent of the total military force.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has increasingly relied on both
involuntarily mobilized and volunteer reservists since the first Gulf
War, as well as in a series of military operations from 1994 through
2001 for contingencies in Haiti, Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Kosovo.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOD has depended
more heavily on the reserves for overseas operations and homeland
missions. The department and Congress have expressed concern with the
frequency and length of time that volunteer reservists are mobilized or
voluntarily serve on active duty, which can lead to overuse of
reservists and stress on the reserve force, impairing the availability
and ability of reservists to respond quickly to contingency
missions.[Footnote 2]
Prior to October 2004, the extent to which reservists could volunteer
to serve in military operations was restricted by legislation, which
became known as the 180-day rule. The rule stated that DOD must count
in its congressionally authorized, active duty, annual end strength
levels any reservist serving in an active duty role and performing
special work for longer than 180 days. As a result of the rule, DOD
could use reservists to perform mission-essential tasks for a limited
period of time without considering them as a permanent addition to the
force. DOD officials believed this rule limited volunteerism, service
continuity, and their flexibility in using volunteer reservists in a
variety of missions. To work around this rule, the services allowed
reservists to volunteer multiple times in succession as long as each
active duty service tour lasted fewer than 180 days. These actions
resulted in volunteer reservists serving on active duty for extended
periods of time without being accounted for under the active duty end
strength numbers.
Enacted in October 2004, the Ronald Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA) included a mechanism to
provide oversight over the number of reservists volunteering to be on
active duty for operational support. The act eliminated the 180-day
rule and created a requirement for Congress to annually authorize the
maximum number of volunteer reserve personnel to be on active duty for
operational support purposes. The act did not define the term
operational support, but provided for the Secretary of Defense to
define operational support in a separately published regulation. The
act also provided that a reservist on active or full-time National
Guard duty for a period greater than 3 years or for a cumulative period
of more than 3 years within the past 4 years was to be counted against
the active duty end strength authorization. DOD then required the
reserve components to report their monthly highest numbers of these
reservists in order to monitor that they did not exceed their maximum
authorized levels. In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, most of the
reserve components had significantly increased their estimates for the
maximum number of reserves authorized to be on active duty for
operational support. The total authorization level nearly doubled
compared to the fiscal year 2005 authorization level. DOD's fiscal year
2007 requested authorization for volunteer reservists remained
consistent with the fiscal year 2006 maximum levels.
Congress required that we review the reasons behind the increases from
fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006, as well as the factors used to
develop the fiscal year 2007 levels.[Footnote 3] Congress also
expressed an interest in understanding which reservists were being
included or excluded from the number of reservists activated for
operational support purposes. The objectives of this report are to (1)
identify the factors that led to the increase in requests for the
maximum number of volunteer reserve personnel authorized to be on
active duty for operational support since fiscal year 2005 and (2)
assess the extent to which the reserve components have consistently
reported the number of reservists serving in an operational support
capacity since 2005.
To identify the factors that led to the increase in the number of
authorized personnel, we reviewed policies, implementing guidance, and
regulations, analyzed key legislation, and interviewed Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense Reserve Affairs and reserve component
officials to gain an understanding of their roles and effectiveness in
developing the authorization levels for reservists on active duty for
operational support. To determine the reliability of the estimates for
the maximum authorization levels for the reserve components, we
gathered reserve component officials' perspectives on their data
systems in the collecting and reporting of reserve numbers to DOD. To
determine the extent to which the reserve components have consistently
reported the number of reservists serving in an operational support
capacity, we obtained documentation and discussed with reserve
officials the consistency in application of the guidelines, including
information on the structure of reserve data systems and the process
for collecting and recording the numbers of reservists. The components
and DOD also provided the highest number of reservists each month as
reported to DOD. We found inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the data,
based in part on definitional problems of categories of reservists to
be included in reported numbers, generating data that we believe are
not sufficiently reliable. As a result, we make a recommendation for
executive action to improve the accuracy and consistency of information
that is reported across the components. We conducted our review from
June 2006 through September 2006, in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. The scope and methodology used in our
review are described further in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
DOD's request for volunteer reserve personnel authorized to be on
active duty for operational support grew between fiscal years 2005 and
2006 primarily due to two key factors: data used by DOD to prepare its
fiscal year 2005 estimate did not accurately reflect all the reservists
voluntarily serving in operational support capacities and DOD had not
defined what constituted operational support prior to submitting the
fiscal year 2005 estimate. According to DOD officials, when it
developed its initial submission for maximum authorization levels, the
department based its estimates on data reported annually by the reserve
components for other purposes. The data excluded some reservists
serving in operational support capacities. Once the numbers requested
for fiscal year 2005 were approved by Congress and communicated
throughout the reserve components, reserve officials with greater
insight over the reservists serving in an operational support role
realized that the estimates were too low and did not reflect the actual
numbers of reservists serving in this capacity. Further complicating
the issue, DOD's definition of operational support was not agreed upon
or distributed until April 26, 2005, approximately 6 months after the
fiscal year 2005 authorized maximum levels were in place. Based on the
published definition and greater outreach to gather appropriate data
from the personnel responsible for monitoring the number of individuals
who volunteered for this type of active duty, most reserve components
revised the fiscal year 2005 numbers and submitted higher estimates for
the maximum authorized levels for fiscal year 2006. DOD submitted the
same maximum levels for fiscal year 2007 as in fiscal year 2006 because
there were no significant increases or decreases.
The reserve components have not consistently or accurately identified
the number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity
since this monthly reporting requirement was adopted in fiscal year
2005. The reserve components are inconsistently including certain
categories of personnel in their reported numbers, and components had
different definitions of the personnel included within some reported
categories. For example, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard
do not include personnel that are serving as voluntarily recalled
retired reservists in their reported amounts, even though this category
is listed in DOD's definition of operational support. Army personnel
stated that these reservists are included in their active duty end
strength numbers. In addition, only three of the six reserve components
include in their reported numbers reservists who are serving on
extended active duty missions, and two of these components have
different definitions of the personnel included in this category. We
also found that instead of reporting the highest number of these
reservists each month, the Navy Reserve submitted cumulative numbers of
reservists for 6 months, which led to erroneously reporting that it
exceeded its maximum authorized level three times. According to Navy
officials, these errors were caused by lack of access to personnel data
due to Hurricane Katrina, and the errors were ultimately corrected.
To help address these inconsistencies and errors, DOD is implementing a
change in its Defense Manpower and Data Center (DMDC) to enable DOD to
systematically generate the number of each component's operational
support reservists. However, the effectiveness of this automated
reporting change depends on the components, which are responsible for
updating and aligning their policies and systems to provide accurate
data to DMDC. DOD is still in the process of developing a draft
instruction and only four of the reserve components have updated or
have plans in place to update their guidance to clarify and
consistently define what categories of reservist to include when
accounting for those performing operational support duties.
Inconsistencies and errors in the reported numbers of operational
support reservists may continue until DOD and the reserve components
uniformly update their guidance to clarify and consistently define what
categories of reservist to include in their reported numbers. Until
this is accomplished, DOD and Congress do not have a clear picture of
how many volunteer reservists are currently on active duty serving in
an operational support capacity. We are recommending that DOD and the
reserve components develop guidance that clarifies and defines the
categories of operational support that should be included in the
reported numbers so that accurate and consistent information is
reported across the components. In its comments on a draft of this
report, DOD concurred with our recommendation.
Background:
Although reserve personnel have been used for contingency and emergency
operations through the involuntary "Presidential Reserve Call-up" and
"Partial Mobilization" authorities, a significant number of reserve
personnel on active duty for these and other missions have been
provided on a voluntary basis.[Footnote 4] Agency officials stated that
these volunteer reservists' roles could include filling in for an
existing active duty mission temporarily (such as an infantryman or
pilot), providing needed special skills (civil affairs or engineer), or
participating in training exercises that result in support to active
duty missions. Legislation has evolved since 1980 to provide DOD with
more flexibility in managing these volunteer reservists.
The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act[Footnote 5] was passed in
1980 to amend Title 10 of the U.S. Code. The act required that Congress
annually authorize total strength levels for each military service for
active duty personnel, with some exceptions. The act also established
the 180-day rule for reserve members serving on active duty for special
work. Reserve members on active duty who performed special work for 180
days or fewer were excluded from being counted against active duty
personnel end-strengths.
Title 10 of the U.S. Code at Section 115, which governs personnel
strengths for the military, gave authority to the Secretary of Defense
to vary active duty and Selected Reserve end-strengths above the level
authorized by Congress. Prior to October 2004, the Secretary of Defense
could increase active duty end strength paid by active duty funds by up
to 3 percent, increase the end strength for active duty and National
Guard paid by reserve funds by up to 2 percent, and vary the end
strength authorized for the Selected Reserve by up to 2
percent.[Footnote 6]
On October 28, 2004, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 was
enacted.[Footnote 7] The act amended 10 U.S.C. § 115 by establishing an
annual authorization requirement for the maximum number of reserve
personnel authorized to be on active duty for operational support, thus
creating a new accounting category. It also added a provision that
allows the Secretary of Defense to increase the maximum strength
authorized for certain reservists voluntarily on active duty to perform
operational support by up to 10 percent.[Footnote 8]
Authorization Levels Increased Due to Inaccurate Information and Lack
of an Operational Support Definition:
DOD's estimates for the maximum number of volunteer reservists
authorized to be on active duty for operational support increased
between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 as a result of two key
factors. First, DOD developed its fiscal year 2005 estimates using
inaccurate data from a data source that could not distinguish volunteer
reservists on active duty for missions that would be considered
operational support from other reservists. Second, DOD did not formally
define operational support prior to establishment of its fiscal year
2005 maximum authorized levels and did not release a definition of
operational support until 6 months after the maximum authorized levels
were passed under the NDAA. DOD increased its estimates for fiscal year
2006 after the reserve components reviewed historical numbers of these
reservists based on the published operational support definition. For
the fiscal year 2007 estimates, the reserve components submitted the
same maximum levels as fiscal year 2006 because there were no
substantial increases or decreases in their numbers, according to DOD
officials.
DOD Based Its Initial Request on Data That Did Not Accurately Reflect
the Number of Volunteer Reservists on Active Duty for Operational
Support:
One key factor that contributed to the increase in authorization levels
requested for fiscal year 2006 was that DOD's initial request for
fiscal year 2005 was not developed using data that accurately reflected
the maximum number of reservists on voluntary active duty for
operational support. In developing the estimate submitted for the
fiscal year 2005 NDAA, DOD used data that was provided by the reserve
components for other purposes. DOD derived its estimates from an annual
data call where reserve components provide information about
reservists' activities throughout the year. These data identified
reservists involved in such missions as domestic emergencies, counter-
drug activities, major exercises, and mobilizations. According to a DOD
official, they compiled the estimates from various categories that
represented what they considered operational support. They
automatically eliminated some categories from their count, such as some
counter-drug activities and mobilizations, because they assumed that
the reported data in these categories only included involuntary active
duty reservists. DOD informally provided the estimates to the reserve
components for their review, but had to submit the estimates before
some reserve components could respond.
After the authorized levels were approved by Congress in the fiscal
year 2005 NDAA and communicated throughout the reserve components,
reserve officials with greater insight over the reservists serving in
an operational support role realized that the estimates did not reflect
the actual numbers of reservists serving in this capacity. Officials
from the reserve components informed DOD that the maximum numbers
requested were too low for force requirements. According to a DOD
official, they scrutinized their initial data review and found that the
information extracted from the data did not distinguish involuntarily
activated reservists from voluntarily activated reservists. Once they
realized that the data did not separate out voluntary and involuntary
reservists, they recognized that some of the data from categories that
had been excluded, such as mobilizations, should not have been
completely excluded since it contained some volunteers. DOD's lack of
formal coordination with the reserve components and its reliance upon
existing data that did not specifically identify volunteer reservists
on active duty for operational support contributed to DOD submitting a
low estimate for fiscal year 2005.
DOD Lacked a Definition of Operational Support Prior to its Fiscal Year
2005 Estimate:
Another key factor that contributed to the increase in DOD's fiscal
year 2006 estimate for the maximum number of reservists authorized was
that DOD did not have a definition of operational support prior to its
initial estimate for fiscal year 2005. When the fiscal year 2005 NDAA
was enacted on October 28, 2004, the act did not provide a definition
for operational support to apply to the maximum authorization levels,
but instead required the Secretary of Defense to prescribe by
regulation the meaning of the term operational support.[Footnote 9]
After the fiscal year 2005 NDAA was enacted, DOD met with reserve
component officials in response to their concerns about the low
authorization levels and also to develop a definition for operational
support. In collaboration with the components, DOD established a
definition for operational support, and on April 26, 2005--
approximately 6 months after the fiscal year 2005 authorization levels
for reserve personnel were made law--released the official definition
with some accounting and reporting guidelines. DOD defined operational
support as: active duty, other than mobilized active guard and reserve
duty, voluntarily performed by reservists; full-time duty, other than
mobilized active guard and reserve duty, voluntarily performed by
National Guard members; and active duty for training performed at the
request of an operational commander, or as the result of reimbursable
funding. The definition of operational support included:
* active duty for special work,[Footnote 10]
* active duty and active duty for training performed as the result of
reimbursable funding,
* funeral honors duty performed not in an inactive duty status,
* voluntary active duty performed by recall reserve retirees not
receiving regular retired pay, and:
* active duty training performed as a result of a request of an
operational commander to provide support.
The guidelines created a requirement for components to report to DOD
the highest number of operational support reservists each month. Once
the definition for operational support was established, reserve
component officials that had direct responsibility for monitoring
reserve personnel end strength reviewed historical data from their
internal systems on the number of volunteer reservists serving in the
areas included under the definition. The components determined that the
numbers that were in fiscal year 2005 NDAA did not accurately reflect
the number of reservists performing operational support. Most of the
reserve components then submitted higher estimates for the maximum
authorized levels in the fiscal year 2006 NDAA. Table 1 shows that five
out of six reserve components provided larger maximum levels for fiscal
year 2006, and the total authorization level nearly doubled compared to
the fiscal year 2005 authorization level.
Table 1: Maximum Authorized Number of Active Duty Reserve Personnel for
Operational Support from Fiscal Years 2005 to 2006:
Maximum number of reservists authorized to be on active duty for
operational support: Army Reserve;
Fiscal year 2005: 5,000;
Fiscal year 2006: 13,000;
Difference from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 8,000;
Percentage change from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 160%.
Maximum number of reservists authorized to be on active duty for
operational support: Army National Guard;
Fiscal year 2005: 10,300;
Fiscal year 2006: 17,000;
Difference from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 6,700;
Percentage change from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 65%.
Maximum number of reservists authorized to be on active duty for
operational support: Navy Reserve;
Fiscal year 2005: 6,200;
Fiscal year 2006: 6,200;
Difference from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 0;
Percentage change from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 0%.
Maximum number of reservists authorized to be on active duty for
operational support: Marine Corps Reserve;
Fiscal year 2005: 2,500;
Fiscal year 2006: 3,000;
Difference from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 500;
Percentage change from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 20%.
Maximum number of reservists authorized to be on active duty for
operational support: Air National Guard;
Fiscal year 2005: 10,100;
Fiscal year 2006: 16,000;
Difference from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 5,900;
Percentage change from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 58%.
Maximum number of reservists authorized to be on active duty for
operational support: Air Force Reserve;
Fiscal year 2005: 3,600;
Fiscal year 2006: 14,000;
Difference from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 10,400;
Percentage change from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 289%.
Maximum number of reservists authorized to be on active duty for
operational support: Total;
Fiscal year 2005: 37,700;
Fiscal year 2006: 69,200;
Difference from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 31,500;
Percentage change from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006: 84%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
Fiscal Year 2007 Estimates Match Fiscal Year 2006 Maximum Levels:
For its fiscal year 2007 estimates, DOD submitted a request for the
same maximum levels as in fiscal year 2006. The reserve components
reviewed their historical data as they did for the fiscal year 2006
estimates and updated them with data from fiscal year 2006. The reserve
components found that there were no substantial increases or decreases
in their fiscal year 2006 numbers that required changes in their
estimated maximum levels for fiscal year 2007.
Reserve Components Are Not Identifying Numbers of Active Duty
Reservists for Operational Support Consistently across Components:
The reserve components have not been consistently identifying the
number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since
this requirement was adopted in fiscal year 2005. In its April 2005
memorandum that provided a definition for operational support, DOD
directed the components to report the highest number of volunteer
reservists serving in an operational support capacity each month so
that DOD could monitor the amounts to ensure that components did not
exceed the maximum levels authorized. On the basis of our analyses, we
found that the reserve components inconsistently include various
categories of personnel in their reported numbers because the
components have different interpretations about what is included under
DOD's operational support definition and how it applies to their
existing categories. For example, the Army Reserve and the Army
National Guard do not include voluntary active duty performed by
recalled retired reservists in their accounting amounts, even though
this is one of the five categories listed under DOD's definition of
operational support. According to Army personnel, the Army Reserve and
the Army National Guard do not include these reservists because they
consider them active duty and include them in their active duty end
strength numbers. In addition, the reserve components are inconsistent
on whether they include volunteer reservists serving on extended active
duty in their reported operational support numbers. The definition of
operational support provided by DOD does not specifically address
extended active duty reservists. We found that three of the six reserve
components--Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Army National Guard--
include extended active duty reservists in their reported operational
support numbers, although the Navy and Air Force define the length of
service for extended active duty reservists differently. The Navy
Reserve defines them as voluntary recall reservists on 2 to 5 year
tours. The Air Force considers them to be reservists volunteering to
fill an existing, funded active duty position for 3 years or less. The
Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air National Guard do not
include extended active duty reservists in their reported operational
support numbers because they are currently being accounted for under
active duty end-strengths.
In addition to these inconsistencies, we also found that one
component's monthly reports of volunteer reservists serving on active
duty for operational support have not provided DOD with an accurate
accounting of the number of these individuals due to errors in the
numbers reported. We found that in each month from January through June
2006, the Navy Reserve erroneously reported to DOD cumulative totals
instead of the highest number of reservists in each month. A Navy
Reserve official stated that they did not have complete access to
personnel data during these months because they had to relocate their
personnel database after Hurricane Katrina. As a result, the Navy
Reserve appeared to exceed its maximum authorized level for 3 months--
in January, February, and June 2006. The Navy Reserve did not discover
this error until late July 2006, at which time they retroactively
corrected the erroneously reported amounts.
To help address these inconsistencies and errors, the Defense Manpower
and Data Center (DMDC) is in the process of implementing a system
change that would allow DOD to have automated access to the number of
volunteer operational support reservists. We reported in September 2006
that DMDC can extract some reserve personnel data, such as a
reservist's number of deployments and citizenship, but it could not
provide data specifically on volunteer status from all six reserve
components.[Footnote 11] According to a DMDC official, the proposed
change would only provide information from systems already aligned with
DMDC that can distinguish volunteer reservists for operational support.
DMDC also does not have the authority to direct the services to correct
data errors and inconsistencies.
As of early October 2006, we found that each reserve component
collected its operational support numbers from accounting systems that
did not provide all this information to DMDC. For example, the Navy
Reserve obtained its reported numbers from the Navy Reserve Order
Writing System, which currently feeds into DMDC, but this system does
not distinguish the highest amount of volunteer reservists each month.
The Marine Corps Reserve's systems can provide volunteer information to
DMDC, but it reported end of the month numbers, not the highest number
of reservists during the month. The Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve,
and Air National Guard each pull key data from external databases
managed by the Defense Finance and Accounting System, but the Army
Reserve's database did not provide the monthly highest number of
volunteers. The Army National Guard compiles its number of volunteer
reservists from its own systems and the Army Human Resource Command,
which do not provide this information on volunteers. The DMDC official
stated that the effectiveness of the proposed change to automate
reporting on volunteer operational support reservists still depends on
the components, which are responsible for aligning their policies and
systems to provide the appropriate information according to changes in
data reporting requirements. As a result, we do not believe that this
system change will provide DOD with accurate information about the peak
monthly number of volunteer reservists serving in an operational
support capacity, unless the components align their policies and
systems to conform to reporting requirements.
We found that DOD and the reserve components have not updated and
aligned their guidance to clearly and consistently articulate and
define what categories of reservists to include in accounting for and
reporting on operational support levels. DOD released preliminary
guidance in its April 2005 memorandum that defined the five categories
of reservists that comprise operational support; however, they have not
yet updated their instruction that governs the use of and accounting
for reservists. DOD is in the process of developing an instruction on
accounting and reporting procedures in the new DOD Instruction 1215.6,
which it plans to officially release in late October 2006. Even though
DOD has not released its updated instruction, the Army National Guard
published updated guidance based on DOD's April 2005 memorandum that
provides examples of missions specific to the Army National Guard that
are considered operational support. Another three components--the Army
Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard--have plans in place
to update their guidance to reflect operational support reporting
requirements. The Department of the Army expects to release its updated
guidance for the Army Reserve within the year. The Air Force Reserve
plans to update its implementing regulations in March or April 2007
and, in the interim, has issued a policy memorandum that applies
operational support requirements to its policies. The Air National
Guard expects to update its guidance in the near future, and has an
interim policy that addresses operational support similar to the Air
Force Reserve. The two remaining components--the Marine Corps Reserve
and Navy Reserve--have not updated their existing guidance to
incorporate operational support accounting and reporting and do not
appear to have immediate plans to do so until DOD releases new
guidance. Until DOD and all of the reserve components update and
uniformly align their implementing guidance, inconsistencies and errors
in the reporting of the number of operational support reservists may
continue. As a result, DOD and the components cannot ensure that they
will not exceed the maximum authorized levels, which may impair the
ability of DOD and Congress to oversee the use of volunteer reservists
serving on active duty in an operational support capacity.
Conclusions:
With DOD's growing demand for reserve personnel to augment its active
duty forces to accomplish its missions overseas and at home, stress on
the reserve force is a significant issue. Reservists have been serving
on increasingly longer and more frequent tours of duty. However,
reserve personnel are a part-time force and DOD must take care in
managing the frequency with which it uses the reserves to complete its
missions. It is critical that DOD and Congress have oversight over
DOD's forces to ensure that its citizen-soldiers are not overextended.
In eliminating the 180-day rule, Congress gave DOD flexibility in
managing its volunteer reservists to serve in a variety of missions,
without limiting volunteerism and continuity of service. However, the
reserve components continue to struggle with accurately and
consistently identifying these reservists each month. Updated guidance
that clearly articulates what should be included and excluded from this
accounting would help the components eliminate the inconsistent
interpretations that currently exist. Until DOD and all of the reserve
components update their implementing guidance in a uniform manner,
inconsistencies and errors in the reporting of the number may continue
and DOD will be unable to ensure that reported numbers are accurate and
that maximum levels are not being exceeded. Lack of an accurate
accounting of the number of voluntary reserve personnel serving in an
operational support capacity defeats the purpose for establishing the
reporting requirement, which in turn hampers DOD's ability to manage
its forces and to minimize lengthy activations and stress on the
reserve forces. This lack of visibility also limits Congress's
oversight over the use, availability, and readiness of the reserve
force to ensure that its citizen-soldiers are not overextended.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To ensure that the components can report accurate and consistent
information about the number of reservists serving in an operational
support capacity, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the reserve
components to develop guidance to clarify and consistently define the
categories of operational support that should be included in the
reported numbers.
Agency Comments:
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) provided written
comments on a draft of this report. The department concurred with the
recommendation. DOD stated that it will develop guidance that
specifically addresses what is to be included when accounting for
operational support. The department's comments are reprinted in their
entirety in appendix II. In addition, the department provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services.
We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries
of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Others making significant
contributions to this report are included in appendix III.
Signed by:
Derek B. Stewart:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the factors leading to the increase in the maximum number
of reserve personnel authorized to be on active duty for operational
support from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006, we reviewed and
analyzed the authorization levels for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and
the requested authorization levels for fiscal year 2007. We also
obtained documentation of the highest number of reservists each month
that is reported to DOD and analyzed figures to identify any trends or
patterns of change. To determine what categories of reservists should
be represented by the numbers of reservists serving on operational
support, we obtained documentation on the definition of operational
support given to the components. We also interviewed DOD and reserve
officials to gain an understanding of their roles and effectiveness in
implementing Sections 415 and 416 of the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2005. We interviewed officials from DOD
Reserve Affairs, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Air Force Reserve,
Air National Guard, Navy Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve. To
determine DOD's authority and role in management of the reservists
under the NDAA, we reviewed legislation and the history of relevant
provisions of the law. To determine the reliability of the estimates
for the maximum authorization levels for the reserve components, we
gathered reserve component officials' perspectives on their data
systems in the collecting and reporting of reserve strength to DOD.
To determine the extent to which the reserve components have
consistently reported the number of reservists serving in an
operational support capacity, we obtained DOD's memorandums,
implementing guidance, and regulations. We obtained documentation from
DOD and reserve components to determine the categories included and
excluded from operational support. We interviewed DOD officials to
determine its definition for operational support, how DOD intended its
implementing guidelines to be applied, and to determine its
interpretation of relevant legislation. We also interviewed officials
to determine the consistency in application of the guidelines. From our
interviews, we obtained information on categories of reservists that
were being excluded from operational support. We reviewed and analyzed
legislation to determine what was required to be included in
operational support. Officials also provided information on the
structure of their data systems and the process for collecting and
recording the numbers of reservists. The components and DOD also
provided the highest number of reservists each month that was reported
to DOD. Due to definitional problems of categories of reservists to be
included in reported numbers, we found some inaccuracies and
inconsistencies in the data, which produced data that we believe are
not sufficiently reliable. As a result, we make a recommendation for
executive action to improve the accuracy and consistency of reported
monthly information.
We conducted our review from June 2006 through September 2006, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Reserve Affairs:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
1500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-1500:
Oct 18 2006:
Mr. Derek B. Stewart:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Stewart:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "Military Personnel: Reserve Components Need Guidance to
Accurately and Consistently Account for Volunteers on Active Duty for
Operational Support (GAO-07-93)," dated October 5, 2006 (GAO Code
350864).
The DoD primary action officer for this GAO study is Mr. Daniel J.
Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P), who can be reached at (703) 693-7479 or via e-
mail at dan.kohner@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
T. F. Hall:
Attachment As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated October 5, 2006 GAO Code 350864/GAO-07-93:
"Military Personnel: Reserve Components Need Guidance to Accurately and
Consistently Account for Volunteers on Active Duty for Operational
Support"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and
the reserve components to develop guidance to clarify and consistently
define the categories of operational support that should be included in
the reported numbers. (page 11/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: The Department concurs with the recommendation. The
Department will pursue developing and publishing more specific guidance
regarding what is to be included in accounting for "Operational
Support."
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Derek B. Stewart, (202) 512-5559:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Geraldine Beard, Renee Brown,
Tracy Burney, Pawnee Davis, Laura Durland, Meredith Georges, George
Poindexter, Terry Richardson, Gina Ruidera, and Karen Thornton made
significant contributions to the report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Air Force Reserve, Air
National Guard, Navy Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve comprise the
DOD reserve components or reserves.
[2] GAO has also issued a number of reports and testimonies reviewing
the increased use of reserve forces related to mobilization,
availability, and readiness: Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address
Long-Term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and
Demobilization Issues, GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004);
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for
Future Overseas and Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 10, 2004); Military Personnel: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to
Address Long-Term Guard and Reserve Force Availability, GAO-05-285T
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2005); and Reserve Forces: Army National
Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to Be Reexamined, GAO-06-
170T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 2005).
[3] H.R. Rep. No. 109-89, Title IV, at 310 (2005).
[4] Section 12301(d) of Title 10 of the United States Code authorizes
the service secretaries to order a reservist to active duty with the
consent of that member, as opposed to being called up or mobilized
involuntarily in a time of war or other national emergency.
[5] Pub. L. No. 96-513, §102 (1980).
[6] 10 U.S.C. § 115(e) (2003).
[7] Pub. L. No. 108-375.
[8] Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 416 (c)(4).
[9] Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 416(m).
[10] DOD previously defined active duty for special work as "a tour of
active duty for reserve personnel authorized from military or reserve
personnel appropriations for work on active component or reserve
component programs. The purpose of active duty for special work is to
provide the necessary skilled manpower assets to support existing or
emerging requirements." Department of Defense Directive 1215.6, Uniform
Reserve, Training and Retirement Categories, paragraph E 1.1.2 (Mar.
14, 1997).
[11] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD and the Services Need to Take
Additional Steps to Improve Mobilization Data for Reserve Components,
GAO-06-1068 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2006).
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