Defense Acquisitions
Challenges Remain in Developing Capabilities for Naval Surface Fire Support Gao ID: GAO-07-115 November 30, 2006Since the mid-1990s, the Navy and Marine Corps have studied ways to better protect landing forces. As new operational concepts evolved, the Marine Corps identified requirements for naval surface fire support and the Navy began developing two systems to meet these needs--the Extended Range Munition for existing classes of ships and the future Zumwalt class destroyer. GAO was asked to address (1) whether requirements for fire support have been established and (2) the Navy's progress on the Extended Range Munition, Zumwalt class destroyer, and follow-on systems. GAO also analyzed whether these Navy systems fulfill the requirements and whether gaps remain. To address these objectives GAO analyzed key documents on requirements and programs and held discussions with officials from the Navy and Marine Corps as well as other interested organizations.
In December 2005, more than a decade after the Navy and Marine Corps began to formulate requirements, agreement was reached on the capabilities needed for naval surface fire support. However, quantifiable measures are still lacking for volume of fire--the delivery of a large quantity of munitions simultaneously or over a period of time to suppress or destroy a target. Until further quantifiable requirements are set for volume of fire, it is difficult to assess whether additional investment is necessary or the form it should take. The Navy's Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer have cost more, taken longer to develop and field than anticipated, and will deliver fewer capabilities than originally promised. Largely due to technical challenges, the Extended Range Munition is expected to exceed the original cost estimate for development by 550 percent, and the Navy has delayed delivery of initial capability by 11 years. The munition's path for development and fielding remains uncertain as key technologies and munition design have not been adequately demonstrated. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently assumed oversight of the program, and while a comprehensive review has not yet been held, there are ongoing studies that could assist such a review. The Navy has reduced Zumwalt class land attack munitions by 50 percent and cut ship quantities from 32 to 7. The primary reason for reduced capabilities are cost pressures created by the Navy's original concept of revolutionary performance at an unrealistically low cost. The Navy plans to begin construction of the first two ships in the Zumwalt class in fiscal year 2008. The recent study of future fire support needs approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council identifies four capability gaps: command and control of fire support; engaging moving targets in poor weather; engaging targets when collateral damage is a concern; and engaging targets that require a large volume of fire. The analysis that forms the basis of the joint study contends that while the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer offer significant capabilities in some scenarios, they do not provide enough capability to meet all fire support needs. The Navy, through its surface warfare directorate, has begun analyzing the three engagement gaps, but the Navy has not chosen an organization to analyze the gap in command and control, which is essential for target assignment and information. Any attempts to accept the risks or invest in programs to fill remaining gaps should also involve the expeditionary warfare directorate as the Marine Corps representative. The expeditionary warfare directorate does not have a formal role in developing requirements, determining capabilities, and managing resources for systems that provide naval surface fire support.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-115, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Remain in Developing Capabilities for Naval Surface Fire Support
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Report to the Subcommittee on Projection Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2006:
Defense Acquisitions:
Challenges Remain in Developing Capabilities for Naval Surface Fire
Support:
Defense Acquisitions:
GAO-07-115:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-115, a report to Subcommittee on Projection
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since the mid-1990s, the Navy and Marine Corps have studied ways to
better protect landing forces. As new operational concepts evolved, the
Marine Corps identified requirements for naval surface fire support and
the Navy began developing two systems to meet these needs”the Extended
Range Munition for existing classes of ships and the future Zumwalt
class destroyer.
GAO was asked to address (1) whether requirements for fire support have
been established and (2) the Navy‘s progress on the Extended Range
Munition, Zumwalt class destroyer, and follow-on systems. GAO also
analyzed whether these Navy systems fulfill the requirements and
whether gaps remain.
To address these objectives GAO analyzed key documents on requirements
and programs and held discussions with officials from the Navy and
Marine Corps as well as other interested organizations.
What GAO Found:
In December 2005, more than a decade after the Navy and Marine Corps
began to formulate requirements, agreement was reached on the
capabilities needed for naval surface fire support. However,
quantifiable measures are still lacking for volume of fire”the delivery
of a large quantity of munitions simultaneously or over a period of
time to suppress or destroy a target. Until further quantifiable
requirements are set for volume of fire, it is difficult to assess
whether additional investment is necessary or the form it should take.
The Navy‘s Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer have
cost more, taken longer to develop and field than anticipated, and will
deliver fewer capabilities than originally promised. Largely due to
technical challenges, the Extended Range Munition is expected to exceed
the original cost estimate for development by 550 percent, and the Navy
has delayed delivery of initial capability by 11 years. The munition‘s
path for development and fielding remains uncertain as key technologies
and munition design have not been adequately demonstrated. The Office
of the Secretary of Defense recently assumed oversight of the program,
and while a comprehensive review has not yet been held, there are
ongoing studies that could assist such a review. The Navy has reduced
Zumwalt class land attack munitions by 50 percent and cut ship
quantities from 32 to 7. The primary reason for reduced capabilities
are cost pressures created by the Navy‘s original concept of
revolutionary performance at an unrealistically low cost. The Navy
plans to begin construction of the first two ships in the Zumwalt class
in fiscal year 2008.
The recent study of future fire support needs approved by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council identifies four capability gaps: command
and control of fire support; engaging moving targets in poor weather;
engaging targets when collateral damage is a concern; and engaging
targets that require a large volume of fire. The analysis that forms
the basis of the joint study contends that while the Extended Range
Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer offer significant capabilities in
some scenarios, they do not provide enough capability to meet all fire
support needs. The Navy, through its surface warfare directorate, has
begun analyzing the three engagement gaps, but the Navy has not chosen
an organization to analyze the gap in command and control, which is
essential for target assignment and information. Any attempts to accept
the risks or invest in programs to fill remaining gaps should also
involve the expeditionary warfare directorate as the Marine Corps
representative. The expeditionary warfare directorate does not have a
formal role in developing requirements, determining capabilities, and
managing resources for systems that provide naval surface fire support.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Department of Defense clarify requirements for
volume of fire, clarify Navy and Marine Corps roles in managing
resources, comprehensively review the Extended Range Munition program,
and assign responsibility for assessing the gap in command and control.
DOD concurred with the first and third recommendations, and partially
concurred with the others.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-115].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202)
512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Agreement on Requirements Took over a Decade and Did Not Address
Quantitative Measures for Volume of Fire:
Naval Surface Fire Support Systems Have Experienced Cost and Schedule
Growth and Will Deliver Less Capability Than Originally Planned:
Needs for Naval Surface Fire Support Exceed Projected Capabilities:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Review:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Basis for Evolving Requirements:
Table 2: Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements:
Table 3: Major Events in the Acquisition of the Extended Range
Munition:
Table 4: Major Events in the Acquisition of the Zumwalt Class
Destroyer:
Figures:
Figure 1: Fires Triad Illustration:
Figure 2: Extended Range Munition:
Figure 3: Cost and Schedule Growth in the Extended Range Munition
Program:
Figure 4: Reductions to Ship Quantities Planned for Naval Surface Fire
Support:
Figure 5: Advanced Technologies on the Zumwalt Class Guided Missile
Destroyer:
Figure 6: Cost and Quantity Change in the Zumwalt Class Destroyer
Program:
Abbreviations:
CEP: Circular error probable:
CG(X): Experimental guided-missile cruiser:
DD: Destroyer:
DDG: Guided missile destroyer:
DD(X): Experimental destroyer:
ERM: Extended Range Munition:
RDT&E: Research, development, test, and evaluation:
SC: Surface combatant:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 30, 2006:
The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett:
Chairman:
The Honorable Gene Taylor:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Projection Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy has shifted its focus away from
warfare on the open ocean and toward operations in coastal waters. In
support of this new focus, the Marine Corps has developed new concepts
for landing forces ashore in a hostile environment from ships at sea.
These maneuvers--referred to as expeditionary operations--increase the
Marine Corps's reliance on sea-based fire support. According to the
Navy and Marine Corps, ship-based guns and missiles, or naval surface
fire support, are essential for advancing landing forces to their
objectives and protecting them from enemy attack.
From 1992 to the present, the Marine Corps has been working to set
requirements for naval surface fire support that reflect evolving
operating concepts. The Navy has been developing systems to meet these
requirements including the Extended Range Munition, a precision-guided
munition with increased range fired from an improved gun on an existing
class of ships, and the DDG 1000 Zumwalt class destroyer, an entirely
new surface ship designed with advanced capabilities specifically for
naval surface fire support. When these systems began development, they
were expected to begin to be fielded by 2001 and 2008, respectively.
Current plans call for fielding to begin in 2011 and 2014. In response
to your request, this report addresses (1) whether well-defined
requirements for naval surface fire support have been established and
(2) the Navy's progress in developing and fielding the Extended Range
Munition, the Zumwalt class destroyer, and follow-on systems. We also
analyzed whether the Navy's systems currently under development fulfill
the established requirements, and the actions being taken to address
any remaining gaps.
To determine whether well-defined requirements for naval surface fire
support have been established, we analyzed documentation on the stated
needs and operational concepts for ship-based fire support including
doctrinal publications and capabilities documents. To supplement our
analysis, we held discussions with a number of Marine Corps and Navy
offices including those responsible for creating requirements, such as
the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and the Chief of Naval
Operations's Surface Warfare Division. To assess the Navy's progress in
developing and fielding systems to meet these requirements, we held
discussions and reviewed documents at the program offices responsible
for acquiring the Extended Range Munition, the Zumwalt class destroyer,
and other weapon systems. We also drew from our prior work on these
systems. In analyzing whether the systems selected meet requirements
for naval surface fire support, we reviewed reports and documentation
produced by or in cooperation with the Navy and Marine Corps, such as
the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals
Initial Capabilities Document, as well as the capabilities development
documents for the systems themselves. To supplement this information
and address the actions taken to close remaining gaps, we met with
officials from joint and service organizations in the requirements
community. For more information on the methodology used in this report
see appendix I. We conducted our analysis from February 2006 to
November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
In December 2005, an agreement was reached that defined requirements
for naval surface fire support in such areas as range and accuracy, but
did not include quantifiable measures for volume of fire. The Marine
Corps derived these requirements over a decade as its thinking on
expeditionary operations evolved. From 1996 to 2002, the Marine Corps
communicated requirements derived from these concepts to the Navy in a
series of letters. These letters included descriptions of desired
capabilities like volume of fire, which the Marine Corps defines as the
delivery of a large quantity of munitions simultaneously or over a
period of time to suppress or destroy a target, as well as specific
requirements for range and accuracy. These capabilities and
requirements formed the basis of the needs identified in the Joint
Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals Initial
Capabilities Document approved in December 2005 through the joint
requirements process. While this document identifies a need for volume
of fire as defined by the Marine Corps, a set of specific requirements
like those for range or accuracy do not yet exist. Requirements for
volume of fire are complicated by the variance in effects desired from
mission to mission, although this is a challenge in other warfare areas
as well. In addition, there is not yet a clear understanding of how the
capabilities offered by precision munitions can be utilized for volume
fires in a cost effective manner.
Developing and fielding the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class
destroyer has required more funding and time than anticipated and may
not offer the capabilities originally promised, while the development
of follow-on systems has just begun. The cost to develop the Extended
Range Munition is expected to exceed the original estimate by over 550
percent and fielding of an initial capability has been delayed by
nearly 11 years, largely due to the failure to recognize and plan for
technical challenges. While the program's current approach seeks to
improve reliability of key components, the viability of the program
remains in question until realistic plans for testing, producing, and
fielding the munition are approved and the munition's design is
demonstrated through testing. Oversight of the program was recently
changed from the Navy to the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology & Logistics, who has not yet held a comprehensive review of
the program. Cost challenges, stemming primarily from unrealistic
expectations, have led the Navy over time to reduce ship capabilities
and procurement quantities from the Zumwalt class destroyer program.
Specifically, the Navy has reduced each ship's land-attack munitions by
50 percent and decreased ship quantities from 32 to 7. These reductions
have further increased the Navy's reliance on the less capable Extended
Range Munition for naval surface fire support. The Navy continues to
develop Zumwalt class technologies and design and plans to begin
construction of the first two ships in fiscal year 2008. To provide
capabilities for naval surface fire support beyond the Extended Range
Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer, the Navy has begun development of
prototypes for the electromagnetic railgun and multipurpose loitering
missile. Further progress on these systems is dependent on continued
analysis of the capabilities required, identification of system
requirements, and advances in technology.
Despite the new capabilities promised by the Extended Range Munition
and Zumwalt class destroyer, needs for naval surface fire support
exceed projected capabilities. Recently, the Joint Fires initial
capabilities document assessed future fire support needs for operations
in the littorals[Footnote 1] and identified capability gaps in command
and control, engaging moving targets in poor weather, engaging targets
when collateral damage is a concern, and engaging targets that require
a large volume of fire. While the identification of gaps by such a
study is not unusual, it is important that the gaps be properly
analyzed so that informed decisions can be made on whether to accept
the gaps or how best to close them. Three issues exist that could
inhibit the analysis of gaps identified in capabilities for naval
surface fire support. The uncertainty inherent in the Marine Corps's
current requirements for volume of fire is one such issue. Any decision
to allocate limited resources to fill this gap would benefit from
clarification of these requirements. In addition, the Navy's
Expeditionary Warfare Division, charged with establishing capabilities
and requirements for naval surface fire support, has not had a formal
role in managing requirements and allocating resources for the Extended
Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer, increasing the risk that
naval surface fire support capabilities may not align with the
requirements and operating concepts of expeditionary warfare. Also,
while the Navy is analyzing gaps for engaging targets, it has not
identified a lead organization for analyzing gaps in command and
control.
We are making four recommendations to assist the Navy and Marine Corps
in clarifying requirements and developing systems for naval surface
fire support. Specifically we are recommending that (1) the Navy and
Marine Corps define requirements and operational concepts for volume of
fire to clarify the effects desired and inform the selection and
acquisition of fire support programs; (2) the Chief of Naval
Operations's Expeditionary Warfare Division, as the division in charge
of expeditionary warfare requirements and liaison with the Marine
Corps, be given a formal role in developing requirements, determining
capabilities, and managing resources for systems that provide naval
surface fire support; (3) the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, as decision authority for the
Extended Range Munition, conduct a comprehensive review of the program
to validate plans for future development and acquisition; and (4) the
gap in command and control of joint fires for littoral operations be
assigned to the appropriate organization and coordinated with the
Navy's work on engagement gaps.
In comments to a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
concurred with our recommendations to clarify requirements and concepts
for volume of fire and conduct a review of the Extended Range Munition
program. The department partially concurred with our recommendation to
give Expeditionary Warfare a formal role in developing and managing
systems for naval surface fire support, stating that a review of
existing roles and regulations would be conducted and changes made if
necessary. The department also partially concurred with our
recommendation to assign an organization to address the gap in command
and control of joint fires in the littorals, stating that means to
address this gap would be investigated later, after initial analysis of
engagement gaps is completed. We are concerned that deferring command
and control to a later analysis continues a history of inattention to
this area.
Background:
The Marine Corps has been developing new concepts for expeditionary
operations that are characterized by an increase in mobility,
flexibility, and depth of operations. To successfully conduct these
operations, the Marine Corps relies on a "fires triad" composed of land-
based artillery and mortars, attack planes and helicopters, and sea-
based surface ships to destroy or suppress enemy forces. Figure 1 shows
the fires triad concept.
Figure 1: Fires Triad Illustration:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO(presentation).
[End of figure]
The systems within the fires triad are considered complementary. For
example, while surface ships provide the majority of supporting fires
for ground forces during the early phases of expeditionary operations,
land-based artillery and mortars assume a greater role in later phases
as more of these assets are placed ashore. Some legs of the triad offer
capabilities others cannot. The guns of artillery and surface ships are
more capable of providing volume of fire--large amounts of sustained
fire to suppress or destroy a target--while aircraft are used for long-
range precision strikes or attacks on moving targets. Regardless of
each system's capabilities or contributions, all components of the
triad are considered necessary for success.
The sea-based portion of the triad is referred to as naval surface fire
support and is traditionally provided by the guns and missiles onboard
Navy surface ships. For decades the Navy had provided this capability
with the 16-inch guns of the Iowa class battleships that were
eventually taken out of service due to the high cost of their
operations and maintenance. With the decommissioning of the last Iowa
class battleship in 1992, the Navy was left with only the short-range
(13 nautical miles[Footnote 2]) 5-inch guns on destroyers and cruisers
to provide naval surface fire support. According to the Navy, new and
improved coastal defense systems deployed by potential adversaries
required that Navy ships protect themselves by coming no closer than 25
nautical miles to shore, rendering the existing 5-inch guns ineffective
for fire support. In May 1992, the Navy approved a mission need
statement for naval surface fire support that recognized this gap in
capabilities and called for new or improved systems that could provide
increased range, lethality, and accuracy. Since that time, the Navy and
Marine Corps have conducted a number of studies to identify possible
solutions for this gap and to clarify the needs and requirements
associated with naval surface fire support.
In 1994, the Navy developed a plan to improve naval surface fire
support by upgrading existing 5-inch guns on Arleigh Burke class
destroyers and Ticonderoga class cruisers and developing a new 5-inch
guided munition for near-term capabilities, and considered options for
long-term capabilities as it developed concepts for a new surface
combatant ship. Eventually, these concepts evolved into the Extended
Range Munition and the Zumwalt class destroyer programs. The
establishment of basic requirements by the Marine Corps supported
efforts to develop these systems. Marine Corps analysis concluded that
since ground-based artillery would be unavailable during the initial
stages of an expeditionary operation, naval surface fire support must
provide, at a minimum, the same range, accuracy, and lethality as
current artillery systems. In 1995, the Navy began to incorporate this
analysis into its plans for acquiring new weapons systems by approving
an initial range requirement of 41 to 63 nautical miles, assuming a 25
nautical mile stand-off range. As Marine Corps thinking on
expeditionary operations evolved over the next decade, more
requirements would be added.
Agreement on Requirements Took over a Decade and Did Not Address
Quantitative Measures for Volume of Fire:
For over 10 years the Marine Corps worked with the Navy to develop
requirements for naval surface fire support that align with the concept
of expeditionary operations. It was not until December 2005 that, as a
result of the joint requirements process, an agreement was reached.
This agreement provides the basis for meeting the fire support needs of
the warfighter through a variety of solutions by attempting to define
the effects required. One issue the agreement has not resolved is the
lack of a clear definition for volume of fire. According to the Marine
Corps, volume fires are necessary to execute expeditionary operations,
but quantifiable volume fires requirements have not been established
due to the variance in effects desired from mission to mission and the
planned use of precision munitions. Clearer requirements would inform
the acquisition of planned systems and aid in determining capabilities
of any future systems.
Validated Requirements for Naval Surface Fire Support Are Derived from
Marine Corps Concepts for Expeditionary Operations:
Although the Marine Corps further defined its needs for naval surface
fire support over the last 10 years, it only recently reached agreement
with the Navy on a new set of requirements through the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System, a joint process for
establishing requirements. This process resulted in the Joint Fires in
Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals Initial
Capabilities Document, which incorporated and validated the Marine
Corps's requirements for naval surface fire support. These requirements
are based on the concept of expeditionary operations that the service
has been developing since 1992. Table 1 describes the documents and
events central to creation of this concept.
Table 1: Basis for Evolving Requirements:
Year: 1992;
Events:
* Gap in fire support left by decommissioning of battleships;
* Publication of —from the Sea shifts the emphasis of Marine Corps and
Navy operations from confronting the Soviet threat at sea to the use of
expeditionary forces in the littorals.
Year: 1994;
Events:
* Navy completes first analysis of how to fill gap in naval surface
fire support;
* Publication of Forward—from the Sea further refines Navy concept of
expeditionary operations in the littorals.
Year: 1995;
Events:
* Navy and Marine Corps agree to an initial range requirement of 41 to
63 nautical miles.
Year: 1996;
Events:
* Operational Maneuver from the Sea presents Marine Corps concepts on
expeditionary warfare including the reliance on sea- basing;
* First Marine Corps letter derives naval surface fire support
requirements from concepts presented in Operational Maneuver from the
Sea.
Year: 1997;
Events:
* Publication of Ship to Objective Maneuver establishes the concept of
multiple, independent maneuver forces attacking their targets directly
instead of pausing to establish a foothold and attacking as a combined
force.
Year: 1999;
Events:
* Second Marine Corps letter on naval surface fire support requirements
expands discussion of Marine Corps's needs.
Year: 2000;
Events:
* Navy releases guidance on how ship design can support Marine Corps's
requirements.
Year: 2001;
Events:
* Marine Corps publishes Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare a capstone
document that encapsulates and revalidates previous concepts and
doctrine on expeditionary warfare.
Year: 2002;
Events:
* Third Marine Corps letter on naval surface fire support requirements
presents requirements across near-, mid-, and far- terms for
evolutionary acquisition.
Year: 2003;
Events:
* The Marine Corps drafts a memorandum of agreement on requirements,
but Navy does not agree to memorandum.
Year: 2005;
Events:
* Agreement reached on requirements for naval surface fire support.
Sources: Navy and Marine Corps (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
According to the concept created by the Marine Corps, the fundamental
aspect that defines expeditionary operations--sea-based forces
operating with increased depth and mobility in multiple dispersed
units--establishes certain requirements for naval surface fire support.
Since land-based artillery is restricted by the need for a large
presence ashore, and air-based fire support can be restricted by
weather conditions, the importance of sea-based naval surface fire
support increases. The depth of operations envisioned requires ship-
based guns and other systems with considerable range, while the speed
and mobility envisioned demand rapid response times. Fire support for
expeditionary forces also requires accuracy and precision, to increase
the probability that targets are destroyed or disabled and reduce the
possibility of marines being killed when calling for munitions to land
close to their own positions. Sustainability and lethality are needed
as well to compensate for the firepower removed from Marine units to
preserve their speed and agility. According to the Marine Corps, volume
of fire, defined as large quantities of munitions delivered over time
or simultaneously to suppress or destroy a target, is also necessary to
immobilize or destroy the enemy and enable maneuver. These requirements
surpass the abilities of the Navy's existing 13 nautical mile range 5-
inch guns, necessitating the development and fielding of new weapons
systems or the acceptance of risks in executing expeditionary
operations.
The Marine Corps quantified many of the requirements for naval surface
fire support to better communicate them to the Navy and aid in the
development of new systems. While an initial range requirement was
established in 1995, the Marine Corps identified a number of additional
requirements for naval surface fire support that clarify the needs for
expeditionary operations. These requirements were identified in a
series of three letters from 1996 to 2002, with the last letter
describing requirements in terms of desired near-, mid-, and far-term
capabilities. The Marine Corps also provided rationale for its needs by
providing an explanation of each of the requirements. Table 2 lists the
requirements as described in the last of these letters. The Marine
Corps sought to use these letters to establish a more formal agreement
on the needs for naval surface fire support, and even drafted a
memorandum of agreement in 2003. While the Navy did not sign this
memorandum, many of the requirements presented in the letters were used
in the development of systems and technologies to provide fire support.
Agreement was reached when the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
which oversees requirements development for all four services, approved
the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals
Initial Capabilities Document in December 2005. This document
incorporated and validated Marine Corps requirements for naval surface
fire support.
Table 2: Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements:
System response;
Threshold[A];
Near-Term (2004-2005): 2.5 minutes;
Mid-Term (2006-2009): 2.5 minutes;
Far-Term (2010-2019): 2.5 minutes.
System response;
Objective;
Near-Term (2004-2005): Limits of technology;
Mid-Term (2006-2009): Limits of technology;
Far-Term (2010-2019): Limits of technology.
Range: naval guns;
Threshold;
Near-Term (2004-2005): 41 nm;
Mid- Term (2006-2009): 63 nm;
Far-Term (2010-2019): 97 nm.
Range: naval guns;
Objective;
Near-Term (2004-2005): 63 nm;
Mid-Term (2006-2009): 97 nm;
Far-Term (2010-2019): Limits of technology.
Range: other systems;
Threshold;
Near-Term (2004-2005): 200 nm;
Mid-Term (2006-2009): 200 nm;
Far-Term (2010-2019): 262 nm.
Range: other systems;
Objective;
Near-Term (2004-2005): 222 nm;
Mid-Term (2006-2009): 222 nm;
Far-Term (2010-2019): Limits of technology.
Accuracy and precision;
Threshold;
Near-Term (2004-2005): 50 m CEP[B];
Mid-Term (2006-2009): 50 m CEP;
Far-Term (2010-2019): 50 m CEP.
Accuracy and precision;
Objective;
Near-Term (2004-2005): 20 m CEP;
Mid-Term (2006-2009): 20 m CEP;
Far-Term (2010-2019): 20 m CEP.
Target acquisition;
Threshold;
Near-Term (2004-2005): 50 nm;
Mid- Term (2006-2009): 63 nm;
Far-Term (2010-2019): 97 nm.
Target acquisition;
Objective;
Near-Term (2004-2005): 63 nm;
Mid-Term (2006-2009): 97 nm;
Far- Term (2010-2019): Limits of technology.
Ordnance effects;
* Destroy or suppress point, area, and moving targets including
personnel and material, and destroy hardened targets;
* Provide smoke, illumination, and incendiary effects
Volume of fire;
* Volume fires are equally important to precision;
* Needed for mass fires, suppression, combined arms effects, and close
fire support;
* Sufficient quantities are maintained to sustain desired effects over
time.
Sustainment;
* All systems sustainable via under way replenishment.
Source: Marine Corps.
Note: As defined by Marine Corps March 2002 "Hanlon Letter" and
approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in December 2005.
[A] Threshold refers to minimally acceptable performance and objective
refers to desired performance.
[B] Circular error probable.
[End of table]
Requirements for Volume of Fire Remain Unclear:
While some of the Marine Corps requirements for naval surface fire
support have been quantified, validated, and applied to Navy systems in
development, the requirement for volume of fire remains less defined.
The Marine Corps has consistently maintained the need for these fires
and has described their use under the concept of expeditionary
operations. The Marine Corps defines volume of fire as large quantities
of munitions delivered over time or simultaneously to suppress or
destroy a target. This definition establishes two types of volume
fires: suppression, which requires a large quantity of munitions
delivered on a target or group of targets in an area over a period of
time, and destruction, where a large quantity of munitions are
delivered simultaneously with as much accuracy as possible. Marine
Corps officials have also identified an increasing need for multiple
simultaneous suppression or destruction missions to support dispersed
units. While the Marine Corps's letters on naval surface fire support
provide definitions of these missions, the requirements provided do not
offer quantitative measures of effectiveness or success for all the key
elements of volume of fire. The firing rate of weapon systems and their
ability to deliver multiple rounds simultaneously are highlighted as
important, but other factors--such as the amount of time or munitions
typically required for suppression, or the number of simultaneous
engagements to be supported--remain undefined.
Marine Corps and Navy officials have stated that the advent of
precision munitions for naval surface fire support further complicates
requirements and definitions for volume of fire. Currently, volume
fires are provided by ground-based artillery and mortars firing large
amounts of inexpensive, unguided munitions. Due to the perceived
benefits of precision in air-delivered weapons and the need to deliver
naval surface fire support from greater distances due to shore-based
threats, the Navy has been developing guided munitions for fire
support. These munitions have the potential to deliver far greater
precision and lethality than unguided munitions, but the high cost of
procurement--up to $54,500 per round for the Extended Range Munition
against $1,633 for the current 5-inch projectile[Footnote 3]--could
preclude the Navy from deploying them in the large quantities posited
for volume fires. Marine Corps officials have stated that the concept
of providing volume of fire with precision munitions is currently being
analyzed and that changes to the way volume fires are employed could be
possible. For instance, as the lethality and precision of munitions
increase, it may be possible to change the way targets are selected and
use fewer rounds to achieve volume effects. Officials state, however,
that there are still scenarios in which large sustained quantities of
munitions are necessary.
The ambiguity surrounding volume of fire, especially when such missions
are executed with precision weapons, has a direct impact on the
procurement of munitions for naval surface fire support. The Navy uses
an estimating process, known as the non-nuclear ordnance requirements
process, to assist in determining the number of munitions needed to
support the warfighter. According to Navy officials, to accurately
estimate the number of rounds needed for volume fires the model
requires--but does not have--a definition of the effects desired from
volume fires. In addition, the process does not currently account for
the new capabilities offered by the precision weapons under development
for naval fires. Without the Marine Corps's definition of these
effects, the model will produce inaccurate or unrealistic estimates of
the number of rounds needed. Navy officials identified other
shortcomings in both the information provided by the Navy and Marine
Corps and in the assumptions used to model naval surface fire support
procurement quantities. For instance, the model does not provide enough
fidelity in the distance to targets or properly account for the number
of precision rounds carried in each ship. The Marine Corps, through the
Expeditionary Warfare Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, is working with the Navy to refine the data provided to the
non-nuclear ordnance requirements process as well as the assumptions
made within the process itself.
The inability to quantify requirements for volume of fire also affects
the ability of the Navy to develop systems to meet the Marine Corps's
needs. The Marine Corps has stated that the effects desired from volume
of fire varies from mission to mission and therefore is difficult to
quantify. However, the variance in desired effects from scenario to
scenario is a challenge in other warfare areas as well. In the absence
of requirements that define at least minimum capabilities for common
scenarios, such as the duration and quantity of fire needed to suppress
a target, it may be difficult to develop cost effective systems that
meet Marine Corps needs.
Naval Surface Fire Support Systems Have Experienced Cost and Schedule
Growth and Will Deliver Less Capability Than Originally Planned:
The Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer have required
additional funding and time for development and will not be fielded in
the quantities initially planned. Development of the Extended Range
Munition has been delayed by nearly 11 years due to technical and
programmatic challenges, resulting in cost growth of over 550 percent
from initial estimates. The Navy continues to face challenges related
to the affordability and viability of its plan ahead that must be
overcome in order to field the munition. Optimistic estimates and
consequent cost increases in the Zumwalt class destroyer program have
resulted in reductions to both ship quantities and munition capacities
per ship, both of which will seriously impact capabilities available to
support future expeditionary operations. Candidate technologies to
provide future naval surface fire support capabilities are currently in
development as science and technology programs, and have not yet
completed the requirements documentation and other steps necessary to
enter the acquisition process.
The Extended Range Munition Has Experienced Cost Overruns and Schedule
Delays and Continues to Face Risk:
Figure 2: Extended Range Munition:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Raytheon, copyright 2006 Raytheon.
After 10 years in development, the Extended Range Munition continues to
experience challenges with technology and design, which could
jeopardize near term capabilities for naval surface fire support.
[End of figure]
The Extended Range Munition is a precision guided munition fired from a
modified 5-inch gun and is designed to provide accurate fire support
for ground forces to an objective range of 63 nautical miles. In order
to fire the munition, elements of the existing 5-inch gun design
including the gun barrel, magazine, ammunition handling, and gun
initialization systems were modified. In addition to changes in the
gun, the Navy has also developed a naval fires control system, which
will be used to receive, process, and execute warfighter fire mission
requests for the gun system. The Navy is installing the modified 5-inch
guns, each with a magazine capacity of 232 Extended Range Munition
rounds, and fires control systems onboard 32 Arleigh Burke class
destroyers (DDG 81 through DDG 112), but has abandoned plans to equip
22 Ticonderoga class cruisers with all the capabilities needed to fire
the new munitions. Table 3 summarizes major events that have occurred
in the Extended Range Munition program.
Table 3: Major Events in the Acquisition of the Extended Range
Munition:
Year: 1996;
Events:
* Operational requirements for an extended range munition are approved
that reflect Marine Corps range and accuracy needs;
* Program begins with system design and demonstration as opposed to
concept and technology development;
* Navy contracts with Texas Instruments in Dallas, Texas, for
development and testing of a 5-inch precision munition.
Year: 1997;
Events: Raytheon acquires Texas Instruments.
Year: 1999;
Events:
* Raytheon relocates development of the program to Tucson, Arizona,
resulting in workforce disruption and delays;
* Design of components changes as contractor learns effects of
fluctuating pressures subjected to the munition when fired.
Year: 2001;
Events: Planned initial operating capability not achieved; currently
planned for 2011.
Year: 2002;
Events:
* Navy alters requirements triggering a change from submunition to
unitary warhead;
* Redesign continues.
Year: 2003;
Events:
* Critical design review completed based on design of developmental
test rounds--design of production ready munition remains incomplete;
* Land-Based Flight Test 1 fails due to guidance and tail fin issues;
* Gun environment instability continues until gun pressures are
stabilized in 2004.
Year: 2004;
Events:
* Navy partially halts work on the program due to budget, schedule, and
performance issues;
* Navy awards second, separate demonstration contract for an alternate
munition and discusses a competition for future contracts;
* Navy partially restarts the program for work in specific areas.
Year: 2005;
Events:
* Engineering Flight Test A succeeds in demonstrating launch and guided
flight of the munition; Engineering Flight Test B fails due to an issue
with the guidance system;
* Land-Based Flight Test 2 fails due to canard and rocket motor issues;
* Land-Based Flight Test 3 fails due to a manufacturing issue;
* Land-Based Flight Tests 4 and 6 fail due to canard issues;
* Land-Based Flight Test 5 succeeds in demonstrating launch and guided
flight of the munition;
* Proposed munition quantities increase with Marine Corps involvement.
Year: 2006;
Events:
* Navy ceases funding for alternate munition due to test failures--
effort continues through funding added by Congress;
* Program costs trigger a change in acquisition category resulting in a
shift in oversight to Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Sources: Contractor and Navy (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
Despite the progress on the gun and fire control systems, development
of the munition has been more challenging than initially anticipated.
When the program began in 1996, the Navy planned to use several
components from the previously developed 5-inch semi-active laser
guided projectile and assumed that few changes to these components were
necessary. Navy officials then approved an accelerated schedule that
began directly with development and demonstration of the system
design.[Footnote 4] In the late 1990's, the program began to experience
technical problems with the explosive used to propel the munition from
the gun, resulting in damage to munition components. These problems
resulted in the need to redesign certain components. Additional design
changes occurred in 2002 when warhead requirements were altered by the
Navy. Although work on the program was partially halted from February
to May 2004 due to poor testing performance and cost and schedule
growth, the contractor continued to redesign components in several
areas, such as the rocket motor, tail fins, and guidance system, in
order to improve performance. After redesign of individual munition
components, testing of the munition resumed. Beginning in February
2005, the contractor sought to demonstrate the munition's reliability
through a series of seven land-based flight tests. Five of these tests
failed due to component issues; two of these failures have been traced
to a lack of quality controls with suppliers.
The Navy's decision to accelerate the program's schedule by entering
directly into system design and demonstration increased cost and
schedule risk in the munition's development. Our work on best practices
has shown that a critical first step in developing systems is to fully
demonstrate technologies before system development begins, thereby
reducing program risk and creating confidence that technologies will
work as expected.[Footnote 5] The Navy chose to accept this technical
and design risk by allowing the Extended Range Munition to enter system
design directly. Since a knowledge-based process was not effectively
utilized early in the program, the Navy could not provide an accurate
estimate for the resources needed for development.
Challenges to date have resulted in schedule delays and significant
cost growth. Figure 3 shows the total estimated cost and schedule
growth in the program since 1996.
Figure 3: Cost and Schedule Growth in the Extended Range Munition
Program:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Navy(data); GAO (presentation).
[End of figure]
The Navy originally estimated that development of the munition would
require $86 million. Currently, the Navy projects that development will
require a total of $475 million.[Footnote 6] Increases in production
costs are due in part to a decision to increase procurement of the
munition from 8,500 rounds to 15,000 rounds. In August 2006, oversight
of the program was elevated by requiring that major programmatic
decisions, such as approval of the Navy's estimate for resources needed
for completion and the strategy for development and testing, be
approved by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics rather than the Navy. While this restructuring has
elevated oversight, a comprehensive review of the program by the
Undersecretary has not been performed.
As a result of challenges in developing the munition, the Navy sought
possible alternatives to the Extended Range Munition and awarded a
second, separate demonstration contract in May 2004 for the Ballistic
Trajectory Extended Range Munition. The munition's rocket motor caused
test failures and led the Navy to conclude that any further efforts to
develop the munition for competition would not be worthwhile. According
to a Navy official, the Navy concluded that the Extended Range Munition
was a more viable option for fielding a tactical round by fiscal year
2011 and is no longer requesting funding for the Ballistic Trajectory
Extended Range Munition. Instead, the Navy has chosen to modify the
current contract and continue development of the Extended Range
Munition. Navy officials state a competition could still occur in 2011
for production of the Extended Range Munition.
While the Navy intends to begin fielding the Extended Range Munition in
2011, major risks remain. The program faces technical challenges in
demonstrating the munition's guidance components as well as
successfully completing component testing and ensuring reliability of
the munition. Even though the program had two successful land-based
tests in 2005, the Navy has yet to repeat such demonstrations and does
not plan to begin shipboard testing until 2010. The Navy currently
plans to conduct 40 land-based guided flight tests prior to the
shipboard event. According to program officials, the Navy continues to
evaluate plans and identify resources required for completing
development of the munition. Program officials are considering
alternative plans for testing the munition's reliability through
additional component and land-based flight tests. Until these plans are
completed and approved through a comprehensive review by the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
uncertainty remains on whether the Navy's revised strategy follows a
knowledge-based approach and aligns the program's available resources
with the Navy's goal to begin fielding in 2011.
Affordability Concerns in the Zumwalt Class Destroyer Program Have Led
to Reductions in Naval Surface Fire Support Capabilities and
Procurement Quantities:
The Zumwalt class destroyer will deliver far fewer quantities of ships
and munitions for naval surface fire support than envisioned 10 years
ago. The primary reason for this reduced capability is that the Navy's
concept for the Zumwalt class destroyer promised revolutionary
performance at an unrealistically low cost. In 2001, the Department of
Defense recognized that additional time and money were required to
develop and field the destroyer and concluded that a new approach was
necessary. Through a series of decisions, the Navy restructured the
program by adding time for technology development, trading naval
surface fire support capability for lower costs, and reducing the
planned number of ships. At the same time, other ship capabilities were
maintained or even expanded, leading to increased cost and additional
technical risk. The capability trades and quantity reductions in the
Zumwalt class destroyer program increase the Navy's dependence on the
less capable Extended Range Munition (ERM) to provide naval surface
fire support, as shown in figure 4.[Footnote 7]
Figure 4: Reductions to Ship Quantities Planned for Naval Surface Fire
Support:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Navy)data); GAO(presentation).
[End of figure]
The Zumwalt class destroyer program represents the Navy's solution for
addressing a mission need identified in 1994 for a 21st century surface
combatant capable of, among other things, projecting sustained naval
surface fire support for amphibious and other ground forces. The
program was derived from a concept for a tailored capability ship
identified as the Maritime Fire Support Ship. This concept featured
significant naval fires capabilities--including two advanced 155
millimeter gun systems capable of firing a land attack munition up to
100 nautical miles--as well as robust surface and subsurface warfare
capabilities, reduced signatures, and reduced crewing compared to that
of current ship classes. The Navy used the characteristics of the
Maritime Fire Support Ship to serve as a basis for developing
requirements for the DD 21 land attack destroyer. These requirements
were approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in 1997 and
featured robust capabilities related to naval surface fire support
including threshold quantities of 2 advanced gun systems, 1200
munitions capable of long range land attack, and 128 missile launch
cells. When sized to these capabilities, DD 21 was expected to displace
over 17,000 long tons. Requirements also included ambitious targets for
reduced manning and a low radar cross section. DD 21 plans, along with
other Zumwalt class program events, are shown in table 4.
Table 4: Major Events in the Acquisition of the Zumwalt Class
Destroyer:
Year: 1994;
Event: Navy identifies need for a new 21st century surface combatant
(SC 21) to provide naval surface fire support.
Year: 1997;
Event:
* Analysis for SC 21 found that using a family of ships--as opposed to
one ship--built on a common hull offered advantages;
* Navy approves minimum requirements for DD 21 including 2 advanced gun
systems, 1200 land attack munitions, and 128 missile cells;
* Plans for DD 21 include 32 ships with an average unit cost not to
exceed $921 million (FY96$) and an initial operational capability of
fiscal year 2008 (Acquisition Program Baseline - January 1998).
Year: 1999;
Event:
* DD 21 program costs increase to account for development of software
and key systems including the volume search radar, advanced gun system,
and integrated power system;
* DD 21 program plans revised to include 32 ships with an average unit
cost not to exceed $956 million (FY96$) (Acquisition Program Baseline -
March 1999).
Year: 2001;
Event:
* DD 21 program restructured to emphasize technology development and
affordability;
* Program renamed DD(X) and designated within a family of future
surface combatants including a future cruiser and littoral combat ship.
Year: 2002;
Event:
* Marine Corps releases a memorandum with a requirement for each DD(X)
to be equipped with 2 advanced gun systems and 900 to 1200 land attack
munitions;
* Navy completes its review of requirements for future surface
combatants and recommends a force structure of 16 DD(X) each with 2
advanced gun systems, 900 land attack munitions, and 96 missile cells;
* Navy recognizes the need for an additional $7.6 billion to complete
DD(X) technology development, testing, and evaluation efforts.
Year: 2003;
Event:
* Chief of Naval Operations directs that DD(X) capabilities include 2
advanced gun systems, 600 land attack munitions, and a minimum of 80
missile cells;
* Navy modifies DD(X) radar design, increasing air defense capability
while adding development risk.
Year: 2004;
Event:
* DD(X) program restructured to include a quantity of 8 ships, an
average unit cost not to exceed $2.6 billion (FY96$), and an initial
operational capability of fiscal year 2013 (Acquisition Program
Baseline--April 2004);
* DD(X) operational requirements approved which reflect minimum naval
surface fire support capabilities outlined by the Chief of Naval
Operations in June 2003 and incorporate the Marine Corps requirements
for range, accuracy, and system response time.
Year: 2005;
Event:
* Navy approves a DD(X) system design, which includes 2 advanced gun
systems with 300 rounds each, a convertible storeroom capable of
holding an additional 320 land attack munitions, and 80 missile cells;
* Navy approves new plans for the DD(X) program including a procurement
quantity of 10 ships, an average unit cost not to exceed $3.1 billion
(FY96$), and an initial operational capability of fiscal year 2014
(Acquisition Program Baseline--November 2005);
* Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics
authorizes detail design and construction of 8 ships;
* Navy pursues further cost reductions and eliminates the 320 round
capable convertible storeroom, saving approximately $19 million in
procurement costs per ship.
Year: 2006;
Event:
* Navy outlines its 30 year shipbuilding plan in a report to Congress,
which identifies plans to construct 7 DD(X) destroyers;
* DD(X) program renamed DDG 1000 Zumwalt class destroyer;
* Congress authorizes split funding of two lead ships but states that
procurement costs for the two ships should not rise above $6.528
billion.
Sources: Navy (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
In 2001, the Office of the Secretary of Defense developed concerns that
the program's cost estimate was unrealistic and that the program was
not adequately funded.[Footnote 8] Although originally envisioned as a
tailored capability ship, DD 21 requirements outlined a multimission
ship featuring several revolutionary technologies. These concerns
prompted the Navy to restructure the program and revisit its planned
family of ships concept. As a result, the Navy revised its family of
ships approach to include a future destroyer named DD(X), a future
cruiser known as CG(X), and a new littoral combat ship. This approach
sought to take advantage of commonality among the three programs in an
effort to mitigate risk in technology development.[Footnote 9] Figure 5
shows the different technologies introduced through the DD 21 and DD(X)
programs.
Figure 5: Advanced Technologies on the Zumwalt Class Guided Missile
Destroyer:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Navy(data), GAO(presentation).
The DD 21 and DD(X) programs introduced several revolutionary
technologies, many of which remain in development.
[End of figure]
The Navy's Surface Combatant Spiral Development Review in 2002
recommended a multimission DD(X) configured with 2 advanced gun
systems, 900 land attack munitions, and 96 missile launch cells as the
most cost-effective basis for developing DD(X) requirements. These
capability reductions were expected to decrease the ship's cost by
reducing the destroyer's weight from nearly 17,000 long tons expected
for DD 21 to approximately 15,700 long tons. Subsequently, the Chief of
Naval Operations directed that the size of DD(X) be reduced to 14,000
long tons while retaining multimission capability. To achieve these
goals, the Navy reduced planned DD(X) land attack munitions to 600 and
decreased minimum requirements for missile launch cells to 80 per ship.
In an effort to address Marine Corps concerns regarding the reduced
naval surface fire support capabilities offered by DD(X) as compared to
DD 21, the Navy modified the DD(X) design to include a convertible
storeroom capable of holding an additional 320 land attack munitions.
The Chief of Naval Operations also directed the Navy to revisit its
plan for developing a volume search radar for the DD(X) design.
According to Navy officials, undertaking development of a less
technologically mature, but potentially more powerful volume search
radar for DD(X) was worthwhile because it would help preserve a
competitive industrial base in advance of CG(X) development. The change
would also add air defense capability to DD(X), giving the ship
capability that exceeds performance requirements. Achieving these
benefits, however, would require the Navy to delay testing for the
volume search radar and commit nearly $20 million in additional
research, development, test, and evaluation funding for the DD(X)
program to manage the significant technical risk associated with
developing the more challenging technology. One month following the
Chief of Naval Operations's directive, the Navy modified the ship's
radar development contract to accommodate the higher risk volume search
radar approach.
In 2004, the Department of Defense approved new program goals and
operational requirements for the DD(X) program that reflected a plan to
procure fewer ships, projecting less naval surface fire support
capability than DD 21. Figure 6 shows how program costs and quantities
have changed over time.
Figure 6: Cost and Quantity Change in the Zumwalt Class Destroyer
Program:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Navy(data), GAO(presentation).
[End of figure]
Continuing cost pressures in the program led the Navy to reevaluate
DD(X) capabilities, technologies, and design as part of a comprehensive
cost reduction effort. As part of this effort, the Navy eliminated the
DD(X) convertible storeroom from the ship's design. Although yielding
approximately $19 million in procurement savings per ship, this
decision reduced the ship's naval surface fire support capability by
almost 35 percent. Other DD(X) capabilities and technologies including
the ship's dual band radar (volume search radar and multifunction
radar), integrated computing environment, and reduced signature
features were not significantly affected during this process. According
to Navy officials, contractor estimates have identified $265 million in
procurement savings achieved for each Zumwalt class destroyer.
In 2006, the Navy changed the name of the DD(X) program to DDG 1000
Zumwalt class destroyer and reduced planned ship quantities to 7.
Although this decision reflected the practical realities of recognizing
more realistic costs, these reductions nevertheless increase the Navy's
reliance on successful outcomes in the Extended Range Munition program
in order to complete future naval surface fire support missions. This
reliance is further compounded by Navy decisions that have reduced the
number of land attack munitions each Zumwalt class ship is capable of
carrying. However, because the Extended Range Munition offers less
range and capability than the DD(X) long-range land attack munition,
the Navy may be forced to accept additional risk in certain fire
support missions. Currently, the Navy plans to field the Extended Range
Munition on 32 Arleigh Burke class destroyers, which will be
supplemented with 7 Zumwalt class ships carrying long-range land-attack
munitions.
Navy Has Begun Development of Some Candidate Systems for Future Naval
Surface Fire Support Capabilities:
The Navy has begun science and technology efforts for the
electromagnetic railgun and multipurpose loitering missile, but has not
approved development or fielding of these systems as formal acquisition
programs. The Office of Naval Research is leading efforts to develop
and test a prototype of the electromagnetic railgun and estimates that
the system will require approximately $216 million to complete its
initial demonstration phase in support of fielding around 2025. The
electromagnetic railgun is one of four key naval prototype efforts
within the Office of Naval Research, which together represent 50
percent of the agency's fiscal year 2007 proposed investment in leap-
ahead innovations.
Naval Sea Systems Command is managing preliminary tests and the
development effort of the Affordable Weapon System, which is one
candidate for the multipurpose loitering missile concept. The project
has received approximately $155 million to date in support of these
efforts. While neither the electromagnetic railgun nor the multipurpose
loitering missile have been formally chosen as programs for
acquisition, these systems provide the Navy and Marine Corps with
potential options for future naval surface fire support capabilities.
Further analysis by the Navy and the Department of Defense will
determine whether these technologies are feasible and if these systems
are needed.
Needs for Naval Surface Fire Support Exceed Projected Capabilities:
Based on the 2005 Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in
Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals, the Extended
Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer will not provide the full
range of capabilities needed for naval surface fire support. Analysis
performed for the initial capabilities document studied the
capabilities of systems across the services to provide fire support in
the littorals and identified 4 capability gaps--command and control of
joint fires, engaging moving targets, minimized collateral damage, and
achieving volume fires effects. While the Navy has initiated efforts to
address remaining naval surface fire support needs, it faces challenges
in further defining requirements for volume of fire, shaping
acquisition outcomes to meet the needs of the expeditionary warfighter,
and managing command and control issues related to fire support.
Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt Class Destroyer Offer Significant
Naval Surface Fire Support Capability, but Cannot Meet All the Needs of
Future Warfighters:
In December 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed and
validated the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the
Littorals Initial Capabilities Document, which describes some of the
fire support needs of the warfighter for the next decade as well as the
gaps that exist in meeting these needs. Needs were defined by
collecting guidance, tasks, conditions, and standards for fire support
from each of the services, including those presented by the Marine
Corps's letters on naval surface fire support. Gaps in capability were
identified by analyzing the ability of current and planned systems
throughout the fires triad, including the Extended Range Munition and
Zumwalt class destroyer, to fulfill the defined needs. As could be
expected from any analysis of current versus desired capabilities, the
initial capabilities document identified a number of gaps. The document
lists the gaps in order of priority as 1) the ability to transmit and
receive targeting information to enable command and control of fire
support, 2) engaging moving targets in poor weather, 3) providing fire
support when collateral damage or casualties in friendly forces is a
concern, and 4) providing volume fires to achieve suppression of enemy
targets.
While the initial capabilities document approaches fire support needs
and capabilities from a joint perspective--meaning that the need for
fire support and the systems providing it can come from the Navy,
Marine Corps, Army, or Air Force--it does address naval surface fire
support systems specifically. The Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt
class destroyer were treated as planned systems within the analysis, as
they are expected to become available within the 2005 to 2015 time
period considered in the study. The analysis conducted for the initial
capabilities document revealed that if these systems are implemented as
currently planned they will provide the warfighter with improved
capabilities to engage certain targets, especially in restricted
conditions such as poor weather. However, they do not provide enough
additional capability to close any of the four gaps. Future systems for
naval surface fire support, such as the electromagnetic rail gun and
the multipurpose loitering missile, were not considered as they will
not be available until after 2015.
The analysis performed for the initial capabilities document discussed
a number of weaknesses in current and planned naval surface fire
support systems. For instance, the analysis determined that Navy ships
cannot take full advantage of targeting information communicated from
other systems affecting their ability to provide accurate fire support,
especially when collateral damage is a concern. Munitions currently in
use or development also lack the ability to hit moving targets, as they
have neither the sensors to detect moving targets nor the ability to
update the location of targets while in flight. The need for volume
fires is not fully met by the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class
destroyer either, and multiple, simultaneous calls for volume fire
provide a challenge as well. Officials state that this gap in volume of
fire persists despite the low number of calls for suppression
anticipated by the analysis--5 targets or 0.3 percent of the total
fires called for in the scenarios analyzed--due to the reductions made
in munitions available for naval surface fire support and uncertainty
about the effects expected.
Risks Remain in the Navy's Approach for Addressing Future Needs in
Naval Surface Fire Support:
Requirements for Volume of Fires Need Further Definition:
The Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals
Initial Capabilities Document provides greater definition for volume of
fire than articulated in earlier Marine Corps's correspondence on naval
surface fire support, presenting new measures of effectiveness for
suppression. The document establishes a minimum capability needed to
fill the gap in volume fires for suppression that includes measures of
effectiveness for probability of damage against targets and a number of
targets to suppress as well as capabilities like range and rate of
fire. However, these desired minimum capabilities still lack a measure
for the duration of fire, or how long targets need to be suppressed or
fired upon to cause the stated amount of damage, and the amount of
munitions needed to cause these effects. Instead of providing measures
for these capabilities, the document reiterates previous analyses by
stating that more specific volume requirements are dependant on the
situation. Initial capabilities documents, like the Joint Fires
document, do not generally establish requirements but only suggest
capabilities. A set of requirements that quantitatively captures all
the capabilities potentially needed is a necessary precursor for the
Department of Defense to determine whether and how to address any
resultant capability gap regarding volume fires.
Current Navy Practices for Managing Resources and Requirements Increase
Risk That Warfighter Needs Will Go Unaddressed:
Navy processes for defining requirements and allocating resources for
naval surface fire support systems may result in acquisition outcomes
that do not align with the priorities of the expeditionary warfighter.
The Navy's Expeditionary Warfare Division is charged with developing
capabilities and requirements for naval surface fire support. However,
this division has not had a formal oversight role in the Extended Range
Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer programs. Instead, the Navy has
assigned management of requirements and resources for these programs to
its Surface Warfare division, which is charged with developing
capabilities and requirements for destroyers and other surface
ships.[Footnote 10] This approach places the Navy at risk for making
investment decisions in its naval surface fire support programs without
fully understanding the potential impacts on operating concepts for
expeditionary warfare.
For example, quantity requirements in the Extended Range Munition
program were initially established by the Navy's Surface Warfare
Division. However, a 2005 report from the Department of Defense's
Office of the Inspector General identified the Navy's Expeditionary
Warfare Division as responsible for both analyzing warfighting
requirements for the Extended Range Munition and validating planned
procurement quantities in the program. On the basis of the Inspector
General's report the planned quantities of the Extended Range Munition
increased by over 75 percent in order to meet Marine Corps naval
surface fire support requirements. In another example, resources and
requirements for the Navy's multimission Zumwalt class destroyer are
principally managed by the Navy's Surface Warfare Division. Cost
challenges within the program have required the Navy to reduce planned
capabilities on the ship as well as procurement quantities, which has
significantly reduced the Zumwalt class's ability and availability to
provide naval surface fire support. This process of cost and capability
trades has been managed by the Navy's Surface Warfare Division, not by
the customer--represented by the Navy's Expeditionary Warfare Division-
-who depends on the delivered capabilities. As a result, current naval
surface fire support capabilities of the Zumwalt class destroyer may
not be aligned with the priorities of the expeditionary warfighter.
Management of Command and Control Issues is Unresolved:
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has designated the Navy as the
lead component to analyze the four gaps. The Navy, through its Surface
Warfare Division, has already begun the analysis for the three
engagement gaps presented in the initial capabilities document.
However, no organization has been chosen to analyze the first gap in
capability, which identified issues in fire support command and
control. Any attempt to close this gap could have consequences for
systems developed to engage targets, as they rely on the command and
control architecture for target assignment and information.
Conclusions:
Since the retirement of the battleships in 1992, the Navy and Marine
Corps have worked to develop capabilities for naval surface fire
support. The Navy and Marine Corps chose to pursue an approach in which
the Extended Range Munition would provide near-term capabilities and
the Zumwalt class destroyer would provide capabilities over the medium
term. However, this investment strategy was defined by low levels of
technical knowledge and poor estimates of the financial resources that
would be needed to acquire this capability. As a result, the
acquisition of systems for naval surface fire support has been plagued
by technical and budgetary challenges that have delayed the fielding of
any significant capability.
The recent joint analysis of fire support for forces operating in the
littorals has been an important and constructive process in generating
agreement and improving the knowledge base required to reconcile needs
and assets. Yet, more work needs to be done to reconcile these
differences, as evidenced by the gaps identified in the joint analysis.
The presence of gaps in capabilities should be expected from any
analysis of current resources, and it does not necessarily follow that
all gaps must be closed with more resources. However, if gaps are to
remain in place, this result should be the product of deliberate
analysis and decision making that takes into account the views of the
warfighter. At this point, there are several issues whose resolution
will enable the kind of analysis needed to fully reconcile naval
surface fire support needs with fire support assets.
First, although the Marine Corps has quantified many of its
requirements for naval surface fire support in a way that allows the
Navy to guide development of its systems, volume of fire remains ill-
defined. While the Marine Corps maintains the importance of volume
fires, the failure to even roughly quantify needs within thresholds and
objectives leads to the absence of this capability in the systems the
Navy develops as well as difficulty in planning munition procurement.
By working with the Navy and other services to better define the
effects required and to create operational concepts for a system or
combination of systems that could achieve volume effects, the Marine
Corps may be able to better provide this capability to warfighters in
future conflicts.
Second, although the Navy and Marine Corps have reached an
understanding on naval surface fire support requirements as a whole,
translation of this understanding to the capabilities and quantities of
individual systems must yet be reached. Over the past 10 years, the
decisions made on individual systems such as the Extended Range
Munition and the Zumwalt class destroyer have reduced the capabilities
the Navy plans to make available to provide fire support for the Marine
Corps's operations. These decisions were reached without providing a
formal role for the Navy's Expeditionary Warfare Division in deciding
the requirements and resources allocated to platforms that provide
naval surface fire support, increasing risk that acquisition outcomes
will not align with the priorities of the expeditionary warfighter.
Third, because of challenges posed by the development of the Extended
Range Munition and the Zumwalt class destroyer, the Navy is now in a
position in which it will rely more heavily on Extended Range Munition
to provide fire support than originally planned. This program still
faces significant development risks, a fact recognized by the decision
of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &
Logistics to elevate oversight of the program.
Finally, while the Navy's Surface Warfare Division has begun the
analysis of gaps related to engaging targets, no office has been
selected to analyze the gap in command and control of fire support in
the littorals. To ensure that current and future systems provide a fire
support function within the larger command and control network, it is
important that this gap be analyzed in conjunction with the other
identified capability gaps in joint fire support.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the Department's efforts to address naval surface fire
support needs, we are making the following four recommendations:
* To determine the desired effects for volume of fire, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Navy and Marine Corps to
define quantitative requirements and operational concepts on use of
volume fires, especially when using precision weapons for suppression
or simultaneous strikes. This analysis should be used to 1) inform and
update the non-nuclear ordnance requirements process used to determine
procurement objectives for these munitions and 2) clarify the
capability gap for volume fires as identified in the Initial
Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary
Operations in the Littorals.
* In order to ensure that the systems providing naval surface fire
support are aligned with the requirements and operating concepts of the
forces they assist, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Navy to provide the Chief of Naval Operations's Expeditionary
Warfare Division, as the division charged with establishing
capabilities and requirements for naval surface fire support and
liaison to the Marine Corps, a formal role in developing requirements,
determining capabilities, and managing resources for Navy systems
responsible for providing naval surface fire support.
* In light of the changes to the schedule, budget requirements, and
design of the Extended Range Munition program, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, as the program's milestone
decision authority, conduct a comprehensive review of the program to
validate progress and acquisition plans that will incorporate results
from current and planned program studies and direct changes as
necessary.
* Given the importance of command and control in coordinating fire
support, especially in the complex environment imposed by joint
operations in the littorals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Navy to designate the appropriate organization for managing
an analysis of alternatives related to this gap and ensure that the
results of this analysis are coordinated with solutions for identified
engagement gaps.
Agency Comments and Our Review:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the
recommendation to define quantitative requirements and operational
concepts on the use of volume fires as well as the recommendation to
conduct a comprehensive review of the Extended Range Munition program.
DOD partially concurred with the recommendation to provide a formal
role to the Expeditionary Warfare Division in decisions regarding naval
surface fire support, stating that the department will review the
existing role of the Director, Expeditionary Warfare and relevant Navy
directives and make adjustments if necessary. It also stated that the
role of Expeditionary Warfare was recently formalized for the munitions
requirements and procurement process, but that the guns and launchers
which fire these munitions are the responsibility of the Surface
Warfare Division. In conducting its review, we believe the department
should be mindful that naval surface fire support capability is not
limited to munitions but also includes guns, ships, and other systems.
DOD also partially concurred with the recommendation to address the
command and control gap identified by the Initial Capabilities Document
for Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the
Littorals, but indicated that full analysis of this gap will be
deferred and not coordinated with the initial analysis of engagement
gaps. This is surprising given that the initial capabilities document
identified correcting weaknesses in command and control as the highest
priority in its analysis. We are concerned that deferring command and
control to a later analysis continues a history of inattention to this
area.
DOD's written comments are included in their entirety in appendix II.
The department also provided technical comments which were incorporated
into the report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H.
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Donald C. Winter,
Secretary of the Navy; and interested congressional committees. We will
also provide copies to others on request. We will also make copies
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report or need additional
information, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO Staff who
made contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Paul L. Francis:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess whether well-defined requirements for naval surface fire
support have been established, we reviewed current and historical Navy,
Marine Corps, and joint force documents that identify requirements
related to naval surface fire support and that explain operational
concepts for expeditionary warfare. We analyzed and compared these
documents to determine 1) when the joint services reached formal
agreement on naval surface fire support requirements, 2) how these
requirements align with the Marine Corps's key operating concepts for
expeditionary warfare, and 3) the degree to which these requirements
include clear, quantitative measures of performance. To supplement this
analysis, we further discussed these issues with Navy, Marine Corps,
and joint force officials responsible for establishing naval surface
fire support requirements. We also interviewed Navy program officials
responsible for developing and procuring the Extended Range Munition
and Zumwalt class destroyer to understand how naval surface fire
support requirements have been incorporated into these programs.
To assess the Navy's progress in developing and fielding the Extended
Range Munition, the Zumwalt class destroyer, and future systems for
naval surface fire support, we analyzed key program documentation
including performance requirements, cost estimates, budget submissions,
acquisition strategies, development and demonstration contracts, and
testing plans and results. We also drew from our prior work related to
best practices and development and cost challenges in the Extended
Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer programs. In addition, we
reviewed Department of Defense reports related to these and other
programs for naval surface fire support. To supplement our analysis, we
interviewed Navy and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials
responsible for managing resources and requirements in naval surface
fire support programs. We also discussed program challenges and risks
with the acquisition managers, contractors, and testing community
associated with each system.
To determine whether current Navy systems in development will fulfill
naval surface fire support requirements, we comparatively analyzed the
joint services' most recent requirements document related to naval
surface fire support--the Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires
in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals--with the
validated performance requirements for the Extended Range Munition and
Zumwalt class destroyer. To identify actions taken to address
situations where naval surface fire support requirements may not fully
align with the capabilities planned for these systems, we interviewed
officials from the Navy, Marine Corps, joint services, and Office of
the Secretary of Defense.
To address our objectives, we visited and interviewed officials from
the Navy's Surface Warfare and Expeditionary Warfare Divisions; the
Marine Corps's Combat Development Command and Plans, Policies, and
Operations offices; the Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare
Systems; and the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer
program offices. We also met with officials from the Department of
Defense's Office of the Inspector General, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, the Naval Surface
Warfare Center--Dahlgren Division, the Office of Naval Research,
Affordable Weapon System project office, the Defense Contract
Management Agency, Raytheon Missile Systems, BAE Systems, and Alliant
Techsystems.
We conducted our analysis from February 2006 to November 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this
report.
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
Mr. Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Nov 5 1006:
Dear Mr. Francis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, "Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Remain in Developing
Requirements and Capabilities for Naval Surface Fire Support" (GAO Code
120520/GAO-07-115). The Department's comments on the recommendations
are attached.
The Department partially concurs with recommendations 2 and 4, which
relate to clarifying the role of the Chief of Naval Operations'
Expeditionary Warfare Directorate in naval surface fire support
matters, and designating an appropriate organization for managing an
analysis of alternatives to close command and control gaps identified
in joint expeditionary fires.
The Department concurs with recommendations 1 and 3, which relate to
defining quantitative requirements and operational concepts on the use
of volume fires, and to conducting a comprehensive review of the
Extended Range Munition program.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. Technical comments were provided separately. For further
questions concerning this report, please contact Darlene Costello,
Deputy Director, Naval Warfare, 703-697-2205.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
GAO Draft Report Dated October 16, 2006 GAO-07-1 I5 (GAO Code 120520):
"Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Remain In Developing Requirements And
Capabilities For Naval Surface Fire Support"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Navy and Marine Corps to define quantitative requirements
and operational concepts on use of volume fires, especially when using
precision weapons for suppression or simultaneous strikes to determine
the desired effects for volume of fire. (p. 28/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: The DoD concurs with the recommendation. Long range
precision guided Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) munitions have been
developed specifically to support Marine Corps operational
requirements. These operational requirements directly affect the size
and cost of NSFS munitions. The DoD has yet to ford an acceptable
absolute metric to determine how many of these new precise projectiles
might be needed at all ranges to create volume effects similar to the
traditional practice of using large quantities of unguided munitions at
relatively short ranges. The DoD recognizes that a trade-off of
increased range and precision for decreased capability to provide
volume fires might exist and might have some inherent risk. But, the
amount of risk is highly dependent on the scenario.
The solution to mitigating the gap in volume of fires is more
appropriately addressed by developing tactics, techniques, procedures,
and doctrine for using all elements of the fires triad (air, ground,
and sea) to achieve volume effects at the ranges required by new
operational concepts. In the interim, the DoD will continue to refine
methods for estimating required quantities of precision ammunition
intended for fire support applications, including volume fires, and the
Navy will incorporate those improvements into the Non-Nuclear Ordnance
Requirements model as needed.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Navy to provide the Chief of Naval Operations' Expeditionary
Warfare Directorate, as the directorate charged with establishing
capabilities and requirements for naval surface fire support and
liaison to the Marine Corps, a formal role in developing requirements,
determining capabilities and managing resources for Navy systems
responsible for providing naval surface fire support to ensure that the
systems providing naval surface fire support are aligned with the
requirements and operating concepts of the forces they assist. (p.
28/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: The DoD partially concurs with the recommendation. The
position of Director, Expeditionary Warfare was established by Congress
in section 5038 of Title 10, United States Code, which states in part
that, "The principle duty of the Director, Expeditionary Warfare shall
be to supervise the performance of all staff responsibilities of the
Chief of Naval Operations regarding expeditionary warfare, including
responsibilities regarding amphibious lift, mine warfare, naval fire
support, and other missions essential to supporting expeditionary
warfare."
Within the Department of the Navy, traditional staff relationships
exist between the Director, Surface Warfare, the Director Expeditionary
Warfare, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and Headquarters
Marine Corps. As recently as 2006, the Navy clarified the role of the
Director, Expeditionary Warfare (N85) in a Chief of Naval Operations
Notice. The Navy directive formalizes the Director, Expeditionary
Warfare role in the DoD Munitions Requirements Process as well as its
role in validating procurement quantities for NSFS munitions. The guns
and launchers that provide NSFS for the warfighters and critical force
protection for the fleet, and facilitate the Sea Shield pillar of the
Navy 21 Strategy, are the responsibilities of the Director, Surface
Warfare (N86). The Expeditionary Warfare Directorate can fulfill its
Title 10 responsibilities with its current authorities in coordination
with other Navy staff directorates through the Navy's Resources and
Requirements Review Board.
The Department agrees to review the existing Navy directives and the
role of the Director, Expeditionary Warfare in NSFS and to direct the
Navy to make any necessary adjustments.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary o^ Defense for Acquisition, Technology &
Logistics, as the program's milestone decision authority, to conduct a
comprehensive review of the program to validate progress and
acquisition plans and direct changes as necessary in light of the
changes to the schedule, budget requirements, and design of the
Extended Range Munition Program. (p. 28/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: The DoD concurs with the recommendation. The Extended
Range Munition program is a Major Defense Acquisition Program (ACAT
ID). A comprehensive review of the program is being conducted by
USD(AT&L). The review includes updating the acquisition strategy, the
acquisition program baseline, the systems engineering plan, and the
test & evaluation master plan. These key acquisition documents will
align to the new program plan to provide an initial operational
capability in 2011. The USD(AT&L) will approve the updated acquisition
strategy, the new acquisition program baseline, and will approve the
updated acquisition strategy, the new acquisition program baseline, and
the updated systems engineering plan. The Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation, and the Director, Systems and Software Engineering will
approve the updated test & evaluation master plan. A Milestone C review
by the Defense Acquisition Board is planned for fiscal year 2009 to
determine the readiness of the program to enter into low rate initial
production.
The Navy established annual progress gates for the program, for which
OSD will review compliance before continuing the program. The first
progress gate is completion of a reliability test series planned in
late FY2008. This gate will ensure that the munition can be produced
and fired successfully in production representative quantities of more
than one or two test rounds. If the reliability measure is met, the
program will proceed to land based qualification tests to demonstrate
that the munition can meet all key performance parameters. When that
gate is successfully passed, the program will proceed to the Milestone
C review. The final progress gate is successful completion of sea-based
developmental and operational testing. Upon successful completion of
that progress gate, the program will seek approval from the Milestone
Decision Authority to begin full rate production.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Navy to designate the appropriate organization for managing
an analysis of alternatives related to this gap and ensure that the
results of this analysis are coordinated with solutions for identified
engagement gaps, given the importance of command and control in
coordinating fire support, especially in the complex environment
imposed by joint operations in the littorals. (p. 28/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: The DoD partially concurs with the recommendation. The
Navy is currently conducting internal analyses on closing some of the
gaps identified in the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary
Operations in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). A
formal Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) will commence when USD(AT&L)
issues the required guidance, which is anticipated in the near future.
The command and control gap (gap 1 in the ICD) is the only gap that is
not in the engagement portion of the fires kill chain. Phase 1 of the
AoA will address the engagement portion of the kill chain using near
term weapon systems in conjunction with existing and program of record
command and control capabilities. When the DoD is prepared to undertake
Phase 2 of the AoA, which will begin to address means to close the
command and control gap and will expand the engagement analyses to
weapon systems available in the mid-term, an appropriate organization
within DoD will be assigned to manage the AoA efforts in the command
and control area. That lead organization might not reside within the
Department of the Navy.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Paul L. Francis (202) 512-4841:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Key contributors to this report were Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant
Director; J. Kristopher Keener; Christopher R. Durbin; Ryan Consaul;
and Lily Chin.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The littoral includes an area extending from a transition point in
the open ocean, to more constrictive and shallower waters, to the
shore, and onward to those inland areas that can be attacked,
supported, and defended from the sea.
[2] A nautical mile is equal to about 1.85 kilometers.
[3] The $1,633 represents the fiscal year 2008 price of the Navy's
unguided 5-inch high explosive projectile and its propelling charge.
[4] The Defense Department's framework for managing acquisition
programs, presented in DOD Instruction 5000.2, establishes 5 program
phases: concept refinement, technology demonstration, system
development and demonstration, production and deployment, and
operations and support. A program may be authorized to enter into the
acquisition system at any point consistent with phase specific entrance
criteria and statutory requirements.
[5] For more information see GAO, Best Practices: Better Management of
Technology Development Can Improve Weapon Systems Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-
99-162 (Washington, DC: July 30, 1999).
[6] All amounts shown as base year 1996 dollars.
[7] The Department of Defense notes that the Zumwalt class destroyer's
planned capacity for land attack munitions--and its ability to
replenish munitions while underway--offered sufficient capability to
meet current programmatic and operational requirements for naval
surface fire support. While the ship may meet requirements as they are
currently stated, decreases to munition capacity on the order of 50
percent--especially when coupled with ship quantity reductions from 32
to 7--lessen the contribution of the Zumwalt class destroyer in
performing naval surface fire support and result in a greater reliance
on other fire support systems.
[8] Since 2001, the Navy has taken some actions to improve the realism
of cost estimates, although we have also reported on additional
measures the Navy could take. See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges
Associated with the Navy's Long-Range Shipbuilding Plan, GAO-06-587T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006) and GAO, Defense Acquisitions:
Improved Management Practices Could Help Minimize Cost Growth in Navy
Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-05-183 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005).
[9] For more information on Zumwalt class destroyer technology
development, see GAO, Progress of the DD(X) Destroyer Program, GAO-05-
752R (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2005) and GAO, Defense Acquisitions:
Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer Program, GAO-04-973 (Washington,
D.C.: September 3, 2004).
[10] In contrast, the Expeditionary Warfare Division is charged with
determining requirements and resources for amphibious and mine warfare
ships, but the Navy instruction defines a formal role for the Surface
Warfare Division in determinations for these ships as well.
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