Military Operations
High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces Gao ID: GAO-07-145 December 18, 2006Prior GAO reports have identified problems with the Department of Defense's (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces. GAO issued its first comprehensive report examining these problems in June 2003. Because of the broad congressional interest in U.S. military operations in Iraq and DOD's increasing use of contractors to support U.S. forces in Iraq, GAO initiated this follow-on review under the Comptroller General's statutory authority. Specifically, GAO's objective was to determine the extent to which DOD has improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces since our 2003 report. GAO reviewed DOD policies and interviewed military and contractor officials both at deployed locations and in the United States.
DOD continues to face long-standing problems that hinder its management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. DOD has taken some steps to improve its guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces, addressing some of the problems GAO has raised since the mid-1990s. However, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for monitoring and managing the implementation of this guidance, it has not allocated the organizational resources and accountability to focus on issues regarding contractor support to deployed forces. Also, while DOD's new guidance is a noteworthy step, a number of problems we have previously reported on continue to pose difficulties for military personnel in deployed locations. For example, DOD continues to have limited visibility over contractors because information on the number of contractors at deployed locations or the services they provide is not aggregated by any organization within DOD or its components. As a result, senior leaders and military commanders cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which they rely on contractors to support their operations. For example, when Multi-National Force-Iraq began to develop a base consolidation plan, officials were unable to determine how many contractors were deployed to bases in Iraq. They therefore ran the risk of over-building or under-building the capacity of the consolidated bases. DOD continues to not have adequate contractor oversight personnel at deployed locations, precluding its ability to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are meeting contract requirements efficiently and effectively at each location where work is being performed. While a lack of adequate contract oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem, lacking adequate personnel in more demanding contracting environments in deployed locations presents unique difficulties. Despite facing many of the same difficulties managing and overseeing contractors in Iraq that it faced in previous military operations, we found no organization within DOD or its components responsible for developing procedures to systematically collect and share its institutional knowledge using contractors to support deployed forces. As a result, as new units deploy to Iraq, they run the risk of repeating past mistakes and being unable to build on the efficiencies others have developed during past operations that involved contractor support. Military personnel continue to receive limited or no training on the use of contractors as part of their pre-deployment training or professional military education. The lack of training hinders the ability of military commanders to adequately plan for the use of contractor support and inhibits the ability of contract oversight personnel to manage and oversee contractors in deployed locations. Despite DOD's concurrence with our previous recommendations to improve such training, we found no standard to ensure information about contractor support is incorporated in pre-deployment training.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-145, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
December 2006:
Military Operations:
High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with
Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces:
GAO-07-145:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-145, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
Prior GAO reports have identified problems with the Department of
Defense‘s (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting
deployed forces. GAO issued its first comprehensive report examining
these problems in June 2003. Because of the broad congressional
interest in U.S. military operations in Iraq and DOD‘s increasing use
of contractors to support U.S. forces in Iraq, GAO initiated this
follow-on review under the Comptroller General‘s statutory authority.
Specifically, GAO‘s objective was to determine the extent to which DOD
has improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting
deployed forces since our 2003 report. GAO reviewed DOD policies and
interviewed military and contractor officials both at deployed
locations and in the United States.
What GAO Found:
DOD continues to face long-standing problems that hinder its management
and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. DOD has taken some
steps to improve its guidance on the use of contractors to support
deployed forces, addressing some of the problems GAO has raised since
the mid-1990s. However, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense is
responsible for monitoring and managing the implementation of this
guidance, it has not allocated the organizational resources and
accountability to focus on issues regarding contractor support to
deployed forces. Also, while DOD‘s new guidance is a noteworthy step, a
number of problems we have previously reported on continue to pose
difficulties for military personnel in deployed locations. For example:
* DOD continues to have limited visibility over contractors because
information on the number of contractors at deployed locations or the
services they provide is not aggregated by any organization within DOD
or its components. As a result, senior leaders and military commanders
cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which they rely on
contractors to support their operations. For example, when Multi-
National Force-Iraq began to develop a base consolidation plan,
officials were unable to determine how many contractors were deployed
to bases in Iraq. They therefore ran the risk of over-building or under-
building the capacity of the consolidated bases.
* DOD continues to not have adequate contractor oversight personnel at
deployed locations, precluding its ability to obtain reasonable
assurance that contractors are meeting contract requirements
efficiently and effectively at each location where work is being
performed. While a lack of adequate contract oversight personnel is a
DOD-wide problem, lacking adequate personnel in more demanding
contracting environments in deployed locations presents unique
difficulties.
* Despite facing many of the same difficulties managing and overseeing
contractors in Iraq that it faced in previous military operations, we
found no organization within DOD or its components responsible for
developing procedures to systematically collect and share its
institutional knowledge using contractors to support deployed forces.
As a result, as new units deploy to Iraq, they run the risk of
repeating past mistakes and being unable to build on the efficiencies
others have developed during past operations that involved contractor
support.
* Military personnel continue to receive limited or no training on the
use of contractors as part of their pre-deployment training or
professional military education. The lack of training hinders the
ability of military commanders to adequately plan for the use of
contractor support and inhibits the ability of contract oversight
personnel to manage and oversee contractors in deployed locations.
Despite DOD‘s concurrence with our previous recommendations to improve
such training, we found no standard to ensure information about
contractor support is incorporated in pre-deployment training.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense appoint a focal point
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently senior level and with the
appropriate resources, dedicated to leading DOD efforts to improve the
management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces. DOD
agreed with our recommendation.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-145].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202)
512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
While DOD Has Made Some Noteworthy Improvements, Long-standing Problems
Continue to Hinder DOD's Management and Oversight of Contractors at
Deployed Locations:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Related GAO Products:
Table:
Table 1: Key Contract Management Roles and Responsibilities:
Figures:
Figure 1: Contracts for Select Services in Iraq Are Awarded by Many
Different DOD Agencies:
Figure 2: Previous GAO Recommendations Highlighting the Need for Better
Training on the Use of Contractor Support to Deployed Forces:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
LOGCAP: Logistics Civil Augmentation Program:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 18, 2006:
Congressional Committees:
The U.S. military has long used contractors to provide supplies and
services to deployed U.S. forces. However, the scale of contractor
support the Department of Defense (DOD) relies on today in locations
such as Iraq and elsewhere throughout Southwest Asia has increased
considerably from what DOD relied on during previous military
operations, such as Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and in the
Balkans. Moreover, DOD's reliance on contractors continues to grow. The
Army alone estimates that almost 60,000 contractor employees currently
support ongoing military operations in Southwest Asia. By way of
contrast, an estimated 9,200 contractor personnel supported military
operations in the 1991 Gulf War.[Footnote 1] Similarly, the spending on
contractors supporting deployed forces is significant. For example,
spending on DOD's single largest contract supporting U.S. forces in
Southwest Asia--the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
(LOGCAP)--was about $15.4 billion between 2001 and 2004.[Footnote 2]
Today, contractors provide deployed U.S. forces with communication
services; interpreters who accompany military patrols; base operations
support (e.g., food and housing); weapons systems maintenance;
intelligence analysis; and a variety of other support. Many of these
contractors live and work side by side with their military counterparts
and share many of the same risks and hardships.
Since 1997, we have reported on DOD's management and training
shortcomings related to its use of contractor support to deployed
forces.[Footnote 3] In June 2003, we issued our first comprehensive
review of DOD's management and oversight of contractor support to
deployed forces, focusing our efforts in the Balkans and Southwest
Asia.[Footnote 4] We reported that (1) DOD used contractors for a wide
range of services; (2) DOD and the services had not identified
essential services provided by contractors or developed backup plans
for those services; and (3) guidance and contract language and
oversight varied within DOD and the services, creating challenges that
might hinder the efficient use of contractors. We made several
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to improve DOD's guidance,
training, and contractor visibility at all levels of command,
recommendations that DOD broadly agreed with. Moreover, we have
established that clear policies, procedures, criteria, and management
oversight are needed to help agencies use resources effectively and
efficiently to meet organizational and program objectives.[Footnote 5]
However, our audit work on related subjects since 2003 indicated that
DOD continued to face difficulties regarding its use of contractors to
support deployed forces.
Because of continued congressional interest in DOD's use of contractors
to support deployed forces, we prepared this report under the
Comptroller General's statutory authority to conduct evaluations on his
own initiative. Specifically, our objective was to determine the extent
to which DOD has improved its management and oversight of contractors
supporting deployed forces since our last comprehensive review of this
issue in 2003. We focused our efforts in Iraq and elsewhere in
Southwest Asia.
To address our objective, we met with and obtained documentation from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and service
headquarters officials to review changes to key DOD and service
guidance and obtain a comprehensive understanding of their efforts in
addressing the issues raised in our 2003 report. We visited select DOD
components based on their responsibilities for contract management,
such as the Defense Contract Management Agency, and various service
commands in the United States, including the Army Materiel Command, to
discuss their roles in managing and overseeing contractors in deployed
locations. We also interviewed staff officers from six combat units
that had been deployed to Iraq between 2003 and 2006 to discuss their
experiences with contractors at deployed locations. We traveled to Iraq
and Kuwait to meet with deployed combat units, installation commanders,
headquarters personnel, and other military personnel responsible for
contracting and contract management at deployed locations. In addition,
we met with 26 U.S. and foreign contractors providing a variety of
services to DOD at deployed locations to discuss their perspectives on
contracting and contract management issues. We conducted our review
from August 2005 through October 2006 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Details on our scope and
methodology are contained in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Although DOD has taken action to improve its guidance on the use of
contractors to support deployed forces since our 2003 report, a number
of long-standing problems continue to hinder DOD's management and
oversight of contractors at deployed locations. Steps DOD has taken
include amending its acquisition regulations to add standardized
deployment language for contracts that may require contractors to
accompany U.S. forces deployed outside the United States and, in
October 2005, issuing the first DOD-wide instruction on the use of
contractors to support deployed forces, which addresses some of the
problems we have previously raised. However, we have concerns that DOD
components are not implementing this instruction. For example, while
the instruction assigns responsibility for monitoring and managing its
implementation to the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, there is no focal point within
this office responsible for issues regarding contractor support to
deployed forces. According to officials within the office, given the
multiple issues they are responsible for, implementing the instruction
or taking other steps to improve DOD's management and oversight of
contractors supporting deployed forces is a lower priority. Ultimately,
while DOD's new guidance is a good first step towards improving the
department's management and oversight of contractors, the department
continues to face problems, including:
* Limited visibility over contractors and contractor activity: While
DOD policy since 1990 has recognized the importance of having
visibility over the number of contractors providing essential services
to U.S. forces and the services they provide, DOD continues to lack the
capability to provide senior leaders and military commanders with
information on the totality of contractor support to deployed forces.
Having this information is important in order for military commanders
to incorporate contractor support into their planning efforts. For
example, senior military commanders in Iraq told us that when they
began to develop a base consolidation plan for Iraq they had no source
to draw upon to determine how many contractor employees were located on
each installation. As a result, they ran the risk of overbuilding or
underbuilding the capacity of the consolidated bases. Similarly,
commanders need visibility over the number of contractor employees
residing on an installation in order to make informed decisions
regarding base operations support (e.g., food and housing) and force
protection. Having limited visibility can also unnecessarily increase
contracting costs to the government. For example, according to an Army
Materiel Command official, the Army estimates that because of their
limited visibility over contractors at deployed locations and the
government services they are entitled to, about $43 million is lost
every year on free meals being provided to contractor employees who are
also receiving a per diem allowance for food. DOD's October 2005
instruction requires the department to maintain by-name accountability
of contractors deploying with the force. The Army has taken steps to
develop a database that could provide this accountability for all DOD
components and help military commanders incorporate contractor support
into their planning efforts. However, at the time of our review, this
database was still in development, and officials involved with this
effort told us that greater involvement by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, which is responsible for designating a database to provide
this accountability, will be needed to direct all DOD components to use
this database and resolve some additional institutional obstacles.
* Lack of adequate contract oversight personnel: Although having the
right people with the right skills to oversee contractor performance is
critical to ensure the efficient and effective use of contractors, most
contract oversight personnel we met with told us DOD does not have
adequate personnel at deployed locations. Having too few contract
oversight personnel precludes DOD from being able to obtain reasonable
assurance that contractors are meeting their contract requirements at
every location where the work is being performed. For example, a
Defense Contract Management Agency official responsible for overseeing
portions of the Army's LOGCAP contract at 27 installations in Iraq told
us he was unable to visit all of these locations during his 6-month
tour in Iraq. As a result, he could not effectively monitor the
contractor's performance at those sites. As we have previously
reported, when contract oversight personnel are able to review the
types and levels of services provided by contractors for both economy
and efficiency, savings can be realized. Without adequate contract
oversight personnel, DOD is at risk of being unable to identify and
correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner. Prior GAO
reports make clear that having too few contract oversight personnel is
a DOD-wide problem affecting the department's management and oversight
of contractors both in the United States and at deployed locations.
However, the more demanding contracting environment at deployed
locations creates unique difficulties for contract oversight personnel.
* Limited collection and sharing of institutional knowledge: DOD has
made few efforts to leverage its institutional knowledge and
experiences using contractors to support deployed forces, despite
facing many of the same difficulties managing contractors in Iraq that
it faced in previous military operations. As early as 1997, we
recommended that DOD incorporate lessons learned from previous and
ongoing operations into its planning and preparation for the use of
contractor support to deployed forces. However, we found no
organization within DOD or its components responsible for developing
procedures to capture lessons learned on the use of contractor support
at deployed locations. Our review of lessons learned that were
collected by DOD components, as well as discussions with DOD officials
and military units deployed to Iraq, found that lessons learned on the
use of contractor support at deployed locations were not routinely
gathered and shared. For example, we found that a guidebook on the use
of a logistical support contract almost identical to LOGCAP, which was
developed by U.S. Army, Europe for the Balkans, was not made available
to military commanders in Iraq until 2006. As a result, commanders in
Iraq were unable to take advantage of an important tool to increase
their familiarity with LOGCAP and build on efficiencies the Army had
previously identified.
* Limited or no information on contractor support in pre-deployment
training: We have pointed out the need for better pre-deployment
training of military commanders and contract oversight personnel on the
use of contractor support in several of our earlier reports, and DOD
has agreed with our recommendations addressing this need. However, we
found little evidence that improvements have been made to include more
information on the use of contractors in pre-deployment training.
Several military commanders told us they were unaware of the types of
services they would be relying on until after they deployed to Iraq. As
a result, they were unable to adequately plan for the use of contractor
support. Similarly, several commanders of combat units told us that
their pre-deployment training did provide them with information on the
extent to which they would have to provide personnel to escort
contractor personnel. As a result, these commanders could not
incorporate this requirement into their planning efforts and were
surprised by the substantial portion of their personnel they were
required to allocate as escorts; personnel they had expected to be
available to perform other functions. Limited or no pre-deployment
training on the use of contractor support can also lead to confusion
regarding roles and responsibilities military commanders have in
overseeing contractors at a deployed location. We found several
instances where military commanders attempted to direct or ran the risk
of directing a contractor to perform work outside the scope of the
contract, despite the fact commanders are not authorized to do so,
which can result in increased costs to the government. In addition,
limited or no information on the use of contractors in pre-deployment
training can inhibit the ability of contract oversight personnel to
execute their responsibilities. For example, the contracting officer's
representative for a linguist support contract told us his pre-
deployment training did not adequately prepare him for his
responsibilities to review invoices submitted by the contractor. We
found no DOD or service guidance, policy, or doctrine establishing
standards to ensure that military units incorporate information about
contractor support to deployed forces in their pre-deployment training.
Nevertheless, several officials told us that DOD and its components
need to include information on contractor support into their pre-
deployment training, including mission rehearsal exercises, and that
the use of contractors at deployed locations should also be integrated
into professional military education.
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense appoint a focal point
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently senior level and with the
appropriate resources, dedicated to leading DOD's efforts to improve
contract management and oversight at deployed locations. The entity
that functions as this focal point would be responsible for, among
other things, improving visibility over contractor support at deployed
locations and developing standards to improve the pre-deployment
training of military commanders and contract oversight personnel on
issues related to contractor support to deployed forces.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendation. DOD stated in their comments that they had created the
office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program
Support) on October 1, 2006 to serve as the office of primary
responsibility for issues related to contractor support. However, it is
not clear that this office would serve as the focal point dedicated to
leading DOD's efforts to improve contract management and oversight. DOD
also provided several technical comments that we considered and
incorporated where appropriate.
Background:
Since the early 1990s, DOD has increasingly relied on contractors to
meet many of its logistical and operational support needs during combat
operations, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian assistance
missions, ranging from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and
operations in the Balkans (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo) to Afghanistan and
Iraq. Factors that have contributed to this increase include reductions
in the size of the military, an increase in the number of operations
and missions undertaken, and DOD's use of increasingly sophisticated
weapons systems. Depending on the service being provided by
contractors, contractor employees may be U.S. citizens, host country
nationals,[Footnote 6] or third country nationals.[Footnote 7]
Contracts supporting weapons systems, for example, often restrict
employment to U.S. citizens, while contracts providing base operations
support frequently employ host country or third country nationals.
Contracts supporting deployed forces typically fall into three broad
categories--theater support, external support, and systems support.
Theater support contracts are normally awarded by contracting agencies
associated with the regional combatant command, for example, the U.S.
Central Command or service component commands, such as the U.S. Army
Central Command, or by contracting offices at deployed locations such
as in Iraq. Contracts can be for recurring services--such as equipment
rental or repair, minor construction, security, and intelligence
services--or for the one-time delivery of goods and services at the
deployed location. External support contracts are awarded by commands
external to the combatant command or component commands, such as the
Defense Logistics Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Under
external support contracts, contractors are generally expected to
provide services at the deployed location. LOGCAP is an example of an
external support contract. Finally, systems support contracts provide
logistics support to maintain and operate weapons and other systems.
These types of contracts are most often awarded by the commands
responsible for building and buying the weapons or other systems.
The individual services and a wide array of DOD and non-DOD agencies
can award contracts to support deployed forces.[Footnote 8] Within a
service or agency, numerous contracting officers, with varying degrees
of knowledge about how contractors and the military operate in deployed
locations, can award contracts that support deployed forces. According
to DOD estimates, in 2005 several hundred contractor firms provided
U.S. forces with a wide range of services at deployed locations. Figure
1 illustrates the broad array of contractor services being provided in
Iraq and the DOD agency that awarded each contract.
Figure 1: Contracts for Select Services in Iraq Are Awarded by Many
Different DOD Agencies:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: GAO and Map Resources.
[End of figure]
The customer (e.g., a military unit) for these contractor-provided
services is responsible for identifying and validating requirements to
be addressed by the contractor as well as evaluating the contractor's
performance and ensuring that contractor-provided services are used in
an economical and efficient manner. In addition, DOD has established
specific policies on how contracts, including those that support
deployed forces, should be administered and managed. Oversight of
contracts ultimately rests with the contracting officer who has the
responsibility for ensuring that contractors meet the requirements set
forth in the contract. However, most contracting officers are not
located at the deployed location. As a result, contracting officers
appoint contract oversight personnel who represent the contracting
officer at the deployed location and are responsible for monitoring
contractor performance. How contracts and contractors are monitored at
a deployed location is largely a function of the size and scope of the
contract. Contracting officers for large-scale and high-value contracts
such as LOGCAP have opted to have personnel from the Defense Contract
Management Agency monitor a contractor's performance and management
systems to ensure that the cost, product performance, and delivery
schedules comply with the terms and conditions of the contract. Defense
Contract Management Agency officials delegate daily oversight
responsibilities to individuals drawn from units receiving support from
these contractors to act as contracting officer's representatives for
specific services being provided. For smaller contracts, contracting
officers usually directly appoint contracting officer's representatives
or contracting officer's technical representatives to monitor
contractor performance at the deployed location. These individuals are
typically drawn from units receiving contractor- provided services, are
not normally contracting specialists, and serve as contract monitors as
an additional duty. They cannot direct the contractor by making
commitments or changes that affect price, quality, quantity, delivery,
or other terms and conditions of the contract. Instead, they act as the
eyes and ears of the contracting officer and serve as the liaison
between the contractor and the contracting officer. Table 1 provides
additional information on the contract management roles and
responsibilities of key DOD personnel.
Table 1: Key Contract Management Roles and Responsibilities:
Contracting officer:
* Interpret the contract;
* Obligate the government for work under the contract;
* Delegate contract management responsibilities to deployed personnel
who monitor contractor performance;
* Ensure that the contractor corrects cited deficiencies.
Contracting officer's representative:
* Provide daily contract oversight;
* Evaluate quality assurance;
* Monitor contract performance;
* Evaluate technical performance.
Customers:
* Develop requirements;
* Write statements of work;
* Obtain funding;
* Provide contracting officer's representatives to monitor contract
performance.
Defense contract management agency:
* Appoint contracting officer's representatives for LOGCAP;
* Review and approve purchase requisitions;
* Monitor government property;
* Evaluate quality assurance;
* Monitor contract performance;
* Evaluate technical performance.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
While DOD Has Made Some Noteworthy Improvements, Long-standing Problems
Continue to Hinder DOD's Management and Oversight of Contractors at
Deployed Locations:
A number of long-standing problems continue to hinder DOD's management
and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. Although DOD has
issued departmentwide guidance on the use of contractors to support
deployed forces and some DOD components have taken some actions to
improve management and oversight of contractors, there is no DOD-wide
effort in place to resolve these long-standing problems. These problems
include a lack of visibility over the totality of contractor support at
deployed locations; a lack of adequate contract oversight personnel;
the failure to collect and share institutional knowledge on the use of
contractors at deployed locations; and limited or no training of
military personnel on the use of contractors as part of their pre-
deployment training or professional military education.
DOD Has Taken Some Noteworthy Steps to Improve Its Policy and Guidance
on the Use of Contractors to Support Deployed Forces, but Lack of High-
Level Action Hinders Implementation:
In June 2003, we recommended that DOD take steps to improve its
guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed U.S. forces. Our
report noted the lack of standardized deployment language in contracts
that support or may support deployed U.S. forces. Since then, in June
2005, DOD amended its acquisition regulations, the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement, by providing DOD-wide policy and a
contract clause to address situations that may require contractors to
accompany U.S. forces deployed outside the United States. Our 2003
report also noted a lack of DOD-wide guidance regarding DOD's use of
and responsibilities to contractors supporting deployed forces. Since
then, DOD has taken steps to improve its guidance by issuing the first
DOD-wide instruction on contractor support to deployed forces.[Footnote
9] Specifically, in October 2005, DOD issued DOD Instruction 3020.41,
entitled Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed
Forces, which states, among other things, that it is DOD policy to:
* coordinate any proposed contractor logistic support arrangements that
may affect Combatant Commanders' operational plans and operations
orders with the affected geographic Combatant Commands,
* ensure contracts clearly and accurately specify the terms and
conditions under which the contractor is to perform and describe the
specific support relationship between the contractor and DOD, and:
* maintain by-name accountability of contractors deploying with the
force and contract capability information in a joint database.[Footnote
10]
DOD Instruction 3020.41 provides guidance on a wide range of contractor
support issues. For example, the instruction provides guidance on when
contractors can be used to provide security for DOD assets, when
medical support can be provided to contractors, and commanders'
responsibilities for providing force protection and security to
contractors. In addition, the instruction references a number of
existing policies and guidance that may affect DOD's responsibilities
to contractors supporting U.S. forces at a deployed location. However,
the instruction does not address a number of problems we have raised in
previous reports. For example, although the instruction addresses the
need for visibility over contractors, it does not address the need to
provide adequate contract oversight personnel, to collect and share
institutional knowledge on the use of contractors at deployed
locations, or to provide pre-deployment training on the use of
contractor support.
While issuance of DOD Instruction 3020.41 represents a noteworthy
improvement to DOD's guidance on the use of contractor support to
deployed forces, we found little evidence that DOD components are
implementing the guidance. Moreover, Congress has concerns over
implementation of the instruction as evidenced by a provision in the
Conference Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007 requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit to
Congress a report on the department's efforts to implement the
instruction.[Footnote 11] DOD Instruction 3020.41 assigns
responsibility for monitoring and managing the implementation of the
instruction to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and
Materiel Readiness (within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). However, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness is
responsible for several policy areas including supply chain management
and transportation policy. A number of assistant deputy under
secretaries serve as functional experts responsible for these areas.
For example, the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Transportation Policy) serves as the principal advisor for
establishing policies and providing guidance to DOD components for
efficient and effective use of DOD and commercial transportation
resources. However, no similar individual is responsible primarily for
issues regarding contractor support to deployed forces, including
implementation of the instruction. According to senior officials within
the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and
Material Readiness, given the multiple issues the office is responsible
for, addressing contractor support to deployed forces issues is a lower
priority.
Consequently, at the time of our review we found that few measures had
been taken by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Material Readiness to ensure that DOD components were
complying with DOD Instruction 3020.41. For example, a senior official
with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence told
us that the office was not aware of its responsibility under the
instruction to develop and implement, as required, procedures for
counterintelligence and security screenings of contractors, until our
inquiry regarding their compliance with that requirement. Similarly, a
senior Joint Staff official involved in the issuance of DOD Instruction
3020.41 expressed concerns that only some of the senior officials who
needed to know about the instruction had been made aware that it was
issued.
Instead, we found that working groups of subject matter experts within
the Joint Staff and the services have begun to address the
instruction's requirements. For example, in May 2006 a working group
began to draft a new joint publication that provides guidance on
meeting the requirements of DOD Instruction 3020.41, as well as
addresses other contractor support issues. As another example,
beginning in April 2006 the Joint Staff Directorate of Logistics
organized a joint contingency contract management working group
consisting of representatives from each of the military services, the
Joint Staff, and various DOD components that meets periodically to
discuss issues related to implementing the instruction's requirement to
maintain by-name accountability of contractor personnel supporting
deployed forces. However, joint contingency contract management working
group officials told us they have no formal charter designating their
responsibilities and that they therefore lack the authority to direct
DOD components to implement the instruction's requirements.
Working group officials told us they are limited in how much they can
accomplish without more direct involvement by senior officials within
the Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. For example, they told us that
they will likely need someone at the general officer level to act as an
advocate for their ongoing efforts to implement the instruction's
requirements and address other contractor support issues. Moreover, a
number of senior officials, including a general officer responsible for
logistics for Multi-National Force-Iraq and a senior official from the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, told us that a focused effort within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense is needed to coordinate efforts to improve DOD's
management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces.
We have previously reported on the benefits of establishing a single
point of focus at a sufficiently senior level to coordinate and
integrate various DOD efforts to address concerns with antiterrorism
and the transformation of military capabilities.[Footnote 12] For
example, DOD recognized the need for a single DOD entity to implement
and improve the department's antiterrorism guidance. In 1996, following
the Khobar Towers bombing, the Downing task force investigated the
incident and made recommendations on how to prevent or minimize the
damage of future attacks. One of the central conclusions of the Downing
task force was that DOD needed a stronger centralized approach to
antiterrorism. To implement this approach, the task force said, a
single DOD entity should be designated as responsible for
antiterrorism. Further, this entity, among other things, should develop
and issue physical security standards, inspect compliance with these
standards, manage resources on both a routine and emergency basis, and
assist field commanders with antiterrorism matters. The task force
found in its review that the lack of a single DOD entity responsible
for antiterrorism had had an adverse impact on the posture of forces in
the field. In response to the task force's recommendation, the
Secretary of Defense established an office within the Joint Staff to
act as the focal point for antiterrorism. Among other things, this
office has:
* improved antiterrorism guidance,
* established antiterrorism training standards for all levels of
command, and:
* instituted outreach programs to collect and distribute antiterrorism
lessons learned.
Limited Visibility over All Contractor Support Continues to Hinder
DOD's Management and Oversight of Contractors at Deployed Locations:
Although DOD has long recognized the importance of having visibility
over all contractor support at deployed locations, the department
continues to be able to provide senior leaders and military commanders
with only limited visibility over those contractors. This limited
visibility continues to hinder the management and oversight of
contractors in deployed locations, including Iraq. In the absence of
DOD-wide efforts to address these issues, some DOD components at
deployed locations and in the United States have taken their own steps
to improve visibility.
DOD Continues to be Unable to Provide Military Commanders at Deployed
Locations and Senior Leaders with Visibility over All Contractor
Support:
DOD continues to lack the ability to provide military commanders and
senior leaders with visibility over all contractor support at deployed
locations, including the range of services being provided to U.S.
forces and the number of contractor personnel at deployed locations.
Although most of the contract oversight personnel we met with had
visibility over the individual contracts for which they were directly
responsible, including the number and location of contractor personnel,
this information was not aggregated by DOD and was not provided to
commanders at higher levels. Many officials responsible for managing
and overseeing contractors that support deployed forces at various
levels of command in Iraq told us there was no office, database, or
other source that could provide them consolidated information on all
contractor support at a deployed location. The following are examples
of what commanders in Iraq told us:
* senior commanders within Multi-National Force-Iraq and Multi-National
Corps-Iraq[Footnote 13] told us they had no source to go to that could
provide them with a comprehensive summary of contractor services
currently being provided U.S. forces in Iraq;
* the base commander of Logistical Support Area Anaconda, a major
logistics hub in Iraq with about 10,000 contractor personnel, told us
he only had limited visibility of the number of contractors at his
installation and the support they were providing; and:
* a battalion commander from a Stryker brigade told us he was unable to
determine the number of contractor-provided interpreters available to
support his unit.
Moreover, we found that major commands and higher headquarters do not
maintain a source of information that could provide improved visibility
over all contractors at deployed locations, as illustrated by the
following examples:
* the Army Materiel Command and Air Force Materiel Command were unable
to readily provide us with comprehensive information on the number of
contractors they were using at deployed locations or the services those
contractors were providing to U.S. forces,
* contracting officials at U.S. Central Command told us that they do
not maintain centralized information on the contractor support within
their area of operation, and:
* Air Force headquarters officials determined the Air Force had about
500 civilians deployed to Iraq but could not readily identify how many
of these individuals were contractor personnel as opposed to DOD
civilians.
DOD has long recognized the importance of providing visibility over
contractors supporting deployed forces. As discussed in our 2003
report, DOD has required since 1990 that DOD components maintain
visibility over contractors providing essential services to U.S. forces
and the services they provide. However, in 2003 we reported that DOD
components were not meeting this requirement and that they lacked
visibility over all contractor support to forces deployed to the
Balkans and Southwest Asia. Further, a 2004 Joint Staff review of
contract management at deployed locations found commanders continued to
have insufficient visibility over contractors operating in deployed
locations and recommended that DOD provide the combatant commander the
capability to maintain visibility over contractor personnel and
contract capabilities. In addition, DOD has been unable to provide
Congress with information on the totality of contractor support in
Iraq, including numbers of contractors and the costs of the services
they provide.
Limited Visibility Continues to Hinder DOD's Management and Oversight
of Contractors in Iraq:
Limited visibility over contractor support poses a variety of problems
for military commanders and senior leaders responsible for contract
management and oversight in deployed locations such as Iraq. With
limited visibility over contractors, military commanders and other
senior leaders cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which
they rely on contractors as an asset to support their operations.
Further, they cannot build this reliance on contractors into their
assessments of risks associated with the potential loss of essential
services provided by contractors, an issue we discussed extensively in
our 2003 report.
We spoke with several senior military leaders in Iraq who told us their
lack of visibility over contractor support in Iraq hindered their
ability to incorporate contractors into their planning efforts. For
example, a general officer responsible for logistics for Multi-National
Force-Iraq told us that acquiring visibility over all contractor
support in Iraq was a top priority because Multi-National Force-Iraq
did not have the information needed to include the presence of
contractors in its planning activities. A number of Multi-National
Force-Iraq officials told us that when they began to develop plans to
consolidate forward operating bases in Iraq, they discovered that while
they could determine the number and type of military units on those
bases, they had no means of obtaining similar information about
contractors, including the number of contractor personnel on each base
and the support the military was providing them. According to a senior
Multi-National Force-Iraq official, without this information, Multi-
National Force-Iraq ran the risk of overbuilding or underbuilding the
capacity of the consolidated bases to accommodate the number of
individuals expected to be stationed there. Because Multi-National
Force-Iraq lacked a source to draw upon for information regarding the
extent of contractor support in Iraq, Multi-National Force-Iraq issued
a fragmentary order[Footnote 14] in April 2006 to base commanders in
Iraq to conduct a census of contractors residing on the installations.
However, at the time of our review, this effort had only yielded
partial results which an Army official familiar with the census effort
told us would not meet the initial goals of the fragmentary order.
Limited visibility over contractors and the services they provide at a
deployed location can also hinder military commanders' abilities to
fully understand the impact that their decisions can have on their
installations. For example, when commanders make decisions to restrict
access of host country nationals to an installation, this can result in
the loss of some contractor-provided services, such as construction or
the delivery of supplies that may be dependent upon the use of host
country nationals. Similarly, one of the more frequent concerns
contractors in Kuwait and Iraq related to us was the impact that base
commanders' decisions to change policies regarding badging requirements
and other base access procedures had on their ability to provide
services to those bases.[Footnote 15]
Decisions affecting such functions as force protection and base
operations support also rely on commanders having an accurate picture
of the contractor assets they have in their area of operations and an
understanding of the number of contractor personnel they have to
support. As we reported in 2003, military commanders require visibility
over contractor support at deployed locations because they are
responsible for all the people in their area of operations, including
contractor personnel. Given the security situation in Iraq, knowledge
of who is on their installation helps commanders account for all
individuals in the event of a mortar attack or other hostile action.
For example, Army officials assisting the movement of contractors into
and out of Iraq described to us the difficulties DOD faced determining
the identity of a contractor who was taken hostage and then killed by
the insurgency in Iraq. We also met with several military commanders
who told us that a lack of visibility over contractors on their
installations complicated their efforts to provide contractors with
support such as food and housing. Several officials told us they
regularly had contractor personnel unexpectedly show up in Iraq and
request support, but were unable to verify what DOD-provided support
those contractor personnel were entitled to. As a result, DOD and its
components may be providing unauthorized support to contractors. For
example, at one of the joint contingency contract management working
group sessions GAO attended, an Army Materiel Command official noted
that the Army estimates that it loses about $43 million every year
providing free meals to contractor employees who are also receiving a
per diem allowance for food.
Some Steps Have Been Taken to Address the Issue of Visibility:
In spite of DOD's continued lack of capability to provide commanders
with the information they need regarding the extent of contractor
support at a deployed location, we found that some steps have been
taken to provide commanders with improved visibility over the contracts
they were directly responsible for. For example:
* In early 2006, the commanding general of Multi-National Force-Iraq
ordered his major subordinate commands in Iraq to provide a head count
of non-DOD civilians on their installations, including contractor
personnel for contracts exceeding $5 million per year. The information,
captured in a database managed by Multi-National Force-Iraq, was needed
to provide the general with a current count of all tenant organizations
operating from the various forward operating bases in Iraq.
* Multi-National Corps-Iraq started a similar effort in February 2006
to provide the commanding general with detailed contract management
information on recurring services contracts such as for the maintenance
of certain aircraft, communications support, and power generation.
* Also in 2006, the corps support command at Logistical Support Area
Anaconda created a database to track recurring services contracts that
support the installation.
While these individual efforts improved visibility over a specific set
of contractors, we found that no organization within DOD or its
components has attempted to consolidate these individual sources of
information that could help improve its visibility over all contractor
support in Iraq. Several DOD officials in Iraq familiar with the
individual efforts described above told us that while a number of
databases have been created to capture information on contractors in
theater, the information is not aggregated at a higher level because no
one is responsible for consolidating this information. In most cases,
these efforts were initiated by individual commanders and there is no
assurance that they would continue when new units with new commanders
deployed to replace them in the future.
Individual contractors we spoke with had excellent visibility over the
number and location of their employees at specific deployed locations.
For example, the contractors could readily provide us with information
on the number of employees they had in Iraq in support of deployed U.S.
forces and the specific installation to which those contractors were
deployed. This information was typically reported on a daily or weekly
basis from the contractor in Iraq to their corporate headquarters in
the United States or elsewhere, as well as to the U.S. government
agency that had awarded the contract. However, we found this
information was not centrally collected. As discussed previously, there
are several hundred contractor firms that support deployed forces,
including in Iraq, and contracts are awarded by numerous contracting
offices both within DOD and from other U.S. government agencies. With
such a large and diverse pool of contractors at deployed locations, it
is impractical for individual commanders to obtain this information
from contractors on their own. For example, several military officials
involved in efforts to improve visibility over contractors in Iraq told
us that while they were generally able to obtain information from
contractors with large numbers of employees, such as the LOGCAP
contractor, it was extremely difficult to identify as well as collect
information from all the numerous smaller contractors, who sometimes
consisted of only one or two individuals.
As discussed above, in October 2005 DOD issued DOD Instruction 3020.41,
which included a requirement that DOD develop or designate a joint
database to maintain by-name accountability of contractors deploying
with the force and a summary of the services or capabilities they
provide. Currently, no such DOD-wide database exists. However, Army
Materiel Command and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology have taken the initiative to
develop a database that could provide improved visibility over all
contractors supporting U.S. forces in deployed locations and enable
military commanders to incorporate contractor support into their
planning efforts.[Footnote 16] According to Army officials, this
database is intended to collect information not only on the overall
number of contractors supporting forces in a deployed location but also
on the organization or system they are supporting and other contract
information that could be used by commanders to better manage
contractors at deployed locations. The Army's goal is to require that
all contractors supporting deployed forces use this database, and in
turn, create the central source of information to provide commanders
with visibility over all contractor support at deployed locations.
However, as of the time of our review, the Army was still in the
process of implementing the database, and it is uncertain when the
process will be completed. For example, we found that only a few
contractors were using the database, and Army officials acknowledged it
does not currently capture all contractors providing support at
deployed locations. According to Army and Joint Staff officials
familiar with these efforts, it is likely that DOD will designate this
database as the joint database for contractor visibility as required by
DOD Instruction 3020.41. However, a number of issues must first be
resolved. For example, efforts are still underway to get all the
services to agree to enter their data into this database. Further,
there is disagreement within the Army staff regarding whether the
Deputy Chief of Staff responsible for logistics or personnel has
responsibility for the contractor visibility database. Several
officials we met with who are involved with these efforts told us that
while the Army Materiel Command has made significant progress in
developing the database, ultimate resolution of these issues will
require action by the Office of the Secretary of Defense because the
Army Materiel Command lacks the necessary directive authority to
resolve them on its own.
DOD Still Does Not Have Adequate Contract Oversight Personnel in Place
to Oversee and Manage Contractors Supporting U.S. Forces in Deployed
Locations:
Having the right people with the right skills to oversee contractor
performance is critical to ensuring that DOD receives the best value
for the billions of dollars spent each year on contractor-provided
services supporting forces deployed to Iraq and elsewhere. However,
inadequate numbers of personnel to oversee and manage contracts that
support deployed U.S. forces is another long-standing problem that
continues to hinder DOD's management and oversight of contractors in
Iraq. In 2004, we reported that DOD did not always have enough contract
oversight personnel in place to manage and oversee its logistics
support contracts such as LOGCAP. In addition, in 2005 we reported in
our High-Risk Series that inadequate staffing contributed to contract
management challenges in Iraq.[Footnote 17] While we could find no DOD
guidelines on the appropriate number of personnel needed to oversee and
manage DOD contracts at a deployed location, several contract oversight
personnel told us DOD does not have adequate personnel at deployed
locations to effectively oversee and manage contractors, as illustrated
by the following examples:
* An Army Contracting Agency official told us that due to a downsizing
of its overall contracting force and the need to balance that force
among multiple competing needs, the Army is struggling to find the
capacity and expertise to provide the contracting support needed in
Iraq.
* An official with the LOGCAP Program Office told us that, as the
United States was preparing to commence Operation Iraqi Freedom in
2003, the office did not prepare to hire additional budget analysts and
legal personnel in anticipation of an increased use of LOGCAP services.
According to the official, had adequate staffing been in place early
on, the Army could have realized substantial savings through more
effective reviews of the increasing volume of LOGCAP requirements.
* Officials responsible for contracting with Multi-National Force-Iraq
told us they did not have enough contract oversight personnel and
quality assurance representatives to allow Multi-National Force-Iraq to
award more sustainment contracts for base operations support in Iraq.
* The contracting officer's representative for a contract providing
linguist support in Iraq told us that he had only one part-time
assistant, limiting his ability to manage and oversee the contractor
personnel for whom he was responsible. As he observed, he had a
battalion's worth of people with a battalion's worth of problems but
lacked the equivalent of a battalion's staff to deal with those
problems.
We also found a number of organizational and personnel policies of
various DOD agencies responsible for contract management and oversight
contributed to inadequate numbers of personnel to oversee and manage
contracts that support deployed forces. The following are some
examples:
* A 2004 Joint Staff review of the Defense Contract Management Agency's
responsiveness and readiness to support deployed forces in the event of
war found that the agency had not programmed adequate resources to
support current and future contingency contract requirements,
compromising its readiness to execute its mission. The review further
found that Defense Contract Management Agency manpower shortages were
aggravated by internal policies that limit the availability of
personnel to execute those missions.
* During its 2003 deployment to Iraq, a unit with the 4th Infantry
Division reported that the divisional contracting structure did not
adequately support the large volume of transactions that were needed in
an austere environment. For example, the unit reported problems with
the quality of services provided by host country nationals, which were
exacerbated by a lack of contracting officer's representatives to
properly oversee the performance of contracting terms.
* An official with the Army Contracting Agency, Southwest Asia told us
that as of January 2006 the agency had only 18 of the 33 staff it was
authorized and that this number of personnel was not enough to support
the agency's mission. In contrast, he told us that other commands, such
as Army Contracting Agency, Korea, were authorized more than 130 staff
even though they were responsible for significantly fewer obligated
funds.
Without adequate contract oversight personnel in place to monitor its
many contracts in deployed locations such as Iraq, DOD may not be able
to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are meeting their
contract requirements efficiently and effectively at each location. For
example, a Defense Contract Management Agency official responsible for
overseeing the LOGCAP contractor's performance at 27 installations in
Iraq told us he was unable to personally visit all 27 locations himself
during his 6-month tour in Iraq. As a result, he was unable to
determine the extent to which the contractor was meeting the contract's
requirements at each of those 27 sites. Moreover, he only had one
quality assurance representative to assist him. The official told us
that in order to properly oversee this contract, he should have had at
least three quality assurance representatives assisting him. The
contracting officer's representative for an intelligence support
contract in Iraq told us he was also unable to visit all of the
locations that he was responsible for overseeing. At the locations he
did visit he was able to work with the contractor to improve its
efficiency. However, because he was not able to visit all of the
locations at which the contractor provided services in Iraq he was
unable to duplicate those efficiencies at all of the locations in Iraq
where the contractor provided support. As we previously reported in
2000 and 2004, when contract oversight personnel are able to review the
types and levels of services provided by contractors for both economy
and efficiency, savings can be realized. Conversely, without adequate
contract oversight personnel in place to manage and oversee
contractors, DOD continues to be at risk of being unable to identify
and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner.
The inability of contract oversight personnel to visit all locations
they are responsible for can also create problems for units that are
facing difficulties resolving contractor performance issues at those
locations. For example, officials from a brigade support battalion told
us they had several concerns with the performance of a contractor that
provided maintenance for the brigade's mine-clearing equipment. These
concerns included delays in obtaining spare parts and a disagreement
over the contractor's obligation to provide support in more austere
locations in Iraq. According to the officials, their efforts to resolve
these problems in a timely manner were hindered because the contracting
officer's representative was located in Baghdad while the unit was
stationed in western Iraq. In other instances, some contract oversight
personnel may not even reside within the theater of operations. For
example, we found the Defense Contract Management Agency's legal
personnel responsible for LOGCAP in Iraq were stationed in Germany,
while other LOGCAP contract oversight personnel were stationed in the
United States. According to a senior Defense Contract Management Agency
official in Iraq, relying on support from contract oversight personnel
outside the theater of operations may not meet the needs of military
commanders in Iraq who are operating under the demands and higher
operational tempo of a contingency operation in a deployed location.
Although the problems discussed above concern contract management and
oversight at deployed locations, the lack of adequate contract
oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem, not limited to deployed
locations. We first designated DOD contract management as a high-risk
area in 1992, and it remains so today due, in part, to concerns over
the adequacy of the department's acquisition workforce, including
contract oversight personnel. We subsequently reported that although
DOD had made progress in laying a foundation for reshaping its
acquisition workforce, it did not yet have a comprehensive strategic
workforce plan needed to guide its efforts. Yet having too few contract
oversight personnel presents unique difficulties at deployed locations
given the more demanding contracting environment compared to the United
States. For example, the deputy commander of a corps support command
told us that contracting officer's representatives have more
responsibilities at deployed locations than in the United States.
Similarly, several officials responsible for contract management and
oversight told us that the operational tempo for contract oversight
personnel is significantly higher at deployed locations than in the
United States.
DOD Is Not Systematically Collecting or Sharing Institutional Knowledge
on the Use of Contractors to Support Deployed Forces:
Despite the fact the DOD and its components face many of the same types
of difficulties working with contractors in Iraq that they faced in
prior military operations, DOD still does not systematically ensure
that institutional knowledge gained from prior experience is shared
with military personnel at deployed locations. We have previously
reported that DOD could benefit from systematically collecting and
sharing its institutional knowledge across a wide range of issues to
help ensure that it is factored into planning, work processes, and
other activities.[Footnote 18] With respect to DOD's use of contractors
to support deployed forces, in 1997 we recommended that DOD incorporate
lessons learned from the Bosnia peacekeeping mission and other
operations in the Balkans to improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of the Army's LOGCAP contract--a recommendation DOD agreed with.
Similarly, in 2004 we recommended that DOD implement a departmentwide
lessons-learned program to capture the experience of military units and
others that have used logistics support contracts--a recommendation DOD
also agreed with.
In its responses to the recommendations made in our 1997 and 2004
reports, DOD stated it would investigate how best to establish
procedures to capture lessons learned on the use of contracts to
support deployed forces and would make this information available DOD-
wide. However as of 2006, DOD still had not established any procedures
to systematically collect and share DOD's lessons learned on the use of
contracts to support deployed forces. Moreover, we found no
organization within DOD or its components responsible for developing
those procedures. By way of comparison, we have previously reported
that when DOD created a Joint Staff office responsible for acting as a
focal point for the department's antiterrorism efforts, that office was
able to develop outreach programs to collect and share antiterrorism
lessons learned and best practices.[Footnote 19]
While some DOD organizations such as the Joint Forces Command's Joint
Center for Operational Analysis and the Army's Center for Army Lessons
Learned are responsible for collecting lessons learned from recent
military operations, we found that neither organization was actively
collecting lessons learned on the use of contractor support in Iraq.
Similarly, Army guidance requires that customers receiving services
under LOGCAP collect and share lessons learned, as
appropriate.[Footnote 20] However, we found no procedures in place to
ensure units follow this guidance. Further, our review of historical
records and after-action reports from military units that deployed to
Iraq found that while units made some observations on the use of
contractor support, DOD had done little to collect those lessons
learned or make them available to other units that were preparing to
deploy.[Footnote 21] Moreover, in some instances, officials from units
we met with told us that their current procedures actually preclude the
collection and sharing of institutional knowledge, such as lessons
learned. For example, officials with the 3rd Infantry Division, as well
as a corps support group that deployed to Iraq, told us that their
computers were wiped clean and the information archived before they
redeployed to the United States, which hindered opportunities for
sharing lessons learned with incoming units.
When lessons learned are not collected and shared, DOD and its
components run the risk of repeating past mistakes and being unable to
build on the efficiencies and effectiveness others have developed
during past operations that involved contractor support. For example,
the deputy commander of a corps support command responsible for much of
the contractor-provided logistics support in Iraq told us that without
ensuring that lessons learned are shared as units rotate into and out
of Iraq, each new unit essentially starts at ground zero, creating a
number of difficulties until they familiarize themselves with their
roles and responsibilities. Similarly, lessons learned using logistics
support contracts in the Balkans were not easily accessible to military
commanders and other individuals responsible for contract oversight and
management in Iraq, an issue we also identified in 2004. For example,
during our visit to Iraq we found that a guidebook developed by U.S.
Army, Europe on the use of a logistical support contract almost
identical to LOGCAP for operations in the Balkans was not made
available to military commanders in Iraq until mid-2006. According to
one official, U.S. Army Central Command was aware of this guidebook in
Iraq as early as late 2003; however, the guidebook was not made
available to commanders in Iraq until 2006. According to the official,
if the guidebook had been made available sooner to commanders in Iraq
it could have helped better familiarize them with the LOGCAP contract
and build on efficiencies U.S. Army, Europe had identified. Similarly,
U.S. Army, Europe included contract familiarization with its logistical
support contractor in mission rehearsal exercises of units preparing to
deploy to the Balkans. However, we found no similar effort had been
made to include familiarization with LOGCAP in the mission rehearsal
exercises of units preparing to deploy to Iraq.
Failure to share other kinds of institutional knowledge on the use of
contractor support to deployed forces can also impact military
operations or result in confusion between the military and contractors.
Several officials we met with from combat units that deployed to Iraq
as well as contractors supporting U.S. forces in Southwest Asia told us
that redeploying units do not always share important information with
new units that are rotating into theater, including information on
contractors providing support to U.S. forces at the deployed location.
Such information could include the number of contractors and the
services they provide a unit or installation, existing base access
procedures, and other policies and procedures that have been developed
over time. In addition, representatives from several contractor firms
we met with told us that there can be confusion when new units rotate
into Iraq regarding such things as the procedures contractors should
follow to access an installation or in dealing with contractors. In
some instances, such confusion can place either contractors or the
military at risk. For example, a contractor providing transportation
services in Iraq told us that a unit responsible for providing convoy
security that had just deployed to Iraq had not been informed of the
existing procedures for responding to incidents involving the
contractor. The existing procedures required the unit to remain with
the contractor until its equipment could be recovered. However,
following an actual incident in which a vehicle rolled over, there was
confusion between the contractor and the unit as to what the required
actions were.
Military Commanders and Contract Oversight Personnel Continue to
Receive Limited or No Information on Contractor Support in their Pre-
Deployment Training:
DOD does not routinely incorporate information about contractor support
to deployed forces in its pre-deployment training of military
personnel, despite the long-standing recognition of the need to provide
such information. Military commanders continue to deploy with limited
or no pre-deployment training on the contractor support they will rely
on or on their roles and responsibilities with regard to managing those
contractors. Similarly, contract oversight personnel typically deploy
without prior training on their contract management and oversight
responsibilities and are often only assigned those responsibilities
once arriving at a deployed location. Many DOD and service officials at
various levels of command told us that ultimately the key to better
preparing military personnel to effectively work with contractors in a
deployed location is to integrate information on the use of contractors
into DOD's institutional training activities.
Several GAO Reports Have Discussed, and DOD Has Acknowledged, the Need
to Provide Better Pre-deployment Training on Contractor Support to
Deployed Forces:
We have been discussing the need for better pre-deployment training on
the use of contractors to support deployed forces since the mid-1990s.
Specifically, we reported that better training was needed because
military commanders are responsible for incorporating the use of
contractor support while planning operations. In addition, as a
customer for contractor-provided services, military commanders are
responsible for identifying and validating requirements to be addressed
by the contractor as well as evaluating the contractor's performance
and ensuring the contract is used in an economical and efficient
manner. Further, better training was needed for contract oversight
personnel, including contracting officer's representatives, because
they monitor the contractor's performance for the contracting officer
and act as the interface between military commanders and contractors.
Accordingly, we have made several recommendations that DOD improve its
training. Some of our prior recommendations highlighted the need for
improved training of military personnel on the use of contractor
support at deployed locations, while others focused on training
regarding specific contracts, such as LOGCAP. In each instance, DOD
concurred with our recommendation. Figure 2 shows the recommendations
we have made since 1997.
Figure 2: Previous GAO Recommendations Highlighting the Need for Better
Training on the Use of Contractor Support to Deployed Forces:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In addition, according to DOD policy, personnel should receive timely
and effective training to ensure they have the knowledge and other
tools necessary to accomplish their missions. For example, a March 2006
instruction on joint training policy issued by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in part that DOD components are to ensure
their personnel and organizations are trained to meet combatant
commanders' requirements prior to deploying for operations. It further
identified management of contractors supporting deployed forces as a
training issue to be focused on. Nevertheless, we continue to find
little evidence that improvements have been made in terms of how DOD
and its components train military commanders and contract oversight
personnel on the use of contractors to support deployed forces prior to
their deployment.
Military Commanders Continue to Receive Limited or No Pre-deployment
Training to Plan For and Manage Contractors at Deployed Locations:
As we have previously reported, limited or no pre-deployment training
on the use of contractor support can cause a variety of problems for
military commanders in a deployed location. With limited or no pre-
deployment training on the extent of contractor support to deployed
forces, military commanders may not be able to adequately plan for the
use of those contractors in a deployed location. Several military
commanders--including the major general responsible for logistics for
Multi-National Force-Iraq, the deputy commander of a corps support
command, a base commander, and commanders of combat units deployed to
Iraq--told us that their pre-deployment training did not provide them
with sufficient information regarding the extent of contractor support
they would be relying on in Iraq. Although some of these officials were
aware of large contracts such as LOGCAP, almost all of them told us
they were surprised by the large number of contractors they dealt with
in Iraq and the variety of services that contractors provided. As a
result, they could not incorporate the use of contractors into their
planning efforts until after they arrived in Iraq and acquired a more
complete understanding of the broad range of services provided by
contractors. Similarly, several commanders of combat units that
deployed to Iraq told us their pre-deployment training included limited
or no information on the contractor-provided services they would be
relying on or the extent to which they would have to provide personnel
to escort contractor personnel. They were therefore unable to integrate
the need to provide on-base escorts for third country and host country
nationals, convoy security, and other force protection support to
contractors into their planning efforts. As a result, the commanders
were surprised by the substantial portion of their personnel they had
to allocate to fulfill these missions; personnel they had expected to
be available to perform other functions.
Limited or no pre-deployment training for military commanders on the
use of contractor support to deployed forces can also result in
confusion regarding their roles and responsibilities in managing and
overseeing contractors. As discussed above, military commanders are
responsible for incorporating the use of contractor support in their
operations planning and, in some instances, for evaluating a
contractor's performance. However, many officials responsible for
contract management and oversight in Iraq told us military commanders
who deployed to Iraq received little or no training on the use of
contractors prior to their deployment, leading to confusion over their
roles and responsibilities. For example:
* Staff officers with the 3rd Infantry Division told us they believed
the division was poorly trained to integrate and work with contractors
prior to its deployment. According to these officers, this inadequate
training resulted in confusion among the officers over the command and
control of contractors.
* Army Field Support Command officials told us many commanders voiced
concerns that they did not want to work with contractors and did not
want contractors in their area of operations. According to the
officials, these commanders did not understand the extent of contractor
support in Iraq and how to integrate LOGCAP support into their own
planning efforts. The officials attributed this confusion to a lack of
pre-deployment training on the services LOGCAP provided, how it was
used, and commanders' roles and responsibilities in managing and
overseeing the LOGCAP contractor.
* Several Defense Contract Management Agency officials told us that
although they were only responsible for managing and overseeing the
LOGCAP contractor, military commanders came to them for all contracting
questions because they had not been trained on how to work with
contractors and did not realize that different contractors have
different contract managers.
In addition, some contractors told us how crucial it was that
commanders receive training in their roles and responsibilities
regarding contractors prior to their deployment because, although they
do not have the authority to, commanders sometimes direct contractors
to perform activities that may be outside the scope of work of the
contract. We found some instances where a lack of training raised
concerns over the potential for military commanders to direct
contractors to perform work outside the scope of the contract. For
example, one contractor told us he was instructed by a military
commander to release equipment the contractor was maintaining even
though this action was not within the scope of the contract. The issue
ultimately had to be resolved by the contracting officer. As another
example, a battalion commander deployed to Iraq told us that although
he was pleased with the performance of the contractors supporting him,
he did not know what was required of the contractor under the contract.
Without this information, he ran the risk of directing the contractor
to perform work beyond what was called for in the contract. As Army
guidance makes clear, when military commanders try to direct
contractors to perform activities outside the scope of the contract,
this can cause the government to incur additional charges because
modifications would need to be made to the contract and, in some cases,
the direction may potentially result in a violation of competition
requirements.[Footnote 22]
We found that many military commanders we spoke with had little or no
prior exposure to contractor support issues in deployed locations,
exacerbating the problems discussed above. Many of the commanders we
met with from combat units deployed to Iraq told us this was their
first experience working with contractors and that they had had little
or no prior training or exposure to contract management. According to
officials responsible for contract management and oversight in Iraq as
well as several contactor representatives we met with, it can take
newly deployed personnel, including military commanders, several weeks
to develop the knowledge needed to effectively work with contractors in
a deployed location. For complex contracts such as LOGCAP, these
officials told us that it can take substantially longer than that. This
can result in gaps in oversight as newly deployed personnel familiarize
themselves with their roles and responsibilities in managing and
overseeing contracts.
Contract Oversight Personnel Continue to Receive Limited or No Pre-
deployment Training to Effectively Monitor Contractor Performance:
We also found that contract oversight personnel such as contracting
officer's representatives continue to receive limited or no pre-
deployment training regarding their roles and responsibilities in
monitoring contractor performance. Although DOD has created an online
training course for contracting officer's representatives, very few of
the contracting officer's representatives we met with had taken the
course prior to deploying to Iraq. In most cases, individuals deployed
without knowing that they would be assigned the role of a contracting
officer's representative until after they arrived at the deployed
location, precluding their ability to take the course. Moreover, some
of the individuals who took the course once deployed expressed concerns
that the training did not provide them with the knowledge and other
tools they needed to effective monitor contractor performance. Other
officials told us it was difficult to set aside the time necessary to
complete the training once they arrived in Iraq. DOD's acquisition
regulations require that contracting officer's representatives be
qualified through training and experience commensurate with the
responsibilities delegated to them. However, as was the case with
military commanders, we found that many of the contract oversight
personnel we spoke with had little or no exposure to contractor support
issues prior to their deployment, which exacerbated the problems they
faced given the limited pre-deployment training.
We found several instances where the failure to identify and train
contract oversight personnel prior to their deployment hindered the
ability of those individuals to effectively manage and oversee
contractors in Iraq, in some cases negatively affecting unit morale or
military operations. The following are examples of what we found:
* The contracting officer's representative for a major contract
providing intelligence support to U.S. forces in Iraq had not been
informed of his responsibilities in managing and overseeing this
contract prior to his deployment. As a result, he received no training
on his contract oversight responsibilities prior to deploying.
Moreover, he had no previous experience working with contractors. The
official told us that he found little value in DOD's online training
course and believed this training did not adequately prepare him to
execute his contract oversight responsibilities, such as reviewing
invoices submitted by the contractor.
* According to officials from a corps support group deployed to Iraq,
the group deployed with 95 Army cooks even though their meals were to
be provided by LOGCAP. However, prior to deploying, the unit had
neither identified nor trained any personnel to serve as contracting
officer's representatives for the LOGCAP contract. According to unit
officials, they experienced numerous problems with regard to the
quality of food services provided by LOGCAP, which impacted unit
morale, until individuals from the unit were assigned as contracting
officer's representatives to work with the contractor to improve the
quality of its services.
* According to officials with the Army's Intelligence and Security
Command, quality assurance representatives responsible for assessing
the performance of a linguist support contractor did not speak Arabic.
As a result, it was unclear how they could assess the proficiency of
the linguists. Some units that used interpreters under this contract
told us they experienced cases where they discovered that their
interpreters were not correctly translating conversations.
* Intelligence officials with a Stryker brigade told us a lack of
contractor management training hindered their ability to resolve
staffing issues with a contractor conducting background screenings of
third country nationals and host country nationals. Shortages of
contractor-provided screeners forced the brigade to use their own
intelligence personnel to conduct these screenings. As a result, those
personnel were not available to carry out their primary intelligence-
gathering responsibilities.
The frequent rotations of contract oversight personnel, who can deploy
for as little as 3-4 months, can also hinder DOD's management and
oversight of contractors in a deployed location. Several contractors
told us the frequent rotation of contracting officer's representatives
was frustrating because the contractors continually had to adjust to
the varying extent of knowledge those personnel had regarding the
contractor support they were responsible for. Moreover, several
contractors told us that frequent rotations meant that by the time
contract oversight personnel had familiarized themselves with their
responsibilities they were preparing the leave the country. If these
personnel were replaced by individuals who were not familiar with the
contract or had not received training in their roles and
responsibilities, problems could occur. For example, a contractor
providing food services in Iraq told us that while the contract
specified a 21-day menu rotation, some of the newly deployed
contracting officer's representatives assigned to monitor the contract
directed the contractor to modify the menu rotation, which affected the
contractor's inventory of food stores and ran the risk of directing the
contractor to perform work outside the scope of the contract.
Many contractors told us that a consistent level of pre-deployment
training would help to ensure some continuity as individuals rotate
into and out of deployed locations. In addition, several contractors,
as well as military officials responsible for contract management and
oversight, told us that the length of deployment for contracting
officer's representatives is too short and that by the time individuals
have acquired the knowledge to effectively monitor a contract, they are
preparing to redeploy. For example, senior Defense Contract Management
Agency officials told us that the current 6-month deployments of
contract oversight personnel monitoring the LOGCAP contract in Iraq
were too short to make the most efficient use of personnel who had
developed the expertise to effectively manage that contract. As a
result, senior Defense Contract Management Agency officials told us
they are considering extending the length of deployment for their
contract oversight personnel assigned to monitor the LOGCAP contract
from 6 months to 1 year.
We found that contract oversight personnel who had received training in
their roles and responsibilities prior to their deployment appeared
better prepared to manage and oversee contractors once they arrived at
a deployed location. For example, the program office for the Army's C-
12 aircraft maintenance contract developed a 3-day training course that
all contracting officer's representatives for this contract are
required to take prior to deploying. This training provides contracting
officer's representatives with information regarding recurring
reporting requirements, processes that should be followed to resolve
disputes with the contractor, and the variety of technical and
administrative requirements these individuals should be familiar with
to monitor the contractor's performance. Officials familiar with this
training course told us that they found the course to be very helpful
in providing contracting officer's representatives with the knowledge
and tools necessary to effectively execute their responsibilities. As a
result, the program office developed a similar course for another of
its aviation maintenance contracts. Similarly, Defense Contract
Management Agency officials responsible for overseeing LOGCAP told us
they are developing a standardized process for evaluating the
contractor's performance in Iraq, which includes ensuring units
deploying to Iraq identify and train contract oversight personnel for
the LOGCAP contract.
Officials Believe Integrating Information on the Use of Contractors
into DOD's Institutional Training Activities Could Improve the
Management and Oversight of Contractors:
Our review of DOD and service guidance, policies, and doctrine found no
existing criteria or standards to ensure that all military units
incorporate information regarding contractor support to deployed forces
in their pre-deployment training. According to a official with the
Army's Training and Doctrine Command, while some steps have been taken
to create elective courses on issues related to contractor support to
deployed forces, it is important that all DOD components incorporate
this information into their existing institutional training so that
military personnel who may interact with contractors at deployed
locations have a basic awareness of contractor support issues prior to
deploying. Moreover, most of the military commanders and officials
responsible for contract management and oversight we met with in
deployed locations told us that better training on the use of
contractors to support deployed forces should be incorporated into how
DOD prepares its personnel to deploy. Some officials believed that
additional training should address the specific roles and
responsibilities of military personnel responsible for managing and
overseeing contractors in deployed locations. For example, the base
commander of Logistical Support Area Anaconda told us there should be a
weeklong pre-deployment course for all base commanders specific to
contractor support to deployed forces. Similarly, the commander of a
unit operating Army C-12 aircraft stated that the contracting officer's
representative training developed by the program office, as discussed
above, should not only be required for all contract oversight personnel
but also for military commanders of units operating the aircraft.
Other officials believed that their pre-deployment preparations, such
as mission rehearsal exercises, should incorporate the role that
contractors have in supporting U.S. forces in a deployed location.
However, we found that most units we met with did not incorporate the
role of contractor support into their mission rehearsal exercises.
Moreover, we found no existing DOD requirement that mission rehearsal
exercises should include such information, even for key contracts such
as LOGCAP. Several officials told us that including contractors in
these exercises could enable military commanders to better plan and
prepare for the use of contractor support prior to deploying. For
example, when a Stryker brigade held its training exercise prior to
deploying to Iraq, the brigade commander was surprised at the number of
contractors embedded with the brigade. Initially, he wanted to bar all
civilians from the exercise because he did not realize how extensively
the brigade relied on contractor support. By including contractors in
the exercise, their critical role was made clear early on and the
brigade's commanders were better positioned to understand their
contract management roles and responsibilities prior to deploying to
Iraq. In addition, officials responsible for the LOGCAP contract told
us they were undertaking efforts to include basic information on how to
work with LOGCAP into the mission rehearsal exercises of units
deploying to Iraq.
Many officials we met with in the United States and at deployed
locations told us that ultimately the issue of better preparing
military commanders and contract oversight personnel for their contract
management and oversight roles at deployed locations lies with
including training on the use of contractors as part of professional
military education. Professional military education is designed to
provide officers with the necessary skills and knowledge to function
effectively and to assume additional responsibilities. However, several
officials told us that the need to educate military personnel on the
use of contractors is something the military has not yet embraced. As
corps support command officials observed, the military does a good job
training logisticians to be infantrymen, but does not require
infantrymen to have any familiarity with contracting or the roles and
responsibilities they may have in working with contractors at a
deployed location.
Conclusions:
DOD's reliance on contractor support to deployed forces has grown
significantly since the 1991 Gulf War and this reliance continues to
grow. In Iraq and other deployed locations, contractors provide
billions of dollars worth of services each year and play a role in most
aspects of military operations--from traditional support roles such as
feeding soldiers and maintaining equipment to providing interpreters
who accompany soldiers on patrols and augmenting intelligence analysis.
The magnitude and importance of contractor support demands that DOD
ensure military personnel have the guidance, resources, and training to
effectively monitor contractor performance at deployed locations. In
prior reports, we made a number of recommendations aimed at
strengthening DOD's management and oversight of contractor support at
deployed locations, and the department has agreed to implement many of
those recommendations. However, DOD has failed to implement some of our
key recommendations, in part because it has not yet institutionally
embraced the need to change the way it prepares military personnel to
work with contractors in deployed locations. While we found no
contractor performance problems that led to mission failure, problems
with management and oversight of contractors have negatively impacted
military operations and unit morale and hindered DOD's ability to
obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are effectively meeting
their contract requirements in the most cost-efficient manner.
The difficulties DOD faces regarding contractor support to deployed
forces are exacerbated by the fragmented nature of contracting, with
multiple agencies in multiple locations able to award and manage
contracts that may all provide services to a particular military unit
or installation. However, DOD's actions to date have largely been
driven by individual efforts to resolve particular issues at particular
moments. A lack of clear accountability and authority within the
department to coordinate these actions has hindered DOD's ability to
systematically address its difficulties regarding contractor support--
difficulties that currently affect military commanders in Iraq and
other deployed locations and will likely affect commanders in future
operations unless DOD institutionally addresses the problems we have
identified. When faced with similar challenges regarding the
department's antiterrorism efforts, DOD designated an office within the
Joint Staff to serve as a single focal point to coordinate its efforts,
which helped improve its protection of military forces stationed
overseas. Moreover, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has established dedicated
organizations to coordinate efforts to address departmentwide problems
in areas such as supply chain management. Unless a similar,
coordinated, departmentwide effort is made to address long-standing
contract management and oversight problems at deployed locations, DOD
and its components will continue to be at risk of being unable to
ensure that contractors are providing the services they are required to
in an effective and efficient manner.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To improve DOD's management and oversight of contractors at deployed
locations, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense appoint a
focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently senior level
and with the appropriate resources, dedicated to leading DOD's efforts
to improve contract management and oversight. The entity that functions
as the focal point would act as an advocate within the department for
issues related to the use of contractors to support deployed forces,
serve as the principal advisor for establishing relevant policy and
guidance to DOD components, and be responsible for carrying out
actions, including the following six actions:
* oversee development of the joint database to provide visibility over
all contractor support to deployed forces, including a summary of
services or capabilities provided and by-name accountability of
contractors;
* develop a strategy for DOD to incorporate the unique difficulties of
contract management and oversight at deployed locations into DOD's
ongoing efforts to address concerns about the adequacy of its
acquisition workforce;
* lead and coordinate the development of a departmentwide lessons-
learned program that will capture the experiences of units that have
deployed to locations with contractor support and develop a strategy to
apply this institutional knowledge to ongoing and future operations;
* develop the requirement that DOD components, combatant commanders,
and deploying units (1) ensure military commanders have access to key
information on contractor support, including the scope and scale of
contractor support they will rely on and the roles and responsibilities
of commanders in the contract management and oversight process, (2)
incorporate into their pre-deployment training the need to identify and
train contract oversight personnel in their roles and responsibilities,
and (3) ensure mission rehearsal exercises include key contractors to
increase familiarity of units preparing to deploy with the contractor
support they will rely on;
* develop training standards for the services on the integration of
basic familiarity with contractor support to deployed forces into their
professional military education to ensure that military commanders and
other senior leaders who may deploy to locations with contractor
support have the knowledge and skills needed to effectively manage
contractors; and:
* review the services' efforts to meet the standards and requirements
established above to ensure that training on contractor support to
deployed forces is being consistently implemented by the services.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendation. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also
provided several technical comments which we considered and
incorporated where appropriate.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
appoint a focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently
senior level and with the appropriate resources, dedicated to leading
DOD's efforts to improve contract management and oversight. DOD further
stated that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and
Materiel Readiness established the office of the Assistant Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Program Support) on October 1, 2006 to serve as
the office of primary responsibility for issues related to contractor
support. However, DOD noted in its comments that the office is not yet
fully staffed.
While we commend the department for taking the initiative to establish
this office and believe that it is appropriately located within the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, it is not clear that this office would serve as the
focal point dedicated to leading DOD's efforts to improve contract
management and oversight. In our recommendation, we identified several
actions that such a focal point would be responsible for implementing.
In concurring with those recommended actions, DOD offered additional
information on the steps it intended to take in order to address the
recommended actions. However, none of these steps included information
on the roles and responsibilities of the office of the Assistant Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) in implementing and
overseeing these corrective actions. For example, in concurring with
our recommendation that the focal point develop requirements to ensure
that mission rehearsal exercises include key contractors, DOD specified
corrective actions that the Joint Staff, the Defense Acquisition
University, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense would take.
However, it is not clear what role the office of the Assistant Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) would have in meeting this
requirement, nor is it clear that this office would be the entity
responsible for ensuring the requirement is met, as stated in our
recommendation.
As noted in the report, a lack of clear accountability and authority
within the department to coordinate actions intended to improve
contract management and oversight has hindered DOD's ability to
systematically address its difficulties regarding contractor support in
the past. We continue to believe that a single focal point with clearly
defined roles and responsibilities is critical if DOD is to effectively
address these long-standing problems and we therefore encourage the
department to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the
office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program
Support) in implementing and overseeing each of the corrective actions
discussed in our recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at
(202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors include David A. Schmitt,
Assistant Director; Vincent Balloon, Carole F. Coffey, Grace Coleman,
Laura Czohara, Wesley A. Johnson, James A. Reynolds, Kevin J. Riley,
and Karen Thornton.
Signed by:
William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has
improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting
deployed forces, we met with DOD, Joint Staff, and service headquarters
officials to obtain a comprehensive understanding of their efforts in
addressing the issues raised in our June 2003 report. We also reviewed
changes to key DOD and DOD component policies and other guidance. In
some instances, guidance was not available. For example, guidance was
not available on the appropriate number of personnel needed to monitor
contractors in a deployed location. In those instances, we relied on
the judgments and views of DOD officials and contract oversight
personnel who had served in deployed locations as to the adequacy of
staffing. We visited select DOD components and various military
contracting commands in the United States based on their role and
responsibility in managing and overseeing contracts that support
deployed U.S. forces. Because there was no consolidated list of
contractors supporting deployed forces available, we asked DOD
officials at the components and commands we visited to identify, to the
extent possible, the extent of contractor support to their deployed
U.S. forces. We focused our efforts on contractors supporting military
operations in Iraq and elsewhere in Southwest Asia because of the broad
range of services contractors provide U.S. forces in support of the
Global War on Terrorism.
We held discussions with military commanders, staff officers, and other
representatives from five Army divisions and one Marine Expeditionary
Force as well as various higher headquarters and supporting commands
that deployed to Iraq or elsewhere in Southwest Asia during the 2003-
2006 time frame to discuss their experiences working with contractors
and the challenges they faced managing and overseeing contractors in a
deployed location. Specifically, we met with unit officials responsible
for such functions as contracting and contract management, base
operations and logistical support, and force protection and
intelligence. These units were selected because, for the most part,
they had recently returned from Southwest Asia and unit officials had
not yet redeployed or been transferred to other locations within the
United States. We also met with representatives from the Department of
State and the U.S. Agency for International Development to discuss the
extent to which they have visibility over contractors supporting their
activities in Iraq. In addition, we traveled to deployed locations
within Southwest Asia, including Iraq, to meet with deployed combat
units and to discuss the use of contractor support to deployed forces
with various military commanders, installation commanders, headquarters
personnel, and other military personnel responsible for contracting and
contract management at deployed locations.
We met with 26 U.S. and foreign contractors who provide support to DOD
in Southwest Asia to discuss a variety of contracting and contract
management issues. For example, we held discussions with contractors to
obtain an understanding of the types of services they provide deployed
U.S. forces and the difficulties they have experienced providing those
services to DOD in a deployed location. The contractors we met with
reflected a wide range of services provided to deployed forces,
including theater support, external support, and systems support, and
represented both prime contractors and subcontractors.
We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review:
Department of Defense:
* Defense Contract Management Agency, Alexandria, VA; Houston, TX;
* Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, Washington, DC:
* Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and
Materiel Readiness:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence,
Washington, DC:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
Washington, DC:
* U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL:
* U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:
* J-3 Operations, Washington, DC:
* J-4 Logistics, Washington, DC:
* J-7 Operational Plans and Interoperability, Washington, DC:
* J-8 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, Washington, DC:
Department of the Army:
* Headquarters, Washington, DC:
- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 Personnel:
- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 Logistics:
* Army Contracting Agency, Fort McPherson, GA; Fort Drum, NY; Fort
Lewis, WA:
* Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, VA:
- Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL:
-- Program Executive Office, Aviation:
-- Program Executive Office, Missiles & Space:
- Army Field Support Command, Rock Island, IL:
-- Program Office, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program:
- Army Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ:
- Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, MI:
* Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, VA:
* Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA:
- Combined Armed Support Command, Fort Lee, VA:
* Stryker Brigades, Fort Lewis, WA:
- 2nd Infantry Division:
* 3rd Brigade, Stryker Brigade Combat Team:
- 25th Infantry Division:
* 1st Brigade, Stryker Brigade Combat Team:
- Task Force Olympia:
- 593rd Corps Support Group:
* U.S. Army Central Command, Fort McPherson, GA:
* 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA:
* 2nd Brigade Combat Team:
* 26th Brigade Support Battalion:
* 3rd Sustainment Brigade:
* 87th Corps Support Battalion:
* 4th Brigade Combat Team:
* 703rd Brigade Support Battalion:
* 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY:
Department of the Navy:
* Headquarters, Washington, DC:
* Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition
Management:
* 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, CA:
Department of the Air Force:
* Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH:
* Program Office, Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, Tyndall Air
Force Base, FL:
Other Government Agencies:
* Department of State, Washington, DC:
* U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC:
Contractors:
* CACI International, Arlington, VA:
* Dimensions International, Inc. Sterling Heights, MI:
* DUCOM, Inc., Sterling Heights, MI:
* DynCorp International, Irving, TX:
* General Dynamics Land Systems, Fort Lewis, WA:
* Kellogg, Brown and Root, Houston, TX; Arlington, VA:
* L-3 Communications Corp.
* L-3 Titan Linguist Operations and Technical Support, Reston, VA:
* Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control, Dallas, TX:
* Mantech International, Chantilly, VA:
* M7 Aerospace, San Antonio, TX:
* PWC Logistics, Kuwait:
* Readiness Management Support, Panama City, FL:
* SEI Group, Inc., Huntsville, AL:
* Triple Canopy, Inc., Herndon, VA:
The overseas activities and contractors we visited, by country, were:
Iraq:
* Camp Victory, U.S. Military:
* Multi-National Force-Iraq:
* Multi-National Corps-Iraq:
* Defense Contract Management Agency:
* 4th Infantry Division:
* Camp Victory, Contractors:
* Kellogg, Brown and Root:
* L-3 Communications Corp.
* L-3 Communications ILEX Systems, Inc.
* L-3 Government Services, Inc.
* International Zone, U.S. Military:
* Multi-National Force-Iraq:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics:
* Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Regional Division:
* Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan:
* International Zone, Contractors:
* L-3 Communications Corp.
* L-3 Titan Linguist Operations and Technical Support:
* Private Security Company Association of Iraq:
* Logistics Support Area Anaconda, U.S. Military:
* Logistics Support Area Anaconda Garrison Command:
* 3rd Corps Support Command:
* Aerial Port of Debarkation operations:
* Program Management Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:
* Logistics Support Area Anaconda, Contractors:
* AAI Corporation:
* DynCorp International:
* General Atomics Aeronautical Systems:
* General Dynamics Land Systems:
* L-3 Communications Corp.
* L-3 Titan Linguist Operations and Technical Support:
* M7 Aerospace:
Kuwait:
* Camp Arifjan, U.S. Military:
* Coalition Forces Land Component Command:
* Area Support Group, Kuwait:
* Army Contracting Agency, Southwest Asia:
* Army Field Support Brigade, Southwest Asia:
* Army Materiel Command:
* U.S. Embassy, Kuwait City:
* Camp Arifjan, Contractors:
* Ahmadah General Trading & Contracting Co.
* British Link Kuwait:
* Combat Support Associates:
* Computer Sciences Corporation:
* IAP World Services:
* ITT Industries:
* Kellogg, Brown and Root:
* Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Co.
* Tamimi Global Co.
United Arab Emirates:
* Dubai, Contractors:
* Kellogg, Brown and Root:
* Prime Projects International:
We conducted our review from August 2005 through October 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Acquisition TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington DC 20301-3000:
DEC 14 2006:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "Military Operations: High-Level DoD Action Needed to Address
Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors,"
dated November 2, 2006, (GAO Code 350739/GAO-07-145).
The DOD concurs with the draft report recommendations and appreciates
the opportunity to comment. Technical comments were provided
separately. For further questions concerning our input, please contact
Lt Col Jill Stiglich, 703-695-8567.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Shay D. Assad:
Director, Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy:
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated November 2, 2006 GAO Code 350739/GAO-07-145:
"Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-
standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendation:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
appoint a focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, at a sufficiently
senior level and with the appropriate resources, dedicated to leading
DoD's efforts to improve contract management and oversight. The entity
that functions as the focal point would act as an advocate within the
Department for issues related to the use of contractors to support
deployed forces, serve as the principal advisor for establishing
relevant policy and guidance to DoD components, and be responsible for
carrying out actions, including the following:
* oversee development of the joint database to provide visibility over
all contractor support to deployed forces, including a summary of
services or capabilities provided and by-name accountability of
contractors;
* develop a strategy for DoD to incorporate the unique difficulties of
contract management and oversight at deployed locations into DoD's
ongoing efforts to address concerns about the adequacy of its
acquisition workforce;
* lead and coordinate the development of a Department-wide lesson-
learned program that will capture the experiences of units that have
deployed to locations with contractor support and develop a strategy to
apply this institutional knowledge to ongoing and future operations;
* develop the requirements that DoD components, combatant commanders,
and deploying units (1) ensure military commanders have access to key
information on contractor support, including the scope and scale of
contractor support they will rely on and the roles and responsibilities
of commanders in the contract management and oversight process, (2)
incorporate into their pre-deployment training the need to identify and
train contract oversight personnel in their roles and responsibilities,
and (3) ensure mission rehearsal exercises include key contractors to
increase familiarity of units preparing to deploy with the contractor
support they will rely on;
* develop training standards for the Services on the integration of
basic familiarity with contractor support to deployed forces into their
professional military education to ensure that military commanders
andother senior leaders who may deploy to locations with contractor
support have the knowledge and skills needed to effectively manage
contractors; and:
* review the Services' efforts to meet the standards and requirements
established above to ensure that training on contractor support to
deployed forces is being consistently implemented by the Services.
DOD Response: Concur. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness (DUSD (LM&R)) established the office
of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support)
(ADUSD (PS)) on 1 October 2006 and has given the incumbent this
mission. The office is not yet fully staffed, but the intent is to make
the ADUSD (PS) the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR).
Recommendation: Oversee development of the joint database to provide
visibility over all contractor support to deployed forces, including a
summary of services or capabilities provided and by-name accountability
of contractors.
DOD Response: Concur. The Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational
Tracker (SPOT) has been identified as the DOD Enterprise Solution by
the DOD Investment Review Board (IRB) and once the Defense Business
Systems Management Council (DBSMC) concurs with this designation
(expected to occur at their 30 November 2006 meeting), SPOT will be
declared by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness (OUSD (P&R)) in coordination with the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics (OUSD
(AT&L)) as the Joint Solution required by Department of Defense
Instruction 3020.41 (DoDI 3020.41).
Recommendation: Develop a strategy for DOD to incorporate the unique
difficulties of contract management and oversight at deployed locations
into DOD's ongoing efforts to address concerns about the adequacy of
its acquisition workforce.
DOD Response: Concur. Section 854 of the 2007 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) requires the Department to develop joint
policy on requirements, program management and contingency contracting.
This language includes assessing the health of the military and
civilian acquisition work force to support deployed forces. As part of
this assessment, DOD will study the roles and missions of Defense
Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the Services in contract
oversight, assess the Department's ability to execute this mission and
protect its interests and make recommendations on needed changes to
military and civilian force structure.
Recommendation: Lead and coordinate the development of a Department-
wide lesson-learned program that will capture the experiences of units
that have deployed to locations with contractor support and develop a
strategy to apply this institutional knowledge to ongoing and future
operations.
DOD Response: Concur. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition Technology and Logistics /Defense Procurement and
Acquisition Policy (OUSD (AT&L) / (DPAP)), Defense Acquisition
University (DAU) and the Services all have websites that capture
current lessons learned; however, the department will develop and
implement a systematic strategy for capturing, retaining and applying
lessons learned, including updating training of personnel involved in
Contingency Acquisition. DPAP and DAU are currently examining
implementing one common website and will receive input from Services on
its utility/ viability/usability as a collection site for Contingency
Contracting information and make whatever changes the joint community
considers necessary to maximize its utility. Once this is done, DPAP
will promulgate guidance to the Services requiring their contingency
contractor personnel to submit lessons learned and after action
reports. DAU will develop a systematic method of studying and assessing
this information and promulgating significant findings through
coursework and other forums.
Recommendation: Develop the requirements that DOD components, combatant
commanders, and deploying units (1) ensure military commanders have
access to key information on contractor support, including the scope
and scale of contractor support they will rely on and the roles and
responsibilities of commanders in the contract management and oversight
process, (2) incorporate into their pre-deployment training the need to
identify and train contract oversight personnel in their roles and
responsibilities, and (3) ensure mission rehearsal exercises include
key contractors to increase familiarity of units preparing to deploy
with the contractor support they will rely on.
DOD Response: Concur:
(1) DODI 3020.41 requires the designation or development of a joint
database on contractor personnel and contract capability to capture the
information necessary to give the Combatant Commander (CCDR) both
visibility of contractor personnel and contracts and a basis for
assessing risk and capabilities available to him in theater. The
Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) has been
identified as the DOD Enterprise Solution by the DOD Investment Review
Board (IRB) and the Defense Business Systems Management Council (DBSMC)
concurred with this designation (at their 30 November 2006 meeting),
SPOT was declared by OUSD (P&R) in coordination with OUSD (AT&L) as the
Joint Solution.
(2) The Joint Staff, in conjunction with its Army Lead Agent and Air
Force Technical Review Authority, is working on a new Joint
Publication, JP 4-10, Contracting and Contractor Management in Joint
Operations that will address the roles of Contracting Officer's
Representatives (COR), Administrative Contracting Officers and related
personnel (Quality Assurance Representatives). In addition, DPAP will
work with DAU to ensure COR training reflects recent lessons learned
and assess whether a separate or tailored Contingency COR Course is
needed. Contracting Support Plans associated with operations plans
(OPLANs) and operations orders (OPORDs) will address the requirement to
identify and train CORs prior to deployment. This requirement will be
incorporated into the next update of the Logistics Annex to the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCAP) which contains requirements for
OPLANS.
(3) The Joint Staff will review how contractors could/should be
incorporated into joint training exercises. For Service specific
training, DAU will study the Army's incorporation of Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) personnel into their training exercises
and develop a Case Study for use by all the Services on how this has
been done (please see next DOD response for specifics on Army
training). The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) will encourage
the Services to incorporate contractor personnel into training
exercises whenever it makes sense.
Recommendation: Develop training standards for the Services on the
integration of basic familiarity with contractor support to deployed
forces into their professional military education to ensure that
military commanders and other senior leaders who may deploy to
locations with contractor support have the knowledge and skills needed
to effectively manage contractors.
DOD Response: Concur. The Joint Staff is researching Joint education
for logisticians which will include efforts on contract and contractor
management. However, clearly there is a need for broader E-1 to 0-10
level training for non-acquisition military personnel in order for them
to understand the basics regarding contractor personnel (command and
control issues, contractor status, contractor entitlements) and
contracts (unauthorized commitments, constructive changes) given the
tremendous growth in the utilization of contracts to support
contingency operations. OSD will mandate the development of core
training on these topics and also mandate the Services incorporate this
into recruit and command level training as well as pre-deployment
training.
The Army continues to develop and improve platform training for LOGCAP
in seven courses at the Army Logistics Management College and the
Captains Career Course, in addition to the Army War College and the
Contractors on the Battlefield Elective Seminar Course at the Army
Command and General Staff College. The Combined Arms Support Command
(CASCOM) Training Directorate continues to develop training strategy
and curriculum outline on LOGCAP and partners with the Training and
Doctrine Command and Combined Arms Center to develop and incorporate
LOGCAP training into existing courses and expand LOGCAP training in
additional courses. LOGCAP planners from the LOGCAP Operations
Directorate at Fort Belvoir continue to participate in exercises like
the Joint Transformation Wargame, Ulchi Focus Lens, and Blue Advance.
LOGCAP planners also continue to provide pre-deployment training to
deploying Army and Marine units and provide information on the LOGCAP
statements of work and various task orders that will support the units
in Iraq. Additionally, Army representatives have also provided
training, to include lesson plans, briefing, and test questions, to the
Marine Corps Engineer School and Marine Corps contracting instructors.
Representative from DCS worked with the Defense Acquisition University
(DAU) and OUSD (AT&L) to develop the current contingency contracting
courses on the DAU portal. Finally, DCS, G-4 funded the initiative to
create a web based LOGCAP Interactive multi-media Instruction Course in
the Sustainment Portal and the CASCOM Training Directorate executed the
development. This initiative provides the ability for individual self-
training on LOGCAP and provides a source where instructors can obtain
the latest information on LOGCAP and Contractors Accompanying the
Force.
Recommendation: Review the Services' efforts to meet the standards and
requirements established above to ensure that training on contractor
support to deployed forces is being consistently implemented by the
Services.
DOD Response: Concur. The Joint Log Test Case Logistics Services
Initiative on Contractors Accompanying the Force: Accountability and
Visibility will examine related governance and consider how governance
might need to change to best support this joint capability.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor Employees
Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information, but U.S.
Forces Take Steps to Mitigate the Risks Contractors May Pose. GAO-06-
999R. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private
Security Providers. GAO-06-865T. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security
Providers. GAO-05-737. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005.
Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's Orders to
Support Military Operations. GAO-05-201. Washington, D.C.: April 29,
2005.
Defense Logistics: High-Level DOD Coordination Is Needed to Further
Improve the Management of the Army's LOGCAP Contract. GAO-05-328.
Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2005.
Military Operations: DOD's Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts
Requires Strengthened Oversight. GAO-04-854. Washington, D.C.: July 19,
2004.
Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed
Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans. GAO-03-695.
Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003.
Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost in
the Balkans. GAO/NSIAD-00-225. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2000.
Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program. GAO/NSIAD-97-63. Washington, D.C.: February 11,
1997.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Estimated figures are used because neither DOD nor the services
have a single point that collects information on contracts that support
deployed forces.
[2] Established in 1985, LOGCAP is an Army program that preplans for
the use of global corporate resources to support worldwide contingency
operations. In the event that U.S. forces deploy, contractor support is
then available to a military commander as an option.
[3] See the end of this report for a list of prior GAO reports and
testimonies on the use of contractors to support deployed U.S. forces.
[4] See GAO, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to
Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans, GAO-03-
695 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003).
[5] See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999) and Internal
Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.:
August 2001).
[6] A host country national is an employee of a contractor who is a
citizen of the country where the work is being performed.
[7] A third country national is an employee of a contractor who is
neither a citizen of the United States nor the host country.
[8] For example, in 2003 DOD relied on a Department of the Interior
contracting office that specializes in awarding and administering
contracts for other agencies to obtain contractor-provided intelligence-
related services quickly to support U.S. forces in Iraq. See GAO,
Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's Orders to
Support Military Operations, GAO-05-201 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29,
2005).
[9] Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel
Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces (Oct. 3, 2005).
[10] DOD Instruction 3020.41 requires the department to maintain by-
name accountability of contractors deploying with the force, who are
defined as systems support and external support contractors, and
associated subcontractors, specifically authorized in their contract to
deploy to support U.S. forces. At the time of our review, DOD was in
the process of clarifying whether additional contractor personnel
should be included in the joint database.
[11] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 109-702, p. 243 (Sept. 29, 2006).
[12] See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks
Remain for Forces Overseas, GAO/NSIAD-00-181 (Washington, D.C.: July
19, 2000) and Military Transformation: Clear Leadership,
Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's
Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004).
[13] Multi-National Force-Iraq is responsible for counter-insurgency
operations to isolate and neutralize former regime extremists and
foreign terrorists and for organizing, training, and equipping Iraq's
security forces. Multi-National Corps-Iraq is the tactical unit of
Multi-National Force-Iraq responsible for command and control of
operations in Iraq.
[14] A fragmentary order, or FRAGO, is an abbreviated form of an
operation order used to inform units of changes in missions and the
tactical situation.
[15] We recently reported that military commanders in Iraq have
instituted a variety of base access procedures to address the risk
third country and host country nationals may pose. See GAO, Military
Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor Employees Supporting
Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information, but U.S. Forces Take
Steps to Mitigate the Risks Contractors May Pose, GAO-06-999R
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2006).
[16] This database is known as the Synchronized Pre-deployment and
Operational Tracker.
[17] See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2005).
[18] See GAO, Information Technology: DOD Needs to Leverage Lessons
Learned from Its Outsourcing Projects, GAO-03-371 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 25, 2003) and Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned
to Avoid Past Mistakes is Largely Untapped, GAO/NSIAD-95-152
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 9, 1995).
[19] See GAO/NSIAD-00-181.
[20] Army Regulation 700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
(LOGCAP) (Dec. 16, 1985).
[21] After-action reports provide an official description of the
results of military operations. An after-action report typically
includes a summary of objectives, operational limitations, major
participants, a description of strengths and weaknesses, and
recommended actions.
[22] For example, it is improper for an agency to order a supply or
service outside the scope of the contract because the work covered by
the order is subject to the Competition in Contracting Act (10 U.S.C. §
2304 and 41 U.S.C. § 253) requirements for competition.
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