Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Gao ID: GAO-06-365R February 1, 2006GAO has undertaken a body of work to address federal, state, and local preparations for, response to, and recovery from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This correspondence contains GAO's preliminary findings.
GAO-06-365R, Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
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entitled 'Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita' which was released on February 1, 2006.
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February 1, 2006:
The Honorable Thomas Davis:
Chairman:
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As you know, GAO has undertaken a body of work to address federal,
state, and local preparations for, response to, and recovery from
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Enclosed is a statement for the record of
GAO's preliminary findings.
GAO will continue work on a wide range of issues relating to the
preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to the
hurricanes. We expect to provide Congress with more detailed findings,
with a comprehensive summary of what went well and why, what did not go
well and why, and what specific changes, if any, are called for in the
National Response Plan. If you or your staff has any questions about
this statement, please contact Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director for
Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-8777 or
rabkinn@gao.gov.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States:
[End of section]
Enclosure:
Enclosure I: Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
In recent months, GAO has undertaken a body of work to address federal,
state, and local preparations for, response to, and recovery from
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. I am here today to provide some
preliminary observations based on our work to date. GAO is supporting
Congress through a range of strategic and integrated audit and
evaluation engagements to determine what went well, what did not, and
what lessons learned are critical to improving government's abilities
to do better in the future. The Inspectors General of the various
federal departments are conducting detailed Hurricane Katrina-related
work on fraud, waste, and abuse in individual federal programs.
GAO staff has visited the affected areas. They have interviewed
officials and analyzed information from the various involved federal
agencies such as FEMA and the Department of Defense (DOD); state and
local organizations, including state emergency management agencies;
state adjutant generals; local officials; and representatives from
nongovernmental agencies. I have also personally toured southern
Mississippi, southern Louisiana, and the city of New Orleans. I have
also had discussions with many governmental and other officials,
including the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas;
the mayor of New Orleans; the primary federal official on the scene;
and the joint task force commander of active duty forces. In addition,
GAO has done a great deal of work on prior disasters, including
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the terrorist attacks in 2001.
Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our
nation's history and because of its size and strength, will have long
standing effects for years to come. It exacted terrible human costs
with the loss of significant numbers of lives and resulted in billions
of dollars in property damage. At present, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) reports that FEMA has distributed nearly $4.4 billion in
federal aid to more than 1.4 million households. Forty-four states and
the District of Columbia have been given emergency declarations to
cover expenses related to sheltering millions of evacuees forced from
their homes by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Furthermore, many who
survived now face the disruption of being dislocated and separated from
their normal way of life, the prospect of rebuilding their lives in
other locations, and, for those who desire to return home, the
continuing uncertainties regarding what kind of life the future may
hold.
Significant local, state, and federal resources were mobilized to
respond to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, along with significant
participation from charitable and private sector organizations.
However, the capabilities of several federal, state, and local agencies
were clearly overwhelmed in response to Hurricane Katrina, especially
in Louisiana. Therefore, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the
level of preparedness and the collective response. As events unfolded
in the immediate aftermath and ensuing days after Hurricane Katrina's
final landfall, responders at all levels of government--many victims
themselves--encountered significant breakdowns in vital areas such as
emergency communications as well as obtaining essential supplies and
equipment.
The causes of these breakdowns must be well understood and addressed in
order to strengthen the nation's ability to prepare for, respond to,
and recover from major catastrophic events in the future--whether
natural or man-made. Unfortunately, many of the lessons emerging from
the most recent hurricanes in the Gulf are similar to those GAO
identified more than a decade ago, in the aftermath of Hurricane
Andrew, which leveled much of South Florida in the early 1990s. For
example, in 1993, we recommended that the President designate a senior
official in the White House to oversee federal preparedness for, and
response to, major catastrophic disasters.
There are several key themes that, based on our current preliminary
work, underpin many of the challenges encountered in the response to
Hurricane Katrina and reflect certain lessons learned from past
disasters. The following three key themes seem to be emerging.
Clear and Decisive Leadership:
First, prior to a catastrophic event, the leadership roles,
responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all levels
must be clearly defined and effectively communicated in order to
facilitate rapid and effective decision making, especially in preparing
for and in the early hours and days after the event. As we recommended
in 1993, we continue to believe that a single individual directly
responsible and accountable to the President must be designated to act
as the central focal point to lead and coordinate the overall federal
response in the event of a major catastrophe. This person would work on
behalf of the President to ensure that federal agencies treat the
catastrophe as a top priority and that the federal government's
response is both timely and effective. In cases where there is warning,
such as the high probability of a major hurricane (e.g., a category 4
or 5), the senior official should be designated prior to the event, be
deployed appropriately, and be ready to step forward as events unfold.
Neither the DHS Secretary nor any of his designees, such as the
Principal Federal Official (PFO), filled this leadership role during
Hurricane Katrina, which serves to underscore the immaturity of and
weaknesses relating to the current national response framework. More
specifically with regard to the lessons to be learned from Hurricane
Katrina:
* No one was designated in advance to lead the overall federal response
in anticipation of the event despite clear warnings from the National
Hurricane Center. Furthermore, events unfolded both before and
immediately after the landfall of Hurricane Katrina that made it clear
that governmental entities did not act decisively or quickly enough to
determine the catastrophic nature of the incident. For example, the DHS
Secretary designated Hurricane Katrina as an incident of national
significance on August 30th--the day after final landfall. However, he
did not designate the storm as a catastrophic event, which would have
triggered additional provisions of the National Response Plan (NRP),
calling for a more proactive response.[Footnote 1] As a result, the
federal posture generally was to wait for the affected states to
request assistance. At the same time, some federal responders such the
Coast Guard and DOD did "lean forward" in proactive efforts
anticipating a major disaster. Furthermore, other federal agencies took
proactive steps to prepare for and respond to the disaster, such as the
U.S. Postal Service and the National Finance Center.
* Although the DHS Secretary designated a PFO to be the federal
government's representative under the NRP structure and to coordinate
the federal response, the efforts of all federal agencies involved in
the response remained disjointed because the PFO's leadership role was
unclear. In the absence of timely and decisive action and clear
leadership responsibility and accountability, there were multiple
chains of command, a myriad of approaches and processes for requesting
and providing assistance, and confusion about who should be advised of
requests and what resources would be provided within specific time
frames.
Strong Advance Planning, Training, and Exercise Programs:
Second, to best position the nation to prepare for, respond to, and
recover from major catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina, there must be
strong advance planning, both within and among responder organizations,
as well as robust training and exercise programs to test these plans in
advance of a real disaster. Although the NRP framework envisions a
proactive national response in the event of a catastrophe, the nation
does not yet have the types of detailed plans needed to better
delineate capabilities that might be required and how such assistance
will be provided and coordinated. In addition, we observed that the
training and exercises necessary to carry out these plans were not
always developed or completed among the first responder community. The
leadership to ensure these plans and exercises are in place must come
from DHS in conjunction with other federal agencies, state and local
authorities, and involved nongovernmental organizations. More
specifically,
* By their very nature, major catastrophic events involve extraordinary
levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption that likely will
immediately overwhelm state and local responders, circumstances that
make sound planning for catastrophic events all the more crucial. Our
previous work on Hurricane Andrew also highlighted the importance of
such plans focused specifically on major catastrophic events. Our
initial review of the NRP base plan and its supporting catastrophic
provisions as well as lessons based on Hurricane Katrina suggest the
need for these documents to be supported and supplemented by more
detailed and robust implementation plans. Our previous work has also
underscored the need to prepare for both natural disasters and man-made
disasters such as terrorist events.
* Planning should also include further defining and leveraging any
military capabilities as might be needed in a major catastrophe. Prior
disasters and the actual experience of Hurricane Katrina show that DOD
is likely to contribute substantial support to state and local
authorities, including search and rescue assets, evacuation assistance,
provision of supplies, damage assessment assets, and possibly helping
to ensure public safety. In fact, military support to Hurricane Katrina-
affected areas reflected an unprecedented domestic response of 70,000
personnel--far greater than in any other domestic disaster, including
Hurricane Andrew. This response involved about 20,000 active duty
troops and about 50,000 National Guard troops. More detailed planning
would provide greater visibility and understanding of the types of
support DOD will be expected to provide following a catastrophic
incident, including the types of assistance and capabilities that might
be provided, what might be done proactively and in response to specific
requests, and how the efforts of the active duty and National Guard
would be integrated. It would also avoid the type of confusion that
occurred in Louisiana regarding the types of military support needed
and requested, and the respective contributions of active duty and
National Guard forces.
* Planning also must explicitly consider the need for and management of
the contractor community. In this regard, we found that agencies did
not always have adequate plans for contracting in a major contingency
situation. We also noted the competing tension between the selection of
national contractors and the requirement under the Stafford Act for a
preference for contractors from the affected area. Better planning
could ameliorate those tensions.
* Regular training and periodic exercises provide a valuable way to
test emergency management plans. In our previous work on Hurricanes
Andrew and Hugo, we identified the need for the federal government to
upgrade training and exercises for state and local governments
specifically geared towards catastrophic disaster response. Hurricane
Katrina demonstrated the benefits of applying lessons learned from
training exercises and experiences with actual hurricanes as well as
the dangers of ignoring them. FEMA's "Hurricane Pam" exercise--
conducted between 2004 and 2005 to simulate the impacts of a category 3
hurricane--identified the impacts such as widespread flooding,
extensive evacuations, sheltering thousands of individuals left
homeless after a storm, and disposing of tons of debris similar to
Hurricane Katrina's results. Not all capabilities-related issues
identified in the Hurricane Pam exercise were addressed before
Hurricane Katrina hit. In addition, we observed that an incomplete
understanding of roles and responsibilities under the NRP lead to
misunderstandings, problems, and delays, an area that training might be
able to correct. One overall challenge is ensuring that key officials
participate in training and exercises so that they are better prepared
to deal with real life situations.
Capabilities for a Catastrophic Event:
Response and recovery capabilities needed during a major catastrophic
event differ significantly from those required to respond to and
recover from a "normal disaster." Key capabilities such as emergency
communications, continuity of essential government services, and
logistics and distribution systems underpin citizen safety and
security. In addition, as these capabilities are brought to bear,
streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making must quickly
replace "business as usual" approaches to doing business. The following
provides examples of capabilities we have identified in our preliminary
work. All of these areas require better contingency plans and the
resources to carry them out.
* Hurricane Katrina exposed difficulties in continuing or rapidly
restoring essential government operations, particularly at the local
level. Local government infrastructure was destroyed and essential
government employees, including many first responders, were evacuated
or victimized themselves by the storms, resulting in limited continuity
of operations for essential public safety and key service agencies.
Also, because of storm damage, emergency communications to meet
everyday internal and emergency communication requirements and
interoperability needs were severely compromised and backup systems
were often limited or nonexistent.
* The scope of the devastation, including the flooding in the New
Orleans area, made a comprehensive damage assessment and an estimate of
services victims might need very difficult. After Hurricane Andrew,
similar to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, it was several days
before local authorities had a full picture of the situation to
determine how much and what types of assistance were needed. A
catastrophic event will overwhelm the capacity of state and local
officials to assess damage, and our preliminary work indicates that the
military's significant capabilities in assessing damage--a capability
used for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and other past disasters--should
be an explicit part of future major catastrophic disaster plans.
* While there were aspects that worked well, it appeared that logistics
systems for critical resources were often totally overwhelmed by
Hurricane Katrina, with critical resources apparently not available,
properly distributed, or provided in a timely manner. In addition, our
preliminary work assessing agency acquisition practices for responding
to the hurricanes indicates that those agencies needed additional
capabilities to be able to: (1) adequately plan for and anticipate
requirements for needed goods and services, (2) clearly communicate
responsibilities across agencies and jurisdictions, and (3) deploy
sufficient numbers of personnel to provide contractor oversight. These
capabilities are critical to ensuring that agencies receive the goods
and services needed to accomplish their missions in a timely manner and
at fair and reasonable prices.
* The magnitude of the affected population in a major catastrophe also
calls for greater capabilities in several areas. For example,
evacuation capabilities must include evacuating special needs
populations such as those in hospitals and nursing homes, coordinating
transportation assets, and ensuring that receiving shelters are not
overwhelmed. Search and rescue and mass care should work together in a
seamless transition so that victims are not just rescued, but can be
taken to a place of shelter.
* Mass care--sheltering, feeding, and related services--following
Hurricane Katrina required the integrated efforts of many
organizations, including volunteer groups, charities and other
nongovernmental groups, organizations providing mutual aid, and the
military. Although many of these efforts were successful, it appeared
that Hurricane Katrina seriously challenged the capacity of
organizations such as the American Red Cross and FEMA to provide
expected services to certain populations and in certain areas and at
certain times. Housing beyond short-term shelters also became--and
remains--a major problem, especially for victims who either cannot
return to their community or require housing options in their community
if they do return.
* Additional capability will be needed to effectively manage and deploy
volunteers and unsolicited donations. Our early work indicates that
because of the magnitude of the storms, volunteers and donations,
including from the international community were not generally well
integrated into the overall response and recovery activities. For
example, there were challenges in integrating the efforts of the
Salvation Army and smaller organizations, often local churches and
other "faith-based" organizations. In addition, federal agencies
involved in managing the international assistance were not prepared to
coordinate, receive, distribute, or account for the assistance. Agency
officials involved in the cash and in-kind international assistance
told us the agencies had not planned for the acceptance of
international assistance for use in the United States and, therefore,
had not developed processes and procedures to address this scenario.
* Lastly, beginning and sustaining community and economic recovery,
including restoring a viable tax base for essential services, calls for
immediate steps so residents can restore their homes and businesses.
Removing debris and restoring essential gas, electric, oil,
communications, water, sewer, transportation and transportation
infrastructure, other utilities, and services such as public health and
medical support are vital to recovery and rebuilding. In less severe
disasters, restoring these lifelines is easier. However, the magnitude
and scope of Hurricane Katrina painfully makes visible the many
challenges in effectively addressing these issues.
GAO will continue our work on a wide range of issues relating to the
preparation, response, recovery, and reconstruction efforts related to
the hurricanes that I have discussed today. We have over 30 engagements
underway and look forward to reporting on them throughout 2006. We will
provide Congress and the American people with a comprehensive summary
of what went well and why, what did not go well and why, and what, if
any, specific changes are called for in the National Response Plan.
FOOTNOTES
[1] As defined by the National Response Plan, an incident of national
significance is an actual or potential high-impact event that requires
a response by a combination of federal, state, and local governments
and/or private sector entities in order to save lives and minimize
damage, and provides the basis for long-term community recovery and
mitigation activities. A catastrophic incident is one that results in
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely
affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy,
national morale, and/or government functions.
