Combating Nuclear Smuggling
Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in Other Countries and in the United States Gao ID: GAO-06-558T March 28, 2006GAO is releasing two reports today on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries and in the United States. Together with the March 2005 report on the Department of Energy's Megaports Initiative, these reports represent GAO's analysis of the U.S. effort to deploy radiation detection equipment worldwide. In my testimony, I will discuss (1) the progress made and challenges faced by the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State in providing radiation detection equipment to foreign countries and (2) the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to install radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry and challenges it faces.
Regarding the deployment of radiation detection equipment in foreign countries, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million since fiscal year 1994 to provide equipment and related training to 36 countries. For example, through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE's Second Line of Defense program had completed installation of equipment at 83 sites, mostly in Russia. However, these agencies face a number of challenges that could compromise their efforts, including corruption of foreign border security officials, technical limitations and inadequate maintenance of some equipment, and the lack of supporting infrastructure at some border sites. To address these challenges, U.S. agencies plan to take a number of steps, including combating corruption by installing multitiered communications systems that establish redundant layers of accountability for alarm response. State coordinates U.S. programs to limit overlap and duplication of effort. However, State's ability to carry out this role has been limited by deficiencies in its interagency strategic plan and its lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation detection equipment provided to other countries. Domestically, DHS had installed about 670 radiation portal monitors through December 2005 and provided complementary handheld radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry at a cost of about $286 million. DHS plans to install a total of 3,034 radiation portal monitors by the end of fiscal year 2009 at a total cost of $1.3 billion. However, the final costs and deployment schedule are highly uncertain because of delays in releasing appropriated funds to contractors, difficulties in negotiating with seaport operators, and uncertainties in the type and cost of radiation detection equipment DHS plans to deploy. Overall, GAO found that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers have made progress in using radiation detection equipment correctly and adhering to inspection guidelines, but CBP's secondary inspection procedures could be improved. For example, GAO recommended that DHS require its officers to open containers and inspect them for nuclear and radioactive materials when they cannot make a determination from an external inspection and that DHS work with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to institute procedures by which inspectors can validate NRC licenses at U.S. ports of entry.
GAO-06-558T, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in Other Countries and in the United States
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Testimony:
Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST:
Tuesday, March 28, 2006:
Combating Nuclear Smuggling:
Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment
in Other Countries and in the United States:
Statement of Gene Aloise, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-06-558T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-558T, a testimony before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
Why GAO Did This Study:
GAO is releasing two reports today on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear
smuggling in foreign countries and in the United States. Together with
the March 2005 report on the Department of Energy‘s Megaports
Initiative, these reports represent GAO‘s analysis of the U.S. effort
to deploy radiation detection equipment worldwide.
In my testimony, I will discuss (1) the progress made and challenges
faced by the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State in
providing radiation detection equipment to foreign countries and (2)
the Department of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) efforts to install
radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry and challenges it
faces.
What GAO Found:
Regarding the deployment of radiation detection equipment in foreign
countries, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million since
fiscal year 1994 to provide equipment and related training to 36
countries. For example, through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE‘s
Second Line of Defense program had completed installation of equipment
at 83 sites, mostly in Russia. However, these agencies face a number of
challenges that could compromise their efforts, including corruption of
foreign border security officials, technical limitations and inadequate
maintenance of some equipment, and the lack of supporting
infrastructure at some border sites. To address these challenges, U.S.
agencies plan to take a number of steps, including combating corruption
by installing multitiered communications systems that establish
redundant layers of accountability for alarm response. State
coordinates U.S. programs to limit overlap and duplication of effort.
However, State‘s ability to carry out this role has been limited by
deficiencies in its interagency strategic plan and its lack of a
comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation detection equipment provided
to other countries.
Domestically, DHS had installed about 670 radiation portal monitors
through December 2005 and provided complementary handheld radiation
detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry at a cost of about $286
million. DHS plans to install a total of 3,034 radiation portal
monitors by the end of fiscal year 2009 at a total cost of $1.3
billion. However, the final costs and deployment schedule are highly
uncertain because of delays in releasing appropriated funds to
contractors, difficulties in negotiating with seaport operators, and
uncertainties in the type and cost of radiation detection equipment DHS
plans to deploy. Overall, GAO found that U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) officers have made progress in using radiation
detection equipment correctly and adhering to inspection guidelines,
but CBP‘s secondary inspection procedures could be improved. For
example, GAO recommended that DHS require its officers to open
containers and inspect them for nuclear and radioactive materials when
they cannot make a determination from an external inspection and that
DHS work with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to institute
procedures by which inspectors can validate NRC licenses at U.S. ports
of entry.
U.S.-Funded Equipment in Uzbekistan and at a Northern U.S. Port of
Entry:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
In the report on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other
countries, GAO made five recommendations to improve, among other
things, equipment maintenance, coordination among U.S. programs, and
accountability of equipment. Both DOE and State agreed with GAO‘s
recommendations. In the report on radiation detection at U.S. ports of
entry, GAO made nine recommendations designed to help DHS speed up the
pace of portal monitor deployments, better account for schedule delays
and cost uncertainties, and improve its ability to interdict illicit
nuclear materials. DHS agreed with GAO‘s recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-558T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on U.S. government
programs to combat nuclear smuggling through the deployment of
radiation detection equipment at border crossings and other ports of
entry both in foreign countries and in the United States.[Footnote 1]
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and
2004, there were 662 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear
and radiological materials worldwide. Twenty-one of these cases
involved material that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon, and
over 400 involved materials that could be used to produce a device that
uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a
"dirty bomb"). Especially in the aftermath of the attacks on September
11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to
smuggle nuclear material or a nuclear weapon into the United States.
This could happen in several ways: nuclear materials could be hidden in
a car, train, or ship; sent through the mail; carried in personal
luggage through an airport; or walked across an unprotected border. If
terrorists were to accomplish this, the consequences could be
devastating to our national and economic interests.
In response to these threats, four U.S. agencies, the Departments of
Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), State (State), and Homeland Security
(DHS), implement programs to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign
countries and in the United States. Regarding U.S. efforts in other
countries, the first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling
during the 1990s concentrated on deploying radiation detection
equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union. One of
the main U.S. programs providing radiation detection equipment to
foreign governments is DOE's Second Line of Defense program, which
began installing equipment at key sites in Russia in 1998. In 2003, DOE
began a second program, the Megaports Initiative, to combat nuclear
smuggling at major foreign seaports.[Footnote 2] In addition to DOE's
efforts, two DOD programs have provided radiation portal monitors,
handheld equipment, and radiation detection training to 8 countries in
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Similarly, three State
programs have provided radiation detection equipment and training to 31
countries since fiscal year 1994.
Regarding efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in the United States, DHS
is responsible for providing radiation detection capabilities at U.S.
ports of entry. Until April 2005, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) managed this program. However, on April 15, 2005, the President
directed the establishment, within DHS, of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO), whose duties include acquiring and supporting
the deployment of radiation detection equipment.[Footnote 3] CBP
continues its traditional screening function at ports of entry to
prevent illegal immigration and interdict contraband, including the
operation of radiation detection equipment. DHS is deploying portal
monitors in five phases: international mail and express courier
facilities; northern border crossings; major seaports; southwestern
border crossings; and all other categories, including international
airports and remaining border crossings, seaports, and rail crossings.
Generally, CBP prioritized these categories according to their
perceived vulnerability to the threat of nuclear smuggling (rather than
through a formal risk assessment).
My testimony summarizes the findings of our two reports being released
today on U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling. Specifically, I
will discuss (1) the progress made by the various federal agencies
tasked with installing radiation detection equipment at ports of entry
in foreign countries and the challenges these agencies face and (2)
DHS's efforts to install radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of
entry and challenges DHS faces in completing its program.
Summary:
Regarding deployment of radiation detection equipment in foreign
countries, DOE, DOD, and State have spent a total of about $178 million
since fiscal year 1994 to provide assistance to 36 countries. For
example, DOE's Second Line of Defense program has installed equipment
at 83 sites, mostly in Russia, at a cost of about $130 million.
However, DOE, DOD, and State face challenges that could compromise
their programs' effectiveness, including (1) corruption of foreign
border security officials, (2) technical limitations of some equipment
at foreign sites, (3) problems with maintenance of some handheld
equipment, and (4) the lack of infrastructure and harsh environmental
conditions at some border sites.
* According to officials from several countries we visited, corruption
is a pervasive problem within border security organizations. DOE, DOD,
and State officials told us they are concerned that corrupt foreign
border security personnel could compromise the effectiveness of U.S.-
funded radiation detection equipment by either turning off equipment or
ignoring alarms. To mitigate this threat, DOE and DOD plan to deploy
communications links between individual border sites and national
command centers so that alarm data can be simultaneously evaluated by
multiple officials.
* Some portal monitors that State and other U.S. agencies previously
installed at foreign border sites have technical limitations and can
only detect gamma radiation, which makes them less effective at
detecting weapons-usable nuclear material than equipment with both
gamma and neutron radiation detection capabilities. Since 2002, DOE has
maintained this equipment but has only upgraded equipment at one site.
Until the remaining sites receive equipment with both gamma and neutron
detection capabilities, they will be vulnerable to certain forms of
nuclear smuggling.
* DOE has not systematically maintained handheld radiation detection
equipment provided by State and other agencies. As a result, many
pieces of handheld equipment, which are vital for border officials to
conduct secondary inspections, may not function properly.
* Finally, many border sites are located in remote areas that often do
not have access to infrastructure essential to operate radiation
detection equipment and associated communication systems. Additionally,
environmental conditions at some sites, such as extreme heat, can
affect equipment performance. To mitigate these concerns, DOE, DOD, and
State have provided generators and other equipment at remote border
sites to ensure stable electricity supplies and, when appropriate, heat
shields or other protection to ensure the effectiveness of radiation
detection equipment.
In addition, State is the lead interagency coordinator charged with
limiting overlap and duplication of effort among U.S. programs, but its
ability to carry out this role has been limited by deficiencies in its
strategic plan for interagency coordination and its lack of a
comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation detection equipment provided
to other countries.
Regarding deployment of radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of
entry, through December 2005, DHS had installed about 670 portal
monitors--about 22 percent of the portal monitors DHS plans to deploy-
-at U.S. border crossings, seaports, and international mail and express
courier facilities at a cost of about $286 million. DHS plans to deploy
a total of 3,034 portal monitors by 2009 at a total cost of $1.3
billion. However, the final costs and deployment schedule are highly
uncertain because of delays in releasing appropriated funds to
contractors, difficulties in negotiating with seaport operators, and
uncertainties in the type and cost of radiation detection equipment DHS
plans to deploy. Specifically:
* DHS's cumbersome review process for providing requested information
to the Congress has resulted in funds being unavailable until later in
the fiscal year. This review process involves multiple approvals within
DHS and the Office of Management and Budget and has held up the release
of program funds, which has delayed the deployment of radiation
detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry.
* Difficult negotiations with seaport operators about placement of
portal monitors and screening of railcars have delayed deployments at
U.S. seaports. Many seaport operators are concerned that radiation
detection equipment may inhibit the flow of commerce through their
ports. In addition, seaports are much larger than land border
crossings, consist of multiple terminals, and may have multiple exits,
which may require a greater number of portal monitors.
* DHS's $1.3 billion cost estimate for completing its domestic
radiation detection program is uncertain, in part, because DHS would
like to deploy advanced technology portal monitors that will likely
cost significantly more than current models. However, tests have shown
that these new advanced technology portal monitors are not demonstrably
more effective than current models in their core function of
identifying the presence of radiation. Consequently, it is not clear
that the benefits of the new portal monitors would be worth the
increased cost.
In addition, CBP officers have made progress in using radiation
detection equipment correctly and adhering to inspection guidelines,
but we identified ways to improve CBP's secondary inspection
procedures. For example, when detection equipment alarms to indicate
the presence of radioactivity, CBP officers are not expressly required
to open containers and inspect their interiors, even though, under some
circumstances, doing so can increase the chances that the source of
radioactivity will be correctly located and identified. Furthermore,
although radiological materials shipped into the United States are
generally required to have a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
license, importers are not required to present these licenses at U.S.
ports of entry, and CBP inspectors are not required to verify the
authenticity of these licenses and do not have a system to do so. My
GAO colleague, Mr. Greg Kutz, will be testifying on a GAO operation
that was conducted to test CBP's inspection procedures and certain NRC
licensing procedures.
In our report on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other
countries, we made five recommendations. Specifically, we recommended
that DOE take steps to upgrade U.S.-funded portal monitors in foreign
countries that do not have both gamma and neutron detection
capabilities and improve program cost estimates for anticorruption
measures. Additionally, we recommended that State, working with DOE and
DOD, ensure maintenance is provided for all handheld radiation
detection equipment supplied by U.S. programs; strengthen its
interagency coordination plan by including specific performance
measures, overall cost estimates, and projected time frames for
completion of U.S. efforts; and compile, maintain, and share a master
list of all U.S. radiation detection assistance. Both DOE and State
agreed with our recommendations. In our report on DHS's efforts to
deploy radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry, we made
nine recommendations, including a series of actions designed to help
DHS speed up the pace of portal monitor deployments, better account for
schedule delays and cost uncertainties, make the most efficient use of
program resources, and improve its ability to interdict illicit nuclear
materials. DHS agreed with our recommendations and is taking steps to
implement them.
Background:
Detecting illicit trafficking in nuclear material is complicated
because one of the materials of greatest concern--highly enriched
uranium--has a relatively low level of radioactivity and is, therefore,
among the most difficult to detect. In contrast, medical and industrial
radioactive sources, which could be used to construct a dirty bomb, are
highly radioactive and, therefore, easier to detect. Although their
levels of radioactivity differ, uranium and radioactive sources are
similar in that they generally emit only gamma radiation, which is
relatively easily shielded when encased in high-density material, such
as lead. For example, we reported in March 2005 that a cargo container
containing a radioactive source passed through radiation detection
equipment DOE had installed at a foreign seaport without being detected
because the source was surrounded by large amounts of scrap metal in
the container.
Plutonium, another nuclear material of great concern, emits both gamma
and neutron radiation. Although most currently fielded radiation
detection equipment has the capability to detect both gamma and neutron
radiation, shielding neutron radiation can be more difficult than
shielding gamma radiation. Consequently, plutonium can usually be
detected by a neutron detector regardless of the amount of shielding
from high-density material. According to DOE officials, neutron
radiation alarms are caused only by man-made materials, such as
plutonium, while gamma radiation alarms are caused by a variety of
naturally occurring sources, including commercial goods such as
bananas, ceramic tiles, and fertilizer, as well as by dangerous nuclear
materials, such as uranium and plutonium.
Because of the complexities of detecting and identifying nuclear
material, customs officers and border guards who are responsible for
operating detection equipment must be trained in using handheld
radiation detectors to pinpoint the source of an alarm, identify false
alarms, and properly respond to cases of nuclear smuggling. The manner
in which radiation detection equipment is deployed, operated, and
maintained can also limit its effectiveness. Given the difficulties in
detecting certain nuclear materials and the inherent limitations of
currently deployed radiation detection equipment, it is important that
the equipment be installed, operated, and maintained in a way that
optimizes authorities' ability to interdict illicit nuclear materials.
Although efforts to combat nuclear smuggling through the installation
of radiation detection equipment are important, the United States
should not and does not rely upon radiation detection equipment at U.S.
or foreign borders as its sole means for preventing nuclear materials
or a nuclear warhead from reaching the United States. Recognizing the
need for a broad approach to the problem, the U.S. government has
multiple initiatives that are designed to complement each other that
provide a layered defense against nuclear terrorism. For example, DOE
works to secure nuclear material and warheads at their sources through
programs that improve the physical security at nuclear facilities in
the former Soviet Union and in other countries. In addition, DHS has
other initiatives to identify containers at foreign seaports that are
considered high risk for containing smuggled goods, such as nuclear and
other dangerous materials. Supporting all of these programs is
intelligence information that can give advanced notice of nuclear
material smuggling and is a critical component to prevent dangerous
materials from entering the United States.
U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other
Countries Face Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Challenges:
One of the main U.S. efforts providing radiation detection equipment to
foreign governments is DOE's Second Line of Defense program, which
began installing equipment at key sites in Russia in 1998. According to
DOE, through the end of fiscal year 2005, the program had spent about
$130 million to complete installations at 83 sites, mostly in Russia.
Ultimately, DOE plans to install radiation detection equipment at a
total of about 350 sites in 31 countries by 2012 at a total cost of
about $570 million. In addition to DOE's efforts, other U.S. agencies
also have programs that provide radiation detection equipment and
training to foreign governments. Two programs at DOD--the International
Counterproliferation Program and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation Prevention Initiative--have provided equipment and
related training to eight countries in the former Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe at a cost of about $22 million. Similarly, three
programs at State--the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, Georgia
Border Security and Law Enforcement program, and Export Control and
Related Border Security program--have spent about $25 million to
provide radiation detection equipment and training to 31 countries.
However, these agencies face a number of challenges that could
compromise their programs' effectiveness, including (1) corruption of
foreign border security officials, (2) technical limitations of
equipment at some foreign sites, (3) problems with maintenance of
handheld equipment, and (4) the lack of infrastructure and harsh
environmental conditions at some border sites. First, according to
officials from several recipient countries we visited, corruption is a
pervasive problem within the ranks of border security organizations.
DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned that corrupt
foreign border security personnel could compromise the effectiveness of
U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either turning off
equipment or ignoring alarms. To mitigate this threat, DOE and DOD plan
to deploy communications links between individual border sites and
national command centers so that alarm data can be simultaneously
evaluated by multiple officials, thus establishing redundant layers of
accountability for alarm response. In addition, DOD plans to implement
a program in Uzbekistan to combat some of the underlying issues that
can lead to corruption through periodic screening of border security
personnel.
Second, some radiation portal monitors that State and other U.S.
agencies previously installed have technical limitations: they can
detect only gamma radiation, making them less effective at detecting
some nuclear material than equipment with both gamma and neutron
radiation detection capabilities. Through an interagency agreement, DOE
assumed responsibility for ensuring the long-term sustainability and
continued operation of radiation portal monitors and X-ray vans
equipped with radiation detectors that State and other U.S. agencies
provided to 23 countries. Through this agreement, DOE provides spare
parts, preventative maintenance, and repairs for the equipment through
regularly scheduled maintenance visits. Since 2002, DOE has maintained
this equipment but has not upgraded any of it, with the exception of at
one site in Azerbaijan. According to DOE officials, new implementing
agreements with the appropriate ministries or agencies within the
governments of each of the countries where the old equipment is located
are needed before DOE can install more sophisticated equipment.
Third, since 2002, DOE has been responsible for maintaining certain
radiation detection equipment previously deployed by State and other
agencies in 23 countries. However, DOE is not responsible for
maintaining handheld radiation detection equipment provided by these
agencies. As a result, many pieces of handheld equipment, which are
vital for border officials to conduct secondary inspections of vehicles
or pedestrians, may not function properly. For example, in Georgia, we
observed border guards performing secondary inspections with a handheld
radiation detector that had not been calibrated (adjusted to conform
with measurement standards) since 1997. According to the detector's
manufacturer, yearly recalibration is necessary to ensure that the
detector functions properly.
Finally, many border sites are located in remote areas that often do
not have access to reliable supplies of electricity, fiber optic lines,
and other infrastructure essential to operate radiation detection
equipment and associated communication systems. Additionally,
environmental conditions at some sites, such as extreme heat, can
affect the performance of equipment. To mitigate these concerns, DOE,
DOD, and State have provided generators and other equipment at remote
border sites to ensure stable supplies of electricity and, when
appropriate, heat shields or other protection to ensure the
effectiveness of radiation detection equipment.
We also reported that State's ability to carry out its role as lead
interagency coordinator of U.S. radiation detection equipment
assistance has been limited by deficiencies in its strategic plan for
interagency coordination and by its lack of a comprehensive list of all
U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance. In response to a
recommendation we made in 2002, State led the development of a
governmentwide plan to coordinate U.S. radiation detection equipment
assistance overseas. This plan broadly defines a set of interagency
goals and outlines the roles and responsibilities of participating
agencies. However, the plan lacks key components, including overall
program cost estimates, projected time frames for program completion,
and specific performance measures. Without these elements in the plan,
State will be limited in its ability to effectively measure U.S.
programs' progress toward achieving the interagency goals.
Additionally, in its role as lead interagency coordinator, State has
not maintained accurate information on the operational status and
location of all radiation detection equipment provided by U.S.
programs. While DOE, DOD, and State each maintain lists of radiation
detection equipment provided by their programs, they do not regularly
share such information, and no comprehensive list of all equipment
provided by U.S. programs exists. For example, according to information
we received from program managers at DOE, DOD, and State, more than
7,000 pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment had been
provided to 36 foreign countries through the end of fiscal year 2005.
Because much of this equipment was provided to the same countries by
multiple agencies and programs, it is difficult to determine the degree
to which duplication of effort has occurred. Without a coordinated
master list of all U.S.-funded equipment, program managers at DOE, DOD,
and State cannot accurately assess if equipment is operational and
being used as intended, determine the equipment needs of countries
where they plan to provide assistance, or detect whether an agency has
unknowingly supplied duplicative equipment.
DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at
U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns Remain:
Through December 2005, DHS had installed about 670 radiation portal
monitors nationwide--about 22 percent of the portal monitors DHS plans
to deploy--at international mail and express courier facilities, land
border crossings, and seaports in the United States. DHS has completed
portal monitor deployments at international mail and express courier
facilities and the first phase of northern border sites--57 and 217
portal monitors, respectively. In addition, by December 2005, DHS had
deployed 143 of 495 portal monitors at seaports and 244 of 360 at
southern border sites.[Footnote 4] As of February 2006, CBP estimated
that, with these deployments, it has the ability to screen about 62
percent of all containerized shipments entering the United States (but
only 32 percent of all containerized seaborne shipments) and roughly 77
percent of all private vehicles. DHS plans to deploy 3,034 portal
monitors by September 2009 at a cost of $1.3 billion. However, the
final costs and deployment schedule are highly uncertain because of
delays in releasing appropriated funds to contractors, difficulties in
negotiating with seaport operators, and uncertainties in the type and
cost of radiation detection equipment DHS plans to deploy. Further, to
meet this goal, DHS would have to deploy about 52 portal monitors a
month for the next 4 years--a rate that far exceeds the 2005 rate of
about 22 per month.
In particular, several factors have contributed to the delay in the
deployment schedule. First, DHS provides the Congress with information
on portal monitor acquisitions and deployments before releasing any
funds. However, DHS's cumbersome review process has consistently caused
delays in providing such information to the Congress. For example,
according to the House Appropriations Committee report on DHS's fiscal
year 2005 budget, CBP should provide the Congress with an acquisition
and deployment plan for the portal monitor program prior to funding its
contractors. This plan took many months to finalize, mostly because it
required multiple approvals within DHS and the Office of Management and
Budget prior to being submitted to the Congress. The lengthy review
process delayed the release of funds and, in some cases, disrupted and
delayed deployment.
Second, difficult negotiations with seaport operators about placement
of portal monitors and screening of railcars have delayed deployments
at U.S. seaports. Many seaport operators are concerned that radiation
detection equipment may inhibit the flow of commerce through their
ports. In addition, seaports are much larger than land border
crossings, consist of multiple terminals, and may have multiple exits,
which may require a greater number of portal monitors. Further,
devising an effective way to conduct secondary inspections of rail
traffic as it departs seaports without disrupting commerce has delayed
deployments. This problem may worsen because the Department of
Transportation has forecast that the use of rail transit out of
seaports will probably increase in the near future.
Finally, DHS's $1.3 billion estimate for the project is highly
uncertain, in part, because of uncertainties in the type and cost of
radiation detection equipment that DHS plans to deploy. The estimate is
based on DHS's plans for widespread deployment of advanced technology
portal monitors, which are currently being developed. However, the
prototypes of this equipment have not yet been shown to be more
effective than the portal monitors now in use, and DHS officials say
they will not purchase the advanced portal monitors unless they are
proven to be clearly superior. Moreover, when advanced technology
portal monitors become commercially available, experts estimate that
they will cost between about $330,000 and $460,000 each, far more than
the currently used portal monitors whose costs range from about $49,000
to $60,000. Even if future test results indicate better detection
capabilities, without a detailed comparison of the two technologies'
capabilities it would not be clear that the dramatically higher cost
for this new equipment would be worth the investment.
We also identified potential issues with the procedures CBP inspectors
use to perform secondary inspections that, if addressed, could
strengthen the nation's defenses against nuclear smuggling. For
example, CBP's procedures require only that officers locate, isolate,
and identify radiological material. Typically, officers perform an
external examination by scanning the sides of cargo containers with
handheld radiation detection equipment during secondary inspections.
CBP's guidance does not specifically require officers to open
containers and inspect their interiors, even when their external
examination cannot unambiguously resolve the alarm. However, under some
circumstances, opening containers can improve security by increasing
the chances that the source of radioactivity that originally set off
the alarm will be correctly located and identified. The second
potential issue with CBP's procedures involves NRC documentation.
Individuals and organizations shipping radiological materials to the
United States must generally acquire a NRC license, but according to
NRC officials, the license does not have to accompany the shipment.
Although inspectors examine such licenses when these shipments arrive
at U.S. ports of entry, CBP officers are not required to verify that
shippers of radiological material actually obtained required licenses
and to authenticate licenses that accompany shipments. We found that
CBP inspectors lack access to NRC license data that could be used to
authenticate a license at the border.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to
any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-3841 or at aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. R. Stockton Butler, Nancy Crothers, Jim Shafer,
and Eugene Wisnoski made key contributions to this statement.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying
Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns
Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination
Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection
Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.: March 14,
2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection
Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T.
Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign
Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New
Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November
18, 2002.
Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection
Equipment. GAO-03-235T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. GAO-
02-989T Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO-02-
426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.
FOOTNOTES
[1] See GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress
Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but
Concerns Remain, GAO-06-389 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006) and
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination
Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection
Equipment to Other Countries, GAO-06-311 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14,
2006).
[2] In addition to the two reports being released today, in March 2005
we reported on DOE's Megaports Initiative. For additional information,
see GAO, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign
Seaports, GAO-05-375 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). Through the end
of fiscal year 2005, DOE had spent about $101 million to complete
installations at four ports in Greece, the Netherlands, Sri Lanka, and
the Bahamas. DOE anticipates completing an additional port in Spain in
April 2006. DOE has signed agreements to begin work at ports in seven
other countries (China, Honduras, Israel, Oman, the Philippines,
Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates).
[3] See National Security Presidential Directive No. 43/Homeland
Security Presidential Directive No. 14, Domestic Nuclear Detection
(Apr. 15, 2005).
[4] In addition, three portal monitors had been installed at the Nevada
Test Site to analyze their detection capabilities, and four had been
retrofitted at express mail facilities.
