Defense Acquisitions
Improved Business Case Is Needed for Future Combat System's Successful Outcome Gao ID: GAO-06-367 March 14, 2006The Department of Defense (DOD) anticipates that the Future Combat System (FCS) will modernize the U.S. Army's ability to move, shoot, and communicate on the battlefield. It is an impressive concept that is the product of holistic, non-traditional thinking. The Army describes FCS as one of the most complex weapon acquisition programs ever executed because it involves developing and integrating a family of 18 systems and an information network. Army leadership started the program early as part of its effort to change Army culture and believes that the program risks are manageable. GAO is required by law to review the program annually. In this report, GAO analyzes FCS's acquisition business case and assesses requirements stability, technology maturity, soundness of the acquisition strategy, and reasonableness and affordability of program costs.
The FCS entered the development phase in 2003 and has not yet reached the level of knowledge it should have attained in the pre-development stage. The elements of a sound business case--firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding--are still not demonstrably present. The Army will continue building basic knowledge in areas such as requirements and technologies for several more years. Requirements stability: The Army has reached agreement on FCS system of systems requirements--about 11,500--that help define how FCS units are expected to work as a whole. But the Army must continue to work out the technical feasibility and expected costs of the requirements for individual FCS systems. These requirements may not be completely stabilized until 2008. Until then, the Army expects the system-level requirements to change and to make trade-offs to offset technical risks and cost. Technology maturity: None of FCS's 49 critical technologies was at a level of maturity recommended by DOD policy at the start of a program. Some technologies may not reach full maturity until after production starts. Not having firm requirements matched with mature technologies at the start of development is a key indicator of program risk. Also, the Army is depending on 52 complementary programs, each of which is essential for FCS to perform as intended. Some of these programs have significant technical challenges; some do not have the funding needed to complete development. Soundness of acquisition strategy for design and production: The current acquisition strategy for FCS is improved over the original strategy but still calls for maturing technologies, designing systems, and preparing for production at the same time. Even if requirements and technologies proceed without incident, FCS design and production process maturity will not be demonstrated until after the production decision is made. Although production representative prototypes will not be available, the Army plans to test all FCS systems before committing to production. If problems are discovered in testing at that stage, they will be very expensive to correct. Reasonableness and affordability of program costs: The estimated cost of the FCS program now stands at $160.7 billion, a 76 percent increase since program start. This is a better estimate than the original, as it embodies a more realistic schedule and scope. Including the total investment for the 52 essential complementary programs, the FCS program cost estimate would reach the $200 billion range. The Army has taken steps it believes will control FCS costs. Yet, the current level of knowledge about FCS is low, which makes it difficult to have a solid basis for cost projections. FCS's long-term affordability depends on the accuracy of cost estimates, an increased level of procurement funding, and the level of competing demands.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-367, Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Is Needed for Future Combat System's Successful Outcome
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2006:
Defense Acquisitions:
Improved Business Case Is Needed for Future Combat System's Successful
Outcome:
GAO-06-367:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-367, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) anticipates that the Future Combat
System (FCS) will modernize the U.S. Army‘s ability to move, shoot, and
communicate on the battlefield. It is an impressive concept that is the
product of holistic, non-traditional thinking. The Army describes FCS
as one of the most complex weapon acquisition programs ever executed
because it involves developing and integrating a family of 18 systems
and an information network. Army leadership started the program early
as part of its effort to change Army culture and believes that the
program risks are manageable.
GAO is required by law to review the program annually. In this report,
GAO analyzes FCS‘s acquisition business case and assesses requirements
stability, technology maturity, soundness of the acquisition strategy,
and reasonableness and affordability of program costs.
What GAO Found:
The FCS entered the development phase in 2003 and has not yet reached
the level of knowledge it should have attained in the pre-development
stage. The elements of a sound business case”firm requirements, mature
technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost
estimate, and sufficient funding”are still not demonstrably present.
The Army will continue building basic knowledge in areas such as
requirements and technologies for several more years.
Requirements stability. The Army has reached agreement on FCS system of
systems requirements”about 11,500”that help define how FCS units are
expected to work as a whole. But the Army must continue to work out the
technical feasibility and expected costs of the requirements for
individual FCS systems. These requirements may not be completely
stabilized until 2008. Until then, the Army expects the system-level
requirements to change and to make trade-offs to offset technical risks
and cost.
Technology maturity. None of FCS‘s 49 critical technologies was at a
level of maturity recommended by DOD policy at the start of a program.
Some technologies may not reach full maturity until after production
starts. Not having firm requirements matched with mature technologies
at the start of development is a key indicator of program risk. Also,
the Army is depending on 52 complementary programs, each of which is
essential for FCS to perform as intended. Some of these programs have
significant technical challenges; some do not have the funding needed
to complete development.
Soundness of acquisition strategy for design and production. The
current acquisition strategy for FCS is improved over the original
strategy but still calls for maturing technologies, designing systems,
and preparing for production at the same time. Even if requirements and
technologies proceed without incident, FCS design and production
process maturity will not be demonstrated until after the production
decision is made. Although production representative prototypes will
not be available, the Army plans to test all FCS systems before
committing to production. If problems are discovered in testing at that
stage, they will be very expensive to correct.
Reasonableness and affordability of program costs. The estimated cost
of the FCS program now stands at $160.7 billion, a 76 percent increase
since program start. This is a better estimate than the original, as it
embodies a more realistic schedule and scope. Including the total
investment for the 52 essential complementary programs, the FCS program
cost estimate would reach the $200 billion range. The Army has taken
steps it believes will control FCS costs. Yet, the current level of
knowledge about FCS is low, which makes it difficult to have a solid
basis for cost projections. FCS‘s long-term affordability depends on
the accuracy of cost estimates, an increased level of procurement
funding, and the level of competing demands.
What GAO Recommends:
In order to improve the FCS‘s business case, GAO is making
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that involve setting clear
expectations for progress and evaluating that progress by 2008. DOD
partially concurred with our recommendations. This report also contains
matters for congressional consideration to ensure FCS has a sound
business case before future funding commitments are made.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-367.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202)
512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Army Has Made Progress but Feasibility and Affordability of System-
level Requirements Remain Uncertain:
FCS Success Hinges on Numerous Undemonstrated Technologies and
Complementary Programs:
FCS Acquisition Strategy Will Demonstrate Design Maturity After
Production Begins:
As FCS's Higher Costs Are Recognized, Funding Availability Becomes a
Greater Challenge:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Critical Technologies' Current Status and Projections for
Reaching Technology Readiness Level 6 (TRL 6):
Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Number of FCS Critical Technologies Sorted by TRLs:
Table 2: Comparison of Original Cost Estimate and Current Cost Estimate
for FCS Program (in billions of then-year dollars):
Table 3: Annual and Cumulative FCS Funding and Planned Events and
Achievements:
Figures:
Figure 1: FCS's Core Systems:
Figure 2: Flow of FCS's Overarching Requirements to System-level
Requirements:
Figure 3: Comparison of Projected Dates for Technology Maturity:
Figure 4: FCS Acquisition Compared with Commercial Best Practices'
Approach:
Figure 5: Comparison of Original Cost Estimate and Current Cost
Estimate for FCS Program between Fiscal Years 2003 and 2026 (in
millions of then-year dollars):
Figure 6: Comparison of FCS Budget with Total Army Procurement Budget
(in billions of then-year dollars):
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FCS: Future Combat System:
JTRS: Joint Tactical Radio System:
TRL: technology readiness level:
WIN-T: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 14, 2006:
Congressional Committees:
The Department of the Army (Army) is in the midst of transforming
itself into a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force that
will be better equipped to meet the defense challenges of the future.
One of the centerpieces of the Army's transformation is the Future
Combat System (FCS), a weapon systems acquisition program that embraces
a new concept of operations, new technologies, and a new information
network of numerous ground and air vehicles, sensors, and munitions.
The Army itself calls this the "greatest technology and integration
challenge the Army has ever undertaken." The FCS concept demonstrates
the Army's desire to be proactive in preparing for the changing scope
of modern warfare. When factoring in other Army programs needed to
deliver FCS's full capability, the total investment costs are on the
order of $200 billion. Spending of this magnitude has drawn attention
in Congress because the nation is facing a large and growing deficit.
Fiscal realities are putting pressure on the Army and the rest of the
Department of Defense (DOD) to take a hard look at how it is managing
its resources for weapon acquisition programs, such as FCS.
Given the Army's challenges to date and the cost and scope of the FCS
program, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
requires GAO to report annually on the product development phase of the
FCS's acquisition. Congressional Committees and GAO agreed that this
report should analyze FCS against the basic elements of an acquisition
business case, namely: (1) firmness of requirements, (2) maturity of
critical technologies, (3) soundness of the acquisition strategy as it
relates to design and production, and (4) reasonableness and
affordability of program costs.
In conducting our work, we have contacted numerous DOD and Army
offices. We reviewed many documents pertaining to the FCS program,
attended meetings at which DOD and Army officials reviewed program
progress, and we held discussions with key DOD and Army officials on
various aspects of the program. Officials from DOD and the Army have
provided us access to sufficient information to make informed judgments
on the matters in this report. In addition, we drew from our large body
of past work on weapon systems acquisition practices. We reviewed DOD's
acquisition policy, the experiences of successful and unsuccessful DOD
programs, and the best acquisition practices of leading commercial
firms. We performed our work from June 2005 to March 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I
further discusses our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
Today, about one-third of the way and $4.7 billion through FCS's
development, the Army does not yet have the level of knowledge--such as
firm requirements and mature technologies--it needed three years ago
when it began product development. Army leadership started the program
early as part of an overall effort to change the culture of the Army
and believes that the risks in the program are manageable. While
progress has been made and efforts are continuing in the requirements
and technologies areas, the Army has not yet fulfilled the basic
elements of a sound business case for a weapon system acquisition,
including firm requirements, mature technologies, a sound strategy for
attaining design and production maturity, realistic program cost
estimates, and sufficient funding.
The Army has made significant progress defining the initial FCS system
of systems requirements, having reached agreement on nearly 11,500.
However, FCS requirements are not yet matched with program resources
because the Army still faces the daunting task of defining about 90,000
more requirements for FCS's 18 individual systems. Although firm
requirements should have been established at the start of the program,
the process of setting and refining FCS system-level requirements may
not be complete until 2008. The initial system-level requirements
defined to date are likely to change as technical feasibility and
expected costs of the system-level requirements become clearer. The
Army plans to trade off system requirements to offset technical risks
and cost, but this flexibility is not unlimited as FCS overall
capabilities are still expected to be as good as or better than those
of the current Army forces in terms of lethality, survivability,
responsiveness, and sustainability.
None of the FCS's 49 critical technologies were at an acceptable level
of maturity[Footnote 1] when the product development began. Since the
FCS program began, projected dates for maturing critical technologies
have slipped, and some technologies are not expected to mature until
very late--well into the design phases of the program and possibly into
production. Other challenges have arisen as well. Several of 52
complementary systems considered essential to FCS may not be able to
complete development when needed. Some of these programs have not yet
been fully funded, and others are facing their own technical
challenges. For example, the Joint Tactical Radio System could be a
deciding factor in FCS's overall success, but it is being restructured
because of significant development problems.
The FCS acquisition strategy is not knowledge-based: the strategy calls
for maturing technologies, designing systems, and preparing for
production concurrently. Even if requirements definition and technology
maturity proceed without incident, FCS design and production maturity
will not be demonstrated under the current acquisition strategy until
after the production decision is made. At this point, the critical
design review is planned for the seventh year in a nine-year
development, leaving little time to demonstrate the design will work as
intended before the scheduled decision to begin production. In fact,
the Army does not plan to build and test production-representative
prototypes before committing to low-rate initial production. Design
integration promises to be a major challenge, particularly for FCS's
manned ground vehicles, which have been likened in sophistication to
fighter aircraft. The late accumulation of design and production
knowledge called for by the FCS acquisition strategy increases the
likelihood that problems will be discovered in late development and
early production, when the costs of fixes will be very high.
The low level of knowledge available today on requirements and
technologies makes FCS cost projections very uncertain. Costs of the
FCS program are estimated at $160.7 billion--an increase of 76 percent
since the program began. The growth is attributable, in part, to the
restructuring that increased the program's scope and extended the
development schedule by four years. The projected costs also rose as
program managers attained more knowledge about system of systems
requirements. While the latest estimate may be better than earlier
estimates, the essential complementary programs are not included.
Including the costs of these programs would bring the required total
investment to the $200 billion range. DOD has not yet prepared an
independent estimate to validate the Army's current cost estimate. The
Army is taking steps to control the costs of the program, but these
steps may require changing or eliminating some requirements. The long-
term affordability of FCS depends on the soundness of several key
assumptions, including the accuracy of the cost estimate, the overall
level of development and procurement funding available to the Army, and
the level of competing demands.
We are making several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to
take a number of actions, prior to DOD's long-term commitment to the
program, to improve the FCS business case and establish knowledge-based
measures to guide oversight of FCS progress. DOD concurred with the
intent of our recommendations; however, it did not agree to limit its
commitment to the FCS program or to do much beyond what it had already
planned to do. As a result, this report also contains matters for
congressional consideration to ensure FCS has a sound business case
before future funding commitments are made.
Background:
The FCS concept is part of a pervasive change toward what the Army
refers to as the Future Force. The Army is reorganizing its current
forces into modular brigade combat teams, meaning troops can be
deployed on different rotational cycles as a single team or as a
cluster of teams. The Future Force is designed to transform the Army
into a more rapidly deployable and responsive force and enables the
Army to move away from the large division-centric structure of the
past. Each FCS brigade combat team is expected to be highly survivable
and the most lethal brigade-sized unit the Army has ever fielded. The
Army expects FCS-equipped brigade combat teams to provide significant
warfighting capabilities to DOD's overall joint military operations.
The Army is implementing its transformation plans at a time when
current U.S. ground forces are playing a critical role in the ongoing
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The FCS family of weapons includes 18 manned and unmanned ground
vehicles, air vehicles, sensors, and munitions that will be linked by
an information network. The systems include:
* eight new types of manned ground vehicles to replace current tanks,
infantry carriers, and self-propelled howitzers;
* four classes of unmanned aerial vehicles;
* several unmanned ground vehicles; and:
* an attack missile.
At a fundamental level, the FCS concept is to replace mass with
superior information--that is, to see and hit the enemy first rather
than to rely on heavy armor to withstand a hit. This solution attempts
to address the mismatch that has posed a dilemma to the Army for
decades. The Army's heavy forces had the necessary firepower but
required extensive support and too much time to deploy. Its light
forces could deploy rapidly but lacked firepower. If the Future Force
becomes a reality, then the Army would be better organized, staffed,
equipped, and trained for prompt and sustained land combat. This is
expected to translate into a force that is responsive, technologically
advanced, and versatile. These qualities are intended to ensure the
Future Force's long-term dominance over evolving, sophisticated
threats. The Future Force is to be offensively oriented and will employ
revolutionary concepts of operations, enabled by new technology. The
Army envisions a new way of fighting that depends on networking the
force, which involves linking people, platforms, weapons, and sensors
seamlessly together in a system of systems.
Figure 1: FCS's Core Systems:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
If successful, the FCS system of systems concept will leverage
individual capabilities of weapons and platforms and will facilitate
interoperability and open system designs. This would be a significant
improvement over the traditional approach of building superior
individual weapons that must be retrofitted and netted together after
the fact. This transformation, in terms of both operations and
equipment, is under way with the full cooperation of the Army
warfighter community. In fact, the development and acquisition of FCS
is being accomplished using a uniquely collaborative relationship
between the Army's developers, the participating contractors, and the
warfighter community.
The Army has employed a management approach that centers on a lead
systems integrator. Although there is no complete consensus on the
definition of a lead systems integrator, those we are aware of appear
to be prime contractors with increased program management
responsibilities. These responsibilities have included greater
involvement in requirements development, design, and source selection
of major system and subsystem subcontractors. Boeing is the lead
systems integrator for the FCS system development and demonstration
phase of acquisition. The FCS lead systems integrator acts on behalf of
the Army to optimize the FCS capability, maximize competition, ensure
interoperability, and maintain commonality in order to reduce life
cycle costs. The Army advised us that it did not believe it had the
resources or flexibility to use its traditional acquisition process to
field a program as complex as FCS under the aggressive timeline
established by the then-Army Chief of Staff. The Army will maintain
oversight and final approval of the lead systems integrator's
subcontracting and competition plans.
FCS Restructures the Program and Changes Contracting Approach:
As a key element of its efforts to transform itself, the Army has
recognized FCS from its outset as the greatest technology and
integration challenge it has ever undertaken. In May 2003, DOD approved
the FCS program to begin the system development and demonstration
phase, a milestone that ideally marks the completion of technology
development and the start of product development. However, FCS's entry
into this phase was premature given that the program had failed to
satisfy basic tenets of DOD acquisition policy. We have reported that,
as FCS started product development, it did not have mature technologies
or adequately defined requirements.
Responding to direction from the Army Chief of Staff, the Army
announced in July 2004 its plans to restructure the FCS program. The
Army added four years to develop and mature the manned ground vehicles,
added more demonstrations and experiments, and established an
evaluation unit to demonstrate FCS capabilities. The restructuring
reintroduced four systems that previously had been left unfunded,
raising the total number of FCS-related systems to 18. The restructure
also included plans to spin off mature FCS capabilities as they become
available to current force units. With the restructuring, the FCS
program now plans to achieve initial operational capability in fiscal
year 2015 and full operational capability in fiscal year 2017. FCS low-
rate production is expected to start in fiscal year 2012, and full-rate
production in fiscal year 2016. The Army intends to continue FCS
procurement through fiscal year 2025, eventually equipping 15 brigade
combat teams.
The restructuring was not the only major modification to the FCS
program. Because of congressional concerns that the Army's contracting
approach incorporated insufficient safeguards to protect the
government's interests, the Army is preparing a new contract that is to
be completed and finalized in March 2006 and is based on the Federal
Acquisition Regulation, which governs acquisitions within the federal
government. The new contract will incorporate standard Federal
Acquisition Regulation clauses such as those relating to procurement
integrity, Truth in Negotiations, and Cost Accounting Standards.
Previously, the lead systems integrator had been performing FCS work
for the Army under a contractual instrument called an "other
transaction agreement" that was not subject to the Federal Acquisition
Regulation. The other transaction agreement gave the Army considerable
flexibility to negotiate the terms and conditions for contractors
involved in FCS development. The Army's purpose for using such an
agreement was to encourage innovation and to use its wide latitude in
tailoring business, organizational, and technical relationships to
achieve the program goals. In April 2005, the Army decided to
incorporate into its agreement the procurement integrity, Truth in
Negotiations, and Cost Accounting Standards clauses from the
regulation.
After the Congress raised questions about the Army using an other
transaction agreement for the development of a program as large and
risky as FCS and about the Army's choice not to include standard
Federal Acquisition Regulation clauses in the agreement, the Secretary
of the Army directed that the other transaction agreement be converted
to a Federal Acquisition Regulation-based contract.[Footnote 2] All of
the work performed under the product development phase as of September
2005 will be accounted for under the prior other transaction agreement,
and all work after September 2005 will be performed under the new
contract. The Army expects the content of the program--its statement of
work--will remain largely the same, and it does not expect the cost,
schedule, and performance of the overall development effort to change
materially.
Elements of a Business Case:
We have frequently reported on the importance of using a solid,
executable business case before committing resources to a new product
development effort. In the case of DOD, a business case should be based
on DOD acquisition policy and lessons learned from leading commercial
firms and successful DOD programs. The business case in its simplest
form is demonstrated evidence that (1) the warfighter's needs are valid
and that they can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the
chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing resources--
that is, proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, and
adequate time to deliver the product when it is needed. A program
should not go forward into product development unless a sound business
case can be made. If the business case measures up, the organization
commits to the development of the product, including making the
financial investment.
At the heart of a business case is this knowledge-based approach to
product development that is both a best practice among leading
commercial firms and the approach preferred by DOD in its acquisition
regulations. For a program to deliver a successful product within
available resources, managers should demonstrate high levels of
knowledge before significant commitments are made. In essence,
knowledge supplants risk over time. This building of knowledge can be
described as three levels or knowledge points that should be attained
over the course of a program:
* First, at program start, the customer's needs should match the
developer's available resources--mature technologies, time, and
funding. An indication of this match is the demonstrated maturity of
the technologies needed to meet customer needs. The ability of the
government acquisition workforce to properly manage the effort should
also be an important consideration at program start.
* Second, about midway through development, the product's design should
be stable and demonstrate that it is capable of meeting performance
requirements. The critical design review is the vehicle for making this
determination and generally signifies the point at which the program is
ready to start building production-representative prototypes.
* Third, by the time of the production decision, the product must be
shown to be producible within cost, schedule, and quality targets and
have demonstrated its reliability. It is also the point at which the
design must demonstrate that it performs as needed through realistic
system-level testing.
The three knowledge points are related in that a delay in attaining one
delays the points that follow. Thus, if the technologies needed to meet
requirements are not mature, design and production maturity will be
delayed. On the successful commercial and defense programs we have
reviewed, managers were careful to conduct development of technology
separately from and ahead of the development of the product. For this
reason, the first knowledge point is the most important for improving
the chances of developing a weapon system within cost and schedule
estimates. DOD's acquisition policy has adopted the knowledge-based
approach to acquisitions. DOD policy requires program managers to
provide knowledge about certain aspects of a system at key points in
the acquisition process. Program managers are also required to reduce
integration risk and demonstrate product design prior to the design
readiness review and to reduce manufacturing risk and demonstrate
producibility prior to full-rate production.
The FCS program is about one-third of the way into its scheduled
product development. At this stage, it should have attained knowledge
point one, with a strategy for attaining knowledge points two and
three. Accordingly, we analyze the FCS business case first as it
pertains to firming requirements and maturing technologies, which
indicate progress against the first knowledge point. We then analyze
FCS's strategy for attaining design and production maturity. Finally,
we analyze the costs and funding estimates made to execute the FCS
business case.
Army Has Made Progress but Feasibility and Affordability of System-
level Requirements Remain Uncertain:
The Army has made significant progress defining FCS's system of systems
requirements, particularly when taking into account the daunting number
of requirements involved--nearly 11,500--at this level. Yet system-
level requirements are not yet stabilized and will continue to change,
postponing the needed match between requirements and resources. Now,
the Army and its contractors are working to complete the definition of
system-level requirements, and the challenge is in determining if those
requirements are technically feasible and affordable. Army officials
say it is almost certain that some FCS system-level requirements will
have to be modified, reduced, or eliminated; the only uncertainty is by
how much. We have previously reported that unstable requirements can
lead to cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls. Once the Army gains
a better understanding of the technical feasibility and affordability
of the system-level requirements, trade-offs between the developer and
the warfighter will have to be made, and the ripple effect of such
trade-offs on key program goals will have to be reassessed.
Army Has Largely Completed the Definition of FCS System of Systems
Requirements:
The Army has completed an FCS operational requirements document, a
mandatory step in the DOD acquisition process. This document outlines
552 requirements intended to meet the warfighter's needs and discusses
the characteristics needed for the FCS-equipped brigade combat teams to
achieve the Army's desired tactical concepts and capabilities.[Footnote
3] FCS is described in this document as a family of systems comprising
advanced, networked air-and ground-based maneuver, maneuver support,
and sustainment systems. The program has seven key performance
parameters: network-ready, networked battle command, networked
lethality, transportability, sustainability/reliability, training, and
survivability. In simpler terms, the Army has stated that the FCS-
equipped brigade combat teams must be as good as or better than current
Army forces in terms of lethality, responsiveness, sustainability, and
survivability. Since the FCS program started in May 2003, the Army and
the lead systems integrator have been working to translate those
warfighter requirements first into system of systems requirements at
the FCS level. Having this information in hand gives the Army a good
understanding of what FCS brigade combat teams should be capable of,
but more detailed knowledge is needed for each of the 18 individual
systems. Now, the Army and the lead systems integrator are delving much
deeper and more precisely to translate system of systems requirements
into more specific requirements for individual systems within FCS.
Figure 2 illustrates how the requirements laid out in the operational
requirements document flow down to the FCS's system of systems and
later to the individual system level.
Figure 2: Flow of FCS's Overarching Requirements to System-level
Requirements:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
During the requirements definition process, the Army, its lead systems
integrator, and other contractors provided feedback on the feasibility
of the requirements being proposed. The feedback sometimes resulted in
several rounds of negotiations and trade-offs before requirements could
be finalized. For example, the Army has invested much time and effort
in deciding how best to meet the FCS transportability requirements
while continuing to meet its lethality and survivability requirements.
A series of design concepts were used to examine the possibilities, and
the Army and the lead systems integrator have conducted numerous design
trade studies. Since program start, the Army has made a number of
design trade-offs that have been incorporated into the current design
concepts. For example, the current manned ground vehicle design
concepts feature a basic, lightly armored vehicle (each weighing about
19 tons) and additional armor (bringing the total vehicle weight up to
about 24 tons). This trade-off was intended to achieve an acceptable
level of survivability while maintaining a limited capability for the
vehicles to be transported on the C-130 Hercules air lifter. The Army
also decided to accept a higher weight to achieve the lethality of the
120-mm cannon for the mounted combat system. Finally, the Army decided
to accept a reduction in range inherent in the lighter weight 38-
caliber 155-mm cannon for the non-line-of-sight cannon vehicle.
In August 2005, the Army and the lead systems integrator conducted the
System of Systems Functional Review, which is a multi-disciplined
technical review used to ensure that a system can proceed into
preliminary design. The review is conducted to ensure that all system
of systems requirements have been defined and are consistent with
program budget, schedule, risk, and other constraints. The Army and the
lead systems integrator demonstrated that they had (1) essentially
completed the definition of the system of systems level requirements,
(2) established the functional baseline for the program, and (3) made
an initial allocation of functional requirements down to the individual
FCS system level. As shown in figure 2 above, at the system of systems
level, there are about 11,500 requirements. The Army anticipates that
there eventually could be eight times the number of requirements at the
FCS system level, or roughly 90,000 requirements.
For the System of Systems Functional Review, the Army prepared a number
of performance evaluations, including assessments of the entire brigade
combat team's capabilities as well as more focused evaluations of
individual FCS design concepts or requirements. The Army is conducting
performance evaluations while continuing to evaluate requirement trade-
offs and refine system-level requirements. These evaluations will be
valuable in understanding the impact of individual requirement trade-
off decisions on FCS capabilities as well as the Army's pledge that FCS
would be as good as or better than the current Army forces in terms of
lethality, survivability, responsiveness and sustainability.
FCS System-Level Requirements Are Not Yet Firm:
The Army deserves credit for having decided on so many requirements at
the system of systems level and for beginning the process allocating
functional requirements to the individual system level. However,
according to DOD policy and best practices, requirements should be
firmed up at the beginning of the product development phase. System
requirements--how big, how heavy, how fast, how strong--can each be
expressed in multiple ways. In deciding how best to address those
system-level requirements, trade-offs may be necessary. Ideally,
solutions go through a prioritization and refinement process before
final decisions can be agreed upon. But continuing to define and refine
system-level requirements three years after product development began
creates a real challenge for the other elements of the FCS business
case.
Signs of instability in FCS system-level requirements are already
evident. At the System of Systems Functional Review, an initial
assessment was made of the technical feasibility of the functional
requirements allocated to the individual FCS systems. While many are
expected to be achievable, there would be technical risk in the full
achievement of some system-level requirements including:
* mine detection;
* automatic target recognition for weapon terminal guidance;
* real-time battle damage assessment;
* chemical and radiation detection;
* weapon self-loading for some of the unmanned ground vehicles;
* manned ground vehicle countermine capabilities;
* safe operation of unmanned ground vehicles;
* network latency, quality of service, and intrusion detection;
* improvised explosive device detection and suppression;
* reliability, availability, maintainability, and testing;
* unmanned air vehicle size and weight;
* hidden target detection; and:
* sensor data fusion.
The Army's System of Systems Functional Review also underscored how
critical the FCS information network is to the achieving of many of
FCS's requirements. For example, FCS survivability depends on the
brigade-wide availability of network-based situational awareness plus
the inherent survivability of the FCS platforms. There is hardly any
aspect of FCS functionality that is not predicated on the network, and
for many key functions, the network is essential. As we will discuss
later in this report, there is considerable technical uncertainty
surrounding several key aspects of the FCS network.
In the coming months, FCS teams working on individual systems will
continue to evaluate the technical feasibility of addressing the
allocated requirements within their current design concepts. Program
officials also will be conducting functional reviews at the system
level. According to Army officials, it is almost certain that some of
the FCS system-level requirements will have to be changed; it is only
uncertain by how much. The Army does have the ability to reallocate a
requirement from one system to another. The Army plans to evaluate its
progress in defining and refining FCS system-level requirements at the
August 2006 initial preliminary design review, which signals the start
of the systems engineering process as well as the beginning of
preliminary design work. However, the Army may not have a stabilized
set of technically feasible and affordable system-level requirements
until 2008.
Concurrently, the system-level teams will be evaluating the
affordability of fully developing and producing each of the FCS systems
and platforms to meet the allocated requirements. The Army has stated
it will not exceed the target cost of $20.9 billion for the lead
systems integrator's development contract and will attempt to produce
the FCS systems and platforms within specific procurement cost targets.
Key FCS program officials have indicated to us that additional system-
level requirements changes will be needed to meet these targets.
Applying the discipline of affordability is a good step, but it can
make the requirement definition process more difficult. For example, to
meet the weight goals for the manned ground vehicles, the Army expects
to use advanced, light weight materials, such as ceramics, rather than
traditional steel for armor protection. However, these materials are
expected to be much more costly to produce than steel. To meet the
individual manned ground vehicle's survivability requirements, each
vehicle will have to be equipped for detection avoidance, target
acquisition avoidance, hit avoidance, ballistic protection, and kill
avoidance. Further, each manned ground vehicle would have to carry
sensors that can detect, classify, recognize, identify, and locate
enemy combatants. All of these capabilities will add to the cost of
developing and producing the manned ground vehicles. Finally, the FCS
concept depends, among other things, on the capabilities of the
unmanned ground vehicles and unmanned air vehicles to enhance the
survivability of the rest of the brigade combat team. However, a high
number of unmanned ground vehicles and unmanned air vehicles themselves
are expected to be lost to enemy fire. In the end, the Army may have to
either provide additional unmanned ground vehicles and/or unmanned air
vehicles or risk the loss of even more valuable manned ground vehicles
and soldiers. Either option would involve additional costs.
Cumulative Effects of Individual Requirement Trade-Offs Must Be
Measured:
Since the start of the program, the Army has already made some
requirements trade-offs. The Army realizes that the ripple effects of
requirements trade-offs on the anticipated FCS capabilities will need
to be thoroughly assessed to determine if the fundamental tenets of the
program--such as being as lethal and survivable as the current Army
force--are still intact. For example, in deciding to maintain a
requirement for the manned ground vehicles to be transportable on C-130
aircraft, the Army determined that the vehicles could still meet their
survivability and lethality requirements while meeting the size and
weight restrictions needed to be compatible with the C-130 operating
limitations. This solution involves, in part, the use of additional
armor that would be put on the vehicle after it had been flown by a C-
130 to its new operating location. The Army made this decision with the
knowledge that the C-130 aircraft's capability to transport the FCS
vehicles would be very limited and that the solution would require more
C-130s to transport vehicles than previously planned. Also, as we
pointed out in our March 2005 testimony, the development and
integration of manned ground vehicle technologies was made vastly more
difficult by the Army's decision to retain the C-130 transportability
requirement. As the FCS development effort proceeds, the Army will have
to regularly assess whether the manned ground vehicles will still be
able to meet their lethality, survivability, and other requirements as
well as the assumed operational value of maintaining the C-130
transportability requirement. Decision makers need to be kept informed
on the status of the program's basic tenets, such as FCS capabilities
being as good as or better than those of current Army forces.
As the technical feasibility and affordability of requirements are
better understood, additional FCS requirements trade-offs will have to
be made and their ripple effects identified. For example, if the
requirements for FCS missile and munition terminal guidance are changed
due to feasibility or cost issues, that may not have an impact only on
lethality, but also on overall FCS survivability because the Army
maintains that FCS survivability will be enhanced if it is able to see
first and kill first. Also, if the FCS weapon terminal guidance
requirements are changed, the brigade combat teams may have to carry
and use more weapons than expected, which would have an impact on the
team's sustainability. As another example, if the FCS countermine
requirements are changed, then FCS manned ground vehicles may be less
survivable and mobile. The Army may have to add additional armor to the
manned ground vehicles, directly affecting their weight and impacting
their transportability and sustainability. Finally, if the reliability,
availability, maintainability, and testing requirements are adjusted,
the brigade combat teams may have to carry more spare parts and use
more maintenance personnel than originally anticipated.
The Army is aiming to field FCS systems and platforms that meet all of
its minimally acceptable threshold requirements, but according to
program officials, that may not be possible for all requirements.
Further, it is unclear at this point if the resulting set of system-
level requirements will yield an overall FCS capability that will be
acceptable to the Army as a whole and its user representative, the
Training and Doctrine Command. The Training and Doctrine Command has
had extensive involvement in the program to date and would have to
approve any major changes in FCS requirements. At the System of Systems
Functional Review, the Training and Doctrine Command representatives
pledged their continuing cooperation in the process but also vowed to
appeal to the Army leadership if the FCS design concepts do not provide
sufficient capabilities to meet their wartime needs.
FCS Success Hinges on Numerous Undemonstrated Technologies and
Complementary Programs:
According to the latest independent assessment,[Footnote 4] the Army
has not fully matured any of the technologies critical to FCS's
success. Some of FCS's critical technologies may not reach a high level
of maturity until the final major phase of acquisition, the start of
production. The Army considers a lower level of demonstration as
acceptable maturity, but even against this standard, only one-third of
the technologies are mature. We have reported that proceeding into
product development without demonstrating mature technologies increases
the risk of cost growth and schedule delays throughout the life of the
program. The Army is also facing challenges with several of the
complementary programs considered essential for meeting FCS's
requirements. Some complementary programs are experiencing technology
difficulties, and some have not been fully funded. These difficulties
underscore the gap between requirements and available resources that
must be closed if the FCS business case is to be executable.
Critical Technologies Are a Long Way from Reaching Maturity:
Technology readiness levels (TRL) are measures pioneered by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and adopted by DOD to
determine whether technologies were sufficiently mature to be
incorporated into a weapon system. Our prior work has found TRLs to be
a valuable decision-making tool because they can presage the likely
consequences of incorporating a technology at a given level of maturity
into a product development. The maturity level of a technology can
range from paper studies (level 1), to prototypes that can be tested in
a realistic environment (level 7), to an actual system that has proven
itself in mission operations (level 9). The definitions of each TRL can
be found in appendix IV. According to DOD acquisition policy, a
technology should have been demonstrated in a relevant environment (TRL
6) or, preferably, in an operational environment (TRL 7) to be
considered mature enough to use for product development in systems
integration. Best practices of leading commercial firms and successful
DOD programs have shown that critical technologies should be mature to
at least a TRL 7 before the start of product development.
In the case of the FCS program, the latest independent technology
assessment shows that none of the critical technologies are at TRL 7,
and only 18 of the 49 technologies currently rated have demonstrated
TRL 6. None of the critical technologies may reach TRL 7 until the
production decision in fiscal year 2012, according to Army officials.
Five technologies that the Army previously considered to be critical to
FCS are no longer being monitored for technology maturity, although
those technologies continue to be under development by either the Army
or another military service. Table 1 sorts FCS's critical technologies
according to readiness levels, and their progression over the last two
years.
Table 1: Number of FCS Critical Technologies Sorted by TRLs:
TRL: TRL 7 and higher;
Critical technology assessment as of April 2003: 1;
Critical technology assessment as of April 2005: 0.
TRL: TRL 6;
Critical technology assessment as of April 2003: 7;
Critical technology assessment as of April 2005: 18.
TRL: TRL 5 and lower;
Critical technology assessment as of April 2003: 24;
Critical technology assessment as of April 2005: 31.
TRL: Total;
Critical technology assessment as of April 2003: 32;
Critical technology assessment as of April 2005: 49.
Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation):
Note: The April 2003 assessment was organized into 31 technology areas,
one of which had two different TRL ratings for separate technologies.
For the April 2005 assessment, the original 31 technology areas were
subdivided into 54 individual technologies. Five of the original
technologies are no longer being tracked, leaving a total of 49.
[End of table]
Projected dates for FCS technologies to reach TRL 6 have slipped
significantly since the start of the program, as shown in figure 3.
Figure 3: Comparison of Projected Dates for Technology Maturity:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In the 2003 technology assessment, 87 percent of FCS's critical
technologies were projected to be mature to a TRL 6 by 2005. In April
2005, 31 percent of the technologies were expected to mature to a TRL 6
by 2005, and all technologies are not expected to be mature to that
level until 2009. Several key technologies have slipped. For example,
to meet FCS survivability and sustainability requirements, the Army
requires High Density Packaged Power, a technology designed to provide
high-output, constant-level, stored power to the FCS manned ground
vehicles. This technology was originally projected to reach TRL 6
maturity by fiscal year 2003. In the latest assessment, however, that
date slipped nearly five years to fiscal year 2008. Another technology,
Quality of Service Algorithms, which are protocols implemented in
network software and used to determine how information is moved and
tracked to users, was originally expected to reach TRL 6 by fiscal year
2004, but now projected maturity has slipped three years. The Army
originally anticipated the Lightweight Hull and Vehicle Armor to reach
TRL 6 by fiscal year 2003; however, this has been delayed by five
years. Appendix III lists all 54 critical technologies, their current
TRL status, and the projected date for reaching TRL 6.
Technology and Integration Challenges for Manned Ground Vehicles:
FCS features eight types of manned ground vehicles, each requiring the
development of numerous technologies that must be brought together in
an integrated design to deliver required capabilities. The Mounted
Combat System will require a newly developed lightweight weapon for
lethality; a hybrid electric drive system and a high-density engine for
mobility; advanced armors, an active protection system, and advanced
signature management systems for survivability; and the Joint Tactical
Radio System with the wideband networking waveform for communications
and network connectivity. FCS manned ground vehicles are expected to be
revolutionary, not only because of their proposed capabilities but also
in terms of their size and weight. They have been likened in complexity
to fighter aircraft. Under other circumstances, each of the eight
manned ground systems would be a major defense acquisition program in
its own right.
Since 2003, the Army has been working to develop a series of design
concepts and is currently evaluating the technical feasibility and
affordability of the system-level requirements that have been allocated
to each of the eight vehicles. By August 2006, the Army expects to
decide which of those requirements will be pursued in the preliminary
design, and which ones will have to be changed or deleted. Among many
others, the achievement of the following manned ground vehicles
requirements have been identified as involving technical and design
challenges:
* engine,
* silent watch (which relates to battery capacity),
* 14.5-mm survivability,
* signature management,
* lightweight track, and:
* power distribution.
As we noted earlier, several critical technologies are not projected to
mature to a TRL 6 until fiscal year 2008 or 2009, at or around the
point when the program should be starting detailed designs for each
vehicle. Further, it should be noted that the step to mature
technologies from a TRL 6 to a TRL 7 is often difficult and
unpredictable. All told, the Army is unlikely to be able to match
requirements with technical and design solutions until at least fiscal
year 2008.
In addition, manned ground vehicles face several technology and
integration challenges.
* The Active Protection System is expected to protect manned ground
vehicles by sensing and destroying such threats as incoming tank rounds
and rocket-propelled grenades. However, technology assessments have
recognized that (1) it may not be possible to have a single, integrated
active protection system that protects against all threats, (2) the
Threat Warning System, a technology used to detect and track incoming
threats at extended ranges, will not be mature to TRL 6 until fiscal
2009, (3) the part of the system to defeat kinetic energy threats will
require significant effort from the science and technology
community,[Footnote 5] and (4) protection technology may have limited
utility in urban environments due to collateral effects.
* The Army is considering integrating an electromagnetic armor as a
defense layer for manned ground vehicles. However, electromagnetic
armor is still an immature technology and poses integration issues,
including requiring a large amount of power storage capability that may
not be possible within vehicle design and weight constraints. Component
maturation and size reduction will be needed to keep electromagnetic
armor as a viable survivability approach.
* The integration of the 120-mm cannon on the Mounted Combat System
vehicle poses design challenges. While the lightweight 120-mm cannon
has achieved TRL 6 maturity that meets baseline requirements for the
gun, this testing was conducted on a stationary hardstand and not on a
turret or vehicle prototype. Those tests are planned for fiscal years
2007 and 2009, respectively. Realistic testing is important because
program officials cannot be certain whether the turret and vehicle
design will be able to withstand the gun blast without damage to the
vehicle.
* The integration of the Lightweight Hull and Vehicle Armor in manned
ground vehicles may also prove to be difficult, and there is a risk
that the proposed lightweight armor will not satisfy transportability
requirements while providing adequate protection. The design and
integration issues must be addressed by large-scale ballistic testing,
particularly for the cutting-edge ceramic armors being considered.
* Mine protection technology, intended to protect manned ground
vehicles and occupants from mine blast, is still immature and has
significant challenges that include blast armor development, armor
repair, and structural and weight integration. Because of its immature
status, the program is considering alternatives for its development.
The acceptable resolution of at least some of these issues--such as
those involving the active protection system, lightweight hull and
armor, and mine protection--may be important enough that they represent
"go/no go" markers in the development of manned ground vehicles. For
example, if the active protection system technology and integration
issues cannot be acceptably resolved and its capabilities may be less
than needed, it is unclear if the FCS program will be able to complete
the detailed designs of the manned ground vehicles and meet the
expectations for critical design review.
To meet the program's goal to have manned ground vehicle prototypes
available in late fiscal year 2010 or early fiscal year 2011, their
fabrication would probably have to start well before design stability
is achieved. If technology and integration issues identified to date
are not resolved by that point, it is questionable whether the level of
system integration that may be available for the prototype designs and
if their demonstration will be able to yield acceptable results.
Many Complementary Programs Are at Risk:
The FCS program may have to interoperate or integrate with as many as
170 programs, some of which are in development and many are currently
fielded programs. Many complementary programs are not being developed
exclusively for FCS and are outside the direct control of the FCS
program. Because of the complementary programs' importance to FCS, the
Army closely monitors how well those efforts will synchronize with the
FCS program. Of all the complementary programs, 52 are considered
essential to meeting FCS key performance parameters. However, many of
these programs have technical or funding problems and generally have
uncertain futures.
FCS Information Network Depends on Complementary Programs:
We reported in June 2005 that two key systems of the FCS network, the
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and Warfighter Information Network-
Tactical (WIN-T), were struggling to meet ambitious user requirements,
steep technical challenges, and aggressive schedules, which raised
uncertainty about the ability of the FCS network to perform as intended
and threatened the schedule for fielding Future Force
capabilities.[Footnote 6] We recommended that the Secretary of Defense
establish low-risk schedules for JTRS and WIN-T and synchronize the FCS
schedule with a demonstration of JTRS and WIN-T capabilities. DOD
generally concurred and indicated it has begun taking action to address
our recommendations. Since our report, JTRS has been undergoing a major
restructuring to reduce technical and programmatic risks. In addition,
WIN-T is being rebaselined to address the Army's recent shift in focus
to meet both near-and future-term requirements, as well as to better
synchronize with FCS. The results of the JTRS and WIN-T program
restructurings are not expected to be completed and approved until
later this year, however; preliminary indications are that the programs
will focus on delivering incremental capabilities to support the needs
of FCS and other users.
JTRS:
JTRS is a family of software-based radios that is to provide the high
capacity, high-speed information link to vehicles, weapons, aircraft,
and soldiers. The JTRS program to develop radios for ground vehicles
and helicopters--referred to as Cluster 1--began product development in
June 2002 with an aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and lack
of clearly defined and stable requirements. The Army has not been able
to mature the technologies needed to provide radios that both generate
sufficient power as well as meet platform size and weight constraints.
In addition, the radio design is not sufficient to meet security
requirements for operating in an open network environment. These
factors have contributed to significant cost and schedule problems. In
early 2005, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Army to
stop work on portions of the Cluster 1 development and have a newly
established JTRS Joint Program Executive Office[Footnote 7] conduct an
assessment of the program and develop options for restructuring the
program.
A second JTRS program--referred to as Cluster 5--to develop different
variants of small radios that will be carried by soldiers and be
embedded in several FCS core systems, also entered product development
with immature technologies and a lack of well-defined requirements.
Since the program began in 2004, it has faced significant technical
challenges due to the small size, weight, power, and large data
processing requirements for the radios. As a result, the Army
recognized in 2005 that the Cluster 5 program was not sufficiently
synchronized with the FCS program and it began assessing the
feasibility of accelerating the development of some of the small form
Cluster 5 radios. However, in light of the problems encountered with
the Cluster 1 program, DOD directed the JTRS Joint Program Executive
Office to conduct a broad assessment of all the JTRS components and
identify more well defined and executable increments for Cluster 5.
In December 2005, DOD approved a preliminary plan for restructuring the
JTRS program, including Clusters 1 and 5. Details of the restructuring,
however, are still to be worked out and the new program is not expected
to be formally approved by DOD until late 2006. According to JTRS Joint
Program Executive Office officials, the proposed program will address
many of the concerns we raised in our July 2005 report and be
structured to deliver capabilities in increments rather than all at
once. The first increment is intended to support the FCS schedule.
However, there are still cost, schedule, and technical risks associated
with the planned delivery of increment one capabilities, and therefore
it is unclear whether the capabilities will be available in time for
the first spin-out of FCS capabilities to current forces in 2008.
WIN-T:
The WIN-T program is intended to provide an integrated communications
network to connect Army units on the move with higher levels of command
and provide the Army's tactical extension to the Global Information
Grid, a separate, DOD-wide networked force. The WIN-T program began
with an aggressive acquisition schedule and entered product development
with only three of its 12 critical technologies close to full maturity.
The program office expects that all 12 critical technologies
demonstrated during a November 2005 developmental test/operational test
event will be assessed as close to fully mature. In August 2005, the
Department of the Army conducted a study which explored options for
better synchronizing three of its major system development efforts--
FCS, JTRS, and WIN-T. As a result of this study, the WIN-T program will
be rebaselined to meet emerging requirements. A new WIN-T capability
development document will support the rebaselining of the program and
is currently under review. A milestone B reexamination to rebaseline
the program is planned for July 2006, and a new date for the WIN-T
production decision will be established then.
The restructuring of the JTRS and WIN-T programs and the success in
developing these capabilities could well be deciding factors in the
overall success of the FCS program. If JTRS and WIN-T do not work as
intended, there will not be sufficient battlefield information for the
FCS units to operate effectively. Because the network is so crucial to
the overall success of FCS, we have suggested that its development and
demonstration should precede major commitments to other elements of the
FCS program, particularly the manned ground vehicles. However, the Army
has admitted that the development of the network is several years
behind the development of other elements of the FCS program.
Funding Issues Cloud Future of Other Complementary Programs:
The future of other complementary programs is in doubt primarily
because of funding issues. The Compact Kinetic Energy Missile was to
provide superior lethality against current tanks, bunkers, buildings,
and future threat armor. The Joint Common Missile was to provide line-
of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight capabilities and could be employed in
a fire-and-forget mode or a precision attack mode. The Army has not yet
decided if it will fund the full development of the Compact Kinetic
Energy Missile. In December 2004, a DOD program budget decision deleted
all procurement funding for the Joint Common Missile.[Footnote 8] The
absence of these systems could reduce the brigade combat teams' ability
to fight at stand off ranges, thereby reducing lethality and the
ability to dictate the terms of the engagement. The Mid-Range Munition
is to provide beyond-line-of-sight precision munitions for the mounted
combat system, but its development is unfunded after fiscal year 2007.
Elimination of the Mid-Range Munition would compromise the beyond-line-
of-sight capability--which is a FCS threshold operational requirement-
-as well as the Army's ability to shape the battle space and dictate
the terms of the engagement. The Precision Guidance Kit is a technology
for projectiles that provides greater accuracy at extended ranges, but
the development of this technology is partially unfunded. If this
technology is not available for FCS, then long-range projectiles would
be less accurate, reducing their effectiveness and requiring additional
rounds to be fired at the threat. As a result, the brigade combat team
may need to carry additional munitions, an outcome that imposes a
logistical and transportability burden. The Army also concedes that
there is no funding to develop the following munitions needed to meet
selected requirements: Advanced Kinetic Energy munition, Advance Multi-
Purpose Munition, Javelin Block II missile, Loitering Attack Missile,
and non-lethal munitions.
Recognizing the multiple issues surrounding complementary programs, the
Army is reassessing its list of 52 essential programs. When that list
is finalized in the coming months, the Army will have to determine how
to replace any capabilities eliminated from the list. As with
requirements, the cumulative effects of changes in technologies and
complementary programs on overall FCS capabilities are important to
measure. The Army's inability to fund all essential complementary
programs raises concerns about the gap between requirements and
resources.
FCS Acquisition Strategy Will Demonstrate Design Maturity After
Production Begins:
The knowledge deficits for requirements and technologies have created
enormous challenges for devising an acquisition strategy that can
demonstrate the maturity of design and production processes. Even if
requirements setting and technology maturity proceed without incident,
FCS design and production maturity will still not be demonstrated until
after the production decision is made. Production is the most expensive
phase in which to resolve design or other problems. Several efforts
within the FCS program are facing significant problems that may
eventually involve reductions in promised capabilities and may lead to
cost overruns and schedule delays.
FCS Acquisition Strategy Involves Concurrent Development and Is Not
Knowledge-Based:
The Army's acquisition strategy for FCS does not reflect a knowledge-
based approach. Figure 4 shows how the Army's strategy for acquiring
FCS involves concurrent development, design reviews that occur late,
and other issues that are out of alignment with the knowledge-based
approach outlined in DOD policy.
Ideally, the preliminary design review occurs at or near the start of
product development. Activities leading up to the preliminary design
review include, among others, translating system requirements into
design specifics. Doing so can help reveal key technical and
engineering challenges and can help determine if a mismatch exists
between what the customer wants and what the product developer can
deliver. Scheduling the preliminary design review early in product
development is intended to help stabilize cost, schedule, and
performance expectations. The critical design review ideally occurs
midway into the product development phase. The critical design review
should confirm that the system design performs as expected and is
stable enough to build production-representative prototypes for
testing. The building of production-representative prototypes helps
decision makers confirm that the system can be produced and
manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets. According to
the knowledge-based approach, a high percentage of design drawings
should be completed and released to manufacturing at critical design
review. The period leading up to critical design review is referred to
as system integration, when individual components of a system are
brought together, and the period after the review is called system
demonstration, when the system as a whole demonstrates its reliability
as well as its ability to work in the intended environment.
The Army has scheduled the preliminary design review in fiscal year
2008, about five years after the start of product development. The
critical design review is scheduled in fiscal year 2010, just two years
after the scheduled preliminary design review and the planned start of
detailed design.[Footnote 9] This is not to suggest that the two design
reviews for the FCS could have been scheduled earlier but rather that
commitments to production are scheduled too soon afterward. The timing
of the design reviews is indicative of how late knowledge will be
attained in the program, assuming all goes according to plan. The
critical design review is scheduled just two years before the initial
FCS production decision in fiscal year 2012, leaving little time for
product demonstration and correction of any issues that are identified
at that time. The Army is planning to have prototypes of all FCS
systems available for testing prior to low-rate initial production. For
example, manned ground vehicle prototypes are expected to be available
in late 2010 and early 2011 for developmental and qualification
testing. However, these prototypes are not expected to be production-
representative prototypes and may not be fully integrated. Whereas the
testing of fully integrated, production-representative prototypes
demonstrate design maturity and their fabrication can demonstrate
production process maturity, neither of these knowledge points will be
attained until after the production decision is made.
Figure 4: FCS Acquisition Compared with Commercial Best Practices'
Approach:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The FCS program is thus susceptible to late-cycle churn, a condition
that we reported on in 2000.[Footnote 10] Late cycle churn is a phrase
private industry has used to describe the efforts to fix a significant
problem that is discovered late in a product's development. Churn
refers to the additional--and unanticipated--time, money, and effort
that must be invested to overcome problems discovered through testing.
Problems are most serious when they delay product delivery, increase
product cost, or "escape" to the customer. The discovery of problems in
testing conducted late in development is a fairly common occurrence on
DOD programs, as is the attendant late cycle churn. Often, tests of a
full system, such as launching a missile or flying an aircraft, become
the vehicles for discovering problems that could have been found out
earlier and corrected less expensively. When significant problems are
revealed late in a weapon system's development, the reaction--or churn-
-can take several forms: extending schedules to increase the investment
in more prototypes and testing, terminating the program, or redesigning
and modifying weapons that have already made it to the field. While DOD
has found it acceptable to accommodate such problems over the years,
this will be a difficult proposition for the FCS given the magnitude of
its cost in an increasingly competitive environment for investment
funds.
The Army is proceeding with its plans to mitigate FCS risks using
modeling, simulation, emulation, and system integration laboratories.
This approach is a necessary aspect of the Army acquisition strategy
and is designed to reduce the dependence on late testing to gain
valuable insights about many aspects of FCS development, including
design progress. However, on a first-of-a-kind system--like FCS--that
represents a radical departure from current systems and warfighting
concepts, actual testing of all the components integrated together is
the final proof that the FCS system of systems concept works both as
predicted and as needed.
As FCS's Higher Costs Are Recognized, Funding Availability Becomes a
Greater Challenge:
The total cost for the FCS program, now estimated at $160.7 billion
(then-year dollars), has climbed 76 percent from the Army's first
estimate. Because uncertainties remain regarding FCS's system-level
requirements and the Army faces significant challenges in technology
and design maturity, we believe the Army's latest cost estimate still
lacks a firm knowledge base. Furthermore, this latest estimate does not
include complementary programs that are essential for FCS to perform as
intended, or the necessary funding for spin-outs. The Army has taken
some steps to help manage the growing cost of FCS, including
establishing cost ceilings or targets for development and production.
However, program officials told us that setting cost limits may result
in accepting lower capabilities. As FCS's higher costs are recognized,
it remains unclear whether the Army will have the ability to fully fund
the planned annual procurement costs for the FCS current program of
record. FCS affordability depends on the accuracy of the cost estimate,
the overall level of development and procurement funding available to
the Army, and the level of competing demands.
FCS Costs Have Increased as Army Attains More Information, but Firm
Knowledge Base Still Lacking:
At the start of product development, FCS program officials estimated
that the program would require about $20 billion in then-year dollars
for research, development, testing, and evaluation and about $72
billion to procure the FCS systems to equip 15 brigade combat teams. At
that time, program officials could only derive the cost estimate on the
basis of what they knew then--requirements were still undefined and
technologies were immature. The total FCS program is now expected to
cost $160.7 billion in then-year dollars, a 76 percent increase. Table
2 summarizes the growth of the FCS cost estimate.
Table 2: Comparison of Original Cost Estimate and Current Cost Estimate
for FCS Program (in billions of then-year dollars):
Research, development, testing, and evaluation;
Original estimate: $19.6;
Revised estimate (as of 1/2006): $30.5;
Percentage increase: 56%.
Procurement;
Original estimate: $71.8;
Revised estimate (as of 1/2006): $130.2;
Percentage increase: 81%.
Total;
Original estimate: $91.4;
Revised estimate (as of 1/2006): $160.7;
Percentage increase: 76%.
Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
According to the Army, the current cost estimate is more realistic,
better informed, and based on a more reasonable schedule. The estimate
accounts for the restructure of the FCS program and its increased
scope, the four-year extension to the product development schedule, the
reintroduction of four systems that had been previously deferred, and
the addition of a spin-out concept whereby mature FCS capabilities
would be provided, as they become available, to current Army forces.
Under the original estimate, the program planned to acquire enough FCS
equipment for an average of two brigade combat teams per year and to
equip all 15 by fiscal year 2020. Army officials told us that the
current cost estimate incorporates the lengthened development schedule
and a more realistic procurement plan under which the program will
procure 1.5 brigade combat teams per year (versus two per year in the
original cost estimate), reaching 15 complete brigade combat teams by
fiscal year 2025. This cost estimate has also benefited from progress
made in defining the FCS system of systems requirements.
Figure 5 compares the funding profiles for the original program and for
the latest restructured program.
Figure 5: Comparison of Original Cost Estimate and Current Cost
Estimate for FCS Program between Fiscal Years 2003 and 2026 (in
millions of then-year dollars):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The current FCS funding profile is lower than the original through
fiscal year 2013, but is substantially higher than the original after
fiscal year 2013. Stretching out FCS development by four years freed up
about $9 billion in funding through fiscal year 2011 for allocation to
other Army initiatives. Originally, FCS annual funding was not to
exceed $10 billion in any one year. Now, the cost estimate is expected
to exceed $10 billion in each of nine years. While it is a more
accurate reflection of program costs than the original estimate, the
latest estimate is still based on a low level of knowledge about
whether FCS will work as intended. Also, the latest cost estimate has
not yet been independently validated, as called for by DOD's
acquisition policy. The Cost Analysis Improvement Group will not
provide its updated independent estimate until spring 2006, for the
planned Defense Acquisition Board review of the FCS program in May
2006.
The latest cost estimate does not include all the costs that will be
needed to field FCS capabilities. For instance, the costs of the 52
essential complementary programs are separate, and some of those costs
could be substantial. For example, the costs of the Joint Tactical
Radio System Clusters 1 and 5 programs were expected to be about $32.6
billion (then-year dollars).[Footnote 11] Some complementary programs,
such as the Mid-Range Munition and Javelin Block II, are currently not
funded for their full development. These and other unfunded programs
would have to compete for already tight funding. Furthermore, program
officials told us the procurement of the spin-outs from the FCS program
to current Army forces is not yet entirely funded. Procuring the FCS
items expected to be spun out to current forces is expected to cost
about $19 billion, and the needed installation kits may add another $4
billion. Adding these items to the FCS cost estimate brings the total
required investment from the Army to the $200 billion range.
The Army is planning to make substantial financial investments in the
FCS program before key knowledge is gained on requirements,
technologies, system designs, and system performance. Table 3 shows the
annual and cumulative funding and the level of knowledge to be attained
each fiscal year.
Table 3: Annual and Cumulative FCS Funding and Planned Events and
Achievements:
Fiscal year: 2003;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 0.5; Annual research, development,
testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars): 158.9;
Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 158.9; Planned events and achievements: Start of
product development.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 5.9; Annual research, development,
testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars): 1,637.3;
Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 1,796.2; Planned events and achievements: Program
restructured.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 15.5; Annual research,
development, testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars):
2,929.9; Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation
funding (in millions of dollars): 4,726.1; Planned events and
achievements: System of Systems Functional Review; system of systems
requirements stabilized; cost estimate updated.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 26.7; Annual research,
development, testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars):
3,398.4; Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation
funding (in millions of dollars): 8,124.5; Planned events and
achievements: Initial preliminary design review; initial system-level
requirements.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 38.7; Annual research,
development, testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars):
3,669.4; Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation
funding (in millions of dollars): 11,793.9; Planned events and
achievements: [Empty].
Fiscal year: 2008;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 50.7; Annual research,
development, testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars):
3,655.6; Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation
funding (in millions of dollars): 15,449.5; Planned events and
achievements: Preliminary design review; most technologies reach TRL 6;
initial critical design review; final system-level requirements.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 61.9; Annual research,
development, testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars):
3,419.2; Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation
funding (in millions of dollars): 18,868.7; Planned events and
achievements: All technologies reach TRL 6.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 72.6; Annual research,
development, testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars):
3,256.0; Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation
funding (in millions of dollars): 22,124.7; Planned events and
achievements: Critical design review; limited user test 2; some
prototypes available.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 81.8; Annual research,
development, testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars):
2,799.9; Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation
funding (in millions of dollars): 24,924.6; Planned events and
achievements: Design readiness review; all system prototypes available.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 88.2; Annual research,
development, testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars):
1,952.3; Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation
funding (in millions of dollars): 26,876.9; Planned events and
achievements: Technologies reach full TRL 7 maturity; initial
production decision; limited user test 3; initial system of systems
demonstration.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 92.9; Annual research,
development, testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars):
1,410.8; Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation
funding (in millions of dollars): 28,287.7; Planned events and
achievements: [Empty].
Fiscal year: 2014;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 96.7; Annual research,
development, testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars):
1,167.3; Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation
funding (in millions of dollars): 29,455; Planned events and
achievements: Limited user test 4; full system of systems
demonstration; fielding start brigade combat teams.
Fiscal year: 2015;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 99.6; Annual research,
development, testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars):
901.7; Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation
funding (in millions of dollars): 30,356.7; Planned events and
achievements: Initial operational capability.
Fiscal year: 2016;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 100; Annual research, development,
testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars): 108.3;
Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 30,465; Planned events and achievements: Initial
operational test and evaluation; full- rate production decision.
Fiscal year: 2017;
Percentage of funding spent to date: [Empty]; Annual research,
development, testing, and evaluation funding (in millions of dollars):
[Empty]; Cumulative research, development, testing, and evaluation
funding (in millions of dollars): [Empty]; Planned events and
achievements: Full operational capability.
[End of table]
Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analyst and presentation):
Through fiscal year 2006, about $8 billion will have been spent on FCS
development efforts. However, many pre-development activities, such as
requirements definition and technology development, were slated for
this period. About one-half of FCS's development funding, or about $15
billion, will be spent by the time most critical technologies are
mature to TRL 6 and the preliminary design review is conducted. About
$22 billion, or over 70 percent of the total funding, will be spent by
the expected time of the critical design review. Further, about 88
percent will have been spent before an initial demonstration of FCS
capabilities is accomplished.
Army Has Taken Steps to Control FCS Program Costs:
The Army has taken several steps to help manage the growing cost of
FCS. Program officials told us they have budgeted for development risk
by building a total of $5 billion into the FCS cost estimates to cover
risk. Also, program officials have said that they will not exceed the
$20.9 billion cost ceiling of the lead systems integrator's development
contract, but may have to modify, reduce, or delete FCS requirements to
stay within this target. For example, the Army has prioritized each of
the FCS requirements. If one or more of the highest priority
requirements ultimately cost more to develop than anticipated, the Army
plans to modify, reduce, or delete a lower priority requirement. In
addition to the ceiling on FCS development costs, the Army says it will
focus on reducing the average unit production cost of the FCS brigade
combat teams. To do this, the Army is evaluating and improving
producibility of designs early in the program and has given the
contractor incentives to reduce the unit costs.
The Army monitors the FCS program's development progress through its
earned value management system. This is a tool by which the program
manager can monitor the technical, schedule, and cost parameters of the
contract. As the program proceeds, the Army and the lead systems
integrator can determine the status of each portion and can take
corrective actions as problems occur. While the earned value system
currently shows that the program slightly exceeds schedule expectations
and is below estimated cost against the restructured baseline, program
officials said it is too early to broadly interpret these data in light
of the recent rebaseline of the program. At this point, the Army
believes that the data are not yet mature enough to develop trends and
make predictions.
In addition, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in early fiscal year
2006, asked each military service to provide additional adjustments to
their projected budgets. The Army, in particular, was asked to decrease
its budget by $11.7 billion from fiscal year 2007 to 2011. At this
point, the FCS funding profile has not been affected.
Future Funding May Not Be Sufficient to Cover Projected FCS Procurement
Costs:
The affordability of the FCS program depends on several key
assumptions. First, the program must proceed without exceeding its
currently projected costs. Second, the Army's annual procurement budget
is expected to grow, from about $11 billion (then-year dollars) in
fiscal year 2006 to at least $20 billion in future years. The Army's
projected budget also includes $5 billion per year from fiscal year
2007 through 2011 for its initiative to convert current Army forces to
modular units. The Army is counting on its modularity initiative for
brigade combat teams to be completed by fiscal year 2014, just as FCS
procurement dollars begin to ramp up. However, recent GAO work[Footnote
12] has indicated that modularity efforts to date have exceeded
original estimates and remain likely to further exceed current cost
estimates. Army officials further told us that they expect to rely on
supplemental funding for the war on terrorism and Operation Iraqi
Freedom for the duration of those efforts plus two additional years.
Within that supplemental funding, about $4 billion per year is
projected to be needed to refurbish Army equipment used in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The Army also assumes that (1) it will realize savings of
about $5 billion per year from fiscal year 2005 through 2011 from
business process engineering and (2) Congress will continue to provide
additional annual funding of about $3 billion for higher Army troop
levels.
Figure 6 compares the projected FCS budget with the funds the Army
projects for its total procurement budget.
Figure 6: Comparison of FCS Budget with Total Army Procurement Budget
(in billions of then-year dollars):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Army's annual procurement budget--not including funds specifically
allocated for the modularity initiative--is expected to grow from about
$11 billion in fiscal year 2006 to at least $20 billion by fiscal year
2011. Even if this optimistic projection comes to pass, FCS annual
procurement costs will dominate the Army procurement funding. If the
Army budget remains at fiscal year 2011 levels, FCS procurement will
represent about 60-70 percent of Army procurement from fiscal years
2014 to 2022. With the remainder, the Army will have to address current
force upgrades, including spin-outs from FCS, the procurement of FCS
complementary programs, aviation procurement, trucks, ammunition, and
other equipment. Further, FCS will have to compete for funding with
other Army "big-ticket" items, such as missile defense systems and the
future heavy lift helicopter.
The large annual procurement costs for FCS are expected to begin in
fiscal year 2012, which is beyond the current Future Years Defense Plan
period (fiscal years 2006-2011). This situation is typically called a
funding bow wave. The term bow wave is used to describe a requirement
for more funds just beyond the years covered in the current defense
plan that are subject to funding constraints. As it prepares the next
defense plan, the Army will face the challenge of allocating sufficient
funding to meet the increasing needs for FCS procurement in fiscal
years 2012 and 2013. According to an Army official, if all the needed
funding cannot be identified, the Army will consider reducing the FCS
procurement rate or delaying or reducing items to be spun out to
current Army forces. However, reducing the procurement rate would
increase the FCS unit costs and extend the time needed to deploy FCS-
equipped brigade combat teams.
Conclusions:
The critical role played by U.S. ground combat forces is underscored
today in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the global war of terrorism. That
the Army should ensure its forces are well equipped with the
capabilities they will need in the coming years is unquestioned.
Moreover, the top-level goals the Army has set for its future force
seem inarguable: to be as lethal and survivable as the current force,
but significantly more sustainable and mobile. However, the Army's
approach to meeting these needs--embodied in the FCS and complementary
systems--does raise questions.
On the one hand, the FCS is the result of the Army leadership's taking
a hard look at how it wants its forces to fight in the future. Army
leadership has had the courage to break with tradition on FCS; it would
have likely been much easier to win support for successor vehicles to
the Abrams and Bradley. Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the FCS
solution is the fact that the Army defined the larger context within
which it wants its new assets and capabilities to work, including
command and organizational changes. This holistic approach will
facilitate designing individual systems to operate together in a way
that has not been done in the past. In this sense, FCS is being
designed to be much more than the sum of its individual parts.
On the other hand, FCS does not present a good business case for an
acquisition program. It is necessary that a major new investment like
FCS have a compelling, well-thought out concept, but this alone is not
sufficient. FCS began product development prematurely in 2003, and
today is a long way from having the level of knowledge it should have
had before committing resources to a new product development effort.
The elements of a sound business case--firm requirements, mature
technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost
estimate, and sufficient funding--are not present. FCS has all the
indicators for risks that would be difficult to accept for any single
system. They are even more daunting in the case of FCS not only because
of their multiplicity, but because FCS represents a new concept of
operations that is predicated on technological breakthroughs. Thus,
technical problems, which accompany immaturity, not only pose
traditional risks to cost, schedule, and performance; they pose risks
to the new fighting concepts envisioned by the Army.
The Army sees the foregoing as risk-averse thinking. The Army does not
see immature technologies as an unacceptable risk, but as a "just in
time" approach that is necessary to guard against technological
obsolescence. The Army believes FCS technologies will mature
predictably when needed and that they must have much latitude to make
trade-offs across systems in case they do not mature. Similarly, the
Army has set cost limitations for FCS and is prepared to make trade-
offs in capability to offset future cost growth. Also, the Army is
confident that advances in modeling and simulation reduce the reliance
on physical testing to demonstrate performance.
It is possible that the Army's strategy for acquiring FCS could succeed
as planned. But counting on it would require suspending credence in the
lessons learned on other programs as well as the best practices of
successful programs. Committing to the strategy also means setting
aside DOD's acquisition policies--which espouse an evolutionary,
knowledge-based approach--for an entire generation of Army
acquisitions. The Army has made important progress on setting FCS
system of systems requirements and making key decisions, such as
vehicle weights. But its progress thus far seems to have done more to
confirm risk than to have refuted it; setting system-level requirements
and maturing technologies have proven difficult and are taking longer
than planned.
In making decisions to commit additional resources to acquiring the
capabilities represented by FCS, DOD must recognize the immaturity of
the program and the amount of discovery that lies ahead. It is not a
certainty that FCS will work and enable the concept of operations the
Army envisions. A full commitment to the Army's strategy for acquiring
FCS is not yet warranted because the Army has not demonstrated
sufficient knowledge to provide confidence that it can deliver a fully
capable FCS within projected costs and time frames. Based on the Army's
plans, there should be sufficient progress on system-level requirements
definition and technology development by the time of its preliminary
design review in 2008 to realistically assess whether the program's
goals are achievable and at what cost. As DOD proceeds with its
decisions, it must preserve its ability to change course on acquiring
FCS capabilities to guard against a situation in which FCS will have to
be acquired at any cost. It must also be able to hold the Army
accountable for delivering FCS within budgeted resources. In this vein,
options are available to frame FCS capabilities around a business case
that comports with acquisition policies and best practices and to
minimize risk within the current acquisition strategy. Alternatives to
the current FCS acquisition strategy must also be kept viable in the
event that desired capabilities prove unattainable.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense limit DOD's commitment to
the FCS product development phase and eventual production until a sound
business case that is consistent with DOD acquisition policy and best
practices can be clearly demonstrated.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense lay the groundwork for
the Army's development of a sound FCS business case by tasking the
spring 2006 Defense Acquisition Board to do the following:
* Revaluate the FCS business case--including requirements,
technologies, complementary programs, acquisition strategy, cost, and
funding availability--in light of its own acquisition policies. In its
reevaluation, the board should (1) assess both the program's prospects
for success and the consequences of not delivering desired capability
within budgeted resources and (2) ensure that the Army has a
disciplined way to measure and assess the cumulative effects of
individual requirements, technology, design, and cost changes on the
primary FCS characteristics of lethality, survivability,
responsiveness, and sustainability.
* If the business case for FCS is found not to be executable, determine
whether investments in FCS design-and production-related activities
should be curbed until system-level requirements are firm and
technologies are mature.
* If the deficiencies in the FCS business case are judged to be
recoverable, establish the incremental markers that are needed to
demonstrate that FCS is proceeding on a knowledge-based approach and to
hold the Army accountable, through periodic reporting or other means,
for achieving those markers. The markers should include, but not be
limited to:
* the schedules for all critical technologies to realistically progress
through TRL 7;
* waypoints and criteria for reaching a set of system-level
requirements that are both technically feasible and affordable;
* the schedule and funding availability for developing essential
complementary programs;
* waypoints and criteria to be used to lead up to and complete the
preliminary and critical design reviews;
* waypoints and criteria to be used to lead up to and complete testing
of fully integrated prototypes of all FCS systems, including the
network; and:
* waypoints and criteria to be used to demonstrate that key production
processes are in statistical control.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense reassess the FCS cost
estimate and funding availability based on the independent cost
estimate and any program changes to improve its business case.
Finally, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish a
milestone review by the Defense Acquisition Board following the Army's
preliminary design review scheduled for 2008. This should be a go/no-go
review of the FCS program that is based on (1) the program's ability to
demonstrate whether it is meeting the knowledge markers outlined above
at times consistent with DOD policy and best practices and (2) whether
the funds can still be made available to afford its costs.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Based on its response to our report, it does not appear that DOD plans
to assess the FCS business case against best practices or its own
policies. Nor has DOD agreed to hold a go/no-go milestone review in
2008 based on the preliminary design review. Congress will likely be
asked to approve fiscal years 2008 and 2009 funding requests before the
FCS business case is adequately demonstrated. In light of DOD's
response, the Congress should consider directing the Secretary of
Defense to:
* Report on the results of the May 2006 Defense Acquisition Board's
review of the FCS program business case in the areas of requirements,
technologies, acquisition strategy, cost, and funding.
* Direct DOD to conduct and report the results of a milestone review in
2008, following the preliminary design review, that will be a go/no-go
review of the FCS program that is based on its demonstration of a sound
business case.
The Congress should also consider restricting annual appropriations for
fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for the FCS program until definitive
progress in establishing a sound business case is demonstrated in terms
of firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based
acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient
funding. Importantly, the Army must provide sufficient evidence that
FCS will work.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD concurred with the intent of our recommendations but did not agree
to limit its commitment to the FCS program or to take any action beyond
what it had already planned to do. DOD stated it is committed to the
Army's transformation and that effort, and in particular the FCS
program, requires a disciplined, yet agile, acquisition construct. DOD
added that the Defense Acquisition Executive has determined that the
FCS program is based on a viable acquisition strategy. DOD stated that
it would reevaluate the FCS acquisition strategy and reassess FCS cost
estimates and funding in the spring 2006 Defense Acquisition Board
review. DOD also noted that a Defense Acquisition Board review would be
held for the timeframe (2008) of the FCS preliminary design review, but
refrained from committing to making it a milestone decision review.
DOD's response to our draft report did not specifically address our
findings on the FCS program's lack of a sound business case. DOD was
also not specific about what criteria or standards for knowledge it
would use in making its assessments, but referred to the incremental
markers contained in the FCS acquisition strategy and system
engineering plan. It is important that these markers reflect standards
for knowledge that are consistent with best practices and DOD policy.
Thus far, the FCS program has been judged by its own markers. As we
have pointed out in this report, these markers have allowed FCS to be
judged as acceptable despite its falling far short of the markers that
represent best practices and DOD acquisition policy. For example, the
low state of technology maturity has not prevented DOD from concluding
that the FCS strategy is viable. Using the program's markers as a basis
for future reviews raises the question of whether FCS will continue to
be held to a lower standard than DOD policy. Over time, as the
program's markers are adjusted in light of actual performance and more
money is invested, it will become increasingly difficult for the Army
and DOD to conclude that program progress is anything other than
acceptable.
Regarding a commitment to a milestone review in 2008, we note that, in
recognition of the fact that the FCS was allowed to proceed into
Systems Development and Demonstration prematurely, DOD had directed a
full milestone review update be held in November 2004. However, that
review has not yet occurred and it now appears that it will not occur.
Thus, there is no commitment by DOD to review the FCS business case
(including all elements in addition to the acquisition strategy),
culminating in a go/no-go decision in 2008 based on the preliminary
design review. The increased responsibility of making a declarative
decision adds a higher level of discipline and accountability than a
review implies. We maintain our position that such a decision is
warranted.
It is important to note that Congress will continue to be asked to make
funding commitments in advance of program events. Specifically, the
budget request for fiscal year 2008, which will support the preliminary
design review, will be presented to Congress for approval in January
2007. Conceivably, the request for the fiscal year 2009 budget, which
will be presented in January 2008, will also precede the preliminary
design review. Congress should safeguard itself against a situation in
which budget decisions could preclude its ability to make adjustments
to FCS as warranted by actual demonstrated performance against the
business case. For example, the status of the FCS business case based
on the knowledge demonstrated in the 2008 preliminary design review
should be used to guide ensuing program activities and funding
commitments. Accordingly, we have raised these issues as matters for
congressional consideration.
We also received technical comments from DOD which have been addressed
in the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Army; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request. Please
contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff has any questions
concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Other contributors to this report were Assistant Director
William R. Graveline, Robert L. Ackley, Lily J. Chin, Noah B. Bleicher,
Marcus C. Ferguson, Michael J. Hesse, Guisseli Reyes, Lisa R. Simon,
John P. Swain, and Carrie R. Wilson.
Signed by:
Paul L. Francis:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To develop the information on the Future Combat System program's
progress toward meeting established goals, the contribution of critical
technologies and complementary systems, and the estimates of cost and
affordability, we interviewed officials of the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Army
G-8; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the
Secretary of Defense's Cost Analysis Improvement Group; the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation; the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology); the Army's Training and
Doctrine Command; Surface Deployment and Distribution Command; the
Program Manager for the Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team); the
Future Combat System Lead Systems Integrator; and LSI One Team
contractors. We reviewed, among other documents, the Future Combat
System's Operational Requirements Document, the Acquisition Strategy
Report, the Baseline Cost Report, the Critical Technology Assessment
and Technology Risk Mitigation Plans, and the Integrated Master
Schedule. We attended the FCS System of Systems Functional Review, In-
Process Reviews, Board of Directors Reviews, and multiple system
demonstrations. In our assessment of the FCS, we used the knowledge-
based acquisition practices drawn from our large body of past work as
well as DOD's acquisition policy and the experiences of other programs.
We discussed the issues presented in this report with officials from
the Army and the Secretary of Defense, and made several changes as a
result. We performed our review from June 2005 to March 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON. DC 20301-3000:
MAR 03 2006:
Mr. Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Francis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-06-367, "Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case is
Needed for Future Combat Systems' Successful Outcome," dated February
6, 2006 (GAO Code 120456).
The report recommends that the Secretary of Defense withhold full
commitment to Future Combat Systems (FCS) until a sound business case
is demonstrated. It further recommends the Defense Acquisition Board
reevaluate the FCS business case and establish incremental knowledge
markers for assessing FCS progress.
The Department concurs with the intent of all GAO recommendations. The
Army's transformation effort, and in particular the FCS program,
requires a disciplined, yet agile, acquisition construct. The strategy
to develop and acquire FCS represents the Department's business case
and includes periodic acquisition reviews by the Department, in
addition to the milestone reviews called for by DoD acquisition policy.
The acquisition has been restructured to spin-out mature FCS
capabilities to the current force, with each spin-out having decision
points consistent with DoD acquisition policy. Detailed comments on the
report are enclosed.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Mark D. Schaeffer:
Acting Director:
Defense Systems:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 6, 2006 GAO-06-367 (GAO CODE 120456):
"DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: IMPROVED BUSINESS CASE IS NEEDED for FUTURE
COMBAT SYSTEMS' SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
withhold full commitment to the Future Combat System (FCS) product
development phase and eventual production until a sound business case
that is consistent with DOD acquisition policy and best practices can
be clearly demonstrated. (p. 40/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. The Department is committed to the
Army's transformation efforts for expeditious and effective integration
of emerging capabilities into the current force, while continuing to
move toward the future land combat vision. This requires a disciplined,
yet agile, acquisition construct. The FCS acquisition is the Army's
principal modernization effort. The FCS acquisition strategy, or
business case in the GAO vernacular, includes regular acquisition
reviews, in addition to the milestone reviews called for by DoD
acquisition policy. The acquisition has been restructured to spin-out
mature FCS capabilities to the current force, with each spin-out having
decision points consistent with DoD acquisition policy. The periodic
reviews of the FCS acquisition, by the Defense Acquisition Board and
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council offers opportunities to inform
and alter Department acquisition and budget decisions and prioritize
program efforts.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense lay
the groundwork for a sound FCS business case by tasking the spring 2006
Defense Acquisition Board to revaluate the FCS business case-including
requirements, technologies, complementary programs, acquisition
strategy, cost, and funding availability-in light of its own
acquisition policies. In its reevaluation, the board should (1) assess
both the program's prospects for success and the consequences of not
delivering desired capability within budgeted resources and (2) ensure
that the Army has a disciplined way to measure and assess the
cumulative effects of individual requirements, technology, design, and
cost changes on the primary FCS characteristics of lethality,
survivability, responsiveness, and sustainability. (p. 40/GAO Draft
Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The FCS acquisition review in spring 2006 will
reevaluate the FCS acquisition strategy.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that if the business case is
found not to be executable, that the Secretary of Defense lay the
groundwork for a sound FCS business case by tasking the spring 2006
Defense Acquisition Board to determine whether investments in FCS
design-and production-related activities should be curbed until system
level requirements are firm and technologies are mature. (p. 40/GAO
Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The spring 2006 FCS review will inform
acquisition decisions and Department budget planning.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that if the deficiencies in the
FCS business case are judged to be recoverable, that the Secretary of
Defense lay the groundwork for a sound FCS business case by tasking the
spring 2006 Defense Acquisition Board to establish the incremental
markers that are needed to demonstrate that FCS is proceeding on a
knowledge-based approach and to hold the Army accountable, through
periodic reporting or other means, for achieving those markers. (p.
40/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Defense Acquisition Executive has determined
that the FCS program is based on a viable acquisition strategy. The
program will be periodically reviewed to assess the program's progress.
Expectations for incremental markers to demonstrate FCS progress will
continue to be established and defined in the FCS acquisition strategy
and the FCS System Engineering Plan and progress towards those markers
regularly reviewed.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
reassess the FCS cost estimate and funding availability based on the
independent cost estimate and any program changes to improve its
business case. (p. 41/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The FCS acquisition, to include program cost
estimates and funding, will be reviewed in the spring of 2006 to
support budget planning and programming.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
establish a milestone review by the Defense Acquisition Board following
the Army's preliminary design review scheduled for 2008. This should be
a go/no-go review of the FCS program that is based on (1) the program's
ability to demonstrate whether it is meeting the knowledge markers
outlined above at times consistent with DOD policy and best practices;
and (2) whether the funds can still be made available to afford its
costs. (p. 41/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. An FCS acquisition review, while not a
milestone review, is planned for the timeframe of the FCS preliminary
design review.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Critical Technologies' Current Status and Projections for
Reaching Technology Readiness Level 6 (TRL 6):
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
Network ready:
Software programmable radio:
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
1. JTRS Cluster 1;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2007.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
2. JTRS Cluster 5;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2007.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
3. WIN-T;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2007.
Interface and information exchange:
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
4. Army, joint, multinational Interface;
TRL Ratings: 4;
TRL 6 Projections: 2008.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
5. WIN-T strategic communication;
TRL Ratings: 4;
TRL 6 Projections: 2008.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
Networked battle command:
Security systems and algorithms:
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
6. Cross domain guarding solution;
TRL Ratings: 4;
TRL 6 Projections: 2008.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
7. Intrusion detection--Internet Protocol Network;
TRL Ratings: 4;
TRL 6 Projections: 2008.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
8. Intrusion detection--Waveform;
TRL Ratings: 4;
TRL 6 Projections: 2008.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
9. Mobile ad hoc networking protocols;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2007.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
10. Quality of service algorithms;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2007.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
11. Unmanned systems relay;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2006.
Wideband Waveforms:
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
12. Wideband waveform--JTRS;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2007.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
13. Wideband waveform--Soldier Radio Waveform;
TRL Ratings: 4;
TRL 6 Projections: 2007.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
14. Advanced man-machine interfaces;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
15. Multi-spectral sensors and seekers;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
16. Decision aids/intelligent agents;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
Combat identification:
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
17. Air (rotary wing/Unmanned Aerial Vehicle)--to--ground;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
18. Air (fixed wing)--to--ground (interim/robust solutions);
TRL Ratings: Not rated;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
19. Ground--to--air;
TRL Ratings: Not rated;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
20. Ground--to--ground (mounted);
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
21. Ground--to--soldier;
TRL Ratings: Not rated;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
22. Rapid battlespace deconfliction;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2008.
Sensor/data fusion and data compression algorithms:
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
23. Distributed fusion management;
TRL Ratings: 4;
TRL 6 Projections: 2007.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
24. Level 1 fusion engine;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
25. Data compression algorithms;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
Networked lethality. 26. Dynamic sensor--shooter pairing algorithms and
fire control;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
Line-of-Sight/Beyond-Line-of-Sight/Non-Line-of-Sight Precision
Munitions Terminal Guidance:
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
27. Precision Guided Mortar Munitions precision munitions, terminal
guidance;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2007.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
28. Mid-Range-Munitions precision munitions, terminal guidance;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2007.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
29. Excalibur precision munitions, terminal guidance;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
30. Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System, terminal guidance;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
Aided/automatic target recognition:
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
31. Aided target recognition for reconnaissance, surveillance, and
target acquisition;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2007.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
32. Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System aided target recognition for
seekers;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
33. Recoil management and lightweight components;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
34. Distributed collaboration of manned/unmanned platforms;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2006.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
35. Rapid battle damage assessment;
TRL Ratings: Not rated;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
Transportability:
High-power density/fuel-efficient propulsion:
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
36. High-power density engine;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2007.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
37. Fuel-efficient hybrid-electric engine;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
Sustainability/reliability. 38. Embedded predictive logistics sensors
and algorithms;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2009.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
39. Water generation and purification;
TRL Ratings: Not rated;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
Training:
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
40. Computer generated forces;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
41. Tactical engagement simulation;
TRL Ratings: 4;
TRL 6 Projections: 2008.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
Survivability:
Active Protection System:
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
42. Active Protection System;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2008.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
43. Threat Warning System;
TRL Ratings: 4-5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2009.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
44. Signature management;
TRL Ratings: 5-6;
TRL 6 Projections: 2006.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
45. Lightweight hull and vehicle armor;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2008.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
46. Health monitoring and casualty care interventions;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
47. Power distribution and control;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2006.
Advanced countermine technology:
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
48. Mine detection;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
49. Mine neutralization;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
50. Efficient resource allocation;
TRL Ratings: 6;
TRL 6 Projections: Not applicable.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
51. Protection;
TRL Ratings: 4;
TRL 6 Projections: 2008.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
52. High-density packaged power;
TRL Ratings: 5;
TRL 6 Projections: 2008.
Class 1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle propulsion technology:
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
53. Ducted fan;
TRL Ratings: 4;
TRL 6 Projections: 2006.
FCS Critical Technologies and Associated Key Performance Parameters:
54. Lightweight heavy fuel engine;
TRL Ratings: 4;
TRL 6 Projections: 2007.
Source: Technology Readiness Assessment Update, Office of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology, April 2005
(data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels:
Technology Readiness Level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported;
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties;
Hardware and Software: None (paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration Environment: None.
Technology Readiness Level: 2. Technology concept and/or application
formulated;
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed,
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption.
Examples are still limited to paper studies;
Hardware and Software: None (paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration Environment: None.
Technology Readiness Level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical
function and/or characteristic proof of concept;
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This
includes analytical studies; and laboratory studies to physically
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology.
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or
representative;
Hardware and Software: Analytical studies and demonstration of non-
scale individual components (pieces of subsystem);
Demonstration Environment: Lab.
Technology Readiness Level: 4. Component and/or breadboard. Validation
in laboratory environment;
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity"
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad
hoc" hardware in a laboratory;
Hardware and Software: Low-fidelity breadboard. Integration of non-
scale components to show pieces will work together. Not fully
functional or form or fit but representative of technically feasible
approach suitable for flight articles;
Demonstration Environment: Lab.
Technology Readiness Level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation
in relevant environment;
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly.
The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory
Integration of components;
Hardware and Software: High-fidelity breadboard. Functionally
equivalent but not necessarily form and/or fit (size, weight,
materials, etc.) Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include
integration of several components with reasonably realistic support
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality;
Demonstration Environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies.
Technology Readiness Level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype
demonstration in a relevant environment;
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high-fidelity
laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment;
Hardware and Software: Prototype--Should be very close to form, fit,
and function. Probably includes the integration of many new components
and realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate
full functionality of the subsystem;
Demonstration Environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or
limited/restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment.
Integration of technology is well defined.
Technology Readiness Level: 7. System prototype demonstration in an
operational environment;
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system.
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of
an actual system prototype in an operational environment, such as in an
aircraft, vehicle, or space. Examples include testing the prototype in
a test bed aircraft;
Hardware and Software: Prototype. Should be form, fit, and function
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate
full functionality of subsystem;
Demonstration Environment: Flight demonstration in representative
operational environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator
aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data.
Technology Readiness Level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight
qualified" through test and demonstration;
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if
it meets design specifications;
Hardware and Software: Flight-qualified hardware;
Demonstration Environment: Developmental test and evaluation in the
actual system application.
Technology Readiness Level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through
successful mission operations;
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the
system under operational mission conditions;
Hardware and Software: Actual system in final form;
Demonstration Environment: Operational test and evaluation in
operational mission conditions.
Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space
Administration data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Acquisitions: Business Case and Business Arrangements Key for
Future Combat System's Success, GAO-06-478T. Washington, D.C.: March 1,
2006.
DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change, GAO-06-257T. Washington,
D.C.: November 15, 2005.
Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of
Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force, GAO-05-926. Washington,
D.C.: September 29, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Development Risks in the Army's
Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future Force,
GAO-05-669. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects
for Success, GAO-05-428T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects
for Success, GAO-05-442T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.
NASA's Space Vision: Business Case for Prometheus 1 Needed to Ensure
Requirements Match Available Resources, GAO-05-242. Washington, D.C.:
February 28, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: The Army's Future Combat Systems' Features,
Risks, and Alternatives, GAO-04-635T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, GAO-04-248.
Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Issues Facing the Army's Future Combat Systems Program, GAO-03-1010R.
Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems
Challenges, GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 2001.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to
Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8,
2001.
[End of section]
(120456):
FOOTNOTES
[1] According to DOD policy, technology maturity means a technology
must have been demonstrated in a relevant environment (or, preferably,
in an operational environment) and considered mature enough to use for
product development in systems integration.
[2] In Section 212 of the Fiscal Year 2006 Defense Authorization Act,
the Congress also stipulated that the Secretary of the Army procure the
FCS through a Federal Acquisition Regulation contract.
[3] The Army's concept for future warfighting is documented in The
United States Army Future Combat Force Operational and Organizational
Plan for the Future Combat System Brigade Combat Team. The FCS
operational requirements document was derived from the operational and
organizational plan.
[4] Technology Readiness Assessment Update, Office of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology, April 2005
[5] Defeating kinetic energy threats is an objective, not a threshold,
FCS requirement.
[6] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Development Risks in the
Army's Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future
Force. GAO-05-669. (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005).
[7] Joint Program Executive Office was established in February 2005 in
response to the fiscal year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act
which directed DOD to strengthen the joint management of all the JTRS
program components.
[8] In the fiscal year 2006 defense appropriation act, H.Report 109-
359, page 372, Congress provided some funding to continue development
of the Joint Common Missile.
[9] The 2008 preliminary design review and the 2010 critical design
review are culminating events; system-level preliminary design reviews
and critical design reviews will be conducted prior to those dates.
[10] GAO, Best Practices: A More Constructive Approach is Key to Better
Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-00-199 (Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2000).
[11] The operational assessment of the Joint Tactical Radio System
functionality has resulted in an ongoing program restructure, which
could have an impact on the program's costs.
[12] GAO, Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and
Oversight of Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force. GAO-05-
926. (Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2005).
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